Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul

Polemon's *Physignomy* from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam

Edited By

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Introduction

Simon Swain

This volume studies the *Physiognomy* of the second-century politician, aristocrat, and intellectual Polemon of Laodicea (*c.*AD 88–144). The work is a manual of instruction for reading character from people's physical appearance. The original is lost, but it survives as an independent work in complementary Greek and Arabic versions.[1] The *Physiognomy*'s double existence in two cultures led to this project, which has the aim of considering both the Graeco-Roman origins of Polemon's book and its reception in one of the most exciting of all cultural adaptations, the translation of Greek thought into Arabic for an Islamic readership. In this volume we present texts and translations of all the main versions of the *Physiognomy* together with a series of studies of its background and appeal. For the most part work on 'Graeco-Arabic' (the study of Arabic texts translating, dependent on, or developing Greek thought) is done by Arabists. The team responsible for *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul* consists of Classicists and Arabists. It is led by a Classicist with a knowledge of Arabic, and both our Arabists are familiar with Classical material. We hope that we have thereby ensured unity and understanding between both parts of the work.

Our objective is threefold: to study Polemon's work against its own intellectual heritage and in its own historical context (Chs. 2–4); to study its development in Arabic literature, society, and science (Chs. 5–7), and to provide translations and texts of the major surviving versions in Greek, Latin, and Arabic (Chs. 8–11). We hope that Classicists and Arabists will read all parts of the book and that this project will lead to further productive collaborations.

The following remarks introduce the material studied in the chapters below and provide a context for their concerns and arguments.

[1] Greek names will normally be transliterated as they would appear in Latin, since this is customary English usage, except where common English versions exist. But 'Polemon' has been left as a Greek form (Latin—and English—may also use the form 'Polemo'), partly to distinguish him as a figure belonging to the culture of the Greek-speaking part of the Roman Empire, and partly because it is the Greek form that is used both in the Anonymus Latinus (where it marks the Greekness of the author and his art; for the spelling *Palemon* see Ch. 11, p. 550) and in the Arabic versions of the *Physiognomy* (*Aflīmūn* in the Leiden Arabic and the biographer Ibn al-Qifṭī; for variants see Ch. 7). On the transliteration of Arabic see n. 21. References to the text of the *Physiognomy* are as follows. A1, B1, etc. refer to the two books of the Greek version of Adamantius. The main Arabic version (that in Leiden) is referred to by its chapter numbers (with a reference to Adamantius if needed, esp. in the very long first chapter on the eye). Anonymus Latinus is referred to by chapter number.

Polemon—or Marcus Antonius Polemo (Μᾶρκος Ἀντώνιος Πολέμων) to give him his official Roman name—was a member of an illustrious family based in the city of Laodicea on the Lycus. This city was part of the Roman province called 'Asia', which in the High Roman Empire (first to third centuries AD) comprised (very approximately) the western third of Anatolia. The great cities of its coastal region—Pergamum, Ephesus, Smyrna—and others like Laodicea which were on important inland routes made Asia in this period the most successful and renowned part of the Empire. Polemon's family were evidently tremendously wealthy. They had been sensible enough to ally themselves with Roman interests for well over a century and a half before Polemon's birth, and Rome had allowed several of them to hold princedoms in Pontus and Thrace. It is important to see Polemon both as a man who was a political leader in the city where he chose to live, Smyrna, and as an intellectual—his most visible legacy to us—who exercised his talents writing a history (a lost work), giving display speeches (of which one pair survives), and teaching pupils. It is in this latter capacity that he appears in the *Lives of the Sophists* by Flavius Philostratus (d. *c.*246), since the term 'sophist' means *stricto sensu* a teacher of rhetorical skills who was at the top of the social scale (with all that this implies). As we shall see in Ch. 3, the *Lives* are a brilliant source for the intellectual and political culture of the time and they capture much of importance in the careers of those who were famous performers of the display oratory which was so popular among the elite of this time and who attracted Greek-speaking pupils from far and wide to study the art with them. The term 'sophist' was not always used by those who qualified for it because not all its connotations were positive. In the *Physiognomy* Polemon uses it, surely with contempt, of his bitter enemy Favorinus (indicating he was no more than an intellectual).[2] But in an inscription celebrating a diplomatic rapprochement with a neighbouring city the proposer is named as 'Marcus Antonius Polemon the Sophist'.[3] This shows nicely how Polemon fits into the culture of his day which we, borrowing from Philostratus, call the 'second sophistic', for it is illegitimate to separate the intellectual, virtuoso activity of men of Polemon's class from their activities as financial and political benefactors of the communities where they held property and citizenship.[4]

Polemon was not the first to write on physiognomy. But of the surviving texts, only the double treatise known as the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy* is older. By reason of its length, its detail, and the fame of its author, Polemon's *Physiognomy* displaced all rivals bar those bearing the name of Aristotle. It was plainly considered useful since it had a long history. The original survived at least till the end of Antiquity. A Greek author of the fourth century, Adamantius, considered it important enough to re-edit.[5] His version, which he calls a *paraphrasis* (a 'rewriting'), is shorter than the original. If we go by the main Arabic version

[2] Leiden ch. 1, A20. Cf. Ch. 3, pp. 128, 156. [3] *IK* 24. 1, no. 676.

[4] For basic guidance on the second sophistic see Anderson (1993) on literary and literary-cultural aspects, and Puech (2002) for a historical view based on epigraphical sources. Civiletti (2002) offers an up-to-date historical commentary on the *Lives*.

[5] What little is known of Adamantius may be found in Follet (1989). It is highly likely that he also wrote a work on the origin of winds. Cf. Ch. 10, introduction.

(the Leiden), it is only about two-thirds as long.[6] The Arabic, however, is undoubtedly longer than its source, since Arabic translations of Greek often amplify the original in an effort to bring out the sense of the text. On the other hand, about 20 per cent of the Leiden text consists of Polemon's personal observations, and it is difficult to see in these passages much sign of enlargement. All these personal observations have been excised by Adamantius.[7] Despite the abridgement Adamantius is clearly faithful to much of what Polemon actually wrote both in contents and in order of treatment. We translate him in this volume for the first time (Ch. 10, by Ian Repath).[8] Another classical author, probably also of the fourth century but whose name is unknown and who is called Anonymus Latinus, based a sizeable portion of his own Latin *Physiognomy* on Polemon's original, to which he added much from Ps.-Aristotle and an otherwise lost Hellenistic physiognomer called Loxus. This long text is translated for the first time into English in Ch. 11 of this volume (also by Ian Repath).[9]

At some point a translation of the Greek was made into Syriac. Syriac is the Aramaic literary language, based on the dialect of Orhai (Greek and Roman Edessa, modern Urfa/Şanlıurfa), which is the most important cultural symbol of late antique Christian Syria and Mesopotamia. A large quantity of Greek theological and scientific writing was translated into it. The Syriac translation of Polemon is lost but is known from its use in the great encyclopedia called *The Cream of Wisdom* written by the polymath bishop Bar Hebraeus (Ibn al-ʻIbri;[10] d. 1286). It was presumably made in the fifth- or sixth-century heyday of translation from Greek (though maybe later; see below). It is believed that it was fairly close to Polemon's original. Syriac translations in this late period tend towards literalness, which was important for preserving the thought of both theological and technical material.[11] Thus when Bar Hebraeus' quotations (or rather, for the most part, citations) of Polemon are compared with Adamantius, they accord with him relatively well.

It has been suggested on the basis of common deviations from Adamantius and mistakes of translation which seem to depend on translation from Syriac that the Arabic Polemon was rendered from this lost Syriac version.[12] We are not

[6] The Leiden Arabic is approximately 13,250 words (21,000 in our English). Adamantius is approximately 8,000 words (11,000 in English).

[7] On this matter at least Adamantius was more skilful than was believed by Richard Foerster, who edited the Greek, Latin, and (with the help of Georg Hoffmann) Arabic versions at the end of the 19th c. (Foerster 1893 [henceforth Foerster] i, pp. civ–v), for there is no sign of the excisions. The Anonymus Latinus retains references to some of these personal observations. On Foerster see below.

[8] We reprint Foerster's text with changes as signalled in the notes to the translation.

[9] Again, we reprint Foerster's text with changes. André's Budé text (André 1981) has been consulted. His divergences from Foerster are not numerous nor especially significant, but his readings have been preferred in several cases noted in the notes to the translation.

[10] Bar Hebraeus' Arabic name. For our practice regarding the transliteration of Arabic, see n. 21.

[11] See studies by S. Brock and D. Taylor listed in the bibliography.

[12] Zonta (1992), focusing on the relevant section—the *Economy*—of the largely unpublished *Cream of Wisdom* (cf. Foerster i, p. lxxxii n. 1). For the phenomenon of Arabic through Syriac, cf. e.g. P. Kraus and Walzer (1951) 18–24 on the Arabic of Galen's summary of the *Timaeus* (lost in Greek).

so sure and do not regard the matter as proven either way.[13] In Arabic literature we have explicit references to Polemon's *Physiognomy* in the years after the middle of the ninth century AD. This would place the translation into Arabic in the main period of the Arabic translation movement of the late eighth to early tenth centuries. In the history of the transmission of Greek science, technology, and philosophy this movement is of the greatest importance.[14] As far as Western Europe is concerned, the (re)translation of these texts and of the original works in Arabic which flowed from them into Latin played a major part in the birth of the Renaissance. In Islamic culture the translations were always made for practical purposes which were consistent with Islamic society: virtually no attempt was made to translate Greek literature.[15] And while admiration for the achievements of the classical and post-classical Greeks was very great, so was a confidence in the ability of Arabic-speaking intellectuals to build on the ancient texts, to improve them, and to harmonize them with the cultural encyclopedia of Islam. It may well be that the translation of Polemon was inspired by the translation into Arabic of the physiognomical treatises attributed to Aristotle. This was done (directly from the original) in the mid-ninth century by the celebrated Christian physician and translator, Hunayn b. Ishaq (Johannitius; d. 260/873), who came close to voicing doubts about Aristotle's authorship by pointing out flaws in the Greek.[16] But there is nothing to suggest that he or his helpers were involved in the translation of Polemon.

The original Arabic of Polemon is lost. But two surviving recensions were made from it at uncertain dates.[17] The first is the version of Polemon's *Physiognomy* which is the best known to Classical scholars. It survives in a single, generally well-written manuscript now in Leiden which was copied in the fourteenth century AD. Even a superficial comparison with Adamantius makes it clear that the text is a recognizable and often very close version of Polemon's Greek both in the contents of individual sections and in the ordering of the whole. More to the point, it is only the Leiden text, as I have noted, that preserves the fascinating series of observations Polemon made of his contemporaries, including the emperor Hadrian and his courtiers and the notorious cryptorchid Favorinus, and which Adamantius clearly thought of no value for his own readers. The Leiden manuscript was first published over a century ago in the excellent collection of physiognomical texts assembled and for the most part edited by the great German Classicist Richard Foerster (1843–1922).[18] Anyone who has used this or Foerster's other

[13] See the introduction to Ch. 8 and nn. 1, 29, 45, 52, 53, 115, 145, 204, 210, 240, 246, 265, 268 to the translation.

[14] See e.g. Goodman (1990), Gutas (1998); and below in this volume, Ch. 5, pp. 227–35.

[15] But see 'Abbas (1993) on resonances of Greek poetry (epic, tragedy, lyric) in Arabic literature.

[16] Ghersetti (1999a), pp. xx–xxiii. This translation was commissioned, like most of Hunayn's work, and the fact it was done straight into Arabic makes it plausible to hold it was requested by a Muslim. On Hunayn's school and their translations see below, Ch. 5, pp. 231–2, Gutas (1998), esp. 133–45, Bergsträsser (1913).

[17] See below at n. 28 for evidence that the Istanbul recension was in existence before the mid-10th c.

[18] See the biography by Richtsteig (1923).

editions (of Libanius and Choricius) will know that he was an active editor who was not afraid to correct his manuscripts. This was often necessary, but we see a less commendable side of it in the edition of the Leiden Arabic that was made for Foerster by his friend Georg Hoffmann. Hoffmann's stated policy was to adapt the Leiden text to the sense of Adamantius' Greek or the Anonymus' Latin.[19] This was actually a two-stage process. First, from his deep knowledge of classical Arabic Hoffmann suggested new readings for words which (for the most part) were clear and made sense in the manuscript and did not require emendation. Then in translating his suggestions into Latin for the benefit of Classical scholars he often extended the meaning of his Arabic beyond what was legitimate. Hoffmann believed that the Leiden version had been made directly from the Greek,[20] and this belief helped justify his intention of making the Arabic closer to the original. Today we look at things differently. As soon as one realizes that Arabic translation literature was far from slavish and that the literature of physiognomy (*firāsa*[21]) in particular had a tradition within Islam *predating* translations from Greek, it becomes dangerous to say that deviations from Adamantius (who was himself ready to rewrite or abbreviate Polemon) represent an 'incorrect' translation requiring correction. If an Arabic editor wanted to make a certain body part correspond to a certain physical trait which it did not do in the original, it is not our business to change the text. There are certainly mistakes in the Arabic Polemon, but there is also alteration for its own sake. For all these reasons we decided to make a new and accurate edition of the Leiden manuscript with its first translation into a modern language. This is Ch. 8 below (by Robert Hoyland).

It is almost certainly the case that the lost original Arabic was also the basis of an extensively rewritten *Physiognomy* which appears to have enjoyed a wider currency than the Leiden version. The principal witnesses to this recension are two manuscripts kept in the library of the Topkapı Sarayı museum at Istanbul, which contain essentially the same text. In Ch. 7 of this volume Antonella Ghersetti studies the differences between them and their relationship to the Leiden recension. We did not think it worth while to edit either of the Istanbul texts (henceforth TK) in full because the extent of the rewriting (including omission of the personal vignettes[22]) takes us away from Polemon; but we do give references to these versions in our translation of the Leiden. The TK version is, however, *prima facie* evidence of the importance of Polemon the 'Master of Physiognomy', as he is called in Arabic sources. For this reason we have chosen to present a text and translation of the introduction of one of these manuscripts

[19] Foerster i. 95–6.

[20] Cf. the list of 'mistranslations', ibid., pp. lxxxi f.

[21] Transliteration of Arabic: our policy is for the most part to transliterate Arabic words using dotted letters and macrons and we use (') for the guttural *'ayn*. Names, on the other hand, have usually been written in the text and notes without special signs. Arabists may be offended by this but will know the proper forms, while Classicists and other readers will not be disturbed by doubts about pronunciation. There will inevitably be inconsistencies in our practice. The bibliography uses the 'correct' form for primary sources.

[22] Hadrian alone is mentioned: TK 3207, fo. 52a ('and they told that his eyes were such'), 3245, fo. 35b.

(Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III, 3207) in Ch. 9, by Antonella Ghersetti. This introduction consists of a long theoretical section on the importance of using *qiyās* ('analogical deduction', 'logical reasoning') in the practice of physiognomy. Analogy is a major principle of Islamic intellectual life, taking its authority from theology and philosophy.[23] This and other aspects of the language of the introduction, especially a medical focus on the three 'faculties' of desire, anger, and intellect, and the several invocations of Allah, reveal a physiognomy reworked to appeal to Muslims' expectations of what a scientifically valid discourse should look like.[24]

The Muslim readership of Polemon was, of course, an educated one. In the educated circles which such texts were aimed at knowledge of the 'ancients'—for the most part, the Greeks—was often an important sign of a man's culture. Anecdotes and sayings—the practice and the theory of a sage's wisdom—were what people wanted to hear. It is not surprising that Hunayn was the first to write down a collection of the *Anecdotes of the Philosophers and Sages and of the Culture of the Teachers of Old.*[25] Much of this information goes back to Late Antiquity (in gnomologies and popular collections), but much represents oral tradition invented to suit the demands of Syriac and Arabic students and scholars. The figure of Polemon certainly attracted such stories, as the great littérateur al-Jahiz (d. 255/868) attests.[26] So it is that the TK version of Polemon's physiognomy, which discards much of what is Greek about the original, can begin with a tale about Polemon and Hippocrates that rests on a well-known Greek and Roman anecdote about the first Greek physiognomist, Zopyrus, and the philosopher Socrates.[27] The fullest version of the story of Polemon and Hippocrates is found in the TK texts, which leads to the supposition that it was invented for them.[28] The reshaping of the story is significant in two ways. First, Polemon, not Zopyrus, is the physiognomist *par excellence* and this demonstration of his practice stands in for the omitted series of personal observations. Second, while it may have been considered too great a fiction to match Polemon with the well-known figure of Socrates,[29] the confrontation between the Arabic Polemon and one of the most famous of

[23] It was first defined in Islamic law by the great legist Shafi'i (d. 204/820), who was heavily interested in physiognomy: Ch. 5, pp. 241–3, Ch. 6, p. 301.

[24] For further details see Ch. 7.

[25] It survives as an epitome: see Badawi (1985) for the Arabic with a useful introduction, Loewenthal (1896) for a German translation of the Hebrew version.

[26] See Ch. 5, pp. 236–8 for this and also on Polemon's appearance in the *Choice Aphorisms and Best Sayings* of Mubashshir b. Fatik (written 440/1048/9), a collection with a long life in western Europe (including the honour of being the first book printed in England in English; Rosenthal 1961: 132–3, 149–58).

[27] See Ch. 2, pp. 23–33, Ch. 6, pp. 282–3, Foerster i, pp. vii–xiii.

[28] See Ch. 6, p. 283. If this is right, the TK recension predates the next mentions of the tale in the first Arabic medical biographer, Ibn Juljul (ed. Sayyid 1955), whose *Generations of the Physicians and the Sages* was finished in 377/987 (Sayyid 1955: 17), and in the final chapter of the famous *Sirr al-asrār* (*Secretum secretorum*), which was assembled from the 9th c. onwards.

[29] Indeed, the most accurate of the Arabic medical biographers, Ibn Abi Usaybi'a (d. 668/1270), notes in his *Sources of Information on the Generations of Physicians* that the story (which he reports from Ibn Juljul) applies to Socrates, p. 48 Rida = 28 Mueller.

the Greek physicians has a distinct advantage. Polemon is introduced as a 'philosopher' (*faylasūf*). In Islam medicine and philosophy were firmly linked, which is a development of the Galenic legacy of philosophized medicine. Thus in the anecdote Hippocrates' students naturally assume that Hippocrates also is a philosopher. The approbation of ancient Greek wisdom could not be clearer, and the link with medicine is clearly designed to be picked up in the theoretical, medical introduction (cf. above) which follows the anecdote.

It has not been our aim in this volume to produce a philological study of translation technique of the kind that has been of great importance in many editions of Graeco-Arabic literature. This is partly because we do not possess Polemon's original; but it is also because our main concern here is to examine the origins, function, and influence of the *Physiognomy* in Greek and Islamic culture. Two chapters of our study look respectively at *firāsa* in Islamic culture in general (Ch. 5) and *firāsa* in Arabic medical texts in particular (Ch. 6). Since I have just commented on the medical aspects of the TK Polemon, it may be appropriate to say something first about Ch. 6 by Antonella Ghersetti. Little by way of a formal relation between medicine and physiognomy was suggested in Classical Antiquity till the later second century when Galen (surely influenced by Polemon's book) advanced grounds for the connection in his work *The Powers of the Soul Depend on the Mixtures of the Body*.[30] Galen was very interested in the relation between mind and body—several important works are on psychological and moral topics[31]—and *Powers of the Soul* tries out ideas (a typical Galenic strategy) about the workings of physiognomy. The relevance of Galen's theories was commented on by Hunayn in several notes he makes to his translation of the Aristotelian *Physiognomy*.[32] There was no apparent medical interest on the part of Polemon himself, who lived half a century before Galen,[33] and hence none in the Leiden recension or Adamantius. Yet most of the major texts of *firāsa* are medical or medicalized. The great physician Rhazes (as he was known to the Latin West), who died 313/925, included a physiognomical section in his famous *Ad Almansorem*, while the analytical philosopher and theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209) wrote a very organized book which bases the science of physiognomy on the theory of the four humours.[34] The comprehensive treatments of (Shams al-Din al-Ansari) al-Dimashqi (d. 727/1327) and Ibn al-Akfani (d. 749/1348) are similar.[35] For the latter *firāsa* simply has 'the same rank as medicine'.[36]

[30] *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur*. Text in *Galenus. Scripta minora*, ed. I. Müller, ii (Leipzig, 1891), 32–79, also in Kühn's edn., iv. 767–821. Translated as *The Soul's Dependence on the Body* in Singer (1997*a*: 150–76). Hunayn's Arabic translation is edited by Biesterfeld (1973), which is itself a good example of philological endeavour. See further Ch. 2, pp. 99–109 and below here.

[31] Manuli and Vegetti (1988) offer studies of the classical and Arabic contexts. There is brief but valuable examination of the influence of Galen's moral-psychological works in Arabic and Hebrew—esp. the most important of them, *De moribus*, which survives principally in an Arabic epitome (English translation in Mattock 1972)—in Zonta (1995).

[32] Ghersetti (1999*a*: p. xxii).

[33] But see below for a suggestion about Rufus of Ephesus and other contemporaries.

[34] Text and translation in Mourad (1939); text also published at Cairo in 1982.

[35] Below Ch. 5, pp. 265–6, esp. Ch. 6, pp. 301, 303–5.

[36] Cf. Ch. 6, p. 303.

Apart from the Galenic legacy there is a practical reason behind the readiness of Muslim doctors to link the physical and the spiritual, which apparently has to do with the rise of the great hospitals in the major cities from the ninth century onwards.[37] The accreditation of doctors depended in part on service in these institutions. In the hospitals there were special wards for the insane; there were also dedicated mental asylums. The medical treatment of these patients helped to collapse doubts about the physical causation of mental dispositions. Ibn Bakhtishu' (d. 450/1058), one of the best-known hospital administrators, wrote a highly interesting pamphlet on medicine's independence from philosophy and its ability to cure mental ills.[38] In ch. 4 of his work Ibn Bakhtishu' builds up his argument about the relation between body and soul/mind by quoting extracts from Galen's observations on the relationship in amongst other works *Powers of the Soul* and from the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy* and Aristotle's *History of Animals*. He is at pains to prove that the medical basis of *firāsa* was developed by Hippocrates (as Galen had stated). He is thinking especially of a famous passage in Hippocrates' *Epidemics* 6 where attention is recommended to the patient's mental condition and environment;[39] but significantly when he quotes Hippocrates he is in fact quoting Galen's *Powers of the Soul* (34 text = 64 trans.). Rhazes is cited as a recent doctor who fully accepts the link (44 text = 76 trans.).

Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's humoral *firāsa* with its careful attention to 'humours' (*akhlāt*) and 'temperaments' (*amzija*) seems to bear out his beliefs, since it starts with an echo of Galen by declaring that 'external aspect and internal character *must* follow the temperament (of the body)'.[40] Fakhr al-Din al-Razi stresses the need to see through false character which those with intelligence can adopt to disguise their innate make-up (a theme which is important in Polemon and is elaborated in the TK recension). After a long discussion of the temperaments of the parts of the head and of the brain (bk. 2), the third and last book of the work focuses on the face as 'more complete than the signs of the rest of the body parts' (58 text = 115 trans.). Tribute is in fact paid to Polemon in a rewriting of the Hippocrates anecdote in which he physiognomizes a king's picture (Hippocrates is not named); but the Islamicization of the TK version is completed by a determination to trace the 'science' back to the Koran (bk. 1, ch. 2) and to other Islamic semiotic practices (bk. 1, ch. 5). The contemporaneity of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's world is shown in the list of peoples showing specific national types: Arabs, *Rūm* (i.e. Byzantines, *Rhōmaioi*), Persians, Indians, and Turks (bk. 1, ch. 6).[41]

The Arabic–Islamic background to *firāsa* and its reception of Greek physiognomy is the concern of Ch. 5 of this volume by Robert Hoyland. Hoyland begins by introducing the Arabic translation movement (including the

[37] Dols (1987), (1988). [38] Ed. and trans. by Klein-Franke (1977).

[39] *Epidemics* 6. 6. 2 (v. 322. 11–324. 1 Littré): 'intelligence, memory . . . exertion, food, drink, sleep, sexual activity' (tr. Smith), with Galen's observations in his *Commentary on Hippocrates Epidemics VI* (CMG V. 10. 2. 2, pp. 328–31, 483–7).

[40] 4–5 text = 77 trans. in Mourad (1939).

[41] Indians and Turks also replace Greek names at Leiden chs. 34 and 41.

translation of non-Greek material), then looks at the range of physiognomical practices in Islamic society beginning with the Koran, and finally seeks to explain the function of these texts against the courtly and literary circles of the classical Islamic world. What emerges is a fascinatingly rich picture of the context into which a Greek text like Polemon's could insert itself, both at the semi-technical level of studying character (for religious, legal, or social reasons) and as part of a wider concern with conduct and appearance in a courtly society. A fundamental concept in the medieval Islamic period is *adab*, which has been well defined as 'the whole complex of manners, moral conduct, deportment, and scripted forms of self-presentation'.[42] In Polemon's own age in the second century AD a similar cluster of social practices was gathered under the word *paideia*, 'education' and/or 'culture'. Several terms are used to signal possession of *paideia*. The function of the word is essentially social and therefore political. It is the elite and their interactions with each other that matter and it is the exposure to peers and rivals that drives the concern with self-presentation and the need to be able to read the faces, bodies, and movements of contemporaries. In Arabic writers *paideia* is regularly translated by *adab*.[43] This correspondence is one of culture, and not simply vocabulary.

In both languages high culture was perceived as hard-won and laborious and therefore—given the restricted access to opportunity—as socially significant. Graeco-Roman and Muslim elites needed the process of acquiring education/culture to distinguish themselves from others and to make distinctions among themselves. But in classical Islamic society the investment in education was, if anything, greater than in the Roman empire. Inheritance laws and landholding entitlements worked against the establishment of the stable landowning patterns and the great local families of notables (such as Polemon's) that were so important in Classical Antiquity. Thus *adab* took on an even greater significance and there were different sorts of *adab* for different sorts of social groups. For these broad groupings of 'those with *adab*' (the *udabā'*) *adab* offered self-control against anger and the passions, it offered sociability by enabling the choice of good friends and the ability to act in a civilized way with them, and in a word it guaranteed acceptance within the elite group. Apart from the expected restrictions on raucous laughter, drooling, sneezing loudly, and other bodily solecisms, there was a concentration on clothing and smartness (*ẓarf*) among the 'smart people' (the *ẓurafā'*), a term which is used with increasing frequency from the third/fifth to the ninth/eleventh centuries; and there was a whole set of rules for the 'boon companion' (*nadīm*) of the prince, a member of a select group of courtiers who drank, ate, hunted, and sang with him. In a tense situation like playing chess with his lord, the *nadīm* was advised to 'pay attention to the exterior and interior states of his body and to indications about it and to the secrets within it', in other words to physiognomize him.[44]

There was, then, a very rich and multilayered moralistic literature in medieval Islam and it is to this culture that we must look to find the readers of our *firāsa* texts. One specific category of this output may be mentioned that takes us back

[42] Chamberlain (1994) 107 in his study of 13th-c. Damascus.
[43] *GALex* fasc. 2 s.v. *adab*.
[44] Kushajim, *Adab al-Nadīm* (Cairo, 1999) 126.

to Polemon's own time; this is 'oeconomic' literature, texts to do with the running of the *oikos*, 'household' (Arabic *manzil*). More will be said about this in Ch. 3 of this volume, where I consider Polemon's work in its own context and culture, for some of this literature was very much concerned with conduct and with observation as a technique for assessing and regulating it. Islamic oeconomic literature developed from classical works, especially the *Oikonomikos* of a Neopythagorean called Bryson.[45] This treatise, which is virtually unknown to Classicists, survives in an abridgement of an Arabic translation, and spawned a home-grown Muslim oeconomic literature including the influential *Nasirean Ethics* written in Persian by (Nasir al-Din) al-Tusi (d. 672/1274).[46] These works describe the household under four heads: money, servants, wife/marriage, and children. Much of this material offers moral and behavioural prescription (including the presentation of the body) which was found as useful in Islam as in Antiquity. In the *Nasirean Ethics* (but not explicitly in Bryson) there is a recommendation to use physiognomy for the buying of slaves, with a section on ethnic stereotyping.[47] Ethnic stereotyping is a noticeable constituent of Graeco-Roman physiognomy. The application to the purchase of slaves has wide resonances in Arabic medico-physiognomical literature and may rest ultimately on a lost work of a contemporary of Polemon, the famous Rufus of Ephesus.[48]

The importance of Bryson is that he offers a unique handbook of the family's role in society. It is known that he was read by the late first-century philosopher Musonius Rufus, and it is unlikely that he should be dated much before him because what appealed to Musonius particularly was Bryson's advocacy of a conjugal and affective relationship between husbands and wives. This is a new and very significant element in the moral thinking of the High Roman Empire. In Bryson we probably see the first written testimony to it. When we place Bryson alongside more sophisticated authors who share and develop his thought world, like Musonius, Plutarch, Dio of Prusa (Polemon's teacher, who also seems to have used Bryson directly), and the writers of the Greek novels with their strong accent on conjugality, we see in the later first and second century AD a 'complex of manners, moral conduct, deportment, and scripted forms of self-presentation' that is strikingly similar to what we find in medieval Islam.[49] This highly regulated culture is the background to Polemon's *Physiognomy*. For his book reflects concerns about the proper use of money, correct sexual relationships, deportment, movement, and other modes of self-presentation. Above all, it is concerned with moral failings like anger, bullying, cowardice, and effeminacy, which Polemon exemplifies in critical situations such as the failure of arranged marriages (Leiden ch. 69), competition for the attention of the emperor (ch. 1, A12), or memorable confrontations with enemies like

[45] Plessner (1928). [46] Trans. Wickens (1964).

[47] Cf. Zonta (1992), 19, 100–1 (translation), for the reuse of this in Bar Hebraeus.

[48] *De emptione servorum*, attested by Rhazes: Ullmann (1970) 74. Cf. Ch. 3, p. 148. For the Arabic literature, see Ch. 6, pp. 294–6.

[49] Cf. above, p. 9.

the insatiably evil Man of Lydia (ch. 1, A11) or the laughing Phoenician (ch. 1, A16).

Someone in Polemon's position needed the assurance of knowing what his colleagues were about. Physiognomy offered a useful tool for this. How did it work? Serious philosophical and medical interest in physiognomy explores the relation between innate psychological character and the construction or form of the body. This is the basis of the Aristotelian *Physiognomy*, of Galen's suggestions in *Powers of the Soul*, and of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's philosophical-medical *firāsa*. Polemon is not especially interested in this aspect; or at least does not bother to argue for it. Yet he does want his physiognomist to get to a man's innate characteristics. His chapter on the need to see though dissimulation of innate character is explicit;[50] but he offers no philosophical or scientific justification. If we place him against intellectual currents of his time, we might excuse him for making assumptions rather than accuse him of simply being dogmatic. He was a contemporary of Rufus of Ephesus (cf. above) who was extremely interested in psychosomatic disorders, such as the rarely touched-on problem of memory loss,[51] and who was one of the first to define the physiology of a range of mental afflictions to which he gave the generic name of *melancholia*. Rufus was an important influence on Galen in this regard.[52] Another contemporary, Aretaeus of Cappadocia, suggested a psychogenic origin for depressive illness.[53] Thus it may be that Polemon was partly responding to contemporary science in offering his peers a popular account of what the body can reveal about moral disposition. We might also recall that his hugely influential older contemporary, Plutarch (*c*.45–120), was committed to the view that the body had a strong influence on the moral character of the soul. In his *Parallel Lives* of famous Greeks and Romans, which were written in the reign of Trajan (98–117), he quite often assumes a relationship between appearance and character, and in the comparisons which conclude most of the pairs he likes to draw attention to physical factors as reflecting the differences between men who are, he suggests, essentially quite similar.[54] Dio of Prusa should also be mentioned here, for he certainly saw the possibility of using physiognomy as invective, just as his pupil did.[55] Plutarch, Dio, and Polemon were also aware, of course, of the widespread assumption among all classes that physiognomical assessment really worked.[56]

What about Polemon's claim to be able to predict the future? Here he may seem to depart from science and philosophy. The basis upon which he makes the claim is unclear in our versions; but he exemplifies it at length in Leiden

[50] Leiden ch. 49 ('If a person were thus to affect an alternative appearance, he might approach the ruler with it and mix with notables with it, etc.'), Adamantius B38, Anon. Lat. 74. See Ch. 7, pp. 323 n. 30, 325 n. 34 and Ch. 9, pp. 477, 479 for the far more elaborate discussion of people who hide their innate character in the introduction to the TK recension.

[51] It also interested another contemporary, Archigenes of Apamea, whose letter on the subject exercised Galen, *On the Affected Parts*, viii. 148 ff. Kühn.

[52] Flashar (1966) 84–104, Dols (1992), esp. ch. 1 on Rufus and Galen. *On Melancholia* survives in Arabic quotations: Ullmann (1970) 73, *cf.* (1978) 72 ff.

[53] Flashar (1966) 76–7. Nutton (2004) 205 places his *floruit* in the 140s/150s.

[54] Cf. Ch. 2, p. 123. [55] *Or.* 33. 52–6, below Ch. 3, p. 190. Cf. Dio *Or.* 4. 87–8.

[56] See Evans (1969) for a general survey and e.g. the collection of texts in Foerster ii. 233–352.

chs. 68–70, which amount to over 7 per cent of the whole and constitute a finale to the book. There are two ways of looking at this. First, Polemon's age was one in which the predictive science of astrology was widely accepted (and feared).[57] People expected to be able to find out what was going to happen. Furthermore, prognosis of the future course of disease had been an important part of medical discourse from Hippocratic times.[58] Galen publicized the medical claim with works like *Prognosis* in which he boasted of his predictions of cures for members of the court. In this regard Polemon's own claims do not look so unscientific by the standards of his day. Second, with the exception of the Woman of Perge in ch. 68, Polemon is judging from circumstance as much as anything. He determines what could happen, looks for signs of intentions, and ascertains the truth.[59] His claim that physiognomy pertains to the 'knowledge of what has happened and what will happen' (Leiden ch. 70) should be seen in this light.[60]

To any reader the really striking feature of Polemon's work is the attention given to the eye. Adamantius, Leiden, and the TK recension accord the eye about 30 per cent of the whole. In the original (as represented by Adamantius and Leiden) it occupied the key position on its own before the other body parts.[61] Why? At least one physiognomist before Polemon operated mainly with the eye.[62] With regard to Polemon himself there are three points to make. First, contemporary rhetorical training and practice made the eye (and the face) the prime indicators of the orator's feelings and therefore advised careful control over what he might unconsciously divulge.[63] Second, the culture of looking at self and at others to attain spiritual improvement has received a good deal of attention in recent scholarship.[64] It is almost certainly from Polemon's own introduction that Adamantius reports the cliché that the eye is the gateway to the soul and remarks that 'the sum of (the signs) is located in the eyes' (A4). Foerster denied Polemon any originality here; but on the one hand the only texts we know of before him—the Ps.-Aristotelian—make little of the eye, and on the other Polemon was evidently sensitive to what his audience wanted. So the concentration on the eye in the small world of Polemon may well reflect the culture of mutual inspection that many contemporary texts reveal. It also poses interesting and unanswerable questions about how anyone should conduct such scrutiny on the microscale of the human iris. The implication is that one physiognomizes people one knows pretty well; though we must be

[57] Barton (1994*a*) for a good introduction. [58] Swain (1994); Barton (1994*b*: ch. 3).

[59] Cf. Anon. Lat. 133 'and then especially he began to know the truth from these indications.'

[60] Cf. the Hippocratic *Prognosis* 1 (ii. 110 L.) 'knowing and declaring before the patient the present, past, and future', and *Epidemics* 1. 5 (1. 2. 5) (ii. 634 L.) 'state the past, know the present, predict the future'.

[61] In Anon. Lat. the eye is treated for approx. 20% of the total. It forms part of the discussion of the head (chs. 20–43).

[62] See Ch. 3, p. 181.

[63] Though in general terms physiognomical observation plays little part in oratory itself: cf. Hesk (2000) 225 on the Classical Athenian tradition.

[64] Of the many works that have flowed from Foucault's *The Care of the Self* (vol. iii of the *History of Sexuality*), by far the best on the High Roman period is Gleason (1995).

aware of our complete ignorance of how acceptable eye contact was among Polemon's contemporaries.[65]

Third, Polemon would have had a good chance to study some of the features of the leading figures of his time through the honorific statues and busts that filled public buildings and spaces. In Ch. 4 of this volume Jaś Elsner addresses the possibility that his interest in the eye responds to the contemporary artistic innovation of drilling the pupil and iris in stone (rather than painting them in). For this practice first becomes noticeable in the very extensive portraiture of Hadrian. The connection between Polemon's interests, those of his readers, and the emperor's eyes (which Polemon says were uniquely luminous) is there to be made, if one wants it.

But in one other important respect, Polemon does not follow Hadrianic portraiture: the beard has no place in his work, and this may call into question some moderns' insistence on the importance of the beard as a sign of maleness, especially among intellectuals.[66] Which is not to deny that Polemon is interested in gender. There is more on this in the Arabic versions of the text, especially the Leiden, than in Adamantius. The Leiden Polemon discusses male and female traits at some length and relates these to animal types. There are some quite negative remarks about women. Effeminacy, pederasty, and sodomy are charges made against men. Polemon's world is largely a man's one where men are judged by their dealings with other men. Charges of deviance are a standard way of doing opponents down. Couching these in the language of a logical science offered a powerful way of managing abuse.

Polemon's fame in his lifetime is shown by the stories in Philostratus' biography, by contemporary references such as the epigrams by Ammianus or the young Marcus Aurelius' letter to Fronto, and by his appearance in inscriptions and coin legends.[67] A few decades after his death Galen quotes a famous tag of his to make the point that Rome—'the epitome of the world'—offered the physician a greater variety of cases than any other city. As has already been indicated, it is not too much to suggest that Galen's thoughts in *Powers of the Soul* and elsewhere were prompted by the existence of Polemon's famous manual of physiognomy. *Powers of the Soul* has a clear agenda, of defending the physician's right to govern the patient's physical *and* mental health. It uses various tricks of rhetoric to make its case, and harnesses Aristotle's zoological works to give credence to physiognomy (and so to the relationship between body and soul).[68] Aristotle, Plato, and Hippocrates are used (or abused) to sustain the argument. Galen considered his philosophical training to be the foundation of his medical science. His interest in physiognomy rests on a long history of philosophical investigation which begins with the story of Zopyrus and Socrates (cf. above) as related by the Socratic philosopher Phaedo of Elis. This history is studied in Ch. 2 by George Boys-Stones, who starts with the thoughts of Phaedo and the airing they are given in the dialogue Plato named after him. Plato's Phaedo holds that the irrational part of the soul is

[65] See Cairns (2005) for an interesting survey of Greek attitudes.

[66] Cf. R. R. R. Smith (1998) in response to assumptions by Paul Zanker and others.

[67] See Ch. 3, pp. 128–9, 161–2, 176, 189.

[68] Lloyd (1988).

an 'epiphenomenon' of the physical body, making a person's character, his desires and inclinations, innate and inalienable. It seems likely that this represents Phaedo's own view, for the story of Zopyrus and Socrates is precisely about this: Zopyrus saw that Socrates was innately vice-ridden, but Socrates used philosophy to restrain his natural impulses. The story of Polemon and Hippocrates in Arabic sources and their interest in dissimulation addresses the same problem and for the same reason: only those who were ready to accept the idea of innate character could explain physiognomy.

For Plato himself moral character was primarily psychological, not physiological. He certainly allowed that the body might have an influence on the soul or moral character. But even where—as for example in the *Timaeus*—he was prepared to link the temperament of geographical regions (e.g. Athens' *eukrasia*) with the character of their inhabitants, we should not be misled by Galen's interpretations into thinking that Plato ever envisaged the soul as a function of the body. The *Timaeus* was of course important in medicine, and not least because it specified the location of the parts of the soul (69 C–71 D, 90 A). Through Galen's use of the work in *Powers of the Soul, Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*, and his somewhat tendentious *Summary of the Timaeus*[69] and *Commentary on the Timaeus* (on the medical parts), a corporealist Platonic psychology was transferred to Islam, where it can be seen in e.g. Ibn Bakhtishu' (cf. above). We ourselves must allow that Plato was different, if we are committed to discovering what physiognomy actually meant for a philosopher. And this is important because the conception of physiognomy as a key to the innate character survives in Polemon and was reinforced in the TK recension, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, and others. The decisive development appears to have been a reading of Aristotle by some of his followers that made him advocate 'epiphenomenalism', i.e. the belief that psychology is somehow determined by physiology. On the basis of passages like *Prior Analytics* 2. 27 we may assume that Aristotle regarded individual characteristics as the physical consequence of the same causal process behind the production of an animal with certain species characteristics: if it works for species, it can work for individuals.

If Aristotle opened a door, he merely glanced at what he saw: beyond a scattering of physiognomical observations in his biological works, there is nothing.[70] But the two anonymous authors of the treatises known to Antiquity and Islam as Aristotle's *Physiognomy* took up the opportunity. In their prefatory discussions both of these treatises seem to develop Aristotle's musings on physiognomical methodology reflected in *Prior Analytics*; and because the systems they build are practically identical, it is not unreasonable to assume that they were pupils of Aristotle and heard him lecture on the subject. It seems that only the first treatise subscribes to the epiphenomenalist view that the soul 'follows' the body. Treatise B, at least in its account of species traits in one passage, appears to make the body *posterior* to the soul. What is important is that both authors saw the possibility of doing physiognomy and that at the end

[69] Cf. n. 12 above.

[70] Cf. recently Rapisarda (2005) 15–16 on Aristotle's chiromantic and physiognomical hints.

of the fourth century BC there was an audience to listen to them. We include a text and translation of these treatises in the Appendix to this volume.

At some later date probably in the Hellenistic period (*c.*323–50 BC) the shadowy Loxus, who is used by Anonymus Latinus, seems to provide evidence for the continuing interest of Aristotelian epiphenomenalism in physiognomy. Aristotelianism was not, however, the only route to an acceptance of physiognomy. The late, unorthodox, and hugely important Stoic philosopher Posidonius (*c.*135–51 BC) departed from the founders of Stoicism and committed himself to a belief in an innate, non-rational character rooted in the body. Like Aristotle he seems to have been prepared to use the term 'physiognomy' itself and is cited for this by Galen in *Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato.*

The Galenic legacy in Islam may mislead us into searching for earlier medical influences on physiognomy. In *Powers of the Soul* Galen was pleased to hail 'divine Hippocrates' as the inventor of the 'theory'. But, though the term physiognomy occurs in the Hippocratic corpus, the context is correlations between mental activity and physiology, not psychological character and outward appearance. Hippocrates was not in fact interested in *psyche* as such. Aristotle brings the change. But the problem of what constituted the individual was even more acute for a doctor like Galen who staked his claim to fame on his grasp of human physiology. Wanting to suggest a convergence between all the great thinkers of the past and his own beliefs, he repackaged Aristotle into saying that an individual's psychology corresponds exactly to its physical structure or rather is an expression of the matter which develops into a certain physical structure. Galen went on from here, however, to consider how external factors might modify the temperament, and so the psycho-physical character of an individual. He concluded that these modifications might have effects on a person's appearance which would confound the expectations that a reasonable physiognomy might otherwise have had. Partly for this reason, but also because he was never fully committed to the psychological reductionism which underwrote physiognomy for him, he actually makes little use of it.

Later Platonists were very aware of both Aristotle's and Galen's allowance of physiognomy. Leaving aside the eccentric musical theorist Aristides Quintilianus (if he is a Platonist), who uniquely made the soul influence the shape of the body, some of the thinkers of Late Antiquity did accept a congruence between the inclinations of the body and the moral character of the soul. Even opponents of Galen's suggestion of a deterministic relationship like Proclus could allow a (bad) influence on the soul from the bodies of the uneducated and the unphilosophical. Boys-Stones observes that physiognomical passages in the Neoplatonists are actually quite restricted in range and most comprise reports of how the science was used by Pythagoras (now considered its founder) or Socrates. These stories focus on the *potential* of the person who is physiognomized. There is never any question of denying psychological self-reform to a soul which is really independent of the body.

We suffer in fact from a lack of informed discussion about the applications of physiognomy in Late Antiquity. There are occasional glimpses of its use in

political or religious invective (as there are in earlier centuries).[71] We should dearly love to find physiognomical theory incorporated in some work of political advice by Themistius or Synesius as it is in Islamic mirror-of-princes literature like the celebrated *Secret of Secrets*. The very dominance of Platonism in Late Antiquity may be a reason why no new tracts of physiognomy emerged, even if the names of Aristotle, Galen, and Polemon were enough to maintain the science's intellectual respectability. The full grounding of physiognomy in humoral theory had to wait for a system where the Galenic ideal of the philosopher-physician was an axiom reinforced by practical experience. In this Islamic society, the polity of courts and competition understood Polemon's intentions very well, and the authority of the Koran guaranteed the ancient Arabic truth of a Greek art.

[71] See Asmus (1906), Evans (1969) 74 ff. on Gregory Nazianzen, Julian, Ammianus, Ambrose (*On the Duties of the Clergy*); cf. Parsons (2006), ch. 2. See also Ch. 2, p. 105 n. 189.

Part I
Antiquity

2

Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory

George Boys-Stones

Of all animals, human beings display the most remarkable tendency towards perversity of nature. But more than this, human beings display the most remarkable *variety* of perversion. It is as Aristotle said: virtue is simple, but vice takes many forms.[1] No two people are unnatural in quite the same way (one is more cowardly, another more lecherous, and so on), and while one can generalize about the way humans *ought* to be, there is only a limited extent to which one can generalize about the way they *are*.

In a sense, then, it is easier to talk about virtue than to talk about vice, and this is reflected in ancient discussions of ethics, which naturally focus, first and foremost, on what it would be like to be a well-functioning individual. But, particularly in a context in which virtue, happiness, and what is 'natural' for a human being coincide, as they tend to do in ancient philosophical thought, there is a real and interesting philosophical question raised by the fact that people fail so regularly to achieve the ideal, and specifically a question about what it is that directs them down their particular path of vice. Is this to be explained purely by the education and habituation people receive in the course of their upbringing? Or is the inclination to form a certain kind of moral character to some extent innate—part of what makes them individual humans in the first place? And if innate, is there a link between physical peculiarities and moral character? Again, many ancient philosophers think that there must be, since our souls (as the locus of impulse) are intimately linked with our bodies, and the greater part of our moral character is constituted by our attitude to specifically bodily demands. When one looks at the question from this perspective, it is not so hard to see how the distinctive tradition of Greek ethical philosophy opens the way quite naturally to what we might describe as physiognomical speculation. Depending on the explanation given for the link between the body and the soul, a philosopher might easily find himself committed to the position that there is a regular correspondence between the two such that one could, in principle at least, tell what a person is like from the way he or she looks.

It is important to recognize how naturally the course of ancient psychological thought leads into the territory of the physiognomist because it is something that existing studies of physiognomy in antiquity have tended to ignore.

[1] Aristotle, *NE* 2. 6, 1106^{b}35; and cf. Anon. Lat. 44.

The typical assumption is rather that 'physiognomy' in some form or other (whether as a practical activity or a sociological prejudice) *influenced* philosophy, in the sense that it presented itself as a set of empirical truths to be accepted and explained by philosophers. The focus of such studies tends, then, to be either a 'demonstration' of the influence of physiognomy through the identification in theoretical texts of passages which coincide with material from the surviving physiognomical handbooks;[2] or else an investigation into the particular question of physiognomical semiology—how inferences from appearance to character are developed and structured by philosophers.[3] But the assumption that philosophers felt compelled to take physiognomy seriously, or that they were at all in this sense 'influenced' by physiognomy, is not one that stands up to any prolonged scrutiny. It is a plain and simple matter of fact that not every philosopher or philosophical school in antiquity displayed *any* theoretical commitment to physiognomy at all; and when one asks what makes the difference, what led some philosophers to an interest in physiognomy and not others, the answer in every case comes down to whether the theoretical possibility of physiognomy followed from beliefs they already held about the nature of the soul.

My aim, then, in the present study is to look at physiognomy in ancient theoretical thought *as it arose* in philosophical discussion, and without a prejudicial notion of what constitutes 'physiognomy' imported from other texts and contexts. (As such, the study is intended to be as much a contribution to ancient psychological thought as to ancient thought about physiognomy.) All this, I hope, will help to explain features of it which might seem eccentric or deficient if it is judged by the standards of the existing literature on physiognomy. For a start, I have nothing to say about the earlier *practice* of physiognomy and its origins.[4] This might seem perverse: one might have

[2] e.g. Evans (1935), (1941), (1969); Pack (1941; for Artemidorus); Opeku (1979; for Apuleius); André (1981) 9–15; Mason (1984; for Apuleius again); Gleason (1990, esp. 393, 399–400 for Dio Chrysostom); Weiler (1996); Horstmanshoff (1999; for the medical writer Caelius Aurelianus); Bost-Pouderon (2003; for Dio Chrysostom). Compare the wide range of passages collected at Foerster (1893) ii. 237–352.

[3] e.g. Burnyeat (1982), 228–30; Granarolo (1985); Dagron (1987); Gleason (1990); Sassi (2001), 35–6, 69–71. Cf. Vogt (1999), 108–13, 145–63.

[4] For the record, the evidence for early (pre-Aristotelian) practitioners of physiognomy in Athens includes Phaedo's account of Zopyrus (see Section I), and perhaps the Syrian magus of D.L. 2. 45 = Aristotle fr. 32 Rose[3] (both of them, historical or not, evidence for physiognomical activity at the time of Socrates); also the man who compared all human faces to those of two or three animals mentioned by Aristotle at *GA* 769^{b}20–1. Beyond this it is in any case hard to go. Physiognomy is frequently spotted in earlier Greek literature (notably Homer's description of Thersites in *Iliad* 2. 211–19: cf. Misener 1924: 103–4; Thalmann 1988; Weiler 1996: 162–3). But such identifications are always highly tendentious and question-begging. (In the specific case of Thersites, one might take his ugliness as further proof of the gods' disfavour towards him, rather than an indication of his character. In any case, Homer's imagination can compass men whose looks betray the truth of their character; cf. esp. Sassi 1992: 358, citing *Iliad* 2. 673–5 and *Odyssey* 8. 169 ff.; to which might be added *Iliad* 3. 43–5 and 216–24.) The fact that our explicit evidence for early physiognomical activity in Greece involves a *Syrian* magus and the putatively *Persian* Zopyrus (cf. n. 9) lends some credibility to attempts to trace the practice of physiognomy back to cognate practices in the Near East. On this, see F. R. Kraus (1935); Bottéro (1969), (1974); André (1981), 9; Barton (1994*b*), 100; Böck (2000); but also Lloyd (1991*b*) for the general theoretical difficulties involved in such claims.

thought that a history of physiognomical theory ought to take into account pre-existing practice, just as a history of medical thought might take primitive medical practice as its starting-point. But medical and physiognomical theory turn out to be rather different cases. Medical theory presumably was built on the empirical success of practical therapy, and represents in some sense an attempt to understand why certain treatments worked while others failed. My argument is that physiognomy, on the other hand, was never the empirical starting-point for philosophical speculation: no philosopher ever appears to have *assumed* that it worked, such that it needed explanation. Indeed, in its first appearance in philosophical literature, physiognomy attracted guffaws of laughter from a sophisticated audience, who presumably were rather surprised to be told that it could be justified by Socrates' views of the soul.[5] Those philosophers who accept the possibility of a physiognomy consistently do so from within a theoretical model of human nature which they would have developed had physiognomists never existed. For these philosophers, the pre-existence of physiognomy as a practice does little more than to provide a ready-made vocabulary in which to describe one consequence of their speculation on the relationship between body and soul—namely the consequence that one can in principle deduce people's character from their appearance.

Secondly, and relatedly, my study of individual philosophers and schools is not conducted with a view to understanding the role that physiognomy (explicit or implicit) played in shaping their thought. The reason, again, is that I do not assume that physiognomy in fact played an active role in shaping philosophical thought. Rather, my study looks at the psychological theories of various thinkers with a view to understanding what this implies for their view about the relationship between individual character and appearance, and whether it allows them something that they would be prepared to describe as a physiognomy. For this reason too, I preface each section with a list of explicit mentions of physiognomy relevant to the individuals and schools under discussion; and, although I by no means assume that 'physiognomy' is inoperative as a category in the mind of a writer simply because the word is absent, my discussion privileges these texts, which perforce form the touchstone for any wider judgements. If all this seems to amount to an unnecessarily austere approach, I can only respond that one of the primary conclusions of the study as a whole is a direct consequence of it: for it turns out that not everyone whose philosophy implies the expectation that a person's character will be predictable from his or her appearance does think of it as physiognomical. In ancient philosophical contexts, the word seems to be reserved specifically for the belief that appearance is a guide to *innate* as opposed to acquired character. Thus (as I shall argue) Phaedo of Elis, Aristotle, Posidonius, Galen, and (at least some) later Platonists accept physiognomy as a consequence of their psychological thought, but Plato and the earlier Stoics do not—even though both Plato and the Stoics (unlike, for example, the Epicureans) accepted that people often develop characters

[5] The narrative is from the *Zopyrus* of Phaedo of Elis. For more details, see Section I.

which, non-coincidentally, are predictable from their appearance. This is not only an important conclusion to feed into our wider understanding of physiognomy in the ancient world, but provides a useful sidelight on aspects of ancient psychological theory too.

Finally, I appeal to my focus on strictly theoretical discussions of physiognomy to excuse the relative depth and breadth of discussion in the Sections that follow. I have, for example, a lot to say about Plato and the early Stoics even though my conclusion will be that they do *not* think of themselves as accepting the possibility of physiognomy; but I have a lot to say precisely because it is interesting and illuminating to see why they do not. On the other hand, my discussion of medical thought in Section V is much less wide-ranging than might have been expected—indeed, it is almost (though not quite entirely) concerned with Galen. There is a simple reason for this, which is that, before the subject was taken up in the Arabic tradition (discussed in Ch. 6 by Antonella Ghersetti), Galen was pretty well the only medical writer whom we know to have engaged with physiognomy at a theoretical level at all—and then scarcely *qua* medic. A similar desire to cut my discussion according to the material is my excuse for a discussion of later Platonism in Section VI which generalizes over a wide range of thinkers who, so far as their psychological thought is concerned, deserve rather more careful discrimination. But the fact is that discussions of *physiognomy* in Platonism are not so nuanced: indeed there are, strictly, no *discussions* of it at all, only an apparent acceptance of its possibility. In this case what I have tried to do is to highlight themes in Platonist psychology that show an interest in engaging with earlier writers who discuss physiognomy, and suggest that, insofar as any particular Platonist agrees with the relevant principles, we can understand how they might accept the—physiognomical—consequences.

There is scope for the kind of discussion of physiognomy in ancient philosophy and medicine that I do not cover here: for further examination of physiognomical semiotics; for further studies of the influence of non-theoretical physiognomical thought on philosophical theory in ways which are not necessarily explicit or obvious. But such discussions are for other occasions: it is vital, to begin with, to establish that there is a difference between explicit reflection on physiognomy and the implicit, perhaps even unconscious, influence of physiognomy in other contexts. My aim has been, very narrowly, to isolate the former: to establish what ancient philosophers themselves understood by the word 'physiognomy', and why those who accepted it did so.

I. THE CIRCLE OF SOCRATES (1): PHAEDO OF ELIS

Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in Socratic writers. (*a*) Antisthenes: *SSR* VA 41. 12 (= DL 6. 16); 63 (= Athenaeus 14. 74. 11, 656 F). (*b*) Phaedo of Elis: frr. [ed. Rossetti] 6 (= Cicero, *On Fate* 10), 8 (= scholion to Persius, *Satires* 4. 24), 10 (= Alexander, *On Fate* 171. 11–12 Bruns; quoted at Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 6. 9. 22), 11 (= Cassian, *Conferences* 13. 5. 3), 19 (= Origen, *Against Celsus* 1. 33).

One day, a foreigner named Zopyrus arrived in Athens. Like visitors to Athens in the Socratic dialogues of Plato (think of the *Protagoras*, for example, or the *Ion*), this foreigner had a wonderful skill to exhibit: he claimed that he could divine a man's character from his physical appearance. Finding himself somehow faced with Socrates amid a group of Socrates' friends, he demonstrated his art on Socrates and offered a diagnosis. Socrates was, he declared, a man possessed of 'many vices'; the thickness of his neck indicated that he was 'stupid and dull'; his eyes showed that he was a womanizer—or else, depending on whom you read, a pederast. In either case, Socrates' companions, and Alcibiades in particular, had reason to laugh. The Socratic dialogue as a genre is not without an element of hagiography: the reader knows that Socrates is a paragon of virtue and abstinence, a seeker after the truth, and the wisest man alive. Zopyrus' diagnosis must be wrong: the whole episode a typical example of a sophist deflated, of false claims to knowledge exploded. But there is a surprise in store. The onlookers laugh at Zopyrus, and the reader laughs with them; but Socrates tells us all to stop: 'This *is* how I am,' he said (or something like it: see further below); 'but through the practice of philosophy I have become better than my nature.'

Such is our evidence for the most famous incident in a dialogue, the *Zopyrus*, by the Socratic writer Phaedo of Elis.[6] Apart from the intriguing, but obscure, title of a work by his fellow-Socratic Antisthenes (the 'founder' of Cynicism),[7] it constitutes our earliest evidence from the Classical world for the encounter between philosophy and physiognomy.[8] And the grounds for Phaedo's interest in the subject are very important. In the course of this study, I hope to show that physiognomy attracted the interest of ancient philosophers not as a matter of idle curiosity; and not (for example) because of the value they or their culture might have placed on the ability to 'read' the character or intentions of others. Such an ability would clearly be a wonderful thing to have, and the aspiration to it is something on which the surviving handbooks of physiognomy trade. But, as I suggested in the Introduction, philosophers were interested in physiognomy (when they were) insofar as it represented a consequence of their central concern with the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body. It is possible that the character of Zopyrus represents the arrival in Greece of

[6] Testimonia and fragments of Phaedo's works in *SSR* IIIA, with discussion at iv. 115–27. Giannantoni is rigorous in excluding texts that do not name Phaedo; a more generous collection of testimonia for his *Zopyrus* is collected and discussed at Rossetti (1980) 183–98. With most commentators (including Giannantoni himself: *SSR* iv. 126), I assume as the only serious hypothesis available for their provenance that the fragments describing the famous encounter between Zopyrus and Socrates (= frr. 6–11 Rossetti) ultimately derive from this work—although it is true that Phaedo is mentioned in none of them. On Phaedo generally, cf. von Fritz (1938); Rossetti (1973) (a revised version of which = 1977: 121–53); (1974); Toole (1974–5); Montuori (1976); Dušanić (1993); Kahn (1996) 11–12; Nails (2002) 231; Boys-Stones (2004). On the afterlife of this particular anecdote in the physiognomical tradition, see Ghersetti below, pp. 282–3, 465.

[7] *Physiognomical Treatise On the Sophists* (*Peri tōn sophistōn physiognōmonikos*): D.L. 6. 16.

[8] Zopyrus appears actually to have been referred to as a 'physiognomist' (*physiognōmōn*): frr. 6, 10, 11 Rossetti; cf. *physiologos* (presumably a misreading) in fr. 8.

a practice born in the East;[9] but it was readily taken up (when it was) because and insofar as the theoretical consequences of taking it seriously converged with native interests. It is, in fact, appropriate, and perhaps less than a coincidence, that a serious engagement with physiognomy should first surface among the followers of Socrates, to whom the later psychological tradition looked as the proximate source of this inquiry. If Phaedo was interested in physiognomy, it was *because* he was a Socratic, and because he held a view of the soul which physiognomical evidence could be held to support.

But how do we know, first of all, that Phaedo *did* 'seriously' engage with physiognomy? It could be that Socrates' defence of Zopyrus was ironic; that (did we but have the whole dialogue) it would be the ridicule of Zopyrus that remained in our minds. To answer this question we need context; and it so happens that the one other fragment of the *Zopyrus* we have might provide it. We know that someone in the *Zopyrus* told the following story (fr. 1 Rossetti = *SSR* IIIA 11):

They say, Socrates, that the youngest son of the King [sc. of Persia] made a pet of a lion cub... And it seems to me that it was because the lion was brought up with the child that it followed him wherever he went even when he was a young man, so that the Persians said that it was besotted with the boy.

The story is preserved for no better reason than that the grammarian Theon thought it a happy illustration of the change from indirect to direct speech in narrative. It is lacunose; we do not know who told it (though Zopyrus seems the best guess on the face of it);[10] and, most importantly, we have nothing at all to suggest where and how the telling of this story stood in relation to the physiognomical episode. But despite all this, it is hard to ignore the powerful thematic connections linking this narrative to the physiognomical episode. In both cases, the ostensible moral is, or involves, the possibility that a creature's nature can be changed—in particular that savage and brutish inclinations can be tamed. In the one, we learn that someone as stupid and licentious as Socrates can become a chaste philosopher; in the other, that a member of the wildest species of animal can become as tame and broken as a besotted lover.

Evidence that just such a moral is one that his readership might have expected from Phaedo comes from the Emperor Julian (*Epistle* 82,

[9] That Zopyrus was from outside Athens is clear from fr. 9 Rossetti ('When he [sc. Socrates] was alive, a man called Zopyrus came to Athens...'). He would have come 'from Syria' if he is to be identified with the magus who predicted a violent end for Socrates (Aristotle fr. 32 Rose^3 = D.L. 2. 45). Others have thought him a Persian on the basis of his name, and the circumstantial detail that someone in the *Zopyrus* told a story concerning a Persian prince. (The story is quoted below in the text; for the argument, cf. Rossetti 1977: 145–6.) But the name is not distinctively Persian (cf. *LGPN* s.v.); and nothing independently tells in favour of a link between Zopyrus and the story of the Prince (see next note).

[10] But the reference to Persia could as well be in deference to Zopyrus' presence as an indication that he was the narrator; and then again, it could be incidental (since the identification of Zopyrus' nationality itself rests in part on the reference to Persia here). Socrates himself is not ruled out by the fact that the story is addressed to him: the Platonic Socrates, anyway, is quite capable of relating stories as told to him, or discussions he has had with others. He is, for example, regularly addressed within his own account of discussions with Diotima at *Symposium* 201 D ff.

445 A = *SSR* IIIA 2):

Phaedo . . . supposed that nothing was beyond the cure of philosophy, but that everyone can be purified of any kind of life through it—of their behaviour, desires, everything, in a word, of the sort. If it helped only the well-born and well-brought-up there would be nothing amazing about what it did, but if it brings people in such a bad state to the light, it seems to me surpassing wonderful.

There is no way of telling on which of Phaedo's works Julian based his assessment;[11] but it does seem to be the case that the *Zopyrus* offered at least one candidate to whom such a moral would be particularly appropriate. For there is one further link between the two episodes of the *Zopyrus* I have been considering: the person of Alcibiades. According to frr. 6 and 8 Rossetti, it was Alcibiades in particular who laughed at Zopyrus' diagnosis of Socrates; and, although we have no information that he was there to hear the story of the lion-cub, we might remember for ourselves that Alcibiades compared himself and was compared by others to a lion.[12] The possibility of this connection is surely strengthened by the fact that Alcibiades had a tutor who shared his name with the dialogue's eponym: Zopyrus. Indeed, it might not be too fanciful to suggest that the first readers of the *Zopyrus* were supposed to assume from the title that they were purchasing yet another dialogue about Alcibiades and his education.[13]

Whatever the truth of the matter, the important conclusion for now is that such evidence as we have for the *Zopyrus* aside from the physiognomical episode suggests a remarkable degree of convergence with a reading that treats Zopyrus' diagnosis seriously, not ironically. It starts, in other words, to look as if one of the themes of the *Zopyrus* was the transforming power of philosophy, and that the *Zopyrus* as a whole is best served if Zopyrus really did get Socrates right. Phaedo's Socrates, then, was not being ironic in defending him and confessing to a wicked nature: the *point* is his reform through philosophy. But if this should be accepted, then we can go further and ask by what mechanism Phaedo might have explained all this. What might Phaedo have believed about the soul to lead him to the conclusion that 'natural' character manifested itself in physical appearance, but was the kind of thing which philosophy could overcome?

There is, of course, no reason at all to suppose that Phaedo ascribed to Zopyrus a theoretical view of the soul's relationship with the body, or that this is what Socrates was supposed to be in agreement with him about. In fact, the dynamic of the dialogue would be better explained if Zopyrus had no *theory*

[11] The *Zopyrus* is a possibility: so von Fritz (1938) 1540, and Kahn (1996) 12; but Nails (2002) 231 suggests that he may have read no genuine works of Phaedo at all.

[12] Alcibiades' leonine nature is suggested by Plato (*Alcibiades* 122 E–123 A: cf. Denyer 2001: 186), Aristophanes (*Frogs* 1431–2), and Alcibiades himself at Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 2. 2.

[13] Rossetti supposes that Alcibiades' tutor (for whom see Plato, *Alcibiades* 122 AB) was the dialogue's eponym (1973: 371; more cautiously at 1977: 145; cf. also Nails, 2002: 305 s.v. 'Zopyrus'). But this seems unlikely if Phaedo's Zopyrus was a stranger in Athens at the time of his encounter with Socrates (and impossible if one thinks that Zopyrus was a Persian: see again n. 9 above). For Alcibiades as a stock figure of the Socratic dialogue, cf. Denyer (2001), 5. Denyer notes that Alcibiades played a role in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Symposium*; and that Aeschines (D.L. 2. 61), Antisthenes (ibid.; also D.L. 6. 18), and Euclides (D.L. 2. 108) as well as Plato, and Phaedo himself (*Suda* s.v. *Phaidōn* = φ 154) are all credited with dialogues called *Alcibiades*.

at all. If Phaedo's dialogues were anything like Plato's, Socrates would have spent a good deal of his time talking precisely to people whose abilities ran ahead of their capacity to give them a theoretical underpinning—whose 'skills' and 'virtues' were empirical, where they should have been knowledge-based.[14] Perhaps Zopyrus was like this: a capable enough physiognomist but, like those sophists in Plato whose discourse was also about the soul (cf. *Phaedrus* 271 CD), lacking in an understanding of the virtues and vices of the souls he judged. Knowledge about the soul, then, is what Zopyrus leaves for Phaedo's Socrates to explore. Socrates for his part need not be expected to *reject* physiognomy (as Plato's Socrates does not exactly *reject* rhetoric), but he might want to show how it is only a worthwhile pursuit if it can be made philosophical, grounded on knowledge about the soul. Perhaps this is why he stopped his companions from laughing.

But what, then, did Phaedo's Socrates think about the soul? The question is complicated by the fact that our sources differ over what, exactly, he replied to his companions' mirth at Zopyrus' diagnosis. In particular, there is a difference over whether Socrates thought he had *changed* his natural character (and so, whether one's nature is changeable) or whether he rather thought that he acted in spite of it (so that one's 'nature' turns out to be something immutable but non-determinative).

Cicero certainly talks as if he saw the former model in his source. According to him, Socrates admits to having been *born* with the vices identified by Zopyrus, but states that he managed to *rid himself of them* through the practice of philosophy:

[Of the vices ascribed to Socrates by Zopyrus:] It is possible that they were born from natural causes; but it is not due to the power of natural causes that they were rooted out and altogether removed so that he himself was called away from those vices to which he had been prone (fr. 6 Rossetti = Cicero, *On Fate* 10).

[Zopyrus was defended by Socrates] ... who said that, although those vices had been implanted in him, he had cast them out of himself by reason (fr. 7 Rossetti = Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4. 80).

The fact that Zopyrus was able to get at the nature with which Socrates was born would suggest that the body is somehow or other a force that predisposes one's irrational nature to develop in a certain way, or lays down its 'default'; but it cannot *determine* one's nature, which is open to the healing influence of reason as well.

Cicero, however, is at odds with the majority of our fragments; and, while a head-count is no way to make a judgement in these cases (we have no way of knowing whether or when our fragments are based on a reading of the original, and no evidence for their source if they are not), the principle of *cui bono?* speaks against him too. For one thing, the bipartite psychology implied by

[14] The bravery of Laches, despite his inability to define bravery in the *Laches*, would be a good example. Cf. for the theoretical point the two types of physician at Plato, *Laws* 720 AB, who share the same title 'whether they are free men, or whether they are slaves and acquired their skill by obeying and observing their masters, and by experience—rather than from the study of nature, which is how free men learn it themselves and how they teach it to their own sons.'

Cicero may come close to his own preference in the area.[15] For another, such a psychology provides him with the most robust stand-point in the particular polemical context from which his evidence comes.[16] It seems more plausible all round, then, to prefer the testimony of the remaining fragments, which all imply that Socrates somehow *retained* the evil nature identified by Zopyrus, but did not let that interfere with his life:

fr. 8 (= *Scholia to Persius* 4. 24; Socrates speaks): 'I am indeed libidinous; but it is in my power to overcome that very libido.'

fr. 9 (= Ps.-Plutarch, *Peri Askēseōs* f. 179; Socrates speaking):[17] 'In actual fact, this man has not got it wrong, because by nature I am very much inclined towards lust [sc. for women]; but through careful practice I am as you know me.'

fr. 10 (= Alexander, *On Fate* 6): He would have been like this, as far as his nature was concerned, but through the practice of philosophy he became better than this nature.

fr. 11 (Cassian, *Conferences* 13. 5. 3): 'I am [sc. what Zopyrus says I am], but I abstain.'[18]

'I *am*', says Socrates (frr. 8, 11); 'I *do* incline' (fr. 9); Socrates has become *better* than a nature which he nevertheless retains (fr. 10).

My suggestion, then, is that we can, on the basis of the evidence, ascribe the following claims to Phaedo: (1) that each person has a 'nature' which encompasses his or her irrational impulses; (2) that this 'nature' is related to the body in such a way that an expert in the matter could deduce the former from the appearance of the latter; and (3) that one's 'nature', though ineliminable, does not determine behaviour, for people who engage in philosophy, at least. If this is right, then it suggests that Phaedo is working with a bipartite model of human behaviour of a kind that, in its general outlines, is quite familiar from post-Socratic philosophy: a model according to which a person's actions might be explained *either* by non-rational desires ('nature'), *or* by rational decision, operating independently of desire. What is most striking about Phaedo's model, though, is that it does not seem to allow that the non-rational desires are susceptible to training or rehabituation. Their persistence is betrayed even in the case of Socrates—whose success as a philosopher, as someone who has brought his behaviour under the control of reason, is presumably not in serious doubt. The non-rational impulses are tied to

[15] Cf. Bobzien (1998), 298. We know that Cicero shared Carneades' inclination towards a more or less Peripatetic ethics (e.g. *On Duties* 1. 2 with *Academica* 2. 139 and Goulet 1994 for the 'Calliphon' mentioned there): this may well have been associated with an inclination towards a more or less Peripatetic psychology.

[16] Cicero, at *On Fate* 10, is arguing against the Stoics' claim that action is predetermined because an inevitable consequence of one's nature. His reply is not to deny that nature determines action (which, for the Stoics at least, is the guarantee that an agent is *responsible* for what he does), but to deny that our natures are themselves predetermined. We have, he says, the freedom through reason to make them what we wish—witness Zopyrus and Socrates. See again Bobzien (1998), 297–8.

[17] The work is preserved only in Syriac. Rossetti prints (and I translate) the German rendering of Gildemeister and Bücheler (1872), 527: 'In Wirklichkeit hat dieser Mann nicht gelogen, denn von Natur neige ich sehr zur Begierde, durch angewendete Sorgfalt aber bin ich, wie ihr mich kennt.'

[18] It might be relevant that Cassian gives Socrates' response in Greek (*eimi gar, epechō de*), before translating it into Latin, which suggests that he is quoting the original (or thinks he is, or wants us to think that he is).

the body, in fact, and no more educable than the set of the eyes or the shape of the neck. But how could Phaedo claim this?

It might be tempting to suppose that Phaedo's bipartite model of human behaviour must be a bipartite model of the *soul*, in the sense that he thought (*a*) that the soul was an entity substantially distinct from the body; and (*b*) that the soul was composed of two parts, one rational and one not. But in this case, we should have to suppose that Phaedo thought that there was something about the irrational part of the soul which made it cling so closely to the body: not just an affinity of sorts with the body, but also a perfect inertia against any attempt of reason even to change, let alone eradicate, the habits it derived from the body. It seems to me highly unlikely that Phaedo could have believed this. For one thing, it is a position with no parallels in antiquity; but for another, it is unclear what possible explanatory advantage Phaedo might have gained, in a case where the irrational was so fully determined by the body, from asserting that any substantial difference between them existed at all.

A more attractive possibility, then, would be that Phaedo held something like an 'emergentist' view of the soul. The idea would be that 'psychological' functions (including both desire and reason) are not *substantially* different from the body at all. Rather, they somehow 'supervene' on physiological activity. A case could easily be made that some supervenient qualities (for example the desires) remain fully determined by the nature of the physiological activity on which they depend, while others (including reason) acquire a degree of causal independence. Reason would always owe its existence and capacities to the relevant physiological factors, but in operation might possess a degree of autonomy, perhaps a very large degree of autonomy, that desire altogether lacks.

Such a view undoubtedly has greater philosophical credibility; and indeed I think it cannot be positively ruled out for Phaedo. But it also has historical problems to contend with: for the only (other) evidence for emergentist theories of soul in antiquity suggests that they post-date Aristotle and, more than this, that they were inspired by him.[19] The form of epiphenomenalism known to Plato and Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to have relied on a simple identification of the soul with a 'harmony' of physical elements; to have been a form of reductionism which left no room for the independent activity of reason so essential for Phaedo.[20]

[19] The earliest example would be Aristotle's pupil Dicaearchus, if Sharples (2001) is right to ascribe an emergentist position to him (but see against this Caston 2001; and cf. Gottschalk 1971). For post-Aristotelian debates over the nature of the soul more generally, see below, Section III (esp. references in n. 69), and Section V. ii (for the important evidence supplied by Galen).

[20] For Plato, see the theory posited by Simmias at *Phaedo* 85 E–86 D (refuted by Socrates at 91 B–95 A). For Aristotle, see *DA* 1. 4, 407^b27–408^a30; also fr. 45 Rose[3] (from his lost dialogue, the *Eudemus*). Arguments *ex silentio* are never ideal; but if Phaedo had been an emergentist, and Plato knew it, his decision to make Phaedo the narrator of the *Phaedo* (a decision about which I have more to say below) would have been very strange indeed. The attack on reductionism so important for establishing the immortality of the soul would be fatally undermined by the constant reminder that Phaedo himself held an alternative form of epiphenomenalism less vulnerable to much of Socrates' argument.

If this is right, then we are left with a third possibility, which falls somewhere between the first two and has, it seems to me, the best measure of philosophical and historical plausibility. It could be that Phaedo believed in an independent, rational soul on the one hand, substantially distinct from the body; but explained desires on the other as physiological epiphenomena. Such a model would explain why physical appearance can be used as a guide to the character of one's desires (one's 'nature'): they are little more than an aspect of the body itself. It would also explain why reason could have no effect on them: one could no more change one's 'nature' through reason than one could improve one's physical appearance by thinking about it. But what reason can do, as an independent entity, is to take charge: people can make a rational *choice* to organize their lives in any way they see fit, *despite* the predispositions written into their physiology: reason is precisely *not* determined by the body in which it (merely) resides. And it seems to me that there is a substantial piece of evidence which lends its support to this reconstruction—though, oddly enough, it is evidence that is generally ignored in discussions of Phaedo. For the position I have ascribed to Phaedo as the most plausible explanation of the fragments surviving from dialogues written by him converges to an extraordinary degree with the psychological model championed by Socrates in another dialogue of which he is the narrator: I mean, of course, Plato's *Phaedo*.

It seems to me that the possibility that the *Phaedo* can be used as evidence for the views of the historical Phaedo should be taken seriously not simply because the dialogue is narrated by Phaedo—though indeed Plato goes out of his way to draw attention to the fact that it is, even making explicit his own absence from the discussions narrated[21]—but also because of the extent to which the psychological model assumed by Socrates within the dialogue is (or anyway *looks*) rather different from anything we get in other Platonic texts. This is true particularly in Socrates' treatment of desire—desire, that is, for corporeal stimulation or satisfaction. According to the 'standard' Platonic account, this sort of desire forms a distinct part of the soul, of which another part is reason. Like reason (with which it may conflict), such desire is a psychological determinant of action. What makes this a plausible account of desire is, first, the very fact that it is one source of impulse for a body whose life and activity depend on the presence of the soul; and, secondly, the fact that the *pleasure* posited by desire as the end of human activity is itself something that registers in the soul.[22] In the *Phaedo*, however, Plato appears to be trying something different. According to the Socrates of the *Phaedo*, desire is not of the soul at all, but of the body. It has an impact on the soul (which in essence is pure reason); but as a distraction to it, not as a wayward part of it. The idea seems to be that, once animated by the directive presence of reason, the needs and the satisfaction of the body assert themselves as appropriate objects of reason's care. In many

[21] Phaedo is made to say that Plato was prevented by illness from being present (59 B 10). Note also the emphatic assertion at the very opening of the dialogue of Phaedo's right to narrate as a witness of Socrates' last discussions: '"Were you yourself there, Phaedo?" "I was there myself, Echecrates."'

[22] Compare esp. *Philebus* 21 A–D (for the mental dimension to pleasure); 35 CD (for the location of desire and impulse in the soul).

cases, reason (brought through incarnation to forgetfulness of its proper, divine sphere) actually goes so far as to identify its own interests with those of the body. Nevertheless, the body, and the desires that come from it, are properly alien to the soul, which stands to them as a guard to his post (cf. 62 B), or a man to his cloak (cf. 87 B–E)—or, indeed, perhaps, as the condemned Socrates to the cell in which this dialogue is set.

It would be wrong to deny the familial resemblance between the *Phaedo* and other dialogues in which Plato discusses the character of the soul. In particular, Plato never denies the primacy of reason;[23] and if, in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, desire is so far from being alien to the soul that it seems to be an essential and immortal component of it, in the *Republic* and *Timaeus* Plato takes what might be thought of as the middle ground between this view and that of the *Phaedo*. According to these dialogues, desire is *of* the soul, indeed, but as accident not essence, so that it becomes a 'mortal' accompaniment to immortal reason which might (in images convergent with the dominant theme of the *Phaedo*) eventually be 'purged' of it.[24] Just as importantly, Plato never denies the crucial role played by the body in *shaping* desire, or the irrational soul more generally. Even if the desire for pleasure springs from the soul, the body, as the means by which the pleasure is attained, naturally has a significant input into the shape taken by an individual's desires. But this is *all* the body can do in the 'standard' Platonic account (I shall return to the point in more detail in Section II). It can *shape* the direction that irrational impulse takes; but desire (and the irrational soul more generally) consistently remains *distinct from* the body, and not necessarily determined by it.

This, then, is where the model presented in the *Phaedo* is unique. There is, to be sure, no clear case for thinking that Plato actually changed his mind over the nature of the soul. It might be, for example, that the model we are presented with in the *Phaedo* is intended to explore certain specific features of Plato's 'standard' psychological theory, not to challenge it altogether.[25] But the differences in presentation remain striking enough, even if that is all they are. On a straightforward reading of the *Phaedo*, desires *are* presented as functions of the body, and nothing else; desires can be resisted, but not, during life, eliminated. There is no scope for 'harmonizing' them with reason or

[23] Johansen (2000, at 109 with n. 34) notes references to our rational nature as 'original' in the *Republic* (611 D) and *Timaeus* (42 D, 90 D).

[24] *Republic* esp. 10. 611 B–612 A; *Timaeus* esp. 41 D; 69 CD (42 B for the escape of the just soul from incarnation).

[25] Perhaps, for example, we just have to accept that the soul manifests its nature differently in its incarnate and discarnate states so that 'desire' can be thought of as the operation of the soul in respect of the body—an essential and immortal capacity of the soul, but one which is, as it were, actualized only during incarnation so that it can also, from a certain perspective, be thought of as mortal (its actualization does not outlast connection with the body). In this case, Plato is not contradicting himself, merely considering the soul from different perspectives as it fits the needs of different dialogues. So e.g. Archer-Hind (1973) 27–31; cf. Bluck (1955) 2–5; Gerson (1987); Rowe (1993) 9; Johansen (2000). It does not affect my argument, that the *Phaedo* has an intertextual relationship with the historical Phaedo, whether these differences are philosophically substantial or simply a matter of perspective. Even differences of perspective need to be explained.

subduing them by it, because there is, more generally, no possibility for uprooting them from the body. And this suggests a further divergence from the 'standard' Platonic model. For according to the standard model, in which desires are properly part of the soul, one's natural character can be worked on and improved: desire can come under the influence of reason and be trained to a better state. But as far as the *Phaedo* is concerned (at least on a straightforward reading of it), one's natural character is ineliminably inscribed in one's body. Of course reason can resist: desire does not determine behaviour.[26] But reason cannot eradicate inclination. In these terms, people have control of their behaviour, but not their character or 'nature'. But, according to my earlier reconstruction, this is exactly what Phaedo of Elis seems to have thought. In other words, it seems to me that what is distinctive about the *Phaedo* might be explicable by the views of the historical Phaedo whom Plato chooses to narrate it.

It will be objected that my use of Plato's *Phaedo* as evidence for the views of Phaedo of Elis cannot be quite right—or what becomes of Plato himself in that dialogue? Surely Phaedo is some kind of spokesman for Plato? But my answer to this is that we need take seriously *both* the fact that Plato in fact wrote the work, *and also* the pointed and emphatic manner in which he places his authorial voice in the mouth, not just of a friend, of another member of Socrates' circle, but actually of a fellow-writer of Socratic dialogues. This suggests to me that we need to read the *Phaedo* as a strongly intertextual dialogue: in other words, that the question of *whose view* is expressed in Socrates' theory of the soul in the *Phaedo* is crudely put. It is not Plato's *or* Phaedo's view: it is Plato's view *in engagement with* that of Phaedo. A significant number of commentators have explained the idiosyncratic psychological theory of the *Phaedo* as Plato's exploration of his psychological model *from a particular point of view*.[27] All I am suggesting, in effect, is that we can be more specific about what that point of view is: that the *Phaedo* is written from the point of view of Plato's engagement with Phaedo in tackling the issues raised by those who deny the soul's immortality. As I have suggested elsewhere (Boys-Stones 2004), the reason that Plato might want to invoke Phaedo in this arena is precisely because his main interest is in proving the immortality of the rational soul in particular, and especially in proving its immortality against the 'harmony-theorists' who take the soul in its entirety to be an epiphenomenon of the body. Phaedo provides an ideal standpoint from which to conduct his argument: for he agrees with Plato that reason is immortal; but he also agrees with the harmony-theorists that some psychological functions are epiphenomena of the body. In Phaedo's voice, then, Plato criticizes the way in which the harmony-theorists extend a *plausible* claim that desires are epiphenomena of the body into an *untenable* claim for the mortality of reason

[26] Despite the apparently compelling nature of desires which leave no room for philosophy (66 B–D), and the unavoidable demands of pleasure and pain which 'rivet' the soul to the body (83 B–D), reason maintains control in the end. To think elevated thoughts in the grip of acute agony, for example, might not be within one's power; but reason can remodel one's life by avoiding situations in which intense pleasures and pains are likely to feature (83 B), so that one's behaviour comes to display the virtues of true courage, temperance, and justice (68 B–69 C).

[27] See again n. 25 above.

as well. Plato himself does not believe that desires are epiphenomena of the body, something that is clear in his investigation of the topic in other works; but in the *Phaedo* he can argue that *even if one thinks of them that way* (i.e. rather as Phaedo does) it gives no more weight to the suggestion that reason is an epiphenomenon of the body as well.

I have been at pains to make this point partly because in discussing Plato in the next section I shall need to claim that the *Phaedo* cannot be taken straightforwardly as evidence for Plato's views about the relationship between the body and soul—between physiology and character. But for now, of course, the important issue is what Phaedo believes; and this, I suggest, can be summarized from my survey of the *Phaedo* taken along with fragments of his own lost dialogues, as follows. According to Phaedo, desires and emotions are epiphenomena of physiological states. To this extent, Phaedo can understand the force of the epiphenomenalist claim. But he argues that one must not be misled (perhaps by the economy of the thought) into thinking that *reason* comes about in the same way. In fact reason is a qualitatively different feature of human activity, and something that is in no way defined by, or dependent on, or even (therefore?) confined to the body—as emotions and desires obviously are. When the activity of reason is correctly analysed, when one considers its capacity to *oppose* the body and corporeal desires in directing action (might one read the argument at *Phaedo* 93 A with the moral of the *Zopyrus* in mind?), one sees that it must be something distinct, and free, and immortal.[28]

The conclusion of all of this is that Zopyrus' diagnostic abilities must be limited: he cannot, after all, tell just by looking what people are *like* in the sense of telling *how they tend to behave* because there is nothing in their physical appearance to betray their education and philosophical attainment. But Phaedo can give him the theoretical underpinnings for the expectation that he will be able to discern exactly their *non-rational inclinations*—the 'natural' character of the irrational soul—given that this is an epiphenomenon of the very physiology which explains their outward appearance as well.

There is a tendency in contemporary scholarship to side with those who laughed at Zopyrus: to assume that physiognomy is successful only when it accurately captures the way someone actually is, rather than (if this should be different) his or her original or underlying nature. This tendency is supported by the fact that it is a selling-point of the handbooks that physiognomy is useful precisely because it can do this; also by the occasional use of the word physiognomy (outside philosophical contexts) to refer, not to innate character, but to current disposition.[29] However, we shall see that such a use of the word was, for philosophers, strictly secondary. Physiognomical handbooks improve

[28] And perhaps Phaedo spoke of its 'purification' (*katharsis*) in much the terms used by Socrates *passim* in the *Phaedo*. In any case, we have the evidence of Julian (as cited above) that Phaedo believed in the purifying power of philosophy: 'Phaedo . . . supposed that nothing was beyond the cure (*aniaton*) of philosophy, but that everyone can be purified (*kathairesthai*) of any kind of life through it.'

[29] Cf. Demosthenes, *Against Aristogeiton*, 98: the crowd outside the courtroom will be able to tell by physiognomy (*physiognōmonēsousi*) how the jurors have voted.

on Zopyrus by looking at traits—expression and movement, for example—which might betray modifications of innate character. But such modifications are not the substance of 'physiognomy' properly (or anyway philosophically) so called. It will become increasingly apparent that, at least in philosophical contexts, 'physiognomy' is restricted precisely to the claim that one can tell from appearance the *innate* character of a person or of his or her irrational soul. This becomes apparent from the fact that claims to physiognomy are altogether absent in philosophers who do not believe that the soul *has* an innate character—even when their psychological theory leads them to expect that character tends to develop in ways predictable from the individual's appearance. Among those philosophers who do embrace physiognomy, conversely, there is a consistent tendency to suppose that the soul has an innate character, even though it might be non-determinative for behaviour.

In what follows, I shall gather evidence for this position by looking in turn at Plato (glancing briefly at Antisthenes and Xenophon on the way), Aristotle, and the Stoics; I shall return to the question at the end of Section IV, before tracing physiognomy through the evidence of later antiquity. In order to be clear about Phaedo, however, I shall anticipate here my conclusion: all the thinkers just mentioned reflect on the link between appearance and character; but only Aristotle (in addition to Phaedo) lays claim to physiognomy; and the reason for this is that only he, to this extent like Phaedo, thinks that the link is with *innate* character. If Zopyrus deserves ridicule, it is only because he does not possess the theoretical grounding for the empirical connections he has observed. This theoretical grounding, I suggest, was supplied by Phaedo, for whom physiognomy—the diagnosis of specifically irrational character from outward appearance—was a natural consequence of his psychology.

II. THE CIRCLE OF SOCRATES (2): PLATO

Phaedo of Elis was not the only Socratic philosopher to be interested in the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body: far from it. But as far as we can tell, he was the only Socratic philosopher who made the soul—at least the irrational part of the soul, the locus of moral character—directly a function of the body. It is, then, I wish to suggest, no coincidence that for Phaedo alone of pre-Aristotelian philosophers we can reconstruct a positive attitude towards physiognomy. It is true that Xenophon, while conceiving of the soul as something essentially distinct from the body in its irrational as well as its rational aspects, has Socrates encourage the painter Parrhasius to think that he can capture the character of the soul (*to tês psychês êthos*) in his portraits.[30]

[30] *Memorabilia* 3. 10. 3. This chapter (whose dualism, by the way, is seen as anomalous by Claus 1981: 159–60; cf. 109) is the only passage on which a serious argument for a philosophically reflective physiognomy in Xenophon could be based. So Foerster (1893) ii. 249, inviting us to compare *Memorabilia* 3. 10. 5 with Ad. B28 and Anon. Lat. 50; also Métraux (1995) 5, suggesting 'affinities' with the pseudo-Aristotelian *Physiognomy*. Evans (1969) 46 and Misener (1924) 106 also see physiognomical influence in Xenophon's descriptions of Virtue and Vice in his narrative of the

But he does not do this by suggesting that a person has a natural psychological character that in some way is linked to the natural physical characteristics that distinguish him or her as an individual. Rather, he argues that a person's character or state of mind will tend to manifest itself through physical expression and posture—a very different proposition, and one that Xenophon does not encourage us to think of as physiognomical.[31] It is also true that Antisthenes wrote a work with 'physiognomy' in the title (*Physiognomical Treatise On the Sophists*: DL 6. 16). But we know nothing of the content of this work that could justify our using its title as evidence that Antisthenes thought he could supply theoretical grounds for a physiognomy.[32] In fact the likelihood is that Antisthenes denied the existence of the irrational soul altogether, in which case he could hardly have supposed that physical appearance was a guide to innate character or inclination.[33]

It would be wrong, then, to think that the evidence of Phaedo is enough to predispose us to the assumption that Plato, as a fellow-member of Socrates' circle, is interested in physiognomy. Indeed, what Plato has to say about beauty already suggests rather an anti-physiognomical strain to his thought. For Plato makes great play of the gap that exists between the beauty of the body and the beauty of the soul—the fact that outward manifestations of beauty are no guide to the inner man. Socrates is the supreme example of this: unusually ugly to look at, but unusually beautiful of soul. (Alcibiades famously compares him to a statue of Silenus which opens up to reveal an image of God inside: *Symposium*

choice of Heracles at *Memorabilia* 2. 1. 22, though they rather seem to me allegorical. (In particular, the 'plumpness', *polysarkia*, of Vice is probably better understood as indicating physical decadence than a deficiency in perception or intelligence, as Evans suggests on the basis of e.g. Ps.-Aristotle 807^b19–28.) Xenophon's famous descriptions of Socrates (esp. *Symposium* 5. 5–7; cf. 2. 19; 4. 18) are linked to no analysis of his character (*pace* again Evans, ibid.). The specific point that is made at *Symposium* 5. 5–7 is how useful Socrates finds his snub nose (for smelling) and bulging eyes (for seeing all around); the serious philosophical message, precisely that one should judge a body by its suitability for the purposes of the soul, not by its appearance (and cf. next note).

[31] Socrates gets Parrhasius to agree in turn to the propositions: (1) that humans cast sympathetic or baleful looks which can be depicted by the painter as well as the eyes can; (2) that joy and sorrow cause different facial expressions, so that these too can be reproduced; and finally, (3) that 'magnificence and liberality, baseness and illiberality, temperance and wisdom, violence and vulgarity shine though the face and the attitudes of men whether they are at rest or moving.' The point of all this for Xenophon is (not the coincidence of character between soul and body, but rather) the fact that one can tell from modifications of the body that the soul uses it as a tool. In the same passage, Socrates teaches a sculptor that he can capture the 'activities of the soul' in his work (*ta tēs psychēs erga*: *Memorabilia* 3. 10. 8), and a breastplate-maker that the ideal breastplate is not the most obviously beautiful, but rather the one best suited to the particular body (3. 10. 9–15). The moral is obviously the related one, that the body too should be judged by how useful it is for the soul's purposes, not by how attractive it is.

[32] For discussion, see Giannantoni, *SSR* iv. 281–3. The single fragment of the work that we have is ultimately unilluminating (*SSR* VA 62 = Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 14. 74. 11, 656 F: 'For they force-feed their porkers'). It is worth noting that there is no evidence of a claim to physiognomy among all the adherents of the Cynical movement, which traced its origins back to Antisthenes.

[33] As later Cynics, and like the Stoics, Antisthenes thought virtue sufficient for happiness (D.L. 6. 11)—which suggests that he, like them, saw the soul as essentially rational. (For the link between the Stoics' denial of an irrational soul and the absence from their thought of anything they would recognize as 'physiognomy', see Section IV.)

215 AB.) And Socrates is not the only person for whom external and internal beauty fail to coincide. The beauty of the youths who populate Plato's dialogues is often remarked on;[34] but quite apart from the fact that their physical beauty is subject to change and decay, and so could not, as such, be a reliable reflection of a settled good nature (cf. *Cratylus* 439 D), their very youth means that their achievement inevitably lags behind their looks. For them, in fact, physical beauty is not a mark of virtue, but at best an emblem or symbol for the *potential* that they, and all the young, have for virtue.[35] (Socrates finds *all* youths beautiful, presumably because he can see the potential in all: *Charmides* 154 B.) Whether this potential is fulfilled is another question altogether: it was not in the glamorous Alcibiades;[36] it might have been in the ugly Theaetetus (cf. *Theaetetus* 142 CD with 143 E–144 B). 'An evil soul might well reside in a fine body' (*Gorgias* 523 C): the determining factor in any case is the education a boy receives, not his birth. There is, to be sure, a hint in the dialogue named after him that Charmides might have *inherited* a noble character along with his good looks: at least, Socrates suggests that his ancestry makes it likely that he is virtuous as well as beautiful (157 D–158 B). But if the point is not that the family has a tradition of raising their children well, there is a touch of irony here. The official position is that, while one might be born more or less *intelligent*, virtue in all its forms is acquired, not innate (*Republic* 518 D–519 A). This being the case, of course, there is no reason to hope that any expertise for its recognition exists (*Meno* 89 AB).

It will be objected, and reasonably so, that all this is compatible with the claim that Plato accepted some form of physiognomy. Physiognomy, after all, is not so simply a matter of aligning beauty with virtue and ugliness with vice. Beauty supervenes on the arrangement of individual physical peculiarities: in the sensible world at least it is in the eye of the beholder (cf. esp. *Republic* 474 DE), and its very relativity thus rules it out as a potential physiognomical sign. Physiognomy, rather, is a matter of establishing the character of an individual's psychology on the basis of the physical peculiarities themselves. However, there are two reasons why I make the point. One reason is that Plato has surprisingly little to say about individual peculiarities of appearance. The very strong sense of a fully developed visual world that one might come away with from the dialogues is conjured up precisely by the kind of general background of interest in beauty that I have discussed, set off by the lightest touches of detail. The second reason is that, when Plato does discuss detailed features of appearance, it seems impossible to derive a physiognomical conclusion from them—and

[34] To cite just those after whom dialogues are named (references are to the eponymous dialogue): Charmides (154 B–D), Euthydemus (271 B), Lysis (204 E, 207 A), Meno (76 BC), Phaedrus (243 E, 252 B). Cf. also Alcibiades (104 A). Phaedo has beautiful hair (89 B).

[35] Pausanias (*Symposium* 181 DE) rather piously suggests that there should be a law against falling in love with a youth before he is old enough to grow a beard, precisely on the ground that it will not be clear whether the boy is destined for virtue or vice. He misses the point, of course: the right lover will be in a position to tip the balance, and ensure that when the youth has lost his physical beauty, he will be left with (the much more valuable) beauty of soul. (It might be significant that Socrates seems to have followed the pattern recommended by Pausanias in pursuing his most conspicuous failure—Alcibiades: cf. *Alcibiades* 103 AB with *Protagoras* 309 AB.)

[36] For a précis of Alcibiades' career, cf. e.g. Denyer (2001) 1–3.

it might not be going too far to say that they carry with them an anti-physiognomical message.

To make the point, I here list all cases where Plato indulges in a description of the kinds of physical characteristic that could conceivably provoke a physiognomist's interest. By this qualification, I mean to exclude not just people who are said merely to be 'beautiful' (for reasons already discussed), but in general those whose descriptions involve markers of age or status or fashion rather than their essential distinguishing features. This exclusion would embrace the 'thinnish' (*sklēphros*) Critobulus who is contrasted with the more 'developed' (*prospherēs*) Euthydemus at *Euthydemus* 271 B (the point seems to be the speed at which the two boys have developed physically); the aged Parmenides who is 'very grey' (*sphodra polios*: *Parmenides* 127 B),[37] along with the 'tall and graceful' Zeno who accompanies him (ibid.);[38] Alcibiades in his first beard at *Protagoras* 309 A; Phaedo with his long and beautiful hair (*Phaedo* 89 B: it was obviously a matter of choice or convention that he wore it long).[39] Socrates' mother Phaenarete is described as 'noble and tough' (*Theaetetus* 149 A: *gennaias te kai blosyras*), and it is possible that the second of these words is supposed to refer to her appearance ('burly' would be a possible translation). But even if it does (and it seems unlikely),[40] it tells us rather little: was she naturally burly or did she become so as a result of her profession?

Finally, there are people in the dialogues whose appearance suggests something like 'respectability', as when Parmenides (again) is described as *kalos de kagathos tēn opsin* (*Parmenides* 127 B; similarly Euthydemus at *Euthydemus* 271 B, and Lysis at *Lysis* 207 A). Perhaps in Parmenides' case, his grey hair contributes to the impression; otherwise Plato has nothing specific to say about what does. By my reckoning, in fact, Plato comments on the distinctive physical traits of just *three* of the characters mentioned in the dialogues; in addition to this, of one purely stereotypical human being, one god (imaginatively rendered), and two horses (likewise imaginary):

1. *Meletus.* Anytus' partner in the accusation brought against Socrates is described by Socrates in these terms (*Euthyphro* 2 B): 'He seems to me someone young and unknown ... His deme is Pitheus, in case you know

[37] It could not even be argued that Parmenides' greyness shows that he avoided baldness in later life (which in itself *might* have led to conclusions, e.g. about his sexual vigour: cf. Aristotle, *HA* 3. 11, 518^{b}24–5; *GA* 4. 5, 774^{a}36–^{b}2). A man with little enough hair to qualify as 'bald' man might yet have enough to show that he is grey; and even a completely bald man might have a grey beard.

[38] Cf. Denyer (2001) 86 on *Alcibiades* 104 A 5.

[39] Convention if it is supposed to indicate that Phaedo was still a boy at the time of the dialogue (e.g. Burnet 1911 on 89 B 2, and Bluck 1955: 34; but against this see Robin 1926: p. x, followed by Rossetti 1977: 122–6, and Rowe 1993: 212); choice if it is an indication of pro-Spartan affiliation (e.g. Parmentier 1926: 22–3; Montuori 1976: 35–6; Nails 2002: 231). Perhaps it is not significant of anything in particular (Giannantoni at *SSR* 4. 119). Less likely is the possibility that it is a hangover from the time Phaedo is supposed to have spent as a prostitute (Davidson 1997: 332 n. 56; for the story, see the accounts at *SSR* IIIA 1–3).

[40] Plato uses exactly the same phrase at *Republic* 535 B as is used here of Phaenarete, and there he is talking precisely and explicitly about the psychological character needed by those due to be educated as rulers. Among other things, they must be 'noble and tough (*gennaious te kai blosyrous*) in their character (*ēthē*)'.

one Meletus of Pitheus: he has long straight hair, not much of a beard, and an aquiline nose (*epigrypon*)'.[41]

2. *Theaetetus.* Theodorus enthuses to Socrates about a remarkable youth he has met. He worries that Socrates would suppose that he was in love with the youth—if the youth were beautiful. 'But,' he continues, 'as it is—don't be annoyed—he isn't beautiful, but his snub nose (*simotēta*) and bulging eyes (*to exō tōn ommatōn*) make him look like you. But these features are less pronounced than with you' (*Theaetetus* 143 E). Later on, Socrates himself notes that the description 'snub-nosed and with bulging eyes' (*simon te kai exophthalmon*) could apply equally to himself or to Theaetetus (209 C).
3. *Socrates.* See above on Theaetetus for the only direct mentions in Plato of Socrates' physical attributes; but the implication of *Phaedo* 102 B may be that Socrates was, in addition, short in stature.[42] Elsewhere, Meno compares him to a sting-ray 'in appearance (*eidos*) and in other respects' (*Meno* 80 A); and Alcibiades says he is just like Silenus, or the satyr Marsyas (*Symposium* 215 AB). For completeness (and because physiognomists are particularly interested in the eyes), it might be added that Socrates had, at times, a very direct way of looking at you (*Phaedo* 86 D); perhaps, at times, a menacing gaze.[43]
4. *A stereotype.* At *Republic* 495 E, Socrates is explaining the bad reputation in which philosophy is held. It happens, he says, because the best men are corrupted away from the practice of philosophy, which gets taken over by pretentious second-raters. 'Do you think,' Socrates continues, 'that they [i.e. pretentious second-raters] look any different from a bald-headed little coppersmith who has come into some money, recently come out of prison, has washed at the bath and put on a new cloak like someone intending to

[41] Note that the nose is the one relevant feature here: Meletus' sparse beard is an indication of his age, his hair-length a matter of choice; neither tell us about his physical type. Physiognomical prejudice (or perhaps an assumption about ancient physiognomical prejudice) often misleads translators into representing Plato's description of Meletus as inherently unattractive (e.g. Nails 2002: 202: 'long hair, scraggly beard and somewhat hooked nose'). But nothing in the Greek gives licence to this. The point of Meletus' long hair and aquiline nose is rather that they suggest his aristocratic background. It is true that long hair could have negative moral (or political) connotations for Athenians (cf. Manitheus' concern that his long hair will prejudice the jury against him: Lysias, *Pro Manitheo* 16. 18–19). But this is precisely because it is a *deliberate* signal of aristocratic affiliation, something which might well provoke suspicion (cf. Hall 1995: 51–3, esp. 52). It might even be that Plato is playing to this prejudice in drawing specific attention to Meletus' long hair; but it should also be remembered that he is very much of the class himself, and is able to present a sympathetic portrait of at least one other long-haired young aristocrat, namely Phaedo (cf. above with n. 39).

[42] Relatively short, anyway, since what Socrates tells us is that he is shorter than Simmias, who is in turn shorter than Phaedo (*Phaedo* 102 BC). It should be remembered, however, that Socrates is 70 years of age, while Simmias and Phaedo are nearer their physical prime, so it not clear that the passage should be used as absolute evidence for Socrates' diminutive stature (*pace* Evans 1969: 21).

[43] When asking the jailer if he might pour a libation from his cup of poison we are told that he 'glowered at the man, as he used to do, like a bull' (*Phaedo* 117 B). The context makes this difficult, though: is it only at this man (the jailer) that he used to look thus? Is the gravity implied by Plato's description to be taken seriously? (The question which accompanies it here is not without humour.)

get himself a wife, and is about to marry his master's daughter because she is poor and abandoned?'

5. *Eros.* In the course of his speech on the god, Agathon describes Eros in these terms (*Symposium* 196 A): 'He is very young and soft (*hapalōtatos*); in addition his appearance is supple (*hygros to eidos*)—for if he were stiff (*sklēros*), he would not be able to enfold a soul completely or escape notice when he first entered it or withdrew. Besides, his graceful good looks (*euschēmosynē*) prove that he is balanced and fluid in his nature. Everyone knows that Eros has extraordinary good looks,[44] and between ugliness and Love there is unceasing war.'[45]
6. *Metaphorical horses.* Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (at 246 AB) famously compares the soul to: 'an inborn faculty consisting of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. The horses and charioteers of the gods are all themselves good, and of good parentage, but everyone else has a mixture. First, our driver is in charge of a chariot and pair; secondly, one of his horses is noble, and of noble stock, but the other is the opposite of noble, and of opposite stock.' (In terms of the psychological model outlined in the *Republic*, the good horse represents the spirited part of the soul, the bad horse the desiring part; and the charioteer represents reason.) A little further on (at 253 DE), we get more detailed descriptions of the horses. The good horse is 'upright with well-articulated limbs, has a high neck (*hypsauchēn*), is aquiline (*epigrypos*), white in appearance, with eyes that are black; he is a lover of honour, and moderate and modest; a friend of true glory; not needing the whip, he is guided by verbal command only.' The bad horse, on the other hand, is 'crooked, lumbering, ill-made, with a stout, short neck (*kraterauchēn*), is snub-nosed (*simoprosōpos*), black, with grey, bloodshot eyes; is a friend of outrage and boastfulness; is shaggy around the ears, deaf, and scarcely yields to whip and goad combined.'

What should we make of these characterizations? The description of the coppersmith, first, has nothing to do with physiognomy, but must represent an appeal on Plato's part to the snobbery of his audience. This is very clear, not just because we have no physiognomical text that links baldness (or short stature) with the desire for upward mobility that characterizes the coppersmith: that might or might not be relevant. What certainly is relevant, however, is something that Plato himself says later in the very same work (the *Republic*). For Plato explicitly tells us that no psychological difference is indicated by a man's being bald or long-haired: they have the *same nature* (*Republic* 454 C).[46]

'Physiognomy' in any but the crudest sense of the word is similarly beside the point in understanding Agathon's description of Eros as 'supple in form'.

[44] In fact not everyone does know this, as it happens: Socrates argues that Eros, as *desiring* beauty, is himself neither beautiful nor ugly (*Symposium* 202 AB).

[45] Cf. *Lysis* 216 CD for a similar characterization of beauty.

[46] The point of this passage, by the way, is to suggest that there is no more basis for discriminating between men and women in the division of tasks than between the bald and the hirsute. Taken as a whole, it might be noted that the argument already suggests that the 'nature' of a person is independent of *any* physical differentia they might possess.

The word *hygros* (literally 'moist') does, to be sure, have a certain currency in medical circles, where it is a quality taken to be more characteristic of the flesh of women, for example, than of men;[47] and there are physiognomical consequences one can draw from it.[48] But much more to the point is the fact that the flesh of children is also taken to be 'moister' (or 'more supple') than that of adults.[49] Rather than constructing a physiognomical picture of Eros (there is too little said about his appearance for this to be a realistic motive in any case), it is clear that Agathon is providing us with an interpretation of Eros' iconography. Eros is depicted as young and (therefore) supple (or moist): why? Because 'if he were stiff (*sklēros*; or 'dry'), he would not be able to enfold a soul completely or escape notice when he first entered it or withdrew'. Eros' youthful suppleness is allegorical, not physiognomical.[50]

The descriptions which have received the most attention, as evidence for Plato's physiognomical interests, are the horses in the *Phaedrus*.[51] This, as I shall suggest, is in fact entirely appropriate—though not for the reasons usually adduced. For it seems to me that to see Plato's account of the horses as *physiognomical* once again would be to miss his point. In particular, it misses the subtle blend of convention and subversion in the horses' portraits. For these portraits are *boringly* conventional, insofar they do little more than to establish the horses as, respectively, good and bad *horses*. In particular, its 'upright' bearing, high neck, and aquiline nose would all serve to make the good horse recognizable as such to any rider.[52] Given this perfectly innocent explanation for Plato's descriptions, it is impossible to say without begging the question that he intended their details to apply to good and bad human beings as well.[53] The fact that the terms of his descriptions turn up in later physiognomical handbooks only tells us that the Greeks used the same vocabulary to describe the physical attributes of humans and animals. The fact that some of them answer in those

[47] e.g. Hippocrates, *AWP* 10. 32–3; Aristotle, *HA* 538^{b}9–10 (and cf. Ps.-Aristotle 809^{b}11); Dean-Jones (1994), 46.

[48] It is mostly a good sign in Ps.-Aristotle: e.g. 807^{b}12–13 (with the same combination of 'moist' and 'soft'), 808^{a}25. Cf. 813^{b}7–35 (with Vogt 1999: 459–61 ad loc.), where moistness of flesh (associated with cold) is one of the factors that affects the flow of the blood, and so the character of the individual.

[49] e.g. Hippocrates, *Regimen* 1. 33. 1 (and cf. Galen, *On Medical Method*, x. 195. 9–11 Kühn).

[50] An alternative explanation of Eros' being soft and supple is hinted at in Plutarch (*Table-Talk* 622 D): when a stingy man falls in love, he melts like iron in the fire, and becomes 'soft and supple and more pleasant' (*hapalos kai hygros kai hēdiōn*). (Other examples of *hygros erōs*, though much later, and both in a literally humid context, are Oppian, *Halieutica* 4. 2; Nonnus, *Dionysiaca* 16. 65, 40. 560.) For an altogether different interpretation of Eros' iconographical youth, cf. Cornutus, *Introduction to the Traditions of Greek Theology* 25, 47. 4–5 Lang, where it symbolizes the folly of the lover.

[51] Cf. esp. Misener (1924), 106–7, and Evans (1969), 21. Foerster cites the passage at (1893) ii. 252–3.

[52] This text of the *Phaedrus* was in fact read this way by the author of the *Hippiatrica* (cf. fragmenta Anatolii de equis 2). Cf. already e.g. Xenophon, *On Horsemanship* 1. 8 (and note that the features listed here are marks only of a good *physical* type: this is, as Xenophon says at 1. 1, all one has to go on with an unbroken horse, for whose 'soul' there are 'no clear signs').

[53] That the 'form of the description is that commonly used in later physiognomical handbooks' (Evans 1969: 21) is neither here nor there. It is more likely, in any case, that both rely on standard diagnostic patterns.

handbooks to features of character appropriate to the corresponding horse[54] tells us no more than the fact that some of them do not.[55]

In the context of Plato's own writing, however, the portraits he paints of the *Phaedrus* horses are also strikingly subversive—subversive, that is, of any thought that one can take the link between character and appearance ascribed to these horses beyond the frame of the comparison and into the human world. For (whatever comparisons one might make with later textbooks) there is one outstanding feature of each horse which suggests a link with human characters described by Plato himself: the nose. The good horse, we are told, is aquiline (*epigrypos*), the bad horse is snub (*simoprosōpos*). Yet, as have seen, it is the one evil-doing youth in Plato, Meletus, who is aquiline (*epigrypos*), while Socrates and the most promising of his young acquaintances, Theaetetus, are snub (*simoi*).[56] Given how little delineation of human features there is in Plato, and given the fame of Socrates' snub nose, it is hard not to see here almost a deliberate warning *against* drawing physiognomical conclusions. The truth, in any case, is that Meletus and the good horse look noble; Socrates, Theaetetus, and the bad horse do not.

For physiognomy to work, there has to be a stable relationship between the sign and the signified; if apparent exceptions emerge, they have to be resolved (as we have seen that, in the *Zopyrus*, Phaedo points up the apparent exception of Socrates in order to resolve it). Plato allows beauty to be emblematic of virtue or promise; but his (three) concrete descriptions are all exceptional. Personal

[54] For the good horse, Evans (n. 31) compares its description as 'upright' (*orthos*) with Ps.-Aristotle 807^a31–2 and 808^a19–20 (1969: 21 n. 31). For the bad horse, she compares 'crooked and lumbering' (*skolios, polys*) with Ps.-Aristotle '807b' (sc. $^b29$–31?) (n. 36). Evans further suggests that *polys* 'is related to' *polysarkia*, a sign of insensibility, and compares Ps.-Aristotle '807a' (i.e. 807^b 19–28?) (n. 37).

[55] The following are examples from Evans's own references where the handbooks suggest an association of character at odds with what Plato says of the horses. First, the 'high neck' of the good horse (*hypsauchēn*): Evans compares signs of *arrogance* at Ad. B39–40 (1969: 21 n. 32). The 'stout, short neck' (*kraterauchēn*) of the bad horse, conversely, suggests bravery: Evans (n. 38) compares Ps.-Aristotle 811^a10. But then again, the handbooks would also see signs of *cowardice* in both horses (though cowardice is not obviously a feature even of the bad horse): the good horse because of its black eyes (*melanommatos*: Evans n. 35 compares Ps.-Aristotle 812^b1; though she also notes Ad. B36, where a black eye is a sign of tameness); the bad horse because of its grey eyes (*glaukommatos*: Evans n. 40 compares Ad. B33), because it is 'shaggy' (Evans n. 41 cites Ps.-Aristotle '812b', though there is nothing here corresponding to Plato's specification 'around the ears'), and finally because it is 'black' (*melanchrōs*: Evans n. 39 compares Ps.-Aristotle '811b' (though 812^a12, $^b1$–2 would be more to her point; cf. also 808^a17), and Ad. B25).

[56] The word *epigrypos* is used in Plato only of Meletus and the bad horse—though *grypos* occurs at *Republic* 474 D, in a list demonstrating how a keen lover will find quite opposing characteristics attractive in different cases. The word *simos* appears in the same list, but otherwise is used only in Plato's descriptions of Socrates and Theaetetus, and as part of the compound word *simoprosōpos* (literally 'snub-faced') used to describe the bad horse. Two more speculative observations might support my suggestion that the bad horse is supposed to look like Socrates. First, the *iugula concava* observed in Socrates by Zopyrus (Phaedo, *Zopyrus* fr. 6 Rossetti; Kahn 1996: 11 translates 'bull neck') might recall the bad horse's thick neck (*kraterauchēn*). Secondly, it might be significant that one distinctive physical feature of Socrates does *not* find its way into the description of the horses: his bulging eyes (*Theaetetus* 209 C: *exophthalmon*). Could it be that they are absent because they would have to be a feature of the good horse (Xenophon, *On Horsemanship* 1. 9: *exophthalmon*)?

appearance is a shifting, unstable, unreliable guide to the truth: a very Platonic, but a fatally anti-physiognomical, conclusion.

I take it, then, that Plato was resistant—and perhaps consciously so—to the idea of physiognomy. But there is more to this resistance than a desire to reinforce the familiar lesson that, as philosophers, we should shed our fixation with the perceptible and search for a grasp of the underlying realities in their own terms. A sceptical attitude towards physiognomy is in fact a natural consequence of Plato's psychological theory, and in particular his beliefs about the relationship between soul and body. The reason for this is that physiognomy acquires theoretical credibility only if moral character and physical development are supposed to be related (e.g. at the level of physiology). But in the normal run of Plato's theory, there is no causal relation between body and soul which makes this inevitable. The growth and character of the body can be explained by physical causes; but the soul pre-exists (the soul, in fact, is immortal), and comes into the body with its own history, and a (moral) character developed through its previous experiences of incarnation and the world beyond. There is actually no reason why the body *should* look like the soul, or why it should be any guide to the characterful individual which inhabits it.

It is always dangerous to generalize across Plato's works, and it is certainly possible to appeal to texts in which this rather severe generalization is qualified; but none challenges the basic premise. In fact it is only in the *Phaedo* that we are presented with a psychological model according to which moral character (that is, roughly speaking, non-rational inclination) is rooted in and derived from the body—and the psychology of the *Phaedo*, as I argued in the last section, seems to owe this much at least to Plato's engagement with Phaedo of Elis in that dialogue, and cannot therefore be read as a straightforward account of his own considered judgement.

Nevertheless, Plato clearly did take seriously the effects that the body could have on the soul. A small but significant number of texts state or imply that the body and the physical environment more generally can affect the character of the soul. A temperate climate can be used to explain the superior intellectual powers of the inhabitants of Greece, and had formed the backdrop to the excellent natures of the inhabitants of Atlantis.[57] Despite his commitment to the transmigration of souls,[58] a number of passages attest to Plato's belief that

[57] *Timaeus* 24 C = Foerster (1893) ii. 251–2 (on the character of the Greeks); *Critias* 111 E (on the Atlantans); also *Republic* 435 E = Foerster (1893) ii. 249–50 (of northern races such as Thracians and Scythians); and cf. *Laws* 747 DE = Foerster (1893) ii. 251. In this context, Foerster lists *Laws* 705 A = Foerster (1893) ii. 250–1, where the Athenian Stranger warns against the foundation of cities near the sea. But this passage makes no allusion to the effects of the climate on character: rather, it argues that people living on the sea-board are unduly exposed to, and tend to become unduly attached to, novelty, luxury, and alien patterns of thought.

[58] The Stoics at least appear to have thought that the phenomenon of inherited character sat uneasily with transmigration (Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* 1053 C); but in fact there are ways of reconciling the two, as Neoplatonists proved (see further Section VI). *À propos*: it has sometimes been assumed that passages in Plato which suggest transmigration between species provide evidence for his interest in physiognomy (e.g. *Phaedo* 81 E–82 B = Foerster 1893: ii. 253; and cf. Evans 1969: 22). There is of course (and was already in antiquity) a question over whether Plato

psychological character is inherited, just as physical character is,[59] and he might have thought that there was some physical basis for this.[60] Indeed, in an article on the *Timaeus*, Christopher Gill has argued that Plato in that dialogue systematically ascribes psychological failings—from madness to sexual excess—to the constitution of the body, so that one precisely can talk of character in reductionist terms as 'body-based character'. (Gill, in fact, appeals to the reductionist reading of this dialogue by Galen.)[61]

There is, however, an important qualification to be made of Gill's account of the *Timaeus*, and it is one whose conclusion applies to all the texts mentioned. In brief, whatever *influence* Plato ascribes to physical factors in the development of the non-rational soul, he never says that they *determine* its character (or in any sense its nature) from the start. Indeed, they may never, in fact *should* never, have any effect at all, since they are counterbalanced by the positive effect on character of reason in shaping a person's upbringing. Plato is careful to say that a person becomes bad (i.e. acquires a particular irrational character) because of a bad state of body *and* an 'upbringing without education' (86 E); or where a poor state of body *combines with* a poor government and poor parenting (87 AB); the route to happiness, conversely, involves both physical *and* intellectual training (88 BC). The result of all this is that Plato is not quite so Galenic as Gill implies. For Galen (as we shall see in Section V), the character of the soul is (somehow or other) a *function* of the temperament of the body; for Plato, the body is only one influence on the character of the non-rational soul.[62]

meant this literally; but even if he did, the point is that one's soul migrates into the body of an animal which one comes to resemble in behaviour, not looks (*Timaeus* 42 C; and note the diverse range of forms which might fall to the conventionally just man: a wasp or ant in *Phaedo* 82 B, but a bird in *Timaeus* 91 DE).

[59] So *Charmides* 157 D–158 B; *Cratylus* 394 A; hence also the possibility of breeding for good character: *Republic* 375–6, 459; *Politicus* 310 and *Laws* 773 AB; cf. *Critias* 121 AB.

[60] In the context of the *Timaeus* this seems likely. The parent, *qua* begetter (not *qua* educator: that is considered separately) takes more responsibility for the evil character of the child than the child itself (*Timaeus* 87 B).

[61] See Gill (2000), 62. (For Galen's reductionist reading of Plato, see further Section V.) Cf. *Timaeus* 86 C–E (an excess of seed around the spinal marrow leads to a foolish soul); 86 E = Foerster (1893) ii. 252 (poor physical condition, like maleducation, might be the cause of vice); 87 A (humours cause ill temper, melancholy, rashness, cowardice, forgetfulness, stupidity in the soul); 88 AB (a strong body making a weaker soul dull and stupid and ignorant). Cf. also *Laws* 728 DE (a moderate body has best effect on soul); 790 E (fearfulness is a morbid condition which arises when the soul is dominated by movement of body). Alcohol, of course, provides good proof that the soul's activities can be impeded by the body: *Laws* 645 DE (and cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiognomy* 805^{a}2–4).

[62] Cf. Lloyd (1987), 28–30 n. 89. Gill recognizes (2000: 60), but plays down (61) the significance of educational and political influences on psychological development. I also disagree with him about the effect of the physical environment on reason. Gill assumes that the state of reason, and so one's ability to apply a positive control on the development of one's character, is itself at the mercy of physiology. It seems, however, only to be the case that certain pathological states are able to *disrupt* the normal course of reason to cause madness and ignorance. (Plato would, I assume, think that people suffering mental illnesses of this kind can and should be placed, like children, under the protective rationality of others. In this way, even *their* character can be protected from strictly unnatural influences.)

It might be objected that this misses the point: that 'reason' (particularly when it is someone else's reason, e.g. that of our parents) is, as it were, a corrective, and that the physical forces on our development represent what would be the 'natural' state of our character were the artifice of reason not to be applied. But Plato is, on the contrary, clear that philosophy is an entirely natural factor in our development: a *natural* counterweight to the influence of the body on the irrational soul. This is so not just in the sense that it is a naturally occurring feature of the environment, but in the very strong sense that a tendency to do *and to be receptive to* philosophy is itself part of the physical construction and development of the individual's body—every bit as much as (and probably, in fact, more than) an inclination towards the various forms of vice. As a human being grows, the overwhelmingly disturbing influences of the infant body tend to decline, and education (physical as well as philosophical) is supposed to kick in to ensure a healthy state of soul *and body* (44 BC; cf. 88 BC); and man's philosophical destiny (cf. 42 AB) is an explanatory factor behind, for example, the structure of the sense-organs (47 B–E), the mouth (75 E), and even the gut (72 E–73 A).[63]

The point of all this, so far as I am concerned, is that, while the character of the irrational soul can certainly be influenced by the body (even, when unchecked, to the extent of disabling reason), and while it might be true that every negative characteristic of the soul has a physical cause, it would not be right to say that the *natural* character of the irrational soul is determined by the body (nor, then, by any external factor which might have an influence on the body). It is not the case, for example, that the body determines the nature of the soul (as it does in Phaedo), and philosophy is awakened later on in reaction to the psychological 'diseases' this entails. Rather, an individual's *natural* state consists in a proper equilibrium of the irrational soul as it is held in balance between, on the one hand, the requirements of physical existence and, on the other, the controlling force of reason. (It makes no difference that this reason, in the first place, is that of the educators.) Rather than saying that the character of the soul is naturally determined by the body, the most we can say is that, *if something goes wrong*, in particular if the appropriate (natural) educational forces are not in play, then the soul will tend to acquire a character which can be explained by the individual's physiology.[64]

Still, it might be said, this is not bad going. If we assume that *appearance* is in any case determined by physiology, then we should be able to make a reasonable judgement of a person's character in every case where the proper educational system was lacking. Since the proper educational system is (in our sorry times) almost *always* lacking, our success rate is likely to be high. A refusal to credit

[63] Cf. on this Johansen (2000) 109–10; Steel (2001).

[64] Note that this is subtly, but importantly, different from the common Neoplatonist line explored in Section VI, according to which irrational inclinations are written into the body, to manifest themselves as psychological affections in the absence of reason's control. Plato merely says, at most, that the body tends to influence the character of the irrational soul.

Plato with a physiognomy starts, after all, to look rather forced.[65] But it looks forced, as I am arguing, only if we make assumptions about the meaning of the word 'physiognomy' for ancient philosophers. If I am right that ancient philosophers reserved the notion of physiognomy for the claim that a *natural* state of character could be deduced from the natural appearance of the body (and not just for any claim that mental state and appearance are linked) then Plato is not properly considered, and certainly would not consider himself, an ally of physiognomy. In this respect, as I shall suggest at the end of Section IV, his thought has some interesting parallels with that of the earlier Stoics—and when we have seen what they think, and why, in particular, they did not think of themselves as physiognomists, it will be possible to understand Plato's position more clearly. However, it is also necessary first to be clear about what the acceptance of physiognomy *does* involve for a philosopher; and this is something we can see if we turn now to the most influential of ancient physiognomical theorists: Plato's own pupil Aristotle.

III. ARISTOTLE AND HIS SCHOOL

Peripatetic works of physiognomy: Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiognomy* (805^a1–814^b9 Bekker); Loxus (fragments: Origen, *Against Celsus* 1. 33; Anon. Lat. 1, 2, 12, 48, 80–1, 89, 117, 133).[66] References to an Aristotelian *Physiognomy*: DL 5. 25; Anon., *Vita Menagiana Aristotelis* A. 97 Rose; Anon. Lat. 1, 48, 55, 72, 83–9, 117; Adamantius A1; Galen, *QAM* 57. 7–9 Müller; Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 47. 6. 1–20, i. 301. 23–302. 17 Wachsmuth (quoting the surviving *Physiognomy* 805^a1–18); Pollux, *Onomasticon* 2. 135. 7 Bethe (cf. Suetonius, *de blasphemiis* 4. 70 Taillardat) (cites 811^a17). Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in Aristotle (other than the *Physiognomy*): *Prior Analytics* 2. 27, 70^b7, 13–14, 25–6, 32; *GA* 4. 3, 769^b20. Citations of Aristotelian physiognomy from works not named: Pliny, *Natural History* 11. 273 (= Aristotle, fr. 286 $Rose^3$); cf. Pompeius Trogus, *On Animals* fr. 10 Seel [not naming Aristotle, but cf. *HA* 491^b11–26]. References under this description to physiognomical passages in known Aristotelian works other than the *Physiognomy*: Antigonus, *Collection of Amazing Stories* 114a–c Giannini [not naming Aristotle; but cf. *HA* 491^b11–26, 492^a34–$^b3$, 572^a8–13]; Galen, *QAM* 51. 12–57. 6 Müller [*PA* 648^a2–13, 650^b14–651^a17; *HA* 491^b11–492^a12, $^a34$–$^b3$]; Ammonius, *On the Prior Analytics* iv. 6. 7. 16 Wallies [from the proem, with *Prior Analytics* 70^b7–38 in mind]; Philoponus, *On the Prior Analytics* xii. 2 483. 22–4, 484. 8–11, 485. 5 Wallies [*Prior Analytics* 70^b7–38]; *Commentary on the Generation of Animals* xiv. 3, 185. 13 Hayduck [on *GA* 769^a9, with 769^b20–1 in mind]; cf. *Commentary on the De anima* xv, 155. 22 Hayduck [commenting on *DA* 408^a34–$^b2$]; Latin Scholia to the *Prior Analytics* 370–1 Minio-Paluello [*Prior Analytics* 70^b7, 11]. Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in other Peripatetic writers: Alexander, *On Fate* 171. 11–12 Bruns (also quoted at Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 6. 9. 22).[67]

The single most influential work of physiognomy written in antiquity was the *Physiognomy* which circulated (and survives) under the name of Aristotle.

[65] One should, of course, keep in mind the fact that Plato never once offers us an example of a link between a particular trait of appearance and a particular psychological trait; the position would have to be that physiognomy is *implicit* in Plato.

[66] For Loxus' Peripatetic credentials, see subsection (iii) below.

[67] Alexander was once erroneously credited with a commentary on Aristotle's *Physignomonica*: see Foerster (1893) i, pp. xxxiii f. (The 'physiognomical' passages Foerster himself identified in Alexander, given ibid. 283, are also drawn from a spurious work: see Rose 1863: 216–19; Cranz 1960: 126–35.)

Apart from the fact that the name of Aristotle did a certain amount in its own right to advertise and lend credibility to the study of physiognomy in Classical antiquity and beyond,[68] the work apparently asserted itself as the principal work of reference for all subsequent writing on physiognomy. The two later handbooks which survive from Classical antiquity, those by Polemon and the anonymous Latin writer, draw heavily on it; Galen seems to have had it in mind when engaging in his own theoretical discussion of physiognomy, and may even have intended to invoke it in the opening sentence of the *Powers of the Soul* [*QAM*] (as I suggest in Section V n. 184 below). Antonella Ghersetti shows, in Ch. 6, how the work, read through Galenic lenses, was received in the Arabic tradition as the foundational text of a 'scientific' physiognomy.

But it is not only the case that the later tradition looked back to Aristotle for the definitive, or at least the seminal, account of physiognomy as a practical science; it is also the case that most later theoretical discussions of physiognomy in the Classical world in particular depend more or less directly on a reading of Aristotle for their account of how body and soul interact in such a way that physiognomy becomes a possibility in the first place. This might seem slightly more surprising, since Aristotle's hylomorphic model of the soul did not have a significant take-up among post-Aristotelian thinkers—at least not in the terms we would find it historically appropriate to reconstruct for him. But it happens that Aristotle came to be read in some quarters as an advocate of *epiphenomenalism*, the theory that psychological functions are explicable in terms of a person's physiological state.[69] Since, as I shall argue, such a reading was made possible by those very features of his psychology that open the way to physiognomy, it is after all no surprise, even if it is not exactly inevitable, that

[68] It should be noted that, conversely, Aristotle's forays into physiognomy can be used to undermine his credibility—as in the case of the (Epicurean?) critique of Aristotle's natural history which deploys physiognomical material from *HA* 1. 10 (see Section IV n. 132 below). Even among those who are sympathetic to Aristotle, not everyone finds this material easy to swallow: Pliny confronts it with an exasperated *miror* (*Natural History* 11. 273–4 = Aristotle, fr. 286 Rose[3]; cf. *HA* 493^b32). The immediate object of Pliny's concern here are signs of longevity, not character, but he goes on at 11. 275–6 to assimilate these to more conventional physiognomical observations which he quotes from Pompeius Trogus, but which mostly draw on Aristotle, *HA* 491^b11–26. (Pliny's distaste for physiognomy here is not, by the way, inconsistent with *Natural History* 11. 138 = Foerster 1893: ii. 327, which is about facial expression, not physiognomy as such.)

[69] So already, in the generation after Aristotle, Dicaearchus (frr. 14–28 Mirhady/7–12 Wehrli); Aristoxenus (frr. 118–20 Wehrli); Strato (fr. 118 Wehrli). Later on, Andronicus (quoted semi-approvingly by Galen at *QAM* 44. 12–20 Müller); Boethus (see esp. Gottschalk 1986); Nicolaus (Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 353. 12–354. 18 Wachsmuth); Alexander of Aphrodisias (see his surviving work *On the Soul*). Cf. generally Caston (1997). For Dicaearchus in particular: Caston (2001) and Sharples (2001). For Andronicus, Alexander, and their relationship to Galen: Donini (1971); (1974) 127–85; Moraux (1973–84) i. 132–6 (Andronicus); ii. 740–2, 773–85 (Galen); Thillet (1981); Sharples (1987), esp. 1202–4; Gottschalk (1987); Blumenthal (1996) 15–16; Sorabji (2000) 254–63, 266–7. Aristotelian teleologists include Theophrastus (*cf.* fr. 269 FHSG with commentary at Huby 1999: 18; also Blumenthal 1996: 10; Lennox 1985) and Eristratus (cf. von Staden 1997); later on, cf. Aspasius (*Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 14–19 Heylbut) and Xenarchus of Seleucia (see Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 320. 5–8 Wachsmuth). Cratippus does not count here: although he supposed that the intellect was prior to the body and separable from it, the non-rational soul, as being concerned with physical functions, is inseparable, and perhaps not prior. See Cicero, *On Divination* 1. 70–1.

it should be philosophers influenced by epiphenomenalist thought who were inspired by Aristotle to consider physiognomy a serious theoretical possibility.[70]

In the *Prior Analytics* (at 2. 27), Aristotle has a certain amount to say about the practicalities of physiognomy: how, once one has established the right sort of connection between body and soul, one might go about isolating signs for the condition of the latter in the appearance of the former. I shall have a little to say about this in the Appendix to the present section when I consider the affinities between Aristotle himself and the authors of the Aristotelian *Physiognomy*. (For reasons discussed in subsection (ii) below and in the Appendix, I am assuming with the majority of scholars that the work is pseudonymous, and in fact a composite of works by two different Peripatetic writers.) In what follows immediately, however, this is not what interests me. Rather, my immediate intention is to consider two questions which are prior to this, and actually more important for the broader understanding of theoretical discussions of physiognomy in antiquity: how, exactly, Aristotle himself conceived of the soul such that its relationship with the body would lead one to hope that physiognomy might be a practical possibility; and how the underpinnings Aristotle thereby gave to physiognomy might have led to an association between physiognomy and epiphenomenalism in the minds of later philosophers.[71] Following this, in parts (ii) and (iii), I shall look at the evidence we have for the psychological models assumed by thinkers in Aristotle's school who wrote on physiognomy. I shall argue that we know of three such thinkers: not only the two anonymous authors whose work was combined to produce the surviving *Physiognomy*, but also Loxus 'the physician', who was used as a source by the author of the anonymous Latin *Physiognomy*. The evidence for the psychological basis of their interest in physiognomy is poor and does not allow for certainty; but it may suggest that two of them at least already exemplify the tendency towards the association between an interest in physiognomy and an epiphenomenal view of the soul which in later Sections we shall see in later authors.

[70] There are two exceptions to this generalization: one may be the author of the first part of the Aristotelian *Physiognomy* (see further subsection (ii) below); the other certainly is the Platonist Aristides Quintilianus, whom I discuss in Section V. Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus was a teleologist (cf. n. 69 above), but not a physiognomist—albeit his *Characters* is frequently used to support a claim that he was: e.g. Petersen (1859), 92; Misener (1924), 107; Currie (1985); Vogt (1999), 196; cf. Herzog (1991), 170; Degkwitz (1996*b*), 28; Lombardi (1999). In fact nothing in the *Characters* suggests that Theophrastus had a theoretical interest in physiognomy (as opposed to an ethical interest in manners, for example); nor is there any other evidence that he had such an interest. Indeed, Theophrastus is excluded even from Evans's rather catholic view of physiognomy (cf. 1969: 39: 'no passages of strict physiognomical significance occur').

[71] Evidence that Aristotle *was* committed to the possibility of physiognomy, given that I do not assume him to have been the author of the surviving *Physiognomy*, include his discussion of physiognomical signs at *Prior Analytics* 2. 27 (albeit hypothetical in character: cf. Ross 1949: 498–502; Burnyeat 1982); and the many physiognomical assertions in his biological works (e.g. *HA* 1. 8–10, $491^b10–492^a12$; 15, $493^b32–494^a1$; $494^a16–18$; *PA* 4. 10, $686^b21–7$; *GA* 2. 7, $747^a15–19$; 4. 5, $774^a36–^b2$; 5. 7, $786^b34–787^a2$; and cf. Lloyd 1983: 23–4).

(i) Aristotle

If it is a matter of historical fact that most philosophical accounts of physiognomy in antiquity explained the relevant features of the soul by the peculiar character of the body, it is not a matter of theoretical necessity that this should have been so. An equally systematic basis might be given to physiognomy on the assumption that the peculiar character of the body was determined by the nature of its soul. Indeed, in Section VI we shall meet one thinker who took just such an approach (the Platonist Aristides Quintilianus); and at first glance, we might be tempted to think that this was precisely how Aristotle himself was able to justify physiognomy. Aristotle, after all, took the soul to be a *form*—'the form' (as he says) 'of a natural body potentially having life' (*DA* 412^{a}20–1). The very word 'form' (*eidos*) already suggests appearance; and one might readily assume that, just as the form of a statue both describes and explains the way a statue looks, so the form of a human individual both describes and explains the way that the individual looks. In this case, Aristotle would be committed to physiognomy for the simple reason that the individual's soul is precisely what determines his or her appearance.[72]

Things are not quite so simple, however, because if Aristotle can be thought of as *extending* the explanatory purpose of the soul to cover appearance as well, there is, paradoxically, a certain *restriction* in the relationship Aristotle posits between the soul and a person's psychological character. It is in fact one of the central insights of Aristotelian psychology that the soul is not an independent locus of psychological functioning or psychological character, as one might think of it in Plato, for example. Rather, the 'soul' explains what it is to be something that *has* these functions. Aristotle is clear that particular events that we might have thought of as 'psychological' events are not activities of the soul itself, but are the activities of an ensouled body (*DA* 408^{b}11–15). It is a person, not a soul, that has a psychological character.

This might seem a nice distinction; but it is one that rules out the possibility that Aristotle took the short route to physiognomy when he made the soul the 'form' of a human being. The reason for this is that, even if we were tempted to maintain the identity of 'soul' and physical shape (though here too one should be careful to say, not that the soul *is* a human being's shape, but an *explanans* of it) we can no longer be sure that it is the *only* determinant of his or her character. There is scope to think that there might be aspects of human beings, and therefore of their psychological character, that are to be explained by something else—for example, the material out of which they are made. It is true that it must be the soul that explains why there is a human being here at all (and not, for example, a dog), and to do this, the soul must explain everything that is characteristically human about both their psychology and their appearance. But the lower-level characteristics that mark a thing out, not just as a human being,

[72] In slightly more sophisticated terms, the idea would be that the soul, as the form of the individual, explains his or her peculiar physical disposition (and so appearance) insofar as that disposition realizes the natural behavioural capacities specified in the form.

but as *this* human being (for example, Socrates as opposed to Callias) might be explicable as modal variations of the form's activity required by the particular matter out of which Socrates is made.

In brief, then, the question for us is whether the soul-form is supposed to explain all aspects of character and appearance that distinguish an individual as such, or whether it is rather meant to explain only those that distinguish it as a member of a particular species (e.g. as a human being).[73] This matters a great deal for our understanding of physiognomy in Aristotle and beyond, because if we wish to be able to say more of a person on the basis of appearance than that he or she is human, it is precisely these *individual* characteristics in which we shall be interested. What we need to establish, then, is how Aristotle explains these; and in order to do that, we need to look more closely at his account of how an individual comes to be in the first place.

As I have already indicated, it is uncontroversial that species traits, both 'psychological' and physical, are explained by a thing's form. This, at least, does follow from Aristotle's definition of the soul as the 'form of a body potentially having life',[74] since what this tells us is that the form is as such responsible for all those traits that specify for a thing what it requires in order to be alive. Since terrestrial life is defined in terms of such things as self-nourishment, growth (and decay), locomotion (and rest), perception and thought (*DA* 413^{a}22–5), it is for these things that Aristotle must posit a formal cause. But there is more than this that needs to be said. One cannot possess the capacity for self-nutrition unless one possesses the capacity for nourishing oneself *in a particular, determinate way*—given that there are any number of models for a self-nourishing organism, and nothing could exist whose soul was *merely* nutritive, i.e. nutritive without qualification. These determining characteristics must, then, also be explained by a thing's form: the ability to photosynthesize, for example; or to feed off plants, or flesh; in the case of animals, the ability to feel, to see, etc. But they will also include characteristics that a different kind of psychology

[73] The question is related to the question, raised by Aristotle's discussions of form in the *Metaphysics*, whether each individual is supposed to have its own ('individual') form, or whether forms exist only at the level of the species. Clearly, it is the case that if all forms are species-forms, only those psycho-physical traits shared in common by all members of a given species will be open to teleological explanation. But note that, even if one doubts that there exists any such entity as a 'species form', so that forms exist as particulars, one for each individual, it does not follow that they are *formally* or *essentially* distinct from each other in a way that would allow us to identify them as the cause of the individual's distinguishing characteristics. Indeed, one might think that such a step would undermine the notion that members of the same species are the same in essence—or even the very notion of a species. A more natural assumption might be that individual forms are distinguished one from another only incidentally—that is, by the fact that they are the forms of numerically different individuals; or, to put this another way, by the fact that they are instantiated in different parcels of matter. One might in this case be able to say that the characteristics of the individual are 'incidental' characteristics of the individual's form (as, analogously, Aristotle is able to say that soul moves incidentally in virtue of the movement of the composite of which it is the soul: cf. *DA* 1. 3, 406^{b}5–10); but the form would as such provide the explanation only for traits they shared with the rest of the species. Cf. on this Frede (1987), esp. 77; (2000) 21–6; also Frede and Patzig (1988), i. 48–57.

[74] Though cf. e.g. Caston (1997) 331, arguing that the Aristotelian soul 'supervenes' on the body.

might distinguish from these as 'character-traits'. The essence or form of a lion, for example, must explain its characteristic 'bravery',[75] since a lion is not merely appetitive, but *bravely* so: it is prepared to fight for its food, and its preparedness to fight is every bit as important as its having teeth to eat the food with. Bravery, then, has a formal cause for a lion.[76] But since we know that a lion has just that physical structure necessary for the realization of those characteristics for which there is a formal cause, we can expect that it will be possible, at least in theory, to identify physical features of a lion that will bear witness to its bravery. They will be just those physical features which enable it to be brave, or are a necessary consequence of physical features which allow it to be brave. (In just the same way, one can identify physical features which bear witness to the fact that a lion is sighted and appetitive.)

Aristotle's commitment to physiognomy involves him in the belief that one can perform very much the same sort of exercise at the level of the individual: that is, one can identify physical traits in the individual which are associated with particular traits of character. This above all, perhaps, is what makes it tempting to suppose that Aristotle simply extended down to the level of the individual the scope of what formal causality explains in a creature. The idea would be that the physical and psychological traits of an individual have the same cause as their species traits (namely, a formal cause), so that we should expect to find exactly the same correlations at the level of the individual as we find at the level of the species. In both cases alike, the relevant aspects of the animal's physical structure would be due to the teleological activity of their form. It is true that this move has certain metaphysical implications which not all readers of Aristotle would want to accept: it implies (*a*) that forms exist as individuals, and (*b*) that individual forms are *formally* distinct from one another (distinguished, that is, by characteristics that explain the variations between individuals). But against these concerns, it might be argued that Aristotle's account of natural generation shows directly and explicitly that he did in fact make this move. For Aristotle is clear about one thing in the process of generation: that the father provides the form for the new child, while the mother provides only the matter. As he spells out elsewhere, one of the things that this means is that any resemblance a child might have to its parents must be due to the action of the father.[77] The obvious way of understanding this is to suppose that the child's appearance quite generally, both as a human being and as *this particular* human being, is due to the activity of form, so that its individual characteristics are *part of* its form and have a formal explanation just as its characteristics as a member of the (human) species.[78]

[75] Cf. *Prior Analytics* 70^{b}14–15.

[76] Aristotle is explicit in thinking that animals share not only psychological affections (cf. e.g. *NE* 3. 2, 1111^{b}12), but also 'moral' traits with humans. See *HA* 8. 1, 588^{a}16–26; 9. 1, 608^{a}11–17, with Fortenbaugh (1971); Lloyd (1983), 24–6.

[77] e.g. *GA* 1. 20, 729^{a}9–11; 4. 1, 766^{b}12–14; cf. Cooper (1988), esp. 19–21.

[78] So Balme (1987*a*) 11, 18–19; (1987*c*); Dean-Jones (1994) 193–5 (suggesting that, in explaining inherited resemblance, Aristotle 'has to depart from the theory upheld in the main body of his philosophy' to assert the existence of individual forms); Cooper (1988) (arguing at 35–7 that form is

Such a position quickly runs up against difficulties, however. One is a straightforward biological difficulty: if the father provides the form for the child, and the form accounts for individual (as well as species) characteristics, then we would expect every child to look like its father. But children often look like their mother as well or instead—a fact of which Aristotle is well aware.[79] The second major difficulty is textual: a passage of the *GA* (5. 1, 778^{a}30–5) which seems to rule out explicitly the possibility that we can give a *formal* explanation for *individual* (as opposed to species) characteristics:

Of those things which are neither common works of nature nor proper to each species, none is or becomes the way it is for the sake of anything. The eye is for something, but it is not blue for any purpose—*unless this is a condition proper to the species*. Neither do some such cases[80] have anything to do with the account of the animal's essence but, as coming about by necessity, their causes must be referred to the matter (*hylēn*) and the moving principle (*tēn kinēsasan archēn*).

Just to make the point clear, individual characteristics are not only denied formal explanation here, but are given an alternative explanation involving a kind of necessity: 'matter', and 'the moving principle'. In other words, the possibility that individual characteristics have a teleological explanation seems to be explicitly ruled out—and with it, we might note, the possibility that physiognomy can be founded on the teleological model suggested by the explanation of species-traits. But how, then, *are* individual characteristics to be explained?

It is possible on metaphysical grounds to understand why Aristotle might want to make the distinction in the kinds of explanation to be given to species and individual traits suggested by the *GA* passage just quoted. Species characteristics, after all, determine an animal as a particular thing, namely a

not responsible for 'biologically superficial characteristics like eye-colour, pitch of voice', etc., and so is not exactly individual form; but is responsible for 'whichever properties of the father's body the movements in his blood contain *specific information* for' (his italics), and so are 'universals of a much lower order of generality than has been thought'). My objection to these positions is not, it should be noted, an objection to the claim that forms are, substantially speaking, individual, but rather to the suggestion that forms are individuated by differences that are *essential* (and hence that we can appeal to formal or final causality to explain differences between individuals). See again n. 73 above.

[79] e.g. *GA* 4. 3. (Even though resemblance to one's mother is strictly *unnatural*—even being female is unnatural in this sense of unnatural: 767^{b}8–9—it still has to be explained.) Cf. Dean-Jones (1994), 195 for a statement of the problem (though it will become apparent that I disagree with her evaluation of Aristotle's solution, according to which the semen is 'mastered' by the movements of the menses, as '*ad hoc*').

[80] The word 'neither' (*oute*) which introduces this clause might be read, as it were, epexegetically: 'Blue eyes do not have a final cause unless common to the species; *which is to say that* they have no connection with the account of the animal's essence.' But why, if this is correct, the restriction to 'some cases' (*ep' eniōn*)? If this clause merely amplifies what precedes it, then it would apply to *all* cases covered there. So the clause must be read as a *further qualification* of what has just been said, viz.: 'Blue eyes do not have a final cause unless common to the species; *and not even then* will they have a final cause in all cases.' It is a necessary condition for a trait to have a final cause that it be common to the species; it is not, however, a sufficient condition. (As a matter of interest, Aristotle supposes that eye-colour does tend to be constant within species: humans are unusual in this respect: *HA* 1. 10.)

member of a particular species, and so form part of its essence. Individual characteristics, on the other hand, are incidental at least in the sense that one does not have to have them in order to be a particular kind of thing. But if individual characteristics are 'incidental' rather than essential, this does not of course mean that an individual can avoid having any such characteristics at all. On the contrary, every individual must have *some* individual characteristics, for just the same kind of reason that an individual wall, though its essence makes no reference to its being red or brown or grey, must nevertheless be some colour or other if it is to take its place in the world. In the case of individual human beings, then, we should perhaps accept that it is no part of their formal account that they have the particular characteristics they do have; but they must nevertheless have *some* such characteristics. To borrow the example Aristotle gives in his discussion of physiognomy at *Prior Analytics* $70^{b}14$–17, it is not specified in the form of any human individual (as it is for every lion) that he or she should have large extremities, or should be brave. However, each individual must nevertheless have extremities of *some* size, and lie *somewhere* between the extremes of cowardice and rashness in order to take his or her place in the world. There is something, in other words, that determines, that makes concrete, what the form explains at a more general level; something that explains why, when a human being is produced, it is a human being of a particular size, shape, and behavioural disposition. And Aristotle, in the passage just quoted, specifies what: it comes down to the *matter* from which the new human will be made, and the *moving principle* which does the making.

It is important to note that there are *two* additional factors listed here. Focus is frequently directed onto matter alone. In Aristotle's example of an eye which is blue, but not through formal causality, the point is taken to be that it is blue just because only a *blue* eye could be made out of the material available for making the eye. (Technically speaking, the matter is said to make the blueness of the eye an issue of 'hypothetical necessity'.)[81] In the case of a child, similarly, we can say that it is the character of the particular blood out of which a child is to be made that helps to explain its individual characteristics. But a little thought in this case will show that matter is not nearly enough on its own. If matter were the sole determining factor for individual characteristics, then one of the original problems we faced would simply be turned on its head. Instead of expecting all children to look like their fathers, we should now expect them to resemble their mothers, since it is from the mother that their matter derives.[82] This is why Aristotle reminds us that we have to take into account the activity of the father as 'moving cause' as well. For the active partner in the process of generation is *not* (as one might be tempted to say) the form, but the father. To be sure, he acts in virtue of having the form (this goes back to the point I made at the beginning

[81] 'Hypothetical' because there is no absolute necessity for there to be an eye; but *if* there is to be an eye in this case, then the nature of the matter makes it necessary that it should be blue. See in general *PA* $642^{a}7$–9; *Metaphysics* Δ5; *Prior Analytics* $94^{b}36$ with J. Barnes (1994), 232–3; cf. Balme (1972), 76–84, with the corrective remarks of Gotthelf (1987) 234–5 and Cooper (1987) 267.

[82] As Galen already noted: *On Seed* 2. 1. 54–7, and further Section V below.

of the discussion); but he acts as himself a determinate individual.[83] And being a determinate individual, not a mere form, the father of course has his *own* individual characteristics. These, of course, will colour the way in which he conducts the business of procreation as they colour all his activities. Thus a child might look like its mother in virtue of the matter of out which it is made; but it might also look like its father in virtue of his activity in shaping that matter.

For reasons that will emerge shortly, it is necessary to emphasize here that the father is responsible for the shaping of the matter. As we have seen, Aristotle is clear that the father does the crafting of *every* characteristic of the child, even those which it shares with its mother, and whose explanation therefore involves the nature of her matter too.[84] The mother's influence, then, turns out to be slightly indirect. Rather than acting directly to bring about replicas of her own features in the embryo, Aristotle argues that the mother has instead to, as it were, persuade the father to do it for her. The idea seems to be that the mother's blood cannot initiate generative activity. (If it could, there would be no need of the father at all.) But it nevertheless has its own structure or determination in virtue of which it is naturally inclined to support an organism of precisely the mother's characteristics. In some cases it turns out that the paternal semen is too weak to 'master' or 'prevail over' this inclination (Aristotle's word is *(epi)kratei*: see *GA* 4. 3, e.g. 768^{a}34–^{b}1). Like a carpenter who has to modify his design in the face of a piece of wood whose grain and knots prove intractable to him, the semen is instead 'mastered' and 'prevailed over' by the blood. It modifies its activity—though the activity is still *its* activity, just as the form taken by the carpenter's table is precisely the form given to it by the carpenter (the wood did none of the work).[85]

[83] 'For,' as Aristotle says, 'it is a man that generates a man': *Physics* 194^{b}9–13; cf. 194^{b}29–31 (and cf. *Metaphysics* H4, 1044^{a}34–6, where the 'moving cause' is distinguished from formal and final: listing them, Aristotle posits an identity between the latter two only). In more detail, Aristotle thinks that the father uses his semen to craft the blood in the mother exactly as a carpenter uses his tools to craft wood: *GA* 1. 22, 730^{b}11–22. The idea behind this is that the semen is produced by the father as concocted blood with its own generative principle of motion. Since blood in general has the job of building and sustaining the individual, one can understand the semen to be doing something analogous in crafting an individual which is, as far as it is capable of it, just the same as the father. See all of *GA* 1. 19, 726^{b}13 ff. (726^{b}19–21 for the generative 'principle of movement'; cf. 1. 20, 729^{a}10–12; 4. 3, 767^{b}18–20). *Cf.* in general Lloyd (1991*c*), suggesting that there is a difference of emphasis between Aristotle's biological and metaphysical works over the status of the moving cause.

[84] References in n. 77 above. I can, by the way, see no basis for Cooper's claim (1988: 35–6) that there are 'biologically superficial characteristics' (he mentions eye-colour, pitch of voice, and the natural quality of the hair) for which the father is not responsible.

[85] So when Aristotle says that semen contains 'in actuality' the movements required to make a copy of the father, but also contains 'potentially' the movements 'of the female and her remoter ancestors' (*GA* 4. 3, 768^{a}11–14), what he must mean is that the semen is *capable* of reproducing traits from the mother's side of the family (as the carpenter is *capable* of producing features that are not part of his normal style)—only that it would not do so normally, and has to be prevailed upon to do so. Cf. Dean-Jones (1994), 195–8 (but *pace* Dean-Jones 2000, esp. 109, according to whom the movements of the mother compete with those of the semen once it has initiated the process of embryonic development; *pace* also De Lacy 1992: 222 *ad* 154. 9–10, suggesting that the mother's movements 'take over' in cases where the semen fails to prevail). The notion of 'prevailing' is helpfully assimilated by Cooper (1988: 31–3) to the notion of 'reciprocal action'—for which

All this might seem to amount to an unnecessary complication to the central and important point, which is just that every case of human generation involves a father and a mother, some semen and some blood, and that the particular nature of the child that results depends to some extent on the particular nature of each of these. But part of the reason for the complication is very important for the present study: Aristotle's need to maintain the priority of form in the process. For it is in virtue of form (namely the form of human being) that there is any case of generation at all. But what the form does is to explain the activity of a determinate individual, namely the father, as Aristotle supposes. So the father must be thought of as *doing the generating*—all of it. The mother needs to have her say as well; but her contribution cannot be in any sense the source of this activity. This is why Aristotle supposes instead that, just as the father's activity *qua* generator is filtered through his own nature as an embodied individual, so it is modified in the face of the particular characteristics of the matter with which he has to work.

And this, at last, allows us to understand how it is that physiognomy becomes a live possibility for Aristotle. As we have seen, Aristotle has a ready account for the congruence between the psychological and physical traits of species in the fact that they both have a formal cause: an animal is structured in just the way necessary to realize its nature as a member of a particular species. Individual characteristics, on the other hand, are explained by 'hypothetical necessity': the characteristics of the determinate individuals responsible for the generation of the individual. But if species and individual traits have different *explanations*, they nevertheless come about as the result of the same real-world *causes*. In particular, both are due to the craftsmanship, that is, the generative activity, of the father. He acts primarily (in virtue of form) to create a certain *kind* of creature; but in order to do this, and in order to do it with the matter to hand, he sets about to craft an *individual* with certain determinate characteristics. And the fact that species and individual characteristics are unavoidably consequences of the very same causal activity, because the father's production of the latter is the means by which he produces the former, is what guarantees that the correspondences between psychological and physical characteristics at the level of the species will obtain at the level of the individual as well. This is no kind of coincidence: as resulting from a single creative activity they are the *very same* correspondences.

This not only explains in general terms how it is that Aristotle can consider physiognomy a theoretical possibility, it also underpins the practical investigation of physiognomical signs that he suggests in *Prior Analytics* 2. 27. For he says in this passage that physiognomy will be a possibility precisely if one can isolate the psycho-physical traits which differentiate species. The idea is that, when a physical trait distinctive of one species crops up as something that distinguishes

cf. *Generation and Corruption* A 324^{a}5–^{b}13. Note, by the way, that it is only 'things whose form is in matter' (324^{b}5–6) which are reciprocally affected in action. In practice, this confirms that we should focus our attention on the father/semen as moving cause, and away from the 'form' considered in isolation.

an individual member of another species, we can expect that individual to possess the corresponding psychological characteristic (70^{b}14–26):

For if a characteristic [*pathos*] belongs to one individual species, as bravery to lions, it is necessary that there will be some sign as well: *ex hypothesi* they change along with each other. Let this sign be having large extremities—which cannot belong to any other complete species, for (as we are used to saying) a sign is proper in this way when it is proper to a whole species, and not to an individual. And when this sign appears in another species, you will have a brave man (or whatever other type of animal). But he will have the sign: for there is a one-to-one correspondence. If all this is right, and we can gather such signs for those animals which have only one characteristic, and each has its sign, since it is necessary to have one, we shall be able to do physiognomy . . .

One might have wondered why Aristotle does not recommend collecting groups of men known for (e.g.) their irascibility to see whether there is a distinctive physical trait they share in common; or why in general he makes the distinction between species and individuals and starts the investigation from the species.[86] Part of the answer to this will, no doubt, be practical: for one thing, individuals can change or dissemble their character. But there may be another reason too, one that recognizes the difference in status (the difference in their respective explanations) between species and individual traits. For the connections between psycho-physical traits at the level of the species are guaranteed by the fact that they are teleologically grounded (it is *because* a lion is to be brave that it has large extremities). The fact that a man with large extremities will tend to be braver than other men is, on the other hand, more or less contingent on the physical processes that led to his having large extremities. What guarantees the connection in this case is just the fact that that process is the *same* as the process that led to the realization of species traits. Since it is, in this sense, the correlations between character and appearance at the level of the species that guarantee correlations that can be made at the level of the individual, it makes a certain amount of sense for Aristotle to suggest starting with species traits.

To spell this out in slightly different terms provides an answer for the second question I raised at the beginning of this section as well. I noted then that physiognomy after Aristotle tended to be associated with an epiphenomenalist, not a teleological model of the soul. A possible reason for this starts to emerge if one considers that, while teleology remains the ultimate guarantee for Aristotle that physiognomy can be given a secure explanatory grounding, the link between teleology and the production of individual characteristics is at best indirect. At best we can say that teleology explains the causal processes which are in operation such that particular individual characteristics come about in

[86] In fact he does appeal to individuals in the practical investigation of signs, but only when brought to *aporia* by the examination of species: 'But if the whole species has two "proper" characteristics, as a lion might be brave and generous, how shall we know which of the signs following 'properly' signifies which characteristic? Perhaps as follows: if both occur in part of some other species, and in those species in which each is found though not in the whole of it, and whenever a member has one but not the other: for if someone is brave but not liberal, and has just one of these two signs, it is clear that this is the sign of bravery in the lion' (*Prior Analytics* 70^{b}26–32).

particular instances of generation. But for someone who focuses on *individual* traits (i.e. the kind with which the physiognomist deals), this is not very far from saying that the proper explanation for the psychological and physical traits possessed by individuals is a 'bottom-up' explanation, one grounded in the physical processes of generation and growth. I shall defer until Section V a fuller account of the considerations moved by each side of the argument (epiphenomenalist and teleological) in the interpretation of Aristotle's psychology. It becomes most relevant in the case of Galen, who is the clearest example of someone who associates physiognomy with an epiphenomenalist reading of Aristotle, and whose work in any case provides us with the best available evidence for the debate. But to anticipate the conclusion I shall come to there: teleology is most seductive to those most impressed by the constancy and functional adaptation of *species* as such; but those who consider that an *individual's* character and capacities are explained by a physical process conducted between two physical individuals, and that, on the physical plane, these are the means by which species traits are generated, might start to wonder what space is left for the supposedly prior activity of a metaphysical 'form'. It turns out, in other words, that the attractions of epiphenomenalism are bound up with just that aspect of Aristotle's psychology which explains individual characteristics and so, in the end, underpins his physiognomy.

(ii) Two Anonymous Aristotelians: the Authors of the Physiognomy

I have suggested how Aristotle's psychological (and, for that matter, biological) theory provides the theoretical opening for his investigation into physiognomy insofar as it explains why we should expect there to be correlations between the psychological and physical traits of individuals. What is more, we have seen that these correlations are exactly the same as correlations between physical and psychological traits characteristic of different animal species. This fact allows Aristotle to see the way forward to identifying which physical characteristics signal the presence of which psychological traits. I shall return to the subject in the appendix to this section but, in brief, the idea is that if two or more species share just one physical characteristic (Aristotle's example at *Prior Analytics* $70^{b}14$–17 is large extremities) and one psychological trait (bravery), it can be inferred that *wherever* in the animal kingdom that characteristic is found, it will be indicative of the same psychological trait—whether it is found in another species or (more to the point) in an individual member of a species not otherwise distinguished for large extremities or bravery. Whether Aristotle himself made a systematic attempt to follow through the procedure he recommends to produce a systematic catalogue of physiognomical signs is a moot point: there is a scattering of physiognomical observations through his biological works,[87] and one might be tempted to put some faith in the fact that a *Physiognomy* was ascribed to him in the ancient catalogues of his works, whatever one thinks of the pseudonymous treatise that survives under his name (but see further the Appendix below, nn. 119–20). We do, however, know of

[87] Cf. again n. 71 above.

three members of Aristotle's school who produced works of physiognomy. In subsection (iii) below I shall argue that one of these is Loxus, one of the sources used by the compiler of the anonymous Latin *Physiognomy*. Before that, though, I shall consider the two anonymous authors whose works survive in the composite *Physiognomy* which comes to us (and was already circulating in antiquity) under Aristotle's name. Since it is the theoretical underpinning rather than the practical conclusions of physiognomy that interests me in this study, I do not intend to examine as such the practical aspects of any of these writers (though in the appendix to this section I consider aspects of practice in the *Physiognomy* precisely to show how differences at this level do not undermine the essential unity of purpose and direction that they share with Aristotle himself). But it does seem worthwhile to consider whether anything of their theoretical background (i.e. their respective psychological models) can be discerned in what survives from them. The evidence is not all that good; but what there is might suggest that already among Aristotle's immediate successors, physiognomy was tending to become linked to an anti-teleological view of his psychology.

One of the clearest reasons for supposing that the Aristotelian *Physiognomy* is a composite of two texts (which following Foerster, I shall refer to as [Treatise] A and [Treatise] B respectively) is the fact that there is a very clear break at 808^b11, where the treatise begins as it were all over again with a new preface which, though different from it, covers much the same ground as the preface at the beginning of the work. In particular, both prefaces cover the methodological question of how one goes about establishing which physical traits are signs for which psychological traits—they converge, to this extent, with Aristotle's own discussion in *Prior Analytics* 2. 27. (Again, I shall have more to say about this in the appendix to this section.) The importance of this is that, very much like Aristotle in the *Prior Analytics*, neither part of the composite treatise is interested in establishing *why* there is a relationship between body and soul such that physiognomy becomes a possibility. The question has no bearing on the task at hand: the attempt to identify physiognomical signs only requires *that* we accept a close enough relationship between the two. In other words, although the authors of the two treatises must have held views about the nature of the relationship between body and soul which led them to an interest in physiognomy, there is no particular reason why they should here betray what those views were. Indeed, given that the question is not immediately relevant, one might think that the authors of A and B would have had a positive motive to avoid putting themselves in a position where they might have to explain or justify the psychological model they as a matter of fact assume. Aristotle himself in *Prior Analytics* 2. 27 studiously avoids hinting at any tendentious views of his own about the causal hierarchy between body and soul. All he says is that 'physiognomy is possible *if one allows that, at least in respect of their natural characteristics, body and soul change together*' (70^b7–9). So when Treatise A and Treatise B insist that body and soul are in a relationship whereby they are *mutually affected* (the word both use is *sympatheia*: A at 805^a6; B at 808^b11, 19) we should not be tempted to suppose that this represents a particular theoretical

position on the nature of the relationship between soul and body. It is rather an assertion *that* body and soul are related in such a way that physiognomy becomes possible. In fact Aristotle too talks of the *sympatheia* of body and soul in this context (*Prior Analytics* 70^b16 *sympaschein allēlois*)—and apparently means nothing more than he meant earlier by saying that the two 'change at the same time as' each other (*hama metaballein* at 70^b7–8).

The examples of *sympatheia* offered by A and B confirm the non-theoretical intent of the word: they largely consist of particular events which one might normally have thought of as primarily physical events (illness and drunkenness at A, 805^a2–4; diet and medication at B, 808^b21–4) or as primarily psychological events (e.g. experiences of love, fear, pain, and pleasure at A, 805^a5–8; grief and joy at B, 808^b14–15), but which turn out to be associated with (respectively) psychological and physical changes as well. They talk, in other words, about *operations* of the soul and body, but say nothing about the causes of the characters or capacities in virtue of which they operate.

But this does not quite exhaust the examples we are given. In fact each Treatise offers *one* example or claim which is of a rather different order, and may after all hint at their respective authors' underlying psychological position. Alongside the examples of psycho-physical events, Treatise A offers, in fact begins with, what is apparently a perfectly general statement about the nature of the mind (*dianoia*):

> That minds follow their bodies and are not isolated and unaffected by the changes of the body is something that becomes very clear ...[88]

On its own, this would not be very significant, since the Treatise goes on to 'prove' the point by appealing to physical *events* which are associated with psychological change, and then to show that 'the opposite' is equally true (there are psychological events, such as occasions of emotion, with physical implications). But a little further on, we are told something that makes it look as if these examples are misleading if read as a gloss on the original statement. For we are told that the *type* of *dianoia* any animal has *as a member of a particular species* 'follows', is a consequence of, the kind of body it has (805^a11–14):[89]

> No animal has ever been born that has the appearance of one animal but the mind (*dianoia*) of another, but soul and body are always of the same animal—*so that, necessarily, such-and-such a mind follows such-and-such a body.*

[88] The passage in fact reads, impossibly, *hoti hai dianoiai hepontai tois sōmasi ... touto de dēlon* ('*That* minds follow their bodies ... *and* this is clear...'). For discussion, cf. Vogt (1999) 289. Our translation follows Foerster, who athetizes the 'and' (*de*); but it is just possible that more has dropped out between this opening statement and that the examples that follow were never intended as a direct demonstration of the opening statement at all. (This would be quite consistent with the understanding of the passage I develop in what follows.)

[89] Note that the word 'follows' (*hepesthai*) (also at 805^a1 as quoted above) recurs centrally, and perhaps not coincidentally, in Galen's discussion of the soul's relationship with the body. For its implication and use by Galen, see below, Section V, esp. n. 184. (Treatise B also uses the terminology of 'following' at 808^b20, but claims that the body 'follows' the soul as well as vice versa: 'each follows the other'.)

Of course there are physical and psychological events which are associated with each other: no theory of the soul ever tried to deny that, and only the most reductionist epiphenomenalism would wish to deny that the soul might have a casual impact on the body. This does not demonstrate that there is a causal equality between body and soul. The real question is whether the *capacities* or distinguishing characteristics of the soul are explained by the body or themselves explain the way the body is. From what he tells us, the author of Treatise A seems fairly clearly to take the former line: the soul *as such* 'follows' the body.

My claim, then, is that the author of Treatise A was an epiphenomenalist of some kind: that he took the individual's body to be explanatory of his or her psychological capacities and character, and that it is on this basis that he would have justified his hope that physiognomy might be possible. Treatise B on the other hand, looks as if its author might have taken the opposite view. Having asserted and provided examples to show that change in the state (*hexis*) of the soul are reflected in the appearance (*morphē*) of the body, and that changes in the form of the body are, equally, reflected in changes in the state of the soul (808^b12–14), B goes on to make this rather striking claim (808^b27–9):

It is quite clear that the appearances (*morphai*) which come to supervene on (*epiginontai*) bodies are similar to the powers of the soul.

This is, to be sure, very little to go on; but the most natural reading of the sentence is that the appearance of the body is posterior to the soul, by whose powers it is explained.

I emphasize that neither A nor B seems too keen to make his treatise hang on the position he takes on the relationship between body and soul; and neither of the passages I have highlighted (particularly the one from B) is conclusive. Nevertheless, it is worth noting, as all that it is possible to note, that it looks a little bit as if the author of Treatise B might be a teleologist at least in his account of species traits—perhaps then, an orthodox adherent of Aristotle's own hylomorphism—while the author of Treatise A is already evidence for a trend we shall start to see of an attachment to epiphenomenalism among philosophical writers who deal with physiognomy. A 'trend' already, perhaps, because the one other Aristotelian physiognomical writer for whom we have evidence seems to have been epiphenomenal in his psychology as well: I mean Loxus 'the physician'.

(iii) Loxus 'Medicus'

Loxus, known to us as a source of the anonymous Latin *Physiognomy* and from a passing reference in Origen, has always been a difficult figure in studies of physiognomy. His name alone is a curiosity,[90] though it is appropriate enough

[90] Foerster (1886: 6 n. 1) compares the female name *Loxō* (e.g. Callimachus, *Hymns* 4. 292). Rose conjectures that it represents a corruption of *Eudoxus* (1864: 82, and further below), though this is made unlikely by its appearance in Origen as well as Anon. (*Against Celsus* 1. 33: 'Suppose that the views of the physiognomists are granted, of Zopyrus, Loxus, or Polemon . . . that all bodies conform to the habits of their soul. . .').

since it is itself a term of physiognomical analysis,[91] and also suggests a connection with Apollo *Loxias*—Apollo being patron of medicine (supposed to be Loxus' own profession: cf. Anon. Lat. 1, where he has the epithet *medicus*) and of the interpretation of signs.[92] But if his name has exercised commentators, his philosophical affiliation has been the subject of even greater controversy. Rose (1864: i. 82) suggested that 'Loxus' was a corruption of 'Eudoxus', and that our author was the famous and wide-ranging scientific writer Eudoxus of Cnidus, a rough contemporary of Plato's;[93] but this view was attacked by Foerster (1888*a*, esp. 509–10), primarily on the grounds that Loxus' use of 'animal' signs was not cruder (so Rose 1864: i. 81) but actually richer and more subtle than that of Ps.-Aristotle. Since (Foerster continues) Aristotle himself treats the use of such signs as a practice in its infancy, Loxus must be later than he; and Foerster in fact compares Loxus' psychological theory (I shall return to the details myself below) with that of the Stoics Cleanthes and Diogenes of Babylon, which placed him squarely in the later part of the third century BC (1888*a*: 510–11).[94] Misener (1923) returned to Rose's view that Loxus' theory was 'antiquated' (showing in the process how subjective such judgements can be) and placed him once again before Aristotle: more precisely, between Empedocles and Aristotle (1923: 9–10). As I have already indicated, however, it seems to me that we do not need to look so far afield as either for the key to Loxus' position and age. To judge by the evidence supplied by Anon., Loxus stands every bit as close to the Aristotle of the biological works as the Aristotelian authors of the *Physiognomy*. Loxus, I contend, is a writer of clear Peripatetic affiliation.

The first twelve chapters of the anonymous Latin *Physiognomy* constitute an eclectic 'introduction' to the work as a whole, and much of the material has close or exact parallels in Polemon and Adamantius (cf. on this Misener

[91] *Loxos* means 'slanting' or 'ambiguous' in Greek. It occurs in a physiognomical context, of the head at Ad. B30, 60; but cf. also Gleason (1990) 413, who thinks that it 'seems to mean "he who looks sidewise suspiciously"' (and so is appropriate rather to the practitioner than the subject of physiognomy).

[92] In particular, of course, Apollo is associated with the prediction of the future, and one of the things we learn from Anon. is that Loxus (like Polemon) believed that physiognomical signs could be used to make such predictions (Anon. Lat. 133): 'Polemon and Loxus advanced this discipline to such an extent that they affirmed it could even predict some things in the future.' (However, the treatise ends—or, rather, breaks off—shortly afterwards, in the middle of giving examples from Polemon's treatise. There is no more information on the nature of Loxus' predictions, and it is worth bearing in mind that for all Anon. tells us, his prognostications might have been of a different order or kind to those of Polemon; conceivably, they might, for example, have been medical prognoses.)

[93] Eudoxus' dates are not certain, but he appears to have born between 400 and 390 BC. See on this, and more generally on Eudoxus, Schneider (2000), 293–302.

[94] Foerster also notes that Loxus uses the example of the Celts (cf. Anon. Lat. 9) in place of the Scythians who appear at Ps.-Aristotle 805^{a}27. He suggests that this might be linked with the Celtic incursions into Greece in 280 BC (1888*a*: 510–11; cf. also Evans 1969: 11). However, as André points out, the 'Celts' were known already in the 5th c. (1981: 25, citing Herodotus 2. 33 and 4. 49).

1923: 16–17). There are, however, two passages in which Loxus is explicitly introduced.[95] For reasons which will become apparent, I shall start with the second of those two passages (Anon. Lat. 12, tr. Repath)—in which, by the way, I take *anima* (translated here as 'soul') to be synonymous with *animus* (here 'spirit'):

But before we come to individual signs or signals, it must be known that the blood, in which Loxus placed the seat of the soul, if it is copious, provides the body with bulk and redness, the hair with strength and thickness, but constricts, dulls, and obstructs the senses and the sharpness of the human intellect, whereas if it is thin and not abundant, it weakens the body, mars the colour, thins and diminishes all bodily parts, but fosters the character of the mind and excites the sharpness of the spirit and does not block off its mobility and movement, and finally it confers speed on all the organs of sense which are situated in our faces, the ears, eyes, tongue, nose, and whatever blood vessels there are. And so a balanced temperament of the body indicates a perfect spirit, and that spirit is perfect which is as brave as it is wise. And so it is that the whole character [sc. of the soul] takes its rise from the type and temperament of the blood.

If one had not been told that this was Loxus, one might well have thought immediately of Ps.-Aristotle 813^{b}11–35, whose author shares the thought that the heat of the blood is a crucial factor in determining intelligence. Heat, we are told, assists blood flow, and so helps the 'movements' of the blood reach the 'organ of intelligence' quickly and without distortion (cf. 813^{b}20). It is as such conducive to speed of thought—while cold tends to produce dullness of the senses. Ps.-Aristotle introduces a second term of comparison, this time a factor strictly extrinsic to the quality of the blood, but nonetheless essential to its *flow*: the *size* of the body.[96] The larger the body, the further the blood has to go, so that a large body slows thought down while a small one speeds it up. (A small hot man is so flighty in his thought as to be equally ineffective with a large cold man.) Ps.-Aristotle concludes as follows (813^{b}28–35):

So we have discussed how excess or deficiency in physical size make for effective or ineffective bodies. But someone whose nature falls in the mean between these points has the keenest senses and is most effective. For the blood does not have far to go in order to reach the mind; but nor does lack of space force it away from the mind again. This is why a moderate size makes for efficiency and the keenest senses.

Before passing further comment, we should also look at what Aristotle himself had to say; for at *PA* 2. 2, he also correlates character against two axes

[95] Specifically: Anon. Lat. 2, 12. Loxus is also mentioned explicitly at ch. 81 (on the eyes), 117–31 (on animal types), 133 (on his belief in prediction). It is a reasonable conjecture that chs. 13–15 (on the hair) also derive from Loxus: they draw on Loxan terms of analysis (e.g. the paucity of blood which explains thin, pale hair in ch. 14: cf. ch. 12, and see Foerster 1888*a*: 507–8). Occasionally, 'where I have found the translation or interpretation difficult' (ch. 1), Anon. Lat. notes the terms which he found in his Greek sources. For what it is worth, the following terms are quoted from Loxus: *oinōpos* (14); *charopos, aigōpos, traulos* (81); *lichnos, philenklēmōn* (123), *glaux* (129), *alektruōn* (131).

[96] I shall suggest that Loxus himself does something similar: cf. below in the text on Anon. Lat. 2.

representing features of physical constitution, and more particularly characteristics of the blood. So 648^a2–11:[97]

The thicker and the hotter blood is, the more conducive is it to strength, while in proportion to its thinness and its coldness is its suitability for sensation and intelligence ... Best of all are those whose blood is hot, and at the same time thin and pure. For such are suited alike for the development of courage and of intelligence.

Each of these three passages differs from the other two, but it will be seen that Loxus is if anything closer to Aristotle than is the Ps.-Aristotelian writer of the *Physiognomy*. Aristotle names three qualities of the blood that are relevant (its thickness, heat, and clarity: cf. also *PA* 651^a12–17): Ps.-Aristotle shares with him only one (its heat; his other consideration is the length of its course as determined by the size of the body), but Loxus shares two (in referring to the quantity and thickness of the blood). Indeed, there might be evidence that he shares all three. If we take it, as commentators generally do, that Loxus is behind the discussion of hair types in chs. 14–15 of the anonymous Latin *Physiognomy* (it follows directly on from the passage of Loxus currently under consideration), then Loxus too associated 'cold' (and thin) blood with intelligence, and hot blood with bravery (and lesser intelligence). There is something further to note, if this is right. Aristotle, Ps.-Aristotle and Loxus would agree on this single fact, that the temperature of the blood is relevant to the intelligence of the person; but Aristotle, and Loxus line up *against* Ps.-Aristotle in thinking that colder blood is better on this score.[98]

On the evidence of Loxus' physiognomical analysis of blood, there are, then, no grounds for supposing that Loxus is any less Aristotelian than Ps.-Aristotle. The conclusion to which his analysis points is soundly Aristotelian as well. Loxus, like Aristotle and Ps.-Aristotle, looks for his ideal in someone who combines a quality somewhat like strength with a quality somewhat like intelligence; like them, he looks for this ideal somewhere in the middle of the physical extremes outlined. It is sometimes suggested that a characteristic feature of Loxus' physiognomy is his claim that 'that soul is perfect ... which is as strong as it is wise' (as above), a claim echoed in an intrusive line in ch. 10: 'a good character is constituted in no other way than with the strength of the masculine and the wisdom of the feminine'.[99] We can now see, however, that this conclusion is as Aristotelian as can be.

[97] Cf. also 2. 4, 650^b19–651^a19; cf. *HA* 3. 19.

[98] Note, though, that Aristotle himself can be selective about the range of relevant physiological factors he invokes in any given context. See e.g. van der Eijk (1997), showing that the blood is itself not, in Aristotle, the only factor relevant to the determination of psychological character. It is worth noting, by the way, that Aristotelian discussions of blood quality and its effect on character and appearance makes it all the easier for Aristotelian physiognomy to be received into humoral medicine later on: cf. Section V; also Ghersetti below, p. 289.

[99] Gleason contrasts Loxus on one side with Polemon and Aristotle on the other for according the feminine a positive role in the mix (1990: 391). The thought that intelligence is a feminine quality is, however, perfectly Aristotelian (whether or not Mayhew 2004: 94–6 is right to say that Aristotle himself has a particular, and rather low-grade, form of intelligence in mind). So *HA* 9. 1, 608^a23–8: 'In character, females are softer, more quickly tamed, inclined more to allow themselves to be touched, and easier to teach (*mathētikōteron*). Female Laconian dogs, for example, are better-natured

But this, I said, was the *second* passage of Anon.'s introduction to mention Loxus. The first is as follows (Anon. Lat. 2; tr. Repath, modified):

Loxus established that the blood is the dwelling-place of the soul,[100] and moreover that the whole body and the parts of it which give signs give different signs according to the liveliness or inertia of the blood and whether it is thinner or thicker or according to when it has free and direct or crooked and narrow channels. (But others think that, just as the soul is the shaper of the body, so the soul derives its appearance from the quality of the body.) Just like liquid in a small vessel which derives its appearance from the vessel, and just like air breathed into a pipe, aulos, or trumpet: although the breath is uniform, a trumpet, pipe, and aulos make different sounds.

There is a contrast here between Loxus on the one hand, and others (*ceteri quidem*) on the other. But who are these 'others'? It looks very much as if Anon. is here attempting to summarize what he sees as the characteristic doctrine of the Aristotelian *Physiognomy*. Compare the passage just quoted with Ps.-Aristotle 808^b11–15:

Soul and body seem to me to affect each other sympathetically (*sympathein allēlois*). A change in the state of the soul alters the appearance of the body, and, conversely, when the appearance of the body changes, it changes the state of the soul as well.

It is, I assume, the fact that Loxus is here *contrasted* with a position like that of Ps.-Aristotle which has tended to blind commentators to his theoretical affinity with Peripatetic physiognomy. But two considerations show that this conclusion is hasty. One is the simple fact that different members of the same school, particularly of the Peripatos, might think different things about the relationship between body and soul. Aristotle was (basically) a teleologist, but we know that some of his followers (including some who were interested in physiognomy) were epiphenomenalists. Indeed, I have suggested that the two parts of the surviving Peripatetic *Physiognomy* might themselves differ from each other in this matter. Anon. himself does not tell us that Loxus and the 'others' are members of different schools, and we should not just assume that they are.

It might be argued that the contrast suggested by Anon. between Loxus and the 'others' is strong enough to show that he does think of them as coming

[or 'cleverer': *euphuesterai*] than the males.' (*HA* 9 is certainly Aristotelian, by the way, even if is not by Aristotle: see Lloyd's cautious discussion at 1983: 21–2; for a more robust defence of its authenticity, Balme 1991: 1–13.) One might compare *PA* 648^a2–11 (intelligence linked with thin cool blood) with *GA* 765^b15–18 (the blood of women is cooler than that of men—though admittedly not thinner according to *HA* 521^a21–4). The general principle that the best nature involves a blend of opposites was widely accepted: cf. already Plato, *Politicus* 309 E–311 C; *Laws* 773 AB; later on, e.g. the Stoic Cornutus, *Introduction* 16, 19 (26. 1–2, 34. 12–20 Lang); and cf. the anonymous Platonist *Commentary on the Theaetetus* at cols. 9. 25–10. 7.

[100] Note that Loxus does *not* say that the blood is the seat of *consciousness* or of *thought*—an over-translation that led Foerster, and after him Misener, to argue against the connection with Aristotle, and ultimately to locate him rather earlier (so Misener 1923: 9: 'With Loxus we return to the primitive conception of Empedocles') or rather later (Foerster 1886: 6 n. 1; 1888*a*: 510; and cf. Evans 1969: 11). There is, in fact, nothing here to suggest that Loxus means anything substantially different from Aristotle's belief that the quality of the blood underlies the psychological as well as the physical characteristics of an individual. (I shall, however, argue below that Loxus was a psychological epiphenomenalist, which would introduce differences at some level in the explanation of the claim.)

from quite distinct philosophical backgrounds. But this leads to my second consideration, which is that we have a very good reason not to trust Anon.'s judgement in this matter. This is not because of any obvious failing on Anon.'s part, but simply because he presumably does not have better evidence for the relative positions taken on physiognomy by Loxus and the 'others' than the two texts he has in front of him. On the reading of these that would be most natural to him they would indeed appear to be taking rather different theoretical positions.[101] I suggested in subsection (ii) above that the two parts of the Peripatetic treatise in fact held different views on the question of the relationship between body and soul, but that they were careful not to make the relevance of their respective discussions rest on the particular view one takes. Both parts, then, talk about the relationship in terms of *sympatheia*—a word which, I have suggested, is precisely supposed to avoid signalling the theoretical mechanism that underlies the relationship, and to focus instead on the simple fact that the soul and body do (one way or another) interact in the relevant way. But a reader of the treatise who did not recognize its dual authorship, a reader like Anon., who thought that the whole treatise was by Aristotle himself, would naturally get the impression that the term *sympatheia* was meant to be a term of art—that it named the theory upon which the physiognomy of the treatise was built.

This is why Loxus looks so different from Anon.; for Loxus avoids the term *sympatheia* altogether. More than this (and the reason for it), Loxus seems to have been specific in aligning himself with an epiphenomenalist view of the soul. This, at any rate, seems to be suggested by his claim that the blood is the 'dwelling-place' of the soul. He appears to mean by this that the quality of the blood is *responsible* for the character of the soul: the blood is, as it were, not just where the soul lives, but actually where it *comes from*. This seems to be what he means when he calls the blood the 'seat' (*sedes*) of the soul in Anon. 12 (quoted and discussed in the foregoing), and it seems to be confirmed in the examples that follow.[102] These examples express the differences in character

[101] I assume that Anon. used a text of Ps.-Aristotle that was at least a version of the dual-authored text that we know. For evidence that makes it reasonable to assume this, see references in the appendix to this section, n. 119.

[102] In taking these examples to come from Loxus, rather than the 'others', I am following Foerster (1888*a*) 511, *pace* e.g. André (1981) 51; Raina (1993) 127; and Repath in this volume. My reason for taking the text this way is the fact that the images in question illustrate the effect specifically of body on soul, rather than the *mutual* interaction of body and soul which was the point of introducing the 'others'. Foerster sees a resemblance between these images for the soul and an image attributed by Seneca to the Stoic Cleanthes (Seneca, *Letter* 108. 10 = *SVF* i. 487), a fact which he uses to support his dating of Loxus to the 3rd c.; but it is important not to exaggerate how close they are. Loxus (always assuming it is he) says that the effect of the body on the soul is as that of a (musical) pipe whose shape makes the same breath sound *different*; Cleanthes says only that our breath sounds *louder* when it passes through a trumpet. There is certainly nothing here to encourage the thought that Loxus was a Stoic—and the second image (again, if it his) positively militates against the possibility. Here, the soul is compared to 'liquid held in a vessel (*vasculum*) which changes its shape according to the vessel'. It is true that a Stoic might say that the body is *metaphorically* the 'vessel' of the soul (cf. references at Görler 1997: 207), but only insofar as the body represents the soul's location. The *manner* of the soul's relationship within the body is quite different. Hierocles, for

that blood of a given kind takes on as it flows through the body;[103] and the point of the metaphors of 'shape' and 'tonality' invoked here seems to be precisely that this is one way in which we can understand the *epiphenomenal* nature of the soul. Psychological differences between individuals are expressions of differences in the quality of the blood as it flows through the body. Where the Aristotelian *Physiognomy* appears to talk of a reciprocal relationship between body and soul, Loxus is clear that the body has causal priority.

In short, Anon. has no reason to think that Loxus is coming to physiognomy from the same theoretical position as (what he considers to be) Aristotle. On the contrary, his clear commitment to epiphenomenalism suggests to Anon. a striking contrast with the apparently Aristotelian 'theory' of *sympatheia*. But (and quite apart from the fact that this on its own is no very good reason to deny Loxus a Peripatetic affiliation) if I am right about the different psychological positions in fact taken by A and B, the very contrast which Anon. sees between Loxus and the *Physiognomy* evaporates. For Loxus lines up precisely with the position I attributed to the author of Treatise A by grounding his faith in physiognomy on an epiphenomenalist view of the soul. And in this, as we shall see, he is part of a trend that unites the majority of post-Aristotelian philosophers who discuss physiognomy.

Appendix: The Aristotelian *Physiognomy*

In the body of this section, I have assumed (with most, though not all commentators) that Aristotle was not the author of the *Physiognomy* that comes down to us under his name; and I began to argue (in line with most, though again not all, commentators) that the *Physiognomy* in any case represented two works on physiognomy by two different Peripatetic authors, who might be distinguished from each other by their underlying psychological beliefs. In this appendix, I want to provide some further justification for these assumptions; but I also want to show that, despite the differences between them, there is a very close affinity between Aristotle and the authors of Treatises A and B in the direction each takes towards the development of a practical physiognomy.

(i) From Theory to Practice. Studies of the *Physiognomy* often begin with apparent differences between A and B in the methodological principles by which they seek to construct their catalogues of physiognomical signs, and move on to differences between the catalogues themselves.[104] In particular, it is often noted

example, explicitly says that 'the soul is *not* contained in the body like liquid in a vessel' (IV. 4–5); and the reason for this is presumably that, as Posidonius makes clear, it is the soul that holds that body together rather than vice versa (F149 EK; contrast the position and language of the Epicureans: e.g. *Letter to Herodotus* 65–6; Lucretius 3. 440, 555, 936).

[103] For the introduction of *extrinsic* characteristics of the blood here—the nature of its course through the body—cf. Ps.-Aristotle 813^{b}11–35 as discussed in the text above.

[104] Other noticeable differences, apart from the difference in underlying psychological theory I suggested in III. ii above, are differences in expression and terminology (see further below), and apparent differences between Aristotle and Treatise B (at 813^{b}7–35) over the qualities of blood each

that the author of Treatise A seems more interested in developing a catalogue of signs based on a study of animal species, while B sets out by making a grand division of animal characteristics into those characteristically 'male' and those characteristically 'female'.[105] This fact is, it seems to me, significant not only in confirming the impression that two distinct works went to form the surviving *Physiognomy*, but also that they were written by two different people.[106] It does not strike me as being of any special *theoretical* significance, however.[107] On the contrary, it is quite possible to read the different ways in which A and B go about isolating physiognomical signs as variants of each other, and actually complementary rather than contradictory. (Their being complementary could even explain how it is that Treatises A and B came to be put together, despite the superficial differences between them.) And if A and B go about their work in different ways, what is much more striking is the fact that they seem to share a common starting-point for this stage of the work; and, furthermore, that they seem to share this starting-point with Aristotle's discussion of how one would go about establishing a physiognomy in *Prior Analytics* 2. 27.[108] Given that all three do believe that body and soul are related in such a way that physiognomy becomes, at least in principle, a possibility (despite, that is, the differences I have mooted in the details of their underlying psychological models), their views on how one would go about translating this possibility into practice are remarkably convergent. To make the point, on the following pages, side by side, I give Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 2. 27, and the prefaces to Treatises A and B. (For reasons of space, some sections have been summarized rather than translated; in these cases they appear in square brackets.)

thinks relevant to the explanation of psycho-physical characteristics (see again III. ii above). Vogt (1999) 190–1 notes in more general terms that Treatise A focuses more on 'theoretical' issues, which B on the whole avoids, and expresses greater caution.

[105] B at 809ᵃ28 ff. (and see further below).

[106] Cf. Rose (1854) 221–5, (1863) 697–8, Foerster (1888*b*) 285–90, (1893) i, p. xix (concluding in both cases that both authors must have read Aristotle), *pace* Vogt (1999) 191–2. Vogt deduces from the lack of theoretical contradiction between A and B to the possibility that they are the works of the same author working on different occasions with different purposes. I agree with her (and argue further below) that there is no methodological conflict between A and B; but I think this to the extent that I cannot see how a difference in *purpose* would explain the differences in practical approach exhibited by them. This, in addition to the apparent, and if real then theoretically significant, divergence between A and B over the nature of the soul discussed in III. ii above, leads me to assume that the authors of A and B are in fact distinct.

[107] *Pace* e.g. Sassi (2001), 35 n. 2: 'The differences between the two subsections [sc. of Ps.-Aristotle], which are also significant from a theoretical point of view, are rightly stressed by Raina' (the reference is to Raina 1993: 24 ff.). This is not to say that there *are* no theoretically significant differences: the difference between their respective psychological models would be an example, if my reconstruction in III. ii above is right.

[108] *Pace* Vogt (1999) 191, who sees a parallel only between Treatise A and the *Prior Analytics*.

Prior Analytics 2. 27, 70b7–32	TREATISE A	TREATISE B
Physiognomy is possible if one allows that, at least in respect of their natural characteristics, body and soul change together. For perhaps someone learning music changes his soul a bit; but this characteristic is not one of the ones natural to us, as are things like (among natural movements) cases of anger and desire.	That minds follow their bodies and are not isolated and unaffected by the changes of the body is something that becomes very clear in cases of drunkenness and illness: for states of mind appear to change a great deal through the affections of the body. And correlatively, the body is clearly affected along with the affections of the soul in cases of love and fear and grief and pleasure. Again, among things that come about by nature one might especially see that the body and soul are connate with each other to the extent that in the case of most affections they are causally active on each other. [An animal never came about such as to have the form of one animal and the mind of another; and there are experts in judging the character of animals from their appearance.]	Soul and body seems to me to affect each other sympathetically. A change in the state of the soul alters the appearance of the body and, conversely, when the appearance of the body changes, it changes the state of the soul as well. [Emotional states involve changes in the body, and there are physical cures of 'mental' illnesses.]
So if this is allowed, and there is one sign for one characteristic, and we can grasp the characteristic and sign proper to each species, we shall be able to do physiognomy.	If these things are true (and these things are always true), there can be physiognomy.	
	[Three methods of physiognomy have been tried: (i) from resemblance to animal species; (ii) from resemblance to human races; (iii) from appearance of emotional states. Difficulties with all of these.] But is he any better off if he takes every genus by itself and selects signs that are peculiar to each?	
For if a characteristic belongs to one individual species, as bravery to lions, it is necessary that there will be some sign as well: *ex hypothesi* they change along with each other. Let this sign be *having large*		It is quite clear that the appearances which come to supervene on bodies are similar to the powers of the soul, so that all the resemblances in animals are indicative of some identity. Again, in the case

extremities—which cannot belong to any other complete species, for (as we are used to saying) a sign is 'proper' in this way when it is proper to a whole species, and not to an individual. And when this sign appears in another species, you will have a brave man (or whatever other type of animal). But he will have the sign: for there is a one-to-one correspondence. If all this is right, and we can gather such signs for those animals which have only one characteristic, and each has its sign, since it is necessary to have one, we shall be able to do physiognomy.

But if the whole species has two 'proper' characteristics, as a lion might be brave and generous, how shall we know which of the signs following 'properly' signifies which characteristic?

Perhaps as follows: if both occur in part of some other species, and in those species in which each is found though not in the whole of it, and whenever a member has one but not the other: for if someone is brave but not liberal, and has just one of these two signs, it is clear that this is the sign of bravery in the lion.

Surely not, for he cannot tell what they are signs of. They ought to be signs of peculiar characteristics, but we have no right to assume that there are any mental characteristics peculiar to the different kinds of animals that we examine in physiognomy. Courage is not confined to the lion, but is found in many other creatures; nor timidity to the hare, but it shares this quality with numberless other creatures. Thus it is equally fruitless to select the common and the peculiar features, and we must abandon the attempt to proceed by an examination of every kind of animal singly.

Rather, we ought to select our signs from all animals that have some mental characteristic in common. For instance, when investigating the external marks of courage, we ought to collect all brave animals, and then to inquire what sort of characteristics are natural to all of them but absent in all other animals. For if we were to select this or that as the signs of courage in the animals chosen in such a

of animal behaviour, some traits are proper to a particular species, others common to several; and the proper activities of the soul are accompanied by proper physical traits, common activities by common traits. Examples of common characters are insolence, which is found in all animals with bushy tails, and violent sexual excitability, which is found alike in asses and in pigs: whilst on the other hand railing is a character peculiar to dogs, and insensibility to pain is peculiar to the ass. It has already been explained how common and proper characters are to be distinguished.

	way as not to exclude the possibility of the presence in all these animals of some other mental characteristic, we should not be able to tell whether our selected marks were really signs of courage or of this other character. The animals from which we choose our signs must be as numerous as possible, and they must not have any mental characteristic in common except that one of which we are investigating the signs.	
	[Additional remarks: (*a*) Transitory physical signs of no use the physiognomist. (*b*) Changes in the soul which leave no observable mark in the body: e.g. the acquisition of knowledge or skills . . .]	[Additional remarks: (*a*) The need for experience and subtle discrimination; (*b*) the importance of *epiprepeia* . . .]
	Here I may mention a possible method of physiognomy which has never yet been tried. Suppose, e.g., that irascibility and morose sulkiness necessarily involve an envious disposition, and that the physiognomist could, without any bodily signs of the last character, deduce its presence from the presence of the other characters, we should then have a method peculiarly appropriate to masters of philosophy, since it is, we suppose, the peculiar mark of philosophy to be able to tell that, when certain premisses are given, something necessarily follows. But this method which considers the interrelations of mental characteristics and that which proceeds by observation of animals sometimes arrive at contrary conclusions &c.[109]	Deduction also should be used in the selection of signs, whenever possible. In the deductive procedure we attach to our data known attributes of them. For instance, if we have it given that a man is shameless and niggling, we can add that he will be a thief and a miser, the one as a consequence of his shamelessness, the other as a consequence of his niggardliness. In all such cases we ought to include the deductive method in our procedure

[109] The idea (explained at 807a3–10) is that if character trait *x* necessarily is accompanied by character trait *y*, then physical indicators of *x* will also signal the presence of *y* (i.e. even if there is no causal link between the physical sign of *x* and the psychological characteristic *y*). For a practical

At a linguistic level, there are differences and similarities here which one might note.[110] These, of course, are not without significance. But what is much more interesting is the degree of convergence in the argument of each of the writers. I do not wish to exaggerate the extent to which they overlap, or the extent to which the overlaps I have suggested constitute exact parallels. But it is significant that they overlap as much as they do; and, more than this, that where they do not overlap, or where the overlaps represent a similarity rather than exact coincidence, they complement each other rather well. There is a close similarity in the overall structure of their respective arguments (all three passages begin from an assertion of the intimate connection between body and soul, and move towards a physiognomy based on signs derived from a study of animal species); and it is, in fact, remarkably easy to imagine a single, coherent *Ur*-discussion of which they might all be thought of as descendants:

1. There is a *sympatheia* of natural physical and psychological characteristics ('natural' here excluding acquired characteristics such as learnt skills).
2. To appreciate how intimately the two are connected, consider:
   (*a*) the physical effects of occasions of anger, desire, etc. which we normally regard as 'psychological';
   (*b*) conversely: the 'psychological' effects that can be brought about by physical changes—as madness can be cured through the use of drugs.
3. If there is a one-to-one correspondence of observable physical sign and psychological correlate, physiognomy will be possible.

example, cf. perhaps *PA* 3. 4, 667^{a}19–21 where, if we follow Peck's Loeb translation (in Peck and Forster 1955), animals 'whose cowardice is either outright *or else betrayed by their mischievous behaviour*' (my emphasis) have big hearts. (However, Aristotle might have meant something more like 'animals which are clearly cowardly or made mischievous through fear have large hearts': *megalas tas kardias echousi ... panth' hosa phanerōs deila ē dia phobon kakourga*.)

[110] Differences include the following: Treatise A alone talks of *dianoiai* ('minds': e.g. 805^{a}1) and psychological *ēthē* ('characters': 805^{a}27 &c.); Treatise B alone of the soul's *hexis* ('state': e.g. 808^{b}12) and *dunameis* ('powers': 808^{b}28). B is also unique in using the notion of *epiprepeia* (first at 809^{a}13; cf. n. 113 below). Both parts of the *Physiognomy* use the language of 'following' to describe the relationship of body and soul (albeit the relationship they describe is rather different: see again III. ii above): A at 805^{a}1, B at 808^{b}20–1. As to similarities: all three texts use the word *sympaschein*/*sympatheia* to describe the relationship between body and soul (Aristotle at 70^{b}16, Treatise A at 805^{a}6, B at 808^{b}11, 19)—a word which, in this usage, is first attested in these texts. All use the notion of a sign 'proper' to a species (*idion*; as opposed to a sign 'common' to many species: *koinon*); and both Aristotle and Treatise B excuse their failure to explain the meaning of the term: Aristotle appeals to school usage (70^{b}20), B appeals to previous discussion ('it has already been explained' at 809^a—though in fact it has not been 'stated' anywhere at all in the *Physiognomy*). And there is an unmistakable resemblance between the conclusion to Aristotle's opening remarks ('if this is allowed, and there is one sign for one characteristic, and we can grasp the characteristic and sign proper to each species, we shall be able to do physiognomy': 70^{b}11–14) and the comment made by Treatise A in the same context ('If these things are true, and these things are always true, there can be physiognomy': 805^{a}17–18).

4. Three previous approaches to physiognomy have been tried, all with their difficulties:
   (*a*) from animals; but this has been done crudely, and is prey to these objections:[111]
      (i) if you appeal to signs shared in common with other species, it will be impossible to say that a man sharing the sign is more like one species than another;
      (ii) if you appeal to signs peculiar to one species, it will be impossible to know what they are signs for—unless there are *characteristics* peculiar to the species as well, which there rarely if ever are;[112]
      (iii) if you appeal to signs peculiar to one species, it will be impossible to know *which* of its characteristics the sign is a sign for.
   (*b*) from human racial types, but: <*understand the same kinds of theoretical problem as with (a)?*>
   (*c*) from expressions associated with particular emotions, but:
      (i) the same facial expression may be common to different characters;
      (ii) a man can assume an expression not normally his own;
      (iii) the number of inferences that can be drawn from facial expression is small.
5. A refined form of animal physiognomy is the only way forward: one must choose a sample group of animal species that have one and only one physical characteristic in common, and one and only one psychological characteristic.
6. Further considerations:
   (*a*) signs liable to alteration are of no help;
   (*b*) there is a practical need for subtle discrimination in signs;
   (*c*) a note on *epiprepeia*;[113]
   (*d*) physiognomical conclusions can be extended syllogistically.

(ii) Physiognomical Signs in Ps.-Aristotle. The above sketch of a Peripatetic *Ur*-discussion should be regarded more as a thought-experiment than as serious reconstruction. Nevertheless, the fact that it is possible makes very clearly the

[111] Cf. perhaps *GA* 4. 3, 769^{b}20–1, where Aristotle mentions a physiognomist who compared human faces with those of two or three animals.

[112] There is an apparent contradiction between Treatises A and B over whether there are any psychological characteristics peculiar to individual species; but note that Treatise A does not *deny* the existence of such characteristics: it merely says that we have no right to assume their existence. In fact one could easily imagine a perfectly Aristotelian reflection lying behind both passages—e.g.: 'We have no right to assume that there are any psychological characteristics peculiar to the different kinds of animals that we examine in physiognomy—unless one thinks that railing is peculiar to dogs, and insensitivity to pain is peculiar to asses; though such cases will be rare.'

[113] For the term *epiprepeia*, see Appendix n. 7. It is used in slightly different senses by Ps.-Aristotle and later physiognomical authors. For Ps.-Aristotle it seems to *refer* to the 'fit' or 'congruity' between individual signs and the traits they signify; for Anon. Lat. and Adamantius, on the other hand, it refers to the 'overall appearance' of a person, something that supervenes on the totality of his or her physical characteristics (cf. Anon. Lat. 45; Ad. B1).

point which seems to me most significant, namely that there is a strong familial resemblance between A, B, and Aristotle himself in their approaches to physiognomy as a practical art. And this resemblance continues to link the specific recommendations each makes for establishing physiognomical signs. In saying this, I do not, again, wish to deny the obvious differences identified here by many commentators. In particular, the author of Treatise A confines himself to the comparative study of animal species suggested in the text already quoted, while B goes on to introduce the idea that the relevant differentials can be classified according to a gendered polarity (809^{a}26–30):

Now, first of all, I shall try to distinguish among animals which ones stand out as being brave or cowardly or just or unjust. The whole animal kingdom is to be divided into two types (*morphai*): male and female, and what is appropriate (*prepon*) associated with each type...

B, then, does something rather different from anything we can find in A or the *Prior Analytics*.[114] But while fully recognizing this, what I again wish to focus on is the fact that differences between A and B are not of a kind which suggest that they are the product of distinct theoretical traditions. Indeed, as I suggested above, it is possible to read them as positively complementary.

Take, to begin with, the approach apparently preferred by Treatise A (and perhaps Aristotle himself), which is to classify psycho-physical traits on the basis of a study of animal species. In this case, the idea is one should try to find sets of non-human animal species (i.e. at least two of them) which have one, but only one physical trait in common, and one, but only one psychological trait that they share to exclusion of all other animal species. The resulting psycho-physical correlation can be applied to individual humans: any human with the physical trait identified, will, so far as the natural state of the soul is concerned, possess the corresponding psychological trait as well.

This is A's approach, and it makes sense as far as it goes. But it should be clear that its execution would be by no means a simple task. Not the least of the problems facing someone who wishes to construct a physiognomy this way is the fact that not all physical similarities between any given species will be of any physiognomical significance at all. There is a striking example of this in Aristotle, who gives the hairiness of the ears as an example of a physical trait that signifies nothing about character.[115] It would be easy to multiply examples by looking at smaller and smaller details.

My suggestion is that B approaches the subject of physiognomy with difficulties such as this in his mind. The way he tackles them is as follows. He realizes that the only secure way to identify physiognomically relevant signs will involve an understanding of what links a given sign, a given physical trait, with the psychological trait that it signifies. He also knows that this will involve an analysis of the blood. The reason for this is that, in Aristotelian biology, it is

[114] It should, however, be noted that B's generalization about male and female types has parallels elsewhere in Aristotle: cf. e.g. *PA* 3. 1, 661^{b}32–4; also *HA* 9. 1 (though cf. n. 99 above on the authenticity of this book).

[115] *HA* 492^{a}32–4; though other physiognomical authors do not agree: see Anon. Lat. 82.

the quality of the blood that determines *both* the psychological operation of a creature (as we have already seen to some extent in III. iii above), *and* also its physical appearance.[116] Whether this is made explicit or not, blood is, in fact, the common term of all inference in Aristotelian physiognomy.

In principle, then, we know that any physical trait explained by qualities of the blood (as its heat, consistency, etc.) which also have significance for psychological functioning is a physiognomically relevant trait. But how do we establish correlations between blood-type and psycho-physical trait? Surely the matter becomes hopeless when we reflect that we do not even have direct access to the quality of the blood, but can only deduce this from its psycho-physical effects?

There is, in fact, just one way of making progress: we have to hope that nature provides us with at least *one* example of clearly contrasting sets of psycho-physical attributes that might reasonably be thought to track blood quality between the possible extremes of (say) hot and thick at one end to cold and thin at the other. Treatise B thinks it does: this is precisely the polarity traced by the difference between the sexes. Like other terms of differentiation, the difference between the sexes must relate directly to differences in blood quality (cf. Aristotle himself, e.g. *HA* 521^{a}21–4); but unlike other terms of differentiation, it constitutes a polarity common to just about every species (809^{a}28–9). In every species, he thinks, one encounters the same *kinds* of differentiation between the psycho-physical properties of males and females: males, for example, are generally larger and fiercer, females smaller and tamer. In this way, sexual differentiation provides a secure and easily accessible empirical basis for the construction of a scale mapping out physiognomically relevant physical and psychological attributes, a scale that can be employed with confidence across species.

Commentators sometimes talk as if the author of B were interested in sexual differentials *instead of* species differentials; but this is true neither in theory nor in practice. It is not theoretically true, because (on my account, anyway) his interest in sexual characteristics is *the very same* interest as a concern with species differentials. The reason for this is straightforward: the sexes are differentiated in exactly the same ways as are species (at least insofar as the differences are physiognomically relevant). In both cases, the differences can be referred to differences in blood quality, and manifest themselves in exactly the same psycho-physical correlations. But it is practically untrue as well, because in fact B still cannot, and does not, think that he can determine particular psycho-physical correlations without a study of animal species. So far I have suggested how he might have constructed a scale stretching from characteristically 'masculine' attributes of body and soul to those that are characteristically 'feminine'; but this does not suffice to establish which *particular* physical attributes are indicative of which *particular* psychological attributes. In order to do this, B has to follow precisely the procedure recommended by Aristotle and exemplified in Treatise A as well: he compares different species in order to find uniquely shared

[116] See B, 813^{b}7–35 with III. iii above. For Aristotle's use of blood to explain differences between different species, see e.g. *PA* 648^{a}2–11, 651^{a}12–17; *GA* 765^{b}15–18.

psycho-physical traits. Something else which commentators often assume is that B makes an arbitrary assignment of different animal species to the masculine or feminine ends of his sexual polarity: the evidence for this is his claim that the lion is the most perfectly masculine of animals, while the leopard is the most perfectly feminine (809^b14–810^a13). It is true that he calls the lion the most perfectly masculine type; but in fact he does *not* say that the leopard represents a perfect 'feminine' type. What he actually says of the leopard is this (809^b36–7):[117]

Of all animals accounted brave, the leopard approximates most closely to the female type—save in its legs, which it uses to perform any feat of strength.

All he means by this, of course, is that the physical characteristics of the leopard generally stand in the same relation to those of other animals 'accounted brave' as typically 'masculine' characteristics stand to typically 'feminine' characteristics. To this extent, then, we can expect the leopard to exhibit psychological traits which relatively speaking are more like those characteristic of females in general. But this is not the point of the example: for one thing, it is something we could learn from observation of the leopard's behaviour without reference to its appearance; and for another it tells us nothing about which of the leopard's 'feminine' physical characteristics correspond to which of its 'feminine' psychological traits. The point of the passage lies rather in the qualifications: 'of all animals accounted brave'; 'save in its legs'. What this tells us is that there is just *one* physical characteristic which the leopard shares with other species united by the psychological trait of courage, namely it has large extremities. It is from this that we can draw a useful physiognomical conclusion: that, of all 'masculine' (and to this extent physiognomically relevant) traits, it is powerful legs which betray the psychological quality of courage. This, it might be noted, is a conclusion that is not dissimilar from the connection Aristotle himself posits between courage and large extremities at *Prior Analytics* 70^b14–17.

In the end, then, B's procedure is not so very different from that of A, or from that recommended by Aristotle in the *Prior Analytics*. All three seek to isolate physiognomical correlations by a comparative study of animal species: all three look for sets of species which share a single physical and a single psychological trait in common. The difference with B is merely that it offers a common scale of empirically accessible and physiognomically relevant terms by which his study can be guided.

(iii) Conclusion In subsection (i) above I showed that the prefatory discussions of Treatises A and B seem to converge with Aristotle's discussion of a physiognomical methodology in *Prior Analytics* 2. 27; in subsection (ii), that the systems built on the back of these discussions in A and B are perfectly complementary. I repeat that, in making these observations, I do not wish to play down the differences between the three texts under consideration: they are differences which (quite apart from the tentative evidence I adduced in III. ii

[117] Contrast Polemon, who *does* say, *simpliciter*, that the leopard is the 'most feminine in appearance' (Leiden, ch. 2; Ad. A2; cf. Swain below, pp. 180, 189).

above for differences in their underlying psychological models) seem to me to place the onus of proof squarely on the shoulders of anyone who should wish to deny that the three texts are the works of three distinct authors. Nevertheless, I think it just as clear that the three authors share more in common than is sometimes appreciated. Indeed, a case could easily be made that they represent three developments of the very same original discussion of the topic of physiognomy.[118] My comparison of the three texts above would seem to rule out the *Prior Analytics* as itself the original source (it emerges from the comparison looking itself like a fragment of some broader discussion). I doubt too that there ever existed a physiognomical treatise written by Aristotle himself which we have now lost. There is, in any case, no external evidence for an Aristotelian *Physiognomy* significantly different from the surviving composite of A and B,[119] and this composite treatise presumably came into circulation reasonably early on.[120] But it is perfectly plausible to think that A, B, and *Prior*

[118] Cf. again the conclusions of Rose and Foerster (references in n. 106 above).

[119] It is true that we find references to 'Aristotle's *Physiognomy*' which have no parallels in the surviving text. See in Anon. Lat., for example (references are to chapter and line number as printed in this volume): 83. 3–8; 85. 1–8, 9–13 (cf. Ps.-Polemon 428. 12–13 [Foerster]); 85. 15–86. 2; 86. 7–13; 87. 6–9; 88. 3–5. Further references, with parallels in different Aristotelian texts, are Anon. Lat. 86. 4–7 (cf. *HA* 492^{b}2–3); cf. Ps.-Polemon 431. 3–5 (cf. *HA* 494^{a}16); Pliny, *Natural History* 11. 273–4 = Aristotle fr. 286 Rose^3. Nevertheless, the core of Polemon's treatise (and so, derivatively, that of Anon. Lat.) shows significant overlap with material in both parts of the surviving *Physiognomy*: the list of character types at Polemon, Leiden chs. 53–66 and Anon. Lat. 90–9 and 105–15 substantially relies on Treatise A 807^{a}31–808^{b}9 (cf. Swain below, p. 193), while the discussion of body parts at Polemon, Leiden 3–52 (cf. Anon. 49–72, though with inversions of Polemon's order) reflects Treatise B, 810^{a}14–813^{b}6 (cf. Swain below, p. 179). Other references to an Aristotelian *Physiognomy* in antiquity similarly presuppose access to (something like) A and B indifferently. For A, see Anon. Lat. 84. 6–14 (cf. perhaps 808^{a}17–19); 87. 3–6 (cf. 808^{a}32–3); 88. 1–3 (cf. 808^a 31–2); Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 47. 6, 301. 23–302. 17 Wachsmuth (quoting 'from Aristotle's *Physiognomy*', 805^{a}1–18). Cf. Ps.-Polemon 427. 1–10 F (808^{a}19–24, 32–3); 428. 8–9 F (808^{b}18–19). (The opening line of Galen's *QAM* also looks to me like an allusion to the opening of A, and so the *Physiognomica* as a whole: see Section V, n. 184.) For B, see Anon. Lat. 83. 1–3 (cf. 812^{b}34–6); 8–9 (811^{a}33–6); 9–10 (cf. 811^{b}23–4); 10–11 (812^{b}6–7); 11–13 (812^{b}11–12); 84. 1–3 (cf. 812^{b}24–5); 3–4 (813^{b}4–6); 4–6 (811^{a}17); 85. 13–15 (813^{a}14–15); 87. 1–3 (811^{a}26–8); 7–9 (cf. 810^{a}28–30); 9–10 (812^{b}13–14); 10–13 (810^{b}1–4); 88. 1–3 (808^{a}31–2); 5 (813^{b}7); 5–6 (813^{b}11–16); 6–8 (813^{b}16–20); 11–13 (813^{b}20–3); 13–15 (813^{b}23–5); Pollux, *Onomasticon* 2. 135. 7 (811^{a}17; cf. also Suetonius, *de blasphemiis* 4. 70 Taillardat, leading Vogt 1999: 200–1 to suggest the 1st-c. BC grammarian Didymus as his immediate source). Cf. Ps.-Polemon 427. 11–428. 7 (cf. in order: 808^{b}4–6, 810^{a}30–1, 812^{b}13–14, 811^{a}37–^{b}3, 812^{b}11–12); 428. 10–11 (cf. 808^{b}6–7); 428. 16–18 (cf. 811^{a}24–6); 429. 1–2 (cf. 811^{a}29–30); 429. 3–4 (cf. 811^{a}28–9); 429. 6–8 (cf. 811^{b}2–3); 429. 8–10 (cf. 811^{b}3–4); 429. 11–17 (cf. 811^{b}4–9).

[120] At least there is no solid evidence that it was predated by the independent circulation of either part of the composite—or of any other treatise ascribed to Aristotle. (See again n. 119 above; and note that the citations of material not in our treatise are relatively late, and of the kind of material which might have crept into 'our' text—that they are not, in any case evidence for a different and certainly not for an earlier Aristotelian *Physiognomy*.) It is worth noting that a *Physiognomy* is listed in the catalogues of Aristotle's works: cf. D.L. 5. 25; *Vita Menagiana* (i.e. *Vita Hesychii*) no. 97 (Düring 1957 at 80–92). The latter gives the work as being in two books; the former in one, and Moraux (1951) 203 uses this as evidence that the bipartite treatise we have was compiled as late as the 2nd c. AD. One might think, however, that the two catalogues simply counted the same work differently (do *we* think it is one book or two?). Cf. in any case J. Barnes (1997), 39–44 for a salutary

Analytics 2. 27 might all depend on unpublished work conducted by Aristotle in the Lyceum: that they are different recensions or versions or records, developed to practical conclusions in different degrees and in different ways, of lectures or notes by Aristotle which were available to his early followers.[121]

IV. THE HELLENISTIC SCHOOLS

Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in evidence for Hellenistic philosophers: Posidonius, F169. 85 EK (= Galen, *PHP* 5. 5. 22. 2). Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in fellow travellers of the Stoa: Philo of Alexandria, *On Dreams* 1. 164; Dio Chrysostom, *Orations* 4. 87.[122]

If the frequency of occurrence of the word 'physiognomy' in our surviving evidence is a reasonable measure of interest in the subject, it will be immediately apparent from the list at the head of this section that the Hellenistic schools provide thin pickings for the historian of the subject. Physiognomy was clearly not unknown in the third and second centuries: at least some of the work that came out of Aristotle's school must have been done in this period. But there is little evidence of interest in the subject on the part of the new movements and schools which dominated Hellenistic philosophy—especially the Stoa, the Epicurean Garden, and the Academy in its Sceptical incarnation. An interest in physiognomy is explicitly ascribed to only one philosopher of the period, namely the Stoic Posidonius. For the sake of completeness, I have included the (single) occurrences of the word in the later writers Philo of Alexandria and Dio Chrysostom, since both authors had an interest in Stoicism and sometimes provide valuable evidence for earlier Stoic thought.[123] But their references to physiognomy, as it happens, suggest distance rather than

reminder of how difficult quite generally it can be to relate the ancient catalogues to the Aristotelian corpus as it survives.

[121] And for the (congenial) relationship between the *Physiognomy* and undisputed works of Aristotelian biology, see Lloyd (1983), 24; Vogt (1999), 195.

[122] Artemidorus of Daldis has been suspected of Stoicism (e.g. Hopfner 1937: 2240 with further references; cf. Kenner 1939: 455), in which case cf. *Oneirocritica* 2. 69. 10. But the association is without serious support: see Flamand (1989) 612.

[123] It might also be worth noting Polemon's Stoic connections in this context: he was taught by Dio Chrysostom (Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* i. 539. 23–5 Kayser), and could trace his pedagogical lineage back through Timocrates and Euphrates (535. 32–536. 20; *cf.* Frede 1997, esp. 2, 9–10; Swain below, p. 187) to Musonius Rufus (Fronto, *Letters* 135. 3–4 van den Hout^2, with Frede 1997: 1–2). (In the other direction, his pupil Herodes Atticus—e.g. Philostratus, *Lives* 536. 28–537. 11—taught the Stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius.) There is, however, nothing, either about Polemon's writing a *Physiognomy*, or about the *Physiognomy* he writes, that could support the view that he is himself influenced by Stoicism. Within what we know of the *Physiognomy*, the only tendentious doctrinal position Polemon adopts is the claim that reason lies in the breast: Leiden ch. 1, A5, cf. ch. 15. This is indeed something maintained by the Stoics (against Plato, for example); but it more probably comes to Polemon from Aristotle, who believed the same thing.

affinity: it is invoked as a study comparable with, but in some way different from, what 'we' do.[124] They mention the word; they are far from providing evidence that 'physiognomy' was an active category of Stoic, or generally of Hellenistic, research.[125]

In the case of Epicureanism, the reason for the absence of reference to physiognomy is fairly clear. Epicureanism insists that body and soul are closely intermingled in operation,[126] but it also insists on their substantial independence from each other.[127] The soul's character is explained by the nature of its own atoms, and not (not even indirectly) by those of the body.[128] It is true that there is a perfectly regular correlation between the growth and powers of soul and body at the level of the species; but even this is emphatically not because

[124] Philo compares his work of textual exegesis with the activity of physiognomists: in both cases, something underlying and invisible is deduced from what is apparent (*On Dreams* 1. 164). For remarks in Dio Chrysostom convergent with observations in the physiognomical handbooks, see Barton (1994*b*), 104; Evans (1941), 101 n. 21; Gleason (1990), 393; Bost-Pouderon (2003) (on *Oration* 33 in particular). It is worth noting, though, that most of these concern acquired or acquirable traits (cf. Bost-Pouderon 2003: 160, quoting Clement of Alexandria advising the Christian to acquire them at *Pedagogue* 3. 11. 61. 8; and further below, with n. 133, on the sneeze at *Oration* 33. 53); and there is, in general, nothing to argue Dio's *philosophical* or *theoretical* commitment to physiognomy, e.g. on the grounds of a particular theory of psycho-physical interaction. In other words, if Dio has the Sophist's interest in appearance and is familiar with physiognomical practice, he provides no evidence for its philosophical understanding, let alone for its place in Stoic thought. It might also be noted that, in the one passage in which Dio refers explicitly to physiognomists, he is *contrasting* himself with them. This is partly because, while they deduce a man's character from his form, he rather intends to present portraits of men according to what he knows of their character; but it is also because his portraits will capture this character *symbolically* (see *Oration* 4. 85–8). To this extent, he compares himself to a painter approaching the visual representation of a divinity. In other words, he presents what he is doing here as a kind of allegory *rather than* a kind of physiognomy.

[125] And cf. perhaps Epictetus, *Dissertation* 4. 5. 20, making the point that being virtuous ('being a human being' in a strict sense) is not a matter of the kind of eyes or nose one has: you must see whether the person has the judgements that belong to a human being. This in fact echoes Cleanthes at *SVF* i. 517: 'uneducated people differ from animals only in form.'

[126] See Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 3 *passim* (e.g. in particular 168–76, 323–69, 445–525, 558–79, 688–97, 741–71, 824–9). In arguing this side of the question, Lucretius comes quite close at times to the attempt by the Aristotelian *Physiognomy* to prove the 'sympathy' between soul and body: he draws attention to the disturbance of the soul in someone drunk or sick (3. 463–86; cf. 805^a2–4), and to the physical medicines by which mental afflictions can be cured (3. 510–25; cf. 808^b21–7). He also appeals to the perfectly regular correlation at the level of species between an animal's psychological and physical character. (That the form of the argument, and even the example, namely the invariable spirit of the hunting-dog, suggests allusion to and so perhaps awareness of the Aristotelian *Physiognomy* is no argument that Lucretius followed that treatise to its conclusion: see *On the Nature of Things* 3. 741–53 with Ps.-Aristotle 805^a11–17.)

[127] See esp. Lucretius' attack on those (epiphenomenalists) who view the soul as a 'harmony' at 3.98–135. In contrast to the Aristotelian *Physiognomy* now, it turns out that the soul can suffer and act without any corresponding affection in the body (or indeed spirit) at all (3. 145–51; contrast 805^a1–2).

[128] So Lucretius 3. 258–322, where the ferocity of lions, the velocity of deer, and the placidity of cattle are explained by the quality not of (e.g.) the blood, as Aristotle would have said, but of the atoms that make up the soul. It is true that the body can *disrupt* the activity of the soul (cf. e.g. Lucretius 3. 463–505); but, as we saw in respect of Plato's *Timaeus*, something which has the ability to *disrupt* the soul is not *ipso facto* the *explanans* of its character.

either in any sense *causes* the other to be a certain way. It is rather the case that a certain kind of soul just 'naturally' belongs in a certain kind of body, as trees belong on the earth, not in the sky.[129] (This in turn will be explained by no mechanism beyond the fact that, at an earlier stage of world history, the combination of *this kind of soul* with *this kind of body* happened to prove successful in the fight for survival, and the two have since been reproduced in tandem.)[130] Nothing in any of this suggests reasons, even incidental reasons, why below the level of the species a soul of *this particular character* should reside in a body of *this particular appearance*.[131] It is striking, anyway, that in the course of his attack on the belief in the transmigration of souls, Lucretius appeals to species-level correlations between body and soul, but not correlations at the level of the individual. Strictly speaking, this means that he shows only that souls could not migrate outside their species. If he could have used physiognomical evidence to show that they could not migrate between individuals *within* species, one might have expected him to do so.[132]

Things are slightly more complicated for the early Stoics, however, because they do have a certain amount to say about the correlation between individual appearance and character—enough to make a plausible case for supposing that the absence of the *word* physiognomy from our evidence might in this instance be accidental. This, then, is something I wish to consider in subsection (i) below. And although I shall conclude that the silence of our evidence is, in fact, very eloquent (that the early Stoics were not and could not have thought of themselves as 'physiognomists'), the study will lead to two important results. One will be, at last, an understanding of what the word 'physiognomy' was in fact taken to mean by ancient philosophers, such that it would be wrong to think that the early Stoics were physiognomists. The second result will be to show the danger to us of using the word more freely than the ancient philosophers of whom we use it. For in subsuming every case in which appearance and character

[129] At Lucretius 3. 94–7, the soul is said to be part of a person rather as a hand, foot, or eye is. These too, I suppose, are not caused *by* the body (of which they are organs), but have their place in nature as parts of it. For the trees that could not be found in the sky, see Lucretius 3. 784–9 (where they are in fact used to make a broader point, viz. that souls quite generally are naturally and necessarily found in bodies).

[130] Cf. Lucretius 5. 837–77.

[131] It is true that both physical (see Lucretius 4. 1208–32) and psychological (cf. 3. 741–7) character are inherited from one's parents; but again there is no reason to suppose that there is a correlation between *which* psychological peculiarities and *which* physical peculiarities one inherits from a given parent.

[132] The closest Lucretius comes to such an argument is *On the Nature of Things* 3. 760–4. But the point here is one concerning character. It is not, in other words, the point that metempsychosis might force a soul into a body physically suited to a soul of a different character. Rather, Lucretius' concern is with the absurdity of thinking that a rational soul would of necessity end up in the body of a pre-rational child. There might be evidence of positive Epicurean opposition to Aristotelian physiognomy in the mocking use of physiognomical material from *HA* 1. 10, 491^b34–492^a12 at Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 8. 48, 353 BC. The provenance of this polemic, which is part of a larger broadside against Aristotelian natural history, is not given; but it is immediately followed by anti-Aristotelian remarks which are ascribed to Epicurus.

are said to be linked under the single heading of 'physiognomy', we are at risk not only of misunderstanding the intention behind the statement and exploration of such links, but also of confusing what turn out to be (from a theoretical point of view) very different phenomena.

(i) The Older Stoics

The superficially plausible case for ascribing an interest in physiognomy to the Stoics at large rests in large part on a series of fragments whose form very closely suggests the kinds of judgement made by attested practitioners of the art (numbered for ease of reference in what follows):

> T1. It is said that some young men set out to play a trick on Cleanthes, who followed Zeno in claiming that character (*ēthos*) could be grasped from appearance (*eidos*). They brought to him a man who was sexually deviant, but toughened up through his work in the fields, and they demanded that Cleanthes should declare his character. He could not make it out, and he told the man to go away. But as the man was going, he sneezed, and Cleanthes said 'I have him! He's dissolute.' (DL 7. 173 = *SVF* i. 618; part = i. 204).[133]

> T2. Zeno of Citium seems to sketch a beautiful and properly loveable image of a young man. He sculpts him like this: Let his countenance be pure; his brow not relaxed; his eye not wide open nor half-closed; his neck not thrown back; nor the limbs of his body relaxed, but keyed up like strings under tension; his ear cocked for the *logos*; and his bearing and movement giving no hope to the licentious. Let modesty and a manly look flower upon him, but away with the excitement of the perfumers' shops and goldsmiths and wool shops—and indeed all the other shops where women spend the whole day adorned like courtesans, as though they were sitting in a brothel (*SVF* i. 246).[134]

[133] 'Sexually deviant' = *kinaidos*; 'dissolute' = *malakos*. (I owe to Thomas Hubbard the observation that it is tendentious to translate this passage as if the man's presumed homosexuality were the point.) For the story, see parallels at Dio, *Oration* 33. 53, and Anon. Lat. 11, *ad fin.*) (which Foerster 1893: i, p. lxxi, thinks might come from Loxus; cf. also Pack 1978: 121, tracing the sneeze back to Aristotle). Dio's version comes from an oration set in Tarsus, and the fact that he attributes the diagnosis to a 'local' led von Arnim to identify Chrysippus (who came from nearby Soli) as its author in this case (see *SVF* ii. 10a with comment on i. 618). But the explicit naming of Cleanthes in the present text has led to much greater speculation about *his* interest in physiognomy: see e.g. Foerster (1888*a*) 511; Misener (1923) 3 (cf. 17); Evans (1969) 10–11. Barton (1994*b*: 101) uses the present text as the point of departure for her imaginative claim that the 'third-century B.C. Stoic physiognomist Cleanthes makes it his business to unmask charlatans, effeminates, and adulterers'. Cleanthes' association with physiognomy has been further supported by a superficial similarity between an image he uses for the soul at *SVF* i. 487 and an image reported (probably from Loxus) at Anon. Lat. 2. The similarity is not, however, as close as it at first seems: see again Section III n. 102.

[134] The translation is taken from Schofield (1991), 116. His claim at 115 that the passage is 'one of our best pieces of evidence for Stoic physiognomics' is made immediately questionable by the fact that it describes a pose that anyone (more or less; but cf. n. 135 below on the 'tension' of the limbs) could adopt without sharing the character it is supposed to imply. Nearer the point might be Gleason (1990) 403, who sees it as *advisory*: the passage shows how a 'well-schooled young man would know how to avoid body language that might signal sexual availability'.

> T3. Chrysippus says that goods and evils are perceptible, writing this in his *On the End*, book 2: 'The following is a sufficient basis for us to be able to say that goods and evils are perceptible: for not only are passions perceptible, along with their species, such as grief, and fear, and the like, but so also is it possible to perceive theft and adultery and similar; and, in general, folly and cowardice and many other vices; not only joy and good works and many other right actions, but also wisdom and courage and the rest of the virtues' (*SVF* iii. 85; similarly *SVF* iii. 84).

> T4. The Stoics think that the sage can be grasped as such through perception, using his appearance (*eidos*) as evidence (*SVF* i. 204).

On the face of it, the language in these texts obviously does coincide with language found in unambiguously physiognomical texts: note especially, for example, the claim in T1 that character (*ēthos*) can be discerned in physical appearance (*eidos*). But it fairly quickly becomes evident that none of these texts refers to, or seems to rely on, anything about the natural geography of the physical body from which their deductions are drawn—the shape of the nose, or the breadth of the forehead: the sort of evidence on which Phaedo and Aristotle relied for their physiognomy, so described. T1 actually seems to rule such evidence out (Cleanthes was baffled when presented with the mere appearance of the man); and both T1 and T2 appeal to movement or posture rather than the shape of bodily parts. As to T4: we know that there are no such physical attributes that distinguish a sage. Apart from anything else, one's physical features do not change when one *becomes* a sage (despite the fact that one is supposed at that moment to become 'beautiful' where one had been ugly before: see Plutarch, *That the Stoics Talk More Absurdly than the Poets* 1058 A).

The key to all of these texts, then, seems to be T3: the quite general claim that virtue(s) and vice(s) can be discerned. It is tempting to explain this in turn by the fact that, according to the Stoics, qualities are corporeal: we might suppose that they can therefore be seen in, as it were, their own right. This cannot exactly be wrong; but at the same time it is important to remember that qualities are not entities separable from the bodies in which they occur. It is probably best, then, to think of them in terms of secondary physical characteristics, encompassing such things as expression and posture (T2).[135] This would fit in with the implication in T3 that they are perceptible in just the way and presumably for just the sort of reasons that emotions are manifest in a person's appearance.

[135] Cf. also Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 11. 15 (the eyes and voice of a man should betray his goodness; see Rutherford 1989: 95–6 with n. 13). It might be proper to think of *these* 'secondary' characteristics as the manifestations of an individual's *tonos*: compare the youth with limbs 'keyed up like strings under tension' (T2 above). Cf. also Hierocles V. 11–15 (which, as the example shows, is clearly about bearing not physical features as such): 'It is not impossible that someone sufficiently capable in the judgement of characters (*pr(os) e(pi)krisin ēthō(n)*) could, standing near people when asleep, tell from the manner in which a person sleeps what sort of disposition (*d(ia)the(sis)*) the sleeper had—whether it was strong and full of tension (*tonou pl(ē)rēs*) or softer than it ought to be. For those expecting to die [. . .] even have concern for their corpses to fall decorously, as the girl in the tragedy; so much more will the proofs of their disposition (*tekmēria t(ēs) d(ia)th(es)eōs*) pass over the bodies of those who sleep.' (The 'girl in the tragedy' is Polyxena: cf. Euripides, *Hecuba* 569, with Bastianini and Long 1992: 427–8.)

My conclusion about these texts is that, if they are to be considered evidence for 'physiognomy', it is physiognomy in rather a different sense from what we have seen in Phaedo or Aristotle, in particular because they none of them concern the shape of the body or its parts. But if these texts can fairly quickly be dismissed, they are not the only fragments which constitute our evidence for the Stoics' thinking about the relationship between appearance and character. It happens that the Stoics did also have things to say about the relationship between character and the shape of the body and its parts. In particular, we have clear evidence that Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Panaetius, at least, recognized and addressed the fact (much discussed, as we have seen, by Aristotle) that children tend to resemble their parents in appearance and character. Here is the evidence for Cleanthes and Panaetius—I shall quote and discuss our evidence for Chrysippus at greater length below:

Cleanthes has it that the parents' likeness is reflected in their children—not only through the cast of their body (*corporis lineamentis*), but also the characteristics of the soul (*animae notis*) (*SVF* i. 518, from Tertullian, *On the Soul* 5).

Not only, says Cleanthes, do we become like our parents in body, but also psychologically, in our passions (*pathê*), characters (*êthê*), and dispositions (*diatheseis*) (*SVF* i. 518, from Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* 2, 20. 14–17 Morani).[136]

Panaetius has it . . . that souls are born, as our similarity to our parents makes clear—a similarity which appears in our characters (*in ingeniis*), not only our bodies (fr. 83 van Straaten = Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1. 79).

It is nowhere explicit in our texts how the Stoics accounted for the psychological resemblance of children and their parents, but on the basis of what we have seen in Plato and Aristotle there would seem to have been two kinds of approach available to them. One would be to say that the soul acquires its individual character *from* the body. (There is no problem, at least in principle, in explaining why a child has *physical* resemblance to its parents; and if the soul takes its character one way or another from the body, then we can understand how it comes to acquire psychological resemblance to them as well.) In fact I think this must be right, and I shall return to the detail below. But on the face of it, it might seem that the other kind of approach has more going for it. This approach is to say (rather more in the terms of Aristotle) that the lines of causality which lead to psychological similarity with one's parents are *parallel* with the lines of causality which lead to physical similarity with them. This looks like a plausible way of understanding the Stoic claim that children resemble their parents in character as well as appearance because the Stoics did, after all, think that a child's soul is a chip off the old block in as near a literal sense as any

[136] Von Arnim includes a third passage at *SVF* i. 518 (like the first passage, from Tertullian—this time *On the Soul* 25): 'How can we explain in addition the similarity of psychological character that, according to Cleanthes' testimony, a person shares with their parents if we do not appeal to the seed of the soul?' But note that Cleanthes here is only being invoked as a witness to psychological affinity between parent and child, not for the view that the similarity is traced to the seed. Apart from anything else, this view is associated by Tertullian with a belief in the origin of the soul at conception, a belief not held by the Stoics (as we shall see).

theory of generation has ever allowed. The soul of a child is made out of a piece (or 'fragment': *apospasma*) of the very 'breath' (*pneuma*) from which its father's soul was made (*SVF* i. 128). It is true that the Stoics talk as if there were an element of *dis*continuity here as well: the *pneuma* inherited from the parents' soul does not, properly speaking, constitute a soul in the embryo, which is conceived of as a kind of 'plant', sustained by 'nature' (*physis*: *SVF* ii. 806). (We cannot call the *pneuma* which directs the development of the embryo and foetus a 'soul', presumably because the foetus does not have the capacities of perception and impulse characteristic of an animal.) But one might easily think of this as a technicality. When a child is born, its 'soul' is the result of the 'tempering' of its nature, of this very parcel of *pneuma* as it comes into contact with the cold air outside the womb. It is 'tempered' (the comparison is with steel) in a way that allows the creature to take control of itself (*SVF* ii. 806 again), and it changes from plant to autonomous animal. The idea would be that in some way the unique character of the individual soul is captured and fixed in this process as well. A more elaborate account might describe this character in terms of the 'tension' (*tonos*) transmitted as part of the *pneuma* from parental soul through the embryo's 'nature' to the 'soul' of the child. In any case, there is very clearly a line of physical continuity which the Stoics might have exploited to explain the inheritance of psychological as well as corporeal character.

Whatever the attractions of such a story, however, it is clear that it cannot be right. There are, in fact, two reasons to think that the Stoics did not believe that a person's character was somehow inscribed in the physical nature of the *pneuma* that makes a child's soul. One is a text (not quoted above) which shows that Chrysippus, at least, did not as a matter of fact think it; the other is a consideration from Stoic psychology which makes it impossible that any of the older Stoics might have done. Consider, then, first of all, what Plutarch says of Chrysippus:

> Chrysippus adduces as proof that the soul has come into existence, and comes into existence later [sc. than the body], the fact that children become like their parents both in their manner (*tropos*) and their character (*ēthos*) (*SVF* ii. 806 = Plutarch, *Stoic Self-Contradictions* 1053 CD).

Attempts to deal with this rather obscure passage have tended to operate as if it presents us with two psychological facts which we need to reconcile: (1) that the soul comes into being later than the body;[137] and (2) that children resemble their parents. But these are not two facts in search of reconciliation: they are parts of an argument. The fact that children resemble their parents is *evidence* that the soul comes about later than the body, and this alone seems to forbid us to explain the resemblance by the material substrate of the child's soul. If the character of the soul were explicable by the material from which it was made, then similarity between parent and child could be made *consistent* with the later genesis of the soul, but there is no reason at all why it should be taken to *prove* it. On the contrary: the fact of such similarity would encourage one to suppose that

[137] It is not part of the present argument, but we know from the passage of Plutarch immediately following that it is as late as the moment of birth: *Stoic Self-Contradictions* 1053 CD.

the soul was engendered at conception, or a little later, or at any point in the process whatsoever. I conclude from this that the character of the soul is not straightforwardly to be explained by (or as) some quality of the material from which it is made. There are, in other words, no psychological continuities between the character of the child and that of its parents at all—despite the fact that their respective souls are made out of the same material.

So how does a child acquire the character of its parents if not from the stuff of its soul? I take it that the answer comes in Chrysippus' emphasis on the fact that the soul comes to be *after* the body. If this is supposed to be implied by the fact of psychological resemblance, then it looks very much as if Chrysippus must have thought that the soul derives its character (at least insofar as the child's character is like that of its parents) from the body. The idea would have to be that there is some link between the appearance of the body and the character of the soul so that, insofar as a child's body is like that of its parents, its character comes to be like theirs as well.

One can see the attractions of this solution for him. For one thing—and I take it that this is a large part of the point behind his argument—it would explain why a child comes to resemble its *parents*; that is to say, its *parents* rather than just its father. According to the Stoics, it is from its father's semen that a child grows.[138] But, like Aristotle, the Stoics know that a child can resemble its mother instead of (or as well as) its father, and the way they address this, at least as far as physical resemblance is concerned, is to say that the mother also produces seed which plays a role in the process of gestation. When the male seed is received into the womb, it is brought under the influence of this female seed: Zeno says that it is 'taken hold of by another *pneuma*, part of the female soul' (*SVF* i. 128). The female seed is not capable of initiating embryonic construction (or of becoming a child); however, it does have its own ideas of how one might go about building a human being and, much as in Aristotle, it occasionally 'prevails' over the father's semen (*SVF* ii. 749):[139]

> The woman too emits seed: and if the woman's seed prevails (*epikratēsēi*), the offspring resembles the mother; but if the man's prevails, it resembles the father.

A child, then, might look like its father and/or mother. But it is presumably a little time after conception that the influences of their various principles start to operate; and a while longer before the direction of embryonic development is

[138] 'Seed' is carefully defined by the Stoics not in terms of its material substance, but in terms of the capacities or principles (e.g. *SVF* i. 128) for which the moisture acts as a vehicle; which is why the seed might properly be thought of as a fragment of the father's soul or *pneuma* (*SVF* i. 128; cf. ii. 741).

[139] This, presumably, is the answer to the conflict Diels saw between D.L. 7. 159 (where female seed is said to be 'unproductive', *agonon*) and the fragment that follows (= Aetius 5. 11. 3; see Diels 1879: 423. 5–8 with n.; cf. also von Arnim's n. on *SVF* ii. 749, §4). Note that all of this is only the start: the Stoics adopted a system very closely analogous to that of Aristotle which involves not only the idea of 'prevailing', but also of 'regression', according to which the characteristics of remoter ancestors can skip generations to recur further down the line. This works for the Stoics because every individual, and so, of course, the seed of every individual, contains the 'principles' of his or her forebears and siblings: to be *this* person is precisely to be the result of a specific line of couplings, so that the principles of all one's ancestors are implied in one's own unique blend. So anyway *SVF* ii. 747.

fixed in a way which makes it clear which are in the ascendency. If the character of the soul were to be determined at any point before this (e.g. at conception) then it would be hard to see how a child might be equally disposed to become like its mother *or* its father. In order for this to be possible, it must take the body for whose character they are jointly responsible as its reference-point; and so it comes about later.

It will be objected to my claim (i.e. that the soul must derive its character from the body, at least insofar as its character is like that of its parents) that it leaves open the possibility that Chrysippus might have thought that the soul comes about *with* the body; that its character is determined in *parallel* with the body through the very same process of gestation. Why does Chrysippus insist that psychological resemblance proves that it comes to be *afterwards*? The answer to this involves the consideration that I alluded to earlier as ruling out the possibility that any Stoic might have thought that the material substrate of the soul carries encoding for its character. This is the fact that the Stoics gave a purely *cognitive* account of character. It was simply not open to the Stoics to say (as Aristotle, or again as Phaedo of Elis said) that character is imprinted in the irrational soul at the same time as the body is formed, because they believed that to have any sort of psychological character at all—in the sense of *moral* character, in any case[140]—is to have concepts and beliefs. And concepts and beliefs are not inherited or inheritable or part of your physical development as such. When you are born, your soul is a *tabula rasa*, identical, as far as character is concerned, with everyone else's (*SVF* ii. 83). And there is more. Not only is the soul empty of cognitive content at birth, but we also know that there is nothing about its physical structure (e.g. its 'tension') that determines its cognitive development—certainly not, for example, anything that would determine *whether or not* a child became vicious in the first place. The Stoics are adamant that the causes of vice are *external* (*SVF* iii. 228–36; esp. e.g. 235: *all evil comes into the soul from outside*).[141] The provenance of a child's soul turns out to be of no assistance in explaining how the child comes to resemble its parents in character.

And yet we are told that children resemble their parents in psychological character as well as physical appearance. It seems to me that there is only one way left to explain this. If it is due, not to the soul's provenance, but to the beliefs it goes on to form, and given that we can explain by straightforward inheritance how a child comes to *look* like its parents, then it must be the case that the individual's body has an influence on its cognitive development. How this happens is what I now want to investigate.

The body does not generally play a conspicuous role in accounts of the Stoic theory of rationality. When we talk about the development of rationality, we focus on the terms of their empiricism most familiar, perhaps, to us: the *tabula rasa*, the soul's acquisition of primary concepts, and finally the articulation of

[140] This is not to say that the Stoics did not recognize 'natural' differences between people in respect of their mental abilities. So *SVF* iii. 136–7: among 'preferable' features of the soul are such things as memory and mental acuity.

[141] To talk about the distinctive character of an individual is, of course, to talk of his or her vices: there is only *one* way of being virtuous for the Stoics as for Aristotle (cf. again *NE* 1106^{b}35).

these concepts into a cognitive network capable of active rational analysis (*SVF* ii. 83). Everyone recognizes that the body has *some* role to play in all of this: it provides the organs of sensation and the means of locomotion; it gives the soul access to the external world on which its cognitive development is based. But I wish to suggest that it does rather more than this too. For a start, it does not merely provide organs of sensation, as if it stands as the soul's window on external events. The body is itself the first *object* of the soul's perception. Furthermore, it is constantly present as an object of perception in *all* (further) acts of perception. The Epicureans, with whom the Stoics explicitly contrast themselves on this score, do indeed believe that perception implies the impact of the external world on an animal's constitution so that it is, from the very first, perception of the external world (cf. Cicero, *On Ends* 1. 30). But the Stoics argue that *self*-perception is a necessary precondition for perception of the world (cf. Cicero, *On Ends* 3. 16). In order to register visual information, for example, I have first to perceive my eyes (and perceive them as mine), and I have to keep perceiving them as I perceive the world through them (Seneca, *Epistle* 121, esp. 5–13).

The Stoics have a technical word to refer to perception which involves self-perception in this way (i.e. all perception of the external world): *synaisthēsis*. The importance of this word, and the theory it identifies, is sometimes obscured by commentators who take it mean 'consciousness' or 'self-awareness' (concepts for which there is in fact little evidence in ancient thought).[142] More recently, A. A. Long has created something of a consensus with his argument that *synaisthēsis* is a straightforward synonym of *self*-perception, explained by him as the Stoic answer to the modern technical notion of 'proprioception'.[143] But the Stoics have other, clearer ways of saying 'self-perception'.[144] The very formation of *synaisthēsis* already suggests something more like 'co-perception', i.e. the perception of one thing along with another, and such a meaning is in fact demanded by the principal evidence we have for the word's use. Consider, for example, the following passage from the *Ethical Principles* by the Stoic Hierocles (who was probably writing in the second century AD). It comes in the context of a discussion by Hierocles of the importance of self-perception. Every animal, he says, perceives *that* it has certain limbs; but it also perceives *what these limbs are for*. He invokes features of ordinary experience to support his point (I. 55–II. 3):

We ourselves [perceive] our eyes and ears and the rest. And so, when we want to see something, we strain our eyes towards the visible thing, not our ears. And when we want to hear, we direct our ears, not our eyes. When we wish to walk, we don't use our hands

[142] 'Consciousness': e.g. Pembroke (1971) 119; cf. Sorabji (1990) 312; 'self-awareness' e.g. Watson (1971) 220.

[143] See esp. Bastianini and Long (1992) 396 on i. 38–9 ('sinonimo'); and wider discussion of the concept of self-perception at 380–90. Cf. Long (1993).

[144] 'Perception of self' being the most obvious: e.g. *(ai)stha[n]et(ai) [hea]utou* at Hierocles I. 38, etc.; *sensus sui* at Cicero, *On Ends* 3. 16. The Stoics also talked about an animal's perception of its constitution, or of its limbs (or 'parts'). So in Hierocles: *to t(ōn)] me[r(ōn)] heaut(ōn) (ai)sthanesth(ai)* (I. 48; cf. 51); cf. Seneca, *Epistle* 121. 9 *omnibus constitutionis suae sensus est*. Finally, Hierocles talks about the 'apprehension' an animal has of itself or its limbs/parts: *[tēs heaut](ōn) . . . a[ntil]ēpseōs* at V. 30 (cf. I. 44–6).

for this, but our feet and the whole of our legs. In the same way, we don't use our feet but our hands when we want to take or give something. *Hence the first proof that an animal perceives its whole self is co-perception* (syn(ai)sthēsis) *of the limbs and the functions for which they are provided.*

Synaisthēsis is introduced here as a *proof* of the primacy of self-perception—not as a synonym for it. And the proof is precisely that our perception of external objects *involves* or *could not happen without* perception of our organs as well.[145]

Co-perception, then, is an important concept in the Stoic understanding of perception quite generally. But, as will quickly become apparent, there are implications here that go well beyond the science of perception. In particular, co-perception might also help us to explain the characters that animals display by helping to explain the evaluations they make about the world. Cicero notes at the beginning of his account of Stoic ethics (*On Ends* 3. 16) that an animal is no sooner born than it is concerned for its own preservation; by extension it is attracted to things necessary for its survival (the Stoic term for this attraction, applied primarily to the animal's constitution, and derivatively to the things that benefit it, is *oikeiōsis*, usually translated as 'appropriation'). Correlatively, an animal hates and avoids things which are harmful to it. But how does it know which things are harmful and which beneficial?[146] It must be through co-perception, since the notions of 'benefit' and 'harm' are, of course, relative to the individual constitution. The impression a panda receives of bamboo, for example, will be a favourable one, because the external data reporting the bamboo registers along with the panda's perception of itself as a constitution in need of the sustenance bamboo can provide. There is nothing mysterious about this: a panda is constitutionally adapted to benefit from bamboo, and its being so adapted (its constitution) is the very thing that makes the external data (the appearance, texture, taste, etc. of the bamboo) register as a favourable impression. Or, to put it another way (and from the subjective viewpoint), the panda *co-perceives* the bamboo as something beneficial. A fox has a different constitution, and bamboo registers less favourably with it than chickens . . . and so on. It turns out, in fact, that one has a remarkably rich sense of one's

[145] A further demonstration that *synaisthēsis* means 'co-perception' rather than 'self-perception' can be found in the fact that the word can have as its stated object *either* the animal's constitution, *or* the feature of the external world perceived in relation to it. So at *Ethical Principles* II. 37–8, the toad is said to have *synaisthēsis* of a distance: *tou poson ek[teinet](ai) d(ia)stēma syn(ai)sthanet(ai)* (the idea being that it can perceive without calculation whether it is capable of leaping that far). In this case, one would produce nonsense if one translated the word as 'self-perception'. It is true that, when Hierocles introduces a subsection purporting to show that co-perception continues uninterrupted (III. 55–6), his conclusion is that *self*-perception continues without a break (IV. 44; cf. V. 30). But this only shows that self-perception is of real interest to Hierocles insofar as it is entailed by co-perception: his demonstration that co-perception continues shows *a fortiori* that self-perception does.

[146] Here and in what follows I am speaking a bit loosely: animals do not strictly 'know' anything at all; nor do they conceptualize the objects of the perception in the rational terms implied by my description (e.g. *SVF* ii. 83). On the other hand (as the same fragment makes clear), 'animal' perception is the first stage on the route to the acquisition of human rationality, and we might think of the mental disposition of the animal relative to the object of its (co-)perception as the primitive precursor of rational concepts.

relationship with the external environment in virtue of co-perception. In a famous example from Hierocles, a chick does not need to learn that weasels and hawks are dangerous, but *perceives* them as such from the start—though it remains unflustered in the presence of a bull.[147]

In general, it seems that the 'character' of animals, expressed in the elemental terms of their inclinations to pursue and avoid certain things, can be understood in terms of the co-perception each has of the world—which is to say, in terms of the impressions that external data make when viewed through the filter of their particular physical constitution. Animals, it is true, do not have *moral* characters: they lack the rationality necessary to make judgements about what is, in a strict sense, 'good' or 'bad'. But it is a small step to suppose that the judgements individual human beings make about the good and the bad are based in precisely the same way on their (co-)perception of what is harmful and beneficial to them. In this case, we can see at last how the moral character developed by an individual might be based precisely on their experience of their physical constitution.[148]

It might seem that this immediately provides an opening for a Stoic physiognomy (assuming, anyway, that the relevant features of the individual's constitution have manifestations in his or her outward appearance). But before hastening to this conclusion, there is a vital qualification to be made. I have suggested that the development of rationality in human beings allows them to redescribe what is constitutionally beneficial and harmful for them as what is, respectively, 'good' and 'bad'. The trouble is that rationality, when it develops, is itself part of the nature of human beings and something that enters into their co-perception of the world. And it is not just *a* part of their nature, but (once they have it) their defining feature. As such, mature human beings are supposed to care above all for the preservation of themselves *as rational beings*—even if this is at the expense of their physical constitutions. What is co-perceived as 'good' ought to be just what is conducive to a rational life: and what is conducive to a rational life is virtuous action. Humans, then, are supposed, by the very process of co-perception and appropriation I have been outlining, to develop the belief that virtue, and virtue alone, is good, and that vice alone is bad. To this extent, differences in physical constitution can make no difference to the moral character individuals develop—at least in the sense that they cannot determine whether a person becomes virtuous or vicious at all.

[147] Hierocles III. 40–3; the example recurs at Seneca, *Epistle* 121. 18 (and cf. perhaps Aelian, *On the Characteristics of Animals* 9. 40 for a similar point).

[148] Hence there are texts which say that one's physical temperament influences one's character; and we can now see why this would not contradict their insistence that character is a matter of the rational beliefs one holds. So e.g. Chrysippus at *SVF* ii. 950–1 (= Cicero, *On Fate* 7–9; cf. Sedley 1993: 331 for the alternative suggestion that the atmosphere may have a *direct* effect on the *pneuma* constitutive of one's soul and thereby on one's character); Panaetius fr. 76 van Straaten = Proclus, *On the Timaeus* i. 162. 11–15 Diehl (arguing for a literal interpretation of Plato's claim that intelligence might be causally related to the nature of the environment); Seneca, *On Anger* 2. 19 (*et morum varietates mixtura elementorum facit*; cf. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964: 56).

This qualification is very important; but it by no means undermines the role that perception of the body plays in *shaping* the character of someone who has, by whatever cause, become vicious. There is an interesting parallel here with Plato, which may help to understand the point. As we saw in Section II, Plato too denied that one's moral character was in any absolute sense determined by the body, since physical influences on character were (supposed to be) counterbalanced by the activity of reason. But he also thought that the body *becomes* a determining factor in the development of moral character if and when reason was weakened or undermined by, for example, a bad education. Something similar, I suggest, is the case with the Stoics. In the 'normal' case, i.e. the case in which everything happens as it ought, and one grows up with right reason, the Stoics argue that there is no room at all for the development of vice. We should expect in this case that everyone would grow up with an identical moral character, namely a virtuous character. But suppose now that something goes wrong: that a person is subject to, for example, a bad education which positively leads him or her away from the insight that virtue alone is good (see again *SVF* iii. 228–36 as cited above). What fills the void? What *does* such a person start to think is 'good'? Presumably, just those things that were the object of appropriation in his or her pre-rational life.[149] In general, what such people in their pre-rational lives co-perceived (rightly) as harmful and beneficial with respect to their physical constitution will become in their mistaken view of things 'evil' and 'good' respectively. This will explain the diverse range of moral characters that manifest themselves even among groups of people whose educational influences have been broadly identical. All of them have been diverted from achieving the proper understanding of themselves as essentially *rational* creatures (that is, creatures able to direct their activities according to a rational understanding of the wider cosmos). This means that their self-understanding is *retarded* in a certain way: although it has become rational, it remains fixated on the local needs of the physical constitution, not the capacities engendered in the organism by the very presence of reason. But, as individual physical constitutions differ from each other, so then will the beliefs individuals start to form about what is good and bad. Those who perceive themselves as rather weak might become more timid, because they will co-perceive more things in the world as potentially harmful; others (one might think of the example in Plato, *Timaeus* 86 C of a person suffering from a

[149] It might be objected that a better answer will be found in the very features of the person's education that led them off course in the first place: as, for example, a person might become not just vicious but *greedy* because they were brought up in a society that placed a high value on wealth. This is relevant; but it cannot be the whole story, or even the greatest part of it. For one thing it fails to account for the fact that people become *ceteris paribus* like their parents; for another, it leaves us to explain why, in such a society, one person becomes *greedier* than another. In general, the idea seems to be that a society can very easily stop a person from reaching the 'natural' conclusion that virtue is (the only) good; but only because it has all the years until the development of his or her rationality to do so—which means at least 7 years (*SVF* ii. 83), and perhaps 14 (when rationality is 'perfected': *SVF* ii. 764). Its scope to come between a person and his or her self-perception as a *physical* creature is rather less broad, however, since this is something that begins from the moment of birth.

super-abundance of seed) might become rather lustful if they see the world through the filter of their constitutional inclination to sexual activity... and so on.[150]

One's constitution, then, cannot cause one to stray from the path of virtue; but if external influences nudge one away from it, it will, through the mechanism of (co-)perception, play the leading role in shaping the vicious moral character one forms instead. And if physiognomy featured in the thought of earlier Stoicism, this must have been its opening: this is the only way that a Stoic could have supposed that differences between the characters of individuals might exhibit any sort of regular correspondence with differences in their physical attributes. But did the early Stoics themselves recognize the opening and commit themselves to physiognomy? My answer will be that they did not—and (as it will turn out) for illuminating reasons. But in order to see what these reasons were, it is first necessary to consider the different approach to psychology adopted by the one Stoic who, we are told, did make use of physiognomical data: Posidonius of Rhodes (*c.*135–51 BC).

(ii) Posidonius

The extent of Posidonius' disagreement with earlier Stoics has become a matter of hot debate. Galen, on whom we are heavily dependent for our evidence, has an axe of his own to grind and a motive to exaggerate any difference there might have been, leading to a real question over the degree to which his testimony can be trusted.[151] But unless one takes the extreme (and unkind) view that Galen has not just exaggerated, but actually fabricated the existence of any theoretical difference between Posidonius and his predecessors at all, there is one respect in which it seems that he must have differed—the only, or the simplest way to explain all other differences rightly or wrongly ascribed to him. On my view, he must have differed in his analysis of 'appropriation'.

[150] Another example: anger is defined as the desire to punish perceived offenders (*SVF* iii. 395, 398). It is also understood to be a boiling of the blood about the heart (*SVF* ii. 878; 3. 416; cf. 2. 886 and 900 for our *synaisthēsis* of activity in the chest during occasions of anger). So what makes one non-sage more inclined to anger than another? (A sage, as it happens, never thinks anger appropriate.) I am suggesting that it is the fact that his or her blood is, for example, hotter—in any case, readier to boil. This makes such folk constitutionally more inclined to initiate themselves the punishment which even the cool-headed might wish for their enemies. For this reason, they value enacting the punishment: they *desire* to do the punishing. It might be thought tempting to phrase these examples more simply in terms of the *pleasure* produced in different constitutions by different activities. (Cf. perhaps Cicero, *On Fate* 8; SE, *PH* 1. 80; also Aristides Quintilianus, *On Music* 2. 8, 67. 15–68. 13 Winnington-Ingram.) In this case, we could say that the coward takes greater pleasure in comfort, the pugilist in the adrenalin rush of danger and extreme physical activity, and so forth. However, this would, according to the normal meaning of 'pleasure' in the context of ancient philosophy, be misleading. In fact the Stoics supposed that even fools act to preserve their *nature* as they understand it (albeit their understanding is wrong). Only incidentally is it ever *pleasure* they seek.

[151] See especially Kidd (1971); Cooper (1998); Gill (1998); Sorabji (2000) 93–32, 255–60; Tieleman (2003), esp. chs. 4–5. Of these, Tieleman is most extreme in denying significant doctrinal divergence between Posidonius and Chrysippus.

As we saw above, the earlier Stoics thought that appropriation was directed towards a single goal: the preservation of one's nature. This is the object of appropriation for every animal, and it is the object of appropriation from the moment of birth. But in the case of human beings, most strikingly, this has the effect (as we have seen above) that the particular objects of our striving change as our nature, or more precisely our perception of our nature, changes. This is most striking in the case of human beings because the development of rationality between the ages of 7 and 14 constitutes the most radical change undergone by any animal in the course of its natural development. The result of it ought to be that we come to perceive ourselves as rational beings and to value only what preserves our rational natures—*whatever the consequences for our bodies.* It is true that as a matter of fact most adults care as much about their physical well-being as any animal or child; but this does not undermine the position that appropriation is directed towards the preservation of one's nature: it only shows that they have somehow become confused about their nature.[152]

Posidonius, it seems, did not agree with this analysis of appropriation. From the first, he argued, appropriation is directed not towards *nature*, under that description, but towards *pleasure* and *victory* (158, 160, 161 EK). Assuming that Posidonius based his understanding of appropriation on co-perception, as the earlier Stoics did, we can rephrase this by saying that, according to Posidonius, an animal does not co-perceive things as beneficial to its nature as a certain kind of animal; rather, it co-perceives them as satisfying specific constitutional needs—the need to make good some lack, for example; or to secure itself against a potentially hostile environment.

The difference in Posidonius' analysis of appropriation is no doubt to be explained in part by reflection on the grammar of impulse and appropriation, the proper terms in which to describe their objects;[153] but it has advantages for his ethics more widely as well. For one important consequence of replacing appropriation towards 'nature' with appropriative inclinations towards victory and pleasure in explaining the behaviour of young children is that one does not have to think of the changes that come about with the development of reason in terms of their *modification.*[154] Rather, Posidonius is able to suggest that what happens at this point is that the creature (now an adult human) acquires an *additional* object of appropriation, namely the good. In virtue of their

[152] Note that I am not ascribing to Chrysippus a view that one ever loses concern for one's own physical constitution or self-preservation, in a way sometimes suggested by his critics, as in Cicero, *On Ends* 4, esp. 26–9. (Galen's claim that Chrysippean *oikeiōsis* is only directed towards the *good* involves exactly the same distortion: cf. Tieleman 2003: 221–2.) But what does happen, ideally, is that one changes and enlarges one's view of what the physical constitution is *for*, what constitutes its proper use and preservation.

[153] He might have considered, for example, that although the term 'natural' is an important part of the extensional description of the objects of our appropriation, it is wrong to think of it as relevant to their intensional description. One desires things under the description of them as 'pleasurable', or 'noble', not as 'natural'—even though it might turn out that it is their being natural that explains why they seem pleasurable or noble to us.

[154] They can be modified, though, viz by habituation (e.g. F165. 172–89 EK)—and hence indirectly by reason (among other things).

rationality, adult human beings co-perceive external objects not only in terms of the pleasure and security that they might bring to their physical constitution, but also in terms of whether their pursuit of them will satisfy the wider good (what is good for the cosmos as a whole) with which rationality is properly concerned. Like the earlier Stoics, Posidonius thinks that a rational being should come to see that his nature enables him to do what is, objectively speaking, 'best' despite the subjective inclinations of his constitution, and that to live consistently in this way is the only path to happiness (cf. F185–7 EK); but unlike them, he thinks that even someone who succeeds in doing this, even a sage, will retain his or her original senses of appropriation towards pleasure and victory, his or her co-perception of the world in these terms.

All this enables Posidonius to explain much more satisfactorily (as he thinks) some key phenomena of our mature ethical lives, in particular the vexed question of why people so consistently become vicious when vice is supposed to be the one evil recognized by a rational nature. If the earlier Stoics were right, said Posidonius, it ought to be no easier to corrupt people into vice than to convince them that pain is desirable (cf. F35, 169. 1–77 EK). Posidonius' explanation for this simply involves appeal to our continuous appropriation towards pleasure and victory, our co-perception of the world in these terms as well as in terms of what is 'good'. For the fact that we *always*, continuously, perceive the world in these terms just because we (co-)perceive the world through a particular constitution, the fact that we thereby have an inclination towards pleasure and victory which is ineliminable whatever our understanding of what is *good* and *right*, leads to our having what Posidonius calls 'affective movements' (*pathētikai kinēseis*: F169. 101–3 EK)—something like *inclinations* to act in a certain way, namely just the way in which an animal or child would act in pursuit of pleasure or victory.[155] It is important that although, on my account, these movements must be strictly *non*-rational (animals and children have them too), they are nevertheless based in cognitive processes, specifically the process of (co-)perception. It would be wrong, then, to think of them as distinct, *ir*-rational powers, as Galen implies. Nor do they constitute distinct sources of *impulse* in adult humans: we know that Posidonius agreed with earlier Stoics that impulse required rational assent and to this extent remained squarely in the hands of reason.[156] But they do form an important and persistent part

[155] Posidonius seems himself to have talked of an 'emotional pull': so Galen at F 169. 80 EK (*pathētikē holkē*), but also Seneca at F170. 16–17 (*non irritantem tantum animos sed adtrahentem*). Cf. F186, where Posidonius makes it part of the definition of virtue that one is '*led* (*agomenon*) by the irrational part of the soul in nothing'. One can believe, by the way, that all this enables Posidonius to refine the Stoic account of emotions (i.e. by taking these 'emotional pulls' into account when explaining their origin, object, and intensity) without being seduced by Galen into thinking that Posidonius actually *broke* with the account of the emotions given by Chrysippus. To this extent, I agree with Tieleman (2003), chs. 4–5—who argues, however, that there is, in effect, no difference between them at all.

[156] Cf. F154 EK with Tieleman (2003) 278–83; also Cooper (1998), esp. 87–8 with note 37, defending the received text of *PHP* V 5. 21, 320. 23–8 De Lacy against emendations at F169. 77–82 EK which force it to provide the only evidence that affective movements could, after all, initiate impulse. Sorabji (2000) 104–5 suggests that Posidonius 'denied judgement in some cases of emotion,

of our perception of the world, a real bias in the information used, in the case of rational creatures, as the basis for decision-making. This is why there is no need to appeal to external pressures, by which the earlier Stoics (as we saw) had to explain the birth of vice in an individual: the 'affective movements', the inclinations to action born of our co-perception of the world, exert an *internal* pressure on reason to accede in valuing the objects of their inclination (F35 EK).

But there is more to be said than this. If it turns out that there is an internal cause of our deviation from the path to virtue, that very cause also explains the character of our deviation. As in general co-perception means that we see certain things in the world as pleasurable and glorious, so the particular things in which individuals glory or take pleasure will depend on their particular way of co-perceiving the world—the variable factor being their self-perception, the character of their physical constitution as they perceive it. In this case, it is no surprise if Posidonius thought that the environment could affect character, just insofar as it affects our constitution (F169. 88–96; tr. Kidd 1999: 234, modified):[157]

And environment contributes to considerable differences in human character with regard to cowardice, daring, love of pleasure or toil; the grounds for this are that the affective movements of the soul follow always the physical state, which is altered in no small degree from the temperature in the environment. For he [sc. Posidonius] makes the point too that even the blood in animals differs in warmth and coldness, thickness and thinness, and in a considerable number of other different ways, a topic which Aristotle developed at length.

If all this is right, then the psychology of Posidonius seems to be a little closer to that of Phaedo of Elis (at least as described in Section I) than to that of Plato. It is not a thoroughgoing reductionism, since reason remains free; but the appropriative inclinations towards pleasure and victory *are* determined by the body. And in the passage immediately preceding that just quoted, we learn that Posidonius produced evidence to support his revised psychology—evidence, that is, from physiognomy (F169. 82–8 EK, tr. Kidd):

Posidonius said that, while a creature's impulse was sometimes born in the judgmental decision of the rational faculty, most often it occurs in the movement of the emotional faculty (*kinēsei tou pathētikou*). Posidonius reasonably attaches to this discussion physiognomical evidence (*ta kata tēn physiognōmonian phainomena*): all broad-chested

but saw judgement as being present in the standard cases'; but the text on which he bases this qualified claim (F34. 9–12 EK) only says that emotions are not, and do not supervene on, judgement as the earlier Stoics thought. This is quite right, since emotions *as such* (and as opposed to *merely* false judgement) are rather (and always) determined by the presence of an affective movement. The fact that animals and children are subject to emotions without judgement—cf. Sorabji (2000) 127–9—does not prove that the same will be true of adult humans. Aristotle at least supposed that the non-rational parts of the soul which govern animal behaviour cannot dictate impulse in the presence of deliberate choice—hence the problem, for him, of *akrasia*.

[157] Cf. also 153 EK. One might—though I am suggesting there is no need to—be suspicious of the implication that this represents Posidonius fairly, not least because of Galen's own sympathy for the kind of reductionist psychology implied here (cf. Section V).

and warmer creatures and humans are more spirited by nature, the broad-hipped and colder, more cowardly. And environment . . .

(iii) Physiognomical Conclusion

Physiognomy, then, supports Posidonius' psychology. But note that, on my account, Posidonius' understanding of the differences between different characters, and the reasons why these differences will tend to align with differences in physical appearance, is not the same as that of the earlier Stoics. Posidonius, it turns out, is committed to the belief that an individual has an innate, non-rational character rooted in the body. (This for him is what it would mean to say, as on my reconstruction he might have done, that our senses of appropriation to pleasure and victory are based on our co-perception of the body.) The earlier Stoics rejected altogether the notion of an 'innate' character, let alone one that was inscribed in the individual's physiology. All they were prepared to say was that co-perception of the body will often help explain the vicious character we acquire—*if*, owing to a corrupted upbringing, we acquire any vicious character at all. In fact the difference between them on the question of character-formation is very closely akin to the difference we have already seen between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle (and Phaedo, for that matter; and both like Posidonius) thought that character was innate, and Aristotle's thinking this is at the root of his exploration of physiognomy. Plato, on the other hand (and like the earlier Stoics) believed that the body could influence the direction in which the vice developed, but could not account for the appearance of vice in the first place. Is it coincidence, then, that Posidonius and Aristotle explicitly accept 'physiognomy' as a consequence of their respective psychologies, while the word is absent from all of our evidence for Plato and for earlier Stoicism?

As I observed when discussing Plato, the ability to say what a person would tend to be like if he or she happened not to be virtuous is not a bad starting-point for someone wishing to make a living by predicting character from appearance: most people are not virtuous, after all. And we do in fact have evidence that the Stoics recognized the ability of the sage to make predictions about how a person might turn out on the basis of physical appearance (*SVF* iii. 716):[158]

> The sage will love young men, those displaying through their appearance a nature well-disposed towards the acquisition of virtue (*tōn emphainontōn dia tou eidous tēn pros aretēn euphuian*)—as Zeno says in his *Republic*, Chrysippus in *On Lives* 1, and Apollodorus in his *Ethics*.

[158] This fragment, then, is different in kind from those (discussed earlier) in which the sage is said to be able to perceive actual virtues and vices. It might be thought that the term *euphuia* itself represents a quality—perhaps the pre-rational analogue to virtue in a rational adult. But the similarity of language with that used in the Stoic definition of love at *SVF* iii. 650 suggests that the children the Stoics have in mind here are themselves old enough (i.e. at least 14) to be intellectually mature. Cf. perhaps also *SVF* iii. 690 (certainly referring to adults): 'Anyone who is intelligent will rule, at times, and live with a king who displays both a good nature and a love of learning (*kai euphuian emphainonti kai philomatheian*).' Cf. on the term Ioppolo (1980) 120–3.

The idea, I take it, is that the sage would tell from the physical appearance whether the particular vices towards which the youth will tend (given that he is vicious) are of such a character or of such intensity as to prevent a realistic hope of rehabilitation.[159] (We shall see something very similar among Neoplatonists later on.) And again, this fragment could be adduced in support of the position that the Stoics were physiognomists. Yet the more such evidence is produced (and we have seen quite a lot by now, albeit drawn in fact from rather different contexts) the more striking is the absence of the word 'physiognomy'; and the comparison with Plato, and the contrast with Phaedo, Aristotle, and Posidonius, may now suggest a reason why we should never have expected it in the first place. It seems that '*physio*-gnomy' (etymologically speaking, the knowledge of someone's *nature*) is restricted to cases which involve the discussion of a *natural* or innate moral character—something whose existence is denied by Plato and the earlier Stoics. Physiognomy is about the way someone is constitutionally set up to be and not, as we might have been inclined to suppose, whatever character a person happens to have acquired.

As Phaedo well knew, a person's character, or at any rate behaviour, might change—something which the handbooks of practical physiognomy have to take into account, which is why they do indeed encourage us to look at things such as gait and gesture which might be thought to develop in the wake of, and so provide evidence for, the development of character. The fact that Phaedo, Aristotle, and Posidonius accept 'physiognomy' does not mean that predictions of character made on the basis of their psychological model would be any more successful (that is, successful more often) than predictions made on the basis of Plato's psychology, or that of the Stoics. Nevertheless, it makes complete sense from a theoretical point of view that the word is restricted to their systems. What is philosophically interesting about physiognomy is not so much the question of whether the state of soul can affect the appearance of the body, but the question of how, and how closely, the individual soul is bound up with the individual body at a fundamental level. In this case, of course, what is intriguing is precisely the possibility that there might be some correlation between involuntary physical characteristics (the size of limbs and the colour of the eyes) and the 'original' character of the soul. It is the elucidation of such correlations which distinguishes physiognomy properly speaking.[160]

[159] The Stoics debated among themselves how quickly to give up: *SVF* iii. 366 asks whether sages are born or made as well (by which, presumably, we should understand the question whether the ability to overcome the corruption of society is equally present in everyone), and suggests a division between Stoics who thought that a 'favourable disposition' and 'good breeding' (*eugeneia*) are innate, and those who thought that these first steps towards virtue could be taught as well.

[160] This narrower technical understanding of 'physiognomy' might, then, be compared with cases in the Arabic tradition where 'physiognomic inference cannot be based on signs that do not belong to the realm of temperament': see Ghersetti below, p. 304.

V. MEDICAL WRITERS

Medical writers of works on physiognomy: Loxus (fragments: Origen, *Against Celsus* 1. 33; Anon. Lat. *Physiognomy* 1, 2, 12, 48, 80–1, 89, 117, 133); Adamantius. Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in medical writings: Hippocrates, chapter titles to *Epidemics* 2. 5 and 6; fragment ap. Ps.-Galen, *Prognostica de decubitu* xix. 530. 5–6, 9, 10 Kühn; Galen, *On Temperaments* i. 624. 3 Kühn; *QAM* 54. 20, 55. 8, 63. 1–2 Müller; *PHP* 5. 5. 22. 2; cf. *Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics VI*, 7–8 (53) Ghersetti 1999*a* (=426. 37–8 Wenkebach and Pfaff) (firāsa). De Lacy. Palladius, *Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics* ii. 124. 32, 195. 11 Dietz. Stephanus, *Commentary on Galen's Book on Therapy 'For Glaucon'* i. 252. 2 Dietz. Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in contexts *possibly* derived from medical sources: SE, *PH* 1. 85; *Suda* s.v.*diathesis* (δ 556). Other occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in contexts linking physiognomy and medicine: Clement, *Stromata* 1. 21. 135. 2. 3; Fulgentius, *Contents of Virgil* 84. 10–11 Helm.

(i) The Hippocratic Corpus

The meagre evidence we have might be taken to suggest that the notion of physiognomy as a practical art was reasonably familiar in Athens as early as the fifth century BC;[161] but in the course of this study, I have argued that it became an object of theoretical interest only in the fourth century, when developments in philosophical psychology led to a new interest in the relationship between the soul and the body. (Even then, I have argued, physiognomy did not present itself as a given, a system of *data* to which philosophers felt they had to argue. Rather, the theoretical possibility of physiognomy emerged as a consequence of a certain kind of view of the soul: specifically, a view of the soul according to which its 'natural' character was linked in a fundamental way with the natural character of the body.)

There is, however, a case to be made for a slightly different view of the matter. It is, in fact, commonly assumed that the emergence of physiognomy in a theoretical context is rather older than I have argued, and that the context into which it emerged was not (as such) philosophical, but *medical*.[162] Galen actually tells us that physiognomy was invented by Hippocrates;[163] the word 'physiognomy' appears to have its first attestations in Hippocratic literature;[164] and there is a wealth of apparently 'physiognomical' material scattered throughout the Hippocratic Corpus. On numerous occasions from numerous different angles

[161] See again Introduction n. 4.

[162] e.g. Foerster (1893) i, pp. xiv f.; Misener (1924) 104; Megow (1963) 220; Evans (1969) 17–18; André (1981) 9, 16; Stok (1992) 506; Raina (1993) 13–19; Barton (1994*b*) 97–9, 169–70; Degkwitz (1996*b*) 25–7; Böck (2000) 62. Vogt (1999) 108–13 gives the most realistic (because the most non-committal) overview of the relationship between physiognomy and medicine.

[163] For the claim see *QAM* 57. 11–13. 6 Müller. For the highly selective reading of *Airs, Waters, Places* [*AWP*] that follows, see esp. Lloyd (1988) 23, 28–31 (and cf. Flashar 1966: 27; Singer 1992: 136).

[164] 'Appears', because none of the (three) occurrences of the word (in chapter titles to *Epidemics* 2. 5 and 6, and in a Hippocratic fragment ap. Ps.-Galen, *de decubitu* xix. 530. 5–6, 9, 10 Kühn) are beyond the suspicion of inauthenticity. See further below.

[165] e.g. *Internal Affections* 48; *Aphorisms* 2. 33, 6. 23. Cf. esp. Di Benedetto (1986) 35–69; Gundert (2000), esp. 30–1 with notes.

the relationship between the physical and the psychological is explored: certain physical pathologies have psychological symptoms, for example;[165] and psychological activity, conversely, can have an effect at the physiological level.[166] The treatise *On the Sacred Disease* famously provides a physiological basis for psychological activity quite generally; and it is not the only work to suggest that aspects of psychological character are linked to particular physiological dispositions.[167] On occasion, Hippocratic texts even tell us how aspects of a person's character can be discerned from rather specific physical traits.[168]

There is, however, a significant gap between the material identified as 'physiognomical' in the Hippocratic Corpus and the philosophical discussions of physiognomy which are supposed to follow in its wake. For one thing, this material is largely premised on an interest in correlations between *mental activity* and *physiology*, and it is not at all clear that this is the same thing as, or even very similar to, the physiognomist's investigation of links between *psychological character* and *outward appearance*. It is easy to underestimate the importance of this point, because one might think that it is precisely the suggestion that there is a link between mental activity and physiology that represents the theoretical breakthrough for physiognomy. The trouble is that this would be so—that it would be *physiognomy* for which it represented a theoretical breakthrough—only if the Hippocratic texts *also* offered a general explanation of physical appearance in terms of a person's underlying physiology. In this case, of course, we should be able to see that something linked appearance and mental state (namely the underlying physiology of the individual). This is just the sort of explanation we find later on in Galen and after him (as Antonella Ghersetti shows in Ch. 7 of this volume) in the Arabic tradition. But the truth is that there is nothing of the sort in the Hippocratic corpus.[169]

There are, to be sure, occasions when (quite apart from claims about the person's underlying physiology) outward appearance *is* linked to psychological characteristics; but these cases, now, are too isolated to amount to anything

[166] e.g. *Epidemics* 2. 4. 4; 6. 5. 5. Fuller lists at Gundert (2000) 29–30 with notes.

[167] According to *The Sacred Disease*, thought (*phronēsis*) is a product of air, whose primary seat in the body is the brain (esp. 19); if the brain is diseased, then psychological functions are disturbed (cf. on this e.g. Hüffmeier 1961, esp. 51–61). In *Regimen* 1, the soul is a blend of fire and water (1. 7, 25) which determines both how 'feminine' or 'masculine' the soul is (the moister it is, the more feminine: 1. 27–8, 34), and how intelligent (1. 35). A looser correlation between racial characteristics of body and soul is suggested in the second part of *AWP*—at least, the environment is a factor in shaping each; though the author of *AWP* does not invoke a mechanism *connecting* psychological and physiological changes (cf. Lloyd 1988: 28–9). Further on the relationship between the 'psychological' and the physical in the Hippocratic corpus (though emphasizing that the categories are not clearly distinct for its authors): Miller (1948); Pigeaud (1981), (1987); Gundert (2000).

[168] e.g. *Epidemics* 2. 5. 16; 2. 6. 1 (unblinking eyes: the same word, *askardamyktos*, occurs in Ad. A21); 2. 6. 14 (but only if one takes it, as some in antiquity did, that the word *katakorea*, applied here to the chest, means 'hairy' rather than 'congested' or suchlike: see Galen, *Commentary on Epidemics I and 2* 384. 11–14. Wenkebach and Pfaff); 6. 4. 19 (cf. prominent veins at Ps.-Aristotle 812^{a}29); 6. 7. 6.

[169] For Galen (as for the Arabic tradition which relies on him) it is the (temperament of) the humours which is the denominator common to physi(ologi)cal and psychological types; but no such connection is made even in those Hippocratic works which employ humoral theory. See on this e.g. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964) 8–15; Flashar (1966) 21–46 (esp. 35).

one might think of as indicative of 'physiognomical' interest. They are neither empirically systematic, nor theoretically significant.[170] Of course, it would be possible for someone acquainted with 'physiognomy' from other contexts (for example the systematic claims of practitioners such as Zopyrus) to use the word in *describing* aspects of Hippocratic medicine insofar as they happen to resemble it. Indeed, this might be precisely what is happening when the word 'physiognomy' is used in the titles of two chapters of the *Epidemics* (2. 5 and 2. 6) which happen to contain examples of diagnosis in which the patient's mental state can be deduced from their appearance.[171] It might also be the best way to explain a notorious passage in Ps.-Galen, *de decubitu* xix. 530. 5–10 Kühn, where Hippocrates is quoted as having said that 'the judgement of those who practise medicine but have no share in physiognomy (*physiognōm* < *on* > *iē*) rambles in the dark getting old and sluggish'.[172] The passage is difficult, because Ps.-Galen takes this reference to 'physiognomy' as evidence for Hippocrates' interest in *astrology*; but we could perhaps understand what is going on if we imagine that early physiognomical practitioners did as a matter of fact link a person's character and appearance with his or her astrological chart.[173] In this case, 'Hippocrates' could have used the word 'physiognomy' in a loose sense as a kind of shorthand for his interest in the effects of the environment, including the heavens, on the psycho-physical nature of an individual.[174]

[170] Particular examples of supposedly 'physiognomical' inference in Hippocrates are either impressionistic (as *Regimen* 1) or else sporadic (examples as in n. 168 above; also *Epidemics* 2. 5. 1 and 2. 5. 6). For the lack of a theoretical mechanism on which a physiognomy might be based, see again n. 169 above. Hippocratic writers who tackle the question of how the physical characteristics of an individual arise explain them in terms of a child's resemblance to its parents through the theory of 'pangenesis' (according to which seed from the parents is drawn from all parts of their respective bodies). However, none of the texts which discuss this theory (*On Seed*; cf. *AWP* 14, *Sacred Disease* 5; possibly *Regimen* 1. 7; cf. Dean-Jones 1994: 162 n. 46) links the child's particular physical characteristics with its particular psychological state.

[171] The title to *Epidemics* 2. 5 is *Physiognōmonië* (Littré's apparatus says 'φυσιογνωμία aut φυσιογνωμοσύνη L'); that to 2. 6 is *Physiognōmonikon* (and in the apparatus: 'φυσιογνωμονικός C—φυσιογνωμονικός δεύτερος D'). The word *Physiognōmonië* has authentic dialectal form, but it is nevertheless possible to doubt that the titles are original. In particular, Galen shows no indication of knowing them. One might think that he could have appealed to them in support of his claim in *QAM* that Hippocrates invented physiognomy; but he mentions them neither in his commentaries on the *Epidemics*, nor in his discussions of physiognomy.

[172] Again, the authenticity of the quotation is open to suspicion (Diels 1910; Heeg 1911); though there is no urgent reason to doubt it, and it is presumably not an invention of Ps.-Galen, at least, since is not obviously to his point. He is attempting to demonstrate the importance of astrology in medicine, and to make use of this quotation has to argue further that enthusiasm for 'physiognomy' implies enthusiasm for astrology too (cf. Schöne 1910; Wellmann 1913).

[173] An early example of predictive physiognomy might be D.L. 2. 45 = Aristotle fr. 32 Rose[3], of a Syrian magus who 'among other things' predicted a violent end for Socrates. Later on, Loxus and Polemon both thought that physiognomy could reveal a person's fate as well as character (cf. Anon. Lat. 133).

[174] For a later way of making the link between appearance, climate, and astrology, cf. Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* 1. 2; cf. also Section VI n. 227. For a parallel use of the word 'physiognomy' in the loose sense I am suggesting for Hippocrates here, cf. Fulgentius, *Contents of Virgil* 84. 10–11 Helm: his claim that Virgil, *Georgics* 2 is 'all about physiognomy and medicine' (*omnis physiognomonicus et medicinalis*) must be based on Virgil's description of the type of men bred by Italian soil (cf. esp.

But of course none of this makes Hippocrates (or any Hippocratic writer) a 'physiognomist', any more than members of the crowd outside the Athenian court-room are made physiognomists by Demosthenes' remark that they will 'physiognomize' the expressions of the jurors as they leave (Demosthenes, *Against Aristogeiton* 98. 4).

There is an obvious objection to all this: that we should not use later philosophical standards to judge the physiognomy of earlier medical texts. The original claim was only that physiognomy took its rise in the medical tradition, not that it became systematized there. Instead of expecting a fully-fledged Hippocratic physiognomy (the objection would continue), one should rather be looking to see how Aristotelian physiognomy was only made possible by the pioneering work of Hippocratic writers on human nature.

The trouble with even such a moderate view, however, is that it implies either that medical writers established an interest in the relationship between (for example) the body and the character of a person, and that this interest was taken up and pursued by philosophers; or at the very least that medical writers somehow established a way of looking at human nature such that philosophers following in their path naturally turned to consider the relationship between body and character in a certain light. But neither of these claims can be justified on the basis of our evidence. In the first place, it seems fairly clear that philosophy and medicine, particularly in their approach to the analysis of human nature, developed as theoretical disciplines *in parallel* with each other from an intellectual background which, in crucial respects, they shared in common. Alcmeon, Diogenes of Apollonia, Empedocles, Anaxagoras: the same figures stand behind medical and philosophical thought about the material world in general and the nature of man in particular.[175] The importance of this is that it is hasty to suppose that all similarities between medicine and philosophy in their theories of human nature must be the result of direct influence between the two later traditions. In particular, there is nothing very

Georgics 2. 167–74; 130–5 for medicine). Finally, for an interest in the (psycho-)physical effects of the environment in the Hippocratic Corpus, see e.g. *Nature of Man* and *AWP* (the latter, not coincidentally, being an important text in Galen's representation of Hippocrates as a physiognomist). It should, however, be noted that in all this I am taking the reference to 'physiognomy' in the Ps.-Galenic fragment much more seriously than most scholars think it can be taken at all. Schöne already suggested that it is meant as a simple equivalent for *physiologia*, the 'study of nature' (1910: 419; see now esp. van der Eijk 2000–1: ii. 136 on Diocles fr. 64. 9–16, with his references). Such a position would, of course, be entirely consistent with my overall argument; but it also seems to me that it goes too far in suggesting a meaning for the word 'physiognomy' here that is not only different from, but actually cannot be related to any other attested occurrence of it.

[175] The Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine* deplores the influence of philosophical 'hypotheses' in medicine, which had a long and independent tradition of practice behind it—but thereby gives direct evidence of the importance of Presocratic thought in medical theory, and its recognition by medics themselves. Cf. variously Celsus, *On Medicine*, proem 7–8; Edelstein (1952); Longrigg (1989) (esp. 13, 16, and 19 for the philosophical debt owed by the author of *Ancient Medicine* himself); (1993); van der Eijk (1999) (esp. 9–11 for the relationship between medicine and philosophy in ancient medical historiography, including the passage of Celsus cited). The parallel development of medicine and philosophy is argued in Orelli (1998; cf. 138 'Affinität statt Abhängigkeit') and Jouanna (1992).

surprising at all in the fact that medical writers and philosophers develop accounts of the interaction of mind and body which have formal similarities. This is not, of course, to deny that philosophers were aware of the medical tradition and influenced by it; it is only to say that such influence as medical theory had on philosophical thought about human nature must have been, at best, incidental to the development of the conditions under which philosophers became interested in physiognomy.

As to the possibility that medicine fed physiognomy directly into the philosophical tradition (perhaps in embryonic form as a question about the relationship between physical and mental states): there are a number of indications that this cannot be right. Most importantly, there is no evidence that it was a perceived correspondence between behavioural patterns and physical traits which led philosophers to develop their accounts of body and soul. On the contrary, this seems to have been a secondary question that emerged on the back of psychological theories developed to explain human motivation and activity more generally. In any case, we have seen that an interest in physiognomy was not systematic among philosophers, and that where it emerges it can be understood as the consequence of (not the motivation for) their particular psychological theory. The next point to consider is that, where we do have evidence for philosophers looking to medical texts for inspiration, it is not for inspiration about the relationship between body and soul that they are looking. Indeed, we have seen that Plato, who was both unusually sensitive to medical thought, and decisive in developing Socrates' work towards a distinctively philosophical tradition of psychological analysis, carefully avoids, or even subverts, any suggestion of physiognomy in his own work.[176] Finally, all our evidence for theoretical physiognomy (i.e. in the philosophical tradition) comes in the context of a model of human nature that is already distinctively different from any found in the Hippocratic tradition. In particular, it seems to rely on a systematic distinction between body on the one hand and soul as the locus of moral agency on the other—a distinction which seems in turn to be related to the focus in Socratic philosophy on human moral character, and was in any case not clearly drawn *before* Socrates.[177] It might, of course, be a freak of evidence that theoretical discussions of physiognomy are always associated with a dichotomous model of body and soul along these lines; but one can see how the two go very well together. Physiognomy, like Socratic philosophy, has as its object the judgement of human moral character. Physicians might talk about (what we should class as) psychological phenomena, but not because they are concerned with the 'soul' as such. This is clear from the surviving evidence; it is explicitly remarked on as a characteristic of Greek medicine

[176] See again Section II. For the influence of the medical tradition on Plato's psychology, e.g. Poschenrieder (1882); Jouanna (1966); Claus (1981), esp. 177–8 (which give an interesting argument that medical thought provided the *indirect* impulse towards Plato's development of a dichotomous model of the soul).

[177] Claus (1981, esp. ch. 5) argues that the distinction was not made until Plato's Middle Period. For 'soul' generally in the Hippocratic corpus—or, rather, for the absence of a systematically dichotomous notion of soul—see e.g. Müri (1947); Moraux (1973–84) ii. 781; Pigeaud (1981) 32–47; Gundert (2000), esp. 33–5; Singer (1992).

by Plato;[178] and it is actually the basis invoked by a medical writer of later antiquity precisely to explain why it is that Hippocrates, despite the occasional coincidence of material, cannot be considered a real physiognomist. Commenting on a passage from the *Epidemics* (6. 7. 6) in which Hippocrates says that a person who naturally has the kind of voice or eyes that one has when one is angry is naturally irascible, the sixth-century physician Palladius says this (*Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics*, ii. 195. 10–17 Dietz):

There are *real* physiognomists (*eisi gar tines ontōs physiognōmones*) who make predictions about the character of the soul from the face. If they see someone with eyebrows drawn up, they call him 'shameless'; if with eyebrows drawn down, they call him 'liberal'.[179] *They* look for these things so that they can grasp the character of the soul (*to tēs psychēs ēthos*); but Hippocrates looks for them in order to grasp the disposition of the body (*tēn tou sōmatos . . . diathesin*).

I am assuming that the *practice* of physiognomy in Greece began outside the theoretical context either of medicine or of philosophy, and I am arguing that it became an object of theoretical study in the hands of philosophers, who were motivated in particular by their interest in ethical character. That there is a certain overlap between philosophy and medicine in the treatment of the mental and physical aspects of human nature tells us something about the direction from which philosophy was coming when it started to explore physiognomy: it does not tell us where it was when it did. The specific interest of philosophy in physiognomy was, in the end, all its own; and whatever one thinks about the earlier practitioners of physiognomy (such as Phaedo's Zopyrus), it is, I suggest, no coincidence that we first hear about them in philosophical texts. Nor is it coincidence that, when a medical writer finally turned to discuss physiognomy, it was on Aristotle that he relied for the basis of his theory.

(ii) Galen

Galen's reflection on the nature of the soul is not, or is not presented as, the starting-point for his theory of human nature. Rather, he starts from a *physiological* theory: a general theory of the composition of bodies. Famously, Galen developed from his reading of Hippocrates an explanatory model based on the belief that all organic bodies were composed of a certain 'mixture' or 'temperament' (Greek *krasis*, Latin *temperamentum*) of four fundamental

178 *Charmides* 156 E (Socrates citing a Thracian physician): 'One should not try to cure . . . the body without the soul. This is also why most diseases escape Greek physicians: they don't look to the whole, which ought to be the subject of their care. . .'. (This is not contradicted by *Phaedrus* 270 C, where the 'whole' in which Hippocrates is said to be interested is the whole body—used, indeed, as an *analogy* for investigation of the whole soul in this case. In general, it might be noted that Plato's frequent invocation of medical science as an analogy for what a science of the soul might be is its own argument for the difference in emphasis between the two.)

179 Cf. perhaps Aristotle ap. Anon. Lat. 85; though Palladius' point is presumably that this kind of observation was a physiognomical 'standard' (and it might not be coincidence that we find Aristotle's remarks on eyebrows at *HA* 1. 9, 491^{b}14–18 quoted both by Galen, at *QAM* 55. 17–21 Müller, and also by the paradoxographer Antigonus, at *Collection of Amazing Stories* 114a).

'humours', viz. blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm.[180] Roughly speaking, if the balance of these humours was as it should be in an individual, then they would *ipso facto* be healthy; disease on the other hand was to be explained by some imbalance in the humours.

So much at least could, Galen thought, be demonstrated to the point of certainty (*On My Own Opinions* 15. 2); and, from a clinical point of view, the immediate consequences of the doctrine are straightforward enough: the role of the doctor would be to identify and rectify any humoral imbalance in their patients. However, rather more work needed to be done if one wished to understand the precise causal processes linking humoral temperament to the development and sustenance of the individual's constitution. In particular, Galen was unsure whether an organic constitution should be explained as the natural product of matter having a certain humoral temperament (the kind of thing into which matter of such a nature would naturally be expected to develop), or whether it was necessary to appeal in addition to a teleological principle which operated *through* matter of such a nature in constructing an animal, and which would be the true explanatory cause for the existence of an animal of a particular kind.[181]

The obvious attraction of the teleological option is that it immediately allows one to explain the orderliness of nature, including what might otherwise seem the miraculous suitability and purposiveness of the organic structure of living things. This, anyway, is how it seemed to Galen. Having established to his own satisfaction that the humours constituted the material basis for animal physiology, he saw the difficulty of supposing that their mixture could, with no further comment, be sufficient to explain the intricate construction of a living organism, as a strict reductionism would imply. One can view a house as the organization of some basic materials; but to explain how this organization comes about requires reference to its builder. For the body, similarly, some 'constructive power' (*diaplastikē dynamis*) seems needed in addition to the humours themselves to explain *how* they mix and operate to form a body in just the way they do.

Reasoning along these lines takes Galen along the road to a teleology, since it makes sense to suppose that the 'constructive power', the 'craftsman' of our bodies, uses the humours as its instruments, so that its existence as a psychological force is independent of, and prior to them (*On Temperaments* i. 635–6 Kühn). Yet there is immediately a problem here as well, for the model attributes an extraordinary intelligence to the soul—the intelligence to be able to plan and construct a living body according to some particular intention for its functioning; and such intelligence is not there to be seen in animals or children at all. Indeed, the craftsmanly understanding of the body exhibited by the

[180] For the development of humoral theory see references in n. 169 above and Nutton (1993).

[181] In general for Galen's agnosticism on the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body, see esp. his *On My Own Opinions* 7. 1–2, 76. 25–78. 11 Nutton (1999), with Nutton's commentary at 160 (on 78. 6–10), and at 142 (on 60. 3–6). Cf. also *Construction of the Embryo* iv. 700. 2–6 Kühn. In some works (such as the *QAM*) Galen argues strongly for reductionism; in others (e.g. *Usefulness of Parts*) he makes an equally strong case for teleology. A work like *On Temperaments* lies somewhere in between. See generally Lloyd (1988); Singer (1997*b*) (536–40 for *On Temperaments*); Caston (1997) 351–2.

constructive power remains inaccessible even to the most thoughtful and reflective of adults. If the teleologists were right, basic self-awareness should do perfectly for all of us what the science of anatomy imperfectly does for very few (*Construction of the Embryo* iv. 692. 18–693. 9, 700. 15–17 Kühn).

Teleological explanation has another great weakness in Galen's mind as well—one more directly pertinent to the present study—and that is that the explanatory power that makes it so attractive reaches down only as far as the level of the species. When we marvel at the 'craftsmanship' apparent in nature, at how well constructed and well adapted to living a creature is, we are not focusing on characteristics peculiar to the individual. It is the *species* that is well constructed and well adapted to life: the individual is so only incidentally. (It is not, for example, the irascibility of individuals which inspires a teleologically inclined wonder, but, more generally, their capacity for thinking and moving in ways which will procure nourishment and self-preservation.) Yet the world is populated by individuals; and when one considers what makes them individuals (i.e. their individual peculiarities) the attractions of teleology start to pall.

In my account of Aristotle, I argued that he, at least, felt able to provide an explanation for individual peculiarities within a teleological model, and that he did it through a framework of hypothetical necessity. But Galen (and one might imagine that his arguments are based in the strong tradition of epiphenomenalism within the Peripatetic school itself) baulks at this account. He interprets Aristotle's invocation of (*a*) teleology qualified by (*b*) hypothetical necessity as the claim that (a^*) *form* is responsible for species characteristics (e.g. a nose), while (b^*) matter determines what kind of a nose it is going to be. But in this case there are two serious problems. First, form could not even *start* building a nose without any idea of what sort of a nose to build. The sculptor Polyclitus might change his designs for the nose on a sculpture in the light of the materials he finds himself working with; but he needs to *have* designs before he can begin to wield his chisel. The second problem is that, if matter is supposed to be responsible for the characteristics of the child, we should expect (since form comes from the father and matter from the mother) that a creature would always look like its mother, and never like its father.[182]

This, of course, is an issue of which Aristotle was well aware; and on my reconstruction of his account, Galen's dilemma seems to rest on a more or less crude misunderstanding of his hylomorphism. Galen talks as if the form were supposed to be the thing that does all the work (like Polyclitus), whereas actually Aristotle knows very well that it is not the *form* of human being that does the work, but a particular human father. And a particular human father *does* aim to create a determinate kind of nose—namely, just the kind of nose that he has himself. But we can still explain how resemblance to the mother comes about: the matter supplied by the mother has some influence on the new child, insofar

[182] See *On Seed* 2. 1. 51–3, iv. 605. 16–606. 10 Kühn for the former point; 2. 1. 54–7, iv. 606. 10–607. 6 Kühn for the latter (apparently using Aristotle's example): if the artisan is responsible for kind, the matter for qualities ('in the same way that the eye is made by the moulding power but is made either blue or black by the matter'), then all children would resemble their mothers; and if the artisan is responsible for the qualities too, then all would resemble (only) their fathers.

as the father (or, more precisely, his semen) 'gives in' to it, or fails to 'master' it. It is thus that a child can come to look more or less like both its father and mother.

Perhaps, however, the move Aristotle makes in this response precisely constitutes for Galen the move away from teleology. What we learn from Aristotle's account (as I have presented it) is that in particular cases of generation, the protagonists are *already determined*. Indeed, we can say that in order for there to *be* a particular case of generation, the protagonists must already be determined. A child is not made from the coincidence of pure form and pure matter; it is made from the encounter between one person's semen and another's blood. Its constitution, in other words—or, to speak in terms more Galenic than Aristotelian, its temperament—is determined by the temperaments of mother and father. And this begins to sound like a reductionist position. Aristotle could maintain his analysis of events in terms of the teleological action of form under conditions of hypothetical necessity; but given that form never does act outside the conditions of hypothetical necessity, i.e. that the activity which it is supposed to explain is always and necessarily the activity of a determinate individual, it becomes unclear that we have any licence to posit its existence as a genuine entity or as something prior to the activity of individuals at all.[183] It looks more like a way of describing their activity than of explaining it; it certainly does not have the substantial status accorded to the 'constructive power' whose hypothesis is needed to make teleology an attractive possibility for Galen.

In the light of these difficulties, then, Galen was prepared to take seriously the possibility of a non-teleological biology, taking his lead from those of Aristotle's pupils who saw him not as a teleologist but as a reductionist. He was, to quote the opening line of one of Galen's most important works on the subject, prepared to entertain the possibility 'that the powers (*dynameis*) of the soul follow the temperaments of bodies' (*QAM* 32. 1–2 Müller).[184] The idea, in a

[183] One of Aristotle's own pupils, Dicaearchus of Messene, seems to have made a cognate point in arguing his own reductionism (fr. 8g Wehrli = 26 Mirhady): 'The Eretrians abolish qualities, as having nothing in the nature of substance in common, but subsist by themselves and in combination in particulars. And Dicaearchus, for the same reason, agrees that there is an animal, but abolishes the soul as its cause.' Aristotle's form-soul evaporates into a kind of universal: it is susceptible to just the type of argument he himself applies to Platonic forms. It might be worth noting that there are modern commentators who deny that Aristotelian forms have substantial or prior existence. Cf. e.g. Caston (1997), 331; or again Pavlopoulos (2003). Pavlopoulos argues that 'forms' do not account for why creatures of a certain kind exist in the first place, but constitute a metaphysical principle which explains why 'once life has occurred—be it a unique occurrence lasting a very short while—this same life should go on indefinitely' (2003: 180). If Pavlopoulos is right, the disagreement between Galen and Aristotle here would be over whether such a model could form the basis for a meaningful teleology, or whether it should rather have led Aristotle to embrace reductionism.

[184] The terminology of 'following' is, perhaps significantly, used in this sense (of psychological dependence on the body) by the Aristotelian *Physiognomy*—indeed, it would not be absurd to imagine that the opening line of that work (ὅτι αἱ διάνοιαι ἕπονται τοῖς σώμασι κτλ.) lies somewhere behind the first line of the *QAM* as quoted (ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν ἕπεσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς). Exactly what Galen *intends* by the word 'follow' is, as Geoffrey Lloyd has shown, subject to 'a certain vagueness' (see Lloyd 1988: 33–7; and cf. Singer 1997*b*: 535; also Caston 1997: 352). It turns out that Galen is not only uncertain about reductionism as an approach

nutshell, is that individual creatures can be explained from the bottom up by appeal to the matter out of which they are made. Matter of the necessary complexity is supplied by the parents and, given the kind of matter it is, it undergoes certain physical changes: it develops into a 'construction' (*diaplasis*) of a certain kind.[185] But it happens that one set of properties possessed by this sort of material is what we think of as its 'psychological' properties, including (most importantly) psychological powers or capacities. These psychological properties vary according to the temperament of the material, and so (*a fortiori*) vary in step with the different biological constructions produced by materials of different temperament. Indeed, one might think of them as marks of the kind of material it is, such that it develops in a certain way. The construction of the animal thus *appears* to work in the light of its psychological capacities. In fact, the psychological capacities are expressions of the material which forms the basis for just that construction.

Although Galen's explorations of psychological teleology and reductionism find their expression in both cases as interpretation of Aristotle,[186] Galen does not go so far as to attribute to Aristotle his humoral analysis of biological matter. Nevertheless, he thinks that Aristotle held a view that, in theory at least, worked to much the same effect. When Aristotle said that the soul was the 'form' of the body, we are now supposed to understand him to have meant that the soul is the 'temperament' or 'mixture' of hot, cold, wet, and dry in the body (*QAM* 37. 5–24 Müller). In this way, 'Aristotle too believes that the soul's faculties depend upon the mixture of the mother's blood from which, in his opinion, our blood derives' (*QAM* 51. 12–15 Müller). To support this claim, Galen appeals to *HA* 1 (54. 21–55. 4 Müller). As becomes apparent there (says Galen):

> Aristotle would have it that the construction (*diaplasis*) of the whole body comes about as appropriate to the characteristics and faculties of the soul in each genus of animal—e.g. the birth of blooded animals is from the blood of the mother, and the psychological characteristics follows its mixture (as has been shown in the foregoing). But the construction of the organic limbs comes about as appropriate for the characteristics of the soul.

to psychology, but also (and less overtly) inconsistent in how strong he believes a reductionism has to be: at times he is eliminitivist (the soul is *nothing more than* temperament), at times emergentist (the soul somehow emerges from the constitution of the body and is perhaps influenced, though not determined in its character by it). For details of the stronger line as Galen derives it from Plato and Aristotle in the *QAM* see 37. 5–24, Müller (Aristotle; and cf. *PHP* 5. 5. 27. 1–28. 1 De Lacy); 42. 3–45. 3 Müller (Plato and Aristotle). (Gill, 2000: 66–7 with n. 30, reads the latter passage as a *rejection* of strict reductionism, but whatever the details of interpretation, this conclusion cannot be right, since Galen is quite explicit about the matter at the end of the passage: 'it is not open to us to say that it [the soul] is anything other than the temperament'. Cf. also Sorabji 2000: 255.)

[185] Galen explains a child's resemblance to either or both parents by supposing that *each* contributes to the matter (as, in the slightly different explanatory model of the *On Seed*, each contributes a portion of both matter and moving principle: e.g. *On Seed* 2. 2. 19–24, iv. 614. 5–615. 14 Kühn).

[186] Aristotle is obviously Galen's starting-point for thinking about physiognomy, but he does not acknowledge the real gaps that also exist between their respective models (a fact which is, of course, significant for the way in which the two were read together in the Arabic tradition). See Lloyd (1988) 25–8.

If it seems to be the case that the organic construction of an animal is directed towards the realization of its capacities for living in a certain way (its psychological powers broadly construed), this is in a certain sense correct.[187] But it is not because the capacities constitute a teleological force acting upon the matter, or add up to a 'constructive power'; it is rather because those capacities spell out, as we might say, the nature of the mixture such that it develops the way it does. A given kind of blood constitutes the material necessary to support a particular way of living; and this is one way of looking at (and to this extent explaining) the fact that its inherent movements lead to the formation of a particular kind of organic structure—namely one that embodies this way of living.

The process so far gives an explanation of two crucial phenomena. One is the fact that the psychological character of an animal corresponds exactly to its physical structure. (Those powers are an expression of the material's being such as to develop into this physical structure.) The other (and here the theory starts to go beyond what Galen believes a teleology can explain) is the fact that, for all their generic resemblance to other members of the same species, it is its parents that a creature most closely resembles.[188] The reason for this, of course, is that its construction is explained by precisely the temperament which explained their construction.

But Galen does not stop here; he also considers what will happen if the temperament of the animal is somehow *altered* by external factors—something to which it would seem, as a physical rather than a metaphysical principle, to be susceptible. The effects of climate, for example, or of a person's diet could make a difference to their temperament, and so (independently of their genetic inheritance) to their psycho-physical character. This point might seem innocuous; but, apart from the fact that it has certain physiognomical implications, which I shall consider below, it might turn out to be important to the plausibility of his reductionist model at large that Galen make this distinction between, on the one hand, the temperament a creature inherits from its parents in the material from which it starts to grow, and, on the other hand, further modifications to which its temperament might be subject in the course of its life. The reason that this might be important is because one criticism that was levelled against reductionism in antiquity was precisely that, in the absence

[187] Cf. *QAM* 37 Müller: it is to the 'homogeneous and simple kind of body, devoid of organic composition . . . that activities (*energeiai*) primarily belong'—i.e., again, the *diaplasis* is 'for' the activities already expressed in the humoral temperament. (For a slightly different view of the matter, see *On Temperaments* i. 566.17–567.14, 635.2–636.2 Kühn.) More details of the process of construction are given in the *Art of Medicine*, which describes the development of the four 'principal parts' of the body (brain, heart, liver, testicles), whose character in turn determines the final character of the various regions of the body in which they are situated. (The purpose of this work is to allow one to apply this understanding to the diagnosis of the principal parts in an individual from external physical signs. Not coincidentally, Galen comes closest here to practical 'physiognomical' observations—something of which he seems conscious in issuing a disclaimer at i. 336.15–337.2 Kühn: the fact that we can amend our characters through philosophy ensures that our 'innate' character is never fixed.)

[188] Note that Galen took the fact that a child tended to resemble its parents (the one fact explained by the reductionist qualification of Aristotle' psychology) to be an argument for the reductionist position: *Construction of the Embryo* iv. 700. 12–14 Kühn.

of some constraining force (such as the 'constructive power' posited by Galen in teleological mood), a strict identification of soul and temperament might leave no room for talking about an individual's nature as anything other *than* individual—the result of a particular set of circumstances which includes but in no way privileges the temperament of the parental material in which it began life. Just as teleology might be criticized for failing adequately to explain individual characteristics, so reductionism might be accused of failing to delimit the nature of an individual, to secure its nature as a particular kind of thing at the level of the species. To put this bluntly: if soul just is temperament, and the nature of a thing is the kind of soul it has, then any change in temperament would mean a change in soul—and this in turn would mean a change in its nature, the kind of thing it is. The argument takes satirical form in Nemesius (*On the Nature of Man* 2. 24. 21–4 Morani):[189]

Again, if the soul is a temperament, and temperaments change according to age, season, and diet, the soul changes. And if it changes, we do not have the same soul, but, according to the temperament, sometimes that of a lion, sometimes that of a sheep, sometimes that of something else. Which is absurd.

Galen already was aware of just such a line of reasoning;[190] and it seems to be in an attempt to head it off that he is careful to make a distinction between the temperament of an animal's original constitution, on which is based its construction (*diaplasis*), and further modifications to the temperament which might occur during its life. The idea must be that an animal's nature is determined and delimited by its original temperament, so that we can say that it is just the kind of animal that its parents were, and that further modifications of this temperament (due *in primis* to climate and diet) can never be so severe as to change its nature. Such a claim would not be *ad hoc*, but underwritten by sound biological considerations. Once the process of organic construction is under way (i.e. as soon as parental material begins the process of development into a new animal), any influence on the animal which might in principle be strong enough to change its temperament into a mixture suitable for a different kind of construction would bring its temperament into conflict with its actual psycho-physical construction. The result of this would not be a *change* in its nature

[189] It is worth observing here that Nemesius gives no indication that he is aware of, or interested in, theories of physiognomy—despite a common assumption to the contrary. Evans, for example, refers to *On the Nature of Man* as 'one of the most important documents of the fourth century' in this context (1969: 80). But as her own discussion goes on to show, Nemesius is important rather in more general terms for his discussions of the relationship between body and soul, and for the evidence he supplies for earlier views on the subject. It is true that, when Nemesius discusses Galen, the views he talks about happen to have been relevant to their author's physiognomical interest as well. But even in this case Nemesius makes no mention of the fact.

[190] Against people who think that in the case of cross-breeds it is the mother that determines the species, on the grounds that things change according to their nutrition, he says: 'The Persian plant, when transported to Egypt, did not become different in kind, but on receiving good nutriment bore edible fruit, its fruit not being edible before; and sheep when moved at some time to a different pasture did not become similar to the goats formerly pastured there, just as the goats did not become similar to sheep or asses or horses' (*On Seed* 2. 1. 4–2, iv. 603. 10–15 Kühn as translated by De Lacy 1992).

(it is too late for that), but a *conflict* between temperament and construction which would manifest itself in disease and, ultimately, death: the *destruction* of the animal.[191] So we can say that the 'nature' of the animal (both psychologically and physically) is exhibited in and determined by its physical construction and the causes which underlie that, *not* immediately in its temperament.

All of this has implications for the view Galen has of physiognomy, for we can now distinguish *two* kinds of physiognomical sign on the basis of the reductionist model he offers. There are, first of all, those signs associated with its construction (*diaplasis*): the psycho-physical manifestations of the temperament of its original (parental) material. These correspond to the animal's nature as a member of a particular species, and also (in fact *a fortiori*) its nature as the offspring of particular parents. The shape of its nose might be an example of a physiognomical sign under this heading: an animal will have a nose that is like that of others of its species just insofar as it is like that of its parents; and there will no doubt be features in a description of its psychological character to which the nose corresponds. (At the level of the species, a particular kind of nose will, trivially, indicate the power of smell, and perhaps the degree of the animal's sensitivity to smell; if, like its parents, an animal's nose is a bit more snub than usual, it might indicate a lascivious tendency shared with them.) But then we can also look for psycho-physical manifestations of those modifications of its temperament caused by environmental factors of whatever sort (modifications which the animal can support just insofar as they do not come into conflict with the needs of its *diaplasis*). We shall see below that this is a tricky area, but an example for now might be the effects of a diet which caused an individual to become hotter in constitution and so redder in the face and more inclined to anger than he or she would otherwise have been. In fact it is this very point—the double nature of physiognomical signs—which the *QAM* passage quoted earlier on is introduced as explaining. Here is the same passage again, in its wider context (54. 6–55. 11 Müller, beginning with a quotation from Aristotle, *PA* 651^{a}12–17):[192]

'The nature of the blood is the cause of many things to do with an animal's character and perception. This is reasonable, for it is the matter of the whole body (for nourishment is matter, and blood is the ultimate nourishment). So it makes a great difference whether the blood is hot or cold, or thin or thick, or pure or dirty'. Aristotle says other things in the works on animals and in the *Problems*, but it seems to me superfluous to write out everything: it is sufficient for me to show what Aristotle thinks about the temperaments of the body and about the faculties of the soul. Nevertheless, I shall add things that are spoken about in *Historia Animalium* book 1, some of which lead immediately to temperament (*krasis*), some through intermediate physiognomical signs [according to Aristotle himself]. For Aristotle would have it that the construction (*diaplasis*) of the whole body comes about as appropriate to the characteristics and faculties of the soul in each genus of animal—e.g. the birth of blooded animals is from the blood of the mother, and the psychological characteristics follow its mixture (as has been shown in the

[191] Cf. *Art of Medicine* i. 310.8–311.3 Kühn; *On My Own Opinions* 15. 2–4.

[192] In the translation that follows, the phrases in square brackets are athetized by Müller (but note that they are present in the Arabic translation, pp. 58/26 ed. Biesterfeldt).

foregoing). But the construction of the organic limbs comes about as appropriate for the characteristics of the soul [: very much so, according to Aristotle]. And, in line with this, there are quite a few indications of psychological character and physical temperament. Some of the physiognomical signs indicate temperament directly and immediately—such as those dealing with colour[193] and hair, but also voice[194] and the movements of the limbs.

Construction (*diaplasis*) provides *indirect* signs of temperament (and hence psychological character); what I have characterized as modifications of construction give more direct signs of the same thing.[195]

Galen, then, gives a solid theoretical basis for physiognomy. But it is important even in his case not to exaggerate the importance to him of physiognomy as such. For one thing, even Galen is never a physiognomical *determinist.* He usually allows that rational thought, at least, is an emergent activity, which can overcome the natural disposition determined by temperament with no corresponding trace in the physical character of the individual.[196] This, to be sure, does little to undermine the theoretical status of physiognomy—or even its practical uses, given how little inclined most people are to philosophy (and the same point could in any case be made for Phaedo and Aristotle). There are more significant considerations, however. One is the fact that physiognomy is clearly of interest to Galen only as a consequence of a reductionist psychology, not as an end in itself—something immediately apparent in the fact that Galen's 'physiognomical' speculation is all concentrated in 'reductionist' contexts.[197] This is a significant restriction on its significance for him, because although Galen has reasons to be attracted to psychological reductionism (for one thing, it promotes his attempt to present medicine as a kind of master science if ethical character turns out to be a function of a person's

[193] Cf. *On Temperaments* i. 627–8 Kühn, on the usefulness of skin in inferences to the underlying temperament: since skin 'in our part of the world' is well-balanced, it 'gives a good indication of the parts beneath—though even here this relationship is not straightforward, the above applying only to those parts which have the same mixture as that of the skin.'

[194] In *Art of Medicine* i. 350–1 Kühn, *loudness* of voice is an innate, not an acquired characteristic: but note that it is there explained *indirectly* by the influence of heat on the (*diaplasis* of the) windpipe. So perhaps we should understand that in some aspects the voice functions as a direct sign of temperament, while in others (including loudness) it is an indirect sign.

[195] It might be worth noting, as perhaps another indication that Galen is aware of the Aristotelian *Physiognomy* (cf. n. 184 above) that in that work considerations of colour, hair, movement, and voice (in that order) are listed together *after* the survey of body parts (812^{a}11–end; cf. Polemon, Leiden chs. 31–52; Anon. Lat. 73–9).

[196] e.g. at *Art of Medicine* i. 336.16–337.2 Kühn; cf. *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul* v. 37.11–14 Kühn (nature is dominant in youth, beliefs and habit—*ta te dogmata kai tēn askēsin*—later on). But for the vacillation in the rigour of Galen's reductionism, see again n. 184.

[197] There is no explicit mention of physiognomy anywhere else in his corpus either in 'neutral' contexts, or where teleology is to the fore. Of the six occurrences of the word 'physiognomy' (and its cognates), four come from the *QAM* and one from *On Temperaments.* The remaining example is his reference at *PHP* 5. 5. 22. 1 to Posidonius, whose appeal to 'the physiognomists' evidence' likewise came in an explicitly reductionist context (cf. *PHP* 5. 5. 23 with discussion in Section IV. ii above).

physiological state),[198] his commitment to it is, in terms of his wider output, rather limited.

Even within his reductionist explorations, however, Galen's theoretical enthusiasm for physiognomy does not as a matter of fact translate into an argument for its use in practice, and examples of physiognomical inferences in his voluminous works are vanishingly few.[199] He supports the possibility of a physiognomy based on zoological typology, assuming the appropriate theoretical constraints;[200] but he starts to lose interest where he might be expected to move beyond theory, and readers who want to know more are referred to Aristotle (*On Temperaments* i. 624. 17–625. 1 Kühn; similarly *On Epidemics VI*, 7–8 (53) Ghersetti 1999*a*). Perhaps it is precisely because in his view physiognomical inference collapses with diagnosis of more fundamental physiological states—whether the state of the principal organs, as in the *Art of Medicine*, or of the underlying temperament itself—that it could have very little independent clinical value.

[198] The more one's character is brought under the influence of physical, and especially dietary and environmental, factors, the greater the scope and importance of medicine in human life—to the extent that it can subsume even philosophy. This point has not been lost on commentators: see Donini (1974), 144; Ballester (1988), 129; and esp. Lloyd (1988). This consideration will also help to explain why, despite Galen's obvious reliance on Aristotelian thought, Galen is keen in the *QAM* to provide his psychology and physiognomy with a lineage that goes back *through* Aristotle himself (and Plato too), to an origin in Hippocrates.

[199] I know of two candidates from passages in Galen not already discussed. First, a quotation from al-Mas'udi (which, as Vivian Nutton has suggested to me, perhaps derives from Galen's lost *Commentary on the AWP*). In the translation of Meynard and Courteille (1861) 163–4 this reads: 'Galien signale dix propriétés particulières aux noirs, à savoir: les cheveux crépus, les sourcils rares, les narines dilatées, les lèvres épaisses, les dents aiguës, la puanteur de la peau, la noirceur du teint, la longueur des pieds et des mains, le développement des parties génitales et une pétulance excessive. Cet auteur explique cette dernière qualité chez le *noir* par l'organisation imparfaite de son cerveau, d'où résulte la faiblesse de son intelligence.' This adds nothing substantial to what we have already seen; though it might be interesting to note that the link between stupidity and an 'ill-formed neck' is one that Zopyrus is supposed to have applied to Socrates (Phaedo, fr. 6 Rossetti). A second passage which might provide evidence for Galen's interest in physiognomy is *To Glaucon on Medical Method*, xi. 11 Kühn (= *On Crises* ix. 627 Kühn). 'It is necessary', Galen says, 'to make distinctions in the case of the eyes especially. For it is possible to get evidence from them of the character (*ēthos*) of the soul in those who are healthy; and in the ill, the signs are clearer for one able to see accurately.' Barton uses this passage (and only this passage) to justify her claim that 'it is difficult to draw the line between the two types of examination of the body [viz. diagnosis and physiognomy] at times' (1994*b*: 98, with n. 18). But the value of the claim is vitiated by the fact that Galen does not tell us what to look for in the eyes. It might be humoral temperament, so that the eyes would be physiognomical signs in a sense recognized by Galen's theoretical model for the science (contrast *Art of Medicine* i. 329–31 Kühn, where the size, colour, and moisture of the eyes might reflect the humoral state of the brain); but it might just be that we should look for signs of mental activity in them.

[200] *On Temperaments* i. 624 Kühn. The constraints are: (*a*) that one has a causal explanation to hand for the link mooted between physical and psychological traits (Galen thinks that this is something neglected by many physiognomical practitioners); and (*b*) that one does not generalize too quickly from individual limbs to the character of the body as a whole. This latter point, says Galen, was not even lost on the non-philosophical practitioners (cf. n. 113 to Section III, appendix, on *epiprepeia*; also e.g. Polemon, Leiden ch. 1, A16)—and elsewhere he has his own contribution to make towards explaining the problem. In the *Art of Medicine*, he notes that the state of one of the principal organs can have knock-on effects on parts of the body under the more direct influence of another of the principal organs: e.g. at i. 333 Kühn, heat in the heart can lead to a smaller head—though the organ primarily responsible for the character of the head is the brain.

It is not, though, only pragmatic considerations that limit Galen's interest in making a practical study of physiognomy. For when Galen looks more closely at the detailed workings of humoral theory in a reductionist context, serious obstacles to physiognomical diagnosis emerge. For it turns out that the very same outward, physical effects can be the result of quite diverse, even opposing influences on the temperament. In particular, the effects of climate on appearance and character might not be consistent with the effects of the inherited temperament. So, for example, there are outward signs of a naturally 'hot' or 'cold' temperament (perhaps darker or paler skin respectively). But the effect of a particularly cold *climate* is not (as one might have hoped) to make its inhabitants colder than they would otherwise have been in temperament and paler in appearance.[201] Rather, the cold is supposed to drive their innate heat inwards, making them *hotter* in psychological character, but *paler* (as if colder) in appearance. In a hot climate, conversely, people's heat is 'drawn out', making them look 'hotter' still, but leaving them with little internal heat, and psychologically cooler. (See on this *Temperaments* i. 627–8 Kühn.) So in general, Galen says, one needs to ask whether the visible *signs* of heat in a body are signs of *external* heat or of heat which belongs to the body (i. 628.13–15 Kühn; cf. also *Art of Medicine* i. 341. 14–18 Kühn). This is a fatal blow. However much theoretical interest physiognomy might have in certain contexts, it could not have significant diagnostic value even for Galen.

(iii) Other Medical Writers

As Antonella Ghersetti shows later on in this volume, the materials Galen provided in the *QAM* for reading Aristotle's *Physiognomy* through his own humoral theory were eventually adopted and developed systematically in the Arabic medical tradition. But their immediate impact was altogether less impressive. In fact, Greek medicine after Galen proved no more interested in physiognomy as such than it had been before him. Before him, the only medical writer on physiognomy we hear about is Loxus, used as a source by the author of the anonymous Latin treatise from whom he earns the epithet 'medicus'. But, as we have already seen in Section III. iii, there is nothing characteristically 'medical' about the fragments of Loxus' work: nothing, in fact, that distinguishes it from a work like Ps.-Aristotle's *Physiognomy* at all.[202] The only other physician

[201] 'Cold' and 'hot' climates here are relative to the 'well-tempered' climate of the middle regions of the world (such as Greece), which have a neutral effect as such on physiological temperament: see *On Temperaments* i. 627. 5 Kühn (and cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 24 CD; Aristotle, *Politics* 7. 7, 1327^{b}23–33; but contrast on this *AWP* 12. 6).

[202] In general, Anon.'s choice of Loxus, Aristotle, and Polemon, and his characterization of them as physician, philosopher, and orator respectively (Anon. Lat. 1), is clearly meant to impress us with the seriousness of physiognomy and the breadth of its appeal. In fact it tells us nothing about the theoretical scope of physiognomical writing. On the contrary, it only becomes clearer how those who seriously engage with physiognomy as a theoretically grounded discipline rely heavily on Aristotle (or Aristotelians) in doing so. A physician, like an orator, might conceive an interest in physiognomy or find a use for it; but there is no more (discernible) input into the physiognomical tradition from the medical community *as such* than there is from the rhetorical community as such.

we know to have written on physiognomy is Adamantius; but his surviving work is merely an epitome of Polemon's physiognomical treatise.[203] Again, it contains nothing distinctively medical, nothing that cannot be explained by reference to the Peripatetic tradition.

Medics writing as such naturally continued to be interested in the psychological effects of physiological dispositions as symptoms of physical illness which could be used in diagnosis. They were also, of course, interested in *mental* illness as something which could be explained by physical causes.[204] But despite the occasional coincidence of material between medical observations and the sort of psycho-physical correlations posited in the surviving physiognomical handbooks,[205] despite the opening given by Galen for physiognomy in medical discussion, there is in all of this scarcely any explicit or systematic discussion of physiognomy. Palladius sets the tone in his comment on *Epidemics* 6.7.6, as quoted above. There, he carefully distanced medicine from physiognomy at a point where Galen, in his commentary on the same passage (*On Epidemics VI*, 7–8 (53) Ghersetti 1999*a*), had sought to bring them together. Physicians, says Palladius, sometimes use the same materials as physiognomists; that does not make them physiognomists. Indeed, the most striking thing is (as so often in this study) the *absence* of explicit reference to physiognomy, the *absence* of systematic discussion of evidence we might class as physiognomical. Even when physiognomy and medicine are spoken of in the same breath, as occasionally they are, it tends to be in somewhat non-technical contexts, where both can be linked with other forms of predictive art as well.[206] As far as the medical authors of antiquity themselves are concerned, physiognomy as a category of thought seems generally to hold very little interest.[207]

[203] Adamantius is normally identified with the Adamantius called 'Sophist' (at Aetius, *Iatrica* 3. 163. 1, 8. 29. 2) who wrote *On the Genesis of the Winds*, *On the Origin of Dreams*, and *On the Signs given by Stars*. Cf. Follet (1989).

[204] For the debate over whether physical indisposition always underlay mental illness, see esp. the surviving works of Caelius Aurelianus in the 5th c. (though he relies to a greater or lesser degree on the 2nd-c. physician Soranus), with T. M. Brown (1993), esp. 439–40. For the history of *melancholia* (an archetypal mental illness, along with *mania*), see esp. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964); Flashar (1966). (Cf. also Swain above p. 11 for the possible influence of contemporary interest in mental health on Polemon.)

[205] Cf. again Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (1964), arguing for convergence between medicine and physiognomy in the evolving concept of *melancholia*; also Horstmanshoff (1999), on Aurelianus' treatment of emotion (but note the important qualification in his claim at 267: 'Ses observations, la première source de sa description, s'accordent parfois mot pour mot avec la tradition physiognomonique, *même si l'on ne peut pas fournir les preuves d'un emprunt direct*' [my emphasis]).

[206] Clement, *Stromata* 1. 21. 135. 2. 3 (*hoi physiognōmonountes iatroi te kai manteis*); Fulgentius, *Contents of Virgil* 84. 10–11 Helm as cited in n. 174 above.

[207] Sextus Empiricus at *PH* 1. 85 says that 'the body is the stamp of the soul, as physiognomy shows' and Galen's rather dismissive comments on the mass of physiognomists, that they lack an explanatory basis for their predictions (*On Temperaments* i. 624 Kühn), might be taken as evidence that most were not only empirical in their approach but Empiricist in their philosophy. But this would be taking evidence to the limits of optimism; and (*pace* Barton 1994*b*: 99) Sextus himself was certainly speaking *ad hominem*, using Dogmatic positions to refute Dogmatic positions. (The fact that he refers to physiognomy as a kind of 'wisdom', *physiognōmonikē sophia*, shows irony,

VI. POST-HELLENISTIC PLATONISM

Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* in the writings of Platonists: L. Calvenus Taurus ap. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1. 9. 2; Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 13. 2; 54. 14 Nauck; Aristides Quintilianus, *On Music* 3. 8, 106. 6 Winnington-Ingram; Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 17, 71. 13–14; 74.3 Klein; Ammonius, *On the Prior Analytics* 7. 16 Wallies; Proclus, *On the Cratylus* 88. 6 Pasquali; Olympiodorus, *On the Alcibiades* 13. 19; 97. 6, 12 Westerink; *On the Gorgias* 5. 3. 14 Westerink; Philoponus, *On the Prior Analytics* xiii. 2, 483. 22–4, 484. 8–11, 485. 5 Wallies; *On the Generation of Animals* iv. 3, 185. 13 Hayduck; *On the de anima* xv, 155. 22 Hayduck. Occurrences of *physiognōmon-* (and *metōposkop-*) in the writings of fellow travellers:[208] Philo of Alexandria, *On Dreams* 1. 164;[209] Galen, *On Temperaments* i. 624. 3 Kühn; *QAM* 54. 20, 55. 8, 63. 1–2 Müller; *PHP* 5. 5. 22. 2 De Lacy; Clement, *Stromata* 1. 21. 135. 2. 3; *Pedagogue* 3. 3. 15. 2 (*metōposkopos* glossed as *physiognōmōn* in the scholia ad loc., 336. 10 Stählin–Treu); Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1. 2. 5, 4. 15. 3 (*metōskopiē manteia*); Origen, *Against Celsus* 1. 33. 14.[210]

Physiognomy as a theoretical concern in the philosophy of antiquity starts with Phaedo, flourishes in Aristotle's school, and ends, one might fairly say, with Galen. By this I mean that we have evidence for the theoretical *discussion* of physiognomy as such in no other philosopher. The story has a continuation, however; for while there is no reflection on the nature of physiognomy in the surviving works of later Platonist thinkers, it is clear that many of them accepted

not respect, if it shows anything at all.) There, is by the way, no evidence, nor is it likely, that the word *typos* ('stamp') used here to describe the relationship between body (as sign) and soul (as signified) was one used in other contexts by Empiricists to denote the relationship between two things experienced in conjunction (though it does recur in physiognomical contexts to describe the relationship between soul and body: e.g. Ps.-Aristotle $806^{a}32$; cf. Phaedo fr. 18 Rossetti = Maximus of Tyre, *Dissertations* 25. 3).

[208] There are those who might want to add Posidonius to this list as well; though his use of Plato seems to me thoroughly Stoic (see Section IV. ii above; cf. Boys-Stones 2001: 99–100 with n. 3).

[209] Philo, however, gives no clear indication that he believes in the art (see again Section IV n. 124); and the extent to which it is appropriate to see him as part of the mainstream Platonist revival is a moot point (cf. Boys-Stones 2001: 100–1).

[210] It is worth noting how little direct, theoretical discussion of physiognomy there is among Christians. Origen is the only Christian writer to show awareness of the theoretical history of the subject (see n. 233 below). Ambrose in the 4th c. believes that gait and gesture reveal the soul, so that correction of one's psychological *nature* needs to underlie correction of manners (*On the Duties of the Clergy* 1. 18. 71–5; 1. 19. 84). This is at a little distance from the tradition of philosophical reflection on physiognomy (for one thing, it is *manners* he is speaking of, not physical features); but even so unusual in how near it gets. Clement of Alexandria, who had earlier on spoken about how Christians should order their public appearance (cf. *Pedagogue* 3. 11–12), was clear that an ability to tell people's character from the way they dress and so on is *like*, but *is* not, 'metoposcopy' (i.e. physiognomy: *Pedagogue* 3. 3. 15. 2). That the theoretical issues here are skirted around by Christians is probably to be explained on pragmatic grounds. Not only might Christians find physiognomy pedagogically unhelpful (at least when the accent is on the possibility of change: cf. Origen, *Against Celsus* 3. 66, 69), they might shrink from unnecessary association with an art that sometimes attracted scorn for its pretensions (cf. Artemidorus, *Oneirocritica* 2. 69. 10), and may have been thought to rely for its successes on daemonic influence (as in the case of other forms of prognostication: cf. e.g. Clement, *Stromata* 1. 21. 135. 2; Hippolytus 4. 15. 3). But for a fuller and more positive assessment of early Christian attitudes to physiognomy, see Parsons (2006), esp. ch. 2 ('Physiognomy in Jewish and Early Christian Literature').

it as a theoretical possibility.[211] There might be no evidence that Plato was interested in the art, but Platonists knew that Aristotle was;[212] they explained Socrates' attraction to Alcibiades as an example of physiognomy in practice;[213] and they attributed its invention and use to Pythagoras.[214]

As with every other thinker I have considered, Platonists could accept the possibility of physiognomy insofar as it arose as a consequence of their beliefs about the relationship between the body and the soul. That they did not feel the need to argue or discuss it as a consequence of these beliefs is presumably due to the fact that, as far as they were concerned, the subject had been adequately covered by earlier thinkers in whose footsteps they thought of themselves as following: that a sympathetic attitude to physiognomy enters Platonism with their reception of, in particular, Aristotle. But here we encounter a problem: for, as we have seen, especially in Galen, it turns out that Aristotelian physiognomy quickly came to be thought of as consequent on a specifically epiphenomenalist interpretation of his psychology. According to this interpretation, the body was a guide to the character of the soul insofar as the activity of the soul could be explained as a product of the body's functioning. The problem comes because one might assume that Platonists would want to be very careful to avoid associating themselves with such a view. It is central, not only to the psychology, but actually to the entire metaphysical system of Platonism, that soul is *immortal*, *independent* of the corporeal world, and (at least logically) *prior* to it. It would be anathema to suggest that the soul relied for its nature on the physical circumstances of its instantiation. Already Apuleius, for example, warning that we should not prejudge a person's character by place of birth, explains that local environmental conditions can make a difference to the taste of vegetables and quality of vines but, since the soul comes into the body from outside, such things could make no difference to its virtue.[215]

This point has a particular sensitivity, since Plato himself at one point appears to explain the superior intelligence of the Greeks by the temperate climate of their country (*Timaeus* 24c), and this passage was seized on by some commentators as support for claims that the soul was dependent to some extent

[211] A rare and, in any case peripheral, exception is the Platonizing Sophist Maximus of Tyre who, at *Oration* 25. 3, calls Zopyrus' art 'obscure divination' (*manteian asaphê*) and asks (rhetorically) to what kind of co-mingling (*epimixia*) the body and soul owe their similarity. The mainstream answer to this question will emerge in what follows.

[212] In fact they rarely mention Aristotle's physiognomical interests; but it becomes unavoidable in commentaries on the *Prior Analytics* (cf. e.g. Ammonius, *On the Prior Analytics* 7. 16 Wallies; Philoponus, *On the Prior Analytics* xiii. 2, 483. 22 Wallies).

[213] Proclus, *On the First Alcibiades* 94. 4–15 Westerink; cf. Olympiodorus, *On the Alcibiades* 13. 19 Westerink; also Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 4. 1. Cf. Apuleius, *On Plato* 1. 1 for Socrates' identification of the infant Plato.

[214] Pythagoras is supposed by Platonists to have used physiognomy in choosing friends and pupils (in line with Adamantius' recommendations, by the way, A2). See Calvenus Taurus ap. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1. 9. 2 (§8 for Taurus as the source); Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 13. 2–14. 1, 54; Iamblichus, *Pythagorean Life* 17. 71–4 Klein; Olympiodorus, *On the Gorgias* 5. 3. 14 Westerink (with which cf. Iamblichus, *The Pythagorean Life* 25. 112 Klein). Cf. also Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1. 2. 5. 2.

[215] *Apology* 24 *enimvero animo hominis extrinsecus in hospitium corporis immigranti quid ex istis addi vel minui ad virtutem uel malitiam potest?*

on the body.[216] Galen, indeed, had suggested that one could not be a true Platonist if one thought otherwise (*QAM* 64. 19–65. 9 Müller):

Some of those who call themselves Platonists think that the soul can be impeded by the body during illnesses, but performs its proper activities when the body is well, being neither helped nor hindered by it. So I shall transcribe some remarks of Plato's where it is clear that men are helped *or* harmed where intelligence is concerned by the temperament of the locality, even when the body is not sick. In the *Timaeus*, early in the dialogue [i.e. at 24 c], he writes: 'The goddess first organized you according to this complete arrangement and design when she established your city; and she chose the place in which you would be born with an eye to the fact that its seasons were temperate (*tēn eukrasian tōn hōrōn en autōi katidousa*) and would bear the wisest men.'

Proclus has a sharp rejoinder to this. In his own discussion of *Timaeus* 24 c, he says that the literal reading of it was upheld by 'Panaetius and other Platonists' (*On the Timaeus*, i. 162. 11–15 Diehl). As we shall shortly see, he was certainly not ignorant of Galen's position, and it seems odd that Galen's name is absent here—until one thinks what it might mean for Proclus to appeal to the Stoic Panaetius as a 'Platonist'. His point is precisely directed at Galen's controversial remark: if it is 'Platonists' who believe in a literal reading of *Timaeus* 24 c, they are Platonists like Panaetius: that is, no Platonists at all.[217]

Not all of Proclus' attacks on Galen are so indirect. Indeed, Galen becomes for him the archetypal adherent of the reductionism that Platonists in fact wish to avoid, and Proclus' attacks on reductionist theories of soul often name him, or allude to the *QAM*. So, for example, when he is explaining the fact that people become wiser and more considerate as they mature, Proclus contrasts his view of the relationship between body and soul with that of Galen, encapsulated by the opening (and programmatic) statement of the *QAM* (*On the Timaeus* iii. 349. 21–30 Diehl):

Galen would say that *the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*... But it is not right to make the immortal soul, which exists before the body, think through the body; we should rather say that the body sometimes becomes more of a distraction to the soul in its attempt to live a well-ordered life, sometimes less disturbing.

There is an allusion to the same line in his defence of the soul's immortality in his *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* (1014. 28–36 Cousin):

If the soul is not immortal... it will in addition be mixed with bodies and enmattered, and it will not be able to rule them or lead them where it wishes, but will *follow the temperaments of the body*.

[216] Apuleius may be issuing a tacit warning about the passage when he says that the environmental determination of moral character is disproved by the fact that *not all Athenians are clever* (as, correlatively, not all Scythians are stupid: *Apology* 24).

[217] This passage then, which appears to give textual comfort to those who would like to see Panaetius as a 'Platonist', in fact proves the very opposite (and cf. Boys-Stones 2001: 99 with n. 3). In addition to giving his own view, Proclus lists alternative readings of *Timaeus* 24 c from Longinus, Origen (i.e. the pagan), Porphyry, and Iamblichus (*On the Timaeus* i. 162–5 Diehl).

And again, *On the Republic*, i. 249. 21–3 Kroll:

So let us not accept that argument—when someone says that *the powers of the soul follow the quality of the temperaments of bodies*...

Compare *On the First Alcibiades* 226. 16–18 Westerink (against those who have the soul 'completed' by its association with the body):

This kind of 'completion' is corporeal and enmattered, and posits *a completion of the soul which follows the temperaments of the body*...

Proclus expresses in these passages the hostility of Platonism at large to the kind of reductionism in psychology evident to him in Galen's *QAM*. But since, as we saw in Section V, the *QAM* is the very text in which Galen argues for the close association of reductionism and physiognomy, does this mean that when Platonists accept the possibility of physiognomy it must be under the assumption that it is the *soul* that is somehow responsible for the physical character of the *body*?

There is, in fact, one Platonist thinker who goes some way towards such a position: the music theorist Aristides Quintilianus.[218] According to Aristides, the soul 'when it is far from the things of earth and associating with the almighty' is purely rational, and free of all desire (*On Music* 2. 8. 1–3). At a certain point, however, the time comes round for its descent into the corporeal world. A 'need' arises in the soul for a body—and a 'suitable' body at that (2. 8. 3–5). As we shall see, this is familiar enough territory for a Platonist (though there is a slight eccentricity in the way Aristides characterizes the soul's desire as the desire for a specifically masculine or feminine body).[219] Aristides is not even out on a limb when he goes on to suggest that things can go wrong for the soul, which might fail to acquire a body suitable for it. Other Platonists worried about just such a possibility.[220] But not only does Aristides seem to think that the

[218] Aristides is known only through his work *On Music* (translated in Mathiesen 1983), from which he appears to be a Pythagoreanizing Platonist, probably writing in the late 3rd or early 4th c., though an earlier date is possible. See Jahn (1882); Jan (1896); Zeller and Mondolfo (1932–8) iii/6. 1 n. 1 (associating him with the 'scuola di Porfirio o fors'anche di Giamblico'); Festugière (1954) (suggesting, at 71, a pre-Plotinian milieu for his work); Zanoncelli (1977); Barker (1982); Mathiesen (1983) (10–14 for his life and date); Centrone (1989). Although, as we shall see, Aristides appears to support the possibility of physiognomy, he only uses the word once, at *On Music* 3. 8, 106. 5–6 Winnington-Ingram, where he calls the art of painting a 'conversion (*antistrophē*) of the physiognomists' art'. (The idea is that physiognomists use appearance to get at the underlying character, while the painter uses his knowledge of a person's character in constructing his portrait. Mathiesen (1983) 172 n. 121 compares Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiognomy* 806ᵃ19ᵇ3; but Aristides might also, or rather, have had in mind Socrates' discussion with the painter Parrhasius described at Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3. 10. 3; and there is an even closer parallel with what Dio Chrysostom says at *Oration* 4. 85–8. For these passages see respectively Section II and Section IV n. 124 above.)

[219] *On Music* 2. 8. 16–18. The idea that a soul might be more or less 'masculine' or 'feminine' (or, strictly, in Aristides' case, might be characterized by masculine or feminine desires) is one that appears already in Hippocrates (cf. Section V n. 167 above); within the Platonist tradition, cf. e.g. Proclus, *On the Timaeus* iii. 283. 12–284. 12 Diehl.

[220] For the importance of the soul's choosing a body suited to it (and the possibility of its failure to do so), Plotinus 3. 4. 5. 10–19; Proclus, *On the Timaeus* i. 163. 31–164. 3 Diehl; iii. 279. 14–15 (but athetized by Diehl); Olympiodorus, *On the Phaedo* 7. 4. 8–9 Westerink.

resulting mismatch is not altogether uncommon, he also thinks (and here he does start to diverge from other Platonists) that when things do go wrong in the allocation of body, the soul can do something to put it right (2. 8, 66. 25–67. 3 Winnington-Ingram):[221]

If souls do not naturally gain this kind of body [i.e. the kind they desire], they remodel it themselves according to their own characteristics (*tais spheterais tropais*) and make it into something like themselves (*to hautais homoion*). This is how men come to have a feminine appearance, in which one can see the kind of life they lead; and it is how, conversely, women come to have a masculine appearance, by which we conjecture that they have that sort of character (*to ēthos homoion*). Thus there are smooth men and hairy women; and a man might have a melting look, a woman a steely gaze—so that you will find that the particulars of people's characters (*ēthē*) are in harmony with their appearance (*morphē*).

It is, of course, a commonplace of physiognomy that a man might have 'feminine' characteristics, and a women 'masculine' characteristics;[222] but Aristides' development of the theme is distinctive in the way that he reconciles the insight with a Platonic tripartition of the soul. In particular, he associates femininity of nature with the appetitive urges of the soul, a 'masculine' nature with the 'spirited' part of the soul, and encourages his readers to think about the myriad ways in which appetite and spirit might combine to constitute an individual's character (2. 8, 67. 3–14 Winnington-Ingram):[223]

From its passionate attachment to the masculine or feminine, or both, passions come to be established in the soul. The feminine is highly unrestrained, and the appetitive part of the soul (*to epithymētikon*) answers to it; the masculine, on the other hand, is vigorous and active, and the spirited part of the soul (*to thymikon*) is like this. In the feminine part of the soul, and in feminine people, pains and pleasures proliferate; in the masculine, anger and boldness. Again, there are combinations of these things: of pains and pleasures; of anger and boldness; of boldness with pleasure and pain; and then of anger with each of them. And again, there are mixtures of each with one or more of the others. One could find thousands of images of these passions as they are considered in their variety.

Plato's apparatus for psychological analysis is, in other words, translated here into the terms by which a soul imposes the nuances of its peculiar character onto

221 Plotinus talks at 3. 4. 5. 10–19 of a good soul having the capacity to improve a poor body (and a bad soul to make a good body worse); and, like subsequent Platonists, he thinks that the soul has some ability to calm the passionate inclinations of the body (e.g. 1. 2. 5. 21–31). This, though, seems rather more limited than the sort of change envisaged by Aristides, who is unique in implying that the *appearance* in the sense of the structure of the body will be affected by the character of the soul (though Plutarch talks of the soul imparting the colour of its passions to the body: *On those to Whom Divine Retribution Comes Slowly* 565 c; *Table Talk* 5. 7, 681 D).

222 For 'sexual' characteristics in the Aristotelian tradition, see Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiognomy* 5, 809^{a}26–810^{a}13; Polemon, Leiden ch. 2, pp. 393–5; Anon. Lat. 3. Aristides does not develop a systematic table of correspondences whose dependence on this tradition we could check; but it might be worth noting that, whereas he *opposes* the *hygros* and the *gorgos* (in my translation 'melting' and 'steely') as characteristically 'feminine' and 'masculine' ways of looking, Adamantius thinks that the two adjectives go together as a positive feature of the eyes (A16, B32, 44).

223 For the idea, cf. Clement, *Stromata* 3. 13. 93. 1–3, where references to 'male' and 'female' in a saying of Jesus taken from the *Gospel of the Egyptians* are understood to mean respectively spirit (*thumos*) and desire (*epithumia*).

the essentially masculine or feminine body to which it was (as such) attracted. Here, for the first time in ancient philosophy, is a system, or the beginnings of a system, clearly designed to support a physiognomy led by the character of the individual soul.

It also happens to be the last time: Aristides is exceptional among Platonists, as he is exceptional in the surviving evidence for physiognomical theory at large.[224] This is not an accident of our evidence: most Platonists have very good reasons to doubt whether the soul can affect the character of the body. Indeed, the very independence of the soul makes such a position untenable. For the soul is generally taken to exist not just prior to the body whose soul it becomes, but independently of *any* particular body. It does not, for example, exist actually or potentially in the individual's parents (as in some sense the Aristotelian soul might be taken to do). But in this case the soul lacks any real *opportunity* to direct the development of the new body—or so, at least, Porphyry argues in the *ad Gaurum* (esp. 2. 2–3). On the one hand, he says, it is absurd to suppose that the soul slips into the parental seed during sex: it would have to come in time to direct the conception and development of the embryo, but without being so early that it could be thought to have come from one or other of the parents.[225] If, on the other hand, the soul were to wait until conception before it entered, it would be too late to be of any explanatory use: the physical process of growth is already under way, and clearly does not require a soul to continue.[226] In short, if there is commensurability between body and soul, it cannot be (*pace* Aristides) because the soul in any way influences the natural shape of the body.

All this adds up to what, *prima facie*, appears a dilemma for Platonists, who want to ensure the soul's separability and autonomy on the one hand, while explaining its compatibility with and responsiveness to its embodied environment on the other; a tension, crudely put, between the best in the opposing models of psychological epiphenomenalism and teleology. Their response to it was to find a middle way. Instead of arguing that the fit between body and soul was explained, in one direction or the other, by their union, they argued that their union is explained by their fit. When a soul 'descends' to a body, it is because their

[224] Plotinus notoriously appears to equivocate over the possibility that there are forms of individuals (cf. e.g. Blumenthal 1966); and if (or when) he believes this (cf. esp. *Ennead* 5. 7), one might be tempted to think that an individual's form lies somewhere behind an explanation of his or her psycho-physical peculiarities. But in fact Plotinus is clear that individual characteristics are due, not to individual form, but to the particular material circumstances of the instantiation of the species form (1. 8. 9. 11–14; 5. 9. 12, the clearest proof-text for a denial of individual forms; cf. also 5. 7. 2). Even if individual forms exist, A. H. Armstrong (1977) rightly argues that they would individuate at a much higher ontological level (viz. 'wherever a real formal difference can be detected, as it can be clearly in the case of the true, higher selves of individual men': 58). They would not, in other words, be responsible for a person's physical appearance—let alone moral character.

[225] Cf. Longinus ap. Proclus, *On the Timaeus* i. 51. 9–13 Diehl (= fr. 27 Brisson–Patillon); and Proclus himself, ibid. iii. 322. 24–9.

[226] Like the Stoics, to this extent, Porphyry believes that the embryo is in strict truth a plant, and that the soul does not enter the body until the moment of birth (the proof of this being, in fact, the main purpose of the work *ad Gaurum*). For the entry of the soul at birth, cf. also Porphyry 266F Smith (from Iamblichus ap. Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 381. 2–6 Wachsmuth); Proclus, *On the Timaeus* iii. 322. 18–19 Diehl.

respective natures, independently considered, make them 'suitable' for each other.[227] This is how Plotinus describes it:

> The souls of men see their *images* as if in the mirror of Dionysus and come to be on that level with a leap from above . . . (4. 3. 12. 1–2).[228]

> Each soul comes down to a body made ready for it according to its *resemblance* to the soul's disposition (*kath' homoiōsin tēs diatheseōs*). It is carried there to that *to which it is made like* (*hōi an homoiōtheisa ēi*) . . . (4. 3. 12. 37–8).

> There is a different time for each soul, and when its time comes, as if at the call of a herald, it descends and enters into the *appropriate* body (*to prosphoron sōma*) (4. 3. 13. 8–10).

Despite appearances, it should be noted that, strictly speaking, the 'resemblance' here does not refer in the first place to resemblance between the body and the *soul*—that is, if we think of the soul in its truest sense as an incorporeal 'mind' or intellect. The soul in this sense does not necessarily *have* a character in terms of which it would make any sense to talk about its resemblance to this or that body in the first place. (Many Platonists believe that, at least the first time a soul 'descends' to a body, it does so in a state of moral purity.)[229] Rather, the resemblance is primarily that between the body and the

[227] Cf. also e.g. Porphyry, *ad Gaurum* 11. 2 (where *sympatheia* is the means by which body and soul are thoroughly bound together). For the relationship of the individual soul with the preformed body in Plotinus, cf. Blumenthal (1971*b*) with Corrigan's rejoinder (1985) (esp. 46 for what he argues is the Peripatetic vocabulary of 'suitability'). Since the character of the body is determined by its temperament, which in turn is susceptible to environmental influences, it is subject to change over time as well: cf. e.g. Plotinus for the effect of diet (3. 1. 1. 33–6) and climate (3. 1. 5. 24–33; 4. 3. 7. 20–6). It is worth noting, then, that the 'suitability' of a particular body for a particular soul relies on a diachronic understanding of what it is to be a body: it is a life, not a moment, to which the soul descends. Cf. Plotinus 2. 3. 15; also Proclus, *On the Timaeus* i. 163 Diehl. Accounts of the path taken by the soul in its descent towards the body through the zones of the zodiac and the spheres of the planets is a way of explaining (or expressing) how its inclinations are commensurate not just with the synchronic state of the body at which it arrives, but with the diachronic fate of that body (e.g. Porphyry 271F Smith; Macrobius, *On the Dream of Scipio* 1. 12; and for the influence that the stars have at least on one's physical temperament, cf. Celsus ap. Origen, *Against Celsus* 6. 21; Plotinus 3. 1. 6. 3–11; 4. 3. 7. 20–3; Porphyry, *Cave of the Nymphs* 22–3 = Numenius fr. 31. 10–26 des Places; Proclus, *On the Republic* ii. 54–65 Kroll). This explains how Plotinus can know something of a person's (character and) fate from his or her body (2. 3. 7. 8–11), while at the same time denying (since the practice of philosophy gives one freedom from physical inclination) that astrology is determinative (3. 1. 5. 55–7 and 3. 1. 6. 3–11 with 2. 3. 12; also Olympiodorus, *On the Gorgias* 48. 5 Westerink; cf. Proclus, *On Providence* 3. 14–18, 20). It also explains why Proclus thinks physiognomy a 'murky syllogism' when applied to the newborn, whose temperament has yet to stabilize (*amydros syllogismos*: *On Plato's Cratylus* 88. 6 Pasquali).

[228] On the image of the 'mirror of Dionysus', see Pépin (1970).

[229] Cf. Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 25. 6, 178. 36–7 Hermann (souls descending according to natural sequence or divine will); Celsus ap. Origen, *Against Celsus* 8. 53 (souls descending 'for the administration of the world'); Iamblichus ap. Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 380. 6–9 Wachsmuth (some souls 'come down in order to bring salvation and purification and perfection to things in this world, and make an unsullied descent'); also Proclus, *On the Timaeus* iii. 295. 15–20 Diehl (the moral purity of the soul on its first descent ensures that it will not enter the body of an animal). Iamblichus, however, contrasts Cronius, Numenius, and Harpocration, who think that 'every embodiment is evil' (ap. Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 380. 14–19 Wachsmuth = Numenius fr. 48 des Places; cf. also frr. 32 and 38); and Plutarch too perhaps thought that every descent begins with something like carnal desire (*Divine Retribution* 565 D–566 A; cf. again also Aristides Quintilianus, *On Music* 2. 8).

soul's 'vehicle'—the astral or pneumatic body with which it is provided as a means of establishing its presence in the physical cosmos.[230] For the body and the soul's vehicle do share something in virtue of which they can be said to resemble one another: a material and irrational nature.[231] It is true that the body's nature is the more intrusive, as its greater density and complexity makes it more sensitive to external forces and more determinedly inclined to act in certain ways in respect of them. The body's behavioural inclinations are, indeed, strong enough to be considered quasi-moral, and even came to be classified as 'virtues' and 'vices' of a kind, albeit a low-level kind.[232] Nevertheless, the vehicle has a certain (irrational) sensitivity too; and it is in terms of the congruence between this and the irrational nature of the body that we can understand the attraction between a particular soul and a particular body. The soul, in short, is attracted to a particular body by the 'fit' it recognizes between the body which it is due to control and the vehicle through which it will exercise that control.[233]

[230] Iamblichus claims that 'most Platonists' think that the soul joins directly with the body (ap. Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 385. 1–10 Wachsmuth), though in fact, our evidence includes only two notable exponents of such a view: Plutarch (for whom cf. n. 231 below); and, apparently, Alcinous, who seems to think that the roots of irrational desire are part of the soul itself (cf. *Didaskalikos* 25. 7, 178. 39–46 Hermann), actualized when it swaps its star for an earthly body as its 'vehicle' (16. 2, 172. 2–19 Hermann). Note, however, that where there is no danger of ambiguity it is quite usual for Platonists to apply the term 'soul' to the combination of soul (properly speaking) and vehicle; or even to the vehicle on its own (cf. Plotinus 1. 1. 12. 21: *allo psychēs eidos*). For Numenius, at the other extreme, the vehicle actually *is* another soul, of the same substance as the evil world soul posited by his dualism: see esp. fr. 44 des Places.

[231] Cf. esp. Iamblichus ap. Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 385. 1–10 Wachsmuth (but for the text see Festugière 1953: 237 with nn.; cf. Finamore and Dillon 2002 ad loc. with discussion at 184–5); Proclus, *On the Timaeus* iii. 234. 8–237. 6 Diehl, variously encompassing the views of Albinus, Atticus, Porphyry, and Syrianus. Proclus himself posits two vehicles: one properly irrational and perishable; the other containing 'roots' of irrationality (*akrotētes tēs alogou zōēs*), a view which Dodds (1963) 307 thinks might have been suggested by Plotinus 6. 7. 3 ff.; but cf. already Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 25. 7, 178. 39–46 Hermann. In Plutarch's distinctive psychology, the individual soul is already involved with the material and the irrational since it represents the organization of *true* soul, which for him is irrational (*On the Generation of the Soul* 1014 DE). Although its activity is made essentially intellectual through its organization by the Demiurge, it goes on to acquire an irrational nature when and insofar as it descends into the body and *becomes like it* (*exomoiousthai*: *On Moral Virtue* 450 E; *On the Sign of Socrates* 591 DE).

[232] The notion of 'physical virtue' (and vice) becomes part of a standard Neoplatonic scheme with Iamblichus, assuming him to be behind the whole of Damascius, *Commentary on the Phaedo* (versio 1), §§138–43 Westerink. Cf. later on, and just for example, Olympiodorus, *On the Phaedo* 8. 2. 1–7; Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* 2, 25. 20–4 Morani; and already Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 1.4, 152. 23–9 Hermann; Apuleius, *On Plato* 2. 6. All of this formalizes a distinction that can be found readily enough in Plato: e.g. *Republic* 518 D–519 A.

[233] This is sometimes expressed as the allocation by *Providence* of a soul to a particular body, which in turn allows the process to be described as a matter of the soul's 'punishment' or 'cure'. Cf. e.g. Iamblichus ap. Stobaeus, *Eclogue* i. 380. 9–14 Wachsmuth; also Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's First Alcibiades* 94. 4–15 Westerink quoted below in the text. There is of course no contradiction with the idea that the process is also *natural*, since nature is understood to be an instrument of providence. Compare also Origen, *On First Principles* 1. 8. 1; *Against Celsus* 1. 32–3 (better souls are allotted better bodies according to certain 'esoteric principles'). Note that this latter passage is supported by appeal to Zopyrus, Loxus, and Polemon, who, in Origen's report, thought that 'all bodies are appropriate for their souls' (1. 33. 14). (This is scarcely evidence for close engagement

There are, of course, implications here for physiognomy—though somewhat negative, in the first place since, given that the soul might not be morally tainted when it descends to the body, there should be no absolute expectation that one could discern the moral character of the soul from the appearance of its body (though one might expect, less interestingly, to learn something about its vehicle). However, it turns out that the soul is rather rarely innocent of moral character when it descends. Most incarnations are *re*incarnations, and motivated precisely by the fact that a soul in its previous life acquired an attachment to the material—acquired a moral character.[234] And in this case, the way to physiognomy seems to be opened up at last; because the moral disposition acquired by the soul will precisely be a reflection of the non-rational character of its vehicle, whose similarity with the new body again explains their union. This is inevitably true, because it is in the soul's identification of itself with the body it previously inhabited, mediated through the congruent passions of the vehicle, that the soul's character is established.

It needs to be emphasized that there is no external necessity that can lead the soul to acquire a tainted moral character. Indeed, the soul, as an essentially intellectual and incorporeal entity, is normally (certainly after Plotinus) taken to be strictly *impassible* throughout: immune to the shocks which affect the body and the passions they arouse in it. Nevertheless, as the soul is aware of what is happening with the body, what tends to happen is that it becomes so engrossed in it that it starts to mistake the passions of the body for its own:

> It is as if someone standing on a promontory should cause his image and shape to appear in a flowing river, keeping his face still while the stream as it moved changed his image every which way so that it presented it in different ways at different moments—skewed and straight, fragmented and whole, as chance would have it. Seeing this, the man might think that he was really undergoing these things, though he was only looking at his shadow in the water; and the thought would make him anguished, disturbed, perplexed, frustrated. The soul is in the same case when it sees its image in the body being carried along in the river of becoming and changed all the time by passions arising from within and by external forces. The soul is actually unchanged, but it thinks itself changed because it does not know itself and thinks that it is its own image. It becomes disturbed, perplexed, and bewildered. (Proclus, *On the Timaeus* iii. 330. 10–24 Diehl.)

When the soul does this, when it comes to identify itself with the physical passions of the body, we can talk of it as having, to this extent, a moral character. And the moral character it acquires, its desires and concerns, etc., will of course be precisely those of its body, and (what amounts to the same thing) of its vehicle, through which it perceives the body. Furthermore, since the soul retains its vehicle after death, it will retain the character it acquired when during life it came to identify itself with it. When it next descends to a body we will no longer

with the theory of physiognomy on Origen's part, by the way, but it does show an awareness of the texts which is unusual among Christians—cf. above n. 210. It also helps in general to confirm the relevance of physiognomy within theoretical discussions of body and soul.)

[234] And so the soul might be said to be *inclined* to (re)incarnation (sc. in a certain sort of body) by its own passions: cf. Plutarch at *Divine Retribution* 566 A and 567 A; Celsus ap. Origen, *Against Celsus* 8. 53; cf. Proclus, *On the Timaeus* iii. 293. 26–9 Diehl.

be able to make a distinction between the moral character of the soul and the inclinations of the vehicle: they will have become the same thing. The similarity between the soul and the body to which it is next attracted will not only be a congruence between the character of the vehicle and that of the body, but also a congruence between the inclinations of the body and the character—the *moral* character—of the soul.

Since Platonists came to rely for their understanding of the physical nature and development of the body on medical texts, and particularly on Galen, all of this represents a convergence of sorts (albeit from a very different direction) on the reductionist position we have seen described by Galen in the *QAM*. The Platonist position is that the body's character is a function of its physical temperament, and that the soul's moral character, assuming it is not perfectly virtuous, is acquired through identification with the body. It follows, then, that in a certain sense we can after all say that the moral character acquired by the soul is *consequent on the body's physical temperament*. Olympiodorus sees an analogy for the process in the way in which the same water takes on different characters according to the nature of the earth through which it flows (*Commentary on Aristotle's Meteora* 148. 21–4 Stüve):

> Consider the case of souls, which change according to the underlying temperament of the body if they don't have reason in charge of the reins. When reason is present, on the other hand, the soul does not serve the body's temperament.

Plotinus too talks about how the soul might lose its freedom, more or less, when it enters the body. Then its passions are stronger in relation to the body's physical temperament (1. 8. 8. 28–38), which can compel the compliant soul to feel lust, anger, wretchedness in the face of poverty, or pride at wealth and power (3. 1. 8. 14–20).[235] A particular quality of the bile and blood might explain irascibility (4. 3. 23. 42–7; 4. 4. 28. 40–5, 49–52); desires in general have their origin in the body (4. 4. 20. 28–36; 4. 4. 21; 4. 8. 2. 42–5), specifically the area around the liver (4. 4. 28. 17).[236] All this (to pick up another theme we have seen to be important in the discussions of Aristotle and Galen) helps explain why children tend to take after their parents psychologically as well as physically (2. 3. 12, 14. 5–9); it also explains how environmental factors, which, as we saw above, affect physical temperament, might thereby influence a person's moral development as well. When Plotinus says that 'the soul is open in many ways to being moulded by the nature of places and waters and air; and the locations of cities differ as do the temperaments of bodies' (4. 3. 7. 22–5), there might be an allusion to Galen's reading of the Hippocratic *AWP* as a text demonstrating the

[235] Cf. Plotinus 1. 8. 14; 4. 8. 2. 42–5. Even intelligence can be hampered to some degree by the body; but it is very important that the embodiment precisely *obstructs* the soul to differing degrees in this case: we should not wish to say that the power of thought was *given* by the body in various degrees—*pace* Galen, of course. Cf. Plotinus 4. 3. 26. 12–14 on memory in particular; also Longinus at Proclus, *On the Timaeus* i. 162. 15–27 = fr. 36 Brisson–Patillon (part); Proclus himself at *On the Timaeus* iii. 349. 28–350. 8 Diehl.

[236] Cf. generally 2. 3. 8. 13–16; 4. 4. 28. 40–5; 4. 7.

dependence of temperament, and so character, on the environment (cf. *QAM* 57. 14–62. 22 Müller).

Given the explicit aversion we have seen to Galen's reductionism in the writings of Proclus, this might seem surprising. But the invocation of Galen does not, of course, now suggest approval of the claim that the soul, or any part of the soul, is to be *identified with* physical temperament; nor, more generally, that the character of the soul is somehow determined by the body. Such a 'strong' reading of Galen's thesis has been roundly rejected. Nevertheless, it is open to Platonists to appropriate Galen's language for another, weaker reading of the relationship between body and soul, one which suits their purposes rather well.[237] When Galen says that 'the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body', it is possible to read 'follow' in a sense less than deterministic: to use Galen's considerations in order to support a model according to which, although the soul remains independent of the body, it can nevertheless choose, by the acquiescence of reason, to 'follow' the body—i.e. to identify its interests with it. Proclus himself, therefore, despite his rejection of a strict reading of the opening line of Galen's *QAM*, can now, with suitable qualification, quote it more favourably (*On the Republic* i. 222. 14–15 Kroll, referring back to ll. 4–6, where the Galenic quotation is unabbreviated):

In the uneducated, *the powers* [*sc. of the soul*] *follow the temperaments* [*sc. of the body*].

The same allusion (with the same qualification) is to be found in Olympiodorus (*On the Gorgias* 49. 6. 7–9 Westerink):

It is said *that the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*; but we must add 'unless philosophy counteracts their effect'.

Galen, similarly, must lurk behind the 'doctors' attacked by Philoponus in his *Commentary on the De Anima* (xv. 50. 16 ff. Hayduck). These doctors are in fact invoked twice: first after a survey of ways in which passions seem to be the result of physical states (including disease or diet at 50. 16–51. 3); and then in a discussion of various ways in which mental operations too seem to be determined or affected by the state of the body and the nature of diet (51. 3–51. 15). On both occasions (with an insignificant change of word-order) Philoponus says:

This is why the doctors have said *that the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*.

Similarly at 155. 31–4:

That souls are suited for different things, and have tendencies to particular passions, is because of their relationship to the body and their sympathy with it—which is why some people have thought *that the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*.

[237] And remember that Galen himself equivocates over the sense he gives to 'follow' in his claim that 'the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body': cf. again Section V n. 184.

And, finally, cf. 183. 30–4, which shows that they are, to this extent and with the appropriate qualification, right to think it:

When intellect, the natural leader, is not in charge, order is overthrown and *the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body.*[238]

People who *have* a peculiar moral character have it because they have acquiesced in the inclinations of their bodies, and to this extent their character is explained by their temperament—by the very feature of their physiology which, as Galen described in the *QAM* and as the Platonists must therefore have been fully aware, was responsible for the appearance of their body as well.

To the extent, then, that most people fail to preserve the original purity of their souls, and identify themselves with their bodies, we can understand how it is that a person's moral character will be predictable from his or her appearance: both are underwritten by bodily temperament through a process similar in crucial respects to the mechanism spelt out by Galen. Of course, a person can improve, more or less, through philosophy, or become worse by embodiment in a life that allows wider scope to develop his or her passions. The change of moral state (of the degree of identification with bodily passions) will, in any case, be carried forward after death, to form the basis for the next choice of life. Perhaps the most striking and specific example of physiognomy in a Platonist text comes (again) in Proclus—his description of Socrates' selection of Alcibiades as a pupil. Alcibiades, it seems, had through previous lives acquired a moral character close to perfection, and in receiving now a body appropriate to its nature enabled Socrates to see that he could be helped towards the ultimate achievement (*Commentary on Plato's First Alcibiades* 94. 4–15 Westerink):

Socrates saw many wonderful indications in Alcibiades that he was capable of virtue. His very size and beauty were signs of the outstanding power, strength, and preeminence of his soul; but nature, who crafts the body as a tool [*sc.* for the soul], attached further symbols of these traits to his appearance as well. When Socrates saw these, he understood that the boy was worthy of his care and attention. He derived this custom from the Pythagoreans, who would judge whether those who came to them were capable of the greater life on the basis of physical signs. The idea is that nature constructs bodies which are suitable for the particular souls which will use them as their tools, and sets out images (*eikonas*) of these souls in the bodies. Through these images, someone clever at recognizing such things can uncover the individual characteristics of particular souls.

Socrates was disappointed, of course; but he was no more wrong to see a noble nature in Alcibiades than Phaedo's Zopyrus had been to see a vicious character in Socrates. Alcibiades really did have a promising soul, which earned him a wonderful body. He squandered his opportunity.

It is necessary to end this section with a word of qualification. As I suggested at the beginning, there is not a great deal of physiognomy in Neoplatonist works, and the range of such physiognomical passages as we have is surprisingly narrow, the bulk of it being constituted by reports of its use by Pythagoras and

[238] Cf. *On the De anima* xv. 52. 7, 388. 25 Hayduck; *On the Physics* xvi. 191. 18 Vitelli. For the same claim, but in language not so obviously alluding to Galen, Simplicius, *On the De anima* xi. 19. 4–6 Hayduck.

Socrates (though one might be tempted to find more, unsignalled examples in the biographical works of Plutarch).[239] Significant too is the real emphasis placed on the ability of physiognomy to discover the character of someone's soul in the sense of his or her *potential*: *potential* as a Pythagorean recruit, for example; or *potential* for learning from Socrates. The fact that Socrates picks out Alcibiades as well as Plato as promising youths reminds us (as I said) that potential can go unfulfilled. This is important because there are aspects of Plato's inheritance which stop the Platonists from spending too much time on the subject. For a start, if I am right that 'physiognomy' properly describes the discovery of *innate* psychological character (rather than, for example, character acquired under the influence of the body), then the term should not be used of 'pure' souls in their first descent to the body, even when (as often) they quickly succumb to the body's influence. It should instead be restricted to subsequent cases of descent where the soul *has* a moral character independently of the body to which it is joined. But it is, of course, hard to know which is which. And in any case, the practical focus of Platonist ethics demands that we concentrate on the soul's potential for purity, its capacity for free action, undetermined and uncoloured by the body. Physiognomy as a practice thrives on the suggestion that the soul is constrained by the body, but we should actually be concentrating our thoughts on the freedom we have to release ourselves from it: the freedom *not* to identify ourselves with passions that have their roots in the body (cf. Plotinus 1. 2. 5. 12–15; 1. 2. 5. 21–31; 3. 1. 7. 13–20; 3. 6. 3), a freedom which we acquire when we turn away from the body and back towards the intellectual realm (Proclus, *On Providence and Fate* 20). The Platonist soul might

[239] As do e.g. Misener (1924) 110–11; Evans (1935) 57 with *n.* 3; (1941) 104–5; Métraux (1995) 3–4. On the other hand, Sassi (1992) concludes that Plutarch is *antifisiognomico*—that he is aware of and uses 'physiognomical' associations on some occasions, but deliberately avoids or subverts them on others. Sassi's view is undoubtedly based on a more sophisticated view of Plutarch; nevertheless it might be too pessimistic. We know that Plutarch had a mechanism by which he could explain the union of soul and body by their similarity (see again n. 231 above); we know that other Platonists accepted the possibility of physiognomy under these conditions; and we know, finally, that it is quite standard for a philosopher to accept physiognomy as a means of ascertaining a person's innate disposition without believing that behaviour is in any way determined by physical constitution. This could account for the practical 'ambivalence' in Plutarch's use of physiognomical evidence as outlined by Sassi; it would also explain how he could, without inconsistency or opportunism (*pace* Wardman 1967), argue in one place that sculpture cannot capture a man's 'character and way of life' (*to ēthos kai ton tropon*: *Cimon* 1. 2–3), yet elsewhere find statues that do reflect his subject's character (as *Marius* 2. 1), and can even use sculpture as *evidence* for character (*Themistocles* 22. 3; *Aratus* 3. 2; cf. perhaps *Alexander* 1. 3). It might simply depend on the person and whether his or her success involved overcoming or exploiting innate disposition. For the record, then, Plutarch finds reflections of character in the looks of the following (with references to the eponymous *Life* unless otherwise stated): Sulla (2. 1, 6. 6–7; cf. his meeting with a Chaldean, characterized, though not described, as a physiognomist at 5. 5–6), Pompey (2. 1), Alexander (4. 1–2; cf. *Pompey* 2. 1), Timocleia (*Alexander* 12. 4), Demetrius (2. 2–3), Antony (4. 1), Pyrrhus (3. 4), Marius (2. 1), and Aratus (3. 2). (For completeness, other characters whose physical features are described are: Cocles, *Publicola* 16. 4–5; Themistocles at 22. 3; Pericles at 3. 2; Alcibiades at 1. 3–4; Lysander at 1. 1–2; Agesilaus at 2. 2; Diocles, *Aratus* 20. 1; Galba at 27. 2; also Cyrus, *Precepts of Statecraft* 821 E. Less pertinently, Clearchus' facial expression at *Table-Talk* 620 D; Sertorius' single eye at 1. 4; Fabius Maximus' wart at 1. 3.)

become brutish, literally or metaphorically;[240] but Platonist ethics is geared towards making us see that this is an eradicable fault.

In short, then, Platonists appear to accept that those aspects of the body which at the same time attract a soul with a particular character and also give rise to particular desires and passions in the resulting living compound have discernible tokens, and thus allow the physiognomist to see how people will *tend* to be. However, their actually being this way is ultimately up to them: their body at best mirrors the state of their soul at the time of incarnation and, however difficult it makes things, cannot prevent psychological self-reform and purification. Platonists clearly accept the possibility of physiognomy in a way that Plato does not; but they take its conclusions to be provisional for reasons of which he would thoroughly approve. In proportion as they focus on the freedom of the soul, so they say very little about the practicalities of physiognomy. The whole point of this philosophy is to concentrate the mind upwards, not down to the compound about which physiognomy speaks.

[240] On the question of whether transmigration crossed species boundaries, or whether Plato was speaking metaphorically when he talked of the reincarnation of the wicked in animals, see e.g. Olympiodorus, *Commentary on the Phaedo* 124. 13–20 Norvin; Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* 2. 34. 24–35. 11 Morani. Given the general account of (re)incarnation outlined in this section, one might expect it to be the case that animal reincarnation, if it occurs, fulfils the conditions that make human physiognomy possible: i.e. a person will enter an animal psycho-physically suitable for his or her moral state. If this is right, then Platonists who believed in animal transmigration might have used the fact to guarantee the relevance of a study of animal species in collecting physiognomical signs. But we have no evidence that anyone did this.

Earlier drafts of material from this study have been presented at seminars in Durham, Reykjavik, Warwick, London (at the Institute of Classical Studies), and Austin, Texas: my thanks to the organizers and audiences in each case. I am very grateful as well to Simon Swain for asking me to think about this interesting topic; and to Christopher Rowe, both for his comments, and for his support at Durham, where most of the work was done. Vivian Nutton and Philip van der Eijk suffered a too early draft of Section V, which was greatly improved in the light of their generous comments.

3

Polemon's *Physiognomy*

Simon Swain

This chapter offers an interpretation of Polemon's *Physiognomy* in its second-century context. Why was it written and how did contemporaries read it from the perspective of their own cultural horizons? The *Physiognomy* survives in two complementary versions, Adamantius' Greek abridgement and the Leiden Arabic translation. The closeness of these makes it reasonable to follow Foerster in holding that Adamantius' Greek text is very similar to Polemon's own. In the previous chapter George Boys-Stones has explored the earlier literature on which the *Physiognomy* builds. Polemon was influenced by Ps.-Aristotle and (perhaps) Loxus and no doubt by other lost writings and oral traditions. But his work is very far from being a summary of his predecessors. Rather, Polemon develops his thoughts within the cultural system of his day. He offers his readers a physiognomical handbook which is illustrated by a range of examples drawn from his peers. He runs through the parts of the human body, paying especial attention to the eye, and maps onto these parts or sub-parts particular moral and political qualities. The examples of real enemies and acquaintances which survive in the Leiden (especially in the section on the eye and in the final chapters only preserved in the Arabic) put flesh on the bones. This observation of morally bad and (to a far lesser extent) good types places the *Physiognomy* firmly within the culture of inspection and moral evaluation that is visible in so much of the literature of Polemon's time and which is arguably a product of the competition and rivalry of elite life. By grouping appearances and qualities the *Physiognomy* may even be read as implicitly telling readers what they should be like, just as contemporary moralists make their descriptions of anger, greed, and so on the basis of self-reflection and moral improvement.[1] In addition, the *Physiognomy* provides important information on Polemon's attitude to Rome and the emperor Hadrian, and in general terms offers valuable commentary on the character of political and civic life in the Greek world of the second century.

The culture of observation and evaluation among Polemon's peers is the focus of the first two sections of this chapter. Section I introduces the links between rhetoric and politics, the phenomenon of classicism, and the competitiveness of the elite. Section II looks at particular issues of moral conduct, specifically the regulation and control of male behaviour including correct sexual relations and

[1] Cf. below, 195–7. Moralists: Plutarch's *Absence of Anger*, below, 138–40, 191–2 for anger, etc. in the *Physiognomy*.

gender boundaries (an area of great importance in the *Physiognomy*), the idea of preserving face before superiors, peers, and inferiors on the social ladder, the basic rules of conduct in Polemon's society as they are set out in a little-known but extremely important work by a certain Bryson, and the physiognomical speculations of Polemon's contemporary, Nicostratus of Macedon, on the sensitive area of choosing a wife. Section III considers Polemon's own life and his relations with Hadrian, in whose entourage he found himself from time to time. I shall illustrate the pressures of life at court by looking at the letters of his younger contemporary, Cornelius Fronto, concerning his relations with the emperors following Hadrian. The final section will turn to the *Physiognomy* itself and consider its internal structure and logic, its moral system, Polemon's purposes in writing, and his idea of the 'pure Greek', all of this in the light of the cultural and political background of the time.

I. THE SECOND SOPHISTIC

What we know of Polemon's life comes mainly from his biography in the *Lives of the Sophists* (*VS*), which was written by Flavius Philostratus and probably published in AD 237–8.[2] I shall be examining aspects of Polemon's own biography in Sections III and IV. For now I want to make some general comments on the nature of the work which gives us the term modern scholars apply to the Greek culture of the first three centuries AD, the second sophistic.[3] Philostratus was an intellectual in the ambit of the Severan dynasty (193–235) and appears to have been particularly close to the empress Julia Domna. A common theme of his surviving works—which embrace a wide variety of topics—is the need to reform Hellenic culture and society including specifically religion. The short *Heroicus* advocates a revival of hero-cults. *In Honour of Apollonius* (often called *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*) is a long hagiography of a first-century holy man who berates Greeks who have fallen from the high moral standards expected of Greek culture, and Romans and others who lack sufficient respect for Greek culture. *Gymnasticus* urges athletes to return to the standards of yesteryear which modern trainers and competitors have departed from. In all these works Philostratus presents as his solution a rather exclusive Hellenism which builds on the perceived greatness and purity

[2] Avotins (1978) on the dedication to Gordian (soon to be Gordian I) as proconsul of Africa (Philostratus, *VS* Preface, 480 = I. 17 'best of proconsuls'). Jones (2002) argues attractively but unconvincingly (why 'best of proconsuls' and not 'emperor'?) for Gordian III between 242 and 244. Philostratus is referred to by the 'Olearius' pagination and the yet to be replaced Teubner of Kayser (Leipzig, 1871). There is now a useful commentary by Civiletti (2002). See also the illuminating studies of Campanile (1999) and (2003).

[3] It is important to note (*a*) that the distinctive culture of this period did not arise overnight, and so there are precursors of particular elements stretching back into the Hellenistic period (*c*.3rd to 1st c. BC); and (*b*) that this cultural package did not disappear after AD 300, but between 300 and 600 elements of it were progressively submerged, absorbed, and replaced in the long, slow, change brought about by the Christianization of pagan antiquity (cf. Markus 1990, esp. sections 2 and 3 on the fruition of this process).

of the Classical age of Greece. He passes this off as if it were a natural and unproblematical goal. In *Apollonius*, perhaps the most important of his works, the religious conception of pure Hellenic behaviour presented in the text is informed by Pythagorean ideas of what Philostratus (and others) call 'the Pythagorean life'. Neopythagoreanism was extremely influential in the intellectual life of the Greek world during the Roman period. Its ideas of a mystical union with the divine had a profound impact on the direction taken by the dominant philosophy, Platonism. What we call Neoplatonic thought as taught first by Philostratus' contemporary, Ammonius Saccas, then developed by Ammonius' pupil Plotinus in the mid-third century and disseminated by Plotinus' pupil Porphyry towards the end of that century, represents a redirection of Platonism under the influence of Neopythagorean doctrines. One of the chief political functions of this rather exclusive philosophy was opposition to Christianity. Apollonius was a useful figure in this battle and was taken seriously (with specific reference to Philostratus' *Life*) by no less a figure than Eusebius of Caesarea, the apologist, historian, and hagiographer of Constantine.[4] It is inconceivable that Philostratus himself was unaware of Christianity, since key members of the Severan dynasty had high level contacts with leading Christian intellectuals (Hippolytus, Origen, Julius Africanus). Moreover, though he never mentions Christianity, the appearance of such major Christian thinkers and writers for the first time during his own life make it likely that at least one factor behind his advocacy of an elitist Hellenism in *Apollonius* and other works including the *Lives of the Sophists* was a fear of things to come.[5]

Philostratus begins the *Lives of the Sophists* by saying he is writing about the development of a major trend in Greek rhetoric in which fictional stock character types became the subject of display speeches by the 'sophists'. For Philostratus this trend is the 'second sophistic' and it goes back, he says, to the fourth century BC. He proceeds by giving portraits of famous sophists from the golden age of Athens (like Gorgias) who lived before it and others who represented it down to the period of Nero in the mid first century AD when, he says, the fortunes of Greek rhetoric had hit a low point. It was then that a revival of rhetoric took place with Nicetes of Smyrna and the flourishing crowd of sophists who continued to his own day. Philostratus does indeed give many snippets of the speeches made by his subjects. But he also gives a considerable amount of information about their social and political activities, and this forms a constant backdrop to the work. This is indeed why the phrase 'second sophistic' is now widely used to characterize Greek intellectual and social life in general in the period of the High Roman Empire.

When it comes to factual information, the *Lives* seem fairly reliable.[6] But the studiedly relaxed tone of the work has led many to accept Philostratus' description of a world full of sophists somewhat uncritically. 'Sophist' means

[4] Eusebius, *Against Hierocles*, with T. D. Barnes (1981) 164–7.

[5] Cf. Swain (1999*b*), (forthcoming).

[6] For a recent overview see Puech (2002) 6–35. Heath (2004) objects to Philostratus' lack of interest in the technical/theoretical side of Greek rhetoric—but this is certainly presupposed in much of his material.

someone who teaches rhetoric to pupils for money; we are fortunate in possessing a later second-century thesaurus by one of Philostratus' subjects, Julius Pollux, which makes this fairly certain.[7] Philostratus wrote after Marcus Aurelius had encouraged cities to establish official chairs to teach rhetoric.[8] This is the situation we find in Late Antiquity, where people like Libanius held a position as 'sophist of the city'.[9] The existence of official sophists partly explains Philostratus' emphasis of the term. But he also wanted to connect the leading lights of rhetoric with the famous, if few, sophists of Classical Athens. And in using 'sophist' so freely he is doing exactly what he does in his other works: passing off as natural and expected what was actually highly artificial and constructed. He makes an exclusive group stand for the wider elite, and he does it so well that it is easy to follow him into thinking that they did.[10]

Not everyone saw sophists as desirable. For many in the second century the word bore the bad sense of political and social immorality that Plato and Isocrates had given to it in the fourth century BC. Pollux devotes half his entry to this. Polemon's enemy Favorinus of Arles, for example, was included by Philostratus in the category of philosopher-sophist along with the famous Dio of Prusa (*c.*45–115), an older contemporary and teacher of Polemon.[11] Both men are known from their own and others' works and both preferred to be known as philosophers, not sophists. Again, Philostratus had absolutely no doubt about labelling as a sophist the greatest master of Greek rhetoric in the second century, Aelius Aristides. But in his extensive works Aristides most definitely rejects the title on account of its bad connotations. In all three cases (quasi-)philosophical objections reflecting the legacy of Plato are the reason for dissociation from the term.[12] In the *Physiognomy* Polemon uses the term 'sophist' of his bitter enemy, Favorinus, and this might encourage us to assume that he did not use it of himself.[13] However, as I have noted in the Introduction, he is styled 'sophist' in an inscription on a statue base from the agora of Smyrna honouring a neighbouring city, perhaps Pergamum. Here Polemon is acting as a political leader, and is given his full Roman name 'Marcus Antonius Polemon'. But his intellectual activity as an orator is also stressed—indeed 'sophist' is placed in a position of emphasis on the stone—and this surely indicates that the unknown diplomatic action was secured by a speech he had made. This is precisely the combination of 'culture and power' that is so conspicuous in the *Lives*.[14] On the dedication Polemon made to the most famous orator of classical Athens,

[7] Date: Avotins (1975) 320–1 with Swain (1990) 215–16. At 4. 41–51 (ed. Bethe) 'sophist' is a headword which is then glossed as 'teacher, educator, interpreter, guide, mentor'; Pollux goes on to speak of earnings, pupils, fees, and adds a long section on how to rubbish the sophists (after Plato) for their trickery and flattery. He evidently knew what he was talking about.

[8] Cf. Avotins (1975).

[9] John Chrysostom, *De Babyla contra Julianum* 98 ed. Schatkin.

[10] Cf. the important study by Schmitz (1997).

[11] Philostratus, *VS* 1. 25. 539 = 50. 6 Kayser.

[12] Aristides' theoretical works on rhetoric and its integrity make this clear in his case: *Orr.* 2, 3, 34.

[13] Leiden ch. 1 A20. Arabic borrowed the Greek term (the form used is perfectly regular, despite Hoffmann's suspicions: cf. Ullmann 2002 *s.v.* σοφιστής).

[14] *IK* 24. 1 no. 676 = Puech (2002) no. 211; above, Ch. 1, p. 2.

Demosthenes, in the Asclepieion at Pergamum he simply named himself 'Polemon'.[15] But the claim here to equivalence with the greatest orator-statesman of ancient Greece is indicative of the fact that Polemon surely did *not* see himself primarily as a 'teacher of boys' (with whom Philostratus says the sophist 'will spend most of his day', *VS* 2. 26, 614 Olearius = 114. 2–3 Kayser).

Most of the subjects of Philostratus' biographies (including Polemon) were closely involved in the political life of the communities where they lived. In this sense Philostratus captures something deep and essential about the culture of his time. This culture was urban and it was moneyed. The Greek world had suffered greatly from Rome's wars of conquest and then her civil wars in the second and first centuries BC. But once the imperial system was established by the first emperor, Augustus, the economic prosperity of the leading cities quickly recovered itself. The key to this was the existence of stable local aristocracies who had at their disposal large holdings of land. These aristocracies displayed a terrific loyalty to the towns where they resided. Investment in these towns in the High Roman Empire is such a widely attested phenonemon that it scarcely needs comment. But, to be brief, the motivation for it was twofold. First, it was expected, as it had been for centuries, that the wealthy should contribute to or 'benefit' their cities. In this context they found themselves enmeshed in the expectations of those below them, of their peers on the town council, and of the Roman authorities above them. Hence as much as possible of this benefaction or 'euergetism' was made visible. Funds for the baths, for a festival, for the repair or erection of public buildings, charitable endowments: such activities have produced a rich inscriptional record both listing contributions and honouring those who made them.[16] This leads us to the second motive: reputation. It was ingrained in Graeco-Roman culture that public honour and repute were an obligatory aim for the upper classes. In his essay on the philosopher Epicurus' claim that living privately was actually preferable to public life, Plutarch (d. *c.*120) scoffingly compares great public figures and their glory (*doxa*) with Epicurus 'living in his tiny garden procreating children with the mistress he shared with Polyaenus' (*Not Even a Pleasant Life is Possible Following Epicurus* 1098 B). The stability of the aristocratic families of the Greek East only increased the desire for glory in each new generation.

Competition (*philotimia*, 'love of honour') is a central concept. Literary authors and inscriptions attest a fascination with *philotimia*. Plutarch and Dio explore the ambiguity of the term which oscillated between public service and personal ambition. In its public sense it came to stand for the more technical *euergesia*, 'benefaction'.[17] The ancient rivalries between great families and

[15] Phrynichus, *Selections* 396 (ed. Fischer): 'For Demosthenes of Paiania, Polemon as instructed in a dream'. The inscription (with an almost identical text) has been found: Habicht (1969) no. 33. Note that Phrynichus himself (whose outlook was wholly scholarly) calls Polemon 'the Ionian sophist' (also ibid. 424). All his references to Polemon criticize his Greek: cf. n. 109. For Polemon at the Asclepieion cf. Philostratus, *VS* 535 = 46. 17–21.

[16] The festival established by C. Julius Demosthenes at Oenoanda is emblematic of all this: see e.g. Mitchell (1990), in general Wörrle (1988), and esp. Veyne (1990). On the real costs of benefaction, Duncan-Jones (1990), chs. 10–11.

[17] See e.g. Dio, *Or.* 38. 41, Plutarch, *Political Advice* chs. 30–1.

the cities they represented encouraged intermarriage to dissolve tensions and aggregate wealth, and centuries of landholdings accumulated in this way meant that men like Polemon came to possess estates all over Asia Minor. This in turn meant a constant touring of lands and villas with an eye on maximizing economic production and displaying oneself to as many people as possible. Hence the huge need for rhetoric, especially the rhetoric of welcomes and departures which the ancients called 'panegyric'. For stressing the qualities of the honorand with a rousing speech might just turn him to benefit the local community.[18] If Philostratus was wrong to suggest that rhetoric had practically disappeared by the mid-first century,[19] he was certainly right to identify a resurgence allied to the resurgence of the Greek elites themselves and their activities as political and economic leaders.

The obsession with the past—classicism—is where culture combines with ideology. This ideology has a number of peculiar features. It was not backward-looking.[20] Rather, it served to validate present-day political formations. In their anxiety to acquire ancient pedigrees both Romans and Greeks had tied themselves to the world of Greek history and pre-history (myth) by invented genealogies or other means. Many of those who did so were not Greek at all. They and those like them adopted Greek culture because it offered them standing locally and abroad. The cultural dominance of Archaic and Classical Greece was so enormous that many non-Greeks were trapped by it. Roman military and political power allowed Romans the face-saving response of despising contemporary, real Greeks (whether they were actually Greeks or not). Greeks (in the wide sense) looked at the matter quite differently: they were magnified, not diminished, by the link with the past—which, however, they could not do without. Greek culture transcended the various complex social, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds of many of those who adopted it. It was a tremendous resource for these elites to draw on, and that is why they were prepared to have themselves educated in Classical Greek literature and thought. One of the marked features of second-century classicism is its expression through language. To demonstrate the highest attainments in education one had to be able or appear able to use language heavily influenced by the Classics on such occasions and for such types of speech or writing as demanded it. The range of permissible sources varied enormously. This is not surprising if one thinks about the artificiality of such a project and the differing cultural experiences of those who advocated and practised purism. But the Attic dialect was dominant. Polemon himself wrote model speeches on the theme of the battle of Marathon in 490 BC which are strongly 'Atticizing'.[21]

[18] On such 'panegyical' oratory see the study of Pernot (1993).

[19] Wilamowitz (1900).

[20] The argument of Bowie's classic 1970 study; though Bowie's 'nostalgia' is certainly part of the picture.

[21] Published in Hinck (1873); re-edited in Reader (1996). See Favreau Lindet (2004); cf. Stegemann (1952) 1343–44. On the education system and its values see recently Heath (2004) Part III.

We should not forget that these aspects of classicism had a strongly political slant, sometimes overtly so. The definition of classicism was the preserve of the elite. Classicism made the elite feel entitled to rule. There is evidence that it was resented and seen as an obstacle to progress.[22] The fact that Christian intellectuals (Justin, Tatian, Clement, *et al.*) from the the mid-second century onwards were ready to ditch the social and political parts of the classical legacy that their religion forbade them, while at the same time in many cases utilizing classical Greek literary forms, shows up the inherent weakness of this Hellenism.[23] What must have seemed to Polemon an interlocking set of objectives could easily be unpicked and segmented as needed. For the moment, in the second century, most of the eastern elites still signed up to the whole package and upheld the complex social rules that underpinned it. This is the world of the *Physiognomy*.

II. MORALITY AND SOCIETY

Second-sophistic society was full of rules—behavioural, linguistic, political. It was in the interests of all members of the elite that these rules should be maintained. This need produced a culture of mutual inspection and evaluation. In this section I want to review some of the important moralizing texts written by Polemon's contemporaries in order to consider the moral background of the *Physiognomy*. I shall be making special use of Polemon's older contemporary, Plutarch of Chaeroneia, whose extensive works form a vast encyclopedia of the moral and political life of the period around AD 100. I shall also have much to say about a unique example of a basic guidebook of Greek manners which survives in Arabic and which is likely to come from the first century. The works I shall be looking at are concerned with conduct in the widest sense. The *Physiognomy* is itself largely about observing and discerning failings, hence allowing one to avoid 'those who bear obvious signs of dishonesty, licentiousness or any wrong-doing... and to guard against the wrongs of the bad before having to experience them' (Adamantius A2). It is saturated with 'performative' moral terminology, much of it bad—deceiving, plotting, betraying, being angry, appearing effeminate, etc. Much of the material I shall be looking at here is about controlling comparable acts. I begin by saying something about marriage as a locus of evaluation by oneself and one's peers, for much of the current scholarly work on the second sophistic period focuses on the nexus of identity and sexuality. The marriage relation and the establishment of *public* (or perhaps better, *civic*) morality within this, are areas which have attracted particular attention.

[22] Even by educated people: Galen, for example, has much to say about the absurdities of linguistic purism (though in respect of his own reconstruction of the Hippocratic Corpus to suit his own system, he is an excellent example of how Classicism furthered present-day needs). Cf. Swain (1996) 56–62.

[23] Literary forms should not be confused with linguistic purism: only Clement, who was (as we shall see later) addressing a well-heeled flock, countenanced the idea of Atticism.

Polemon finishes the *Physiognomy* with three chapters demonstrating his ability to predict what is about to happen (Leiden chs. 68–70). The longest (ch. 69) concerns abductions at weddings. Reproduction is the single most important task for any aristocracy. In the High Roman Empire the prosperity of the eastern nobles made marriage particularly important and particularly risky. Marriage was the point in the life of a family where its future could be assured or undone. The overriding concern was to protect wealth and status, and marriages were arranged in order to leave nothing to chance.[24] These tensions are nicely brought out in Dio of Prusa's contrast between a simple, rural wedding on Euboea and 'the marriages of the rich, with their arrangers, investigations into wealth and lineage, their dowries, wedding gifts, promises and deceits, the agreements and contracts, and ultimately the quarrelling and feuds that often occurred at the very wedding' (*Or.* 7. 80).[25] The effort of marriage is most tellingly attested by the 'rise' of the Greek romantic novels. There has been a huge amount of work on these texts in recent years.[26] There is virtually no doubt that they date to the period of the first three centuries AD (though elements of this literature evidently reach back to the Hellenistic era); it is quite possible, indeed likely, that some were written later. That prose fiction comes into being in the first century AD is a fact of great historical interest. Romantic story lines are not found in every novel or fragmentary novel we have. But in the so-called 'ideal' romances—Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesian Story*, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, and Heliodorus' *Ethiopian Story*—though the tone and quality of the writing varies from the sentimental (Longus) to the parodic (Achilles Tatius), the adventures of the young aristocratic hero and heroine lead up to or are in the context of marriage. It seems to be the case that these novels were entertainment written to appeal to their readers' interest in the lives that had been mapped out for them, hopefully without the trials and tribulations of the novelistic heroes. Other aspects of these texts, notably their tendency to be set in the same timeless Greek (and *not* Roman) world as that of fictional oratory, again suggest an elite audience.[27]

Much of the recent writing on the romantic novels and on ideas about the construction of sexuality and gender in this period has been influenced by the French philosopher Michel Foucault's *History of Sexuality*. The first volume

[24] Cf. the sequence of vocabulary at Pollux 3. 31–36: arrangers, in-laws, heiresses, courtships, pledges, dowries, presents.

[25] For the falseness involved cf. Adamantius B38 'soliciting positions of power in the city and glorious marriages'. For pressure over the contract, cf. below on Plutarch, *Peri dysôpias* 532 E at n. 62. Note also the story of Polemon's great-grandson, Hermocrates, and his forced marriage to the daughter of the powerful Antipater of Hierapolis as narrated by Philostratus, *VS* 2. 25, 610–11 = 111. 1–16: the arranger (*promnêstria*) talks up the wealth of his father-in-law to be and the large dowry (*proix*) on offer, his relatives gang up on him, the marriage is finalized by the emperor himself, but soon ends in divorce when the bride proves 'neither nice to look at nor well-matched in character.' For the social competition and political pressures at work here see Ritti (1988) 104–7.

[26] For guidance on the background and contents of the novels, see Swain (1999*a*), chs. 1 (Swain) and 2 (Bowie), and the large and useful collection of studies in Schmeling (1996) as well as the translations (with introductions) in Reardon (1989).

[27] For the educatedness of the readership, with specific reference to Achilles Tatius and his thoroughgoing use of Plato, see now Repath (forthcoming). On Greekness cf. below, pp. 197 ff.

of this uncompleted series looked—like other seminal texts by Foucault—at the formation of a key modern theme in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Foucault then came to feel that he had to turn back to Classical Antiquity in order to understand the Christian influences that were so very important in the formation of modern attitudes to sex and marriage. His second volume therefore examined Classical Athens and the third volume took for its subject the period of the High Roman Empire. Foucault's analysis of this age owed much to two prestigious French Classicists, Paul Veyne and Pierre Hadot. In an important *Annales* article Veyne had argued that the emasculation of the Roman political elite under the emperors led them to turn their gaze inward, to concentrate on their moral lives, and in particular to ground their identity as men of self-control and virtue in their relationship with their wives. He pointed to famous examples like Pliny the Younger's 'affective' letters to and about his wife Calpurnia, esp. 6. 5 ('You cannot believe how much I miss you. I love you so much . . . I stay awake most of the night thinking about you', trans. Radice). Veyne was partly infuenced by the work of Norbert Elias on the development of courtly, bourgeois cultures and the rise of 'manners' and codes of conduct under the European monarchies.[28] Foucault himself developed Veyne's ideas by positing the existence of what he called a 'new conjugality' in the Roman world, a new feeling of equivalence between man and woman in the context of mariage. At the same time, he argued, the Classical Greek focus on male homosexuality (pederasty)—and intellectual discussion of this—had become less attractive. He identified the novels as particular expressions of conjugal love.[29]

Genuine emotion in Pliny's case may have been assisted by his new (third) wife's significant juniority, and the truth of Veyne's thesis is in my view debatable even with regard to the Roman aristocracy. What of the Greek East, the society of Polemon? Here the literature of the time reveals a high level, and perhaps an unprecedented level, of elite male concern about the wife and the family. We have no clear woman's voice to make a comparison;[30] and that silence should in itself remind us that Greek society remained patriarchal. The central role of the household in Greek political writing had been established long before our time, first by the *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon (of Athens), and then by Aristotle's *Politics*, where it is set out in book 1. In Aristotle, though the wife enjoys constitutional freedom along with the husband, she is most definitely an inferior who is ruled by him.[31] The patriarchally defined inferiority of the wife remains in later Greek thinkers. But in works like Plutarch's famous *Essay on Love* an essential and deep-seated harmony and mutual love are required between man and wife in order to make a successful household, and this is far away from Aristotle's simple male control. In Xenophon the wife participates in the economic success of the household unit, but there is no hint of shared love. The change, then, is the move towards an affective relationship of the kind

[28] Veyne (1978). See e.g. Elias (1983), (2000). For a critique of Elias, see Duindam (1995).

[29] Foucault (1988) 228–32 on the 'new erotics'; developed by e.g. Konstan (1994).

[30] But note the existence of Neopythagorean authoresses like Perictione, below, n. 86. There is no cause to take the names as male pseudonyms, but dating is a problem.

[31] See esp. 1. 5.

we have seen in Pliny. But there is no reason to make powerlessness a cause of this change. For a start, local aristocracies—like Polemon's family—retained enormous power, though they might regret aspects of Roman rule, as Polemon himself apparently did.[32] Addressing the leading classes of the East, Plutarch wrote in the course of a passage about civil unrest that, 'of freedom our peoples have as much as those in control (Rome) allow them, and more would perhaps not be better' (*Political Advice* 824 c). Romans did interfere frequently in the political organization of the cities. Much policy had to be submitted to the governor for authorization; propagation of the emperor's image and attention to the religious cult of the emperors was a general concern; Roman soldiers and imperial agents were visible on the streets of most cities; many areas of foreign policy such as making war were obviously ruled out.[33] On the other hand, there was still plenty of room for political life, and especially for disputes inside and between cities. That these were often—on the surface at any rate—over things like the titles accorded by the Roman authorities ('metropolis', 'first city of the province') seems to back up Dio's analysis of such problems as the squabbling of children over toys (*Or.* 38), the pettiness of entirely dependent communities.[34] But the disputes seem to have been common, if we judge by the existence of agreements to combat them or celebrate peace and the speeches of leading figures urging the same *homonoia* ('like-mindedness') which is found in the epigraphical and numismatic record, a term which was an important part of the political vocabulary of the day. While Dio was surely right to identify the human need of baubles as one cause of these disputes, other problems which can readily come between neighbours—social, economic—will have been the dominant factor.[35] And given the economic structure of the society, the disputes will ultimately reflect the feuds of (groups of) leading local families. Local patriotism was the vehicle for these families, for good and bad. In an age of such investment in local communities and such attachment to the urban expressions of prosperity, marriage as the locus of reproduction and guarantor of the continuity of their power was bound to attract intense notice. It is this that led to reflection on the marriage relation and the role of the man within it in Greek texts of the time; it is this that is relevant to the eastern aristocracies and their moralists, not the emasculation of the Roman senatorial elite.

It is not surprising that Foucault was captivated by the brilliant and persuasive work of Pierre Hadot on the Stoic practice of spiritual exercises for dealing with the world, with other people, and with oneself. In the three main Stoic thinkers of this period, Seneca in Latin, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in Greek, we are presented with expressions of this self-training in which modification of one's inner discourse is the primary aim. 'Every time we are looked at,' writes Seneca,

[32] See pp. 197–9.

[33] For a good account of the impact of empire see Mitchell (1993), i, Part II.

[34] See esp. Robert (1977a). Collas-Heddeland (1995) on Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamum offers a useful summary of the issues.

[35] Sheppard (1984–6), Nollé (1996) on the wider economic relationship of *homonoia* exchanges, Drew-Bear and Labarre (2002) on 3rd-c. material. Note Polemon's erection of a statue for a neighbouring city, n. 14.

'we think we are being assessed'. For that reason, we must be ourselves and not put on a made-up character for public display (*On Tranquillity of Mind* 17. 1).[36] 'We must withdraw into ourselves often' (ibid. 17. 3). To do what? In the *Moral Letters* to Lucilius, who is generally reckoned to be an alter ego of Seneca himself, Seneca says knowingly, 'I can see you are making good progress, and I know what makes you write these things... I have hopes for you, but not yet confidence... Investigate yourself, scrutinize yourself, observe yourself in various ways' (16. 2). In the struggle for perfection helpers were needed. 'You go back to the ancients, who have time' (52. 7). '"Love an honest man and hold him always before your eyes: let us live as if he were watching and let us act in everything as if he could see us"—this, Lucilius, is Epicurus' rule... Oh Happy Man... who composes and orders himself by calling (an honest man) to mind' (11. 8–9). It is probably best to see Seneca's letters as a sort of diary written to help him reflect on the present difficult circumstances of his chequered career and the stress of dealing with Nero. Hence the frequent thoughts of withdrawing from public life and the prevalent theme of death. Over a century later Marcus Aurelius, emperor rather than courtier, takes things even more seriously. Marcus accords with what Seneca recommended and retreated within in order to ensure that 'what is outside my mind has absolutely no relevance to my mind' (*Meditations* 7. 2). The mind was for Marcus his 'citadel' (8. 48). In writing out the principles of Stoicism so repetitively, he was following the injunction of Epictetus on precisely this fundamental question of what was and what was not under one's control. 'Those practicising philosophy', the philosopher had remarked, 'must rehearse these arguments, must write them down every day, must use them for their exercise' (*Discourses* 1. 1. 25). Pierre Hadot has argued persuasively that Marcus' apparently dark pessimism about the world is part of a Stoic stripping away of things down to their essentials. Thus the *Meditations* takes us to the heart of Stoic self-reflection. But does it tell us much about the normal run of the elite who wanted moral guidance without philosophical privation?

The answer must be 'no'; or rather, that if the culture of self- and mutual inspection has any relation with Stoic practices, the relationship is a pale one. For other authors the conduct of the self depends always on the relationship with another. The wife—who has no role to play in Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus—assumes the key role; or at least a key role. Let us turn to Clement of Alexandria for advice. Some time around the end of the second century this philosophically trained Christian churchman wrote his *Paedagogus* (or *Tutor*), which contains amongst other things a hugely rich and under-exploited set of instructions for wealthy Christians and sympathetic non-Christians on how they should behave in their public and private lives. The work actually sums up the pagan moral system very well. A specifically Christian code is inserted into the material to hand; but the way of life Clement takes as normal is that which forms the basis of discussion in pagan writers like Plutarch and Polemon. The very title of the work shows this nicely. Clement cleverly turned Jesus Christ—who can see

[36] Cf. Adamantius B38 = Leiden ch. 49 on the assumption of a false persona; see below, 185–6. Hadot's work may be conveniently consulted in English translation (1995), esp. chs. 3, 4, 6, 7; on Marcus Aurelius *et alii* see also Hadot (1998).

our every thought—into the family servant, in Greek *paidagōgos*, who conducted boys to school and had a profound influence on their moral and educational lives by his ever-careful watch.[37] Clement's sources for this material—to leave aside the theological parts of the work—have never been identified apart from a few direct quotations from the later first-century moralist Musonius Rufus (who was important in shaping the views of Plutarch and Dio)—and the reason for this is surely that the moral material is to a large extent oral. It was in the common domain: manners handed down by parents, nurses, and *paidagōgoi* over the years.[38]

Clement was writing for city dwellers. They had to demonstrate their moral conduct as Christians before their polytheist neighbours in the market place, at a dinner party, or in the public baths. They were observing each other as well as being on show. In the most sensitive part of his work, Clement advises his married readers on permissible sexual activity. The hours of darkness were the correct time for congress, but could also encourage the husband to want to do the kind of things with his wife that he did with prostitutes. Typically Clement appeals to the Wisdom of Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus), the plain-speaking handbook of Jewish morality that was so popular and accessible for early Christians.

For he who uses his marriage [i.e. his wife] like a courtesan [he writes], practises adultery in it, and he does not hear the voice of the Tutor crying, 'The man who ascends his bed, who says in his soul, "Who sees me?... Darkness is around me, and the walls are my covering, and no one sees my sins. Why am I cautious... lest the Highest shall remember?" Most wretched is such a man, dreading men's eyes alone, and thinking that he will escape the notice of God. "For he knows not", says the Scripture, "that brighter ten thousand times than the sun are the eyes of the Most High, which look on all the ways of men, and cast their glance into hidden parts" [Ecclus. 23: 18–19].' Thus again the Tutor threatens them, speaking through Isaiah: 'Woe to those who hide deep their counsel, and say, "Who sees us?... [Is. 29: 15]"' (*Paedagogus* 2. 10. 99).

The supposition underlying the whole of this work is that one is being observed continually and had therefore better behave properly both in actions and in thoughts. In the most intimate part of human life, in the bedroom, the wife is present to validate the husband's morality. 'Let the guarantee of faith in the purity of dealings with neighbours be established at home,' writes Clement, by which he means: Display 'dignity' (*semnotēs*, specifically of sexual matters) to your wife to prove to your neighbours your *pistis*, your reputation for honesty (2. 10. 97). There is even a hint in this passage of the wife's own sexual desires—'avoid unseemly embraces[39]... a woman whose keenness for pleasures attests no dignity'—which shows Clement's breadth and his audience. But it is the husband's behaviour at the centre of his household that guarantees his *pistis* in society. The only difference from a Dio and a Plutarch is that the choice of

[37] For the power of this figure, see Libanius, *Or.* 34 *On the Slanders of the Paidagōgos* and *Or.* 58 *On the Carpeting.*

[38] I shall return to this legacy below.

[39] Cf. Musonius XII l. 5 Lutz = p. 63 ll. 15–16 Hense.

moral behaviour is ultimately overseen always by God and the man's consciousness that God is fully aware of what he is thinking.

For a Plutarch God was not constantly looking into one's heart. Control of emotions like anger was a benefit to the individual concerned, to ensure the success of his own life. Control of one's life meant first and foremost control in the domestic sphere, which (as with Clement) ensured one's good name in public life. Lack of control at home brought danger to the commonwealth. Still in the thought world of Aristotle, for whom the house is the basic building block of the city, Plutarch sets out the risks thus: 'a great fire rarely starts in a temple or a public building. Rather, a lamp left untended or litter catching alight in a house causes a conflagration resulting in widespread destruction. Likewise, it is not always public arguments that ignite disorder in the city. Often disputes arising from affairs and differences in private spill over into public life and throw the whole the city into turmoil' (*Political Advice* 824 F–825 A). Much of Plutarch's concern is centred on anger, a problem which forms one of the principal clusters of evaluative terminology in the *Physiognomy*. *Thymos*, 'temper', was friend and foe, and could easily develop into rage (*orgē*) in public. The way to avoid it was to 'practise in advance' and rid ourselves of temper 'when we are dealing with slaves or our wedded wives' (fr. 148 Sandbach from *On Rage*). For 'the man who is even-tempered at home will be much more so in public life, since there with the help of his household he has become the man who is the physician of his own soul' (ibid.).[40]

By 'practice' (*meletē*) Plutarch is not referring to private mental exercises along the lines of a Marcus or a Seneca. Rather, he means dealing with ordinary day-to-day situations in which temper flares up with slaves, such as the story Galen tells—greatly to his own credit—of a vile-tempered Cretan friend at *The Affections and Errors of the Soul*, ch. 4 who half-killed two clumsy servants by striking them on their heads with a sword and then demanded a beating from Galen in punishment,[41] or with wives, such as the angry husband at the start of Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe* who is 'overcome by anger' at his pregnant wife's suspected infidelity and nearly kicks her to death.[42] Domestic violence was common.[43] Slaves were particularly susceptible.[44] Galen (ibid. 5. 41. 1–7)

[40] Following Sandbach's reading of οἷος αὑτῷ τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς εἶναι ἰατρός; cf. *Advice on Marriage* 43. On anger in antiquity see the recent broad study by Harris (2001) and the more detailed essays in Braund and Most (2003).

[41] v. 18. 5–20. 10 Kühn. Galen treated him instead to a lengthy discourse on curbing rage ('and by treating himself over the year he got much better'). What is significant here for noting the *routineness* of such violence is Galen's comment that, had his friend struck the servants with the flat of the blade, 'he wouldn't have done anything especially bad'.

[42] 1. 4. 12–5. 1. Significantly, her father condones the action as 'unintended'. On the incident see Scourfield (2003). Cf. the allegation that Herodes Atticus' wife had died in premature childbirth after being beaten 'for not much reason' at Philostratus, *VS* 555–7 = 63. 20–65. 12.

[43] Though the current literature on the Roman family ignores it. Cf. Saller (1991) for a study of corporal punishment on slaves (and not against sons—the agenda of so much of the research on Roman family life is to prove that Romans did have a nuclear family, even if they and Greeks did not have a word for it). For a fine study of violence in the family of Augustine see Shaw (1987); and for routine beating by parents, see Plutarch's *How to Benefit from Your Enemies* quoted below, n. 315.

[44] Cf. in general Garnsey (1996) 93–7 *et alibi*, esp. Harris (2001) 317–36.

recalls his bad-tempered mother 'sometimes biting her maids' (and 'fighting with my father'). 'Nowadays', says Plutarch, 'we employ porters to prevent a stranger catching... a (male) servant being disciplined or the maids howling' (*On Meddlesomeness* 516 E). '"The only song heard in the house" of an angry man', he notes with an appropriate snippet of a tragedian, is '"the wailing" of the stewards being whipped and the maids being tortured' (*Absence of Anger* 463 B). It is perhaps Plutarch's accent on the success of his own marriage (*Essay on Love*, *Consolation to his Wife*) that leads him to mention anger against the wife only rarely.[45] Seneca's angry man gets annoyed with everything at home: 'you resent your slave, freedman, wife, client answering you? Then you complain public affairs have been deprived of the freedom of which you've deprived your house' (*On Anger* 3. 35. 1). The ex-slave Epictetus had a philosopher's answer: our response to someone's failure was our own problem. If one remembered this, 'he will get angry with no one, will be difficult to no one, will abuse no one, will blame no one, will offend no one' (*Discourses* 1. 28. 10). To be a philosopher meant to stop 'what you do now, blaming God and blaming people' (ibid. 3. 22. 13). Anger was where philosophy and practical ethics crossed over. Plutarch blamed our envious 'folly' for 'accustoming us to live focused on others more than ourselves' (*On Tranquillity* 471 A). 'The man', observed Seneca, 'who engages in many affairs can never pass a day so happily that someone or something does not produce some irritation to make his mind turn to anger' (*On Anger* 3. 6. 3). How to deal with people was the problem. Drawing the line between engagement and disengagement was easy in theory, for disengagement was an option for philosophers like Epictetus. But real people had to deal with their families and their fellow-citizens. Too much interaction made men meddle, 'the foulest of vices', which was 'eavesdropping, prying into public business or secrets, knowing about a great deal of things' (Seneca, *On Tranquillity of Mind* 12. 7). It involved, as Plutarch remarks, a tendency to *epichairekakia* ('pleasure in others' evils', 'Schadenfreude'). His advice is to 'block up the windows and side-doors of your meddling which look upon your neighbours' houses and open up others onto the rooms for the men and the women in your own house and the slaves' quarters' (*Meddlesomeness* 515 E). The point is that 'wanting to learn about others' evils' is a grave error when there is 'plenty to keep you busy at home' (ibid. 515 D). It is just that 'some people cannot face their own lives' (516 C–D).

The solution was a course of training. Inspecting others out of envy or malignity was detrimental to one's health. You had to learn to 'get inside and look at the many problems and disagreeable things (others) have to deal with' (*On Tranquillity* 471 A). The prospects and pitfalls of such gazing are set out in Plutarch's *Absence of Anger* and *Peri Dysōpias*. In an angry society absence of anger (*aorgēsia*) was a highly desirable commodity. Plutarch's essay on the topic is more polished and sophisticated than many of his other pieces of advice. It is set initially in the form of a dialogue between two prominent Romans, C. Minicius Fundanus, suffect consul in 107 and friend of Pliny the Younger,

[45] But cf. below, p. 140, for *On Tranquillity* 460 F, and also *Advice on Marriage* 13, 37–9.

and Sextius Sulla, who was evidently at least of the equestrian class.[46] Sulla begins and says that he has not seen Fundanus for a year. In that time his *thymos* ('anger', 'temper') has subsided. He had heard about this from Eros, a freedman of Plutarch's, but had suspected he was simply crediting Fundanus with 'the qualities that suit gentlemen' (453 C). 'Tell me the cure you used', he asks.[47] Fundanus then takes up the story. 'As for me, and I don't know if it was right, I began my cure by observing others—just as the Spartans used the Helots to discover the nature of drunkenness' (455 E). This gave him a 'picture' (*eikōn*) of a disease which distorts the 'appearance, colour, gait, voice' (455 F) and made him feel in need of someone to hold up a mirror so he could see for himself what he looked like in moments of anger (456 A). 'I was exceedingly upset to think I should ever appear so frightening and deranged to my friends, wife, and daughters' (455 F). Observing the voice was equally important (455 F–456 E). One had 'to store in the memory' the symptoms of the angry (456 D). Sulla has already established at the outset of the essay that anger is unbefitting for a gentleman. Now Fundanus follows this up. 'The nature of temper', he goes on to say, 'is that it is not noble (*eugenēs*) or manly (*andrōdēs*) and lacks real spirit and greatness... The actions, movements, and appearance (of the angry man) betray considerable pettiness and weakness' (456 F). There follows a section of examples of what to do, drawn especially from 'kings and tyrants' (457 F). As in other essays, Plutarch/Fundanus stresses the need to become accustomed to dealing with the problem. 'In the case of no other passion is it better to exercise oneself on servants than it is against temper' (459 B). The reason is explicitly stated: 'frequent fits of anger' make us lose control 'because of our power over them, as there is no one to intervene or stop us'. But though the master has power which is 'accountable to no one', he is egged on by the complaints of his wife and his friends that he is being too soft.[48] It was needling of this sort that made Fundanus punish his servants. But he had come to realize that his harsh temper was distorting his own character, and moreover that slaves who were not beaten and branded were likely to be nicer. Punishments should not be administered in anger, but at the right time. Committing all this to memory made him able to avoid the most disgraceful thing of all, 'that the servant can enter a juster plea than the master' (459 C–E).

Plutarch's point in all this is that people were caught in a web of social interactions and obligations. They needed others to examine in order to cure their own problems; but others were also part of the problem. Thus at home the master was caught between his wife and his slaves. It was owing to his status that he had to be seen to take action when e.g. the food was served burnt or the table upset. What he needed to do was to take control by not punishing in

[46] Jones (1971) 58, 60.

[47] For the cure in a year, cf. Galen above. For anger in Plutarch, see Duff (1999) 87–9, 211–15 on his exploration of the character of Coriolanus.

[48] *atonia*, 'flabbiness', *rhāthymia*, 'laziness', 'easiness'; perhaps there is a suggestion of effeminacy, cf. *andrōdēs* above and 'womanish' below, and *eutonōn*/*eutonountes* on p. 143.

anger, but at the right time and then not show regret for punishing 'which is a womanish thing' (459 F–460 C).[49] And yet—if anger was mostly a reaction to feeling 'despised and neglected', home life made the problem acute. Others could be laughed off; but the master's slaves took advantage of his goodness, friends of his affection, and the master, sensing contempt, 'behaved roughly to wife, slaves, and friends' (460 D–F).

The need to engage in order to study others' faults and, once done, to be able to get away unaffected and improve oneself by recollecting what one has seen of their faces and movements represents a widespread goal in the moral thinking of this age. There is even a hint of it in the *Physiognomy*: 'learn of the matter of your soul and of others' (Leiden ch. 1 A20).[50] A major problem was to maintain one's independence between inferiors and superiors. If superiors were nice—giving us an invitation to governor's drinks or getting a greeting from the emperor—the temptation to boast of our position and to come away name dropping was very great indeed, especially for people who were attached to the court (*to aulikon*) or who belonged to (the higher echelons of) the military (*On Inoffensive Self-Praise* 546 D–E). This caused maximum offence—even hangers-on found it hard to take (547 D). Plutarch is talking here about the pressure to be seen to perform, to make it in public life, with all its tensions and stresses. Those below you offered flattery or malicious baiting (ibid. 547 B–C), topics treated in the polished *How to Distinguish the Flatterer from the Friend*, which is addressed to his grand friend King Philopappus, descendant of the kings of Commagene and Roman consul in 109. As far as the career of the ordinary Greek notable is concerned, perhaps the most significant of all the moral essays with regard to social status and relations with others is the treatise concerned with preserving face and learning how to say no to those above and those below, the *Peri Dysōpias*.[51] The word *dysōpia* in the sense of being too embarrassed to say no to something or yielding to pressure to say yes to something is late.[52] The Atticist grammarians of the second sophistic condemn the usage. As Aelius Dionysius remarks, '*dysōpeisthai* means "to suspect", "to be afraid due to suspicion", "to scowl"; some, at any rate not Attic writers, use it as "to be ashamed", and general usage makes it mean "to entreat" and "to implore"'.[53] The strict Phrynichus was particularly put out by Plutarch. 'There is a book by Plutarch called *Peri Dysōpias*. He supposes this indicates "to feel embarrassed" and "to fail to resist owing to shame". But among the ancients [i.e. the classical, canonical authors] *dysōpia* signifies "suspicion" and "to suspect"' (*Selections* 160 Fischer).[54] Although the particular sense of the verb or noun meaning 'suffering defeat at the hands of the shamelessly importunate' (as Plutarch defines it at *Brutus* 6. 9)[55] does not

[49] For the whole discussion cf. *On the Slow Revenge of the Divinity* 550 E–551 E.

[50] Cf. below, 195.

[51] There is a excellent translation in Russell (1993), on which I draw with some changes below.

[52] *Dysōpia* in the sense of causing embarrassment to someone else occurs as early as Aristotle fragment 611 (l. 231) Rose (εἰς δυσωπίαν). The cognate verb (mostly used in the passive) appears to be used from the time of Xenophon.

[53] Aelius Dionysius, *Attic Words* d 34 Erbse. Cf. e.g. Moeris 194 Bekker, *Philetaerus* 183 Dain.

[54] Cf. ibid. 243 for further indignant (and quite unfair) criticism of Plutarch's Greek.

[55] 'Which some call *dysōpeisthai*'; cf. below for the similar passage in *Peri Dysōpias*.

displace other senses entirely, it is very common among later Greek authors, especially Christian ones. Thus it seems that Plutarch's essay did indeed capture something important and new in the social relations of this age of mutual inspection.

Plutarch defines *dysōpia* as:

> an excess of shame. This is why it is called by the name *dysōpia*, meaning 'being put out of countenance',[56] because in this condition, the face (*prosōpon*) somehow displays confusion and debility at the same time as the mind. As we define dejection (*katēpheia*) as a distress that makes us lower our eyes (*katō blepein*), so we use the term that means 'being put out of countenance' for a sense of shame which inhibits you from looking those who make demands on you straight in the eye (*antiblepein*)... The easily abashed (*eudysōpētos*) show their softness and effeminacy (*to thēly*) in their eyes (*opsis*), euphemistically using[57] the word 'shame' to describe their defeat at the hands of the shameless (528 E, F).[58]

During the last twenty years a tremendous amount of theoretical and empirical research has been done in sociolinguistics on 'politeness phenomena'. This has developed from the seminal work of Brown and Levinson (1987) on the concept of 'face', which essentially refers to an individual's self-esteem and the challenges self-esteem undergoes in social interaction.[59] Like so much recent work in sociolingustics (cf. esp. bilingualism), the study of politeness has moved away from the older interest in individual speaker identity to studying the interaction of the group (consisting at a minimum level of two speakers). Brown and Levinson's theory outlines basic needs on the part of speakers and hearers which they pay attention to in order to get what they want. Broadly these are: (i) the expression of restraint with regard to the hearer's need to be left alone and not bothered ('negative politeness'), (ii) the expression of solidarity with regard to the hearer's need to be appreciated and understood ('positive politeness'). Both sorts of politeness will frequently coexist and conflict. Speakers may negotiate various indirect or 'off record' strategies to express their desires to hearers; or they may 'redress' otherwise bald statements of intent by taking account of the hearer's needs, e.g. by adopting a get-out strategy to avoid imposition if they are not likely to get their way easily, or by suggesting an underlying camaraderie with the hearer to ease his acceptance of what they intend.[60]

[56] Cf. the old word *ōps*, 'face', 'countenance'. But by Plutarch's time this had come to specify the eye(s): Apollonius, *Lexicon Homericum* 96, l. 20 Bekker; Herodian, *De prosodia catholica* 3. 1, p. 404 Lentz; Galen, *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* 3. 7. 6; *Philetaerus* 129 Dain; Pollux, *Onomasticon* 2. 53.

[57] *hypokorizomenos*—with a pun on the word *korai*, 'pupils of the eye' (lit. 'dolls', 'girls'). The verb means to give something a pet name. It is worth noting that *opsis* could specifically mean 'pupil' (cf. Plutarch's contemporary, Rufus of Ephesus, *Names of the Parts of Man* 24).

[58] The close parallel with the *Brutus* (the twelfth pair in the series of *Parallel Lives*; see *Dion* 2. 7) suggests the essay was written well after AD 100.

[59] Drawing for this partly on the everyday word (cf. 'lose face', etc.) and on the ideas of the sociologist Erving Goffman (1967). See Watts (2003) for a review and critique of the field.

[60] For this terminology cf. Lakoff (1973).

This modern work can be readily applied to the second sophistic. Indeed, we can see the whole Atticizing movement in these terms. Atticism—the use of a classicizing form of Greek—was socially significant for a very simple reason: one had to have the social leisure and economic stability to educate oneself sufficiently to be able to command the vocabulary and grammatical structures that distinguished Atticism from ordinary Greek. Thus linguistic purism in this period is a sign of elite solidarity and speaking the correct language was a way of being 'polite' (in the sense defined) and of demonstrating rapport/camaraderie with fellow members of the upper classes. As we have been seeing, attitudes to and expectations in linguistic performance reflect a much wider concern with how others appear and act (which always includes speech acts). Polemon's *Physiognomy* is very much a part of this culture, and it is timely to recall that the eye and the signs of the face are the fundamental indicators of character in it. But it is Plutarch who most clearly and at the greatest length advocates the study of others to see ourselves. Whenever men of nobility

> embark on some course of action, assume an office, or take a gamble, they set before their eyes good men of the present or of the past and ask themselves, 'What would Plato have done here? What would Epaminondas have said? How would Lycurgus have looked, or Agesilaus?' They use these figures as a kind of mirror to put themselves in order and make readjustments or refrain from some undignified utterance or repress an emotion (*Progress in Virtue* 85 A–B).

The same metaphor of the mirror to effect self improvement is used in (among other places) an important passage in the *Parallel Lives* where Plutarch justifies his continuation of the series, suggesting that he (and we) treat his historical subjects as guests and carefully examine (*anatheōrōmen*) how they look (*Aemilius* 1. 1–2).

With regard to *Peri Dysōpias*, politeness theory helps us to realize that Plutarch has identified a set of problems crystallizing around 'social face' and that it is literally the expression of one's eyes and face which communicates the inner distress he felt was so common. He analyses this through the familiar situations of dealing with superiors, peers, and inferiors, and demonstrates in a remarkably sophisticated manner how trapped the elite were in a network of interactions no one greatly welcomed. First, he dismisses 'unbending and unblinking' directness in our dealings. This is as bad as 'the weakness of being too civil (*to epieikes*)' (529 A). The cure is 'not without risk', because removing *dysōpia* could endanger the desirable qualities of 'modesty, civility, and civilized behaviour' (529 B–C). People satisfy our desire for rapport by giving us the idea that we are 'humane, civilized, and sociable beings, not at all inflexible or self-willed', or that we are 'smart and nice'. The danger of this is that we give in to their demands for fear of being called 'hard and stubborn' instead (529 D–E). A key sign of membership of the elite (and one particularly important in the *Physiognomy*) was 'manliness' (*andreia, to andreion*). This was of course a purely social signifier and its precise connotations are often difficult to pin down. Identification of its opposite, effeminate or female behaviour/characteristics in a man, is a standard part of the vocabulary of Greek political and legal abuse from the classical age onward. There is, however, an important

difference in the second sophistic period. Here, while on a purely sexual level affairs with boys and men were clearly both of considerable importance and socially acceptable in terms of the pleasure they offered,[61] it is the reciprocity of heterosexual married love that is so strongly emphasized in the moralists and the fiction (the new phenomenon of the novel) of the time. All this is relevant to the present discussion because Plutarch works with the idea that effeminacy is involved in loss of face. We have seen above that in the essay on anger Fundanus associated control, including resisting wife and friends, with manly (*andrōdes*) and upper-class behaviour (*eugenēs*) befitting 'gentlemen'. In *Peri Dysōpias* Plutarch associates effeminacy and softness with *dysōpia* at the outset ('softness and effeminacy in their eyes'). Now, in public he presents *dysōpia* 'bearing down on the unmanly and unvigorous', perverting judgements in court (because of pressure from superiors or peers) and advice in council (ditto) (529 F). He then pursues the consequences (530 A–E). One can train on small social situations where the cost of resisting is 'slight offence' to the other speaker. To someone who doesn't count in one's social circle, the figure of the 'chatterer' (*adoleschos*), all you need to do is make the firm (*eutonōn*, effectively = manly) reply, 'See you later, I'm busy just now' (531 B). This puts one in better shape to deal effectively with the emperor or the popular assembly. Plutarch turns to our praise of others, that is to making others feel appreciated. This section concerns relations with peers. If you heap uncalled-for praise on a friend's bad poetry, 'how will you set him right when he behaves ignorantly in the matter of an office or a marriage or a political move?' (531 C). Following remarks on inferiors' requests for money, Plutarch returns to family and peer pressure. The network of interactions should be limited 'when we celebrate a sacrifice or a marriage or give some other kind of reception' (532 C). Having too big a circle leads to uneven treatment and embarrassment (*dysōpia*) (*On Having Many Friends* 95 B). In addition to practical training in likely social situations, the teacher must be able to provide a set of 'useful reflections' to help deal with a friend's request for a loan, being asked to favour one party in a suit, or being manoeuvred into 'an unprofitable agreement for a daughter's or a sister's marriage' (532 E).[62] It is not 'ignorant people' we are dealing with: rather, it is *hoi charientes* ('the accomplished/smart people') who require persuasion (532 F). Precisely because they are our friends, we have to take precautions such as signing formal contracts for loans (533 B). They will ask us for 'a presentation at court or an introduction to a governor'. We avoid the bald statement, 'the emperor doesn't know me; go to someone else', because 'we neither want nor have the firmness (*mēde eutonountes*) to say it' (533 E).

Next Plutarch turns to the really serious problem. 'There is no difficulty in resisting the obscure, humble, and worthless among those who seek to impose upon us... But it is different when the pressure comes from a person of power or prestige' (534 B, C). 'Suppose an orator approaches you when you are acting

[61] See esp. Achilles Tatius' 2nd-c. *Leucippe and Clitophon*, 2. 35–38, and the interesting *Loves* attributed to Lucian (and likely to be 2nd or 3rd c.).

[62] For 'agreement', *homologia*, cf. Dio 7. 80 above, 132.

as judge, or a popular politician when you are on the Council: grant him his wish, on condition that he makes a solecism in his proemium or a barbarism in his narrative. He won't want to do so, because it *seems* disgraceful; some people, as we know, won't even tolerate a clash between vowel and vowel in their speeches' (534 F). Here the strategy of resistance is chosen with care by suggesting an indirect invitation to do something which *appears* unseemly in the crucial area of linguistic control.[63] Plutarch then turns to the 'less reputable'—those who don't care because they are set in their ways. Other than to stand by our own reputation he offers no advice on how to behave: the problem was insurmountable. Instead he returns to the theme of language and masculinity. It is our 'flabbiness' (*atonia*) that makes us 'go lax and limp' (*thryptontai kai chalōntai*) before praise (by inferiors) and become terrified of potential criticism from the disappointed (peers). We must not stop punishing malefactors 'in order to be called kind, merciful, and sympathetic' (by the *dēmos*), or be pushed into 'quarrels and prosecutions' to get a reputation (among peers) for being 'the only "real men", the only persons "immune to flattery", and, yes, the only "mouths and voices"[64] (of free speech)' (535 D–536 A). There are only a handful of direct references to flattery in Polemon's *Physiognomy*,[65] and this may be a sign that the work was written more about and for peers who already enjoyed considerable rank. The notable in Plutarch's essay, on the other hand, is caught between inferiors who flatter him and peers and superiors who bully him.

Plutarch's little work explores terribly important issues in the life of the aristocrat of the early second century. Many of his moral-ethical essays, as I have observed, are closely concerned with negotiation between oneself, inferiors, peers, superiors, and above all with successful and appropriate communication between and within these groups. Plutarch is exceptionally aware of the pressures on his readers to conform to the value system of the time and to perform within that system to their maximum—and of how difficult it was to achieve this without damaging family, society, or oneself. The speeches by his coeval, Dio of Prusa, and his much younger contemporary, Aelius Aristides, to the great cities of Asia Minor address similar issues at the level of the civic community. So often the problem centred around individual competition for honour. *Philotimia*, as I have noted, is one of the commonest value terms in Greek and occurs with great frequency in the writers of the second sophistic period. Significantly the term with which it is often associated, 'contentiousness' (*philoneikia*, 'love of strife'), is not used commonly before the Roman period, and it then becomes very common. The *Physiognomy* has only two direct references to competitiveness and one to contentiousness, but the qualities are included within the terms for 'masculine' or 'feminine' behaviour which

[63] For the social consequences of such a gaffe see Lucian's semi-humorous *Slip of the Tongue*.

[64] Cf. Pollux 6. 147–8 for a similar phrase praising the true speaker.

[65] A8 'are slavish and flatter those in power', B38 'soliciting positions of power in the city and glorious marriages... they think they might please those whom they are cultivating, B40 'those who bend over and lean forwards are flatterers; for dogs do this, whenever they fawn and wheedle'.

are common throughout,[66] and the work brims with references to inter-elite rivalry and hostility.[67] In Plutarch both terms are extremely frequent.[68] The approval and disapproval attaching to ambitious behaviour results from the fact that second-sophistic society was on the one hand very rule-bound with a well-established system of behavioural expectations and at the same time a society which encouraged continual testing of the rules to satisfy individual performance. Herein lay the source of the considerable tensions we have been observing.

I have already noted that the sources of Clement of Alexandria's advice on conduct in his *Paedagogus* have never been identified, and I have suggested that the orthodox moral advice he offers on eating, drinking, clothes, sleep, shoes, etc., has an oral pedigree which stretches back for generations. Like any book of rules Clement's presupposes *rule-breaking*, and he evidently felt the danger of this in the intrinsically unstable situation of the insertion of a nascent Christian value system into the age-old pattern of conduct he and his readers were familiar with. For Clement and others (Musonius, Plutarch, Dio[69]), social order depends upon the negotiation of the rules through choices of actual behaviour when one is walking, sitting, speaking in the assembly, giving wealth, beating slaves, and so on. For these moralists the public and private spheres intersect; the modern argument, that someone's private life is their own business, would have bewildered them. In the *Physiognomy* too there is no great distinction between public and private behaviour. When Polemon comments on sexual mores, the use of money or the display of luxury, he presupposes the interrelation of the two spheres. In the introduction (surviving in Adamantius) the function of physiognomy is actually very domestic: 'No one would give a deposit or entrust an heirloom, his wife, or his children, or even share any kind of friendship whatsoever with those who bear obvious signs of dishonesty, etc.' (A2). I have suggested above that this focus on the private life of the notable has to do not with the change in political power at the top of the Roman world but with the successful urbanism of the Greek elites in our period. Economic prosperity brought with it a new pride in being Greek which established an intensified investment in the social life of the ruling class. In other words, the household, the marriage relation, the circulation of wealth, the stylization of education as the performance of a set of manners forming the language of social interaction (*paideia*)—these were the background against which public competitiveness

[66] B2 the horse is competitive, the male type is competitive, the female type is contentious; on the shorthand usage of terms for masculine and feminine, see below, pp. 188 and 192. NB: in Leiden we have translated the word *himma* as 'ambition' (other normal senses are 'endeavour', 'intention', 'resolution'); this sometimes translates Polemon's/Adamantius' *euaisthētos*/*euaisthēsia* ('perceptive') or *anaisthētos*/*anaisthēsia* ('insensible').

[67] Polemon's two little declamations on the battle of Marathon contain both terms in the sort of proportions we should expect.

[68] Cf. Duff (1999) Index of Greek Words *s.vv.* φιλονεικία, φιλοτιμία, also *s.v.* φιλονικία (strictly 'love of victory': see ibid 83 for the idea that because *philonikia* and *philoneikia* were pronounced identically they had somehow coalesced in sense; but it is easy for any educated person to maintain written distinctions between homonyms).

[69] For Dio, cf. below, 190 on *Or.* 33.

(*philotimia*) was possible. It so happens that we have a basic manual of these manners which neatly expresses the value system I am speaking of in a Greek text which survives in Arabic—Bryson's *Household Management*. Though it cannot be proved absolutely, it is highly likely that this work belongs to the first century AD. Bryson has long been available, but has been almost completely ignored by Classicists. The scholar who forms the most important exception to this neglect made considerable progress by demonstrating that Musonius Rufus depended on Bryson for crucial sections of his discussion of reciprocity between husband and wife in marriage.[70] Before I turn to Polemon in depth in the next Section, I want to examine aspects of Bryson's book both because of its intrinsic importance and relevance to the overall theme of this project, and also specifically because it brings out salient points of the discussion in this chapter so far.[71]

Bryson is the Neopythagorean author of an *oikonomikos logos*, i.e. a treatise on the administration or management of the household; this is the original meaning of the Greek word *oikonomia*.[72] The ancient literature is represented by Xenophon's *Oikonomikos Logos*, in which Socrates comments on the economic and social activities of the house of Ischomachus of Athens, two short treatises from the school of Aristotle, and a work by Philodemus.[73] Bryson's text in Arabic (an epitome of a lost original Arabic translation) was first published in 1921 and was made accessible with a German translation by Martin Plessner in 1928.[74] Plessner built on the work of H. Ritter and M. Bouyges in attributing the text to Bryson on the basis of correspondences between two sections and the extract (in two parts) preserved in Stobaeus and attributed by him to 'Bryson's *Oikonomikos*'.[75] Regrettably, Friedrich Wilhelm's fine study of oeconomic literature in antiquity appeared before the firm attribution of the Arabic text.[76]

Bryson divides into four sections (wealth, slaves, the wife, children). These tell us a great deal about orthodox expectations of conduct in these areas. Bryson's name is Neopythagorean (cf. Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 23. 104)

[70] Baldassarre (1978). Bryson's existence has also been registered in a review of Hellenistic theories of marriage by Treggiari (1991) 195, cf. 202. Treggiari relied on Thesleff's 3rd-c.-BC dating—see below—and was unaware of Baldassarre. As we shall see, Bryson is far more than a *peri gamou*. Natali (1995*a*) contains important if brief observations, but is unaware of Baldassarre and again relies on Thesleff's dating. For Bryson in economic historians see n. 73.

[71] Dr Yossef Rapoport and I are in the course of preparing a full edition of Bryson with studies of the Arabic and Classical contexts.

[72] e.g. at the beginning of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* 1. 1.

[73] Pomeroy (1994), esp. 68 ff. for Ps.-Aristotle, Philodemus, and other discussion after Xenophon, Natali (1995*a*) on the Hellenistic theories. Bryson has been noted by a few economic historians on account of the two fragments surviving in Greek which deal with trades and slavery (below, n. 75); but even here he 'remains an "unknown" author' (Baloglou and Constantinidis 1996: 47).

[74] Although the translation is useful, it is considerably longer than the original and this often obscures the sense. There is now a better translation by Zonta in an appendix to Natali (1995*b*).

[75] Ritter (1917) 12–14, Bouyges (1924). Stobaeus: iv. 28. 15. 1–14 and 15–25. These extracts correspond respectively to §§13–12 (*sic*) and 56–7 of Plessner. Like most Neopythagorean material, they are written in a reconstituted Doric dialect.

[76] Wilhelm (1915).

and Stobaeus places him before an extract from another Neopythagorean, Callicratidas. Since H. Thesleff's work on the Neopythagoreans in the 1960s,[77] the dating of the Neopythagorean pseudepigrapha has been fairly universally accepted as Hellenistic (with Bryson located towards the beginning of this period). It may well be that most of these texts are earlier than older scholars like Wilhelm and Zeller had believed. But Bryson at least must be an exception.[78] The dating depends primarily on the tone and content of the work's moral programme and specifically on its statement of a loving, conjugal relationship between the husband and the wife, with a requirement of virginity before marriage and sexual fidelity afterwards. It was this that appealed to Musonius, and it means that Bryson shares the distinctive new moral outlook of the second sophistic period. More on this below. In addition, there is some evidence in the Arabic and medieval Latin tradition of the text that suggests—but perhaps quite misleadingly—that the work was dedicated to a familiar figure from the second half of the first century, none other than Apollonius of Tyana.[79] Various objections have been made to this suggestion, and it should be stressed that the possibility of a dedication to Apollonius must remain unproven until the manuscript evidence can be re-examined. Whatever the case with Apollonius, Baldassarre's contribution was to demonstrate that Musonius drew on the third section of Bryson (the wife) and to argue correctly that Bryson was used by Musonius rather than *vice versa* because Musonius was obviously excerpting from a larger work. It can also be shown in fact that Musonius draws from the fourth section of Bryson on the behaviour expected of (male) children and on their parents' duties in bringing them up. It is therefore indisputable that Musonius had Bryson before him. As we shall see, Dio (Musonius' pupil and one of Polemon's teachers) used Bryson in his own (largely lost) *Oeconomicus*.[80]

This is not the place for a full review of Bryson. What is required here is to note the fundamental approaches of the text illustrating the culture of the time. The first important thing to observe is that the analogies that can be drawn with Musonius, Dio, Plutarch, and Clement[81] may be taken as proving the existence of a common fund of moral thinking that was to a large extent in the oral domain. Bryson offers a basic, written example of these rules. The four 'qualities' (*khiṣāl*) of the household, as he calls them, concern communication and interaction between the community and the household. It was perhaps the

[77] (1961) and (1965).

[78] It has to be said that Thesleff's arguments against the late, Roman dating of the oeconomic tracts (I am not concerned here with other Neopythagorean literature) are not strong (1961: 57–9); and though he was right to note that Wilhelm's observations of the extensive material in common between Musonius, Bryson, and the other tracts *proved* nothing, he had no reason to be aware of the fact (writing in the 1960s and focusing mainly on matters of language) that the material on marriage and conjugality fits properly in the Roman period.

[79] See Plessner (1928) 3–6. Arabic literature knew Apollonius well, and had inherited (via Syriac) the Apollonius of Late Antiquity, the exponent of secret arts and author of talismans: Ullmann (1972) 170–5, 378–81, 405.

[80] Below, n. 85.

[81] For the latter two direct borrowing is not evident.

intensified interest in these matters in the Greek world of the first century AD and the new thinking on conjugality that spurred him to set these down in writing.

In the case of wealth (the first section), recommendations are made about its acquisition and disbursement. The idea is to have enough through proper use in order to have sufficient to benefit family, friends, clients,[82] the poor, and beggars. Above all, as we should expect, the personal (moral) happiness of the subject is paramount. The second section on slaves begins like the first with some theoretical remarks, adding an apparently unique division into three generic types of slave.[83] The analysis offered by Bryson is not very deep, but it is used in the following remarks about choosing slaves (another unique passage). A man about to buy a slave 'must have a good look at him' (58) to ascertain the purity and quality of his body and his soul. We shall see in Ch. 6 that there was an extensive Muslim literature on the medical-physiognomical examination of the slave. We cannot tell to what extent, if any, this was dependent on the treatise by Polemon's older contemporary, Rufus of Ephesus, 'On the Buying of Slaves', which is known from Rhazes and other Arabic writers. There is no physiognomical directive in Bryson; but his Muslim readers would certainly have taken the phrase 'have a good look' as a cue for a physiognomical examination. Bryson then goes on to counsel the sympathetic treatment of the slave owing to the common humanity he and the master share in. This rests on well-known Stoic ideas, voiced in a famous moral letter of Seneca.[84] According to Bryson the master should only resort to blows if he has to, and in general should treat the slave in the case of a delict as he treats his child. He must allow the slave periods of rest and be sympathetic to him in order to get the best out of him. In this section the personal happiness of the owner(s) is not made as clear as in section 1, but it is nevertheless presupposed in the advice on good treatment. Many of these remarks accord with what is said by Plutarch and others; but we can see how in Plutarch and Seneca the basic message has been elevated into a far more sophisticated argument to prove that the moral happiness of the master is located in his ability to control his own anger against his servants.[85] As with the other writers, Bryson is essentially being practical when he advises good treatment, since this is what makes a successful economic unit.

It is the third and fourth sections which I want to comment on in more detail. Section 3 concerns the wife. I have noted already that although the *Physiognomy* hardly mentions the family in the body of the text, the introductory section

[82] §53 *ahl l-hurma bi-hi*, 'people of [i.e. who enjoy] protection/honour with him', a circumlocution which Plessner may well be right to take as referring to the Roman institution of clientship.

[83] This is the second part of Stobaeus' extract. Cf. Wilhelm (1915) 165.

[84] Seneca, *Letters* 47 with Garnsey (1996) 55–8, 67–9, 143–4.

[85] The comments on moral slavery in Bryson appear to have influenced Dio of Prusa, cf. *Orr.* 14–15 *On Slavery and Freedom*. In particular, from Dio's own *Oeconomicus* we have a fragment (fr. V von Arnim) recommending those acting as masters to allow relaxation to prepare for labour. It is clear he is talking of slaves. The image of the bow (*toxon*) used by him occurs in Bryson §67 (*qaws*) in the same context of the master allowing the slave time for recreation. The metaphor is known elsewhere (Praechter 1912), but is not used of masters/slaves nor is it present in other oeconomic literature.

preserved by Adamantius makes it plain that Polemon like everyone else assumed public and private were fundamentally interrelated and that his book was applicable to both domains. The sexual value system that runs throughout the text is patriarchal: extreme criticism for consorting with (other) women or for resembling a woman (the whole 'anti-system' of effeminacy). In supposing a correct set of sexual mores, then, Polemon is as much a part of the orthodox moral universe as anyone else. We shall see shortly that one of his contemporaries did something to fill the overt gap in his text by applying physiognomy to choosing a wife.

The fact that Bryson offers a section on wives will not surprise anyone who knows anything of the other, short Neopythagorean texts on the family which survive in Stobaeus' anthology.[86] There was an ancient literature, represented by Polemon's contemporary Hierocles in his *On Marriage*,[87] on the subject of whether marriage was a burden a man ought or ought not to take on. Even Musonius includes it, but he gives it an important and uplifting philosophical twist (*Diss.* XIIIA, XIIIB, XIV). It is significant that Bryson dispenses altogether with this antiquated theme. His concern is certainly with the prosperity and success of the house in general, but he introduces and emphasizes the theme of conjugal, reciprocal love. There is no sign of this in Perictione and the other Neopythagorean family writings. This advance is of the greatest importance for students of the second sophistic and of the romantic, 'ideal' novel.

What does section 3 of Bryson say? 'The most beneficial thing for a man is that there should be a partner in his house who will own it in the same way he owns it, who cares for it as he cares for it, and who manages it as he manages it' (76). God made men and women for procreation. 'Further He established between them a feeling of love and familiarity which leads to the removal of envy, rivalry, and greed from either one of them towards his companion... He made them to be one soul' (81). The wife is subservient: 'the business of the household prospers only if its superior member is the chief of the other people in it and the others listen to him and obey him' (87). But both man and woman need the same virtues (92) and the wife can help the husband improve his (93). Moreover, 'the man and the woman must jointly be intelligent, moral, just. For if they are not, there is no accord and the management of their house becomes corrupted' (96). There follows a fairly long section endorsing the qualities of the wife. She has the intelligence, kindness, and acumen to run the house effectively. She is utterly selfless: 'she prefers their wronging of her to her wronging of them and tolerates their anger and bad moods and tyrannical behaviour at times of vexation and illnesses which afflict them, and further makes them see that the fault in all this lies entirely with her and not at all with them, and she bears them no grudge and has no evil in her soul because

[86] For discussion see Pomeroy (1984) 61–71 (incl. a translation of Perictione's *On a Woman's Harmony*), Treggiari (1991) 192 ff. There is a translation, not always accurate, of these texts in Guthrie (1987). The question of the completeness of the extracts—affirmed by Wilhelm—cannot be addressed here.

[87] See n. 102.

of it. Rather, when she recalls it sometimes, she renews her feeling of kindness and pity towards them and makes it an occasion for excusing them for it as she recollects the situations of annoyance, anxiety, or illness which led them to do it' (101–2).

The picture of the selfless devotion of the wife who is 'one soul' with the husband strikes the same tone as the novels or Plutarch's *Advice on Marriage*: a woman who is under the control of the husband but is loved by him and loves him and their children as far as she can. Whether or not the individual parts can be paralleled—and one key metaphor for mutual love that appealed to Musonius is not found elsewhere[88]—the intensity and affective nature of the comments is new. At the end of the work, where Bryson closes the section on the child by observing the ideal of chastity in the boy who has now turned man, he loops back to the wife and recalls that 'his heart enfolds her and her heart enfolds him' (159). In his well-used defence of marriage the Stoic philosopher Antipater of Tarsus (d. *c.*140 BC) had commented on the 'truest and most genuine goodwill' between the man and the wife and observed how they share property, children, soul, and body.[89] But the soul they share is 'that of the man'. All this is part of a long argument in Antipater about the unappealing nature of marriage as an institution to his contemporaries. There is nothing on the common virtues of husband and wife, nothing on the qualities of the wife in her management of the house, no equivalent of the affective passage about her love for the husband and children, no hint of a merging of hearts. Bryson's discussion is rooted in the success of the household which (in section 1 of his work) is presented as the basis of the human community along the lines of traditional Greek socio-political thought. It has been argued here that the emphasis in the second sophistic period of a relationship between the harmony of the state and the harmony of the household reflects the prosperity of the Greek cities and the emotional investment in the mechanisms of urbanism that accompanied this. Bryson's affective presentation of the wife's role in the household should be seen as the first expression of this investment in a treatise of morals.

In section 4, Bryson's rules for the upbringing of the (male) child reflect the view, which is again so common in our period, that male behaviour needs to be regulated and that the household is the place to begin training correct movement, language, control of force, and so on. Bryson's underlying concern is the need to form good habits in childhood in order to avoid what Clement calls 'the habit due to bad upbringing'.[90] Habit-forming is a crucial part of the philosophical armoury of the second sophistic, and the idea of habituation in childhood and youth is widely explored in the moral writings of Plutarch

[88] The image of the husband and wife as two straight and not crooked pieces of wood: § 95 = Musonius XIIIb, p. 90 Lutz = p. 70 Hense. This is based on the proverbial idea of testing the straight by the crooked rule, Aristotle, *On the Soul* 411^{a}5–7 (cf. Plessner 1928: 283), Lyco ap. Diogenes Laertius 5. 66; but there is no exact parallel.

[89] Stobaeus iv. 22a. 25, l. 27 ff.

[90] *Paedagogus* 2. 10bis. 107. 2.

and others like Galen.[91] Bryson has specific things in common with the first section of Galen's *On Morals* in the idea of the naturally good and bad child and the implications of these natural dispositions for adulthood, though there is no sign of direct borrowing. But the bulk of the text concerns instruction in conduct and deportment. For the common assumptions here, let us again consider Plutarch, who as ever is so rich a source of reflection and example. To rid ourselves of the luxury and softness (*malakia*) which generate feelings of anger in us, he says, 'we must habituate (*ethisteon*) the body to self-sufficiency by plain living .... Take food as our starting point: it is no problem to use what has been laid before us in silence...' (*Absence of Anger* 461 C). Starting with food is exactly what Bryson does in his recommendations and it is exactly what Clement does in *Paedagogus* 2. 1. For Bryson 'the first matter is food. The boy must get accustomed to not rushing up before it is set out' (116–17). 'He should only eat what is before him. He should not keep on stretching out his hand, now for one thing, now for another' (118). The long section on food is succeeded by drink; similarly Clement passes from food to drink at *Paedagogus* 2. 2, beginning like Bryson with a recommendation to drink only water (2. 2. 19. 2). Bryson's child/boy is in fact 'to be supervised in every situation involving his food, drink, sleep, standing, sitting, movement, speech, and all matters' (115). There is a 'panoptic'[92] degree of observation in which the medical and scientific ideas (e.g. 136 'soft bedding is bad for the boy because it loosens and opens up [his body]') that crop up throughout the treatise are blended with a 'Victorian' morality to mould the boy into a man. Clearly, such rules were never followed to the degree hoped for; but the *acceptability* of stating them and the *assumption* that they ought to be enforced show us the reason for writing. Supervision of the boy is by both parents and teacher—who is assumed to hit his charge as a matter of course (152).[93] The gendering is strong. As has been noted, only 'the boy', *al-ṣabīy* (= *ho pais*), is spoken of.[94] Second, the boy must pay no attention to clothes, long hair, jewellery, etc., like women and what the Arabic calls *al-mutarrafīn* ('effeminate types' = *malakoi* vel sim.), and he must 'realize the disgrace involved in *taṣannuʿ* ('affected behaviour' = effeminacy)[95] and the aims of those who indulge in it' (140). As we shall see, this is a strong preoccupation of Polemon's. The boy must be trained to be competitive only 'in the field of education/culture' (141, 153), i.e. in *paideia*, and to love and honour his peers, avoiding all 'envious and insolent behaviour' (153–5). It should be noted that these instructions for the child apply to the adult man too (cf. 124, 135, 145, 159–60). In 159–60, the last two paragraphs of section 4 and effectively the end

[91] Cf. e.g. Duff (1999) 72–7 on Plutarch's ideas in *On Moral Virtue* and the *Lives*. Galen: *On Habits* (in *Galeni scripta minora*, ii, ed. Mueller pp. 8–31), *On Morals* (Arabic; English translation by Mattock 1972) with Walzer (1962) 142–63.

[92] I refer of course to Foucault's marvellous *Surveiller* ['supervise', 'inspect'] *et punir* (1975) and his study of Bentham's 'Panopticon'.

[93] Cf. Cribiore (2001) 65–73 on schoolroom violence. Bryson's parent will beat the boy if necessary: §§ 114, 149.

[94] *al-walad*, 'the child' (= *to paidion*) or 'children' (collective noun) is also used but with no hint of the feminine gender.

[95] For this term see Ch. 7 n. 34.

of the treatise, there is advice on sex. The boy should remain a virgin till marriage. Thereafter he and his wife will have no other sexual partner because 'his heart enfolds her and her heart enfolds him' (159). Moreover, if athletes forbear from sexual intercourse to improve their bodily strength, 'those who seek virtue in their soul have all the more reason to abstain from it' (160)—a clear statement of the sexual renunciation which in the following centuries was to throw up the greatest of challenges to the moral set-up of the pagan world.[96]

For any assessment of Bryson it is important to note that the Arabic translation is hardly Islamicized. Not only does the comprehensive moral system outlined here *appear* to accord with the world of Musonius, Plutarch, Dio, Polemon, and the rest—it *does* accord with it and it has not been reformed to suit its later readers. In this respect Bryson is rather like the Leiden *Physiognomy*, which is so lightly Islamicized—even to the extent of making the Greek the ideal type of human being—and contrasts with the Istanbul versions of the text.[97] Later Muslim authors who used Bryson Islamicized by e.g. making religion a starting point of childhood behaviour.[98] Bryson's influence on Muslim discussion of the Islamic family is certainly ironic, because the Islamic family has always been seen as a purely Muslim domain governed exclusively by Islamic law (*fiqh*). But that—regrettably—cannot be explored here. Clearly, Bryson is one author and he cannot stand for a whole culture all by himself. Nevertheless, the nature of a treatise like this is to offer received views. In the area of conjugality and sex Bryson's views were not only orthodox, but also sufficiently in tune with new developments to have been recognized and exploited by Musonius.

Many of the moral assumptions of Polemon's *Physiognomy* are also on view in Bryson. And although Polemon does not comment directly on marriageability, he does physiognomize two disastrous weddings and in a fragment 'regarding women' preserved in Syriac, which (I shall suggest) introduced the predictive chapters preserved at the end of Leiden, he comments on how useful physiognomy would have been to Agamemnon to avoid being murdered by his wife.[99] To introduce the *Physiognomy* and to discuss some questions about the status of its science I should now like to consider a contemporary of Polemon who does apply physiognomy to marriage, Nicostratus of Macedon.

Nicostratus was a professional orator, and though the Byzantine school encyclopedia known as the *Suda* (ν 404) says he was 'included among the ten orators judged to be of secondary rank', he enjoyed a considerable reputation in Antiquity for his charming style. The *Suda* tells us he was a contemporary

[96] The echo of Plato (*Laws* 840 A: the athlete Iccus never touched women or boys) proves Plessner (1928) 24 n. 1 was wrong to suggest these paragraphs are more elaborate than the original. The adaptation of Plato to an exclusively heterosexual context shows the typical second-sophistic focus.

[97] See Ch. 7, pp. 318, 319.

[98] There is even a residue of his thought in perhaps the most famous Muslim ethical thinker, Ghazzali (AD 1058–1111), who decisively delimited the role of Greek philosophy and science in Islam and in some eyes represents the end of the creative period of Greek influence.

[99] Below, pp. 177–8.

of Dio of Prusa, Aelius Aristides, and the emperor Antoninus Pius. Assuming that he was at the height of his career under Pius, to whom he dedicated encomia, he would have been a little younger than Polemon (and lived longer). He may perhaps have known or studied with Dio as a very young man.[100]

It is Stobaeus who preserves parts of his *On Marriage*.[101] There is much traditional material here from *peri gamou* literature (as we see it well for example in the exactly contemporary work of Hierocles the Stoic[102]). Thus Nicostratus is concerned with the bride's health, wealth, her potential for adultery, the husband's sexual infidelity, and the role of the wife as the husband's truest friend. When it comes to choosing the wife,[103] there is again traditional advice not to take account of her family's nobility and to make sure she is used to hard work. There then follows an original section on how to choose.

Since it is not at all clear to the man who is marrying what sort of character the wife will prove to have, this is how Indians do their marrying—and that includes their wise men who are said never to be proved wrong. Well, those Indians don't marry a rich and famous man's daughter because of his money and reputation; rather, they pay a great deal of attention to the girl[104] and to her eyes and her beauty, doing this you understand not for any disgraceful reason nor for the reasons we do, but because of a certain wisdom. For you see good eyes should give proof of the beauty in the soul. It isn't possible for someone to keep his face bright and innocent if he has a temper, anger, or a mood. Again, if a person is villainous and dissembling, he will immediately throw sidelong glances and fearsome looks. Someone who is stupid and simple will have the eyes and pupils wide open—they're like the eyes of sheep and asses. A man who knits his brows is clumsy. If a dark cloud breaks out over someone in place of a blush, his mind cannot possibly be happy. Now, these tokens and signs can be found on girls and women and men themselves. With regard to the Indians the story goes that they can divine from a distance how the wives will turn out. Please don't let anyone criticize me if I'm making a novel use of beauty by advising you to pursue it. I'm not recommending handsome boys and girls; rather I can't speak otherwise if I am to follow the Indians' tale.

So, if we're intending to enjoy relaxation and enjoy entering our homes, we must examine the wife's appearance for signs of intelligence, accomplishment, and generosity. Marrying an ugly wife, then abandoning the home to her—that isn't abandoning the home, it's called escaping the wife! Just as we call for an early assessment of the wife's appearance,

[100] But the connection with Dio is more likely to be extrapolation from stylistic comparisons between Nicostratus and Dio in the rhetorical sources. Nicostratus' ranking may explain the lack of a biography in Philostratus' *Lives*, though he is mentioned favourably at 2. 31, 624 = 123. 14. He is praised by among others Menander Rhetor, Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Art of Rhetoric*, and Hermogenes (cf. Wooten 1987: 148 n. 44). He has been identified with the epigraphically attested T. Aurelianus Nicostratus of Amos (in Caria; *PIR*^{2} A 1427), but see *RE* xvii. 551 (Stegemann) and Puech (2002) 369 for reasonable doubt.

[101] iv. 22d. 102; 4. 23. 62–65.

[102] iv. 22a. 21–24, 24a. 14. The fragments on marriage and other aspects of family life can be found in von Arnim (1906) 48–63.

[103] iv. 22d. 102 (partly in Foerster ii. 275).

[104] *korē*: cf. n. 57.

we should also make an early assessment of the bridegroom's so he doesn't cause upset by being ugly and managing to marry a pretty girl. That is to say, so he doesn't cause upset by being *horrible* and managing to marry a *good, nice* girl.

It's also possible to know the soul of each person from their voice. So, after this, you must examine the wife's voice. A melodious one is rather pleasant early in the day and after lunch. But let the sound be restricted to the softer notes. Shouting or speaking roughly is to be avoided—for this shows the wife is rather mannish ... There are many other things which each of us must pay attention to, but I suspect I've mentioned enough already.

It might be felt that Nicostratus shows some diffidence about advocating a physiognomical inspection of intended brides in his attribution of the practice to the Indian wise men (i.e. the Brahmans). But the Brahmans were idealized in Greek literature,[105] and in this clever and at times ironic, humorous piece of oratory they surely serve to enhance the argument. Nicostratus is talking to an audience, and the Brahmans have a decorative, 'sophistic' function within the story.[106] Inspection of women represents a major difference from Polemon. For though there is physiognomizing of women in Leiden chs. 68 and 69 in order to learn what will happen to them, for the most part Polemon uses women only to provide typological deformations of the male (note Nicostratus on the girl's voice[107]) or sees them as the objects of male lust. Nicostratus may have been reacting against this; the same goes for his light tone in contrast with Polemon's obsessive depiction of treachery, cowardice, and evil. The physiognomical indications of Nicostratus presuppose a wide acceptance of physiognomical analysis among his listeners.[108] But of whose system? The relations of signs and characteristics have virtually no correspondences in either Polemon or Ps.-Aristotle. Were the 'many other things' Nicostratus ends with explained in his own book of physiognomy? If so, was there professional competition with 'the Pinnacle of the Greeks', as Phrynichus calls Polemon (while reproving his Greek)?[109]

There was of course no Association of Physiognomists to rule on correct correspondences between signifier and signified. This freedom encouraged the competition which is so important an aspect of all ancient scientific

[105] See Dio of Prusa, *Or.* 35. 17–25 where Dio uses the truly happy and prosperous Indians to get at the materialistic folk of Apamea Celaenae, with Desideri (1978) 130–1, 181–2.

[106] Cf. Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 12. 12 (p. 407 Rabe) 'he delights in myths and the pleasures that they give. In fact he himself has made up many of them' (tr. Wooten). Stegemann, *RE* xvii. 552–3, notes that Ps.-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Art of Rhetoric* 2. 9 (p. 266. 13 Us.–Rad.) cites Nicostratus as a model of *apheleia* precisely in a discussion of marriage speeches (though there is no explicit reference to our text).

[107] On male stipulations about how women should speak, see Gleason (1995) 94–8, 98–101 (gender boundaries in the voice).

[108] For which see in general the evidence assembled by Evans (1969), and Ch. 1 at n. 56.

[109] *Selections* 396 F. καὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῶν Ἑλλήνων πταίοντα ὁρᾶται. For further criticisms see ibid. 140 (unkindly linked with Favorinus), 424 (the start of Polemon's *Histories*, which are otherwise unknown; note 'Secundus the Grammarian' who 'corrected the sophist's texts').

disciplines and which has been examined in the High Roman Empire by Tamsyn Barton in her interesting book, *Power and Knowledge* (1994*b*). Barton has applied a heavily Foucauldian gaze to the 'rhetorical' methodological frameworks of physiognomy, astrology, and (aspects of the) medical texts in the second century. By 'rhetorical' she is calling attention to the apparently pointless complexity of, for example, Galen's classification of the pulse. She suggests that we should move away from the traditional 'scientific' interpretation of seeing such complexity as a natural development of Aristotelian logic, and relocate it in the practitioner's need to blind opponents with a display of knowledge, deriving his own power and status from an ability to persuade others to take his system seriously. The competitiveness so widely attested in this period is indeed in evidence in the *Physiognomy* as a text with its pedagogical stipulations on how to learn and its guarantee to deliver expertise to readers who follow it. Polemon is certainly saying, *this* text is better than others in the field. But the legacy of Aristotelian division in science is not necessarily to be written off as a rhetorical strategy. It *is* how science empowers itself; but it is also how science is happiest with itself and needs to be. One has to go into minute detail to classify the 50,000 + species of weevils which form most of the superfamily 'Curculionoidea'. Doing this is not (only) a case of browbeating opponents, but (often) rather of attempting to provide comprehensive information about nature. Of course, in the ancient world science was often not done quietly in a Natural History Museum. Galen's public displays of anatomy were what made his reputation at Rome (*On Prognosis*) and such practices were instrumental in the identification of the best practitioner (*On Examinations By Which the Best Physicians are Recognized*).[110] But, having said that, Galen's massive tomes on the pulse were written for, and received with thanks by, other physicians. The most masterful example of detailed scientific explication from the second century—Ptolemy's *Almagest* (*c.*150)—had a similarly grateful and long-lived reception.[111] Ptolemy told a few white lies to tie up awkward loose ends; but in essence his work was practical. The endless copying and translation of such books shows they were found very useful, and not empty, rhetorical constructions. It is the same with physiognomy. We may find Polemon's minute categorization of the eye confusing to read (though I shall argue later that it is logical enough).[112] But Adamantius and the Anonymus Latinus did not. For the Anonymus, Polemon is 'our authority', while Adamantius calls his book 'a universal boon for those who will encounter it' (A1). Arabic readers simply knew him as 'the Master of Physiognomy'. One could argue that Polemon's definitive treatment *did* come to provide a standard which had been lacking (despite the attachment of Aristotle's name to the two tracts known as the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy*), though physiognomical descriptions in literature continued to reflect individual interpretations and the epitomes of Adamantius show the same (and expected) freedom. As to Nicostratus, I would suggest that he was promoting the claims of another system or his

110 Nutton (1979), Iskandar (1988).

111 See the magnificent translation by Toomer (1984).

112 Below pp. 181–5, 187.

own system. The business of marriage, with which I began this section on the culture of observation and evaluation, was so fraught with difficulty that an audience might well have listened to anything that made the chances of a mismatch less likely. Unfortunately for Nicostratus and others like him Polemon's book extinguished any record of their own treatises.

III. THE 'INTOLERABLE'[113] POLEMON: CAREER AND PERSONALITY

'The deeds of the arrogant Polemon are clearly presented in the *Lives of the Sophists*' (*Suda* υ 389). Let us then start with Philostratus' account.[114] Every ancient reader of the *Lives* knew of Polemon 'the Pinnacle of the Greeks'. Polemon is introduced in the earlier life of the extraordinary cryptorchid sophist and philosopher, Favorinus.

> The quarrel between Polemon and Favorinus began in Ionia where the Ephesians attached themselves to Favorinus while Smyrna admired Polemon. It grew worse at Rome where consuls and sons of consuls applauded the one or the other and started in them that competition for honour (*philotimia*) which sets alight great feelings of envy even in men who are wise. They may be forgiven for their *philotimia*, because human nature thinks of '*to philotimon* as untouched by age'; but they should be criticized for the speeches they wrote against each other because such abusiveness is disgraceful and brings shame even to those who speak of it (*VS* 1. 8, 490–1 = 10. 13–24).[115]

Favorinus was born about the same time as Polemon. The rivalry between them underlies one of the best known scenes in the *Physiognomy* (Leiden ch. 1 A20) and was famous enough for the easy identification of its unnamed victim by the Anonymus Latinus (ch. 40). This long-running dispute has all the hallmarks of a fight between 'rival practitioners' (*VS* 1. 8, 491 = 10. 27). But it is also firmly enmeshed in the disputes between neighbouring cities for which this era is notorious. The amplification of the quarrel at Rome may go back to Polemon's first known visit there on an embassy representing the interests of Smyrna to Trajan, when the emperor gave him the privilege of travelling without having to pay port dues (*VS* 1. 25, 532 = 44. 3–4).[116] If so, both men were on the make, trying to impress Rome's elite with their intellectual powers. But more noteworthy is the willingness of two leading Greek cities to allow men still perhaps in their mid-twenties to represent their own competing interests. Both Favorinus and Polemon were extremely rich, and this no doubt added to

[113] Syme (1958) i. 511 'the intolerable Polemo, in perambulation from country to country, with a princely household, with horses and hunting dogs'.

[114] See esp. Campanile (1999), also Quet (2003).

[115] On Favorinus see e.g. Gleason (1995), Holford-Strevens (2003) 98–130. Philostratus' quotation is from Thucydides' Funeral Speech, 2. 44. 4.

[116] In 113 according to Stegemann (1952) 1333; cf. Campanile (1999) 274–5.

their appeal. In the tiny circle of elite intellectual activity the two combatants could hardly have avoided one another.[117] As ever, the merging of politics and culture is striking.

Polemon did not in fact come from Smyrna, but from the important wool-producing city of Laodicea on the Lycus at the head of the Maeander valley, 'in the hinterland, but more powerful than cities on the coast', as Philostratus observes at the start of his biography (*VS* 1. 25, 530 = 42. 14–15). The family had had a remarkable career as petty dynasts and intellectuals from the late Republic onwards. Shortly after Polemon's death another member, M. Antonius Zeno, perhaps his brother, would attain the consulship.[118] The success of the family owes a great deal to their absolute support for Rome, beginning with the first member to rise to international prominence, Zeno of Laodicea, who resisted the Parthian troops led by the renegade Labienus in the year 40 BC. The rewards which followed made the family (even more) wealthy and gave them a pedigree of pro-Roman political activity that evidently brought major benefits to the cities where they were influential.[119] Polemon's property in Smyrna was the best in the city (534 = 44. 32–45. 1). Descendants of petty kings (who were always intermarried with the Greek nobilities) had been among the first of the eastern elites to enter the Roman senate, and they were particularly favoured by Trajan.[120] Thus Polemon's ancestry made him a natural choice to represent Smyrna, especially as he had lived there since his teens (530 = 42. 18–19). Along with other top dogs of the city he was allowed the privilege of riding the sacred trireme which was brought into the agora in full sail during the city's annual civic ritual. Polemon benefited Smyrna by bringing in rich pupils. Philostratus is one of the first authors to invest the word 'Hellene' with a sense of a member of traditional pagan society, and I have argued elsewhere that his awareness of the growing importance of Christianity was a motive in doing this.[121] So it was 'a pure and select Greece' that Polemon attracted as his pupils (531 = 42. 32). It is in fact very difficult to get from Philostratus a clear idea of what teaching activity and its economic and social aspects involved.[122]

[117] Cf. Pliny the Younger, *Letters* 2. 3, on the performance at Rome of the sophist Isaeus about AD 97/8 (cf. *VS* 1. 10, 512–14 = 26. 9–27. 26). The letter shows well enough how such performances were used to affirm social credentials—the senator and governor who is the addressee (Sherwin-White 1966: 146–7) is told by Pliny that he too has to go along ('you must hear Isaeus—if only to say you have done').

[118] In 148: Halfmann (1979) no. 74. Of later descendants, cf. nn. 25, 128, 131 on Hermocrates.

[119] On the family, see Bowersock (1965) 143–4, (1969) 22–3; Halfmann (1979) 44–5, 162–3 (for no. 74), Salmeri (2002) 58–9; Puech (2002) 527–30; Thonemann (2004) with revised stemma; *PIR*^{2} A 862.

[120] Halfmann (1979) 48–9.

[121] Cf. above, n. 5.

[122] We may compare the sophist Scopelian's ability to attract to Smyrna ('a gateway by land and sea') 'Ionians, Lydians, Carians, Maeonians [an archaism for those inhabiting the region between Phrygia and Lydia], Aeolians, the Hellenes from Mysia and Phrygia ... Cappadocians, Assyrians [archaism for Syrians] ... Egyptians, Phoenicians, the most illustrious of the Achaeans, and all the youth of Athens' (518 = 31. 15–23).

For this, the detailed evidence of the fourth-century sophist, Libanius of Antioch, is crucial. If one looks at the networks of pupils (often sons or relatives of earlier ones) who came from all over the eastern empire, it is possible to envisage the really extraordinary pull of a major teacher and the enduring political and social contacts he created.[123] If we couple this with the wealth and ancestry of Polemon, it is possible to realize why Philostratus accords him the second longest life, which is placed in pole position at the end of the first of his two books of biographies.[124]

Philostratus next discusses Polemon's political and financial benefits to Smyrna. The city had been rent by factions (nothing is known of this), but Polemon calmed the situation down.[125] Next, 'Hadrian had previously favoured Ephesus, but Polemon converted him so much to Smyrna that on a single day he lavished ten million on the city' (531 = 43. 6–8). Hadrian's benefactions are attested by an inscription which lists the gifts (including, notably, permission to build a second temple of the imperial cult with attendant Olympic games) as coming about 'through the agency of Antonius Polemon'.[126] The religious cult of the emperors was an extremely important expression of both civic pride and rivalry and of the relationship between provincial cities and the centre of the Empire.[127] As well as promoting civic festivals and games, the cult was another outlet for the rich and ambitious to promote themselves and serve Roman interests. Among Polemon's forebears was at least one high priest of the cult, and it is possible that he himself held such a position as a result of the new temple he had helped to secure.[128] This celebration of Polemon's career continues with a notice on his advice to the Smyrnaeans about which legal disputes they should deal with at home and which ones they should refer to the Roman governor (532 = 43. 16–22).[129]

[123] For this aspect of Libanius' teaching see the detailed study of Petit (1957).

[124] Book 1 actually ends with the very brief sketch of Secundus which serves to introduce the hero of book 2, the fabulously rich sophist and politician Herodes Atticus (below, pp. 173–4), whose life is the longest. But Secundus may well be identical with Polemon's copy-editor of this name (above, n. 109), though Philostratus is silent on the matter.

[125] Campanile (1999) 277–8 draws a parallel with the Sardian troubles of which Plutarch reminds the addressee of *Political Advice*, Menemachus of Sardis (825 D), and about which Apollonius of Tyana wrote so bitterly in his letters to the Sardians (*Epp.* 38–41, 56, 75, 76; to which add no. 75a in the edition and commentary of Penella 1979).

[126] *IGR* IV. 1431 = *IK* 24. 1 (I.Smyrna II.1) no. 697. 33 ff. with Petzl's notes ad loc., cf. Quet (2003) 414–23. On Hadrian and Smyrna see Boatwright (2000) 157–62 (including evidence for the temple of Zeus Akraios which housed the cult of Hadrian). As Boatwright points out, the inscription files Hadrian's gifts with those of other benefactors—a powerful statement of the city's own worth.

[127] See esp. Price (1984*a*), id. (1984*b*), cf. Collas-Heddeland (1995). Cf. *IGR* IV 1398 = *IK* 24. 1 (I.Smyrna II.1) no. 594 (AD 124) 'in the most happy times of the emperor dearest to the gods, Trajanus Hadrianus Caesar Augustus, when the whole world under him sacrifices and prays for the everlasting continuation of him and his unconquered government...' (Keil's restorations).

[128] Halfmann (1979) 162. Polemon: Gleason (1995) 23–4. But Puech (2002) 527–9 argues strongly that the 'priesthoods' referred to by Polemon's descendant Hermocrates (see below, n. 131) refer to a municipal office rather than the high priesthood of the province.

[129] Cf. Plutarch, *Political Advice*, ch. 19, 814 E–816 A, on the hope that the cities will not 'bring on a reproach of slavery' by referring every matter to the governor; similarly Dio of Prusa, *Or.* 34. 38–9.

All this brought 'glory to Smyrna' (532 = 43. 27–8). But Polemon incurred criticism for his way of life: 'whenever he travelled, there followed behind him a great many baggage animals, horses, servants, and specialist breeds of dog for this or that type of hunting, while he himself would proceed in a Phrygian or Gallic carriage with silver-mounted bridles' (532 = 43. 23–6). Campanile nicely illustrates the level of Polemon's luxury by citing an outraged Pliny the Elder on the costly outfitting of Gallic carriages.[130] This glory was reflected in the privileges granted by Trajan and Hadrian (532–3 = 44. 3–27). These were jealously guarded by later generations, as Polemon's great-grandson Hermocrates is made to state with full Polemonian arrogance at *VS* 2. 25, 611 (= 111. 19–22).[131] When the Smyrnaeans complained to Hadrian that Polemon had spent money given to them on himself, such was his influence, says Philostratus, that Hadrian wrote a letter to the effect that 'Polemon has rendered me accounts'. But Philostratus adds that he would not have been forgiven, had he not excelled in oratory and specifically delivered an 'amazing' oration to celebrate Hadrian's completion of the huge temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens in 131/2.[132] Hadrian's impact on the development of Athens was enormous. The temple itself had been half-built for several centuries. Finishing it was a major statement of imperial benefaction. Moreover it was part of Hadrian's establishment of the pan-Greek organization called the Panhellenion, by which he sought to give his blessing to Athens as the centre of the Greek East and to extend the role of his own cult.[133] It is well known that there is no evidence of involvement in this organization by the important cities of Asia Minor including Smyrna, and although most evidence for the Panhellenion is epigraphical and a new discovery could change things overnight, the most reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this is that they did not wish to participate in something designed to affirm the ancestral precedence of the ancient cities of Athens, Sparta, and Argos over themselves.[134] Thus Polemon's presence may not have been entirely popular at home, and it would surely be right to see tension between the

[130] (1999) 279–80. Pliny, *Natural Hist.* 34. 162–3 for the Gauls' skill in silver-plating vehicles ('the luxuriousness has extended to [supplying] gold figurines ... it is now called "stylish" to wear out such objects on our carriages!').

[131] 'Crowns, immunities, public meals, (the use of) purple, priesthoods'. Purple refers probably to official Roman religious garb: Casartelli (1998) 117; but the matter is disputed. For such grants cf. 589 = 93. 11–13 'public meals, front row seats, immunities, priesthoods, and all else that adds lustre to a man', and the story of the removal of Philiscus' immunities by Caracalla at 622–23 = 121. 18–122. 23. On Hermocrates cf. recently Jones (2003).

[132] Cf. Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 27 on the temple of Zeus-Hadrian at Cyzicus. Aristides used the occasion of the temple's repairs following an earthquake to celebrate the building, the reigning emperors (Marcus and Lucius Verus), and to promote the *homonoia* of the cities of the Asia—Polemon's celebration of Hadrian, Zeus, and the Panhellenion (see below) will have been similar.

[133] On the temple (and the organization) see Boatwright (2000) 145–53 with bibliography. The temple of Zeus was finished to the plan initiated in the early 2nd c. BC, but the design of the court surrounding it was very Roman. For Hadrian's ideas (Hellenism, identification with Zeus Olympios and Panhellenios, importance of the Eleusinian Mysteries) in setting up the Panhellenion, see esp. Spawforth (1999).

[134] Cf. e.g. Aelius Aristides' celebration of Smyrna in *Or.* 17, which begins by informing the visiting governor that the city's antiquity goes back to the gods (3 ff.).

imperial 'command' (Philostratus) and the aristocrat's own freedom of action. As we shall see later, Polemon had his own ideas of Greek purity which he combines with some criticism of Rome.[135]

For now, Philostratus continues the theme of Hadrian's favouritism towards Polemon and in particular tells the anecdote of Polemon evicting from his house the future emperor Antoninus Pius, who had lodged there one night during his governorship of Asia in 135/6 (534–5 = 44. 27–45. 28).[136] Philostratus uses the story to highlight 'the mildness of the king and the arrogance of the man. For in truth Polemon was so arrogant that he conversed with cities as one superior, with princes as one not inferior, and with gods as an equal' (535 = 45. 30–46. 1). Philostratus does not bother to point out something all his (elite) readers knew perfectly well, that among the 'immunities' enjoyed by a leading orator was exemption from 'boarding' (*epistathmeia*).[137] In other words, Polemon was probably entitled to ask Antoninus Pius to leave. The issue was the arrogant way he did it by evicting the proconsul in the middle of the night.[138] But Polemon and all his (elite) friends knew the law meant nothing if it was not enforced. The final part of the anecdote bears on this. Philostratus is unable to pass by a joke and he records that when an actor threatened to take Polemon to court (*ephienai*) for having expelled him from the Olympic competition (i.e. the one founded by Hadrian at Smyrna to celebrate its second temple of the imperial cult),[139] and Antoninus discovered this had happened at midday, 'the emperor[140] replied wittily, "But it was around midnight when he expelled me from his house, and I did not take him to court"' (534–5 = 45. 21–8).[141] Whatever the law said, the witty Antoninus implied that he *could* have prosecuted Polemon.[142] And whatever status he and his family enjoyed, Polemon and his like were fully aware of the precariousness of their position in relation to any emperor, no matter how mild his public persona.

Polemon, then, was a man who by breeding and instinct was extremely well versed in the civic and imperial political game. This political society is the background to much of the *Physiognomy* and should be understood in the caricatures of enemies surviving in the Leiden version. I shall have more to say about

[135] Below, p. 197–9.

[136] Date: see recently Ritti (1997).

[137] For this term see e.g. Robert (1946) and the other bibliography assembled in Campanile (1999) 298–9 n. 110. Note also *Digest* 50. 4. 18. 30 'Both the deified Vespasian and the deified Hadrian issued rescripts to the effect that teachers who are released from civil *munera* and grammarians and orators and doctors and philosophers had been granted immunity from billeting by the emperors' (trans. Watson).

[138] Ironically Polemon's privilege of free travel (cf. above) probably gave him the right to demand board from others lacking exemption.

[139] 530 = 42. 22; *IGR* IV. 1431. 37 = *IK* 24. 1 (I.Smyrna II.1) 697. 37 with Petzl *ad loc.*

[140] Presumably in fact during Antoninus' proconsulship.

[141] More of the anecdote is told at 541 = 52. 16–21.

[142] For Antoninus' wit in official communications, cf. Williams (1976) 74–8. On the realities of entertaining the governor and his followers, cf. Plutarch quoted below, p. 169.

it in the next section. For the moment, I want to part from Philostratus (who proceeds to discuss Polemon's character and his rhetorical activity) and to examine two hostile epigrams about Polemon by a certain Ammianus, the author of a number of satirical poems collected in book 11 of the *Greek Anthology* which relate to the elite culture of the second century. Ammianus naturally had it in for intellectuals and like Lucian ridiculed the overbearing atticizing of some of his contemporaries.[143] These epigrams have been discussed with many attractive suggestions by Gideon Nisbet.[144] It may be that Ammianus' wit was revenge on some of Polemon's own *asteismoi*, 'witticisms', which Philostratus gives us a flavour of at 540–2 (=50. 31–52. 22).[145] The epigrams naming Polemon (11. 180–1) run as follows:

Εἰδοῖς οὐ κρίνει Πολέμων, νώναις κατακρίνει·
κἂν δῷς, κἂν μὴ δῷς, ἔστιν ἀεὶ Πολέμων.

On the Ides Polemon refuses judgement, on the Nones he finds against you.
If you give, or if you don't give, he's the same old Polemon.

Ἤιδειμεν, Πολέμων, Ἀντώνιον ὄντα σε πάντες.
ἐξαπίνης τρία σοι γράμματα πῶς ἔλιπεν;

We all know, Polemon, that you are Antonios.
How come three letters have suddenly dropped off you?

Nisbet has in fact pursued more of a vendetta against Polemon than Ammianus by trying to connect with him (any) other poems by Ammianus;[146] but the two epigrams here constitute the limits of our knowledge. The first poem attacks Polemon's impartiality as a judge. It is full of bilingual and bicultural jokes. Εἰδοῖς ('On the Ides') would have been pronounced in a similar way to εἰ δῷς 'if you give', i.e. 'if you bribe him'. Ewen Bowie, reported by Nisbet, has made the attractive suggestion of finding in νώναις ('on the nones') the Latin phrase 'non aes' ('no cash'), which would have been pronounced very similarly. Ides and nones are part of the Roman calendar, of course, and the point of mentioning them is not factual but to make suggestions about Polemon being in the pocket of the governor. No bilingualism as such is implied either

[143] 11. 157; cf. Lucian's *Teacher of Rhetoric* 13, 16 and *Lexiphanes* 2–15 for similar fun against those who used obsolete words.

[144] (2003) esp. 145 ff. There are regrettably a number of errors in this study, one of which must be pointed out straightaway: Polemon did not write 'a physiognomonic explanation of the events of the Trojan War' (153, cf. 163). The reference is actually to a work written nine centuries after his death by Isaac I Comnenus, and the misattribution is as bad as, but less amusing than, the ascription of a book by G. Anderson to G. Bowersock (bibliography, p. 214 *et al.*).

[145] These *bons mots* are in prose; but it is worth remembering that composition of epigrams was an important social skill, and that Polemon would certainly have composed little pieces for dinners and other occasions. Among his ancestors, (Julius) Polemon (II) (king of Pontus 37–63) composed epigrams which found their way into the *Greek Anthology* ([5. 68], 9. 746, 11. 38). The two genuine pieces are 'pompous and insipid. . . [and of] small credit', and well reflect a man who 'was personally undistinguished in the high social position which he owed to his family's connexions' (Gow and Page 1968, ii. 400–1).

[146] e.g. 11. 230 addressed to a Marcus, 11. 229 on a victim of gout. None of this is convincing (and reminds me of Nisbet's comment, 2003: 156 n. 56, about the 'tirelessly speculative Birley', for whom cf. n. 164 below).

in Ammianus or his audience: ides and nones were perfectly well known to any Greek.[147] As to 'non aes', such a phrase is so basic that the assumption many readers would pick it up is on the right lines. Effectively it constitutes a tag, and the common use of such tags as codeswitches certainly implies some degree of familiarity with the accessed code—Roman culture—while the speaker may remain firmly, as here, within the framework of his matrix language and culture (Greek).[148] Ammianus was probably pleased to use a joke which depends on parallel processing of Latin and Greek;[149] but he was surely not the first to have thought of it. Nisbet has made the suggestion that behind 'same old Polemon' of line 2 lurks another bilingualism, from Latin *emere*, 'to buy' (which can have the pejorative sense of 'bribe'). This is clever, but unlikely to be right, because the assumed use of the Latin root with the Greek present participle ending -ων would mean one of two things: either that Ammianus' readers were regularly using Latin to converse and therefore able to codeswitch and be understood to be doing this; or that we are dealing with a codeswitch with a full-time job, i.e. a borrowing—and there is no evidence either that they regularly spoke Latin or that *emere* was ever taken into Greek.[150] As to the second epigram here, the removal of three letters from Polemon's Roman *gentilicium* gives the Greek word ὤνιος, 'for sale', 'venal'.[151] Again, the Smyrnaean allegations of peculation reported in Philostratus lie behind the witticism. All in all, the 'intolerable' Polemon is damned fairly comprehensively in these two poems, and for that reason they should perhaps be dated shortly after his death.

Greed for money is a charge thrown around very commonly, including in the *Physiognomy*. Dio of Prusa was accused *inter alia* of the same thing before Pliny the Younger during Pliny's governorship of Bithynia about 110/112.[152] As with Hadrian and Polemon, Trajan writes back about the accounts that Dio 'does not and should not refuse' inspection. Dio's friendship with Trajan has been the basis of at least one scholar's career; but there is no good evidence for it other than Dio's own claims in *Orr.* 45. 3 and 47. 22 before the Prusans, and even Dio only ventures 'perhaps friendship'. We should bear this case in mind when trying to assess what Polemon's relationship with Hadrian was really like. It was natural to Philostratus to talk up sophists' friendships with those in power because he himself claims friendship with some of the

[147] Cf. Plutarch, *Roman Questions* 25, 269 E–270 A, further the joke etymologies at *Table Talks* 8. 6, 726 E–F (Latin terms to do with eating and drinking, i.e. social life), *Platonic Questions* 1010 D 'nearly all men are familiar with' Latin (i.e. they know something about it). In general, see Rochette (1997).

[148] For codeswitch, matrix language, etc., see Myers-Scotton (1993*a*) and (1993*b*), cf. Adams, Janse, and Swain (2002) 1–20 on bilingualism in the ancient world, including codeswitching.

[149] Cf. Cicero's comments at *Letters to his Friends* 9. 22. 3, with Swain (2002) 155.

[150] For real examples of bilingual epigrams, go to the fourth-century Latin poet Ausonius, who constantly plays on his readers' knowledge of Greek. See e.g. Adams (1983) on the amusing alphabet of *ep.* 87.

[151] The humour is very typical of Ammianus: cf. 11. 230 Μαστaύρων ἀφελὼν δύο γράμματα, Μᾶρκε, τὰ πρῶτα | ἄξιος εἶ πολλῶν τῶν ὑπολειπομένων, 'If you take away the first two letters from Mastaura, Marcus | You are worth the rest over and over', punning on the town name Mastaura and the punishment of crucifixion, *stauros*. Cf. Nisbet (2003) 135–6.

[152] Pliny, *Letters* 10. 81–2.

Severan royals. He likes the idea that intellectuals are respected and cherished by men of influence. One suspects that the somewhat crabby and awkward Dio would have annoyed as busy and as hardworking an emperor as Trajan. With Polemon on the other hand, there was the confidence that comes from belonging to an ancient dynasty, the style and dash that characterizes the young aristocrat with his hunting dogs and cars, and the emperor Hadrian's own deep obsession with Greek culture. The opportunities for ingratiation may have increased if Favorinus and other intellectuals fell from favour with the emperor.[153] Perhaps, as Philostratus asserts, what made Hadrian forgive Polemon for everything was his oratory—which, however, cut no ice with the witty Ammianus.

We have some autobiography about Polemon and Prince Hadrian in the *Physiognomy* itself, and I now wish to turn to this passage, which survives only in the Leiden Arabic ch. 1 A12. Discussion has been dominated by G. W. Bowersock's appendix in his *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire.*[154] The important thing about the passage is its symbolism. On the surface, it could be taken as showing the closeness of the courtier to the king with whom he is travelling around. Yet Polemon was not, like Dio, making justifications of his policies in public and purporting to be a firm friend of the emperor in order to gain credibility at home. What he says about Hadrian therefore repays close study, for in fact there is no other personal account of being with an emperor from a Greek author of this time. First, though, I must dwell on the matter of the placenames in the text and the itinerary followed by Polemon. The problem with Bowersock's discussion is that (*a*) he only quotes the text in Arabic, so it is difficult for most readers to see what is going on, and (*b*) he does not quote all the relevant passage. Had he done so, he would have noticed that the placename he takes to be 'Asia' is where Athens is located. Evidently this cannot be right.[155]

I accompanied the great king once and, while we were travelling with him from *Br'qh* to *Asyh*, and with the king were his armies[156] and boats, that man mixed with them. We passed through many towns until we reached the sea. Then he sailed to *Bwn* and *'lsrws*, [13ᵃ] and the lands of Lydia and Phrygia, and many places. Next we returned to *Ásyh* through the two seas in the sea, and he [sc. Hadrian] went east to *Rwks*. Then he went in the ships to *'yns*,[157] and by this route the ships of the sea began to catch up with the king. When we reached *Ásyh*, and I went to see that man, there he was with his companions surrounding the king, bearing weapons.

[153] Swain (1989); but see Bowie (1997) on the unreliability of such anecdotes.

[154] (1969), app. II, pp. 120–3.

[155] Note that the names below are transliterated in their consonantal skeletons, as in the translation in Ch. 8.

[156] Cf. Fronto quoted below at n. 176.

[157] Bowersock stops here. 'The narrative proceeds, after this, by describing how—in Asia—a man of particularly suspect physiognomy had made an attempt on the emperor's life.' But Bowerwock himself locates Hadrian in Athens (*'yns*). Note that Hoffmann prints *'nys* (انيس; transliterated as 'Anis'). The MS is a little ambiguous, but *'yns* is correct. For the purposes of redotting, there is no difference.

Emendations in Arabic cannot easily be represented in the Roman alphabet because many Arabic letters are distinguished from each other only by one or more dots written above or below the letter, and since these dots were not always written in manuscripts, copyists were at liberty to add their own as they saw fit or to ignore dots already there, especially in the case of names. The result is that foreign names in particular may acquire a form that looks quite different from the original, and may be quite impossible to understand. In addition, the end of foreign words is liable to change. Having said all this, the Leiden manuscript is at least written in a clear hand and by considering possible variations of dots considerable progress can be made in the passage above. Hoffmann, who was, as has been remarked, a very competent Arabist, proposed all the emendations which Bowersock attributes to von Premerstein or himself.[158] Athens is easy enough: اينس (*'yns*) can be redotted to اثيني (*'thyny*) or اثينى (*'thynā*) or even اثينس (*'thyns*).[159] براقه (*Br'qh* or *Brāqh*) can be redotted to ثراقة (*Thrāqa*). *Asyh*, *Āsyh* (آسيه), where Athens is located, *must* represent Achaia (the Roman name of the province of Greece)—and this is perfectly possible. In some dialects of Greek the letter *chi* was palatalized into a 'sh' sound,[160] and hence in some Arabic authors we find forms like *Ashilūs* for Achilles or *anṭalāshiyā* for *entelekheia*. This may point to a Syrian environment.[161] All we need to do is repoint: آسيه becomes اشية (*Ashya, Ashayya*, etc.).[162] Thus Hadrian went from Thrace to Achaia. From there he journeyed to Ionia.[163] Then comes a problem: 'and *'lsrws*'. Bowersock's suggestion of السردس (**al-srds*) is based on the use of the definite article with Sardis in Greek (αἱ Σάρδεις). This may be right: though Arabic does not routinely use the definite article with city

[158] 'Fortunately ... von Premerstein had the manuscript examined ... by a competent orientalist ... After so much progress, it was regrettable that von Premerstein yielded to sheer fantasy ... There remain ... two further difficulties which can now be resolved both by conjecture on its own merits and by confirmatory reference to the *HA*.' At least von Premerstein realized that *'yns* (which he read as *'nys* after Hoffmann) had to be located in *Āsyh*: where he went wrong was (on the advice of his *two* orientalists, Juynboll and Geyer) to insist on turning *'yns* into *mīs*, 'Mysia' (not an obvious thing to do with the Arabic): (1908) 55. For Hoffmann see Ch. 1, p. 5.

[159] Note that the (') represents the *hamza* or light glottal stop which is often omitted in writing leaving only its carrier (here *alif*); *alif* may itself represent a long *a*-vowel. It may be noted that the normal (vocalized) Arabic form of Athens is *Athīniyya* (ending in *tā' marbūṭa*) or *Athīniyyā* (ending in *alif*, not *alif maqsūra*); but an ending in *sīn* is found rarely (e.g. in the Arabic of Artemidorus). There is a little evidence to suggest that the translator was deliberately staying close to the Greek forms: see n. 164 on ?Damascus.

[160] The old value of chi [kʰ], aspirated plosive, had already shifted to [x], unvoiced spirant, by around the 2nd c. AD. The palatalization of chi to [ʃ] (and also of kappa to [tʃ]) before 'i' or 'e' is not surprising. The phenomenon in modern times seems to be restricted to the Cappadocian subdialects (as they then were) and Cypriot. Cf. Dawkins (1916) 71, Newton (1972) 26.

[161] Zimmermann (1986) 114 with bibliography in nn. 27–30, and app. ii, p. 136 on Kindi's preference for Syrian, Greek-speaking translators, one of whom from Homs (Emesa) provides evidence of the palatalized form. Fritz Zimmermann kindly brings to my attention in addition Bar Bahlūl, *Lexicon* ii. 294. 25–6 (Duval) Syriac *'rkymydys*, Arabic *'rshmyds* (Archimedes).

[162] Note that the copyist of the Leiden no doubt meant 'Asia' by أسيه (properly أسية), since he regularly omits the diacritical marks of the *tā' marbūṭa*. That the first of the three examples is apparently marked *Āsyh* rather than *Ásyh* shows error or uncertainty.

[163] Repoint بون to يون. Cf. ch. 1 A11, where the MS has *Nwn*, نون, and below, 200. The correct form seems to be اونيا as in the Arabic Artemidorus, p. 35. 3 Fahd.

names, it not infrequently does (al-Qahira, al-Riyad, al-Mawsil, etc.). It is just possible in *'lsrws* that the *'l-* represents a corruption of *ilá*, 'to', leaving us with a placename based on the letters *s-r-w-s*. It would not be implausible to suggest Smyrna—both because the Arabic *mīm* ('m') could have been missed in hasty copying, and because we have to ask what city Polemon is likely to have mentioned in Ionia?[164] From this place (whatever it is) they all went up to Lydia and Phrygia. Next Polemon and others returned to Achaia 'through the two seas in the sea'. The reading *baḥrayn* ('two seas') was missed by Hoffmann and von Premerstein's competent orientalist. The 'b' is not dotted, but seems clear from its position. The *ḥ* can only be a *ḥ* because it is marked with a *muhmal* sign, which signals that it is not the same-shaped letter with dots (not necessarily written in) which represents a *kh* or a *j*.[165] The text, then, seems to be clear: how to interpret it is another matter. One might suggest a journey through the Icarian and Myrtoian seas, which lie within the (greater) Aegean (the name of which may have dropped out after 'sea').[166] Whatever this means, Hadrian meanwhile 'went east to Rhodes'.[167] Then he went to Athens. Presumably Polemon and the others had taken a slow boat, since it is evident that they only reached Achaia after Hadrian. It was there (in Achaia) that Polemon found his enemy. It is also plain why he did not like him: unlike Polemon, who had been sent off, the enemy had remained with Hadrian all the time.

The placenames in the account are, then, fairly certain (with the exception of *'lsrws*). It is clear from other sources that the journey must be fitted into the spring or summer of 124. Helmut Halfmann has made the most progress in identifying Hadrian's stopping points. He contends that one should start with the epigraphical record and use Polemon's account as part of it. That is sound; but many of the calling points are not in fact securely dated.

[164] Note Leiden ch. 69, where Hoffmann may well be right to take زمروين as زمورني (*Zmwrnī*, Smyrna). Bowersock's Sardis keeps Birley in business, (1997) 168–70. The problems of placenames may be illustrated by 'a town called *Dmsws* (دمسوس)' at Leiden ch. 69, where Hoffmann's restoration of Samos on the basis of Anonymus Latinus 133 is not justified (see note to translation). By the easiest of emendations *Dmsws* becomes *Dmsqs* (دمسقس) as if rendering Δαμασκός. It is difficult to believe that the translator would have avoided the regular form Dimashq; but cf. n. 159, and note that Ibn Asakir's great history of Damascus begins with the story of how Alexander the Great founded the city and named it after his slave *Dmsqs* (thereby indicating familiarity with the Greek form of the name, which is used in Syriac alongside the normal *drmswq*; cf. Payne Smith s.vv.).

[165] Respectively (medial forms) ـحـ, ـخـ, ـجـ, (the latter two giving Hoffmann's 'straits'—see n. 106 to our translation—or 'islands', an alternative suggested in his notes ad loc.). Bowersock took Hoffmann's 'insulas' and produced a reading that 'makes infinitely more sense... الجزير [*al-jazīr*], "islands".' However, this form is not attested either as a sg. or a pl.

[166] Cf. Arabic *baḥr Īǧih*, 'Aegean Sea'.

[167] Rhodes is an easy change from روكس (*Rwks*) to رودس (*Rwds*). Eagle-eyed readers will notice Bowersock printed a question mark after 'went east' (شرق); but the word is clear.

It is noticeable that those that are are all in Ionia (Smyrna, Erythrae, Ephesus).[168] As Peter Weiß has observed, Polemon's Thrace must be added to the journey which according to Halfmann began from winter headquarters in Bithynia.[169] At some point early in 124, then, Hadrian went to Thrace. It may be that Polemon joined him there because of family landholdings in the area.[170] Then Hadrian went down through Greece while his boats followed along the coast.[171] Next he crossed to Provincia Asia. Weiß notes Polemon's classicizing preference for the ancient names of Ionia, Lydia, Phrygia, whereas he does not name Mysia or Bithynia (but we should note that stopping points in these areas are *not* securely attested). Moreover, we must now accept that Polemon is happy to use 'Achaia': like anyone else who was in the train of the emperor, he describes things through Roman eyes.[172] On his own territory he uses the old names. By the start of October 124 Hadrian was back in Athens, where he was initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries.[173]

Polemon chooses to style the emperor the 'Great King', recalling the ancient Persian kings Darius, Xerxes and so on. The use of classicizing terminology for Roman institutions is well known. The institutions of the old Persian empire, so familiar from classical Greek literature (Herodotus especially), were sometimes also used. At Lucian, *Toxaris* 17, for example, we again find 'Great King'—a purely literary affectation.[174] In Plutarch's attack on Roman moneylenders in *Against Borrowing* the comparison is hostile. 'Just as Darius sent Datis and Artaphernes to Athens with chains and bonds for the prisoners, so they bring their chests full of contracts and bills like fetters against Greece and drive through her cities on their march' (828 F–829 B). The allusion is to the battle of Marathon (the topic of Polemon's surviving declamations)—and Roman bankers. In Polemon we should expect literary allusion. However, the reason for including this whole passage is the description of the man with the small, hollow eyes. Polemon implies he was going to assassinate the emperor ('surrounding the king, bearing weapons'). Polemon, who was plainly in the

[168] (1986) 190–1 (Cyzicus, Ilium, Alexandria Troas, Pergamum, Stratonicea, Mysia [Hadrianutherae], Smyrna, Erythrae, Ephesus).

[169] (1995) 221.

[170] Cf. Halfmann (1979) 44.

[171] Note Bowersock's 'chariots (not *naves* as in Hoffmann's translation)': *markab* can mean any vehicle or boat (the latter is the sense in modern Arabic), but here plainly means 'boat' since the cognate verb is used for Hadrian sailing to Ionia (*rakaba*), not to mention the fact that the whole passage concerns crossing the Aegean.

[172] So e.g. the first Greek senator from Xanthos in Lycia, M. Arruntius Claudianus, *IGR* III 615, was leg. pr. pr. ἐπ]αρχειῶν Ἀχαίας καὶ Ἀσί[ας (Xanthos, early 2nd c.); Halfmann (1979), no. 28. The acceptance of Roman geography was common: e.g. Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* 2. 3. 17, 21 'Hellas and Achaia'; Lucian, *False Critic* 22 'Achaia and Italy', cf. *How to Write History* 14; Philostratus, *Apollonius* 5. 10 Nero in Achaia; see Pausanias 7. 16. 10 for consciousness of the Roman change of name.

[173] Cf. n. 133. As for the 'confirmatory reference to the *HA*' (n. 158), it is vague enough to suit anyone's suggestions: 'per Asiam et insulas ad Achaiam navigavit et Eleusinia sacra … suscepit' (SHA *Hadrian* 13. 1). But see n. 175.

[174] Cf. Jones (1986) 56. Note the same usage in Fronto in a letter to Marcus' mother concerning his speech of thanks to Pius, *Ad Marc. Caes.* 2. 3 (21. 20 van den Hout^2)—where it may say something about Fronto's perception of Pius; see below. See also n. 317.

second division of the court (not allowed to go to Rhodes) and evidently not an *amicus* (an official 'friend') at this point, emphasizes his distance from Hadrian: 'we were unable to speak with him. I and my friends sat down to converse, talking of the king and his weakness, and his remoteness from the blessed state which people say he is in.' Suddenly the enemy appears, Polemon asks him how be bears his evil, and the man promptly breaks down and blames what the translator calls a 'satan', probably a *daimōn*, for his woes.

The report of a plot against a distant emperor is not flattering to Hadrian.[175] It may suggest that the *Physiognomy* was not published till after Hadrian died in 138 (and therefore towards the end of Polemon's own life). It has been thought that Hadrian's extensive travels round the Empire are implicitly condemned in Aelius Aristides' *To Rome*, which was delivered before Antoninus Pius in (very probably) 155, when the great orator (and here archflatterer) records that the Persian kings had had to be constantly on the move like wandering nomads, in a state of isolation and fear (15–23), while the current 'president' has no need to wear himself out travelling but rules *per litteras* (31–3). Polemon's description of Hadrian as the Great King and his observation of Hadrian's isolation and weakness may well indicate that his relationship with the emperor was not as close as Philostratus would like (constructing as he is a pattern for his own relationship with the Severan court). Polemon's comments may have something to do with the fact that, as he describes things, he was not at the very centre of court life. They may further show that he was sensitive to the views of the following regime.[176]

Shortly after this passage is the reference in Leiden to Hadrian's eyes (A16). Hoffmann emended the text here without any good reason. He seems to have wanted Polemon to praise Hadrian's eyes unambiguously, and his changes have misled many interpreters. Polemon has been talking of small shining eyes (A14). If they are actually large, they indicate a mixed bag of qualities. Alexander (the Great) had these eyes, but they were hyacinth in colour and this upped his appetite for greatness and pleasures. Polemon then compares these eyes with black ones, considering dryness, smallness (very bad), and whether they 'are of good account' (in which case, not bad at all). Then we come on (A16) to eyes 'from which it is as if rays of light emanate'. These indicate someone 'cunning, treacherous to companions, of little faith, and never far from a desire for fornication and the other desires. We shall talk (*sanukhbir*, سـنـخبر) about these eyes and their character (*akhlāq*, اخـلاق), and also those clear shining eyes that are like (*andād*, انـداد) them, because you will find them good, if other signs do

[175] The assassination attempt has naturally attracted attention; now the location is clear, we should compare SHA *Hadrian* 13. 2 'some report that in Achaia a rule was implemented that no one came to a sacrifice armed when Hadrian was present, though usually many carried knives on such occasions'; this passage certainly accords with the chronology of the visit.

[176] Aristides: Birley (1997) 303. Antoninus Pius stayed put in Rome (bar a trip to Campania; cf. below) for the whole of his twenty-two-year reign (SHA *Pius* 7. 11). For the official ideology under Marcus and Lucius, see Fronto, *Principia Historiae* 11 (208. 7–209. 9 van den Hout[2]) on 'prince Hadrian being energetic enough at making the round of his armies', but having let military discipline and toughness go by the way; cf. Champlin (1980) 95–6 (but failing to note that Fronto's anti-Hadrianic comments must have been acceptable to his masters, esp. in the *Princ. Hist.*).

not spoil them.' We are then treated to a short aside on how one must suspend judgement until one has examined all signs which are in contradiction/mutually exclusive (*tatanāqad*). He goes on, 'The eyes of King Hadrian were of this description [i.e. clear shining eyes], except that they were full of beautiful light. They were bluish-black, with sharp vision. No one has been seen with more luminous eyes than he.' Hoffmann ingeniously changed *sanukhbir* to *satukhayyir* (ستخير), 'you will prefer', and *akhlāq* to *akhlāf* (اخلاف), 'different', and the latter allowed him to take the following *andād* as 'oppositos'.[177] But Polemon is careful to say nothing of the character associated with such eyes (Hadrian's character). Rather, 'if you see this light in such an eye [i.e. one like Hadrian's],' and—the crucial distinction—it does not sparkle like glass but looks like the rays of the sun, which is most likely in blue eyes, and 'in addition you see some redness, judge for its owner sharpness and impudence, and... madness.' Then Polemon sails close to the wind. If the colour is bluish-black (Hadrian's colour), cowardice and caution are diagnosed. Thus it seems that Hadrian's eyes are saved by their unusual vitreous luminosity. No wonder Polemon issues a warning to take one's time to sort out such contradictory signs. This passage, despite its difficulties, shows some degree of wariness. Hadrian's eyes are surrounded by other types of eyes which signal bad men. If Polemon wanted a contrary example to illustrate the care needed by the physiognomist, it seems risky to have chosen Hadrian before 138. The past tenses used throughout the description of Hadrian's eyes seem to confirm that Hadrian was dead. Two further signs of late publication are, as we shall see, the very negative typology of the *androgynos*, which one could hardly read in the reign of Hadrian without thinking of Hadrian's pathic, Antinous, and the surprising comment about the Roman land-grab in Greece in Leiden ch. 35 B32 on the Pure Greek.[178]

[177] Foerster i. 148 'His oculis contrarios et oppositos praeferes scilicet oculos perlucidos coruscantes.' The word *andād* (sg. *nidd*) means something in a comparative relation to another thing—'pareil, semblable, égal à l'autre' (Kazimirski), 'equal, (a)like, same; an equal, a peer; partner; antagonist, rival' (Wehr). It may imply comparative difference in context ('*a like that is contrary, or opposed to, another thing*', Lane; 'similis; contrarius *rei*', Freytag, who was used by Hoffmann) as e.g. the English 'resemble'. Hoffmann, as often, has been influenced by Adamantius (here A15) and Anonymus Latinus (34). In these it appears that the material has been simplified to say that eyes which are *enantioi* or *contrarii* to dark eyes (the main subject of chs. 15–16) are good *tout court*, unless another sign contradicts this. The secondary chapter heading at Adamantius A15 *bis* 'On bright eyes' suggests abbreviation. Anonymus inserts its brief remark about Hadrian's eyes here. Both then take up (in A16 and ch. 35) with sparkling blue or red eyes (= Leiden ch. 1 A16). Since Adamantius and Anonymus agree fairly well, it could be that Leiden has invented the initial portion of A16. Against this, the style of the text reads authentically and the link between 'clear shining eyes' and Hadrian's eyes 'of this description' seems to guarantee authenticity (and perhaps also the talk of mutually contradictory signs: Hadrian's eyes could appear bad, unless one had examined everything carefully). Whatever the case, in the Arabic as it stands *andād* should be translated as 'like' and there is no reason whatsoever to turn 'character' into 'different'.

[178] On Antinous, see 189; on the 'others' who want the Pure Greeks' land, see 197–200. It is worth noting that another modern cliché about Hadrian's eyes is that their colour (bluish-black) and luminosity intentionally recall the eyes of the Pure Greek at Leiden ch. 35 (which are 'moist, bluish-black, very mobile, and very luminous') and that this constitutes further praise of Hadrian. The descriptions actually have little in common (even the word for 'luminous' is different in the two passages, though that does not necessarily indicate a different word in the original Greek).

The *Physiognomy* reflects the world of the high-ranking elite. This group came into contact with Roman power regularly whether they liked it or not.[179] The prevailing picture in modern historiography is that the emperors from Nerva (96–8), Trajan (98–117), Hadrian (117–138), Pius (138–61) to Marcus and Verus (161–80; 161–9) were competent, sane administrators, and if Hadrian himself was not always easy or popular with the Senate (some of whose members he executed or drove to suicide), he too was a 'good' emperor. Polemon was at some point part of this emperor's court—but what does that mean? We need to treat the meaning of 'court' (Greek *aulē*, *aulai*) flexibly, thinking of a fluid organization consisting of core members and a very large periphery with people like Polemon coming and going, both for reasons of mobility up and down the social and political scales and also because of the shifting location of the emperor. Even in the case of the sedentary Antoninus Pius, when the court once moved to Campania we can use our imagination to picture the emperor's attendants, officials, friends, flatterers, and soldiers in tow. According to the Augustan History, the 'excessively thrifty' Pius said that he did not travel because of the serious burden imposed on provincials by the imperial *comitatus* (SHA *Pius* 7. 11).[180] Plutarch puts his waffling Roman friend and ex-governor Mestrius Florus in his place by reminding him that 'invitations' and 'choice' do not enter into entertaining the governor and 'those who come along with him' (*Table Talks* 708 B).[181]

I began this chapter by considering aspects of the pressures felt by the elite in the period of Polemon's lifetime. The extensive picture of backbiting and political/social assassination that we find in the *Physiognomy* (Section IV) reflects this to the highest degree. Before turning to the *Physiognomy*, I want to examine the sort of pressures experienced by those close to court. We have no direct evidence in the form of a diary or letters from the reign of Hadrian. But what we do have—the letters of Fronto from the next reign—is not a bad second. M. Cornelius Fronto, suffect consul in 142, was tutor to Marcus Aurelius and his adoptive brother, Lucius Verus. The correspondence has much on educational matters, especially to the young Marcus, but also much of interest concerning politics that has not been brought out in modern studies. Fronto was a core member of the court. He plays the courtly game of manners, sometimes well, sometimes not so well. He is also, at times, painfully aware of his inferiority to the royals and their favourites, and his defences and shifts show us how insiders had to look out for themselves in an autocratic regime. Analysis of Fronto's position will help our understanding of Polemon's relationship with Hadrian and more generally of the tone of political life that he presents in the *Physiognomy*.[182]

[179] Cf. Plutarch, *On Exile* 602 C, F, 604 B, D the routine chores the exile is now freed from include dealing with the governor and the emperor (embassies to Rome).

[180] Cf. Ps.-Aurelius Victor, *Epitome de Caesaribus* 14. 4–5 on the 'builders, stonemasons, architects, and every kind of specialist for constructing walls or decorating buildings' who (*inter alios*) formed Hadrian's 'column of companions'.

[181] Florus: proconsul of Asia, *PIR*^{2} M 531.

[182] On general trends in the development of the Roman court in this period see Winterling (1997) and (1999), and Paterson in Spawforth (forthcoming).

Let us begin with a letter to Verus of 161/2[183] apparently dealing with some jealousy against Fronto at Verus' court (which was newly powerful following the death of Pius). Fronto writes that although Verus had refused to speak to him 'for more than three or four days', he then ordered him to be introduced into his private rooms (*cubiculum*). As we shall see, Fronto was probably obliged (as he certainly was shortly after) to wait on the word of Verus' freedman chamberlain for his admittance. Once inside he received a kiss, which would not excite 'jealousy in anyone'. No wonder he breathes a sigh of relief at the end of the letter: 'I think that even the smallest and most unimportant signs displayed by the One and True Prince indicate the things men find most impressive and desirable: expressions of love and marks of esteem' (*amores honoresque*).[184]

In reading the relations between a prince and a courtier we should not be fooled by the banter or blandishments of the senior correspondent: princes can afford to be affable and amiable, courtiers study their words carefully, and the tone of their letters often makes the relative statuses plain. In the same unclear situation following the transfer of power to Marcus and Verus, Fronto received a reproachful ('I have a serious complaint about you') but—as he states in his reply—friendly note from Verus joking that Fronto had timed his visit to the Palace so he just missed him but saw Marcus (*Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 11, pp. 114–15 v.d. H.[2]). 'It was not my fault', Fronto began in the reply he sent immediately, 'when I came to the Palace to see *both* of you'. He shows he is acutely aware of the official grief for Pius ('should I come to look at your tears and display mine?'). Old tutor and ex-consul as he was, he had had to approach Verus' freedman, Charilas, for instructions. '"Do you know if it is convenient for me to come to them today? Please tell me as a man of sense and a friend to me. Send me news." As a result of his encouragement...' (*Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 12, pp. 115–16 v.d. H.[2]). Fronto wrote to Charilas in Greek, perhaps to save face in having to deal with a freedman, and the memo stands out clearly in this apologia to Verus.[185]

Relations with Verus were never personal. In a fragmentary letter from the 160s involving some delicate business Fronto tells him, 'It makes little difference to me, which of the friends you hold dear cherishes me—except that we take prior account of someone who is less critical of us' (*Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 13, p. 117 v.d.H.[2]). While Verus was on campaign in the Parthian war at this time, Marcus asked Fronto to send him two speeches (*Ad Ant. Imp.* 3. 3, p. 102 v.d.H.[2]). But Fronto was put in a difficult position. 'I myself prefer you to send them', wrote Marcus. 'You are acting in keeping with your other kindnesses to me by wishing me to win favour through sending him the speeches', wrote back Fronto:

I have taken the liberty of adding a third speech, *For Demostratus*... about which I have written this to him: 'I have added the speech *For Demostratus*, but on submitting it to your brother I learnt that Asclepiodotus, who is attacked in that speech, is not

[183] Unless stated, I follow van den Hout's Teubner text (his 2nd edn.) with the chronology on pp. 292–4. Translations are based on Haines's Loeb (the text of which should not be relied on).

[184] *Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 7, pp. 111–12 v.d.H.[2]

[185] Cf. SHA *Verus* 9. 3 'the freedmen had much power with Verus'—a stereotypical indication of a 'bad' emperor.

disapproved of by you. As soon as I became aware of this, I took steps to have the speech suppressed. But it had already been distributed too widely for this to be possible. But what should happen now? What should happen, I say, other than that Asclepiodotus, because you yourself approve of him as you do me, should become a very good friend of mine too—in exactly the same way as Herodes is now my best friend, although I delivered the speech' (*Ad Ant. Imp.* 3. 4, p. 102 v.d.H.^{2}).

Presumably Fronto had been uneasy about the speech in which he had attacked not only Asclepiodotus, but also the great sophist, politician, and *consul ordinarius* of 143, Herodes Atticus. As we shall see, Fronto was well aware of the sensitivity of this notorious speech of his, which had caused trouble between him and Marcus many years before. Offering it to Marcus now for approval shows due caution—he was presumably aware that Asclepiodotus had risen to become one of the friends of Verus—and it serves to remind us of how political an expression of high culture may be.[186] Fronto played extra safe by copying to Marcus the apology to Verus regarding his offending speech. By good chance we have also his letter to Verus on the same topic (*Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 8, p. 113 v.d.H.^{2}). He begins this by emphasizing his chronic ill health and the grief into which he has been plunged by the deaths of his wife and his three-year-old grandson over the past few months. He pathetically says that he was cheered by the speeches Marcus 'decided should be sent'. He then includes in almost the same words the apology he referred to Marcus about the *For Demostratus*. And he adds that Marcus had discussed with him earnestly (*impense*) 'what I am still more earnestly desirous to take in hand', i.e. to write up Verus' notebook account of the war. Verus actually spent the war with girls and boys (cf. Lucian's *Portraits* and *Apology for Portraits*, in flattery of his mistress) while his generals did the fighting. This evidently gave him no time to write to his old teacher himself: 'even if I remain silent', he wrote back to Fronto, 'I have no doubt that you know how keenly I feel every sadness of yours, however slight ... It is a father's part to pour forth a heart full of love and affection' (*Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 9, p. 113 v.d.H.^{2}). The affection is professional, not personal. As for the rest of his letter, Verus writes with the superior's politeness, 'I was delighted by the speech and wish both of you would forget that bitter suit and be at peace'.

Fronto was needed. 'There is one thing I wish not indeed to point out to you ... but to offer you to think over: dwell upon the causes and beginning of the war and those failures that happened while *we* were absent ... Further, I think it essential to make crystal-clear the superiority of the Parthians before my arrival so that the magnitude of our achievements will be apparent' (*Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 2, p. 108 v.d.H.^{2}). This was the main thing on Verus' and Marcus' mind.[187] In the midst of all this pressure Fronto penned to Marcus the moving, affective letter *On the Loss of his Grandson* (pp. 235–9 v.d.H.^{2}). What is particularly interesting in this is the ringing endorsement he gives of his own career at the end.

[186] On Asclepiodotus see Champlin (1980) n. 113 on p. 172: he speculates attractively on the identity of several men with this name known from inscriptions in whom, if they may be combined, 'we can see the rise to power of an imperial freedman with pronounced literary interests, a man whom Fronto might dislike'.

[187] Marcus: cf. *Principia Historiae* 2 'si ... non displicebit' (p. 202 v.d.H.^{2}).

The language used recalls his own letters of recommendation for clients—stressing honesty, probity, learning. Perhaps feeling that no one was listening, Fronto recommended himself.

Fronto's relations with Antoninus Pius were no less professional and no more personal. Pius was mild, but his praetorian prefect, Gavius Maximus, was a 'vir severissimus' (SHA *Pius* 8. 7). This prefect was the most powerful of the emperor's officials and the only one in command of soldiers in Rome. Censorius Niger, a high-ranking equestrian who had governed minor provinces, had died, Fronto tells Marcus, and he had left Fronto a sizeable sum in his will. Unfortunately he had also 'inveighed in unmeasured terms (*inclementius*) against Gavius Maximus, a man of the highest rank who is entitled to our respect' (*Ad Ant. Pium* 4, p. 164 v.d.H.^{2}). Marcus would have known all this already, of course, but he may not yet have known that Fronto had written to 'our Lord your Father and to Gavius Maximus himself letters of a most difficult kind'. Naturally Fronto disapproved of Censorius' 'act', but he also had 'to uphold the duty of a friend and heir'. He had tried to pen a lengthy letter to Marcus, but was worried about bothering him—the important thing was that he should know what was going on. At this time (*c.*155), Fronto evidently felt he could trust Marcus to smooth things over with the emperor so he would not have to cave in abjectly. Hence in the letter to Gavius Maximus (*Ad Ant. Pium* 7, pp. 165–6 v.d.H.^{2}), the first portion of which is badly mutilated, Fronto reminds the severe prefect that he too had once been friends with Censorius and avers that Censorius often wept at their *discidium*, 'dissension', a word that only occurs here in this mannered corpus. He then comes to the most important thing: 'lest your ears should be open to people who bear malice (*malignis hominibus*) towards me... that loyalty which I have preserved truly and sincerely for Censorius much more assuredly will I strive to keep for ever unimpaired for you'. To Pius Fronto writes at great length about this (*Ad Ant. Pium* 3, pp. 162–4 v.d.H.^{2}). After fulsomely expressing regret for what Censorius had written, he addresses the enemies mentioned to Maximus: 'Perhaps someone is saying that I should have given up my friendship with him (Censorius) after I discovered that his standing (*gratia*) with your person was diminished.' But since Pius did not break with him entirely, Fronto remained friends seeing Censorius needed 'advice'. Finally, he affirms (it appears—the text is damaged) his own sincerity: 'I assuredly call on the gods above and the gods below that I have always been one to...'. The courtier's enemies were waiting for him to slip up. Censorius had offered them an opportunity. Luckily two professions of loyalty and the intercession of his favourite pupil Marcus were enough to protect him.

In a letter to Marcus written perhaps in the 140s (*Ad M. Caes.* 4. 1, pp. 53–4 v. d.H.^{2}),[188] Fronto compares Marcus to Orpheus the legendary singer of Greek mythology whose music brought men, animals, even rivers and trees to follow him. But Fronto is not interested in the *fabula*. 'To those who interpret it correctly', it refers to his intelligence and eloquence—that is, to Marcus and

[188] For the date, cf. the following note and below in text.

specifically to the prince's ability to unite all his friends in *concordia*. 'You will achieve this more easily, if you take steps to uproot and stamp out completely this one vice of mutual envy and jealousy... Envy among men is a deadly evil and most fatal.' This reworked myth is not decorative. After warning about discord, Fronto finishes by writing, 'Let us talk (*fabulemur*) of better things: I love Julianus—for my tale (*sermo*) took its origin from him—and all those who are fond of you.' Marcus replied immediately (*Ad M. Caes.* 4. 2, pp. 54–5 v.d.H.^{2}), beginning by acknowledging the elegance of Fronto's letter and the favour he has done him in visiting the sick Julianus. Fronto has made this friend 'more friendly to me'.[189] He had also shown how much *fiducia*, 'trust', he places in Marcus' friendship. Then comes the crunch. He tells Fronto he makes it 'impossible for me to love you as I want' and 'that is why I am often full of anger and irritated by you when you are not here, though you don't deserve it ... Concerning Herodes, proceed as you say ... Herodes loves you and I am working to promote this.'

That this elaborate exchange finishes with Marcus' worry about the quality of his Latin ('if any word is misused') only emphasizes the politically sensitive subject matter. Herodes had been a problem between Fronto and Marcus since he and Fronto had taken opposing sides in a trial of (it seems) a certain Demostratus. Fronto must have led the defence and successfully, since his *For Demostratus* was published far and wide and caused him trouble years later (cf. above). As Champlin observes, the affair must have been a sensation given that both men had probably already held their consulships (Fronto in 142, Herodes in 143) and were both famous orators.[190] A Demostratus together with a Praxagoras and a Mamertinus are known from Philostratus (*VS* 559–60 = 2. 1, 67. 19 ff., cf. 563 = 71. 3–10) as bitter opponents of Herodes who were given a hearing by Marcus when he was based at Sirmium in the early 170s. These three men have been plausibly identified with leading Athenians of the 150s and 160s known from inscriptions.[191] It seems unlikely, however, that the Demostratus defended by Fronto was the same Demostratus. Although the date cannot be known precisely, Marcus' letter to Fronto on the subject which begins with the remarkable opening 'It is a fact that you have often said to me, What can I do to give you particular pleasure?' (*Ad M. Caes.* 3. 2, p. 36 v.d.H.^{2}) plays with the idea that Marcus' advice to Fronto to handle 'this very disagreeable business as honourably as possible' is that of an 'ill-advised counsellor or a bold little boy

[189] Julianus is presumably the Julianus named by Fronto as another opponent of Herodes at *Ad M. Caes.* 3. 4, p. 38 v.d.H.^{2} (below in text with n. 196).

[190] Champlin (1980) 63. Fronto: redated by Eck (1998).

[191] Bowersock (1969) 97 in the course of a useful clarification of the events. Ti. Claudius Demostratus, Aelius Praxagoras, and Julius Theodotus the sophist, who is also named by Philostratus (566 = 73. 17–24), were related through marriage. Like Demostratus and Praxagoras, M. Valerius Mamertinus served as archon. For more details see Follet (1976) 277, 278, with further references in Annexes III and IV.

(*audacem puerulum*)'.[192] It is scarcely conceivable that this could be later than the early or mid 140s (Marcus was born in 121). The comparison with Orpheus (cf. above) is also more apposite for a young man. Thus Fronto's client will be an older relation, and his younger namesake would be perpetuating the feud in the 170s when he himself was still 'assez jeune'.[193]

Marcus tells Fronto that he is 'advising him. But why do I say "advise"? I am requesting it, and urgently (*magno opere*)'. And he makes it plain that Fronto's enemies will enjoy the spectacle of his angry performance against Herodes 'out of malice' (*maligne*). The request was made the more forceful by dictating it rather than writing in his own hand, as Fronto notes at the end of his reply, 'I really love your writing, so please, when you write, I'd like you to write in your own hand' (*Ad M. Caes.* 3. 3, pp. 36–7 v.d.H.^{2}). This small reproach makes up for the climbdown in the body of the letter. Here, after a strained calculation that Herodes must be good if 'he is worthy of your patronage (*tutela*)', Fronto manages with great insincerity to say, 'Had I had any inkling of this, may all the gods afflict me if I should ever have ventured to say a word to hurt any friend of yours'.[194] Fronto now reveals his attack: the speech would rest on 'most savage' charges against Herodes—assaulting and killing freedmen, being disobedient to his father.[195] But he promises to stick to this and say nothing about Herodes' character or lifestyle. Plainly worried, Fronto quickly sent after his letter a *post scriptum* to inform Marcus that others might be speaking 'in unmeasured terms' (*inclementius*)—and he names names.[196] No wonder Marcus writes back pleased that Fronto has taken his 'advice' (*Ad M. Caes.* 3. 4–5, p. 38 v.d.H.^{2}). Fronto takes up the cue: 'Never forbear to mention what you want done by me... I shall never begin to do anything against your will' (*Ad M. Caes.* 3. 6, p. 39 v.d.H.^{2}).

It was perhaps not long before this that Fronto received a letter from Marcus asking why he had not yet delivered his formal speech of thanks (*actio gratiarum*) to Pius for his appointment to the consulship (*Ad M. Caes.* 2. 4, pp. 24–5 v.d.H.^{2}). Fronto had a good answer: he was delaying the speech to coincide with the show he was going to put on in the circus. But he is aware that this is not enough. He goes into overdrive to express his love for Pius. Hadrian he had propitiated and appeased, 'but for loving one needs *fiducia* and intimacy ... Antoninus I love, I cherish like the sun, the day, like life, like breath—and I feel I am loved back by him'. The language of love and of friendship is well known in the political language of Rome. Cicero's work is full of it; and so is Fronto's. In fact Fronto had so interiorized this discourse that he hardly ever speaks of

[192] Cf. Fronto's reply, *Ad M. Caes.* 3. 3 (pp. 36–37 v.d.H.^{2}) 'Away with your "bold little boy" ... Believe me, if you will ... that in good sense you leave your elders behind.'

[193] Follet (1976) 277, perhaps about 40 given that he was archon in the late 150s; the age of entry to the archontate was probably 25, cf. ibid. 13. Cf. Champlin (1980) 160 n. 15 for similar doubts about Bowersock's tentative dating of the trial to the 'later years of Pius' reign' (1969: 99).

[194] Commentators have been surprised that he appears not to know Herodes or of Marcus' attachment to him: that is far too literal. Of course Fronto knew, and knew Marcus knew it as well.

[195] These disputes over the will of his father, Atticus, are detailed in Philostratus, *VS* 2. 1, 549 = 58. 2–26.

[196] Including Julianus; cf. above, nn. 188–9.

enemies directly and does not even use the words *inimicus*, 'enemy', *inimicitiae*, 'enmity'.[197] Marcus' reply to this and another letter may be ironical—it is difficult to tell. It begins, 'I surrender: you have won. Beyond question your loving has beaten all the lovers who ever lived. Take the crown and let the herald proclaim publicly before your own tribunal this your victory: M. Κορνήλιος Φρόντων ὕπατος νικᾷ, στεφανοῦται τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν μεγάλων φιλοτησίων ("M. Cornelius Fronto, consul, is the winner. He is crowned in the contest of the Great Games of Love")'. This goes beyond anything in the time of Cicero, as the use of Greek surely indicates. And Marcus goes on in the same vein, using Plautine language to express his rivalry with Fronto's *wife*, Cratia. The fact that it is not clear which letter of Fronto has caused such excess only shows how extensive this type of language is between them. Perhaps Fronto and Marcus really did bear each other what we call affection.[198] Yet in most cases, as in Fronto's relationship with Pius or Gavius Maximus, love meant no more than cordial professional relations, and these were at all times fluid and subject to cancellation. 'As to the other letter,' Marcus continues, 'in which you indicated why you were going to put off delivery of the speech to praise my Lord . . . I could not refrain from reading it aloud to my Father myself . . . As a result of this a long talk arose between us about you . . . And I've no doubt that at that time your ears were ringing for a long while in the Forum' (*Ad M. Caes.* 2. 5, pp. 25–6 v.d.H.^{2}). No doubt they were.

In his *Meditations* Marcus recalls that Fronto had taught him that the Roman nobility lacked real affection.[199] In a letter of recommendation to Verus asking him to support the impoverished senator, Gavius Clarus, Fronto describes him as a man who has a 'φιλοστοργία [affection] which is perhaps not Roman, for there is nothing I have found less at Rome . . . than a man who is genuinely φιλόστοργος. The reason why there is not even a Roman word for this virtue must, I suppose, be that in reality there is no one at Rome who is φιλόστοργος' (*Ad Ver. imp.* 1. 6. 7, p. 111 v.d.H.^{2}). In another letter of recommendation, to the proconsul of Africa Lollianus Avitus, Fronto describes his client Montanus as 'worthy, upright, *philostorgus* . . . since there is no term for this among the Romans' (*Ad Amicos* 1. 3. 4, p. 173 v.d.H.^{2}). By writing the word in the Roman alphabet,[200] Fronto was perhaps trying to introduce it to Latin. If so, he was unsuccessful. His statement—using the mannerism of a Greek word—that the leading men at Rome did not really care about each other is remarkable, a strange thing to put in a reference.

[197] Cicero uses these terms frequently. In the *Physiognomy* friendship is hardly mentioned; cf. below, 191; it is also true that there are none of the usual words for 'enemy' (*polemios, echthros, apechthēs, enantios* [only in the sense 'opposite']), but this is probably because the text is so specific about varieties of ill will.

[198] It has been observed that in the same period of Fronto's consulship Marcus ends a letter to him with what is almost certainly an exclusively female form of address used by women to women: 'mi semper anima dulcissima' (*Ad M. Caes.* 2. 10. 3, p. 30 v.d.H.^{2}). See Adams (1995*a*) 120 with n. 196. The implications of this are unclear. But the so-called Erotic Letter, written soon after 139, is more than the superficial literary pastiche it claims: see Swain (2004) 20–1.

[199] 1. 11 οἱ καλούμενοι . . . εὐπατρίδαι ἀστοργότεροί πως εἰσίν.

[200] If we can trust the codex of the letters.

Fronto spent most of his time in Rome, and was thus permanently in the shadow of the court. He reacts to his superiors as circumstances allow. He is not beyond taking risks, if he feels he is protected (the will of Censorius). He understands how to use the ritual language of affection to get his own way (the date of his *actio gratiarum* for Pius), he knows his superiors' levity needs to be taken seriously (Verus' complaint). In the area of most personal concern to him, the oratory that is his identity, he both preserves face with Marcus by showing determination to deliver his speech aimed at someone of comparable or senior rank (Herodes) *and* climbs down by revealing its contents and informing on his colleagues. When he is needed (to write the history of the war), his likes and dislikes (Asclepiodotus) are of no importance to a superior (Verus). Above all, Fronto is frightened of the *invidia* of potential enemies who, as Marcus remarks, 'will be watching *maligne*' (*Ad M. Caes.* 3. 2. 1, p. 36 v.d.H.^{2}). Ultimately, if Fronto really felt there was no true friendship among the Roman elite, his life as a courtier and *amicus* must have been fairly stressful. For someone on the margins of the court like a Polemon the stress may have been greater, if rarer. It was perhaps fortunate for Polemon that Hadrian, as we have seen, dealt with the 'intolerable' Greek who conversed 'with princes as one not inferior' by leaving him behind. But in terms of his relations with his peers, Polemon's experiences and views were not so different from those of Fronto.[201]

IV. THE *PHYSIOGNOMY*

The *Physiognomy* survives in a Greek version by Adamantius, which is undoubtedly fourth-century, and an Arabic translation (the Leiden) which exists in a single manuscript. We have also the fairly free reworking of the Anonymus Latinus (including much material from Loxus and Ps.-Aristotle), which can be useful in determining Polemon's meaning in cases of difficulty, and in addition the parallel Arabic versions (the Istanbul recension; hereafter TK) which are heavily reworked from the original, lost Arabic translation, but from time to time offer obvious corrections of the Leiden manuscript. Leiden retains the anecdotes illustrating Polemon's researches, some of them very long. As has been noted in the Introduction, it is hardly Islamicized, and it seems likely that the retention of so much 'Greek' material (including B32 on the 'pure Greek') tells us something about the interest the translator's patron took in the ancient Greeks in general and Polemon in particular. In the following pages, I shall be speaking mostly with reference to Adamantius. Leiden like many Arabic translations often seems to use more than one word to express the original, and this together with the anecdotes

[201] For the sake of completeness note *Ad M. Caes.* 2. 10, pp. 29–30 v.d.H.^{2} of 142 (cf. n. 190): Marcus tells Fronto he has derived no pleasure from hearing Polemon's oratory.

explains its length. Nevertheless, that it is in most cases close or very close to Adamantius shows us that Adamantius himself stayed close to Polemon, and though it is clear he has rewritten various bits, Foerster was right to consider his text an abridgement in nature.[202] Most of the shortening is due to the excision of the anecdotal material. This means that by studying Adamantius we can get the flavour of Polemon's own Greek and attempt to recreate his moral universe.

The structure of the *Physiognomy* is fairly clear. The division into two books is ancient. It makes sense too: book 1 is devoted to the eye, book 2 to the other parts and to the character types that follow.[203] That Leiden makes the eye one long 'section' (*bāb*) confirms this book structure as Polemon's own. Adamantius has four chapters of introductory material before he begins to accord with Leiden (A5). Leaving aside his reasons for writing (A1), there is a good chance that most of this goes back to Polemon. But it looks as if there had been some abbreviation, since the material does not seem to flow as well as it might do (esp. A4). As I have remarked, Adamantius was capable enough of excising Polemon's personal examples without any apparent sign, and we should have no details of these but for the Leiden.[204] Nor are we of the view that the TK recension preserves any introductory material at all apart from a note on the eye as the gateway to the soul.[205] There is a better chance, as Zonta notes, that the thirteenth-century Syriac polymath, Bar Hebraeus, includes some introductory material in what appears to be a direct quotation discussing how Paris-Alexander and Agamemnon would have benefited from a knowledge of physiognomy.[206] The passage runs:

ܡܛܠܗ̇ ܗܢܐ ܐܡܪ ܦܠܝܡܘܢ، ܕܐܠܘ ܦܪܝܡܘܣ ܗܘ ܕܝܠܕ ܐܠܟܣܢܕܪܘܣ ܦܪܝܣ
ܠܗܠܝܢ ܐܬܘܬܗ ܕܦܪܨܘܦܗ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܒܝܬܗ ܕܡܫܬܘܕܥܢܐ ܒܝܫܐ
ܐܬܦܪܣ ܗܘܐ ܠܐܠܟܣܢܕܪܘܣ ܕܦܠܓܐ ܗܘ ܠܬܝܒܘܬܗ ܠܐ ܐܫܠܡܗ ܘܐܫܬܘܕܥܗ
ܠܐ ܫܘܩܗ. ܘܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܒܝܫܐ ܘܦܠܓܘܬܐ ܕܐܟܣܢܝܐ. ܘܫܒܝܐ ܕܗܠܝܢܝ، ܡܢ ܒܥܠܗ̇
ܘܡܚܘܬܐ ܘܩܛܠܐ ܕܦܪ̈ܫܐ ܕܝܘܢܝ̈ܐ. ܘܚܘܪܒܐ ܕܡܕܝܢܬܐ ܕܦܪܘܓܝܐ
ܠܐ ܗܘܬ ܠܗ. ܘܐܓܡܡܢܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܠܘ ܠܦܘܣܝܘܓܢܘܡܘܢܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܢ
ܗܘܐ ܐܫܬܡܠܝ ܠܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܐܬܘܬܗ ܠܐܓܝܣܬܘܣ. ܘܠܐ ܐܫܬܕܠ ܒܗ ܥܠ ܦܠܓܘܬܗ
ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܚܙܝ ܥܠ ܐܢܬܬܗ.

[202] Foerster i, pp. ciii–cix. For displacements of material in Leiden, see Ch. 7, pp. 311 n. 7, 322–5, Ch. 8, p. 330. For Ad, cf. n. 204 below.

[203] Adamantius breaks up the material on the eye into subsections (we have retained the titles found in the MSS). In book 2 the divisions of Adamantius and Leiden run parallel till B31, which Leiden breaks up into subsections, perhaps 'in order to have the number of chapters reach the magical figure of seventy' (Ch. 8, p. 330).

[204] Anonymus Latinus mentions Polemon's observations of peers at chs. 27, 31, 32, 34, 40, 71, 105, 133. The clearest example of Adamantius' technique is Favorinus (Leiden A20). Adamantius removes all reference to eunuchs in A20 so completely that he detaches the material following the example of Favorinus in Leiden and makes it into his B3 (which follows B2 on gender tolerably well).

[205] Inserted in our translation between the title and the start of ch. 1 (A5). The thought is contained in Leiden ch. 1 B1. Cf. 181; Foerster i, pp. xc, cv, cvi.

[206] Zonta (1992) 30–2, whose text (p. 31) is followed here, from *The Cream of Wisdom*. On the Syriac version see Ch. 1, pp. 3–4, and Ch. 8 introduction.

Regarding women Polemon said in relation to Menelaus, whose wife Helen was seized by Alexander Paris, that truly had God granted Menelaus to know the natural signs, he would have realized Alexander was an adulterer, and he would not have introduced him into his house and would not have shown his wife to him. And the hard war and the slaughter of the heroes, the destruction of the famous city of Ilion, the dissolution of the seven guiding stars, and the many miseries that happened to the Greeks would not have occurred. And again, if Agamemnon had noticed the look of his wife Clytemnestra, he would have understood the deceit she had prepared for him and he would not have been killed in his house on a table like a bull in its manger.

As Zonta notes, the passage has a 'carattere esemplificativo' and does not relate to any specific part of the body. The reference to Greek mythology betrays the mind of a sophist.[207] It does not seem to fit very well with Adamantius A2–4; though it could have been tucked in easily enough like the material on Pelops and Oedipus in A5 (Adamantius[208] and Leiden); and at A2 Adamantius says that one of the aims of physiognomy is 'to guard against the vices of the bad before having to experience them.' What is actually interesting about the passage is that it is the only reference in the work to physiognomizing a woman apart from the observation of the Woman of Perge (B68) and the two brides of B69. Furthermore, Polemon indicates that particular events would have been averted had Menelaus and Agamemnon intuited the true natures of Alexander and Clytemnestra. For both reasons it may be suggested that the passage would actually fit better as an introduction to the 'predictive' stories of Leiden chs. 68–70, which now lack any foreword, but must have had one because the break with ch. 66 is so great.[209]

The *Physiognomy* is a practical manual. Frequently the reader is told to 'judge', 'say', 'witness'. There are a number of asides about technique, and I shall look at these briefly. In Adamantius, the intial statements concern the utility of the discipline for choosing friends and avoiding bad people, advice to conduct physiognomy on a man-by-man basis rather than starting with racial types (A2), the need to consider combinations of signs (A3), problems caused by femininity, age, animal-types, and the precedence of the eye over other signs (A4). There is

[207] But Zonta is wrong to claim that the reference to the myth of the Pleiad Electra (who ceased to shine from grief at the fate of Troy) occurs only here and in a Homeric scholiast; it was clearly well known, cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 4. 170–8 'sive quod Electra Troiae spectare ruinas / non tulit. . .', Hyginus, *Fab.* 192. 5.

[208] Adamantius is lacunose here, but the Paris Epitome and Ps.-Polemon both offer a fairly full text of what is missing: Foerster (1900) 142.

[209] Cf. Anonymus Latinus 133 'Polemon and Loxus advanced this discipline to such an extent that they affirmed it could even predict some things in the future. And so we shall set down two or three examples from the many predictions which Polemon reports he made'—this appears to summarize part of a preface. Note that Leiden ch. 67 ('Sign of the Man whose Time of Death has Approached with No Apparent Disease') should probably be counted with the 'predictive' chapters and on the basis of the title presumably contained another personal observation; but it is so drastically truncated that nothing can be said about it. See further n. 214 below on ch. 65.

not much else in the first book other than the occasional reminder to use combinations of signs (A14, 15). It is fortunate that we do have Leiden, for one obvious purpose of Polemon's personal examples is to break up the complex, highly detailed material on the eye, to make it more digestible, and to show how physiognomy could be done. These examples are in ch. 1: A8 the Man from Cyrene,[210] A11 the Lydian,[211] A12 Hadrian and the Corinthian, A13 the Lydian called 'the Crab', A16 the Phoenician,[212] and A20 the Celt.[213] Leiden offers no other major personal examples (the Armenian at B12 is very short) until the final three chapters which Adamantius leaves out.[214] Some programmatic material is included in the example of the Cyrenaean: this man exemplifies the need to combine signs, and learning physiognomy in this manner is 'just like teaching a boy refinement'.[215] In the case of the Crab Polemon reports that he sought the man out after he had heard of him (ch. 1 (A13)). Ch. 1 (A16) has been discussed above, where I suggested that in abbreviating the notice on Hadrian's eyes Adamantius has also excised the advice that one 'should not hurry to judgement'. In 1 (A20) memory is stressed as a necessary attribute for a physiognomist.

In both Adamantius and Leiden chapters B1 and 2 are very important programmatic passages marking the end of the eye section, introducing the study of the rest of the body, and outlining a gendered and animalized reading of the human being. The precedence of the parts for Adamantius (head parts, neck/chest, shoulders, limbs, 'and last are those around the stomach') reflects Ps.-Aristotle 814^b4–9; but in B4–30 the hierarchy is reversed in accordance with Ps.-Aristotle 810^a15–812^a12, where the order is basically from the toes up. Leiden is the same. In rewriting Polemon and Aristotle the Anonymus Latinus adopted the top-down order favoured by the medical writers and the rhetoricians.[216] Adamantius B2 represents a drastic pruning of what is in Leiden. He keeps the essentials—resemblances between men and animals and intersecting with this the gendering of animals and their corresponding people according to the schema set out in Ps.-Aristotle.[217] The Anonymus Latinus notes that 'Polemon went into this side, namely the correspondence between

[210] Hoffmann's emendation: the Arabic [فــورينس, *Fwryns*] could perfectly well produce 'Corinth'; the fact that the form is slightly different from A12 [قــورينن, *Qwrynn*], where it seems best to follow Hoffmann's 'Corinthian' (esp. given the reading of *Asyh* as 'Achaia'), is neither here nor there.

[211] Almost certain; but the form is somewhat different from Lydia at Leiden A12 and A13.

[212] Secure here; in Leiden ch. 31 it is a likely emendation.

[213] A secure emendation given Anonymus Latinus' identification of Favorinus.

[214] Anonymus Latinus 105 records that Polemon used a personal example to illustrate the 'harmfully stupid' type ('wickedly stupid' in Adamantius B58–60). The drastically truncated Leiden ch. 65 ('the evil and stupid man') gives no indication of the example and is anyway confused. On the liklihood that another personal example was originally included in ch. 67 see above, n. 209.

[215] 'Refinement' is our translation of the key term *adab*, which itself often translates and maps onto the Greek word *paideia* (*GALex* fasc. 2 s.v. *adab*; above, Ch. 1, p. 9).

[216] Also in the TK recension. Cf. Ch. 7, p. 317. For rhetoricians see e.g. Quintilian, *Education in Oratory* 11. 69–136.

[217] Ps.-Arist. 5 = 809^a26–810^a11.

people and animals, too laboriously, Aristotle more obscurely than his wont, while Loxus treated it briefly but pretty clearly' (ch. 117). Leiden offers us no fewer than ninety-three snappy characterizations of land animals, water animals, birds, insects, etc. Given the testimony of the Anonymus, this list should be based closely on Polemon (presumably writing under the influence of Loxus),[218] and there is a fair chance that the pedagogical comment at ch. 2, B2 ('what you should not be ignorant of, etc.') is Polemonian.[219] After the list Leiden provides a fuller account of male and female typologies. There are further programmatic comments ('know beforehand the gait, the voice, the movement of the eyes, and the nature of each animal ... nor should you ignore ... the physiognomical scrutiny of the signs of masculinity and femininity'), and Polemon adds, 'As for me, I did not acquire this science without much memorization, memorizing a great deal, and long experience.' The typology of the masculine lion and the feminine leopard (already set out in Ps.-Aristotle 809^b14–810^a8) is, again, treated in greater detail in Leiden.

There are some brief programmatic statements in the rest of the text. In B31 Polemon passes on to 'each colour, movement, breath and noise, and all the other things which come after these' (as Adamantius has put it already at B1). Leiden is fuller in the sections dealing with races (including the 'pure Greek' type) and colours (B31–7; Leiden chs. 31–48). Adamantius' view is that 'signs from colours and hair are not sufficient in themselves for the purposes of physiognomy, and it is not easy to judge from them even in terms of races who is from a particular race, especially because there has been racial mixing' (B31). Leiden, on the other hand, warns the reader that 'these signs' (colour, hair, gait) only work if your judgement is correct, i.e. you have used the more significant signs too. In the important first chapter on movement (B38; Leiden 49) dealing with the three types of affected conduct Leiden is more aware of the difficulty of detecting feints and the need of 'careful physiognomical scrutiny'. Adamantius inserts a break before moving to the character types of B43–60: 'and so in general one must know that in movement and speech and colour and size and harmony of limbs the mean is by and large the best mixture and the opposite is bad' (B42); and his B43 introduces the typologies 'which are worth mentioning'. As we shall see, Ps.-Aristotle is responsible for most of these chapters and half of the typologies actually play little part in the rest of the *Physiognomy*. Given the excision of the 'predictive' chapters, the brief epilogue at Adamantius B61 ('you must judge the many and manifold appearances of men from the many signs which occur in each part, relying on their combinations and significations in some cases and distrusting them in others') is presumably Adamantius' own.

There are several possible reasons why Polemon not only began with the eye but made his treatment of it so extensive. A memorial epigram by the famous

[218] It may also to some unknown extent reflect Arabic literature's fondness for animal stories. See Ch. 5, (pp. 252–3).

[219] Especially given the personal aside on the man who resembled a turtle at ch. 2, B2 (p. 391).

Leonidas of Tarentum (third century BC) records one Eusthenes:

> This is the tomb of Eusthenes: he was a professional physiognomist
> Adept at knowing the mind from the eye, etc.[220]

There were, then, precedents. Secondly, as Gleason has noted, the rhetorical training of a man like Polemon would have stressed the importance of the eye as an indicator of an orator's mind.[221] Thus Cicero's *On the Orator* culminates with a discussion of gesture and voice. 'Everything depends on the face, and in the face itself the eyes are all powerful. . . Delivery is wholly a matter of the mind, the face is a picture of it, and the eyes are its expression' (3. 221). Again, for Quintilian the eyes and face express one's thoughts—thus 'they must never be fixed, popping out, languishing, sleepy, stupefied, lascivious, shifty, swimming, etc.' (*Education in Oratory* 11. 75–6).[222] Thirdly, in Ch. 4 of this volume we shall explore the possibility that Polemon was responding also to the new sculptural techniques of the Hadrianic period, when for the first time in stone the markings of the pupil were picked out; this must have been quite a noticeable innovation. Fourthly, in this chapter I have been stressing both the close observance of self and others that was normal and expected in Polemon's age and also in particular the role of the face as a vector of inner feeling. I have suggested that Plutarch's little essay on being 'discountenanced' epitomizes this culture. Given all this, it is not surprising that the face and the eye within it are Polemon's major focuses. For Polemon himself the eye is, in the mode of the rhetoricians, the gateway to the soul (Adamantius A4, Leiden ch. 1 B1).[223]

I have already mentioned Barton's suggestion that the quantity of detail about the eye should be seen primarily as a strategy for emphasizing the practitioner's command of his field. As I noted, the fact that others evidently found Polemon's treatise practical tends against this. But it may be asked, How usable is the presentation of the signs of the eye and other parts, movements, etc.? One problem is unanswerable. The *Physiognomy* does not simply suppose scrutiny of the face and the eye is possible: it presupposes that one can look *very* closely at strangers' eyes. The degree to which such looking is acceptable is naturally culture-specific. But it is still difficult to imagine that one could stare at a peer for long enough to gather the information Polemon says we need.[224] Leaving this aside, it is not too difficult to show that Polemon's analyses make sense—or at least, that they are logical enough. In the examples that follow here (FIGS. 1–4) I have made diagrammatic representations of three chapters from Book 1 of Adamantius and of two linked chapters from Book 2. The analyses could no doubt be done differently, and I must stress that they are

220 *Greek Anthology* 7. 661: Εὐσθένεος τὸ μνῆμα· φυσιογνώμων ὁ σοφιστής | δεινὸς ἀπ' ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ τὸ νόημα μαθεῖν, κτλ. Cf. Foerster i, p. lxx (and pp. lxxvii f.) 'ne huius quidem rei auctor exstitit (Polemo)'.

221 (1995) 57.

222 See in general Graf (1991) 37–48 on Quintilian.

223 Developing the image used by Plato at e.g. *Republic* 533 D or *Phaedrus* 255 C. Cf. above, n. 205.

224 Other parts of the body—hairy backs and stomachs—could be viewed at the baths or the gymnasium.




Fig. 1




Fig. 2

exempli gratia. Bold type means a negative character trait is attached to the sign; italic type indicates a positive trait; underlining indicates a mixed interpretation; regular type indicates that no moral evaluation is made. Take first Fig. 1 on A18 ('sullen eyes'). This shows a simple type. The two primary divisions (dry and moist) both have attached characteristics; both are themselves further qualified. If we want to know what other combinations would produce,




Fig. 3

we are to presumably to understand, as the Leiden Polemon puts it at ch. 1 A8, that no one can include everything 'in a single treatise', or as the Adamantius Polemon has it at B43, that 'It is not necessary to indicate all the definitions of the appearances of men, but only those which are worth mentioning. For from these it is not difficult to know the rest'.[225] Adamantius A7 ('moving eyes';

[225] Cf. Adamantius A20 'With this in mind you will also be able to practise physiognomy on things which have not been mentioned, judging for yourself'. Anonymus Latinus ch. 76 (on movement): 'Polemon thinks that these things provide sufficient instruction; for individual details and comparisons made with real subtlety and accuracy can be easily established from what has been said.'




Fig. 4

Fig. 2) is an example of a more complicated structure. Here note the relatively positive evaluation which comes from a combination of quickness and not moving the eyelids: 'bold and daring in dire straits'. The other main division, quality/size (which appear to be taken together here, but not e.g. at B39), produces two bad combinations, one further division with three bad combinations, and one combination of mixed import ('swelling and seething' eyes mean men 'excited by sex and luxury' but 'neither unjust nor villinous nor naturally inferior nor uncultured'). The latter may serve to remind us of something important. Polemon does not in fact always paint a black and white picture of characteristics indicated by this or that sign. Often there are good and bad traits together (though not necessarily in equal proportions).

A11 ('eyes changeable in colour'; Fig. 3) presents the single most complex (and confusing) chapter in the whole work. For a start, 'changeable' is an attempt to translate the very difficult term *aiolos*, which Jaś Elsner comments on in Ch. 4. It seems to refer not to changeability of colour in terms of hue alone (the category we tend to think in), but in addition refers to the sparkle or brilliance of the colour.[226] Fortunately this does not affect the sense or at least the overall meaning of this section. Polemon is attempting to describe eyes which are dark blue (*charopos*) but seem black from a distance, and to say something about black eyes themselves. The reason the colour is difficult is partly (it appears) because of the presence of 'dots'. We have chosen to translate the word *kenchros*, literally a 'millet seed', by 'dot' because what distinguishes millet seeds is their roundness. *We* may not see dots in others' eyes, but that is irrelevant. Polemon did and he was right in expecting his readers to do so (since the dots remained in Adamantius, Anonymus Latinus, where they become 'droplets', and the Arabic versions, where the word for a 'dot' or a 'point' is used).[227] Anyone who reads the chapter with my analysis will see that the order we like is not fully evident in the text. Presumably a teacher was envisaged—though Polemon makes no clear mention of one (cf. Leiden ch. 1 A8, p. 351) and it is difficult to say if the reference to the 'student' at the end of Leiden ch. 70 is original. For both blue-black and black Polemon distinguishes between dotted and undotted eyes. Redness and size are the indicators of moral qualities in blue-black eyes with dots. Those without dots differ according to the 'rim' (*itys*), presumably of the iris. In the case of black eyes, which are immediately categorized as bad, the division is more complex with four different types of dots denoting bad qualities. Eyes without dots contain 'red bits'—if these are not very red, they signal good qualities, but if they are very red and square, and 'in addition' the eyes have various dots and other features, the eyes are 'the worst of all'. This combination is in fact a prelude in the Leiden version (which is somewhat different from Adamantius here) to Polemon's long personal example of the sinister Man of Lydia. The complexity reflects the uniqueness of this individual.

My final example—B38 and 39 (Fig. 4)—has a different interest, for B38 is the first of three linked chapters on movement. They are also important for thinking about Polemon's interest in gender since they have much to say on the figure of the *androgynos* or effeminate man. (More on this shortly.) Polemon divides primarily between natural and unnatural movement. Natural movement is treated no more in B38, but is postponed for quantitative and qualititive analysis in B39–40. Of the three types of unnatural movement in B38, the first concerns those who accommodate themselves to their audience in order to acquire power or achieve good marriages. The second type want boys or men for sex. The third sort are *androgynoi*, but seek to conform to 'the masculine' (*to andreion*). 'They are easily detected.' Movement, gait, and posture are always areas of concern among the rule-bound elites of this period, and this is reflected

[226] Ch. 4, pp. 219–20.

[227] For dots see also A8 'black pebbles about the size of a millet seed, etc.' (similarly in Leiden but here including the Man of Cyrene).

not only in the rhetoricians but also in Clement and of course in Bryson, whose advice is that the boy should 'not let his hands hang slack or fold them over his chest. He should not reveal his arm. He should not hurry too much when he walks nor be too slow, for speed in walking is a sign of recklessness while slowness is a sign of haughtiness and indolence. Revealing the arm is an act of insolence, and letting the hands hang slack shows contemptuousness of people' (§139). That the physiognomist must detect the natural shows the philosophical foundations of physiognomy (as traced in Ch. 2 of this volume) are at least distantly reflected in Polemon.

In B38–9, then, a longer scheme is included, rather than the parallel divisions of the eye.[228] It may be worth observing that a fondness for logical division would have been natural for anyone trained in rhetorical instruction in this period—which includes most male members of the upper classes. An analogy of sorts may be drawn with the *stasis* theory elaborated most famously by Hermogenes of Tarsus, who came to prominence in the late second century.[229] *Stasis* probably refers to the 'stance' taken by a speaker in arguing his case. The ostensibly complex theory of how one should proceed has its origins in the Hellenistic period but became particularly important as a result of innovations made in the second century. Hermogenes' system builds on the work of predecessors including Polemon's direct contemporary Lollianus. It is distinctive because 'it links the various headings [the *kephalaia* of *stasis*] in a progression of alternatives, rather than separating them into parallel categories.'[230] Hermogenes begins his book on the subject by asserting that the most important part of rhetoric is division and demonstration.[231] The *Physiognomy* does not take its inspiration directly from this (of course); but the kind of process Polemon and his peers were comfortable with and expected in their daily use of rhetoric would have made Polemon's procedures in the *Physiognomy* feel more familiar than they do to us. B38–40 show the idea of progression nicely. This can be illustrated within many other chapters; but in the lengthy and complex eye section as a whole Polemon preferred parallel categories.[232] Apart from the influence of rhetoric, I have noted in the Introduction that Polemon might in general terms have been influenced by contemporary medical and philosophical interest in the relationship between the body and the soul.[233] Adamantius refers to physiognomy as an 'art'/'science' (*technē*, A2, 3), while the Leiden Polemon several times calls it a 'science' (*'ilm*; chs. 1 A8, 2 B2, 31 B31, 52 B42, esp. ch. 70 'my science'). Thus there is every reason to

[228] B39 can easily be followed in the text.

[229] See Philostratus, *VS* 2. 1, 577–8 = 83. 3–23 on this famous infant prodigy. See Heath (1995).

[230] Kennedy (1983) 73–86 (quotation p. 82; cf. the diagrammatic layout on p. 83). On Hermogenes and *stasis* see also Russell (1996) 11–14, Heath (2004) Part I, Schouler (1984) i. 171–85. (P. Hordeonius) Lollianus: Rothe (1989) 37–55.

[231] 1 line 6 (p. 28) ed. Rabe μέγιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ περὶ διαιρέσεως . . . καὶ ἀποδείξεως.

[232] One might note the use of the verb *diairein*, 'divide', at B42 and esp. B59. Cf. Ps.-Aristotle 807ᵃ27, 809ᵃ1, 26; but Adamantius does not employ the Aristotelian logical division of *genos* and *eidos* (cf. Vogt 1999: 338 for literature on this).

[233] Introduction p. 11 for Rufus, Aretaeus, Plutarch, Dio (for whom see below at nn. 255–6).

think that Polemon believed physiognomy—*his* physiognomy, at any rate—was a reputable discipline complete with logical procedures his peers would have understood.

I have mentioned Polemon's view of *androgynoi*, 'effeminates', in B38. There is a further attack on them in the linked chapter B40.[234] Philostratus reports that Polemon's 'proud and haughty temper' owed much to his association with the Stoic philosopher Timocrates, who was 'irascible beyond measure'. Timocrates plainly had or adopted a super-virile persona: 'while he was arguing, his beard and head hair stood up like a lion's launching an attack' (535–36 = 46. 22 ff.). The lion is the male type *par excellence* (B2). As Maud Gleason has brought out so well in *Making Men* (1995), there was a strong will in the moralists, medical writers, and educationalists of this period to impugn conduct by males which could be taken as overlapping with female dress, clothing, gait, and voice. It is quite clear that many men were strongly attracted by non-virile forms of dress, by the use of make-up, by depilation and shaving of body and facial hair, and by a greater range of vocal tones and pitches than other men allowed. Philostratus records that the sophist Scopelian, Polemon's older contemporary at Smyrna, was attacked by the shaggy Timocrates for his effeminate use of pitch depilatories and for employing female hair-pluckers.[235] Clearly Scopelian had gone further than was normally acceptable, and once Timocrates pointed this out, the 'youth [i.e. the students of rhetoric] took sides... Polemon, who was the pupil of both men, became one of the faction of Timocrates'. His preference for the leonine philosopher is Philostratus' only allusion—if one wishes to read it that way—to his interest in physiognomy.

How does Polemon construct the *androgynos*? Pollux's *Onomasticon* includes the term in a long list of associated words under the heading *kinaidos*. The words cover both the way of life—disgusting, unclean, disgraceful—and specify the sexual connotations of a male who has sold his youth for money and has been used as a prostitute.[236] These words are almost certainly to be seen as part of the vocabulary of political abuse that was ages old. Thus the first thing that comes into Plutarch's mind when he imagines how we go about upsetting an enemy is to warn us against 'abusing him as *kinaidos*, effeminate (*malakos*—see below), dirty, crude, or mean' (*How to Benefit from Your Enemies* 88 c). In the section on 'deviant and prostituted males' in Suetonius' dictionary of abusive terms in Greek, written in the early second century, *androgynos* is given as a gloss on the term *arrenōpas* found in the comic poet Cratinus. Suetonius says Cratinus' term means an effeminate who has the form/shape of a man (*andromorphon*, a rare

[234] 'Those who move with the whole body, both altogether and in each limb, are androgynous, for this is very feminine. And those who incline themselves to the right in their movement are androgynous.' Cf. Ps.-Aristotle 813^{a}17–18 (where this is applied to the *kinaidos*; cf. below, n. 238, and Ch. 7 n. 33).

[235] *paratiltriai*, filed by Pollux under 'barber', 7. 165.

[236] 6. 126–7; note καταπύγων (a general term of abuse like the English 'bugger'), κλύσμα ('douche'; cf. 7. 39 κλύσμα καὶ πλύμα, 'douche and washbag', of a 'hard-worn' female prostitute), λακκόπρωκτος ('reservoir arse'; a more learned reference—Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1330—which Pollux says is 'bad'), all three implying passivity.

word)—'the kind we also call *androgynoi*'.[237] If this indicates contemporary usage, it may explain Polemon's preference for the word over *kinaidos*, which does not occur in Adamantius.[238] Most elements of the description of the *androgynos* at B52 recur in the *Physiognomy*.[239] The other words associated with the term are (using our translations, with their frequency in brackets and the frequency of the Greek terms as they are listed) 'effeminate' (1) (*thēlydrias* 1), 'feminine' (4)/'womanly' (7) (*gynaikeios* 10, *thēlys* 3[240]), 'unmanly/iness' (13) (*anandr-* 13). 'Soft' (*malakos*) is also mostly associated with the feminine male.[241] Polemon also associates these terms with the 'pederast' (1) (A11), and the 'fop' (1)/'dandy' (1) (A23; *habryntēs*,[242] *kallōpistēs*); *androgynos* itself occurs 11 times. It is important to note that these terms are a sort of shorthand: when we meet them, we are expected to apply the moral characteristics associated with them from e.g. A4 ('feminine appearance in the eyes and the other signs' means 'womanly in luxury and sex ... daring and shameless and rejoice in villainy, treachery, and faithlessness'), the crucial B2 (the 'female ... is ignoble, bitter, deceitful, light-minded, unjust, contentious, and impudently cowardly'), B21 ('androgynous ... lewdness'), B41 ('cowardly and faint-hearted... androgynous'). As we shall see, 'manly' is a similar shorthand.

The effeminate typology is, then, used extensively. But we need to put this in context. Consider the voice. Rhetoricians and educationalists were keen to instil manliness in the voices of their pupils.[243] In Adamantius B42 Polemon includes fourteen types of voice and associated moral traits. Only one of these types is the androgynous man ('the man who speaks with a high and soft and flexible voice indicates that he is androgynous'). The other thirteen offer a good cross-section of Polemon's moral terminology: 'mindless and aggressive and gluttonous', 'insensible', 'melancholy', 'changeable', 'noble ... great-mindedness and righteousness', 'kind thoughts', 'wanton and frivolous and think flighty thoughts', 'greedy, troublesome... suspicious in everything', 'malicious, spiteful liars and rejoice in the sufferings of others', 'anger and violence and lawlessness and

[237] 3 Ὁ παρὰ τῷ Κρατίνῳ (fr. 389 Kock) ἀρρενώπας· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γύννις ὤν, ἔχων δέ τι ἀνδρόμορφον· οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀνδρόγυνοι λέγονται. Suetonius' Roman audience will have been familiar with the *androgynus*, cf. *OLD* s.v. Cf. Adamantius B2 ἀρρενωπότατον.

[238] Ps.-Aristotle uses *kinaidos* in his list at 808ª12. Although B52 ('Androgynous Man') largely follows him in the ordering of the typologies, the material here is rather different. Cf. Ch. 7 n. 33.

[239] Cf. A19 cannot keep brows level, A23 fluttering of eyelids (not the same as B52's eyes, admittedly), B2 the feminine type has a narrower face, etc., is knock-kneed, etc., has 'moist flesh', B9 knees knocking together are 'womanly and effeminate', B21 (an important passage) deviation of eyes, movement of loins, fidgeting of hands, bending of neck, screaming voice, B40 movement of whole body and limbs, B41 high, soft voice. For the 'moist' (ὑγρός) and 'reckless' (ἰταμός), cf. Pollux 6. 126 ἀνδρόγυνος, ὑγρός, 127 ἰταμώτερος ἑταιρῶν. For 'hands palms up' cf. below, n. 255.

[240] Excluding the sense 'female'.

[241] See esp. B2 'the whole appearance of the (feminine) body is softer', B42 'a high and soft and flexible voice' belongs to the *androgynos*, but note that 'those who speak with a voice both soft and deep have kind thoughts' and at B54 softness of flesh and voice is associated with the mild type (but this may not be good, and it is interesting to note how little the mild type—the *praos*—is cited other than in B54; cf. below at n. 301). Further association of softness and the feminine type can be found at B6 (feet), B37 (hair), and B45 (the coward, on which see below).

[242] Found only here.

[243] Gleason (1994) ch. 5.

misanthropy', 'idleness and cowardice', 'thoughtlessness and mindlessness', 'bad and mindless'. Thus, though there is no doubt that Polemon makes good use of the masculine norm, we should not exaggerate this use.

Two interesting side-lines on Polemon's attitude may be mentioned. First, during his term as *stratēgos* at Smyrna in *c*.134/5, he was responsible for issuing an impressive number of medallions in celebration of the memory of Hadrian's 'beloved',[244] Antinous. Antinous died in 130 and the quality and uniformity of the medallions suggests a central, Roman initiative was behind the issues; the same is true of the Antinous series from other cities.[245] Polemon also produced coins now for Hadrian (as Zeus) and Hadrian's wife, Sabina.[246] The Antinous medallions associate the youth with Dionysus, Hermes, and Attis(-Men), deities celebrating beauty and vitality, by portraying animals identified with their cults, respectively the *pardalis*, the ram, and the bull. Bull and ram do not feature in the *Physiognomy*, but *pardalis*, the leopard (or panther), certainly does. For Polemon, as for Ps.-Aristotle, it is the stereotype of the feminine (B2). It is (in Adamantius) *thēlymorphotaton*, 'the most feminine in appearance' and its character is 'elegant and irascible and cunning and treacherous, cowardly as well as bold'. In Leiden ch. 2 B2 the traits of the masculine lion and the feminine leopard are expounded in much greater detail. The leopard is 'impudent, immoral, spiteful, foolish, a lover of killing and coercion for whoever opposes it, peaceable to whoever makes peace with it, disdainful, haughty, neither tame nor tamed.' Anonymus Latinus is similar.[247] What does this mean? Polemon evidently hated what he saw as deviation from the male standard. In his official capacity he celebrated Antinous—and capitalized on doing so.[248] In private he can hardly have had much time either for the pathic or the prince's 'excessive sensuality' towards him.[249] This is another reason for thinking that the *Physiognomy* was published after Hadrian's death.[250]

Second, as we have just seen, Philostratus blames Timocrates for Polemon's negative attitude towards perceived breaches of the male code. But we must not forget Dio of Prusa, with whom Polemon also studied.[251] Dio's hostile attitude to male same-sex relationships and effeminate behaviour is candidly expressed in a number of places.[252] But there is one speech in particular where the claimed

[244] Cassius Dio 69. 11. 2 παιδικά; for the word cf. *Physiognomy* B38 'boyfriends'. For Herodes' report of Polemon's oratory in this same year (cf. Halfmann 1979: 157), see Philostratus, *VS* 536–9 = 47. 16–50. 5.

[245] But note the dedication 'to the Smyrnaeans' on Polemon's medallions: the imperial order is used to advantage to emphasize the local benefactor's relationship with his city by signalling that he had paid for the issue on their behalf (cf. Meyer 1991: 137 for him and other named issuers, 142). For Antinous, including the cults set up for him (cf. SHA *Hadrian* 14. 7 'the Greeks made him a god at Hadrian's request'), see Meyer (1991) 135–51 (coins), 189–211 (cults).

[246] For all these see Klose (1987) 16–18, 68–9, Katalog pp. 248–9 (Hadrian), 250 (Sabina), 250–4 (Antinous).

[247] Chs. 8, 46 'the man who is similar to a leopard is insidious, unbending, savage and daring'.

[248] Above, n. 245 on the dedication of the issue to the Smyrnaeans.

[249] SHA *Hadrian* 14. 6, cf. 14. 5 'quem muliebriter flevit'.

[250] Cf. above, pp. 167–8.

[251] Above, n. 11.

[252] Swain (1996) 126, 214–16, cf. (2000) 48.

degree of offensiveness to his audience stretches belief that the words as we have them could ever have been spoken, and where the physiognomical invective against effeminacy must have proved congenial to Polemon. This is the First Tarsian Oration (*Or.* 33). Dio delivered two speeches to Tarsus. The second deals with its political turmoil and problems with the Roman authorities. The first speech is a sustained, sarcastic condemnation of the males of the city for what Dio calls their continual 'snorting'.[253] By this he refers, in the words of Gilbert Highet, to the 'heavy breathing of men engaged in sexual intercourse'.[254] The matter is revealed he says (also) by the 'voice, glance, and posture', of the Tarsians, and by their 'hairstyle, gait, inverting the eye, bending the neck, and conversing with palms turned upward' (33. 52).[255] After retelling the story of how Cleanthes identified a *kinaidos* from his sneeze and wishing he could ask 'the experts' what the Tarsians' noise means,[256] Dio adapts various historical and mythological stories to the ridicule of his audience. He has already told them the sound they make is that of *androgynoi* (33. 39). Now the speech culminates with a savage attack on their determination to remove from themselves all body and facial hair, 'the characteristics of men'. Dio concludes, 'If only we could borrow other things from women, it's clear we'd be totally happy … complete creatures and *androgynoi* by nature!' (33. 64). Only one further point may be made: unlike Dio, Polemon is uninterested in facial hair as a signifier of maleness.[257]

'Androgynous' and the words associated with it forms one of the main clusters of negative moral terms in the *Physiognomy*. There are five other clusters which are equally or more important, and which show the bleak assessment Polemon made of his peers. The first to consider is the huge group of terms pertaining to malicious, troublesome, underhand, jealous, and bullying behaviour.[258]

[253] Perhaps only the elite: cf. 33. 52.

[254] (1983) 95.

[255] ταῖς χερσὶν ὑπτίαις: 'to receive with upturned palms' is a proverbial gesture of acceptance or welcome in later Greek (at any rate: in the 3rd c. Philostratus, *Imagines* 1. 6. 3, in the 4th c. Basil, *Letters* 203. 4, Libanius, *Letters* 1192. 1, and many examples in John Chrysostom and elsewhere; note that Bremmer 1991: 21–2, followed by Vogt 1999: 373, on Ps.-Aristotle 808^{a}13–14—the verbal source of Adamantius B52 'he carries his hands palms up'—invokes Aeschylus, *PV* 1002–6 γυναικομίμοις ὑπτιάσμασιν χερῶν as indicating that women held their hands in this way and so the point should be the feminine behaviour of a male—but Prometheus' indignation makes the phrase rather special there); here it appears to signal readiness for sex, and I suggest the same meaning is present in Adamantius.

[256] In Dio Cleanthes (cf. Ch. 2, p. 78 becomes a local Tarsian physiognomist. On this and other physiognomic material in the oration note the recent treatment by Bost-Pouderon (2003).

[257] Cf. Ch. 1, p. 13. For Dio cf. esp. *Or.* 36. 17: 'Only one of (the Borysthenites) was shaven, and everyone reviled and hated him. It was said he had adopted this practice simply to flatter Romans and to show his friendship for them. One could see from him the disgrace of the matter and how completely unsuitable it was for men (οὐδαμῆ πρέπον ἀνδράσιν).'

[258] Note: English and Greek numbers for terms do not always match because (*a*) we have not always translated on a word-for-word basis, and (*b*) I have listed only the most numerous or other interesting equivalents in either language. The numbers serve to give an indication, and anyone interested in exact figures must consult the Index Graecus in Foerster ii (which, praiseworthy though it is, should always be checked with the *TLG* electronic search facility, since there are one or two omissions under individual entries and at least one important whole omission, ἐναντίος).

The main terms[259] are 'malevolent' (*kakothelēs* 1, *kakothymos* 2), 'malicious'/'malice' (*kakoēth-* 16), 'rejoice at others' woes' (*epichairekakos* 1), 'malignant' (*palingkotos* 2, *engkotos* 1),[260] 'villainous/-y' (*panourg-* 13, *kakourg-* 7),[261] 'mischievous'/'mischief' (*kakomēchan-* 11),[262] 'spite(ful)' (*baskan-* 4),[263] 'deceit(ful)', 'treacherous/-ery', 'plot(ting)' (*dol-* 8, *doler-* 18, *epiboul-* 12, *proboul-* 1, *apatē* 2),[264] 'dishonest', 'faithless' (*apist-* 11),[265] 'untrustworthy/-iness' (*palimboul-* 4),[266] 'envious/envy' (*phthon-* 5),[267] 'thievish(ness)' (*epiklopos* 4, *kleptosynē* 2).[268] With these we should certainly associate 'savage(-minded)' (*ōmos* 1, *ōmophrōn* 7),[269] and 'wild' (*agrios* 20).[270] These words may be used singly or in combination with each other or with terms in the following groupings. The second sense area and in fact the single most common negative term in the *Physiognomy* is 'coward(ly)'/'cowardice' (*deil-* 34),[271] which occurs alone or with other terms, including the related 'suspicious' (*hypoptos* 3, *kachypoptos* 1, *hypono-* 2, *hypoblepō* 1, *hyphorāsthai* 1),[272] 'cower' and 'crouch' (*ptōssō, ptōx* 3). A third common grouping is 'anger'/'angry/angered', 'irascible' (*orgē* 7, *orgilos* 5, *dysorg-* 4, *thymousthai* 3, *mēnis* 1) and 'hot-tempered' (*thermoboulos* 3), which terms occur 23 times. The fourth area to note is the rich variety and number of terms relating to stupidity and crassness: 'stupid(ity)', 'fool(ish)'/'foolishness' (*mōr-* 16,[273] *ēlithios* 2, *euēth-* 3, *embrontētos* 1, *kakophradēs* 1),[274] 'insensible/-ility' (*anaisthē-* 10, *dysaisthētos* 1),[275] 'mindless(ness)' (*anoētos, anoia* 15),[276] 'ignorant/-ce' (*amath* 14),[277] 'clumsy' (*skaio-* 7),[278] 'unintelligent' (*asynetos* 2),[279] 'empty-minded' (*keneophrōn* 1),[280] 'damaged mind' (*beblaphthai tas phrenas* 1),[281] 'mad(ness)' (*mania* 6, *memēna* 1, *emmanēs* 1, *apoplēxia* 2).[282] We may

[259] The word count of the English terms is placed in the footnotes (unless otherwise made clear); the count of the Greek terms is placed in the text with the terms.
[260] 24 times.
[261] 19 times.
[262] 11 times.
[263] 4 times.
[264] 43 times.
[265] 10 times.
[266] 4 times.
[267] 5 times.
[268] 7 times.
[269] 10 times.
[270] 20 times (in this sense of unhuman behaviour).
[271] 36 times.
[272] 7 times.
[273] Including Foerster's suggestion at B58.
[274] 21 times.
[275] 11 times.
[276] 15 times.
[277] 14 times.
[278] 7 times.
[279] 2 times.
[280] Deleted by Foerster at A6 as being a 'lectio varia' to the preceding *kakophradēs*; but neither word is common and *keneophrōn* is rare and basically poetic (in prose the more usual form is *kenophrōn*).
[281] Once.
[282] 10 times; 'madness' is associated with stupidity in the *Physiognomy*.

add as a fifth grouping several common terms relating to incontinent behaviour: 'intemperate/-ance' (*akolas-* 9), 'gluttonous/-y' (*gastrimarg-* 12),[283] 'wanton' (*margo-*13),[284] 'greed(iness)' (*aplēstia* 1, *boros* 2, *philokerdēs* 4),[285] 'fond of money' (*philochrēmatos* 4, *philargyros* 2),[286] 'shameless(ness)' (*anaid-* 6, *anaischynt-* 6),[287] 'shamefully' (*aischrōs*).[288] Naturally in addition to the above there are the usual terms for 'bad'/'evil' (*kak-*), 'wicked' (*ponēr-*), etc. As for interest in sex, this is not as common as might be thought: 'sex' (*aphrodi-* 6),[289] 'lascivious(ness)' (*lagn-* 8).[290]

It is easy to see from all this that Polemon is far from being fixated by gender. We also must remember, as has been pointed out, that *androgynos* and its affines are themselves shorthand for many of the terms that have just been reviewed. Before asking what we should make of the negative nature of Polemon's assessment of his peer group, let us consider the most common positive terms. These are certainly less numerous as a whole and individually. The most important word is 'manly/-iness' (*andrei-* 14, *andria* 5),[291] which is often, but *not* here, translated as 'brave(-ry)'. See B2: 'for the most part what is masculine is noble, without deceit, just, spirited, competitive and simple', and of course B44 where the 'manly' (*andreios*) man is in sum 'the courageous (*eupsychos*) and strong (*ischyros*) man'.[292] 'Manly', then, is also a shorthand. A number of words indicate 'brave(ry)', 'courage'/'courageous(ness)' (*alk-* 9, *eupsych-* 3).[293] More promising is the group of words indicating intelligence:[294] 'fond of learning' (*philomathēs* 4) and 'good at learning'/'quickness at learning'/'aptitude for learning' (*eumath-* 9),[295] 'intelligent/-ce' (*synetos, synesis* 9),[296] 'perceptive(ness)' (*euaisthētos, euaisthēsia*).[297] 'Noble' (*gennaios* 9) is also important,[298] as is 'spirit (ed)' (*thymos* 4, *thymoeidēs* 5, *thymikos* 2),[299] 'talented' (*euphyēs* 9),[300] and the grouping 'kind', 'gentle', 'meek', 'tame' (*ēpios* 6, *hēmeros* 6, *praos* 1).[301] But the word which appears to be the most-used positive term is *megalonous/megalonoia*. Although it occurs once in Plato (*Laws* 935 B), it is only from the

283 13 times.
284 13 times.
285 6 times.
286 6 times.
287 13 times.
288 Once.
289 5 times.
290 8 times.
291 19 times.
292 'Strong'/'strength' in virtually all cases without ambiguity indicate a physical, not a moral quality.
293 8 times.
294 Note the curious absence of *paideia*, 'culture', 'education', and related terms including the negative *apaideu-*. It seems that specific terms are preferred.
295 13 times.
296 9 times.
297 6 times.
298 8 times.
299 12 times.
300 7 times. For the translation in Ps.-Aristotle see Appendix n. 2.
301 *praos* (cf. above, n. 241) only at B39 of gait; *prao-* in B21 ('not mild'), B58 are emendations.

first century AD that this term becomes commonly accepted.[302] It occurs 12 times in the *Physiognomy*, and is translated here as 'great-minded(-ness)'. Its real flavour may be gathered from the ever-useful thesaurus of Pollux (6. 148). He includes it in a group of words and phrases which describe the man who deals with the people 'powerfully'. He leads them about, pours out his words like a river, and unleashes his tongue on them. As an example of phrases one might wish to apply to such a doughty individual, Pollux gives: 'Who could withstand the barrage of his words... the inundation, the vehemence, the force, the strength, the loudness, the fluency, the *megalonoia*, the clear expression, etc.?' In this list at any rate the term seems to imply a no-nonsense leader who speaks his mind and gets his message across with maximum clarity. It would probably not be wrong to think of this *megalonous* as literally 'big-thinking', and that may be a more accurate rendition of the sense in Polemon. If the word is the one he most often reaches for in approbation of others, we may be reasonably sure it was something he liked to hear about himself.[303] By contrast, the great Aristotelian virtue of *megalopsychia*, 'magnanimity', occurs in his work only three times.[304]

Megalonoia may lead us on to enquire into the character types of B44–57 (Leiden chs. 53–67[305]). These are: manly, cowardly, talented, insensible, shameless, orderly, cheerful, troublesome, androgynous, bitter, mild, dissembler, fond of money, fond of gambling. Half of these types do not feature much in the *Physiognomy*: orderly, cheerful, bitter, mild, dissembler, fond of money, fond of gambling.[306] Thus Polemon followed the list made canonical under the name of Aristotle (807^a32–808^b11); but his own moral patterns are his, and not traditional. To the typologies must be added the 'wickedly stupid' man of B58–60, which is however separated from the others by its (original) theoretical introduction (B58–9).[307]

In B42 there are, as we saw above, just two good types of voice out of fourteen, and this seems to be a fairly usual ratio. Polemon's world is full of deceit, treachery, cowardice, stupidity. This preference for negative characterizations may be demonstrated by what he leaves out as well: there are only two occurences of *sōphrōn* ('moral'; B21, B59),[308] which is one of the very most frequent terms of approval in Greek, just one of the ubiquitous word *aretē*

[302] The usage at Chrysippus fr. 586 should be ascribed to the source, Gregory of Nazianzus (*Epistle* 32. 7), who uses the word a number of times.

[303] One comparison may suffice: Lucian's defence of his new Roman employer at *Apology* 9: 'I admired his intelligence, manliness, and great-mindedness/big-thinking' (σύνεσιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλονοίαν) and wished to share the deeds of such a man'. Cf. B24 ('great-mindedness and manliness'), B26 ('manliness and intelligence and great-mindedness'), B40 ('very great-minded and manly').

[304] Note its use in Polemon's declamations on Marathon, 1. 20 ed. Hinck.

[305] On chs. 65 and 67 see above, nn. 209 and 214.

[306] The only one of those that do feature which has not been treated above is 'troublesome' (see Ch. 10, p. 491), *aniaros*, which occurs 5 times.

[307] The typology is apparently also original: Foerster i, pp. cvii f. held that the term *mōroponēros* replaced the allegedly more obscure *mōroblaptēs* found in Anonymus Latinus 104 (which André 1981: 149 suggests—for no reason—is from Loxus); but neither word occurs elsewhere.

[308] We may also count as Polemonian A2 '*sensible* men should work at the observation of this art with all enthusiasm'.

('virtue'), and none of the term *philanthrōpos*/*philanthrōpia*, 'human', 'sympathetic', 'nice', which is also extremely common in all major authors from Plato on. Not surprisingly Polemon does include its much less common antithesis, *misanthrōpia*, at B42.[309] The pessimistic view of humanity can only remind one of Thucydides.[310] But it is also noteworthy that Polemon avoids some basic negative words we would expect to be frequent: *polemios*, *echthros*, *apechthēs* ('enemy'); the reason (as has been suggested) is perhaps a preference for particularizing and detailing an enemy's characteristics. It has been remarked above that direct references to *philotimia* (*philotimon*) and *philoneikia* (*philoneikon*) are restricted to B2 where, however, they are part of the masculine and feminine typologies and are therefore implicitly frequent throughout. In this context we may note that the common word *timē*, 'honour', occurs only once (A19), and that *doxa*, 'glory'/'fame', is absent even though it is one of the most common words in Greek at all periods and (like *timē*) is used several times by Polemon in his declamations on Marathon (cf. in the *Physiognomy* only B38 *endoxos*). One might conclude from this that Polemon is less concerned with the system of competition for honours than with the rivalries and hatreds the system engendered. That the words for friend (*philos*; cf. A5 'friends of justice', A10 'fond of pleasures') and friendship (*philia*; cf. A6 'never make friends with a man who. . .', A2 physiognomy allows one to form good friendships) are rare will not surprise us as much.

Is there good reason for such a picture of his contemporaries? Polemon was sometimes part of Hadrian's entourage. Fronto, as we saw earlier, gives us an insight into the room for manoeuvre that was available to those near the emperor, and indicates where the courtier had to yield and put up with his inferiority. He also alerts us to the pressures caused by *maligni homines* who were waiting for opportunities to act against him. In the *Physiognomy* we have the merest glimpse of Polemon with Hadrian; but it is enough to get a sense of the tensions involved. Much of Polemon's life was spent dealing with the political infighting and factionalism of the local elites of Smyrna, Laodicea, and other places where he had influence or property. Battling with peers, as Fronto is seen to do occasionally (Herodes), was for Polemon daily bread and butter. If we look at the anecdotal material in Philostratus about his struggles with other sophists, it is easy to miss the political prizes that were often at stake in the claims to intellectual credibility that interest Philostratus—who would be chosen to go on an embassy, who would give a speech of celebration, and so on. All we can say is that Polemon's negative stereotyping gives us an insight into the tone of political life as he viewed it. And his negative view is not so out of step with what we find in other authors if we bear in mind (*a*) the stresses of public and private life which they so commonly report, and (*b*) the fact that most of the writing of a Plutarch or a Dio is concerned with reformation of problems, not description of them. We should bear in mind that the *Physiognomy* by its nature is over-saturated with evaluative vocabulary. If one takes a common word in

[309] 'A slightly cracked voice indicates anger and violence and lawlessness and misanthropy.'
[310] Who also lacks *philanthrōp-*.

Polemon and Plutarch such as the root *deil-* 'coward-', a *TLG* search of Plutarch shows 148 usages. Polemon, as we have seen, uses the root 34 times. But Plutarch's corpus contains over one million words, whereas Adamantius is only about 8,000 words long.[311] On this basis we would expect Plutarch to use the root over *4,000* times. Again, Polemon's positive *megalono-* is used by Plutarch only 3 times, whereas on a like-for-like basis we should expect some 1,500 instances; and so on. This saturation makes the *Physiognomy* a valuable additional resource for understanding the moral-political language of the second century. But it also means that we should not over-generalize from the quantity of negative views.[312]

To what extent did Polemon have particular enemies in mind? Obviously there are the personal examples in the Leiden *Physiognomy*, notably Favorinus at A20, the Lydian at A11, and the Phoenician at A16. Favorinus, we know, was a bitter foe. The Lydian is said to be unique, like Favorinus. He has an 'effeminate mouth', but the description otherwise concerns his evil behaviour. Given the detail of the story it would be difficult to hold that he was not a long-standing enemy. But the Man of Cyrene (A8), the Corinthian who tries to assassinate Hadrian (A12), and the Lydian called the Crab (A13), are said to have been seen only once.[313] No comparable information is given in the stories of the Phoenician (A16) and the Armenian (B12).[314] Thus the *Physiognomy* is not simply a rhetorical denunciation of personal acquaintances. It would do well to recall that one friend is mentioned (*'*lwqyds*; an unrecoverable form) in the story of the Lydian. Also, the characters at the end of the book at chs. 68–70 are not enemies: the man who is caught out lying in ch. 70 is unknown to Polemon, as is the Woman of Perge at ch. 68, and Polemon is simply a bystander during the two abductions in ch. 69, though he must have known many of the people around him.

What are we meant to do with the knowledge we gain of the evil around us as a result of reading Polemon's book? Is there any scope for self-improvement? Leiden ch. 1 A20 contains a pointer in this direction: 'if you have any memory of that, you can learn of the matter of your soul and of others'. Otherwise, Adamantius gives some possible uses of physiognomy at A2. Noteworthy is the

[311] The figures for word length given in Berkowitz and Squitier (1986) are only approximate, as they explain at p. xxviii. The exact length of our text of Adamantius is 8,176 words.

[312] For the saturation of moral terminology cf. the list of astrologically determined characteristics at Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* 3. 14 (13 in older editions), and (satirically) Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 4. 15–27 = Foerster ii. 341–6. Note Bouché-Leclercq's observation (1899: 313) that astrological predictions of character in texts like these borrowed from the physiognomists, not *vice versa*.

[313] Cf. the 'turtle' at ch. 2, B2.

[314] It is tempting to identify the laughing Phoenician with the sophist Hadrian of Tyre (with Tyre as the island state mentioned in the story; Hoffmann ad loc. proposed Aradus), since he was already prominent in the 130s (Philostratus, *VS* 2. 10, 585 = 90. 4–5, 590 = 94. 4–6, with Avotins 1975: 320–1, Swain 1990). For Hadrian's likely identity with Lucian's sneering enemy in the *False Critic*, see Jones (1986) 110–15. Lucian's allegation that his Phoenician practised 'Phoenician sex' (28, i.e. cunnilingus; cf. e.g. Galen xii. 249. 12–13) recalls Polemon's remark that his enemy, though peotomized, continued to desire women so much that 'he committed deeds too unpleasant to mention' on them, i.e. practised oral sex.

domestication of the subject in this passage ('deposit ... heirloom ... wife ... children'); whereas the rest of the *Physiognomy* seems more to reflect the world outside the immediate family. Adamantius seems to be condensing and abbreviating in A2, and there is every chance that Polemon included some remarks here about public life too—we cannot tell. I have already mentioned in passing a little work by Plutarch which goes under the title of *How to Benefit from Your Enemies*. This may offer some suggestions about reading the negative portrayal of one's peers. Most of Plutarch's moral and political essays assume there is much vice and wrongdoing around us, and they offer guidance on how we should avoid this by studying its adherents to make ourselves better. In *How to Benefit from Your Enemies* Plutarch tries two tacks. The primary one is the normal route of examining others—here enemies—and becoming superior to them by acting more morally.[315] But there is a secondary theme which surely has much to do with the fact that his addressee is the highly ambitious Greek politician in Roman service, Cornelius Pulcher, who was perhaps 5–10 years older than Polemon.[316] Contention, jealousy, and envy are only natural, Plutarch tells Pulcher, and since this is so, we keep them away from colleagues and family by 'using them up' on enemies (91 E–92 B). 'Villainy, deceit, and treachery (*panourgia, apatē, epiboulē*) do not seem bad or wrong against an enemy' (91 B–C). 'Concentrating malice and spite (*to kakoēthes kai baskanon*) on a foe will make one kinder and more agreeable to successful friends' (92 B). Enemies are routine for the politician here, and when Plutarch allows, indeed encourages, hostile behaviour against them, he is telling us something about Pulcher's own world, a world which is perhaps not so different from that of the *Physiognomy*. The theme of self-improvement is relevant too. 'Suppose that our enemies appear to acquire power at court or in political circles by ... flattery, trickery, bribery, or corruption'—*we* shall be happy because we never swop virtue for 'preferments with kings' eunuchs, mistresses, and governors' (92 E).[317] So, we look on 'bad' enemies and are glad we are not like them. Clearly, no reader of the *Physiognomy* wanted to be like the bad men portrayed there. If he was, and if he accepted the principles of physiognomy, he would like the Corinthian be obliged to admit the essential evil in his soul (Leiden 1 A12). In an age when observation and inspection of peers was a uniform practice, it may not be wrong after all to detect an *implicit* concern with one's own self-fashioning in the *Physiognomy*. As Plutarch remarks, if our enemy makes a *blasphēmia*, an allegation, against us of effeminacy in our 'hair style and walk', we must try to do something about it and show the charge does not actually apply (*mē prosonta*) to us (89 D–E). In this instance—effeminacy—Polemon might reply (B38) that you cannot disguise your nature; but since he allows for 'the element of practising', it

[315] Note the casual allusion to domestic violence at 90 D: if you learn to tolerate enemies' abuse, you will 'submit calmly and unresentfully to being thrashed or having things thrown at you by your father or mother'.

[316] Procurator of Epirus under Trajan, *iuridicus* for Hadrian in Egypt, and probably first archon of the Panhellenion: literature in e.g. Swain (1996) 163.

[317] Note 'satraps' for governors: another example of Persian terminology. Although 'kings' is ambiguous, Roman emperors are certainly included in the term for any Greek-speaker.

is open to anyone to see, for example, that a large step is good and then imitate this in order to excel, as Leiden puts it (ch. 50 B39), 'in being with kings'.

A person who can claim to be from the fairest race of all, the Greeks (B32, Leiden ch. 35 B32), manifestly has a head start, and it is this racial stereotyping that I want to consider in the final pages of this chapter. Anyone who knows anything of Greek literature and society in the period of the *Physiognomy* will be aware, as I have remarked already, that there is a huge emphasis on Greek ancestry and an investment in classicism to give meaning to the present. Part of this was a kind of imaginary biology which enabled Greek and non-Greeks to claim kinship with the ancient Greeks. The wandering of the Greek mythological heroes proved very helpful here, since they could often be invoked as founders of cities if no appropriate human agent existed.[318] As we have seen, Hadrian's Panhellenion exploited these ideas and sought to integrate Greek classicism with the cult of the Roman emperor. It is striking that unless there is reason to do so, many Greek authors mention Rome or Romans rather rarely, though in their real lives they may have had Roman citizenship and must have been highly aware of Roman rule. In his public life Antonius Polemon had a great deal to do with Rome, as his family had over several generations. This picture of the happy Roman Polemon is borne out by the inscriptional and numismatic records. Polemon's relations with the emperors is a key part of Philostratus' biography. Yet in the *Physiognomy* Hadrian the 'Great King' is a distant figure who does not know what is going on. An Arabic reader would not know from this text that Hadrian was in fact a Roman, for the Roman world makes no explicit entry.

The absence of Rome and Romans is highlighted by the chapter praising Greece as the home of the best race physically and spiritually, Adamantius B32 and Leiden ch. 35 B32. The specific example of the 'pure Greek' type completes the characterization of the 'nations of the world' (Leiden) in Adamantius B31 and Leiden chs. 31–4 B31. The material in the two versions differs somewhat and it is not easy to determine in every respect what is original. It seems that Adamantius has rewritten more than Leiden and has condensed somewhat. For example, it is clear that the characterization of Macedonians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, and Scythians in Leiden ch. 31 B31 is Polemon's; but Adamantius has dropped these names.[319] Adamantius' accent on the difficulty of telling racial character caused by miscegenation may be his own perspective ('it is not easy to judge . . . who is from a particular race . . . because there has been racial mixing, with Syrians spread in Italy, Africans in Thrace and others elsewhere . . . Variation occurs because many peoples have moved and settled elsewhere'), since this theme continues into B32, '*Any* who have guarded the Hellenic and Ionic race and kept it pure'; whereas the Leiden Polemon is more confident, promising his reader that he will be able to make a judgement on 'someone of the world and its peoples', and furthermore makes much more of the 'pure Greek' than Adamantius and has no doubt that the type exists. The Leiden Polemon is aware, however, that the pure Greeks are under threat from 'others'

[318] See esp. Strubbe (1984–6), Jones (1999) ch. 9 *et al.*, and the classic study of Bickerman (1952).

[319] The emendations of the three latter names are fairly straightforward ('Macedonia' is clearly written).

who want to take them over because of the 'pleasantness of their life and their moderate temperament... or out of a desire for their knowledge, their good way of life, and their laws.' He exemplifies his Greeks as 'the people of Argos, Corinth,[320] and other lands of theirs.' There is nothing corresponding to this in Adamantius, but it must be original.

The idea that Greece was a superior breeding ground for talent is an old one. The identification of environmental factors as determinants of racial character is the main point of the famous Hippocratic treatise, *Airs Waters Places*. With regard to Greece, its favourable clime and the well-tempered people it produced are recorded in no less orthodox a work than Aristotle's *Politics* (7. 7, 1327^{b} 23–35).[321] In the second century AD Ptolemy's astrological handbook, the *Tetrabiblos*, sets out the same ideas as part of an elaborate discussion of characteristics according to *klimata*,[322] and Galen used Hippocrates' determinism to advance his own speculations about the physiological basis of physiognomical inferences.[323] But in the context of second sophistic politics Polemon's chapter must be seen as operating on a different level. Who are the 'others' who want the Greeks' *epistēmē* ('knowledge'/'science'), *tropoi* ('ways'/'character'), and *nomoi* ('laws'/'customs'),[324] and who 'have become numerous among them, because people want them and their land'?[325] In the context of old Greece (Argos, Corinth), this can only refer to Romans/Italians.[326] There is more than a sense of regret here: the Greeks are being taken over. What of the expression 'pure Greek'? It can be paralleled only in the second sophistic period.

[320] Reliable emendations.

[321] Foerster ii, 269–70. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 24c on Athens' *eukrasia* (which produces 'men of supreme wisdom'). See Sassi (2001) 101–39.

[322] 2. 2–3; see esp. 3. 17–21 Boll–Boer (62–3 in Camerarius' pagination) on Greece and other favoured parts. Arabic writers had different ideas: Ch. 5, pp. 254–5.

[323] *QAM*, ch. 8 (798–804 Kühn). Cf. Ch. 2, pp. 120–1.

[324] If these were the original terms for *'ilm*, *sīra*, and *sunna*. See further below, n. 337.

[325] Literally 'because of people's desire for/desiring of them and their land'. Hoffmann's translation (p. 242) 'Est enim populus terrae suae participes habens, cum dudum peregrini inter eos crebruerint, quia homines eos eorumque terram adamabant' is misleading: *participes habens* ('having persons who share') is a mistake for *particeps* (sharing in'). 'Share' in the Arabic ('they are a people who share in their land') is a present participle, hence *qad kathara* certainly means 'have become numerous' (so 'dudum', 'before', is not right; and, note, 'peregrini' is only an interpretation of 'others', for which see next note), and the noun phrase *li-raghbati l-nās fī* 'because of people's desire for/desiring of' naturally refers to something still happening. It should also be noted that 'adamabant' must be taken in the sense 'form a desire to possess' (*OLD* s.v. 3): the verbal noun *raghba* means 'desire', 'wish', 'appetite', *not* 'love' or 'admire' (which 'adamare' may also mean, *OLD* s.v. 1).

[326] For similar phraseology cf. Dio, *Orr.* 11. 150 'both Greece and Asia are subject to *others*', 34. 48 'leadership and rule are in the hands of *others*'; Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 24. 22 'if you do not voluntarily heed this advice, *another* will come...'; and Polemon cited by Philostratus, *VS* 532 = 43. 17 'he did not allow lawsuits to be referred to any *other* place (ἀλλοσέ ποι)', i.e. the Roman governor (cf. above, n. 129). Dio, of course, was Polemon's teacher and Aristides his pupil (*Suda* π 1889, cf. α 3902, γ 450, δ 1170). Romeo (2002) 34 takes 'others' as Greeks who are not biological Greeks but 'Greek by cultural choice' and who were 'attracted' (cf. previous note on the correct meaning of *adamare*) to Greece to live. But it was Rome that had planted colonies in Greece (Corinth, Patrae, Nicopolis, and others: Rizakis 1997) and was responsible for mixing in Polemon's 'other races'. Immigration by Asian Greeks was hardly on *Polemon's* mind.

It is first used at the start of the second century by Polemon's contemporary, Soranus of Ephesus, who advises the use of 'pure Greeks' (αἱ καθαρῶς Ἑλληνίδες) as nurses (*Gynaecology* 2. 44. 2). At the same time Dio flatters the Prusans that they are 'in fact pure Greeks' (παιδείᾳ διαφέροντας καὶ φύσει καὶ τῷ ὄντι καθαρῶς ὄντας Ἕλληνας, *Or.* 48. 8). Aelius Aristides tells the Rhodians at *Or.* 24. 23 that they are 'pure Greek' (ὑμᾶς καθαρῶς ὄντας Ἕλληνας).[327] Of course, Dio in particular (but also Aristides) was interested in reminding the Greek cities of their ancestry and their self-respect.[328] Thus Polemon's use of the term, in a context that is uncomplimentary about Roman rule in Greece, verges on the nationalistic. Given this passage, Philostratus' report (above p. 157) about Polemon bringing 'from mainlands and islands... a pure and select Greece' to Smyrna should indeed reflect something he said or wrote (cf. *VS* 539 = 50. 6) himself.

It will no doubt cause surprise to some to find that a sometime Roman courtier from a pro-Roman family might harbour any reservations against Rome. Such a reaction would be naïve: Polemon and his type would have been happy to rule for themselves, given the chance. They were also happy with the influence they had under the ruling power, which served to protect them both from the mob and from enemies among their peers. That did not stop them having doubts. Studying with Dio, who says the harshest things about Rome of all the Greek intellectuals of this period (though he is never stupid enough to criticize the emperor), was one place where Polemon might have heard doubts expressed candidly.[329] But he was quite able to make his own mind up on the matter. This may be another reason to hold that the *Physiognomy* was published after the death of his imperial patron, Great King Hadrian.

Polemon's identification of Argos as a pure Greek town presents no problem (connection to it was one way of entering the Panhellenion). But Corinth is tricky, at least for us. The Romans had destroyed old Corinth in 146 BC and the refounded city was a Roman colony and centre of the administration of the province of Achaia. Some Greeks show they were well aware of this.[330] Under Hadrian various attempts were made to re-Hellenize the city, including the reintroduction of Greek in public epigraphy and the refoundation of the Isthmian Games.[331] Favorinus in his *Corinthian Oration* notes somewhat

[327] 'There is this benefit to be gained from the past, the application of well-known examples to the present ... it is not without use to tell (these) to you who are pure Greek and have been raised from childhood in these traditions' (trans. Behr). Later in the fourth century the emperor Julian praised his addressee for being 'purely Greek among the Cappadocians' (ἄνδρα ἐν Καππαδόκαις καθαρῶς Ἕλληνα; *Epistle* 78); but by this time 'Hellene' had come to mean someone who was still pagan and the contrast here is with a true (pagan) Hellene among the (Christian) Cappadocians. Whether this has affected Adamantius' caution is unclear.

[328] Dio's First Tarsian Oration is a good example of how a city's Hellenic founding myths may be used to chastise present-day degeneracy (cf. above); see Robert (1977*b*) 132.

[329] Dio: see esp. *Orr.* 34. 15, 38–42; 38. 33–8; 43. 11–12; 45. 4–5; the meaning of these passages can only be appreciated within and as part of Dio's whole, fascinating political policy. See Swain (1996) ch. 6 for some attempt to understand the overall picture, Salmeri (2002) setting Dio in a wider perspective.

[330] Pausanias is the best example: see Swain (1996) 347–8, 353–4.

[331] On all this see recently König (2001).

unkindly that the city had been 'rendered into Greek' like himself.[332] On the other hand, Aristides was happy to celebrate the Greekness of Corinth and its games in *Or.* 46.[333] And it may be that Polemon had come to feel the same way. After all, racial purity—especially Greek—can be found anywhere, if one is looking for it.

One more detail may be cleared up. The previous chapter of the Leiden text (ch. 34) concerns the people of east and west. The writer then focuses on coastal and inland peoples within this division. As examples he gives the Indians and 'the people of *Nws*', who are very moderate in temperament, with very fine intellects and faces. As for the purest of all, it is the one who is evenly proportioned in all his external form' (there follows immediately ch. 35 on the pure Greeks). That Adamantius has made changes to this section is clear from his statement that he is abbreviating ('to demonstrate this briefly'). The examples he has just given are Africans, Ethiopians, Spaniards, and Celts. It is highly likely that the Arabic 'Indians' has replaced some of these names; but it is just as likely that Adamantius has added some of them himself, perhaps to give an empire-wide perspective (which was more natural for a Greek in the fourth than the second century). Whatever the case, in B32 Adamantius says he will discuss 'the Hellenic and Ionic race'. It is to be expected that Polemon would say something positive about the Greeks of Ionia. I would suggest that Ionia is probably to be found in the mysterious *Nws*'. There is no violence done by redotting the Arabic نوسا of the manuscript to يونيا (or better ايونيا). If this is right, the Ionians with their intelligence and beauty introduce the similarly lovely 'pure Greek' type.

Given the themes of this volume, it is worth noting that Arabic readers would have understood the chapter on the pure Greek very well. An important element in the ideology of the Arabic translation movement was the idea that the ancient Greeks had disappeared and that their intellectual legacy was now preserved by Muslims.[334] Classicists will recall that Romans of the Late Republic and after had used similar arguments about the 'degenerate' Greeks of their own day.[335] For Muslims the Romans/Byzantines (*al-Rūm*) had ruined the ancient Greeks (*al-yūnān, yūnānīyūn*) by imposing the anti-intellectual religion of Christianity.[336] This may explain why the chapter making the pure Greek

[332] Ps.-Dio of Prusa *Or.* 37. 26. The verb—ἀφελληνίζω—is very rare. Pollux 5. 154 lists it with terms to do with translation.

[333] Dated to AD 156 by Behr (1981) 422.

[334] Gutas (1998) 84–95.

[335] Petrochilos (1974), cf. Swain (2002) 130–8.

[336] Note the difference in the Arabic text between Favorinus' acquisition of the Greek language, where the translator is fully aware that ancient Greek is the language in question, and the 'Egyptian- or Greek-made loin-cloth' which falls from the woman of Perge (ch. 68), where 'Greek' is *rūmī* because the translator is thinking in terms of his own time.

(*al-yūnānī*) the best form of humanity was retained. A well-educated Muslim wanted to be able to show awareness of the Greeks' 'knowledge ... way of life and ... laws'.[337] He would certainly have been interested in knowing about what they looked like.[338] That 'others' (i.e. *al-Rūm*) had taken them over was something he knew already.

Polemon's station in life was a privileged and dangerous one. Keeping one's place at the top required an ability to make rapid responses to threats and opportunities presented by the machinations of fellow-citizens or the whims of an emperor who was 'unpredictable in all matters at all times' (SHA *Hadrian* 14. 11). In such a situation the logical seductions of the predictive science of physiognomy promised control and safety. Like all members of his class Polemon was brought up to observe and evaluate peers. In the *Physiognomy* he sought to offer protection from enemies in a world which, like Fronto's, seemed to be based on self-interest. He was a famous man in his own lifetime and it is not unreasonable to think that his handbook was read widely. Proof is lacking, but it would be surprising if Galen were not aware of it. In an observation on the sheer number of cases for a doctor working in Rome, he states that 'the orator Polemon is to be congratulated for describing Rome as "the epitome of the world".'[339] He surely counted him among 'the authors of books on physiognomy' whose confirmation of Hippocrates he mentions with approval in his commentary on *Epidemics* 6. 7. 7.[340] Perhaps Polemon was too recent to be cited in *Quod animi mores*: Aristotle and Hippocrates suited his purposes better. Nevertheless, it would be churlish of us to think that Galen's speculations on physiognomy, which were so important for the development of Muslim *firāsa*, owed nothing to the man whom Arabic writers called the 'Master of Physiognomy'.[341]

[337] Cf. above, n. 324 for the Arabic terms, which are deeply embedded in Muslim culture: no one could read the words *sīra* and *sunna* without thinking of the Prophet's Biography (the Sīrah: see e.g. Kister 1983) and the way of life imitated by the orthodox (Sunnis). On the social power of *'ilm*, 'knowledge'/'science', see Chamberlain (1994).

[338] Thus Mubashshir b. Fatik, the author of the late 11th-c. *Choice Aphorisms and Best Sayings*, which consists mainly of biographies of Greek intellectuals and enjoyed huge popularity in European translations, displays a strong interest in his subjects' appearances: Mourad (1939) 65–6 for examples, Swain (2006) on the cultural implications.

[339] *On Dislocations Not Observed by Hippocrates* xviiia. 347. 15–16; cf. Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner* 20 B.

[340] Text and translation in Ghersetti (1999*a*) 7–8 (53).

[341] Note also Artemidorus' hostile remarks about physiognomists at *Interpretation of Dreams* 2. 40, with Pack (1941) who speculates on rivalry with Polemon (his older contemporary) and Smyrna. See also ch. 4, pp. 223–4 for possible echoes in Philostratus.

4

Physiognomics: Art and Text

Jaś Elsner

> His [Apelles'] portraits were such perfect likenesses that, incredible as it may seem, Apion the Grammarian has left it on record that a physiognomist, or *metōposkopos* as they call them, was able to tell from the portraits alone how long the sitter had to live or had already lived.
>
> Pliny, *Natural History* 35. 88

The questions relating to the science of physiognomics and the actual images surviving from antiquity might be encapsulated like this: Did physiognomics at all influence the production of ancient sculpture and painting? Did Graeco-Roman art at all influence the production of physiognomic theory, such as Polemon's? Is there no relation at all? Even if there were no relation, is there an influence of physiognomic theory on the description of art by such Graeco-Roman authorities as Pliny, Lucian, and Philostratus—the last two of whom were writing in the wake of Polemon's work?[1]

On the face of it, the passage of Pliny quoted above appears to clinch the relationship between ancient painted portraits (at least) and the potential for physiognomic practice. Apelles' naturalism, the peak of naturalistic verisimilitude in painting according to the Plinian account,[2] is such that a physiognomist ('quendam ex facie hominum divinantem, quos metoposcopos vocant')[3] could use his works to exercise the physiognomist's art. But we need to be wary. Pliny—and perhaps his source here, *Apio grammaticus*—has a vested interest in the rise of naturalism. This anecdote is one of the clinching myths of naturalism. Physiognomics is here brought to bear not on any old paintings or painted portraiture as such, but on the uniquely lifelike portraits of Apelles himself, in which representation effectively transcends the normal limits of art (where one

[1] In what follows I shall work from the following assumption: Leiden is a better guide to the full shape, argument, and 'colour' of Polemon's original than any other source. On the other hand, in spite of its numerous omissions, Adamantius' paraphrase preserves the actual Greek words used by Polemon, which are occasionally an invaluable guide to what he actually wrote and thought.

[2] On Apelles as the climactic artist of Pliny's account of painting, see Isager (1991) 129; Elsner (1995) 15–16.

[3] Metoposcopy (μετωποσκοπία)—or reading the face—might be said to be a different art altogether from Polemon's φυσιογνωμονική, which is the first word of Adamantius' opening as well as its title (φυσιογνωμονικῶν) and hence perhaps also of Polemon's original book; but it might also be seen as a subset of physiognomics, and (given the Polemonic insistence on the face) an important one.

might expect the image to fall miserably short of its prototype).[4] Physiognomics is thus applicable not to art as we have or know it, but to the mythical limit case where art transcends itself. Moreover, this Plinian physiognomics is some way from what is described in the Polemonic tradition. It reads the length of life, not character; and indeed *metoposcopy*—a concept of the Roman period sometimes synonymous with physiognomics—may have been more concerned with future-telling than with the Aristotelian idea of detecting the real nature of a person that is normally implicit in physiognomics.[5] Ancient art in general, especially portraiture commissioned by and made to resemble a patron, was basically flattering rather than polemical, positive in its affirmation of the sitter rather than negative in spin. Physiognomics, by contrast, at least in Polemon's testimony, is often (though not exclusively) about negative cases, designed to see through and rhetorically to undermine enemies,[6] as is notably the case with Favorinus of Arles. At best, physiognomics treads a careful course between the positive and negative extremes of a character rather than emphasising the encomiastic elements, as portraiture does.

1. WRITING ON ART

One might seem on firmer ground in examining the writers of the Second Sophistic, Polemon's contemporaries and successors, and their comments on works of art. Again, at first sight, there seems some hope in Lucian. His *Heracles*, for example, takes as its topic the strange and deliberately ugly iconography espoused by the Celts for the portrayal of Heracles, whom they call Ogmios.[7] For example:

> He is extremely old, bald-headed except for a few lingering hairs which are quite grey, his skin is wrinkled, and he is burnt as black as can be, like an old sea-dog (*Heracles* 1)

[4] For examples of such 'bad' or unrepresentative portraits from Polemon's period, see Appian, *Periplus Ponti Euxini* 1. 3–4: 'Though your statue has been erected in a pleasing pose ... the work neither resembles you nor is beautiful in any other way' (of Hadrian, c.132); Fronto, *Ad Marcum Caes.* 4. 12. 6: 'You know that in all the banks, booths, shops and taverns, gables, porches and windows, anywhere and everywhere, there are portraits of you, exposed to public view, badly painted for the most part or carved in a plain, not to say worthless, artistic style...' (of Marcus Aurelius, c.148).

[5] Pliny's own account of physiognomics (*NH* 11. 273–6), based on Aristotle and Pompeius Trogus, does emphasize the claim to predict lifespan. But it is worth noting that Pliny himself thinks physiognomics to be nonsense ('vana', 11. 273). See Evans (1969) 50 and Capponi (1995) 250–5. Barton (1994*a*) 99 n. 30 notes some cases where Pliny endorses physiognomics. On the basic characterological rather than predictive bias of pseudo-Aristotelian physiognomics, inherited by Polemon, see Sassi (2001) 34–81.

[6] Or as Barton (1994*a*) 96–7 puts it, Polemon uses physiognomics 'as a classificatory grid to contain his political and intellectual opponents... Rather than actually making wax images of his opponents to burn, with physiognomics he constructed their bodies so as to destroy their characters.'

[7] There is a huge literature on Heracles/Ogmios, much of which assumes that Lucian is describing an actual image (which I do not myself believe). See e.g. Balmaseda *LIMC* V. 1, 256 for (doubtful) examples and 253 for bibliography. Philological readers of Lucian are more sceptical: Anderson (1976) 31–3; Nesselrath (1990) 132–5; Maffei (1994), pp. lxvi–lxxi.

This might be correlated with some comments in the Leiden Polemon: 'lack of hair and its dispersal . . . indicates treachery and wickedness of action' (41); 'the colour black is indicative of cowardice, long-lasting ambition, and dejection' (36). But it is hard to square any of this with a text that brilliantly turns this Heracles into a figure for eloquence and ultimately a self-portrait of Lucian himself.[8] It is not impossible that the physiognomic aspects are intended ironically (even as a dig at Polemon's own work) but this is to enter an arena of speculation not too far from that occupied by the physiognomists themselves!

For a positive example, Lucian's *Imagines* 6–8 attempts a complex panegyric of the emperor Lucius Verus' mistress Panthea by means of comparing parts of her body with celebrated fragments from some of the most famous sculptural and painted masterpieces of the Classical canon.[9] Here clearly no negative implications are intended, and—while art-works are the foremost rhetorical device of praise for Panthea—the physiognomic dimension to the parts of the body described needs to be in keeping with the general encomiastic atmosphere. Sure enough, 'that gaze so liquid, and at the same time so clear and winsome' (*Imag.* 6) seems to fall under the category of the good eyes that are 'luminous and shining' of Leiden ch. 1 (A5) and Adamantius' 'eyes that are moist and shine like pools reveal good characters' (A5). Likewise, the hands with graceful wrists and supple tapering fingers may come from Alcamenes' *Aphrodite in the Gardens* (*Imag.* 6), but physiognomically they may to echo the 'delicate and soft hands [that] belong to a talented man' at Adamantius 20, the soft palm that shows its owner's 'understanding and quickness' at Leiden ch. 22. But even here, there is much uncertainty. First, Polemon seems insistently male-gendered in his discussion, and one has to ask if his traits (whether positive or negative) are applicable to women.[10] Second, given the space for ambiguity in physiognomic interpretation, Lucian (if given a physiognomic spin) might be said to leave too many hostages to fortune. Is the shapely nose of Phidias' Lemnian Athena sure to confer 'power, good thinking, and knowledge' or 'strength of thought' (Leiden 26)? Do the round cheeks, from Alcamenes (*Imag.* 6), not emulate the 'rounded cheeks' that indicate 'cunning and cowardice' or the 'fleshy cheeks' that imply 'drunkenness and laziness' in Leiden 28? Cheeks in Polemon seem to have no positive physiognomic meanings.

Such examples cannot clinch the case, but they reveal the problems. In relation to the rhetorical uses of ancient art in writers like Lucian, we should be wisest to avoid assuming a physiognomic significance while not wholly closing the door perhaps to the potential presence of a physiognomic allusion.

[8] See Nesselrath (1990) 132–2, 135; Elsner (1998) 429–31 and 435–6.

[9] On this text, see Korus (1981); Maffei (1986); Romm (1990) 87–90; Maffei (1994), pp. xlvi–lv; Goldhill (2001) 184–93; von Möllendorf (2004).

[10] On Polemon's semiotics of gender—itself independent of anatomical sex—with the feminine (and effeminate) generally regarded negatively, see Gleason (1995) 58–81; also Barton (1994*b*) 115–18 and D'Ambra (1996) 226–7.

Rather one might want to see the various learned and artistic strategies of the Second Sophistic (τέχναι)—the making of art, the performance of display rhetoric, the mastery of predictive or character-revealing sciences like astronomy, dream interpretation and physiognomics—as potentially parallel and sometimes even intertwined methods for persuasive, encomiastic, or polemical cultural relations.[11] An interesting passage from Dio Chrysostom's fourth oration on kingship has the cynic Diogenes say to Alexander the Great that they—namely, kings and philosophers—ought to imitate clever artists (οἱ κομψοὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν) in the field of discourse when defining the three kinds of lifestyles adopted by the majority of people. They would thus display 'an accomplishment the reverse of and complementary to the skills and prophetic power of the physiognomists, as they call them. These men can determine and announce a man's character from his shape and appearance, while we propose to draw from a man's habits and acts, a type and shape that will match the physiognomists' work' (Dio, *Or.* 4.85–8, quote from 87–8).[12] Here there is a proposal for an effective parallelism of physiognomic, artistic and philosophical practice, which perhaps reveals the reality of the relative statuses of these forms of paideia more accurately than Pliny's myth of Apelles.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF PHYSIOGNOMICS ON ART

Turning to the bigger question of the relations of Polemonic physiognomics with actual art, again the clear starting point must be that Polemon's text is largely conducted through negative examples—a treasury of vitriol to be polemically directed at one's enemies—while art, and especially honorific statue-portraits or paintings or private commissions for specific patrons, is essentially of the opposite type: encomiastic rather than negative. Here portraiture in bronze, stone, or paint is very different from the kinds of literary portraits created by Polemon's contemporary, Suetonius, which are certainly indebted to physiognomics and use its full effects within the moral rhetoric marshalled to demolish an evil emperor like Caligula or Nero.[13] Moreover, physiognomics must assume significant individualization in the objects analysed: it is on such specific individuality that its methodology of predictive exegesis and characterology is effectively based. Individuality may indeed be true of Roman portraiture when we look at heads, but it is strikingly untrue of the endless replication of a standard repertoire of repetitive body-types in statuary.[14]

[11] See Barton (1994*b*) 13–25 for a model of how this agonistic culture worked. For the links of physiognomics with other τέχναι see ibid. 98–100.

[12] On this passage, see Evans (1969) 14.

[13] See Couissin (1953); Evans (1969) 56–9; Barton (1994*b*) 56–8; Stok (1995).

[14] See most recently Stewart (2003) esp. 47–59, 163–6. For a striking case-study of the 'Large Herculaneum Woman' type, see Trimble (2000).

The issues can be tested directly by looking at Polemon's description of Favorinus (Leiden ch. 1 (A20):

He was greedy and immoral beyond all description. His eyes were those of the most evil of people... He had puffed-up eyes, his cheeks were slack, his mouth was broad, his neck was long and thin, his ankles were thick, with much flesh on the legs. His neck was similar to the neck of a woman, and likewise all the rest of his limbs, and all his extremities were moist, and he would not walk erect, and his limbs and members were flaccid.[15]

Even imagining that this invective were conceivably an objective description, so that Favorinus' true character could be read directly from this physiognomy, can we imagine his statue to have shown him remotely as Polemon describes?[16] The statue that Favorinus complains about the Corinthians' removing[17] was surely a typical honorific image with a standard orator's, sophist's or philosopher's body topped by a portrait head where any defects like puffy eyes and sagging cheeks would be carefully smoothed into a likeness more ideal than actual.[18] The Corinthian statue of Favorinus was clearly a typical example of second-century public honorific statuary in the civic contexts of the Greek east.[19] It is hard to imagine Favorinus in Roman military dress, and the heroic nude (once a popular form of honorific statue-type) was not only deployed exclusively for youths and athletes in the East by the second century AD but it would surely have begged a series of questions in regards to Favorinus' distinctive sexual status...[20] Given Favorinus' western origins, the statue might conceivably have been togate; his philosophic pretensions might have suggested the old-fashioned himation without a tunic; but the most likely type was the himation with tunic, possibly in the so-called Aeschines posture recalling the type of the famous orator.[21]

[15] On this account, see Mesk (1932) 58–9; Barton (1994*b*) 117–18; Gleason (1995) 7–8; Holford-Strevens (1997) 93–5.

[16] Regrettably no actual statue associated with Favorinus survives. We know of two: Philostratus, *VS* 1. 8, 490 = 9. 29–30 mentions a bronze image in Athens and Favorinus himself in the *Corinthian Oration* (= [Dio] *Or.* 37) 8 one in Corinth. Both of these were removed when the honorand appeared to fall from imperial favour. On Favorinus and his statue, see Gleason (1995) 9–20, König (2001) 141–2, 163–6, and White (2005), 73–7.

[17] Apparently of bronze if we believe *Cor. Or.* 10, 20–1, and 25, and set up in a prize location—the proedria of the Library (§8).

[18] Favorinus was not strictly man or woman, which meant that the conventions for his portrait simply did not exist. Even eunuchs, in the sense of *castrati*, have no clearly demarcated portrait type (except perhaps male beardlessness). See Elsner (2003) 29–30 and n. 37. But the case of a natural eunuch like Favorinus was still more complex. Philostratus tells us that he had no beard (*VS* 489 = 8. 28) but that would hardly have been a problem given that numerous portraits of the period were beardless: see R. R. R. Smith (1998) 83–7.

[19] On statues in the East, see the outstanding discussion of R. R. R. Smith (1998). For a good general account of portrait statuary in the period, see Stewart (2003) with 162–74 on the East.

[20] See R. R. R. Smith (1998) 64.

[21] For these body types and some of their social significances in display and self-fashioning, see Smith (1998) 65–6, but note that all his examples are marble and there may have been some differences in form and meaning between marble and bronze which we cannot now recover.

The one example of a Polemonic description where we *do* have some statue types for comparison, and as it happens the *only* positive description of a contemporary in Polemon's entire physiognomic corpus,[22] is the account of Hadrian:

As for eyes from which it is as if rays of light emanate, they are cunning, treacherous to companions, of little faith and never far from a desire for fornication and the other desires. We will talk about these eyes and their character, and also those clear shining eyes that are like them, because you will find them good, if the other signs do not spoil them. For I have indicated to the physiognomist that he should not hurry to judgement until his examination of all the signs which contradict each other has been thorough. The eyes of King Hadrian were of this description, except that they were full of beautiful light. They were bluish-black, with sharp vision. No one has been seen with more luminous eyes than he (Leiden ch. 1, A16).

This passage demonstrates the political precipice upon which the physiognomist teeters. It is the negative bright eye with which Polemon begins—which competes with the positive luminous eyes.[23] Indeed the similarity is such (and so potentially confusing) that Polemon offers a whole sentence of caution about looking at all the available signs, before plunging into the beautiful and luminous light of Hadrian. All this might be taken for flattery (depending perhaps on whether Hadrian was still alive when this text was published!), but Hadrian's later biographer appears to have jumped the opposite way from Polemon in his judgement of the emperor's character.[24]

Assuming Polemon's text to date from about 130, his description of the imperial eyes may be placed beside some contemporary portraits—especially from the later statue-types of the emperor (PLS. 1–4).[25] Frankly, it is difficult to see anything of Polemon's specific description—beautiful eyes, bluish-black colour, sharp vision, unique luminosity—in these objects, though doubtless all he says is there if one wished to see it. Both the examples of Hadrian and Favorinus, negative though they may be (especially Favorinus, since we have no actual statue beyond my speculations) would imply a similar conclusion to that which emerged from the discussion of descriptions of works of art. Physiognomics, at least in its rhetorical-polemical Polemonic form, had little

[22] See Barton (1994*b*) 112.

[23] On the meaning of *nidd* here see ch. 3 n. 177.

[24] See HA, *Hadrian* 9–11: 'He ran to excess in the gratification of his desires . . . he was, in the same person, austere and genial, dignified and playful, dilatory and quick to act, niggardly and generous, deceitful and straightforward, cruel and merciful, and always in all things changeable.' In Anon. Lat. 34 (= Adam. A15) this passage of Polemon is recorded thus: '. . . Eyes covered with darkness are imbued with evil arts, unfaithful and intemperate. From which it should be understood that the best eyes are the opposite, that is very bright, if no other contrary sign is present. Our authority Polemon reported that the eyes of the emperor Hadrian were such, χαροποί: moist, sharp, large, and full of light.'

[25] These are the 'Cuirass-Paludamentum-Bust Baiae type', 'Cuirass-Bust Imperatori 32 type' and the 'Cuirass-Paludamentum-Bust Vatican Busti 283 type'. See Wegner (1956) 20–6, 59–63 for dating, with English summary in Kleiner (1992) 238–41, and esp. Fittschen and Zanker (1983–5) i. 52–8.




PL. 1. Marble head of Hadrian from a bust discovered at Baiae (the principal exemplar of the 'Baiae type'), certainly after AD 127, perhaps around 130. National Museum, Naples, inv. 6075. Photograph: DAI Rome, Inst. Neg. 83.1948

input into actual works of art, although it may potentially have been seen in them if the viewer were so minded.

III. THE INFLUENCE OF ART ON PHYSIOGNOMICS

However, the influence of works of art on Polemon's treatise is less easily dismissed. One case where Polemonic physiognomics was clearly indebted to a Hellenistic tradition of statuary and its interpretation, adapted by Roman artists and writers, is the portrait of Alexander (PLS. 5–7). Alexander's famous melting gaze—especially the heavenward turn of his large eyes—was an old trope, repeated by Plutarch a generation before Polemon (*De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* 2. 2. 3 = *Moralia* 335 AB and *Alexander* 4. 1–2).




Pl. 2. Marble head of Hadrian from a full-length toga-statue with a portrait of the 'Baiae type', c.AD 130–40. Capitoline Museum, Rome, inv. 54. Photograph: DAI Rome, Inst. Neg. 37.342

Polemon reflects this tradition and gives it a partly positive spin with a characteristic sting in the tail:[26]

Eyes . . . of a good size [with] a moist and bright look. For such eyes suggest powerful, lofty thoughts which accomplish great deeds, they reach a peak of daring and great-mindedness, but cannot control anger and drink, boast a great deal, are light-minded,


[26] See Mesk (1932) 57; L'Orange (1947) 22–3, 110–12; Ridgway (1990) 110; Stewart (1993) 72–4.



PL. 3. Marble head of Hadrian from a bust with a portrait of the 'imperatori type', c.AD 130 or later. Uffizi Museum, Florence, inv. 1914.8. Photograph: DAI Rome, Inst. Neg. 37.713

not far from epilepsy, and strive to have glory greater than that which befits men, like Alexander of Macedon (Adamantius A14).

Since the word for the 'moistness' (ὑγρότης) of Alexander's eyes is borrowed by Polemon in Adamantius' abbreviation directly from the tradition—even perhaps from Plutarch himself (*Alex.* 4. 2 and *Mor* 335 B)—it seems reasonable to expect Polemon to have had in mind the portraits of Alexander by Lysippus (and their various Hellenistic and Roman derivatives) which occasion Plutarch's comments in both passages where he discusses



Pl. 4. Marble head of Hadrian from a bust with a portrait of the 'imperatori type', c.AD 130 or later. Museo Torlonia, Rome, inv. 545. Photograph: DAI Rome, Inst. Neg. 34.2271

Alexander's gaze.[27] Here Polemon is relating to a tradition of portraiture extending over five centuries from Alexander's own lifetime via Hellenistic variants (such as Pls. 5 and 6 here) to contemporary types (Pl. 7 is a later second-century-AD Antonine version of the Alexander theme).

[27] Leiden 1 (A14) transmits this passage differently: 'If (the eye) is large, it is less evil, and it increases in goodness, forcefulness, broad-ranging power, love of wine and women, and unreliability. The eye of Alexander was of this description, except that it tended to the colour of hyacinth.' This pair of passages shows some of the complications of using our transmitted texts to recover Polemon's original, since both Leiden and Adamantius offer good but different evidence for what might have been in Polemon. I suspect, however, on the evidence of Plutarch, that Adamantius' ὑγρότης certainly was. See also Anon. Lat. 33 for a further version.



PL. 5. Colossal marble head of Alexander from Pergamon, *c.*175–150 BC. The hair, movement of the neck and eyes may be derived from a Lysippan prototype. Archaeological Museum, Istanbul, inv. 1138. Photograph: DAI Rome, Inst. Neg. 72.2724

Following a further remark of Plutarch (*Moralia* 335 B) abut Alexander's 'virile and leonine demeanour' and the mane-like hair of his Lysippan-derived portrait, scholars have been keen to assign the physiognomic character of the lion (which is positive not only in Ps-Aristotle, *Physiognomica* 5, 809^{b}14–26, but also in Leiden ch. 2 and Adamantius B2) to the portraiture of Alexander.[28]

[28] See Stewart (1993) 77–8; Ridgway (1990) 110.



PL. 6. Over-lifesize marble statue of Alexander from Magnesia-by-Sipylos, originally crowned with a bronze wreath and found with a block bearing the signature of Menas son of Aias of Pergamon. *c.*175–150 BC. Archaeological Museum, Istanbul, inv. 709. Photograph: DAI Rome, Inst. Neg. 36.985

However, here there is no evidence from our texts that Polemon took Alexander's image in this way.[29] At the same time, as PL. 7 shows, Roman versions of the Alexander type certainly emphasize and extend the mane-like hair.

[29] Note that Plutarch's Pompey is made to imitate Alexander's hair and gaze to 'manifest the majesty and kingliness of his nature'—'a resemblance more talked about than apparent in the portrait statues of Alexander' (Plutarch, *Pomp.* 2. 1).



PL. 7. Over-lifesize marble statue of Alexander from the Roman Baths at Cyrene in North Africa. The horse to his left appears to be an allusion to Alexander's charger, Bucephalus. c.AD 150. Photograph: DAI Rome, Inst. Neg. 58.2318

If there is one area of physiognomics that stands out in Polemon's treatment, not only by comparison with the earlier pseudo-Aristotelian tradition, but also in opening and dominating Polemon's treatise, it is the fascination with the eye and the obsession with its details—which take up about a third of the entire discussion. Elsewhere in this volume, Simon Swain has tied this to the culture of looking in the Second Sophistic—and one might emphasize in particular the manifestation of this in rhetorical life (very apposite to a professional performing sophist like Polemon) where an orator was acutely aware of being looked at while he performed.[30] Art-historically, however, the date of Polemon's treatise coincides with significant changes in the treatment of the pupil within the eye in the marble portraiture of the empire—namely the move from a painted pupil in an eyes smoothly cut with the chisel to an incised, drilled, and engraved pupil in the 130s AD (contrast PLS. 5–7, all pre-130s or based on pre-130s models, with PLS. 1–4, which show portraits of Hadrian from precisely this period).[31] The increasing technical focus on the eye in Roman portraits, and the triumph of the eye as the principal organ of Polemonic physiognomics, may be coincidental developments, or parallel moves in a generally ocular culture. Certainly the treatment of the eye in sculpture belongs with a series of other developments in marble cutting, texturing, and polishing techniques to produce ever more elaborate styled and curled locks in hair and beards.[32] Nonetheless it is striking that the opening of Polemon's first chapter in the Leiden (ch. 1 (A5); Adamantius A5) has extensive discussion of the pupil. It is at least possible that this interest, and the strange obsession with grains like millet-seeds in the iris (Leiden ch. 1 (A8) and (A11); Adamantius A8 and A11) owes something to the new drilling of the pupil in statues.

Some interesting absences of facial features in Polemon might also be said to relate to portraiture. Despite the mileage he gets out of eyes (Leiden ch. 1, A5–23) as well as the head (ch. 30, B30) and neck (ch. 23, B21–2) and the face (ch. 28, B28) including chin (ch. 24, B23), mouth and lips (ch. 25, B26), nose (ch. 26, B25), forehead and eyebrows (ch. 27, B26), cheeks (ch. 28, B27) and ears (ch. 29, B29), Polemon fails to make anything of teeth,[33] tongue, or eyelashes. Is it wholly coincidental that none of these marks (potentially very useful grist to his polemical mill) are represented in marble portrait sculpture? While we find both teeth and eyelashes on some of the great Classical bronzes of fifth-century

[30] See esp. Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, 11. 3. 1–184 with Gunderson (1998).

[31] See R. R. R. Smith (1998) 62, 83. For photographic documentation, see e.g. Fittschen and Zanker (1983–5).

[32] See R. R. R. Smith (1998) 62–3, though I do not see why priority need necessarily be given to 'the demands of... hairstyles that drove the new marble techniques', 62, over the changes in the treatment of the eye. On the contrary, the evidence of Polemon might cause us to suggest the opposite.

[33] Leiden's one comment on teeth is a negative appraisal of projecting teeth (ch. 21, B24). Teeth fail to make their way into the equivalent chapter of Adamantius (B24), or to have a chapter of their own.

Greece,[34] and eyelashes in the occasional early Roman piece,[35] there is hardly an example of surviving bronze sculpture of the post-Augustan period with either,[36] and none with a tongue. The absence of these features marks central works like the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius in Rome and the very few surviving imperial portraits in precious metal.[37] Indeed it appears to confirm the suggestion that by the second century not only was marble the dominant medium for portrait sculpture, but that the virtuosity of techniques used for refinement and finish of sculpted stone outclassed those used for metal sculpture to such an extent that bronze statuary came to emulate marble.[38]

Beyond facial features, there are other interesting omissions in Polemon. Despite expecting the physiognomist to see the whole body (in the chapters on kinds of men at the end of the treatise)—in the ancient context of the gymnasium or baths, one supposes—he never mentions sexual organs and is strikingly reticent about buttocks. The latter have no chapter of their own; 'large buttocks' are mentioned in Leiden ch. 2 in the context of the feminine; 'smooth dry buttocks' are a sign of the 'bold and strong man' (ch. 53, B44); shapely buttocks a sign of the 'man who loves knowledge' (ch. 55, B46). The lack of stress on these topics in Polemon's original is effectively confirmed by their total absence from Adamantius' synopsis. Given the potential polemical meat abjured here, it is perhaps a surprising absence. Again, the dynamics of second-century portrait statuary seems to parallel the Polemonic omissions. Nudes were rarely used for civic or honorific portraiture in this period,[39] as opposed to their frequent employment in the assimilation of (usually deceased) individuals to heroes, mythical figures, and deities (where the idealized naked body might hardly be called the portrayed's own).[40] Such assimilation clearly governs what is today the most famous statue type created under Hadrian when Polemon was writing, namely that of Antinous, who is so often an idealised nude,[41] and the great nude statue of Hadrian from the library of the Pergamene Asclepieion, which was probably dedicated in 131 and whose based is explicitly inscribed 'the god Hadrian' (θεὸν Ἀδριανόν).[42]

[34] For instance the Delphi Charioteer has lashes and Statue A of the Riace Bonzes has both lashes and teeth coloured with silver sheeting. On eyelashes see e.g. Mattusch (1988) 183–5; on Riace A, see the photographs in Moreno (1998) 55–61 and the discussion of Arias (1986) 42.

[35] See Lahusen and Formigli (2001). Eyelashes in all cases: no. 3 (the Conservatori 'Brutus', esp. pl. 3.13, p. 340); no. 4; no. 9 (esp. fig. 4, p. 466); no. 18 (the Meroe Augustus, esp. pl. 18.13, p. 355); no. 47 (esp. pl. 47.4, 47.9 and 47.9, pp. 371–2).

[36] I find none in the (admittedly not very adequate) photographs of Kluge and Lehmann-Hartleben (1927) nor in Lahusen and Formigli (2001) with one possible exception. This is a fragmentary portion of a male face that may be Flavian: ibid., no. 95, esp. fig. 22, p. 467. On eyes and eyelashes with exemplary detailed photographs, see ibid. 462–70.

[37] On Marcus' equestrian image see Lahusen and Formigli (2001), no. 138; for silver and gold portraits, ibid. 505–29.

[38] See R. R. R. Smith (1998) 62.

[39] Ibid. 64.

[40] For such assimilation see Wrede (1981); Maderna (1988). The type of the Roman matron as Venus is particularly striking, see D'Ambra (1996); Stewart (2003) 51–3.

[41] See Meyer (1991).

[42] See Wegner (1956) 39 and Inan and Rosenbaum (1966), no. 31.

However, the conclusion that Polemon's typology was structured by what was available to him in portraiture, that he was thinking with the copious Roman population of portrait statues as much as with living human examples, needs caution. First, there are plenty of eyelashes (though no teeth) in the Fayum Portraits, including those of the first half of the second century AD, which is likely evidence of lashes in painted portraiture throughout the empire. Second, another absence in Polemon's text is any mention of beards—a feature of significant popularity in precisely the period when Polemon was writing, following the fashion set by Hadrian and continued by his imperial successors. Much has been made of 'Hadrian's Beard' and its influence as well as its 'intellectual' connotations,[43] and while it is right to be cautious about overstatement (given that there were plenty of beardless portraits in the period)[44] it is very odd that Polemon should have had nothing to say about beards—unless any physiognomic dig at facial hair risked the emperor taking it personally. At the same time, on the face of it, one wonders whether the taxonomy of parts of the body adduced most susceptible to physiognomic interpretation does not owe something to the taxonomy of parts selected for sculptural display by Roman portraiture.

I illustrate a range of exemplars of the later portraiture of Hadrian (PLS. 1–4) to emphasize the repetitive nature of these images—potentially rather suitable for being imbued with affective meaning from the viewer's part on a Polemonic physiognomic model. Moreover, the replicative nature of Roman portraiture—what might be called its visual rhetoric of hair-curls, eye-brow lines, eye shapes and so forth—represents on a visual level something like the literary development of rhetorical tropes in relation to a given (stock) theme in Sophistic declamation.[45]

IV. POLEMON'S COLOURS

One striking element of Polemon's physiognomics is his emphasis on colour. He is interested in the colours of eyes—not only those we should readily identify in modern culture like green or blue (Leiden ch. 1 (A6), but colours that seem surprising to us—yellow (ch. 1 (A5), red (ch. 1 (A6), the colour of unmixed wine (ch. 1 (A7). He distinguishes numerous shades in the blue eye—in a spectrum between verging towards whiteness and verging towards hyacinth (ch. 1 (A8). He analyses various dots 'like millet grains' whose colour may be hyacinth, red, yellow, or green (ch. 1 (A8), as well as white and black (ch. 1 (A11). The emphasis on colour extends beyond the long opening on the eye to the racially determined physiognomics of the peoples of the north, south, east, west, and Greece (chs. 31–5, B31–2) and to a series of colour-specific

[43] See esp. Zanker (1995) 198–266.

[44] See R. R. R. Smith (1998) 83–7.

[45] This point is well made in relation to funerary art and rhetoric by F. J. G. M. Müller (1994) 139–70.

chapters—ch. 36, B33 on the whole body, ch. 37, B34 on the colour of the chest (red is mainly discussed here), ch. 38, B35 on the colour of the face, and ch. 39, B36 again on the colour of the eye. One significant difficulty for the modern reader is that the colours Polemon uses often seem counter-intuitive to modern colour-perception. Yet when we look at the one surviving corpus of painted Roman portraits in colour—the so-called Fayum portraits made in wax-encaustic or tempera on board or linen and bound to the heads of mummies in Egypt during the Roman period—it is striking how naturalistic the colours seem, how like modern illusionistic portraits these images are.[46]

In part our problems with Polemon's colour terms lie in post-Newtonian concepts of colour in relation to the spectrum of light.[47] The modern study of colour perception recognizes three dimensions or components of colour—hue, saturation, and brilliance or brightness.[48] The problem with colour naming and words (a problem not at all unfamiliar to ancient intellectuals)[49]—in relation to other cultures than our own—is that modern western perception, following Newton, maps colour almost exclusively in terms of hue, to the extent that the two are virtually synonymous.[50] Yet it is quite clear that antiquity did not share this post-Newtonian sense of colour perception; its terminology for colour is very imprecise in matters of hue since its interest is in contrasts of light and dark, shade, quality, movement, and play of colours—something much closer to our brilliance or brightness.[51] Once we understand that Polemon's colour terminology reflects a different taxonomy of experience from what we expect, certain things become much clearer. First, the emphasis on colour—which is to say more or less brightness in the eye—is intimately connected with Polemon's interests in luminosity, movement, dryness, or wetness within the eye, all of which may refer to the questions of sparkle, glitter and contrast which so fascinated not only the ancient Greeks but also the Byzantines.[52] Second, some of Polemon's specific colour terms are not so obscure. In ch 1 (A8) we have a spectrum of blue in the blue eye that moves from verging on 'whiteness' to verging towards 'hyacinth'. This appears to imply increasing levels of brightness (from white to hyacinth) as well perhaps as increasing levels of blue saturation. At least, both the eyes of Alexander and Hadrian, respectively Leiden

[46] See, with excellent illustrations, Doxiadis (1995); Walker and Bierbrier (1997).

[47] Anthropology has found colours notoriously difficult to identify cross-culturally and in terms that are not highly culture-specific. The argument about whether colour and colour-perception are universal or may best be accounted for relativistically has therefore raged and continues to do so. Some classic pieces include Turner (1966); Sahlins (1976); Turton (1980). For a philosophical examination of subjectivism in relation to colour, see Stroud (2000) 120–44.

[48] I am particularly indebted to James (1996) in general in the following discussion—esp. 11–14 on hue, saturation and brilliance.

[49] Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 2.26 stages a fascinating debate between (of all people) Favorinus and Fronto on the comparative colour-terms in Greek and Latin.

[50] So James (1996) 14–17.

[51] See e.g. Irwin (1974) 201–3; Gage (1993) 11–32 (for a general account of antiquity); James (1996) 47–90; Gage (1999) 68–76. For an anthropological parallel, consider the value put on brilliance by the Yolngu people of Australia: see Morphy (1992) 196–8.

[52] See also Janes (1998) 139–52; Franses (2003) 19–20.

ch. 1 (A14) and A16, were exceptionally bright ('shining' in the case of Alexander, 'full of beautiful light' and 'more luminous than anyone' in the case of Hadrian) with the former tending to the colour of hyacinth and the latter to bluish-black.

We can examine some of Polemon's colour words using Adamantius' synopsis. Polemon's term for what Leiden calls 'blue' eyes is γλαυκός (e.g. Adamantius A6 and A8). This word in Greek covers a series of hues within the grey, blue-grey and blue-green range. It is used of eyes, vines, olives and the sea, suggesting a meaning that moves beyond hue to brilliance—perhaps 'gleaming' or 'bright',[53] with its Byzantine connotations extending to fear and strength.[54] Adamantius uses χαροπός (e.g. at A7), a word with the sense of fierce and brave, but also glassy and dull (when used of the eyes) and with a hue-range of bluish-grey. A further clue is that in A7 it is contrasted with eyes that are γλαυκός and μέλας in colour, which perhaps supports the choice of 'light blue' for γλαυκός and 'dark blue' for χαροπός made in the translations of this volume.[55] Μέλας is one colour term whose meaning has not been controversial—it implies black or dark in the sense of being deprived of light (both in hue and brightness).[56] In A8 Adamantius adds αἰόλος to the taxonomy—with the sense of swift or nimble and describing changeability or variation, both perhaps in hue and in sparkle or dazzle.[57] At A9, Adamantius uses ὠχρός—which the Arabic takes as 'green'—and ὑπερέρυθρος, meaning 'exceedingly red'.[58] Ὠχρός describes imprecisely a range of shades across yellow and green ('ochre'), with connotations of 'sallow', 'pale', and 'wan' in brightness.[59] In later Byzantine times ὠχρός carries the sense of 'fear', 'weakness', 'sickness' and 'change'.[60] Other Polemonic colours adduced by Adamantius include κυάνεος (e.g. A11), a notoriously unclear word implying both dark (blue-black) and gleaming.[61]

In describing those millet-grain dots in the eye in A8, Adamantius uses ξανθός, the normal term for 'yellow' in the hue range, which has hints of 'fair' and 'bright' in the brilliance range of meanings.[62] Other colours used of the millet grains (in A11) include a group of words suggesting 'white': λευκός,

[53] See James (1996) 49.

[54] Ibid. 73.

[55] I follow LSJ. Note Maxwell-Stuart (1981) on γλαυκός and χαροπός; his contention that χαροπός = 'amber' on the basis of an extensive psycho-sexual enquiry into the epigrammatist Asclepiades of Samos is imaginative but essentially wrong, as is his proposal that the Arabic translation of Polemon's χαροπός as أشهل ('bluish-black') be emended to أشعل meaning 'tawny' (*sic*), since أشعل in fact refers to a white patch on the tail or forelock of a horse.

[56] See James (1996) 50.

[57] Again, my extrapolation of senses from LSJ.

[58] See James (1996) 49: ἐρυθρός.

[59] Ibid. 50

[60] Ibid. 74.

[61] Ibid. 49. I take it that κυάνεος differs from μέλας in that while both mean 'dark' or 'black' in the hue range, κυάνεος has the sense of brightness while μέλας is dull in the brilliance range (where they are opposites).

[62] Ibid. 50.

ἐπίλευκος, and ὑπόλευκος. This term has a brightness range that includes what an object emits or reflects of the light and the transparency through which light passes;[63] in other words it may imply less powerfully bright, or more transparent, than a colour like hyacinth in Leiden ch. 1 (A8). Other millet-like dots are πυρρός (a word derived from πῦρ, fire, and with a hue range covering anything in the red–orange–yellow spectrum, but a brightness range suggesting 'flicker', 'motion' and 'beam')[64] and αἱματώδης (a word derived from αἷμα, blood).

The aim of this brief and unsystematic survey is simply to show that Polemon's chosen colour terms (which largely overlap with the usual range of colour words in ancient Greece and Byzantium) all have a brilliance or brightness connotation as well as a hue range. It is striking that Polemon seems to use largely different taxonomies of colours for the iris as such and for the millet-like dots inside it. It is not impossible that he is being ultra-precise—using one set of colours to indicate hue-brilliance and the other set to give a sense of brilliance-saturation. But it is equally possible (perhaps even more likely) that this apparent precision is part of Polemon's deliberate strategy of 'involution'—deliberate and excessive elaboration to the point of mystification which makes his art of physiognomics into a mastery into which only the ultra-elite practitioner can be initiated.[65] At any rate, expecting colour-precision within the post-Newtonian spectrum of hues is simply not an issue. We must be satisfied with being unable fully to map Polemon's range of terms on our experience of colour, accepting that each of his words has a meaning both of hue and of brightness, if not also of saturation. But it may be that his colour system was such that no one—even in antiquity—would ever have been expected fully to master it. If so, then we must wonder if the versions of Polemon—the Anonymus Latinus, Adamantius, and the Leiden—were passing on a system they believed they had mastered or were posing in the mystique of a sophisticated hand-book whose authority they could appropriate without full command.

A number of issues make the Polemonic meanings of colour still more complicated. First, there was a close tie of colour as pigment with the specific stones or metals that were ground up to make colours in the ancient world (so that Pliny's discussions of painting and sculpture, for instance, occur in books on stones and metals). This connection of colours with natural objects came to have an alchemical meaning so that colours had significant resonances within various systems of esoteric knowledge and exegesis.[66] While such chromatic alchemy might be taken in a spiritual or transformative mystical direction in the early Church, it is certainly potential grist to Polemon's mill of loading up

[63] Ibid. 50, also Sassi (2001) 2.

[64] James (1996) 50.

[65] On 'involution' and the ancient τέχναι, see Barton (1994*b*) 91–3, and specifically of Polemon 107–10.

[66] See James (1996) 41–6 for a brief survey.

the invective. Second, and again potentially very relevant to Polemon's insistent semiotics of gender, colour and its uses were clearly gendered in ancient thought, as well as being socially specific and ethnic.[67] How precisely these significances operated within Polemon's physiognomics is not at all clear and was perhaps not meant to be so. But suffice it to say that they add to the over-determination of potential meanings available to the physiognomist through colour to which Polemon alludes but which he deliberately fails to elucidate.

If Polemon's entire corpus had one serious reader in antiquity, that was surely Philostratus, his third-century biographer (*VS* 1. 25, 530–44 = 42–54). The impact of the physiognomics, and particularly of eye-colour, makes its appearance both in the *Lives of the Sophists* and in a number of other texts, such as the *Heroicus* and especially in Philostratus' scintillating descriptions of paintings in his two books of *Imagines*.[68] In the *Lives of the Sophists*, a physiognomic element is occasionally woven into the accounts of sophists, so for example (of Hippodromus the Thessalian, *VS* 2. 27, 618 = 118. 7–11):

> An extraordinary nobility shone out of his eyes, and his glance was at once keen and good-natured. Megistias of Smyrna also says that he noticed this characteristic of his, and he was considered second to none as a physiognomist.[69]

In the *Heroicus*, Philostratus' gallery of Homeric heroes at the dialogue's climax is physiognomically rich.[70] In the programmatic opening to both books of *Imagines* (the proem to Book I), Philostratus writes:

> Painting is imitation (μίμησις) by the use of colours; and not only does it employ colour, but it cleverly accomplishes (σοφίζεται) more by this one means than the plastic arts with their many means. For it both reproduces shadow (σκιάν) and also permits the observer to recognize the look (βλέμμα), now of the man who is mad, now of the man who is sorrowing or rejoicing. The varying nature of bright eyes (αὐγὰς ὀμμάτων) the plastic artist does not bring out in his work, but the dark blue eye (χαροπὸν ὄμμα), the light blue eye (γλαυκόν), and the black eye (μέλαν) are known to painting; and it knows fair hair (ξανθὴν κόμην) and fiery hair (πυρσήν) and sunny hair (ἡλιῶσαν) . . . (*Imagines* 1, proem. 1)

Here, within a complex opening that alludes to numerous (and in antiquity controversial) philosophical concepts connected with painting—not least mimesis (μίμησις), truth (ἀλήθεια), wisdom (σοφία), the Sophistic

[67] See Sassi (2001) 1–4 for colour and gender, 16–18 for the pallid (ὠχρός) coloration of the philosopher, 19–33 on the skin colours of different races.

[68] Interestingly, the eye features large in Philostratus' *Letters*, but never with connotations of colour. See Walker (1991) 132–48.

[69] For other examples cf *VS* 1. 8, 489 = 8. 26–31 (on Favorinus), 1. 24, 528–9 = 41. 1–10 (on Marcus of Byzantium), 2. 1, 552 = 61. 1–9 (on the 'Heracles of Herodes'), 2. 5, 570 = 77. 6–11 (on Alexander the 'Clay-Plato'). Note that Philostratus avoids giving a physiognomic spin to his account of Polemon.

[70] So Protesilaus, *Heroicus* 10. 2–4; Nestor, 26. 13; Sthenelus and Dionmedes, 27. 13; Philoctetes, 28. 14; Palamedes, 33. 39–41; Odysseus, 34. 1, 5; Telamonian Ajax, 35. 2–3; Hector, 37. 2–4; Aeneas, 38. 2–4; Paris, 40. 4–6; Achilles, 45. 5 and 48, 2–4; Patroclus, 49. 2–3.

(σοφίζεσθαι), skill (τέχνη)—Polemon's physiognomics of colour, especially in relation to the eyes, is given the honour of a direct allusion.[71] I take it that this implied that in Philostratus' time Polemon's physiognomics was clearly a major relatively recent theoretical position related to the topic. A number of the kinds of coloured eyes mentioned in the proem recur in the individual descriptions,[72] partly perhaps emphasizing how painting could carry a Polemonic physiognomic charge so much more effectively than sculpture. The opening description of book 2 (arguably also programmatic) makes the specific point that colour, including the colour of the eye, is as much about light or radiance as it is about hue:

The artistry (σοφία) of the painting must be praised, first, because the artist, in making a border of precious stones, has used not colours (χρωμάτων) but light (φωτός) to depict them, putting a radiance (διαύγειαν) in them like the pupil in an eye (ὀφθαλμῷ κέντρον). (*Imagines* 2. 1. 2)

Again, the allusion to flashing and light in the eyes is continued in various specific ekphraseis, where colour words (especially χαροπός) double as words of sparkle.[73] Certainly this Philostratean material indicates some impact from Polemon's physiognomics, if not on art itself, then at least on the writing about art that became popular in the Second Sophistic.

One final point of potential influence on art from Polemon's text might be his emphasis on the eye. Numerous scholars have remarked on the importance of the gaze in Christian spirituality,[74] and in particular in relation to the frontal gaze of the Byzantine icon.[75] A poem by Agathias (*c*.532–80) emphasizes the eyes of an icon of the Archangel Michael (*Anth. Graec.* 1. 34. 7–8), giving some contemporary documentary support to modern formalist observations.[76] Agathias writes:

ὄμματα δ' ὀτρύνουσι βαθὺν νόον· οἶδε δὲ τέχνη
χρώμασι πορθμεῦσαι τὴν φρενὸς ἱκεσίην.

The eyes stir up the depths of the spirit; and art is able
with colours to ferry over [to its object] the prayer of the mind.

[71] For some discussion of the proem in relation to these philosophical concerns, see Maffei (1991) and Thein (2002).

[72] For instance: *Imagines* 1. 21. 2 (Olympus) ὄμμα χαροπόν; 1. 23. 4 (Narcissus) ὄμμα . . . χαροπὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ γοργόν; 2. 5. 5 (Rhodogoune) οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ κέκρανται ἀπὸ τοῦ χαροποῦ ἐς τὸ μέλαν; 2. 9. 6 (Pantheia) ὀφθαλμοὺς . . . μέλανες.

[73] For example: *Imagines* 1. 11. 4 (Phaethon): While the welling tide of tears in their eyes gleams in the bright pupils (χαροπαῖς ἐπαυγάζει ταῖς κόραις) and seems to attract rays of light (ἀκτῖνα); 1. 14. 1 (Semele) 'flashing light (σέλας) from her eyes'; 1. 28. 4: 'his eye flashes' (χαροπὸν βλέπει).

[74] For instance, recently Kessler (2000); Frank (2000); the essays of J. Elsner, G. Frank and C. Hahn in Nelson (2000).

[75] e.g. Gombrich (1960) 124–5; Weitzmann (1976) 15 (on the 6th-c. icon of Christ); Mathews (1995) 178, 190.

[76] See Mathews (1995) 190; Cormack (2000) 77 and 129; Peers (2001) 62.

It is at least not impossible that the combination here of colours and eyes, and the more general interest in the eye within the Byzantine physiognomics of represented sainthood in the icon, is indebted to Polemon's extraordinary emphasis on the eye in his original treatise and its recensions.[77]

[77] Further on the early Christian physiognomics of ascetic sainthood see Frank (2000) 134–70, esp. 145–55 on the ancient tradition and 165–7 on the eye.

Part II
Islam

5

The Islamic Background to Polemon's Treatise

Robert Hoyland

I. POLEMON AND HIS TREATISE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

(i) Translation of Foreign Sciences into Arabic

Polemon's treatise on physiognomy was one of thousands of texts translated from foreign tongues (especially Greek and Persian) into Arabic in the course of the eighth to tenth centuries AD. So extensive was this activity that modern Western scholars have labelled it a movement, 'the translation movement'.[1] The characterization is well deserved in that the activity was not sporadic or haphazard, but to a substantial degree thorough and systematic. Thus almost all non-literary and non-historical secular Greek works that were available throughout the Byzantine empire and the Middle East were translated into Arabic:

> What this means is that all of the following Greek writings . . . were subjected to the transformative magic of the translator's pen: astrology and alchemy and the rest of the occult sciences; the subjects of the quadrivium: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and theory of music; the entire field of Aristotelian philosophy throughout its history; metaphysics, ethics, physics, zoology, botany, and especially logic—the *Organon*; all the health sciences: medicine, pharmacology, and veterinary science; and various other marginal genres of writings, such as Byzantine handbooks on military science (the *tactica*), popular collections of wisdom sayings, and even books on falconry.[2]

[1] Most recently by Gutas (1998) in his very informative monograph, though in calling it 'the Graeco-Arabic translation movement' he undermines its universalism. For a recent and excellent study of the translations and translators see Endress (1982–92). A representative and readable selection of the material translated from Greek is given in Rosenthal (1975).

[2] Gutas (1998) 1.

Inevitably, a large number of factors lent impetus to this movement. The Arab conquests (c.AH 11–31/AD 632–52) created a single empire from Morocco to India, which promoted greater movement of goods, people, and ideas across this vast region. Not much more than a century later the language of the conquerors, Arabic, had established itself as the official language of this empire, further accelerating the flow of ideas. A military encounter between Arab and Chinese forces at Talas in Central Asia in 136/754 resulted in the knowledge and spread in Islamic lands of paper, which was much cheaper and easier to make than papyrus, and so lowered the price and raised the availability of the written word. These and other factors were crucial for creating an environment conducive to the translation movement, but perhaps the most direct stimulus was the transfer of the Muslim seat of government from Syria to Iraq in 132/750 and the building of the new capital of Baghdad in 145/762. This placed the Abbasids, the dynasty that had affected the transfer, in the heartlands of the former Sasanian Persian empire (AD 224–652). Whereas in Damascus, only a provincial and in any case semi-Arabized city of the Byzantine empire, the Muslim Arabs had been able to withstand pressure to assimilate, in Baghdad they felt very strongly the pull of Sasanian Persian ideas and style of government. One feature of this was an interest in alien wisdom:

> Ardashir son of Babak the Sasanian sent to India and China for the books that were there and also to Byzantium. He had copies made of whatever had come down to them and traced the few remains that survived in Iraq. He collected those that were dispersed and brought together those that had been separated. After him his son Shapur did the same until all these books had been transcribed into Persian, such as those of Hermes the Babylonian who ruled over Egypt, Dorotheus the Syrian, Phaedrus the Greek from the city of Athens, famed for its science, Ptolemy the Alexandrian, and Farmasb the Indian... After these two, Khusrau Anushirwan (531–79) collected and edited these books, and based his acts on them on account of his zeal for learning and love of it.[3]

> Ma'mun (r. 198–218/813–33) used to spend time investigating astrological rulings and prognostications, to follow what the stars prescribed, and to model his conduct on that of the past Sasanian emperors like Ardashir son of Babak and others. He worked hard at reading their ancient books; he was keen on their study and assiduous in their reading to the point that he became skilled in their understanding and proficient in their comprehension.[4]

These ideas lived on, especially among the well-educated Aramaean Christian and Iranian Zoroastrian populations, which had been the mainstay of the Sasanian Persian empire and were all too willing to serve the new Muslim administration. The Abbasids, the Muslim dynasty that had implemented the change of capital, were happy to accept their help, for they sought to create a great empire after the Persian model instead of the loose conquest society of the first century of Islamic rule (c.29–132/650–750), and the

[3] Ibn al-Nadim, *Fihrist* 239, citing Abu Sahl al-Fadl ibn Nawbakht (d. 200/815).

[4] Mas'udi, *Muruj* viii. 300–1.

expansion of the court and the bureaucracy were key elements in the attainment of this goal.

There had of course been some translations made of foreign texts during the time in office of the Umayyad dynasty (40–132/660–750), the predecessors of the Abbasids,[5] but they were few and random, carried out at the whim of certain interested individual members of the ruling elite. Muslim historians are unanimous in attributing the beginnings of the translation movement proper to the early Abbasid sovereigns:

> In the beginning of Islam, the Arabs cultivated no science other than their language and knowledge of the regulations of their religious law, with the exception of medicine...This was the situation of the Arabs during the Umayyad dynasty. But when God Almighty put an end to this dynasty by means of that of the Abbasids and directed the rule to the latter, people's ambitions revived from their indifference and their minds awoke from their sleep. The first among the Arabs who cultivated the sciences was the second caliph, Abu Ja'far al-Mansur (r. 136–58/754–75). He was, may God have mercy on him, deeply attached to them and to their practitioners, being himself proficient in religious learning and advanced in knowledge of philosophy and especially astrology.[6]

> He (Mansur) was the first caliph to have books translated from foreign languages into Arabic, among them [the wisdom compilations of] Kalila wa-Dimna and Sindhind. There were also translated for him books by Aristotle on logic and other subjects, the Almagest by Ptolemy, the Arithmetic [by Nicomachus of Gerasa], the book by Euclid [on geometry], and other ancient books from classical Greek, Byzantine Greek, Middle and New Persian, and Syriac. These translations were published among the people, who examined them and devoted themselves to studying them.[7]

> Ma'mun revived it [the teaching of medicine] by favouring the most excellent of men. But for that, all the sciences of the ancients, including medicine, logic, and philosophy, would have been forgotten, just as they are today in the lands in which they were once most especially cultivated, I mean Rome, Athens, the Byzantine provinces, and in many other lands.[8]

Although a wish to emulate Sasanian Persian emperors may have done much to provoke the initial interest of the Abbasids in foreign scholarship, a number of other reasons soon came to the fore that impelled them to promote its study and to put their weight behind the translation of its literary products. Probably the most important of these reasons was the necessity for the Abbasids to portray themselves as defenders of Islam. This became increasingly important as ever more of their subjects converted to the new faith, and absolutely crucial after the civil war of 808–13 had revealed rifts in the ranks of the ruling elite and weakened the dynasty's claims to legitimacy. Ma'mun, who defeated his brother Amin in the civil war, saw it as essential to demonstrate his Islamic credentials,

[5] See Hoyland (1997) 231–6, which analyses one example and gives relevant secondary literature.

[6] Sa'id al-Andalusi, *Tabaqāt al-umam* 47–8.

[7] Mas'udi, *Murūj* viii. 291.

[8] Ibn Ridwan, *Al-kitāb al-nāfi'* 107–8.

to which end he adopted the title of 'God's deputy' (*khalīfat Allāh*) and instigated debates to determine truth from heresy. In achieving these aims the Abbasids enlisted the aid of Greek logic and eastern (Persian/Indian) wisdom, a policy that was also pursued by the critics of Islam:

Mahdi (r. 158–69/775–85) devoted all his efforts to examining heretics and apostates. These people appeared in his days and publicly proclaimed their beliefs during his caliphate on account of the wide dissemination of books by Mani, Bardesanes, and Marcion, which were translated from Old and New Persian into Arabic. . . . In this way Manichaeans increased in number and their opinions came out into the open among people. Mahdi was the first caliph to command the theologians who used dialectic disputation in their research to compose books against the heretics and other infidels we have just mentioned. The theologians then produced demonstrative proofs against the disputers, eliminated the problems posed by the heretics, and expounded the truth in clear terms to the doubters.[9]

He (Ma'mun) held sessions with theologians and admitted to his company scholars who had distinguished themselves in dialectic disputation and debate, people like Abu l-Hudhayl and al-Nazzam as well as their partisans and adversaries. He had jurists and the learned among men of general culture attend his sessions; he had such men brought from various cities and stipends for them allocated. As a result, people developed an interest in conducting theoretical investigations and learned how to do research and use dialectic; each group among them wrote books in which it championed its cause and through it supported its doctrines.[10]

Another very significant motive for patronizing works of translation was, quite simply, the demands for applied and theoretical scientific knowledge made by those engaged in running the vast Muslim empire. Although they have received drastically less attention than the illustrious subjects of philosophy and medicine, perhaps as many, if not more, texts were translated in the fields of engineering, agriculture, veterinary science, alchemy/chemistry, astrology/astronomy, geometry, administrative studies, and so on—all essential aids to the smooth workings of an empire:

In addition to these works of mine (on linguistic, literary, and religious training), it is indispensable for the secretary to study geometrical figures for the measurement of land in order that he can recognize a right, acute, and obtuse triangle, the heights of triangles, the different sorts of quadrilaterals, arcs, and other circular figures, and perpendicular lines, and in order that he can text his knowledge in practice on the land and not on the survey-registers, for theoretical knowledge is nothing in comparison to practical experience. The Persians used to say that he who does not know the following would be deficient in his formation as state secretary: the principles of irrigation, opening access-canals to waterways and stopping breaches; measuring the varying length of days, the revolution of the sun, the rising-points of stars, and the phases of the moon and its influence; assessing the standards of measure; surveying in terms of triangles,

[9] Mas'udi, *Murūj* viii. 292–3.
[10] Ibid. 301.

quadrilaterals, and polygons of various angles; constructing arched stone bridges, other kinds of bridges, sweeps with buckets, and noria waterwheels on waterways; the nature of the instruments used by artisans and craftsmen; and the details of accounting.[11]

He (Ma'mun) encouraged me to compose a compendious work on algebra, confining it to the fine and important parts of its calculations, such as people constantly require in cases of inheritance, legacies, partition, law-suits, trade, and in all their dealings with one another where surveying, the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned.[12]

The close link between new research and translation of earlier foreign texts is well illustrated in the work of Khwarizmi, the scholar just quoted. To write his famous book on algebra, he drew for inspiration on the translation of Euclid's *Elements*. And Khwarizmi's masterpiece in turn gave rise to the Arabic translation of Diophantus' *Arithmetica*, accomplished in the light of Khwarizmi's book and using technical terms borrowed from it (*EI*, s.v. Riyāḍiyyāt). Another example is provided by developments in the field of optics. The optical books by Diocles, Anthemius of Tralles, and Didymus were translated into Arabic in response to the practical interest of scholars and rulers in burning mirrors. On the basis of these translations the polymath al-Kindi (d. *c.*257/870) wrote his own study on this subject, correcting and furthering the work of the Greek authors (Rashed 1989). As a final example, let us take the veterinary treatise of Theomnestus of Nicopolis (fourth century AD); an Arabic translation of it was made by the physician Hunayn ibn Ishaq (d. 260/873), which was quoted extensively by Ya'qub ibn Akhi Hizam in a veterinary treatise that he wrote for the caliph Mutawakkil (r. 232–47/847–61), and this in turn led to the establishment of the discipline of hippiatry in the Muslim world (Hoyland 2004).

Though the patronage of translation by Abbasid caliphs and their immediate family was crucial for making the activity into a sustained and systematic program, there were many others who supported it. A good number of courtiers were involved, such as the Munajjim family, court astrologers, whose ancestors had once ministered to Sasanian royalty and one of whom, 'Ali ibn Yahya, commissioned from Hunayn ibn Ishaq the still extant inventory of all the works of Galen that had been translated into Arabic (Bergsträsser 1925). State officials of all kinds also played a part, most famously the Barmakids, who served as advisers to many Abbasid rulers, were also descendants of a high-ranking Persian family and one of whom, Yahya ibn Khalid, brought together the patriarch of Alexandria, the bishop of Damascus and a monk called Eustathius to translate directly from Greek the *Synagoge* of Anatolius.[13] Perhaps the most colourful patron from the administrative ranks was Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Malik al-Zayyat (d. 233/847), vizier to three caliphs and member of a rich olive oil-dealing Persian family from Jilan. He is said to have been a highly intelligent

[11] Ibn Qutayba, *Adab* 10–11.
[12] Khwarizmi, *Algebra* 2/3.
[13] Ullmann (1972) 430–1.

and cultured man; he allegedly spent 2000 dinars a month on translators and scribes and when presented with a translation of Galen's *On the Voice* by Hunayn ibn Ishaq corrected many inaccuracies.[14] In addition, many scholars themselves were wealthy enough to pay for translations to facilitate their own research. Particularly renowned were the sons of Musa ibn Shakir (himself a highwayman turned astronomer and friend of Ma'mun), who were said to have paid a stipend of 500 dinars a month to three of the most distinguished translators of the day—Hunayn ibn Ishaq, Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan, and Thabit ibn Qurra—for translation services, and these 'sons of Musa' were themselves adept scientists in astronomy, mathematics, and engineering (*EI*, s.v. Mūsā, Banū). One even senses that the involvement of so many of the Abbasid elite in this activity engendered a degree of competition and rivalry. Thus the son of the caliph Mu'tasim (218–27/833–42), Ahmad, had the *Mechanics* of the Alexandrian Pappus translated by one expert at the same time as the sons of Musa commissioned Hero's work on the same subject from another (Jackson 1972).

Western scholarly attention has been chiefly directed towards the translation of Greek works into Arabic (and Syriac works inasmuch as they often served as an intermediary stage between Greek and Arabic, given the long tradition of translation from Greek into Arabic). Yet there were a considerable number, perhaps even a comparable number, of translations made from Persian and some even from Sanskrit, especially in the domain of astronomy and astrology.[15] Interestingly, many of these were in subjects not found in the Graeco-Arabic corpus. For example, whereas no Greek histories were rendered into Arabic, a number of Iranian national epics—notably the *Khwadāy-nāmag* (*Book of Lords*), first translated into Arabic (*Siyar al-mulūk*) by Ibn al-Muqaffa' for the caliph Mansur (Shahbazi 1990)—did receive such treatment. And whereas no Greek narrative works found favour with the translators, Indian literature was very popular, particularly the genres of mirrors for princes (most famously *Bilawhar and Yūdāsaf*, exported to Europe as *Barlaam and Josaphat*, based on the Sanskrit life of Buddha) and animal fables (most famously *Kalila and Dimna*, based on the Sanskrit *Panchatantra*). However, both of these texts came to Islam via Persian, and both were first translated into Arabic by the aforementioned Ibn al-Muqaffa' (*EI*, s.vv. Bilawhar, Ibn al-Muḳaffa'; Brown 1922).

The translators of Persian works whom we know of were, as one would expect, Persians, though it is not impossible that some texts were translated by Christians living in the lands of the former Sasanian empire, who perhaps continued to speak Persian. As regards Greek works, most translators were Syriac-speaking Christians of Syria and Iraq. In the beginning the majority were clerics, presumably because they were best acquainted with Greek through their study of the Church Fathers and because Abbasid patrons could easily approach them, since they would have already had dealings with them in an official capacity as representatives of their community (patriarchs and

[14] Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, *'Uyūn* i. 206; Bergsträsser (1925) 24.

[15] Sprengling (1939–40); Pingree (1963); *GAS* iii. 187–202, iv. 172–86, v. 191–214, vi. 115–21, vii. 89–97. Ibn al-Nadim, *Fihrist* 303, also lists 'Indian books on medicine extant in Arabic'.

bishops often accompanied caliphs on official tours and even on campaigns). We have, for example, the correspondence of the East Syrian patriarch Timothy (780–823) relating to the caliph Mahdi's request for help in producing an Arabic version of Aristotle's *Topica*:

The royal command required of us to translate the *Topica* of the philosopher Aristotle from Syriac into the Arabic tongue. This was achieved, with God's help, through the agency of the teacher Abu Nuh. A small part was done by us, as far as the Syriac was concerned, whereas he did it in its entirety, both Syriac and Arabic. The work has already reached a conclusion and has been completed. And although there were some others who were translating this from Greek into Arabic . . . , nevertheless the king did not consider it worth even looking at the labours of those other people on the grounds that they were barbaric, not only in phraseology, but also in sense . . . However, the king entirely approved of our labours, all the more so when from time to time he compared the versions with each other. Let your Eminence (Mar Pethion, 'priest and teacher' (d. c.782) sagely ask and enquire whether there is some commentary or scholia by anyone, whether in Syriac or not, to this book, the *Topica*. . . . Enquiries on this should be directed to the monastery of Mar Mattai . . . Job the Chalcedonian told me that he has seen a small number of scholia on the *Topica*, but only, he said, on certain chapters . . .[16]

However, in early Islam the demand for translations was not just found within a small community of experts, as was the case in the Syriac Christian community, but within a broad educated elite. Numerous scholars of many different disciplines make frequent allusion to Greek, Persian, Syriac, and Indian works that they have read in translation. For example, 'Amr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz (d. 255/869) was a composer of belletristic treatises, but in his *Kitāb al-ḥayawān* (*Book of Animals*) he overtly quotes the Arabic translation of Aristotle's work of the same name over sixty times, and probably as many times covertly (Najim 1979). And he has a lot to say, in a rather pessimistic vein, about translators and translations:

There are those who declare that the translator can never render what the scholar says in accordance with the specificities of his meanings, the truths of his doctrine, the subtleties of his epitomes, and the intricacies of his definitions. The translator can never do the scholar justice or express him with fidelity, being unable to fulfil the charge that he was given. How can the translator express this and render the meaning faithfully without possessing the knowledge of the author as regards the subject, the ways in which terms are employed, and the interpretations of their ramifications. Ibn Bitriq, Ibn Na'ima, Abu Qurra, Ibn Fahr, Ibn Wahili, Ibn al-Muqaffa'—have they ever been equal to Aristotle, or Khalid (ibn Yazid, an Umayyad prince famed for his learning) to Plato? The translator needs to possess as much literary ability as he does knowledge. He must be familiar with the original language and the language of translation, and have a perfect command of them both. But when we find someone able to speak two languages, we can be sure that he corrupts them, for they are bound to influence each other, borrow from each other, and distort each other. Besides, how is it possible to have the same mastery of two

[16] Brock (1999) 235–6, 238.

languages as of one. A man only has one capacity, which he can devote entirely to learning one language, whereas in the case of a polyglot this capacity needs to be split up. These considerations hold good for the translation of all idioms. Moreover, the narrower and more difficult of access the door to a subject is, and the fewer the specialists there are in it, the harder is the translator's task and the greater the risk is of making mistakes. For no translator can ever be the equal of one of these aforementioned scholars (i. 75–7).

And authors sometimes pass comment on the quality of individual translations that they have been using for their work:

These are the words of the philosopher Aristotle, which I have quoted exactly. They come from the translation of Abu 'Uthman al-Dimashqi (fl. 303/915) who is a man well versed in both languages, namely Greek and Arabic, and whose translation has won the approval of all those who have studied these two languages. At the same time he has tried hard to reproduce the Greek words and their meanings in Arabic words and meanings without any difference in expression or substance.[17]

This strong demand for translations pushed up their price (note how much, as mentioned above, patrons like Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Malik al-Zayyat (d. 233/847) and Musa ibn Shakir's sons were willing to pay), and it became possible to earn a very good living as a translator. As a consequence, it was not long before professional translators emerged. This, as has recently been noted, is an important point:

It was the development of an Arabic scientific and philosophical tradition that generated the wholesale demand for translations from the Greek, not, as is commonly assumed, the translations which gave rise to science and philosophy.[18]

As the number of translations increased, so did the translators' familiarity with the target language and hence the quality of the translations. Consider, for example, the words of the very competent Hunayn ibn Ishaq in a note to his translation of Galen's *On Medical Names*:

The Greek manuscript, from which I translated this work into Syriac, contains such a large number of mistakes and errors that it would have been impossible for me to understand the meaning of the text had I not been so familiar with most of his ideas from other works.[19]

Moreover, numerous new words were coined and paraphrases devised in order to convey foreign technical terms and syntactical constructions:

A long repertory of neologisms appears in which abstract nouns are derived from pronouns and particles with the Arabic *nisba* suffix, as *māhiyya* 'quiddity' from *mā* 'what?', and *kayfiyya* 'quality' from *kayfa* 'how?' ... The concepts of being *qua* being,

[17] Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb* 81.
[18] Gutas (1998) 137.
[19] Quoted in Rosenthal (1975) 19.

of ontological universals and the categories, offered immense difficulties for which no uniform solutions were found. Our translators developed a whole system of terms to provide for the different usages of Greek *einai*, Arabic having no copula to indicate the predicate of existence: *anniyya* for *to einai* and *to ti ēn einai*, *huwiyya* for *to on*, *aysa* versus *laysa* for 'being' versus 'non-being', and *dhāt* for 'essence'. Since it was a system of concurring words, none of which was well defined, it was superseded by a system of derivatives of a single Arabic root: *wujūd* 'to be found'. Here, as in other cases, the competition between terms mirrored the competition between translators.[20]

Such competition and the high prices on offer meant that translators might go to great lengths to try and find new manuscripts, and accounts are legion of the journeys and investigations undertaken in the quest for fresh material:

None of our contemporaries has up to this point come across a complete Greek manuscript of (Galen's) *De demonstratione*, even though Gabriel [ibn Bakhtishu'] spent an enormous amount of effort looking for it, just as I myself [Hunayn ibn Ishaq] looked for it most intensively. I travelled in search of it in northern Mesopotamia, all Syria, Palestine, and Egypt until I reached Alexandria. I found nothing except about half of it, in disorder and incomplete, in Damascus.[21]

These exciting times of continual new discoveries and the creation of a new Arabic scientific vocabulary and expression waned towards the end of the tenth century. It was not that the activity of translation ceased, but the essential works had all been done and their content absorbed. Hereafter patrons increasingly commissioned original Arabic compositions rather than translations: 'The translation movement stopped or came to an end because the Arabic philosophical and scientific enterprise which had created the need for it from the very beginning became autonomous.'[22] Islamic scholarship had come of age and its exponents now felt able to challenge and respond critically and creatively to the Greek tradition. Thus Ibn Zakariyya al-Razi (d. 313/925) penned a work entitled *Doubts about Galen*, Ibn al-Haytham (d. 430/1039) *Doubts about Ptolemy*, and Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037) his *Eastern Philosophy*, which is an exposition of his doubts about Aristotle. In this context the translated works lost their relevance and became part of the history of science.

(ii) Date of the Translation of Polemon's Treatise into Arabic

The Leiden manuscript Or. 198. 1 (catalogue no. 1206), dated AH 757 (AD 1356), contains a unique copy of the translation from Greek into Arabic of Polemon's treatise on physiognomy. Unfortunately it says nothing about when the translation was made or by whom. In his *Kitāb al-ḥayawān* (*Book of Animals*) the belletristic author 'Amr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz (d. 255/869) cites a certain

[20] Endress (1997) 60–1; cf. Mattock (1989).
[21] Bergsträsser (1925) 47.
[22] Gutas (1998) 152.

Polemon, 'the master of physiognomy' (*Aflīmūn ṣāḥib al-firāsa*), on matters relating to pigeons, and it is usually assumed on this basis that Polemon's treatise must have been translated before the mid-ninth century.[23] However, though pigeons do feature in the section on animals in Polemon's treatise (ch. 2), they do so only very briefly: 'Pigeons are tame, with little evil, fornicating, passionate, at times joyful and happy, at other times lamenting and sighing.' Jahiz does not mention any of this, but instead discourses at length on pigeons kept as pets or as homing/racing birds (iii. 146), on how to build a home for pigeons (iii. 269–70) and how to choose a pigeon: by form, feel, physical qualities, and movement (iii. 270–1), and he relates anecdotes about the usefulness of pigeons (iii. 284 ff.). So, unless we suppose that Polemon's entry on pigeons has only come down to us in a very different and abbreviated form, it would seem unlikely that the quotations of Jahiz are really from Polemon's treatise. Yet one might still argue that, even though inauthentic, these quotations reflect the fact that Polemon was already a famous name in the field of physiognomy, to whom one could attribute material of a physiognomical nature, and the reason for that is only likely to be that his treatise was already available and well known.

A more plausible reference to Polemon's text is to be found in the universal chronicle of Ahmad ibn Abi Ya'qub al-Ya'qubi. He completed his history of the world in 259/872 while in the service of the Tahirid dynasty ruling in eastern Iran. Though for the period after Muhammad he focuses exclusively on the fate of the Islamic empire, for the previous ages he offers us a very rich survey of the various civilizations of the ancient world. He dwells at length on their nature and achievements and includes a substantial section on the Greeks and their scholarship. There he notes that Polemon, 'the master of physiognomy' (*Aflīmūn ṣāḥib al-firāsa*), wrote a book 'in which he explained what physiognomy can tell you of innate disposition, repute, and character, and he gave proofs of that' (i. 135). This characterizes Polemon's work reasonably well and, though it is too general and brief a description to allow certain identification, may be accepted as giving a likely terminus ante quem for the translation of Polemon into Arabic.

A work on physiognomy by Polemon is recorded in the comprehensive bibliographical index of Ibn al-Nadim (d. 380/990), and it is declared extant by the litterateur Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (d. 414/1023), who, in a collaborative work with the scholar Miskawayh, maintains that it inspired others to write on this subject.[24] More importantly, he attributes a central place in the science of physiognomy to the eye, an idea likely to derive ultimately from the high status assigned to it by Polemon:

> Adepts of physiognomy rely particularly upon the eye and claim that it is the gateway to the heart, and they fish out from its shape, colour and many other aspects too numerous to mention here most features and traits of character.[25]

[23] e.g. Fahd (1966) 385.

[24] Ibn al-Nadim, *Fihrist* 314; Tawhidi, *Hawāmil* 208.

[25] Ibid. 207–8; cf. Ibshihi, *Mustaṭraf* 337 (ch. 60): 'the eye of a person is the clue to his heart'.

And this idea of the eye's pride of place in character assessment is also encountered in one of the works of Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), one of the most famous scholars of Muslim Córdoba. He is most known for his writings on Islamic science, but he did make one foray into the field of belles-lettres. This is his *Tawq al-ḥamāma* (*The Ring of the Dove*), a Muslim *Ars amatoria*. He begins by noting that love has many signs, the first of which is the brooding gaze, for 'the eye is the wide gateway of the soul, the scrutinizer of its secrets, conveying its most private thoughts and giving expression to its deepest-hid feelings' (*Tawq* 12/33). He comes back again later to this idea, observing: 'It is a well known saying that hearing of a thing is not like seeing it. This was already remarked upon by Polemon, the master of physiognomy, who established the eye as the most reliable basis for forming judgments' (*Tawq* 20/69). This precise sentiment is repeated a number of times in Polemon's treatise, a full third of which is devoted to the subject of the eye and the judgments one might form of someone from examination of it (ch. 1, A5–23). And there is some similarity between Ibn Hazm's reflections on the significance of the eye and Polemon's comment that 'the eye is related to the place of the heart, in which the ambitions and thoughts move, and you look through to the conversation of the soul'.

The only significant later reference to Polemon's treatise is by the versatile scholar and one-time vizier Ibn al-Qifti (d. 646/1248), who, in his biographical history of scholars, is the first to make specific mention of the fact that the treatise was translated from Greek into Arabic, saying: 'He (Polemon) has a famous composition on this subject (physiognomy) which was rendered from Greek into Arabic' (*Ḥukamā'* 60).

(iii) The Figure of Polemon in Muslim Arabic Literature

Presumably because of the uniqueness and popularity of his treatise on physiognomy, Polemon's name (usually conveyed in Arabic as *Aflīmūn*, not to be confused with *Filīmūn*, survivor of the Flood and chief priest of the pharaoh Surayd) became irrevocably associated with the discipline of physiognomy, and he is almost invariably accorded the epithet of 'master of physiognomy' (*ṣāḥib al-firāsa*). This characterization was evidently established relatively early, as we can see from the fact that Jahiz (d. 255/869) cites the epithet very casually, without making any comment, suggesting that Polemon's abilities in this field had already by the mid-ninth century passed into common knowledge.

His reputation was probably further enhanced by the fact that the classical anecdote about how the physiognomer Zopyrus divined from a picture of the philosopher Socrates that the latter was lustful was transposed in the Islamic tradition onto Polemon and Hippocrates (see further Ch. 6. II below). Of course, Polemon's name must already have been well known and that was why it was chosen to replace the obscure figure of Zopyrus, but the fame of the anecdote could have only helped his cause. When the transposition was first made is impossible to establish. We first find evidence of it in the late tenth century, in the biographical history of physicians (*Aṭibbā'* 17) of the Cordovan scholar Ibn Juljul (d. 380s/990s) and in an academic question-and-answer

work of Tawhidi and Miskawayh (*Hawāmil* 208). From the former source it made its way into the biographical history of scholars of Ibn al-Qifti (*Ḥukamā'* 91–2) and that of Ibn Abi Usaybi'a (*'Uyūn* i. 27–8). And it receives its fullest exposition, and possibly its earliest, in the introduction to the Istanbul (Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi; henceforth TK) versions of Polemon's work, which is for that reason presented in Ch. 9 below.

Also indicative of the celebrity of Polemon in the Muslim scholarly world is the fact that in the *Mukhtār al-ḥikam* (*Choice Aphorisms*) of the eleventh-century Egyptian savant Mubashshir ibn Fatik a chapter dedicated to 'sayings by a number of philosophers known by name, but for none of whom enough sayings are recorded to make a special chapter possible' comprises a few sagacious comments attributed to Polemon. These, however, are not related to physiognomy, but rather to advice on health (pictures in baths are beneficial, as bathers pause to admire them rather than rush out into the cold) and good conduct: 'Use pure friendliness in dealing with free men; in dealing with subordinates use what they desire and fear; in dealing with the rabble use what terrorizes and humiliates'; 'the best ruler is he who masters his desire and is not enslaved by his passion'; 'how little use is great knowledge together with an immoderate nature and a strong desire, and how very useful is a little knowledge with a moderate nature and subdued desire'.[26]

II. PHYSIOGNOMY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD[27]

This science (physiognomy) is beneficial to kings and vagabonds alike in the choice of a spouse, friend, or slave, and it is essential to all mankind because it is necessary for distinguishing the noxious from the useful (al-Qannawji 1978: ii. 396).

(i) Physiognomy before the Translation of Polemon

In a general way one might say that physiognomy was prevalent in Islamic society in that the latter harboured the view that there was a direct link between a person's outer form and his or her inner self:

The exterior form that is attractive to look at is the surest indication of a virtuous soul, for the light of the soul, when it shines, leads to the body. Every person has two chances for judgement, the first from his body, which is his external appearance (*maẓhar*), and the second from his soul, which is his inner nature (*makhbar*), and most often the two are inseparable. This is why the authorities on *firāsa* occupy

[26] Mubashshir ibn Fatik, *Mukhtār* 313, 299, 303. This phenomenon of attributing aphorisms to Polemon is also encountered in other Muslim texts; e.g. Abu l-Fath al-Karajaki (5th c. AH/11th c. AD Shi'ite author), *Kanz al-fawā'id*, ii. 34–5: 'From lack of planning comes ruin' (*min 'adam al-tadbīr yakūn al-tadmīr*).

[27] The only two works specifically devoted to this subject are Mourad (1939) and 'Adi (1982/3), both of which are very informative.

themselves first with the physical form when getting to know the internal states of people.[28]

Accordingly Jahiz, when wishing to impugn the character and worth of an intellectual opponent, saw fit to do so by painting a comical picture of the antagonist's body and his conceit about it:

Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was excessively short in stature, but made himself out to be very tall. Though in fact square, his waist was so large and his sides so fat that he gave the impression of being circular; he had podgy hands and short fingers. Despite all this he liked to think of himself as lithe and slim, and prided himself that he was handsome, without a paunch, of medium height, and with perfectly proportioned bones. He was long in the back and short in the thigh, yet made himself out to be long in the thigh and shank and very tall, with a large head.[29]

However, physiognomy does not seem to have had a distinct and definable existence in Islam before the translation of Polemon's treatise. The only potential indigenous contender would be *qiyāfa*. This is an art that many a Muslim writer triumphantly asserts to be the speciality of the pre-Islamic Arabs.[30] It had two principal aims. The first (*qiyāfat al-athar*) was to track birds, animals, and humans, which was achieved by minute scrutiny of the traces that they leave behind, most obviously footprints. The second (*qiyāfat al-bashar*) was to establish the paternity or maternity of a child by careful observation and comparison of the bodily characteristics of it and its alleged parent. This second function brings it very close to physiognomy, and it is noticeable that very early on the terms *qiyāfa* and *firāsa* became virtual synonyms. Thus Jahiz, when speaking of a child who was as like to his father as a fly to another fly or a crow to another crow, says that even 'the most ignorant person in *firāsa* and the most inexperienced in *qiyāfa*' could see they were father and son. And elsewhere he notes that Turks are so similar to one another in physical appearance that 'you need neither *firāsa* nor *qiyāfa*' to distinguish them from other peoples.[31] However, it would appear that little genuine recollection of the nature of *qiyāfa* was preserved in Islamic times, or at least not within the rarefied circles of Muslim scholars, for they offer no more than a very small and standardized repertoire of anecdotes (e.g. how a *qā'if* confirmed that the Prophet Muhammad's companion Zayd ibn Haritha was the father of Usama ibn Zayd, though the latter was black and the former white) and of axioms (e.g. the tribe of Mudlij were the foremost practitioners of *qiyāfa*).[32] Beyond this we only have the dry theoretical reflections about the relationship of the individual to the genus and to the race, as recounted to us at length by the savant Mas'udi (d. 345/956).[33]

[28] Munawi, *Fayḍ* i. 237, cf. 311–12 and Ghazali, *Iḥyā'* iv. 139 (ch. 32: *al-shukr*).

[29] *Tarbī'* 5.

[30] e.g. Jahiz, *Bayān* iv. 32, *Turk* 70; Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, *'Iqd* iii. 278; Tha'alabi, *Thimār* 120 (ch. 7).

[31] *Hayawān* i. 123; *Turk* 63.

[32] See e.g. Tha'alabi, *Thimār* 120–1 (ch. 7); Ibshihi, *Mustaṭraf* 333–4 (ch. 60); Fakhr al-din al-Razi, *Firāsa* 12–13/82–3; and the comments in Fahd (1966) 370–8.

[33] *Murūj* iii. 336–8.

When we move to the Islamic period, the earliest document available to us is the Qur'an, though one should bear in mind that it is not meant to be a scientific or expository work and so does not provide discussion of any topic. The word *firāsa*, the term used to translate the Greek word for physiognomy, does not occur in the Qur'an, but one could argue that some physiognomic ingredients are present. Chapter 47 of the Holy Book inveighs against those who reject God's message, especially hypocrites, 'those in whose heart is a disease', who feign outward adherence to God and Muhammad, but whose 'hearts are closed'. About these it is said: 'Had we so willed we could have exposed them to you and you would have known them by their physical mark (*sīmāhum*),[34] but you will surely recognize them by the tone (*laḥn*) of their voice' (47. 30). The word *laḥn* is given different shades of meaning by Muslim commentators on this verse, but it is clearly being suggested here that an astute person could spot the insincerity hidden in the heart of an apparently genuine believer just by carefully listening to his speech. We have here, then, an instance of an external physical quality giving an indication about the state of someone's soul or inner disposition, an instance of physiognomy.

Chapter 15 of the Qur'an treats the subject of the signs that God has manifested to mankind, particularly His creation, the messengers He has sent down to earth, and the chastisement He has occasionally been obliged to mete out to ungrateful peoples. A section on Lot and the destruction of the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah concludes with the declaration that 'in that are signs for the discerning (*al-mutawassimīn*)' (15. 75). The exact sense of the latter term was much discussed. One proposal, which is most often attributed to the early Qur'an commentator Mujahid (d. *c.*102/720), was to equate it with *al-mutafarrisīn*, those who practise *firāsa*, which was defined by a later exegete as 'inference from physical makeup about nature/disposition/character' (*al-istidlāl bi-l-khalq 'alā l-khuluq*).[35] The proposal of *mutafarrisīn* became the most accepted solution, but initially there were a number of other suggestions put forward by various scholars: Dahhak ibn Muzahim (d. 105/723) opted for 'the perceptive'/*nāẓirīn*, Qatada ibn Di'ama (d. 117/735) for 'the mindful'/*mu'tabirīn*, and Muqatil ibn Sulayman (d. 150/767) for 'the contemplative'/*mutafakkirīn*.[36] Since all these scholars were active in the early eighth century, we might posit that the debate began, or at least was at its height, about this time, and that the term *firāsa* was already then current and endowed with the meaning of scrutiny of outward signs to obtain inner truths.

The alternative suggestions continued to be presented as originating with the aforementioned scholars, but *mutafarrisīn*, presumably once it had won out over other explanations, was ascribed to the prophet Muhammad, and was then almost always linked with the saying: 'Beware the *firāsa* of the

[34] Qur'an 48. 29 says of true believers that 'their mark (*sīmāhum*) is apparent on their faces as a result of their prostration', which some commentators take to refer to the mark on their foreheads left by bowing their heads fully to the ground, whereas others understand it to mean that the grace and light of God is manifest on the face of the good Muslim.

[35] Ibn 'Arabi, *Aḥkām* 1119 and 1068 (on 12. 21).

[36] Ibn Kathir, *Tafsīr* ii. 555; Tabari, *Tafsīr* vii. 528–9.

Muslim, for he sees with the light of God.' This adage does not appear in written form until the time when the great collections of the sayings of the Prophet were being put together in the third/ninth century. It seems to be first noted, very cursorily, by the famous compiler Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari (d. 256/870), in his *al-Ta'rīkh al-kabīr* (*Grand History*) (vii. 354), and then by his younger contemporary and fellow compiler Abu 'Isa al-Tirmidhi (d. 279/892), who appends a few brief thoughts of his own:

The messenger of God said: 'Beware the *firāsa* of the believer, for he sees with the light of God', and then he recited (the Qur'anic verse): 'In that are signs for the discerning'. Abu 'Isa: This tradition is rare; we only know of it in this context. It is transmitted on the authority of a number of knowledgeable people regarding the exegesis of this verse—'in that are signs for the discerning': ('the discerning' means) 'those who practise *firāsa*'.[37]

However, though not written down until the mid-ninth century, it is evident from Tirmidhi's comment about its explication by 'knowledgeable people' (*ahl al-'ilm*) that the saying was already known in his day. And thereafter it is included in literally hundreds of legal and theological works, particularly those with Sufi leanings.[38]

(ii) Physiognomy Based on Bodily Features

Physiognomy in the sense that Polemon chiefly intends it, the classical sense, seeks to examine the relationship between immutable physical attributes and inherent personality traits, that is, to determine what inspection of a person's corporeal features might tell us about his/her innate character. The Arabic word chosen (or coined?) to convey the Greek concept of physiognomy is *firāsa*, which is used in the translation of Polemon's treatise and in numerous subsequent works on this subject, and which is defined by the scientific bibliographer Hajji Khalifa (d. 1067/1657), echoing many earlier Muslim scholars, as 'a science by which one learns of the character of people from their external qualities such as colours, forms, limbs; in sum, it is inference from the external makeup to the internal nature'.[39] In this narrow technical sense of the word, *firāsa* is mostly only encountered in medical literature, but there are some hints that it was a relatively common phenomenon in Islamic society at large.

In the first place, we come across such hints in tales about particularly perspicacious persons. One famous example is Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (d. 204/820), a great legal scholar and eponymous founder of a legal school who was much famed for his insightfulness and divinatory ability. There are

[37] *Sunan* v. 278–9.

[38] There are a number of like sayings, such as: 'Every people has *firāsa*, but only the honourable (*al-ashrāf*) among them are acquainted with it' (Nisaburi, *Mustadrak* iii. 472; Munawi, *Fayd* ii. 514).

[39] *Kashf al-zunūn* ii. 1241.

many anecdotes about how he was able to guess correctly a person's profession, provenance, or even their future just from close observation.[40] However, it is not usually apparent how he arrived at his conclusions, and it may have been simply by virtue of his astuteness, as in his remark: 'If you see a scribe with his inkwell on his left, then he is not a (true) scribe; but if you see his inkwell on his right and his quill in his ear, then he is a (true) scribe.'[41] Yet there is one occasion when his acquaintance with physiognomy in the classical sense is made clear:

> Shafi'i said: I went to Yemen in search of books on *firāsa* and I copied them and collected them. On my return I passed on the road by a man squatting in the yard of his house who had blue eyes, a protruding forehead, and a hairless face. I said to him: is there a place to stay? He said: 'Yes.' Now, said Shafi'i, the description of him was the worst possible in physiognomical terms, yet he gave me a place to stay, and I observed him to be a most generous man: he sent me dinner, scent, fodder for my animal, and mattress and blanket. I began tossing and turning in the night thinking what should I do with these books (on *firāsa*, which characterize this man as evil). When I got up, I told my servant to saddle my animal and he did so. I mounted and passed the man saying: 'If you come to Mecca and are passing by Dhu Tuwa, ask for the house of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i'. The man relied: 'Am I your father's underling?' 'No', I said. He said: 'Did I owe you some favour?' 'No', I answered. 'Where then are the expenses you ran up yesterday?' I said: 'And what are they?' He said: 'I bought for you food for two dirhams, leather for the same amount, perfume for three dirhams, fodder for your beast for two dirhams, and rent of the mattress and blanket for two dirhams'. I said: 'Servant, give it to him. Anything else?' He said: 'Rent of the house, since I put all at your disposal and constrained myself'. At this I felt happy with those books (on *firāsa*), and then I said to him: 'Anything else?' He said: 'Go on your way, may God dishonour you, for I have never see anyone worse than you'.[42]

Here we have an example not just of astute observation, but clearly of physiognomy in its classical sense. It is the physical qualities of blue eyes, protruding forehead, and hairless face that lead Shafi'i to believe in his host's evil character, not his own perceptiveness or conjecture. But whether he really obtained this information from books from Yemen and if so what these might have been, we unfortunately have no idea.

[40] A very popular one involves him guessing that a certain man is either a carpenter or a blacksmith (or occasionally a tailor), and the man turns out to be an ex-carpenter turned blacksmith (or vice versa); or else he competes with the legal scholar Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 198/805), who guesses the man's present trade whereas Shafi'i guesses his former one, which makes Shafi'i's physiognomic talent the greater in that the man's past profession was less apparent than his present one (Ibshihi, *Mustaṭraf* 337 [ch. 60]; Qushayri, *Risāla* 106; Safuri, *Nuzhat al-majālis* 139).

[41] Bayhaqi, *Manāqib* ii. 210.

[42] Abu Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-awliyā'* ix. 144. In this and other versions the report goes back to a certain Humaydi (d. 219/834), a student of Shafi'i (Mourad 1939: 58).

It is occasionally asserted that Shafi'i himself wrote a book on *firāsa* or at least on *qiyāfa*. Earlier authorities do not mention this, and so modern scholars tend to be sceptical.[43] It should be noted, however, that the comprehensive work on *firāsa* by Shams al-din al-Dimashqi (d. 727/1327), discussed below, contains sixty-four physiognomical sayings of Shafi'i, and a couple of these do overlap with the saying in the above account: e.g. 'the knitted protruding brow is an indication of treachery and deceit' (BNF, ms. arabe 5928, fo. 25^b) and 'the bright blue eye with arsenic-yellow and turquoise-green and also red or nail-white dots are an indication of treachery, deceit and wickedness' (24^a). A few of the sayings ascribed to Shafi'i by al-Dimashqi are reported by other authorities (Ibn Zakariyya al-Razi, two sayings; Ibn 'Arabi, six sayings; Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, eight sayings), but most are independent, though without knowing anything about their transmission it is difficult to say anything secure about their provenance.

In the second place, we obtain hints of the widespread interest in physiognomy in its classical sense from the numerous quotations of Polemon's treatise or imitations thereof, both direct and indirect, that circulate in Islamic literature. A good example is the following piece, which crops up in a number of works:

> Largeness of the forehead indicates doltishness, breadth of it to poverty of intellect, smallness of it to gracefulness of movement, and roundness of it to anger. If the eyebrows are joined straight across, it indicates effeminacy and slackness. If they are driven downwards to the edge of the nose, it indicates grace and intelligence; and if they are driven towards the temples, it indicates derision and mockery. If the inner corner of the eye is small, it indicates a wicked inner nature and bad character traits. If the eyebrow falls down to the eye, it indicates envy. The medium-sized eye is an indication of acumen, fine character, and valour; the projecting eye of a confused intellect; the hollow eye of sharpness; the eye that stares much of impertinence and stupidity; and the eye that looks long of levity and inconstancy. Hair on the ear indicates a good listener, and a big erect ear indicates stupidity and folly.[44]

The longest of such quotations is given by Muhyi l-din Ibn 'Arabi (d. 638/1240), the most prolific of all Muslim mystic writers, who grew up in Andalusia, mostly in Seville (see further ch. 6, pp. 299–301). After seeing a vision, which led him to adopt the way of a mystic, he began to travel, first to learn and subsequently to teach his own blend of mysticism. He initially confined himself to Spain and north-west Africa, but then set off for Mecca to perform the pilgrimage and stayed there two years before continuing his travels around much of the

[43] e.g. Mourad (1939) 57–61, who notes that such a work is absent from the list of Shafi'i's publications given in Ibn al-Nadim, *Fihrist* 209–10. See also below, Ch. 6 n. 99.

[44] Ibn Hamdun, *Tadhkira* viii. 32 (ch. 36); Ibshihi, *Mustaṭraf* 337 (ch. 60); Nuwayri, *Nihāyat al-arab* iii. 149 (2. 2. 3); Zamakhshari, *Rabī' al-abrār* i. 866; cf. Polemon, chs. 27, 48, 1, 29. This passage is almost identical in all four sources (the only discrepancy is at the end of the penultimate sentence where the eye either looks long, interruptedly or often), which suggests that it has been copied from some written source.

Middle East, stopping for longer periods in Anatolia where he received very favourable patronage. His most famous work is his *Al-futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, which he began in Mecca in 598/1201 and allegedly only finished in 629/1231. In six parts, subdivided into 560 chapters, it presents a full exposition of the author's mystical views and doctrines. Not surprisingly for a mystic, from whom one would expect an interest in the link between the inner and outer self (*al-bāṭin wa-l-ẓāhir*), the work includes a section on physiognomy (ii. 311–19: ch. 148). This reproduces and slightly expands the text of an earlier very short work of his entitled *al-Tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-mamlakat al-insāniyya* (*Divine Regulations for the Improvement of the Human Realm*). Ibn 'Arabi's principal focus is *firāsa ilāhiyya* ('divine physiognomy'), a light from the divinity that allows the recipient to penetrate people's hidden depths: their conscience, their innermost thoughts, their past and their future (see the section on divine physiognomy below). However, since he is aware that this talent is possessed only by a few, namely the most pure of heart, he decides to present also the practical conclusions of *firāsa ṭabī'iyya* ('natural physiognomy'), as set out by experts in physiognomy. These are more readily available to all, since they consist simply of an enumeration of the particular characteristics that are associated with specific bodily features, so again very much physiognomy in its classical sense.

Ibn 'Arabi first outlines the form and character of the best type of person and concludes that the Prophet Muhammad was of this character and form. He then moves through the different parts of the body in turn, listing the character traits indicated by different properties of these parts. This was neither Ibn 'Arabi's main area of concern nor his expertise, and so for the most part he simply incorporates whole the chapter on physiognomy found in the pseudo-Aristotelian text known as the *Sirr al-asrār* (*Secret of Secrets*). This purports to be the advice given by the famous Greek philosopher to the equally famous Alexander the Great while the latter was on campaign in Iran. It was perhaps originally devoted to the art of government—its earlier title would seem to have been *'Ilm al-siyāsa fī tadbīr al-riyāsa* (*Science of Government and Leadership*)—but was continually added to until it became a huge compendium touching not just on politics, but also on medicine, astrology, religion, and divination, as well as physiognomy. It was enormously popular in the Medieval West, being translated many times into Latin and all the chief European languages. The Arabic versions on which these translations were based go back at least to the ninth century, though how much further is difficult to say.[45] The categories, style, and vocabulary employed in the *Sirr al-asrār*, if not so much the statements themselves, owe much to Polemon, as is clear from the following sections on the hair and eyes:

If the hair is rough it indicates courage and soundness of mind; thin hair indicates cowardice, weakness of mind, and lack of acumen. If the hair is abundant on the

[45] See Grignaschi (1976), Manzalaoui (1974) and (1977), Ryan and Schmitt (1982).

shoulders and neck, it indicates stupidity and recklessness; if abundant on the chest and stomach, it indicates a brutish nature, lack of understanding, and love of tyranny. Fair hair indicates cowardice, with anger that is frequent, quick, and overwhelming. Black hair indicates great calmness of mind, patience, and love of justice. What is between these two indicates moderation. . . . If the eyebrow is very hairy, it indicates a disposition to stray and poverty of speech; if the eyebrow extends to the temple, its owner is errant and arrogant; and whosever's eyebrow is fine, between long and short, and black, he is alert (Badawi 1954: 119–20; cf. Polemon, chs. 40–8, B37, which also treat types of hair, colours of hair, hair on the chest and stomach, hair on the shoulders and neck, and hair of the eyebrows).

Whoever has large, goggling eyes, he is envious, impudent, lazy, and untrustworthy. If they are blue, it is worse, and he may be deceitful. Whoever has eyes of medium-size, tending towards hollow, and dusky or black, he is alert, quick-witted, trustworthy, and loving. Whosever's eye is inanimate, with little movement, like that of livestock, with a dull gaze, he is ignorant and coarse-natured. Whoever's eye has quick movement and a sharp gaze, he is artful, a thief, and a traitor. Whosever's eye is red, he is courageous and bold. If there are around it yellow dots, its owner is the worst of people and the most wicked of them (Badawi 1954: 119; cf. Polemon, ch. 1, A5–22, which also treats size and colour of eyes, their movement and gaze, and dots around them).

Finally, and more generally, hints about physiognomy's popularity in Islam are found in the beliefs, prejudices, and assumptions about the implications for character of various bodily traits that are frequently cited in Islamic literature. A trawl through the diverse works of Jahiz, for example, reveals to us some of the intrinsic qualities that were in his culture associated with particular physical traits: red eyes indicate angry men and drunkards (*Ḥayawān* iv. 229), and redness in the white of the eye was a trait of the Prophet Muhammad and is therefore a good sign (ibid. v. 333); big heads belong to the brave, as is reflected in the common boast that 'we are a people whose heads fill our helmets and we are dedicated in the advance' (Maskin al-Darimi on Tamim in *Burṣān* 308); 'the nose represents pride and the place of haughtiness' (*Ḥayawān* iii. 305) and those with sensitive noses display propriety and 'neither deviation nor dissociation' (Ibn Maqrum al-Dabbi in *Burṣān* 294); and it was known that 'broadness of the mouth would lead you to commendation and narrowness of the mouth to disparagement' (*Bayān* i. 120–1).[46] And one commonly encounters in Islamic literature descriptions of the physical makeup that was considered to accompany particular character types. For example, turning again to Jahiz, we learn that:

The physiognomy (*firāsa*) of the wicked man is that he is dispirited, not cheerful, of a pale and dull hue even though not ill, fickle of heart, detesting and denouncing joking and jesting, and you will observe him to be rough-spoken in conversation. The physiognomy of the good man is that he appears easy and relaxed, has a radiant aspect, agreeable speech, a well-formed and smooth forehead, not impetuous, clinging, or agitated, liking

[46] A broad mouth and thick lips were deemed signs of courage (Qalqashandi, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā* ii. 11).

jesting and joking, speaking well of others, gentle in conversation, humble (*Tabaṣṣur* 350–1).[47]

Most popular of all were the portrayals of the model man, like that of Ibn 'Arabi mentioned above with reference to the Prophet Muhammad, and of his opposite, the stupid and mean man. A good example of the latter is provided by the traditionalist scholar and preacher Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/1200), who composed a whole treatise on *Akhbār al-ḥamqā wa-l-mughaffalīn* (*Tales of Fools and Dolts*) and begins with an account that reflects a mixture of cultural preference and old ideas about balance and proportion received from the Greeks:

The experts say that if the head is small and badly formed, it indicates that the brain is in a bad state, and Galen himself said that a small head inevitably points to a bad state of the brain. If the neck is short, it indicates a weak and inadequate brain. Whoever has a disproportionate physical build is bad, even with regard to his intentions and intellect, as is also the case with whoever has a large paunch, short fingers, a round face, huge stature, a small crown of the head, and fleshy forehead and face, as though his face were a semi-circle, and also fleshy neck and feet. Likewise, if the head and beard are round, but the face very coarse and in his eyes stupidity and much movement, he is far removed from good. If the eyes protrude, he is impudent and prattling, and if they look you up and down, he is cunning and thieving. If the eyes are large and tremulous, he is lazy, indolent, stupid, and a lover of women. Blue eyes with some yellowness, like saffron, indicate very bad character. Cow-eyes indicate stupidity, as do bulging eyes with falling eyelids. If the eyelids are severed or coloured, not out of illness, their owner is lying, cunning, and stupid. Hair on the shoulders and neck indicates stupidity and recklessness, and on the chest and stomach indicates lack of acumen. Whoever has a long, thin neck is clamorous, stupid, and cowardly. Whoever has a coarse, full nose lacks understanding. Whoever has coarse lips is stupid and coarse-natured. Whoever has a very round face is ignorant. Whoever has large ears is ignorant and long-lived. A fine voice is a sign of stupidity and lack of acumen. Abundant and solid flesh is a sign of coarseness of feeling and understanding. Idiocy and ignorance are found in the excessively tall (pp. 28–9).[48]

[47] On this text and its authenticity see Pellat (1954). Note that Zamakhshari's *Rabī' al-abrār* i. 839–70, contains a chapter on 'outward forms and their qualities, and mention of beauty and ugliness, height and shortness, largeness and smallness, fatness and thinness, and the like', which also provides a rich haul of assumptions about the links between certain bodily features and character, as does the section on the body in Nuwayri, *Nihāyat al-arab* ii. 18–133 (2. 1. 2).

[48] This passage as well as the general issue is discussed in Ghersetti (1996). Though not directly relevant, since no conclusions are drawn about character, it seems worth mentioning here the instructions of Qudama ibn Ja'far (d. c.320s/930s), *Kharāj* 24–6, to secretaries for drawing up a military register, since it shows amazing attention to bodily features (e.g. 'one should describe the eyebrows: if joined, say whether manifestly or lightly; if separated one says *ablaj*, and if a wrinkle line runs between them one says *khaṭṭ*. . .'). Of course, before modern methods a detailed description might be the only way of determining identity, and this explains similarly detailed lists of bodily features in the Islamic travel, tax and employment documents that have survived; see Hoenerbach (1950) 273 and Tantum (1979) 191–3.

(iii) Physiognomy Based on Bodily Expression and Movement

Although the overwhelming majority of Polemon's treatise is taken up with a careful exposition of the character traits that might be inferred from people's immutable bodily features, he finishes with a couple of anecdotes that are concerned with conclusions drawn about their hidden situation and intentions from transient physical expressions and conditions (chs. 68–70). Thus, as a guest at a wedding, he deduced that the bride was about to abandon her husband-to-be and elope with a certain young man, because the latter was panting, sweating, and changing colour, the bride was fearful, and both had eyes brimming with water and a keen gaze. This could still be termed physiognomy in that it is moving from the external to the internal by a process of deduction, but we are now talking about temporary states (both of the external manifestations and the internal conditions) rather than innate qualities, and we are much closer to the detective's use of the 'clue', some tell-tale outward sign, to infer something about a suspect's interior motives or state of mind. In this sense of the word, physiognomy was extremely common in Islam. Jahiz, for example, was of the opinion that by 'accurate use of sensory perception, correct deployment of *firāsa*, and inference from the part to the whole' one could attain 'insight into the intrinsic elements of men' (*Wukalā'* 103). For him *firāsa* was a tool that enables us to gain an insight into people's internal disposition, to understand something of their hidden thoughts, motives, and intentions. Thus one might be able to discern what secrets they harbour in their breast, for 'the most prudent man, even if he can hold his tongue, safeguard his secret, and curtail his speech, cannot, without tremendous effort and constant vigilance, control the glance of his eyes, the expression of his face, his blushing and paling, his smile and his frown'. Hence, a secret 'can be deduced from these indications or others like them, guessed by the perceptive efforts of those skilled in interpreting words and gestures and found out by scrutiny of the causes and symptoms of behaviour and human affairs' (*Kitmān* 148–9). In short, 'no one contemplates something in his inner self without that revealing itself in slips of the tongue and in the external makeup of the face'.[49] A particularly renowned practitioner of this type of physiognomy was the judge Iyas ibn Mu'awiya (appointed in 99/717):

He was celebrated for his talents and judgment; he was equally remarkable for his acuteness, instances of which are thus related: Being at a place in which something happened productive of alarm, and where three females whom he did not know were present, he said: 'One of these females is pregnant, the other is nursing, and the third is a virgin.' On inquiry, it was found that he had judged right; and on being asked how he had acquired that information, he replied: 'In time of danger persons lay their hands on what they most prize; now I saw that pregnant woman, in her fright, place her hand on her belly, which showed that she was with child. And I perceived the nurse place her hand on

[49] Ibshihi, *Mustaṭraf* 337 (ch. 60).

her bosom, by which I knew that she was suckling; and the movement of the virgin's arm proved to me that she was a maid.'[50]

Iyas tells us nothing about the innate character of the three women and does not judge on the basis of any permanent physical quality of theirs, rather he observes the movement of the women's hands and by his own sharpness of mind perceives its import. Sometimes the accounts of his perspicacious prowess take on a Sherlock Holmesian style:

We were with Iyas ibn Mu'awiya before he went to act as judge and we were writing down his *firāsa*, just as we would write down legal sayings (*ḥadīth*) from a man versed in such things (*muḥaddith*), when a man came and sat down on a raised bench in the yard, and began watching the road. Whilst thus, he at one point got down and welcomed a man, looked at his face, then returned to his place. Iyas said to his students: 'Tell me about this man.' We replied: 'What should we say? A man looking for something.' Iyas said: 'He is a teacher of children who has been given the slip by a one-eyed boy.' Some of us went up to the man and asked what he sought, and he answered: 'A boy who has run away from me.' 'What does he look like?' 'Like this and that, and one of his eyes is missing.' 'And what is your profession?' 'I teach children.' We said to Iyas: 'How did you know that?' He replied: 'I saw him come and he sought a place to sit down, and he looked for the highest thing and sat on it. I considered his social rank, and it was not that of kings; I thought about those who were accustomed to sit like kings and I only came up with teachers. Thus I came to know that he was a teacher of children.' We said: 'And how did you know that a boy had escaped from him?' 'I saw him watching the road looking at the faces of people.' 'How did you know that he was one-eyed?' 'Whilst thus, he at one point got down and welcomed a man who was missing an eye, so I knew that he resembled his boy.'[51]

It is no coincidence that Iyas is a judge, for it is particularly in legal contexts that we come across this type of physiognomy, that is, when a legal authority is trying to establish the truth of the matter in order to give a ruling in a particular case or to pass new legislation. The traditionalist theologian and jurist Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) wrote a book on this subject in answer to the question that was put to him whether it was right or not 'for an arbiter or ruler to judge according to *firāsa*, the indications (*qarā'in*) in which truth appears to him to reside, and inference from signs (*amārāt*), rather than to occupy himself simply with manifest evidence and circumstances (*ẓawāhir al-bayyināt wa-l-aḥwāl*)?' Ibn Qayyim responds by saying that if an arbiter were to rely wholly upon *firāsa* without recourse to conventional legal principles, this would of course be wrong and could lead to tyranny and corruption. However, 'if the arbiter has no insight into signs, clues and testimonies pertaining to a situation, and relevant indications, as well as insight into the particular and general aspects of legal precepts, he has missed out on much of jurisprudence, by relying on its manifest parts and not paying attention to its inner depths and its other aspects' (*Turuq* 4–5).

[50] Ibn Khallikan, *Wafāyāt* i. 247–8/i. 232–3; cf. Ibn Qayyim, *Turuq* 29–30; Mizzi, *Tahdhīb* iii. 429; Ibn al-Jawzi, *Akhbār al-adhkiyā'* 68.

[51] Ibn Qayyim, *Turuq* 39; Mizzi, *Tahdhīb* iii. 426; Waki', *Akhbār al-quḍāh* i. 328–9.

Most of the book is concerned with illustrating, chiefly by means of anecdotes, what is meant by *firāsa* in this sense. One of its most important properties is deduction based on careful observation of a person's external form, in particular their movements, gestures, and expressions, as in the following story:

Ahmad ibn Tulun (r. 254–70/868–84) saw one day someone bearing a basket and struggling under it. He said to himself: 'If this agitation was on account of the weight of the load, the neck of the porter would have sunk down, yet I see his neck upright, so I think this state of affairs must be a result of fear.' He ordered him to set down the basket, and there inside it was a slave girl slain and cut up. He said: 'Tell me the truth about her plight.' The bearer replied: 'Four people in such and such a house gave me these gold coins and instructed me to carry this corpse.' Ahmad ibn Tulun had him beaten and the four executed.[52]

However, there is sometimes a hint that the observation is based on more permanent bodily features, bringing us near to the realm of scientific physiognomy, as in the following case:

Makram ibn Ahmad said: I was sitting in a session of the judge Abu Hazim (al-A'raj Salama ibn Dinar, d. 135/752) when an old man approached together with a young lad, from whom the old man claimed a debt of one thousand dinars. 'What do you say to this?', asked the judge, to which the lad replied: 'It is true.' So the judge said to the old man: 'What do you want?' 'His incarceration', he said, which the judge rejected. Thereupon the old man said: 'If the judge decided to incarcerate him, that would be the best chance for obtaining my money.' Abu Hazim scrutinized (*tafarrasa*) them both for an hour and then said: 'Stay together until I look at your case again at another session.' I (Makram) said to him (Abu Hazim): 'Why did you defer his incarceration?' He said: 'In most cases I can discern in the faces of the opposing parties the face of the truthful person from the liar, and thereby I have accrued a knowledge that is rarely faulty.'[53]

And indeed a man comes in to see them who is the father of the young lad and tells them his son had wasted much money on singing girls and was intriguing with their owner to extort a thousand dinars from him, confirming the suspicions of Abu Hazim. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in such accounts, it is impossible to be sure whether the judge was practising scientific physiognomy, inferring from the antagonists' immutable qualities, or deductive physiognomy, inferring from temporary manifestations as in the case of a modern lie-detector. Certainly a part of his conclusions were derived simply from astute thinking, as is clear from his words to Makram: 'Did you not notice the lack of disapproval and disagreement between them, the calmness of their temperament despite the large sum of money involved? And an excess of god-fearing is not the custom of juveniles to the extent that they assent, like this one, willingly and cheerfully, to such a sum of money.'

Besides the observation of a person's outward form, Ibn Qayyim also includes other skills within the realm of *firāsa*, particularly insightful understanding of indications, signs, and evidence. This was displayed by the caliph 'Umar (r. 13–23/634–44) when he perceived that the finding of a baby at the

[52] Turuq 51–2; Ibn al-Jawzi, *Akhbār al-adhkiyā'* 46–7, 60.

[53] Ibn Qayyim, *Turuq* 31–2; cf. Khatib al-Baghdadi, *Ta'rīkh* xi. 65–6; Tanukhi, *Nishwār* iii. 11–13.

same place as where a youth had previously been found slain was likely to be the key to solving the youth's murder. Accordingly he had a woman parade the baby to see who took notice, and sure enough a woman came forward to embrace and kiss it. She was brought before 'Umar and related to him how she had killed the young man in self-defence as he raped her, and then she placed the resulting baby on the same spot at which the young man had been cast (*Turuq* 33–4). And the caliph Mu'tadid (r. 279–89/892–902) also displayed such perspicacity when he realized, on being brought two knapsacks containing body parts hauled out of the river by a fisherman, that it was necessary to find out who had bought the knapsacks. Consequently, he sent round to all manufacturers of such bags, and eventually one recounted how a young man had bought ten of them and had told of how he had fallen in love with a singer who had subsequently disappeared. When summoned before the caliph and shown the body parts, the man's face was drained of colour and his guilt confirmed (*Turuq* 48–9).

(iv) Physiognomy Based on Gender

Islam makes a very sharp distinction between male and female, and so one is not surprised to find that in the Islamicized versions of Polemon (in the TK manuscripts) the discussion of masculinity and femininity is much more extended than in Leiden and Adamantius. The very order of the world, as laid down by God, is based upon the harmony and radical separation of the sexes, and a good Muslim was therefore expected to maintain boundaries of gender. For example, the male should cultivate a beard, keeping it trimmed, brushed, combed, scented, and generally well groomed, while the woman should wear a head covering that protected sufficiently her modesty. Any violation of this natural order is strongly condemned and so, not surprisingly, those who appear very frequently on lists of those incurring the curse of the Prophet and the wrath of God are 'men who imitate women and women who imitate men' (*al-mukhannathūn min al-rijāl wa-l-mutarajjilāt min al-nisā'*).[54] Various anecdotes make clear that this imitation took the form of infringement of the strict Islamic codes of dress, ornament and movement prescribed respectively for men and women. For example, effeminate men are often described as dying their hands and feet with henna, wearing jewellery, and speaking and walking languidly, all practices that were reserved for women.[55] And the young boys who served wine at drinking parties (*sāqīs*) are also usually portrayed as effeminate in their outward aspect:

> A womanly boy, of gentle temper, hurried to us with the wine, ... coquettish, as though his palms were tattooed with henna. His hair was arranged in ringlets over his forehead and curls around his temples. His eyes diffused (love-) sickness ...[56]

[54] Bukhari, *Ṣaḥīḥ* iv. 94–5 (*libās* 61–2), 308 (*ḥudūd* 33); Tirmidhi, *Sunan* v. 98 (*ādāb* 34).
[55] Examples and further discussion given in Rowson (1991).
[56] Abu Nuwas, *Dīwān* 9.

And this idea is found even in the Qur'an: 'They (the male cupbearers) will be with beautiful, big and lustrous eyes ... Upon them will be green robes of fine silk[57] and they will be adorned with bracelets of silver' (56. 22, 71. 20). Conversely, if girls served at such parties they were attired 'after the fashion of young men', with short hair and wearing turbans, long-sleeved tunics, and belts.[58]

Another sexually ambiguous character that caused much consternation among Muslim religious leaders, as it did for Polemon (ch. 1, A20 and B3), was the eunuch, for he had lost the most potent physical symbol of his masculinity, and as such was regarded in very negative terms:

The eunuch is very evil-smelling; the odour of his armpits is very pungent, and rank sweat prevails in the rest of his body to the extent that his body has a smell not found in others ... The person who is castrated will grow in size and breadth ... Also, they will be afflicted with long feet, crookedness in the fingers and a twisting of the toes, and that happens as soon as they start to age. They change and alter quickly, losing moistness, tenderness, and softness of the skin, and purity and clarity of colour ... And there befalls the one castrated a change in voice so that it will be revealed to all who hear it that its owner is a eunuch ... When he is castrated before the sprouting of body hair, then he does not sprout body hair; if he is castrated after body hair has taken hold, it all falls out except for the pubes ... That does not happen to the hair of the head, for the hair of the head, together with the eyebrows and eyelids, comes with birth; rather it happens only to what is generated from the excesses of the body ... And the eunuch has hair in the places that women do. Moreover, women do not become bald, and the eunuch resembles them in this respect ... The eunuch is lacking in vigour, does not possess great strength, has slack muscle joints, and is close to the senile and the decrepit (*Hayawān* i. 106, 113–15).

It is implied here that castration makes a man resemble more a woman, and this is true of the character as well as the body:

The eunuch falls to playfulness, petting birds, and other things that are akin to the character of women and also that of children. He displays gluttony in regard to food, and he is miserly and stingy in everything, and that too is of the character of children ... The eunuch is quick to anger and please, which pertains to the character of children and women. He tends to love of slander and mean-mindedness when entrusted with secrets, and that is of the character of children and women ... He is patient in giving service and that applies to women (*Hayawān* i. 135).

The depictions of these different gender-crossing types helps us to understand the Muslim physiognomy of gender, the external signs that were used to emphasize masculinity or femininity, or, in the case of gender-crossers, to transgress those boundaries. But in Islam, as well as the question of how one looks (appears), there is also the matter of how one looks (watches) and also who looks. For there is both a 'lawful look' (*al-naẓar al-mubāḥ*), which is the controlled gaze, and 'fornication of the eye', which is 'the arrow of the devil',

[57] Note that silk is not meant to be worn by men; *al-ḥarīr li-l-nisā'* as jurists said; e.g. Bukhari, *Ṣaḥīḥ* iv. 85 (*libās* 30).

[58] Mas'udi, *Murūj* viii. 299; this describes the dress of young boys according to Ahsan (1979) 42. On page girls (*ghulāmiyyāt*) see Rosenthal (1997) and especially Zayyat (1956).

which 'looks at the form of the woman beneath her clothes', and this look invalidates a fast and keeps its owner from paradise. But acceptable, according to the traditionist scholar Ibn Hazm, is 'the subtlety with which women play with their eyes to try to attain their lovers' hearts' (*Tawq* 117/235). Then there are the careful distinctions elaborated by lawyers between what a man may see of a woman, what a woman may see of a man, what a man may see of a man, and what a woman may see of a woman. Already such ideas appear in the Qur'an, which forbids women to reveal themselves 'save to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands' fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers, their brothers' sons, their sisters' sons, their maids and servants, and such men as attend them and have no sexual desire' (24. 30–1).[59]

(v) Physiognomy Based on Similarity to Animals

Like Polemon (ch. 2, B2), Islamic civilization made a connection between the characters of men and the characters of animals. Jahiz's huge opus on animals is based on this premise, and often when he appears to be talking about animals he is actually talking about humans. Thus the debate between the owner of the dog and the owner of the cock over the respective merits of their pet is an allegory for the rivalry between the proponents of Arab culture and those of Persian culture, the dog being linked with the Arabs and the cock with the Persians. Jahiz's reasoning is that mankind is at the center of God's creation and in him all the ingredients of that creation are represented so that man is, as it were, a microcosm of creation:

> You no doubt know that man has been called a microcosm, the epitome of the macrocosm, simply because he combines in himself elements of everything that is found in the latter. He possesses the five senses and the five sensations. He eats both meat and corn, that is to say, the food both of wild beasts and of domestic animals. He displays the fury of the camel, the swiftness of the lion, the treacherousness of the wolf, the cunning of the fox, the cowardice of the nightingale, the parsimony of the ant, the industry of the termite, the generosity of the cock, the sociability of the dog, and the navigational skill of the pigeon.[60]

He goes on to say that though a person might display two or three of the qualities of an animal, he cannot be said to be that animal or fully likened to it, just as monkeys, which resemble humans in many respects, cannot be said to be human. What is not clear from Jahiz is whether he believes that similarity in form between a person and an animal implies some similarity in character,[61]

[59] On this subject see Bouhdiba (1998) 36–9 and more generally Sayyid-Marsot (1979).

[60] *Hayawān* i. 212–13. Cf. Tawhidi, *Imtā'* i. 143–4: 'The characters of the numerous kinds of animals are united in mankind, for man is the choicest of that genus called "animal" . . . and what is choicest and noblest in that sense unites in itself one, two or more traits of character of every kind of animal . . . such as stealth, which is in the nature of the lion and the mouse; perseverance, which is in the nature of the wolf; vigilance, which is in the nature of the buffalo from among the night animals; cautiousness which is in the nature of the pig . . .'.

[61] Though note his citation from Muthanna ibn Zuhayra: 'I never saw anything in a man or woman but I saw the like of it in the male and female pigeon' (*Hayawān* iii. 165).

as seems to be the argument of Polemon. Such a belief was held in some quarters in Islam, as is clear from the writings of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209): 'If we see a person who in his outer state resembles an animal, we can conclude from this concord the existence of concord in their inner state' (*Firāsa* 23/89). Thus one endowed with *firāsa* may be able to gain insights into people's inner states from the resemblance of their outward self to a particular animal:

If the heart is characterized by cunning, treachery and immorality and totally suffused with that, its owner takes on the outward appearance of the animal of this description: the monkey, the pig, etc. As that characterization continues to grow in him, it will covertly appear in the external features of his face, then strengthen and increase until it becomes clearly manifest. So anyone who has *firāsa* will perceive in the forms of people a metamorphosis of the forms of the animals whose characters the people have internally taken on. Consequently you won't see a deceitful, cunning, deceiving person who doesn't have on his face the metamorphosed shape of a monkey, nor a greedy, gluttonous person without that of a dog in his face.[62]

And Qusta ibn Luqa, in the treatise mentioned on p. 258, alludes to others who held such a view, and makes clear that it is one that held an interest for him too:

Those who are cognizant with physiognomy (*aṣḥāb al-firāsa*) note that in the natures of humans there are similarities to all the natures of animals ... and they judge each person according to the nature of animal he resembles. Thus whoever resembles the lion and the horse, they judge of him nobility, courage, pride, daring, and diffidence. Whoever resembles the dog, they judge of him servility, humility, loyalty, much movement, talking and shouting, and impudence. Whoever resembles the goat, they judge of lust and much desire. Whoever resembles the pig, they judge of him gluttony and greed for food. Whoever resembles the monkey and the fox, they judge of him cunning, deceit, mischief, and outrage. Whoever resembles the hare and the gazelle, they judge of him cowardice, timidity, and feebleness. Whoever resembles the bull and the donkey, they judge of him stupidity, coarseness of nature, and lack of understanding. Whoever resembles the snake and the scorpion, they judge of him wickedness, seeking to harm and corrupt people, and intending for them what is abhorrent. And they recount the indications by which each person's resemblance to animals may be inferred as regards colours, movements, and forms. Were it not that this falls outside the range of our topic, we should have expanded on it further and said much more about it (*Ikhtilāf* 115/146).

In fact, interest in the animal world seems stronger in Islamic civilization than in the Classical world, evidenced by the large number of encyclopedic animal books extant in Arabic and Persian. One might, therefore, argue that the small size of the animal section in Adamantius compared to Leiden, and even more so compared to the TK recension, does not reflect abridgement of Polemon by Adamantius, but rather amplification by the various Muslim writers, who found the topic to their taste and a wealth of relevant Muslim material readily available.

[62] Munawi, *Fayḍ* iv. 100–1, cf. 128.

(vi) Physiognomy Based on Environment and Race

As in the classical world (cf. Polemon, chs. 31–5, B31–2), the idea prevailed in Islam that different character traits went with different racial types. The explanation for this was that the environment and climate in which people are brought up could have an affect on both their character and form, so that 'if you were a master of physiognomy and there passed by you men some of whom were Kufan, some Basran, some Syrian, and some Yemeni, it would be clear to you from their forms, qualities, dimensions, and vocal inflections which of them was Basran, which Kufan, which Yemeni, and which Syrian'.[63] Following their classical predecessors, Muslim geographers divided the world into seven latitudinal zones or 'climes', the position of a given race in a particular clime predisposing them to the certain physical and mental conditions. The greatest harmony and balance lay in the third and fourth zones, which comprised the central lands of the Arab world, North Africa, Iran, India, and parts of China. The further one moved out of these zones, the more unpleasant a people's nature would become, as witness the Franks:

> As regards the people of the northern quadrant, they are the ones for whom the sun is distant from the zenith, those who penetrate to the north, such as the Slavs, the Franks, and those nations that are their neighbours. The power of the sun is weak among them because of their distance from it; cold and damp prevail in their regions, and snow and ice follow one another in endless succession. The warm humor is lacking among them; their bodies are large, their natures gross, their characters harsh, their understanding dull, and their tongues heavy. Their colour is so excessively white that it passes from white to blue; their skin is thin and their flesh thick. Their eyes are also blue, matching the nature of their colouring; their hair is lank and reddish because of the prevalence of damp mists. Their religious beliefs lack solidity, and this is because of the nature of cold and the lack of warmth.
>
> Those who are farthest to the north are the most subject to stupidity, grossness, and brutishness. The further north, the more this is so. Such are those Turks who penetrate to the north. Because of their distance from the circuit of the sun when it rises and sets, there is much snow among them, and cold and damp have conquered their habitations. Their bodies are flabby and thick, and their backbones and neck bones so supple that they can shoot their arrows as they turn and flee. Their joints form hollows because they have so much flesh; their faces are round and their eyes small, because the warmth concentrates in their faces while the cold takes possession of their bodies. The cold humour produces much blood; then their colouring grows red, since it is a property of coldness to gather warmth and to manifest it on the outside.[64]

Jahiz follows this point of view, emphasizing 'the effects of the workings and influence of the country and the times upon forms, character, qualities, manners, speech, desires, ambitions, appearances . . .' (*Awṭān* 109). For example, 'if the air is bad in a certain region, then its water is bad and its earth is bad, and that affects its inhabitants' nature over time' (*Hayawān* iv. 70). This has

[63] Jahiz, *Hayawān* iii. 211.
[64] Mas'udi, *Tanbīh* 23–4.

two consequences. First, different nations have different characteristics and qualities:

The Greeks were men of learning rather than doing; they could draw a blueprint for a machine or design an instrument and mould the prototype, but were not good at using the equipment; they could devise the implement but not handle it; they delighted in science but shrank from application. By contrast, the inhabitants of China are masters of melting and molding, casting and smelting, of marvellous dyes, carving, sculpting, painting, book production, and calligraphy, and are dextrous in everything they undertake and practise (*Turk* 69).

But second, immigrants will be affected by the particular conditions of a place and over time become like its inhabitants. So, as regards the descendants of Arabs and Bedouins who settled in Central Asia, 'you cannot distinguish one whose father settled in Farghana from the people of Farghana. You see no difference between them in their chestnut moustache, red skins, thick neck napes, and Farghani clothes. All regions are like that; you cannot distinguish the sons of settlers from the native son' (*Turk* 63–4). A good example is provided by the tribe of the Banu Sulaym who live in the lava lands of north Arabia and are rendered black-skinned by their environment; they take their servants from the Ashbān and their wives from the Byzantines, yet 'no sooner have they reproduced for three generations than the lava lands have turned them all into the colour of the Banu Sulaym' (*Sūdān* 219). And it was well known that 'whoever stays in Ahwaz for a time, then examines his intellect, he will find, though he were possessed of great *firāsa*, that it is diminished'.[65]

(vii) Physiognomy Based on Biology

Not only factors from the world outside might impact upon character, but also aspects of the body itself. Islamic civilization took over from Greek thought the idea of the four humours of the body, and it was accepted that their balance and imbalance had repercussions for a person's overall health and disposition:

The malady of melancholy, even when fatal, is always a drawn-out ailment and a lengthy sickness, and the slowness of its progress is in proportion to the extent of maturation of black bile. The malady of anger is silly and inconstant, swift and shameless, quick to repent and cutting without the restraint of counsel; its penetration is in proportion to the extent of inflammation of red bile.[66]

More generally, every person has his own particular nature (*ṭab'uhu al-khāṣṣ*), which must be allowed to come out and move, otherwise 'it will corrode a person just as poison pervades the body'. And it is this that explains why 'some find the study of computation easier than others and why some prefer the study

[65] *Hayawān* iv. 135; cf. Ibn Qutayba, *'Uyūn* i. 220; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam*, s.v. Ahwāz.
[66] Jahiz, *Jidd* 234–5.

of medicine than others, and it is the same for the devotees of engineering and the infatuation of astrologers with the stars . . . and you will find their aspiration is commensurate with the internal causes motivating them' (*Ḥayawān* i. 201–3). However, Jahiz, as a firm rationalist, stresses that a person's innate disposition, as well as his desires, should be tempered by the intellect, both the intuitive intellect (*al-'aql al-gharīzī*) with its innate reasoning powers and the acquired intellect (*al-'aql al-muktasab*) with its experience, knowledge, and learning (*Ḥujaj* 238).

The Christian physician Qusta ibn Luqa (d. *c.*300/912) was also of the opinion that physical constitution affected character, and he even wrote a treatise about this, but he had a slightly different approach. He was particularly trying to answer the question why people's characters differed so much. He agreed with Jahiz that everyone had their own nature or essence (*jawhar*) and this determined certain elements of character, but on the physical side he had a rather more complex theory, which was heavily influenced by Galen. Qusta considered the four major organs of the body—the brain, the heart, the liver, and the testicles—to be crucial:

> The difference in these organs gives rise to the difference in the character of people. These organs differ in two respects: firstly their size, secondly the evenness of their temperament and the excellence or otherwise of their substance . . . Thus a head of fine appearance, regular form, and balanced proportions indicates that the substance of which it consists is good and moderate in temperament. A head with the contrary qualities indicates that the substance of which it consists is bad and variable in temperament (*Ikhtilāf* 116–17/147–8).

Within these organs circulate various nutritive, reproductive, vital, and mental forces that have a direct affect upon human character:

> The mental force in the two anterior cavities of the brain requires its substance to be inclined towards dampness and softness so that it may more rapidly receive the impress of the image of those things that humans imagine. When its temperament is like this, the person has a good, lively imagination, and is quick to learn whatever he hears, reads, and senses. But if it inclines towards dryness, the person is slow to learn, slow to understand what is described to him and what his senses convey . . . The mental force in the middle cavity of the brain requires a moderate temperament with a tender, subtle, delicate substance so that it may receive, by its moderation and tender substance, a greater measure of the power of the expressive soul, to perceive things more easily and to discern things more effectively. If it is like this, the person is intelligent, discerning, an excellent and efficacious thinker. If it is the opposite of this, that is, of a corrupt and coarse substance, he receives little of the power of the expressive soul, and so is lacking, deficient, and weak in ideas, poor and fickle in discernment (*Ikhtilāf* 121–2/151–2).

The same applies to the other three organs. Thus the life force residing in the cavities of the heart is responsible for 'courage, cowardliness, irritation, anger, boldness, pusillanimity, and the like' (*Ikhtilāf* 124/154). However, these qualities, as also the passions that arise in the liver and testicles, can be constrained by the mental force that flows out from the brain and that distinguishes mankind from the animal and plant kingdoms.

In Polemon, however, physiognomy does not have a medical dimension, and consequently any talk of humours and temperaments is absent from the Leiden translation.[67] This was changed by Ibn Zakariyya al-Razi (d. 313/925), probably the most celebrated scholar of medicine in Islam and very influential on medieval European medical thinking too. Since his work is dealt with in the next chapter, I shall do no more here than note that the section on physiognomy in his medical treatise *al-Ṭibb al-manṣūrī* (known in Europe as *Ad Mansorem*), which gives an exposition of the humours and temperaments and their manifestations in the features, properties, and movements of the body, remained authoritative for many centuries after his death and ensured that some consideration of biology-based physiognomy became a standard feature in all major subsequent Muslim works on physiognomy (such as those by Fakhr al-din al-Razi and al-Dimashqi discussed below).[68]

(viii) Divine Physiognomy

In its most general sense physiognomy is about moving from the outer form to the inner nature. These two concepts, in Arabic *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*, are immensely important in Islamic theological discourse. Shi'ites (followers of divinely-inspired imams, descendants of 'Ali) and Sufis (mystics) stressed the secret knowledge of their spiritual leaders and the hidden meanings of the Qur'an and Islamic law (some among them, such as the Isma'ilis and certain Sufi groups, went as far as to regard the external observance of the law and literal understanding of the Qur'an to be secondary to the pursuit of their inner truths and significations, for which they earned the opprobrium of the more conservative elements of Islamic society). And all Muslims accepted to a greater or lesser extent that there existed some distinction between outer and inner truths and realities. Indeed, the Qur'an itself speaks of such things in its description of the outer and inner aspects of sin (6. 120), the manifest and hidden blessings of God (31. 20), the exoteric and esoteric nature of God (57. 3), and of the external and internal forms of things (57. 13). In such an environment, it was inevitable that physiognomy/*firāsa*, as a tool for discerning the inward state from the outward form, would be applied to this theological context. Its semantic range was therefore extended in Islam from its more limited Greek sense to cover the discovery or perception of inner/hidden truths from outer/manifest signs. This was, at least in pious circles, accomplished with, or at least facilitated by, God's aid, and it could comprise prediction of the unknown future as well as the hidden present:

Firāsa is that which God plants in the hearts of his friends (*awliyā'ihi*) so that they might know the internal states of people by a sort of divine action and divination (*bi-naw' min*

[67] This lends weight to the argument that Polemon's treatise was translated into Arabic as early as the 9th c., since one might expect a mention of biological theory if it had been composed post-Razi.

[68] See also Autuori (1984) and Plessner (1967).

al-karāmāt wa-iṣābat al-ẓann wa-l-ḥads),[69] for the heart has an eye just as sight does, and whoever has a sound heart-eye and is supported by God's light may gain confirmation of the true essences of things and understanding of the upper world while he remains in the lower world. He perceives what no eye has seen, no ear heard, and what has never occurred to the heart of any human.[70]

Its possessors and practitioners were usually at pains to emphasize the divine origin of their gift, as when a wandering ascetic greeted the famous mystic Dhu l-Nun (d. 246/861) by name, though he had not met him before, and when asked 'from where do you have this *firāsa*' replied: 'From Him who possesses it—it is not mine, rather He enlightened my heart with *firāsa*'.[71]

Although not everyone possessed *firāsa*, anyone could, in theory, attain to it simply by dedicating himself or herself to the worship and service of God:

Whoever turns his gaze from forbidden things, restrains himself from desires, and suffuses his inner self with constant vigilance and his outer self with adherence to God's law, and accustoms himself to eating only what is permitted, *firāsa* will not fail him.[72]

Conversely this meant that any figure renowned for piety or devotion must have been in possession of *firāsa*, a fact immediately patent from a perusal of the annals of Islamic religious literature. In many cases this will mean no more than that biographical encyclopedias of Muslim holy men conclude their entries with the statement that such and such a person was strong in *firāsa* (*kān lahu firāsa ḥasana/ḥādda* etc.) without any elaboration of the nature of his ability. In this category are the various lists of those people who are endowed with the greatest physiognomic talent. The most popular list, which seems to have first been written down by the biographer of the Prophet, Muhammad ibn Ishaq (d. 150/767), names the top three exponents of this skill (*afras al-nās thalātha*) as: the ruler of Egypt (*al-'Azīz*/Potiphar), who spotted the worth of Joseph (cf. Qur'an 12. 21, 30); Safra, daughter of Shu'ayb, who persuaded her father to employ Moses (cf. Qur'an 28. 26); and Abu Bakr, who appreciated that 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 13–23/634–44) was the best man to succeed him as caliph.[73] A rival list enumerates four candidates, the extra one being

[69] This sentence is in Zabidi, *Tāj*, s.v. firāsa, where it is contrasted with 'what is learnt from indications, experiments, physical forms and manners so that the internal states of people may be known', so *firāsa* of the Polemon type. It is implied that the result is the same (knowledge of the internal states of people), but that the means of attaining it are different (divine inspiration versus observation of evidence etc.). Zabidi adds: 'People have compositions (*ta'ālīf*), both ancient and modern, on this subject.'

[70] Munawi, *Fayḍ* ii. 514–15.

[71] Abu Nu'aym, *Hilyat al-awliyā'* ix. 364.

[72] Ibid. x. 237; Munawi, *Fayḍ* ii. 514–15.

[73] Ibn Ishaq has the list from Abu 'Ubayda/Abu l-Ahwas from 'Abdallah ibn Mas'ud; it is first cited by Ibn Abi Shayba (d. 235/849), *Muṣannaf* vii. 435, and by Jawhari (d. 230/845), *Musnad* 371 (no. 2555). It appears in the same form in Bayhaqi, *I'tiqād* i. 359; Haythami, *Majma' al-zawā'id* x. 268; Ibn 'Arabi, *Aḥkām* 1068; Ibn Kathir, *Tafsīr* ii. 473; Ibn Qayyim, *Turuq* 35; Nisaburi, *Mustadrak* ii. 376, iii. 96.

either Khadija, for recognizing the prophethood of Muhammad, or Asia, wife of Pharaoh, who perceived the merit of Moses.[74]

Otherwise, specific anecdotes might be recounted of great displays of *firāsa*. This is particularly the case with entries on the Prophet Muhammad, the first four caliphs,[75] great authorities on Islamic sciences (most notably Shafi'i), and simply persons renowned for great piety. The latter are the most numerous and their prodigious physiognomic feats are found scattered throughout the pages of Islamic hagiographic texts. They are too many and too diverse to give any real impression of them here, but they all share the fact that the protagonist reveals something that could not have been known purely by observation, scrutiny, perspicacity, or the like, the implication being that divine intervention was in play to bring him to this revelation. One recurring example is the following:

That morning I (the mystic Abu l-Qasim al-Junayd, d. 297/910) sat in the mosque to teach, and the news spread among the people that al-Junayd was lecturing. A young Christian in disguise stood up before me and said: 'O shaykh, what did the holy prophet mean by these words: "Beware the physiognomic talent (*firāsa*) of the true believer, for he sees by means of God's light"?' I reflected with downcast eyes and, raising then my head, I said: 'Become a Muslim; the time of your conversion has arrived', and the youth made profession of Islam.[76]

There are a number of variations of this story,[77] but it is always clear that the protagonist could not have known from the interrogator's external form (cf. above: 'a young Christian in disguise') that he was not a Muslim and so was perceiving what was not apparent, thereby giving a good example of why one needed to 'beware the physiognomic talent of the true believer'. This point is explicitly made by one writer with regard to Potiphar's selection and promotion of Joseph, observing that this could be considered *firāsa* 'because there was no external sign available to him (to guide him in his decision)'.[78] In this category one might also put the anecdotes of how someone recognized a great Islamic hero by means of *firāsa*. The most commonly related tale of this type is the realization, in verse, of the Prophet Muhammad's merit by 'Abdallah ibn Rawwaha, an early convert to Islam and one of the commanders of the first great Muslim military encounter with the Byzantines, at Mu'ta in 8/629:

May God affirm the good He has brought you, an affirmation such as he gave to Moses and a victory such as they won

I perceived (*tafarrastu*) the goodness in you to be a gift, and God knows me to have strong insight

[74] Khatib al-Baghdadi, *Ta'rīkh* x. 357; Safuri, *Nuzhat al-majālis* 198.

[75] For example, there is the very oft-told story that a man who had just looked lecherously at a woman enters the presence of 'Uthman, the third caliph, who looks at the man and observes that the trace of adultery (*athr al-zinā'*) is in his eyes (e.g. Munawi, *Fayḍ* i. 143).

[76] Ibn Khallikan, *Wafayāt* i. 374/i. 338–9; cf. Ibn Qayyim, *Ṭuruq* 39; Nisaburi, *Mustadrak* iii. 96; Qushayri, *Risāla* 110.

[77] For example, Ghazali, *Iḥyā'* ii. 397 (ch. 18: *ādāb al-samā' wa-l-wajd*), makes it a Zoroastrian.

[78] Ibn 'Arabi, *Aḥkām* 1068 (on 12. 21).

You are the messenger, and whoever is deprived of your gifts and the sight of you has been diminished by fate.[79]

Firāsa became such an important aspect of Islamic spirituality that its masters would include it in their instruction as an essential ingredient of the mystic's panoply. 'Abd al-Karim al-Qushayri (d. 465/1072), for example, has a section on it in his famous and much used *Risāla*, a compendium of the principles and terminology of Sufism. He refers first, of course, to the Qur'an and the Prophet, and so cites the Qur'anic verse: 'In that are signs for the discerning' (15. 75) and the Prophetic tradition: 'Beware the *firāsa* of the believer, for he sees with the light of God.' After this, he continues with his own thoughts: '*Firāsa* is a notion that besets the heart and dispels whatever opposes it, and it holds sway over the heart . . . Its strength is related to that of the possessor's faith: whoever is stronger in faith is sharper in *firāsa*' (*Risāla* 105). And then he fills the rest of the chapter with anecdotes and sayings of famous mystics on the subject of *firāsa*, some of which border on the poetic: '*firāsa* is emanations of light illuminating the heart; it is sure gnosis, which bears the soul in the world of mysteries from unknown to unknown until a person beholds things in the way that God lets them be beheld so that they are enunciated through the person's inner being'; and '*firāsa* is spirits flitting about the world surveying the meanings of the unknown and voicing the secrets of creation with the voice of direct testimony not of supposition and conjecture' (*Risāla* 105–6).

The celebrated philosopher-cum-mystic Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), known in the West as Avicenna, also devoted some consideration to *firāsa*. It comes in his philosophical allegory *Qiṣṣat Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* (*The Tale of Living Son of Wakeful*). This narrates the encounter between a seeker after truth (the soul), with his companions (the senses), and the sage Hayy ibn Yaqẓan (the active ntellect). The latter sketches out for the former a metaphysical geography, pointing out the abode of matter in the west, the home of form in the east, and the lands between them, which consist of matter and form combined, and he explains how to find one's way by using the powers of thought and reasoning. One part of the conversation concerns the sciences (para. 5):

I learnt from him how to solve their obscurities until finally, passing from one to the other, we came to the science of physiognomy. I observed in him such penetration and sagacity in that science that I was filled with admiration . . . He said to me: 'The science of physiognomy is among the sciences the profit from which is paid cash down and whose benefit is immediate, for it reveals to you what every man conceals of his own nature, so that you can proportion your attitude of freedom or reserve towards each person and make it befit the situation.'

[79] Ibn Hisham, *Sīra* 792, which is the earliest, and probably the most popular, version, but there are a number of variations; cf. Dhahabi, *Siyar* i. 234; Haythami, *Majmaʿ al-zawāʾid* vi. 158, viii. 124; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Istīʿāb* iii. 900.

And the sage goes on to give a breakdown of the nature and character of the seeker, in particular his weakness, in that he is easily seduced from the right way and so must be on his guard against his companions. Physiognomy comes across as an intuitive, rather than a rational, science, a question of perceiving and bringing out the hidden depth of man, his authentic soul, his *bāṭin*, moving from the apparent, the *ẓāhir*, but also going beyond it and diminishing those exterior forms and faculties that envelop the soul and divert it from its true destiny.

(ix) Divinatory Physiognomy

The practitioners of physiognomy in Islam are invariably anonymous, referred to in vague collective terms as 'masters' or 'adepts' of physiognomy (*aṣḥāb al-firāsa* or *ahl al-firāsa*). And since the reference could be to any of the types of physiognomy mentioned in this section, including possessors of acumen and astuteness, it is impossible to say whether in Islam there ever were individuals who were professional practitioners of physiognomy, that is, made their living by practice of it, or, as is perhaps more likely, persons of great perspicacity and sound judgment are meant, who would be consulted on matters of character assessment and the like.[80] The only time the nature of the talent is made clear is in the case of divination. Thus Jahiz tells us that some *aṣḥāb al-firāsa* can make predictions on the basis of the gnawings of mice, 'just as others of them can on the basis of birthmarks, shoulders, and the palm' (*Ḥayawān* v. 303). And Fakhr al-Din al-Razi gives us a long list of divinatory techniques that he considers in close relation to Polemon-style physiognomy, such as reading of palms and shoulder blades, water divining, and weather forecasting, which all require careful examination of outer signs to arrive at a knowledge of the as yet unknown (*Firāsa* 10–18/81–6). Such techniques are many and detailed, and there is no space to go into them here,[81] but it is important to note that the Islamic term *firāsa* encompasses all these diverse practices and is thus much wider than the Greek term physiognomy. And those described in Muslim sources as experts in *firāsa* may often be soothsayers and fortune tellers, or, as we noted above, generally perceptive and insightful, rather than masters of physiognomy *à la* Polemon.

(x) Physiognomy as an Islamic Science

Physiognomy was only gradually accepted into the canons of Islamic science (see Ch. 6. III below). It is not considered by the philosopher scientists Kindi

[80] Zabidi, *Tāj*, says the use of the word *ṣld* in poetry as a metaphor for horses that do not sweat was deemed objectionable by *ahl al-firāsa*, patently meaning men knowledgeable about literary matters and of good taste.

[81] They are the subject of Fahd (1966). Note that in literary compendia *firāsa* invariably features in the divination section; e.g. Ibn Hamdun, *Tadhkira* viii. 5–38 (ch. 36); Ibshihi, *Mustaṭraf* 332–40 (ch. 60); Nuwayri, *Nihāyat al-arab* iii. 128–51 (2. 2. 3); cf. Ibn Fariqun's *Jawāmiʿ al-ʿulūm* (see next n.).

(d. 257/870) or Farabi (d. 339/950), and only appears on the list of Islamic sciences with Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), who makes it one of the secondary divisions of physics after medicine and astrology.[82] The first scientific treatment of physiognomy in Islam comes from about the same time, from the pen of the litterateur Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (d. 414/1023), recording the academic discussions he had with the great scholar Miskawayh (d. 421/1030). One question he posed to the illustrious thinker was: 'What is *firāsa*, what is meant by it, is it truly sound, or does it hold good only some of the time and only for some people?' The answer he received was a fairly lengthy exposition of the worth and principles of physiognomy. Its aim, in Miskawayh's view, is to reveal the characters of people, and it is universally valid and may be practised by anyone as long as they judge according to the three fundamental sources: natural states (hot/cold, wet/dry), temperament (*mizāj*), and forms, shapes and movements of the body. Thus, a person who has much heat in the heart will have 'powerful breath, a broad chest, loud voice, and much chest and shoulder hair', and is likely to be honest and endowed with anger and courage, though other signs should also be taken into account. And 'every temperament has an appropriate character and a suitable form..., for nature always makes out of every temperament a specific character', and a person whose temperament resembles that of a particular animal is likely to share aspects of the character of that animal, 'like the artifice and deceit of the fox, the cowardliness and duplicity of the rabbit, the flattery and sociability of the cat, and the thievery and secretiveness of the magpie'. And, as an example of the third source, someone in whose face you see contraction of the eyebrows, folds in the forehead, and scowling is likely to possess a wicked character. Finally, Miskawayh gives a piece of advice that closely echoes that frequently reiterated by Polemon, namely that 'one should beware of judgement from one indication, and rather have in mind all indications from the three sources so that one is in the position of just witnesses whose probity is not in doubt, and then your judgement will be right and your physiognomic assessment correct'.[83]

It is also very late before we get texts devoted exclusively to physiognomy as opposed to allusions to and brief expositions of physiognomy within works dedicated to other topics. One of the earliest to be written in Islamic times, and arguably the best one, is from the pen of the famed theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209), a native of Rayy in Iran, who spent much of his life teaching in Herat in Transoxania. Most of his literary output is related to theology, philosophy, and exegesis, but he also gave some thought to such subjects as astrology, mineralogy, alchemy, and physiognomy. In the latter case the result was his *Kitāb al-firāsa*, which is an excellent synthesis of Muslim ideas about physiognomy, drawn from the treatise of Polemon, the medical oeuvres of

[82] Physiognomy's place in the classification of Islamic sciences is discussed in Mourad (1939) 22–30. Before Ibn Sina physiognomy is listed in two secretarial manuals, one in Arabic by 'Abdallah al-Baghdadi (d. *c.*255/869) and the other in Persian by Ibn Fariqun (fl. 330s/940s), who places it in the category of speculative philosophy along with divinatory and occult sciences (Sourdel 1952–4: 120–1; Vesel 1986: 23–4).

[83] Tawhidi, *Hawāmil* 203–9 (Q. 63).

Ibn Zakariyya al-Razi and Ibn Sina (themselves inspired by Hippocrates and Galen), the *Sirr al-asrār*, as well as a range of Arabic literary works pertinent to divination and the like. However, the book is no mere compilation, but is carefully crafted and includes many of Fakhr al-Din's own views and reflections (see further Ch. 6, pp. 297–9 below).[84]

The *Kitāb al-firāsa* is divided into three *maqālas* or discourses. The first deals with general principles and is itself divided into seven chapters. It begins with definitions, using the by now well established *ẓāhir/bāṭin* opposition: 'Physiognomy consists in inference from exterior conditions to internal character' (*Firāsa* 4). But Fakhr al-Din adds the qualification that both the exterior aspect and the internal character must depend on the temperament (*mizāj*), for this is either the soul itself or an agent of the soul, two slightly contrasting opinions which go back, ultimately, to Aristotle and Galen respectively. He then moves on to the merits of physiognomy (ch. 2), finding support in the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet (see the passages quoted in section II.(i) above) and giving three rational reasons: since man is a social animal, living among men, it is useful to know their character; it is deemed essential for those who work with animals to know their qualities, so a fortiori it should be the case for humans; *firāsa* is based on natural science and experience, and so is on the same footing as medicine and of the same worth. Having defined and justified the object of his study, Fakhr al-Din can proceed to describe it in detail. He first makes a distinction (ch. 3) that had by his time become standard: that between divine or intuitive *firāsa* whereby the pure of heart can perceive at once a person's character and nature, and scientific *firāsa* which has the same end but requires inference from manifest external signs. Since the former type of *firāsa* belongs only to prophets and holy men, Fakhr al-Din is concerned only with the latter form and moves on to outline its methodology (ch. 4). Inference about character may be made either on the basis of the cause of character, which is the temperament, or on its effects, which are a person's actions, or else on the effects of the cause (temperament), namely colour, age, sex, and bodily features and states to be explained further on. Next he makes clear the difference between *firāsa* and a number of related sciences (ch. 5), which are: judgement according to bodily marks and movements, according to lines on the hands and feet, and according to the shoulder-blades of sheep and goats, *qiyāfa*, divining of water, divining of minerals and metals, and weather forecasting (especially from clouds, winds, and lightning about whether rain will fall or not).

Chapters 6 and 7 of the first discourse are the most original of the book, for they try to give a proper theoretical foundation to the science of physiognomy, something that no Greek exponent of this art ever did, though one might argue that all the ingredients of such an endeavour were implicit in their writings. The first way to discern a person's character is by observation of their instinctive actions (those emanating from the innate temperament and

[84] The best study on Fakhr al-din's book is by Mourad (1939); on its sources see Autuori (1983).

nature), but to discount their actions determined by the constraints of reason or the practice of divine law. A person's external aspect will differ according to whether there rages inside them anger or desire, and 'that internal character state and those external aspects are closely linked' (*Firāsa* 18–19). The second way is to consider the voice, for a man in the grip of anger will have a raucous and loud voice, and when overcome by fear a weak and shrill voice. If one notes for all psychological states the corresponding tones of voice, one should be able to discern between states and tones a complete and necessary concordance, and 'we can infer the existence of a certain character from a certain tone' (*Firāsa* 20). The third way is by observation of animals. Lacking reason, these act only according to their innate temperament and nature. Since we know that the internal character and the external aspect are related, both a result of the temperament, this means that if a person resembles an animal in their external appearance, then we can infer a resemblance in their internal character (a number of modifications of this general point are given). The fourth and fifth ways are to take account of the race and sex of a person, for certain physical and character traits go with each of these and this may help in character judgement. Thus a man possessing certain physical features of women (e.g. soft and abundant flesh, small head, delicate face, fine neck, narrow chest, etc.) is likely to share certain points of character with women (more calm, cunning, coquettish, etc.). Likewise an easterner with the appearance of a westerner (e.g. small body) is likely to resemble a westerner in character (e.g. pusillanimity). Finally, the sixth way would be to take further what has been learnt from the previous five ways. For example, if we know from one of the five ways that a person is quick to anger, then we can deduce that he will not be very proficient in thinking, for strong anger is a sign of hotness of the brain, and this is an obstacle to proper thinking. In order to temper any hasty judgements ch. 7 provides some useful words of advice and caution. Any sign is not a certain indication, but is the basis for a weak conjecture; only as more signs confirm one another is the conjecture strengthened. The science is only as good as its practitioner, so good judgements rely on a person able to observe, listen, remember, and reason well. Finally, signs may be contradictory, so one must know which are more important and weighty (a number of guidelines are given).

Having treated how to make sense of the various external signs that give a clue as to a person's character, Fakhr al-Din now turns to the signs themselves. The second discourse comprises two sections. The first section deals with the signs of temperament (what sort of character will result if the temperament is warm, cold, humid, dry, hot and dry, hot and humid, moderate, or excessive), and the signs of the state of the brain, eyes, tongue, voice, and heart. The second section is something of a miscellany, treating the character that often goes with the four ages of man (childhood, youth, maturity, old age), noble birth, wealth, and the physical environment (particularly hot, cold, wet, and dry climates). The third discourse takes up the subject that is familiar from Polemon, the indications of character to be divined from the features of the different parts of the body, proceeding from the head (forehead, eyebrows,

eye, nose, mouth/lips/tongue, face, laugh, ears) to the neck (including voice and breathing), to the stomach and back, the arms and hands, and finally down through the waist, hips, legs, and feet.

A century later we encounter what is probably the second most comprehensive Muslim treatise on physiognomy, the *Kitāb al-siyāsa fī 'ilm al-firāsa* (*Treatise on the Conduct of the Science of Physiognomy*) of Shams al-Din Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Abi Talib al-Ansari al-Sufi al-Dimashqi (d. 727/1327).[85] He was a versatile scholar and imam in Rabwa, a village near Damascus in Syria. He is probably best known for his cosmological writings concerned with wonders of the world, but his Arabic treatise on physiognomy was evidently very popular too, judging from the large number of surviving copies. It is much less academic than al-Razi's work; indeed, it is more in the nature of an Islamic religious and legal work, a compilation of citations from earlier authorities with, ostensibly at least, minimal intrusion from al-Dimashqi himself. Yet it is well organized, and serves the useful function of preserving for us material that would mostly otherwise have been lost. It is arranged into seventeen sections dealing with the following topics:

1. List of authorities quoted in the treatise: Shafi'i, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Ibn 'Arabi, Aristotle, Polemon, Indian experts, and Hippocrates (fo. 2^a).
2. Advantages of physiognomy and its different branches: divine and deductive (2^a–3^a).
3. Divinatory physiognomy and *qiyāfa* (3^a–4^a).
4. Physiognomy of four-legged animals (4^a–6^a).
5. Physiognomy of water-animals, birds, and insects (6^b–9^a).
6. Masculinity, femininity, and affectation (9^a–10^a).
7. Physiognomy of men of different countries (10^b–12^a).
8. Physiognomy of women of different countries (12^{ab}).
9. Humours of the body taken from Ibn Zakariyya al-Razi (13^a–15^a).
10. Relationship between parts of the body and humours from al-Razi (15^{ab}).
11. Physiognomy and the purchase of male slaves from al-Razi (15^b–16^b).
12. Physiognomy and the purchase of female slaves (16^b–18^b).
13. Physiognomy of the parts of the body, which is the main part of Polemon's text (18^b–36^b).
14. The signs of the different types of men (36^b–40^a).
15. Birthmarks according to Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Galen (40^a–41^b).
16. Pimples and blotches according to Hippocrates (41^b–43^b).
17. Lines on the palm of the hand (43^b–45^b).

The treatise would seem to have been intended as a kind of self-help manual, to which one would turn if one wanted to know what to look for when buying a slave, what the lines on one's hand mean or the marks on one's face,

[85] For his life and writings see *EI*, s.v. al-Dimashḳī; Ullmann (1972) 34 and 130; Fahd (1966) 386–7. I use here the version in BNF, ms. arabe 5928, since it is more complete than the printed editions (Cairo 1882; ed. Muhammad ibn al-Sufi, Cairo 1983); note that its title is slightly different, namely *Kitāb al-firāsa li-ajli l-siyāsa*.

how to judge the character of a new associate in one's life, how to seek out a good and trustworthy partner, etc. Its value is certified by its reliance upon the greatest authorities of Greece, India, and Islam. And it surpasses all other works in its comprehensiveness and clear structure. It offers no new theories or ideas, but all that one needed to know about the subject of physiognomy was easily and readily to be found within its pages (see further Ch. 6, pp. 301–3 below).

III. THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND TO PHYSIOGNOMY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

In the introduction attributed to Polemon it is remarked that assessing man's character is difficult, because people dissimulate. Animals are easy to judge because their characters are part of their genetic makeup and so cannot be feigned, but, as Miskawayh explains to Tawhidi, 'man hides within himself the censorious aspect of his character..., and assumes the behaviour of the praiseworthy and displays what is not in his nature' (*Hawāmil* 207). This ties in with Simon Swain's point made in the introduction to this book that the background to Polemon's work is the imperial court and the competition among men for power and privilege. Does this in any way explain the popularity of Polemon's treatise in the Islamic world? Certainly the Islamic world was a highly competitive arena for social climbers, possibly more so than most societies, since there were few institutions and structures in place to guarantee the continuity of a particular elite, so conversely the cadres of the elite were relatively permeable. And it is true that an important factor in this competition was looking the part, displaying the right signals, adapting one's dress, speech, and movements to attract the notice of those in a position to allocate power and prestige, and consequently also there was a need to be able to read and decipher these signals.

(i) Court Life[86]

In the Islamic world power and wealth were concentrated in courts to a greater degree than in the Classical and even medieval European worlds. There was no law of primogeniture to ensure the survival of landed elites and grand estates; rather inheritance was distributed amongst all qualified heirs, which could include women, with the result that estates would get broken up and parcelled out. Moreover the military, usually either tribesmen and/or slave soldiers recruited from the margins of the Islamic world, were frequently paid for their service by revocable grants (*iqtā'*) of the revenue from land and other government sources of income (even water rights and rights of access). These grants were not transferable to an heir, and indeed were usually only made for short

[86] For the background to this section and further discussion see Kraemer (1986); Mez (1937); Robinson (2002); Vadet (1968) and (1995).

periods (commonly a year), so it was difficult for military elites to build up any lasting power base. Moreover, an *iqta'*-holder was not, like a European baron, an arbiter of power in local society, but rather little more than its temporary tax collector.

As in Europe the cities produced professional men (secretaries, doctors, astrologers, etc.) for the ruler's administration and court, but they were frequently recruited from among members of the minority religions, and even when they were not, they tended to stand out against society at large, particularly for their fondness for secular learning and their willingness to collaborate with the state, which damned them in the eyes of the religious authorities. Thus the cultural institutions of the city were neither linked to them nor under their control, nor were they capable of monopolizing either the acquisition of revenue or its distribution in pursuit of political goals. Their futures depended, therefore, upon the whim of the ruler. The urban notables, who formed the bridge between society and state, did combine landed and commercial wealth, urban residence, and cultural leadership in a manner reminiscent of the elites of the medieval Italian and other cities. But the patricians of the European cities, like those of ancient Rome, wielded public power, whereas the distinctive feature of the notables was precisely that they did not have a share in such power, but only served as middlemen between their local communities and the ruler.

It was therefore to courts that the would-be upwardly mobile gravitated, and given that they were such a source of wealth and power there were inevitably very many who tried to reach their inner circles. As an ambitious young man, one would set out for a court, display one's skills, literary, secretarial, medical, or other, get an appointment or an allowance and/or a position among the boon companions of a high-ranking person. Some people toured from one court to another. The great poet Mutanabbi (d. 354/955), for instance, spent nine years in the court of Sayf al-Dawla in Aleppo, then a very brief period with Kafur, ruler of Egypt. After this he headed for Baghdad, where his efforts to join the prestigious court of the vizier Abu Muhammad al-Muhallabi were thwarted by two of its members, and he accepted instead an invitation from the brilliant Ibn al-'Amid in Arrajan, whereafter he proceeded to the court of 'Adud al-Dawla in Shiraz.

The heyday of courts in Islam lasted from about 750 to 1250. The first dynasty of Islam, the Umayyads, of course held court, and in palaces hidden away on the margins of the settled lands a number of their princes famously indulged in wine, poetry, and song.[87] However, when the Abbasid dynasty came to power and made Iraq their base (132/750), they were exposed to the more sophisticated imperial traditions of the Persians and there was an enormous expansion of the court on the Persian model with a proliferation of different types of officials and rules of etiquette. The grand new capital of Baghdad, the spectacular palaces at Samarra, which stretched for some 50 km along the Tigris north of Baghdad, and later, as the Abbasid world fragmented into many autonomous dynasties,

[87] For example, see Hamilton (1988).

the numerous competing provincial capitals, all enjoyed a vigorous court life in this period, and enormous numbers of anecdotes survive about the goings on at courts in our written sources. Often they fit a standard type: the powerful patron would invite a few of his closest friends and of the most renowned thinkers of the day, and they would assemble in a dedicated space in his home to drink and discuss intellectual matters and human affairs:

(The vizier) Yahya ibn Khalid ibn Barmak (d. 190/805), an enlightened man, learned and fond of discussion and philosophical enquiry, assembled at his house for symposia a number of famous controversialists chosen from among Muslim theologians, free-thinkers, and divines of various sects. In the course of one of these assemblies Yahya spoke as follows: 'You have debated at length the theories of potentiality and actuality, pre-existence and creation, duration and stability, movement and rest, union with and separation from the Divine substance, being and nothingness, bodies and accidents, acceptance and refutation of authorities, the absence or presence of God's attributes. . . . Today describe love.[88]

A good number of anecdotes also tell of how such assemblies were an occasion for the trend-setting elite to exhibit a spirit of mockery, of antinomianism, of looking behind and beyond the rules and flouting them, of buffoonery, or of *mujūn* as they themselves would call it:

(Abu l-Qasim al-Tanukhi) was one of the judges who were intimates of the vizier al-Muhallabi. They would gather at the latter's place twice a week and throw off all modesty and indulge in revelry and carousal. . .. All had long white beards . . . yet when they were beginning to enjoy themselves . . . they were all so merry that they generously abandoned the last veils of their shame . . . They would dip or indeed soak their beards in wine . . . splash wine over one another and dance together wearing brightly coloured clothes and garlands of fruit. . . . When morning came, they would return to their customary primness, gravity and aloofness.[89]

Though power, wealth, and descent might aid in gaining a place at court, it was learning and culture that counted most, and one could get to court with learning or literary skills alone if very talented. For example, Ibn Ridwan (d. 453/1061) was a baker's son who worked as an astrologer of the popular fortune-telling kind for years while studying on his own, being too poor to afford a teacher. He made it when he was in his thirties, rising to become court physician in Fatimid Cairo. And Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi rose from lowly copyist to the proud station of constant boon companion at the soirées of the vizier Ibn Sa'dan. The culture that one needed was high culture, what in Islamic terms is called *adab*, 'good education, good breeding, good manners, excellence or elegance of mind, manners, address, and speech',[90] the sum of knowledge and etiquette that made a person civilized, refined, and urbane, made him an *adīb*. If one wanted to make it as a secretary, judge, doctor, or astrologer, technical training was an additional requirement, but it was mastery of high culture that made one

[88] Mas'udi, *Murūj* vi. 368.

[89] Yaqut, *Udabā'* iii. 334–5.

[90] Lane (1863–93), s.v. On this concept see Bonebakker (1984); Lichtenstädter (1943); Pellat (1964).

polished, witty, elegant, acceptable for life at court, something infinitely above the scribes, doctors, and astrologers who sat in the street and dispensed services to the masses.

A number of guides were at the disposal of the would-be *adīb*. Firstly, there were numerous belletristic encyclopedias, compilations containing selections of the most essential reading for the cultured man. One of the earliest of these works is the *'Uyūn al-akhbār* (*The Choice of Transmitted Information*) of Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889). He enjoyed a number of government appointments, including judge and inspector of grievance courts, before settling down in Baghdad to teach his own works, which encompass an impressively wide array of subjects. The book is divided into ten parts dealing with the following topics: government, war, nobility, natural disposition and character (both animal and human), learning and eloquence, asceticism, brotherhood/friendship, needs (fulfilling/refusing them), food, and women. Nothing is treated in great depth, but a great deal of ground is covered, allowing its user to be able to say something sensible about most things if called upon:

> This book, although not dealing with the Qur'an or sayings of the Prophet, the religious law or the knowledge of what is lawful and forbidden, yet leads on to the heights of things and shows the way to noble character. It restrains from baseness, turns away from ugly things, incites to right conduct and fair management, to mild administration and to rendering the land prosperous. For the way to God is not one nor is all that is good confined to night-prayers and continued fasting and the knowledge of the lawful and the forbidden.... These 'choice items of transmitted information' I have arranged as an eye-opener for those whose upbringing is scanty, as a reminder for the learned, as an education for the leaders of men and those whom they lead, as a place for the kings to rest in from the toil of endeavour and weariness... Through it the minds of the learned are impregnated, the thoughts of the wise are brought forth.... Let it enter your speech when you hold a conference and your eloquent style when you write; with its help you will succeed in what you ask for.... Make use of its culture in the company of your ruler and in setting aright administration, in making his policy mild, and in managing his wars. Enliven your company through it, whether in earnest or jest, render your proofs obvious with the help of its similes (*'Uyūn* 1. h–ṭ/173–4).

There is no new or original research, but the wisdom of the ancient Greeks and Indians and the poetic and prose lore of the Arabs is deeply trawled and dredged. And since it was not only what one knew that mattered, but also how one expressed it, the section on rhetoric is packed with illustrations of how to speak fluently and lucidly, models of sweet limpid prose that one should try to imitate and remember, examples of 'good verse, famous proverbs, eloquent sermons, and a selection of noble speeches and stylish letters'.[91] In short, equipped with this tome the cultured gentleman could hope to hold his own in polite society, and this was of course the aim of these books that were produced in such substantial numbers in the Muslim world of the third to fifth/ninth to eleventh centuries.

[91] Thus the contents of the *Compendium of Language, Adab, Grammar, and Inflection* of Mubarrad (d. 285/898) as described in his introduction (*Kāmil* i. 2).

Secondly, there were numerous moral guides offering advice on character reformation (*tahdhīb al-akhlāq*) and refinement (*ta'dīb*), the self-improvement manuals of their day.[92] Most follow the Platonic tradition in enumerating three faculties of the soul: the rational, the temperamental, and the appetitive, and emphasizing that each of the faculties must be cultivated to realize its proper virtues. Wisdom is the virtue of the rational faculty, courage and self-control are the virtues of the temperament, and continence is the virtue of the appetitive faculty. When each faculty performs in the proper way and in harmony with the others, there is justice in the soul, and this is achieved under the guidance and supremacy of reason. In the struggle for self-perfection, reason is essential, for temper and appetite are never eliminated, but only controlled and directed by an ever-vigilant intellect. This virtue of self-restraint is known in Arabic as *ḥilm*, and is well described by Jahiz:

> To restrain one's wrath, suppress evil impulses, and clip the wings of hotheadedness, all this merits the name of *ḥilm* and comes close to the essence of it; no less, to repress exuberant satisfaction, control one's desires and refrain from malicious glee, insolent merriment, inappropriate grief or excessive anxiety, over-hasty compliments or reproaches, evil propensities and base covetousness, unwholesome greed for a bargain, excess of cupidity for one's objective, whining and snivelling, being full of complaints and repining, shifting too suddenly from anger to pleasure or pleasure to anger, and from making either body or tongue perform meaningless, useless, pointless evolutions (*Kitmān* 40).

Every impulse, every deed, must be examined; every fault noted and corrected. To become good, a man must watch over himself, reprimand himself for mistakes, castigate himself in order to correct errors, and thus control and order the faculties. Control must be exerted over heart, word, and deed, as one would expect, but also over one's face and body. One should, for example, manifest 'joy, showing happiness to whomever one meets, be they brothers, friends, companions, associates, or acquaintances, and smiling when one meets them'; avoid 'levity, which is too much talking, needlessly moving around, and raucous laughter' and 'sullenness, which is scowling when meeting someone, the want of a smile and the manifestation of antipathy'.[93] What we have here is the idea of self-grooming and self-monitoring of both one's interior and exterior aspects that was a strong feature of Antique *paideia*. It is a sentiment well summed up by a saying attributed to Plutarch and cited approvingly by the eleventh-century Egyptian scholar Mubashshir ibn Fatik: 'How useful it is for us to watch over our actions, to scrutinize our being, to do or say nothing carelessly, thoughtlessly or aimlessly' (*Mukhtār* 319).

Such guides would also usually offer advice on how to pick one's friends, for the *adīb* was a social animal and, as the secretary and translator Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 139/757) observes, 'consorting with others relaxes the heart whereas isolation makes it anxious' and 'the integrity of a man is judged by his friends and comrades' (*al-adab al-kabīr* 80, 90). Choosing one's friends

[92] On these see Druart (1996).

[93] Yahya ibn 'Adi, *Tahdhīb* 39, 26, 53 (3. 13, 26, 33).

was, therefore, an important business, and many *adībs* wrote at length on this subject. There are certain duties incurred with friends, since devotion must be 'unto life and fortune' (ibid. 85), but the rewards are ample: moral improvement and good counsel, a prop in adversity, provision of serenity and security, joy and happiness (ibid. 13, 46, 52, 13). In short, 'true friends are the best possession this world has to offer, an adornment in good times, a provision in bad times, an aid to prospering in this life and the hereafter' (ibid. 100). In this field physiognomy could be a useful tool, for 'the physiognomist knows... the character and the purpose of the lives of all men, and so how to choose the friendship of the good alone, and how to guard against the wrongs of the bad before having to experience them' (Polemon A2). And it is noticeable in the Islamicized versions of Polemon (e.g. TK and al-Dimashqi) that there are extended sections on how to recognize the good and the evil person.

Thirdly, there are many guides to good manners and etiquette, knowing the right way to dress, eat, speak and generally to deport oneself in public. Some of this advice might be very salutary and sound, mainly concerned with hygiene and politeness, such as that by the famous scholar Miskawayh:

> When a person sits in the company of others, he should not be the first to start eating nor should he stare constantly and fixedly at the courses of food, but should be content with whatever is near him. He should not eat in a hurry or take rapidly one mouthful after another. The mouthfuls should not be too big or swallowed before they are well chewed. He should not soil his hands or his clothing, or his table companions, nor follow with his eyes the movements of their hands in eating. He should be trained to offer to others the food that lies near him even if it is the kind that he prefers, and to control his appetite so as to be content with the least and poorest of food, eating once in a while dry bread without anything else (*Tahdhīb* 58–9).

But some of the advice was much more about distinguishing oneself from those considered as boorish, and looking chic and refined. The Arabic word for these latter two qualities is *ẓarīf*, a term that appears with increasing frequency in the third to fifth/ninth to eleventh centuries and is connected with the expansion of court culture in Islam. It is explained and advocated by Muhammad ibn Ishaq al-Washsha' (d. 325/936), who started out as a schoolteacher in Baghdad, but his writings attracted royal attention and he was invited to give lectures at the caliph's palace. One of his books, the *Kitāb al-muwashshā'* (*The Book of Richly Variegated Cloth*), sets forth how persons of refinement, *ẓarīfs*, should deport themselves in society. Such persons possessed *adab* (moral and intellectual training) and *muruwwa* (honour and integrity), but in addition they claimed and sought to display elegance and chic (*ẓarf*) in their outer conduct, the aim being to set themselves apart:

> Male *ẓarīfs* wear fine, thin undergarments, thick shirts of the best kinds of linen in soft and pure colours.... Refined people do not wear soiled clothing with clothing that has been washed, nor garments that have been washed with new garments.... Female *ẓarīfs* wear smoke-coloured undergarments, Rashidiyya or Tabariyya cloaks, coloured brocade, silk embroidered with round circles, Nishapuri veils, waist-wraps of Khurasani patchwork... They do not wear the trouser-cord or any garment sprinkled or perfumed, or one of a single colour, and not any garment of white linen... since that is the dress

of men. Neither should they wear yellow, black, green, rose, or red clothes, except those naturally so coloured (i.e. not dyed)... for it is the dress of peasant women and singing girls.

In eating... refined persons do not pursue food where there is much fat, so as not to make their hands greasy, nor take an excessive amount of salt, which is considered by them the height of vulgarity. They do not dabble about in vinegar and they do not abstain from eating herbs; they do not eat palm roots because of the similarity of their odour to stagnant water .... They do not make the bread lying before them greasy, reach out from their places, rub their fingers together, or take big pieces such as would make their lips greasy.

The *ẓarīf* should enter the bath alone, so that he does not see the genitals of a friend, and he should not stare at anyone. Nor should he hang his clothes on a peg nor dangle his feet in the drain, for that is what coarse people do. He should not rub his hands with a rag as the feeble-minded do, or roll on the hot floor of the bath as the lowly masses do (*Muwashshā'* 124–6, 129–30, 147).

Violation of the rules of elegance would be remarked upon and the transgressor rebuked. For example, at one nightly gathering Tawhidi ate his meat broth with great gusto, prompting the vizier Ibn 'Abbad (d. 385/995) to comment that such gluttony was harmful to old men. And at a convivial assembly of Ja'far ibn Yahya al-Barmaki (d. 187/803), favourite of the caliph Harun al-Rashid, a certain 'Abd al-Malik ibn Salih, through a mistake of the chamberlain, arrived wearing the wrong clothes, whereupon he was immediately prevailed upon to don the drinking-party dress (*thiyāb al-munādama*), namely fine vest (*ghilāla*), bright yellow robe (*mulā'a*), and silk shirt.[94] Such a climate of looking and censure inevitably promoted a tendency towards ostentation and pretentiousness amongst some, as we see from an attack on secretaries by Jahiz:

From the moment that he puts on a long full-bottomed robe and takes to wearing his side-whiskers braided on his cheeks and his hair pulled over his forehead in a V-shape, he imagines himself the master and not the underling, the sovereign above his vassals. Once your novice scribe has sat down in the seat of power, taken his place in the council of the caliphate, arranged a wicker screen to separate himself from the common herd and placed his inkstand in front of him, once he knows by heart the more spectacular clichés by way of rhetoric and the more elegant rudiments by way of science... he sees himself as the great discerner in matters of administration (*Dhamm* 34–5).

It is worth noting that Jahiz begins his attack by bringing up the scribe's external appearance, for it is this that reveals, after physiognomical scrutiny, his affectation and pompousness. Or at least this is what his garb signified to Jahiz's eyes; presumably a scribe so attired was in his own view projecting an air of gravity and dignity and would have considered himself a *ẓarīf*.

It has been proposed that these *ẓarīf*s constituted a distinct group. However, though they were easily distinguishable through their adherence to an elaborate

[94] Yaqut, *Irshād* v. 381 (Tawhidi); Isfahani, *Aghānī* v. 408 ('Abd al-Malik). On the dress of elegant people see Ahsan (1979) 56–8; and on the elegant people themselves see Ghazi (1959) and Enderwitz (1989).

code of public behaviour, which dictated everything from the proper greetings to utter on certain occasions to the elegant way to conduct a love affair to the shoelaces one should sport while doing so, the boundaries of this group appear to have been relatively penetrable. Slave girls, for instance, could quite easily be considered as belonging to the *ẓarīfs*, so long as they possessed the identifying characteristics of grace, eloquence, good (and expensive) taste, and wit. Abbasid texts testify to the affectedness embodied in the elaborate rituals made by the *ẓarīfs* out of eating, drinking, dressing, and lovemaking; in short if one could affect elegance, one was elegant.

Within this broad and amorphous category of *ẓarīfs* was the more defined group of *nadīms*, boon companions, who fulfilled a specific role at Abbasid courts, and a considerable amount of literature exists which delimits and expounds upon the qualities they were expected to possess and the duties they were to perform. They served primarily as companions to the rich and powerful, and their principal functions were those of accompanying them in pleasurable pursuits, most famously drinking, but also hunting and other sports and leisure activities. They were few and carefully chosen, their personal, physical and intellectual merits being taken into account for their selection. Abu Nuwas (d. *c.*200/815), the most famous of the Abbasid wine-poets, specifies that 'alcoholic beverages should not be partaken alone, but with people who are pleasing to the eye, to the ear and to the heart'. The poet also states that the perfect *majlis* should include no more than five persons: 'three guests, the host, and a musician, and any addition may spoil it'.[95] In the presence of the boon companions the host should be free to drink with abandon, speak with freedom upon any subject, frivolous or serious, that he desired and, in general, trespass the protocol which pertained in all other social circumstances to one of his social rank. The *nadīm* was expected to 'observe good deportment, forbearance, humility, and brevity in speech, and should remember that talk uttered at night should be forgotten by daybreak'.[96] The soirées themselves would seem to have been subject to a detailed set of rules, as is indicated by Mas'udi in reference to a book of his which does not survive:

> Mu'tamid's gatherings, his audiences, conferences, and conversations have been recorded. . . . The polite formulas for invitations are there as well, with examples of invitation and acceptance . . . instructions on how to behave at gatherings; the place destined to master and subordinate, the rules of precedence to be observed and the arrangements to be made for seating guests. Lastly, the phrases used for greetings . . . All this is to be found, with much fuller details, in my *Historical Annals*. There you may also read a whole mass of hitherto unpublished information on the kinds of wines, on different sorts of nuts and dried fruits and the ways of arranging them on trays and in bowls, either in pyramids or in symmetrical rows . . . and some indications of the new fashions in dishes and of the skilful combination of spices and aromatics in seasonings. The different subjects of conversation are also mentioned; the way of washing one's hands in the presence of the host and of taking one's leave; the manner in which the cup should

[95] Cited by Chejne (1965) 330; Kushajim, *Adab* 20, recommends between three and seven.
[96] Cited by Chejne (1965) 330.

be circulated;...a sketch of the *nadīm*, his obligations and his master's obligations towards him (*Murūj* viii. 102–4).

Much was expected of the *nadīm*:

> There is none among the companions and frequenters of kings in whom the possession of good character and excellent *adab*, choice anecdotes, and rare stories is more appropriate than in the *nadīm*, who needs to have the conflicting properties of the honour of kings and the humility of servants, the modesty of ascetics and the shamelessness of murderers, the gravity of old men and the irreverence of youth.... He is sworn only to eat with his master, and he pledges and promises that; and should he do otherwise, he commits treachery and perfidy.... A sense of fun and of humour earn him a high place with the host.... He should be knowledgeable in all those things in which kings emulate one another and set great store by, such as expensive slaves, precious jewels, special foods, types of perfumes and furnishings, as well as horses, weapons, and all the other things that are relevant to kings at their pleasurable gatherings...It is highly esteemed that he can describe a wondrous kind of culinary dish, an original voice, a moving poem, a melody of a song...A *nadīm* does not deserve his name unless he has *jamāl* and *muruwwa*; the former is cleanliness of attire, sweetness of odour, fluency of tongue, and the latter is much modesty in the enjoyment of fine things, respect for his fellow drinkers, together with cheerfulness without any foolishness.[97]

And there were strict rules to follow with regard to conversation ('listen well...and do not be in a rush to answer'), washing hands ('the host first washed his hands, then the guests followed'), to cups and toasts ('begin with the big cup...then go on to the small cup'; 'the cup passes to the right'; 'it would be wrong and annoying of the *nadīm* to refuse and decline to drink at the host's request, for there is no fault with him being drunk if he was compelled to it...but it would be disgraceful for the *nadīm* to ask the host to drink to intoxication'), to dress and deportment ('do not stint on the turban and shoes...lest the head be exposed and the feet appear', 'he should refrain from hastening his step lest if the host see him his gait appear swaggering', when playing chess with the host 'the *nadīm* should be mindful of himself and pay attention to the exterior state of his person').[98] So strict indeed seemed the rules to one candidate for the position of *nadīm* to the caliph Mu'tasim that he excused himself saying that he preferred company where one could pass wind in this or that direction without a fuss being made of it.[99]

It would seem that the most important rule for *ẓarīfs* and *nadīms* was the observance of a strict code of etiquette and displaying elegance in all things, in dressing, eating, drinking, conversing, and even in lovemaking. But in all cases it was the external appearance and impression that mattered, and internal feelings were not accorded much attention. For example, though the postures of the chaste lover were to be adopted for their charm, such as the inscribing of poignant verses on one's hand in the hope that the beloved would see them,

[97] Kushajim, *Adab* 7, 9, 10, 11, 11–12, 12.
[98] Ibid. 23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 39.
[99] Narrated by Chejne (1965) 332.

this should not compromise his dignity, especially as, hints Ibn Washsha', the chastity of lovers was only a front:

It is disgraceful that the intelligent and sensible man of culture should submit completely when he is in love and hand over control of his heart to another so that he is a slave to his heart and a prisoner of love, particularly when you consider how the times have changed and how friends and beloveds betray one another; for he will not find, among all of them, even one sincere friend, but only deal with self-interested friends.

He (the bedouin lover) does not endeavour to have intercourse or live with his beloved; he only wants to look upon her, and he considers himself fortunate upon being able to meet with her, accompany her, converse with her, and recite verses to her. . . . But (elegant) people think it perfectly fine to become bored with their beloveds, to replace them, betray them, and exchange them. The most elegant and the best lovers among them claim to be in love for many years and throughout long ages, and thus they consider themselves to be great lovers, but if they lose their beloveds for even a day, they exchange them for another (*Muwashsha'* 117–18, 77).

(ii) Religious Life

Islamic sciences and non-Islamic sciences had different bearers in Islam. Those who pursued the latter were highly educated, but their livelihoods did not depend on mastery of the religious sciences, that is, they did not earn their livelihood by dispensing religious services and their whole lifestyle predisposed them to a secular and cosmopolitan outlook. Such people would have had a good Islamic education, but they regarded Muslim sciences as part of a much bigger cultural packet and as they saw it the world was full of phenomena that could, or indeed had to, be studied without direct reference to God or reliance or religious authority. Secretaries were bred on Persian statecraft, doctors and astrologers on Greek science and philosophy, etc. This made them rivals of the religious specialists (the *'ulamā'*), who had a vested interest in the primacy of the Islamic sciences, who wanted everyone to revere those sciences and nothing else, who were mistrustful of people whose attitudes were shaped by a tradition outside their control. This rivalry was old, and although it softened over time, it was still there.

The religious scholars were a very vaguely defined body. Most had other identities—as landlords, local notables, etc.—and this would usually override their common identification as religious scholars. Though they were undoubtedly respected by the masses, they could be no *vox populi*, since their internal disagreements and their other identities meant that they were only likely to speak for a segment of the population or limited interest groups. Though it is true that they elaborated Islamic law, they did so by their general acceptance (*ijmā'*) over a long term of the answers proposed to contentious questions, a glacially slow process that could define only in the vaguest terms who was or was not entitled to participate in decisions. Religious knowledge (*'ilm*) was the quality that defined the *'ulamā'*, particularly the science of *hadith* (reports of the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions), but anyone who was willing to devote himself or herself to its study could acquire it.

Moreover, higher education was very informal; one would seek out a teacher and study with him either at his home or as part of a circle in a mosque. And there was no formal examination system, only the *ijāza*, whereby a teacher would authorise (*ajāza*) you to transmit his works or works by others that he had taught you. *'Ilm* formed a real bond among people who pursued it, but, given its accessibility, it was a bond that, instead of clearly circumscribing a group, extended through more and more tenuous links into the less scholarly portion of the Islamic community. The *'ulamā'* are, therefore, one of the most important and yet least restrictive categories of self-definition in Islamic society. Its unrestrictive nature is evident from the number of other categories with which it overlaps. Clerks are almost never soldiers, soldiers almost never clerks. Merchants are almost never soldiers, and rarely become clerks. But soldiers, clerks, merchants, and members of almost any category we know about could and did on occasion become *'ulamā'*.

Most religious scholars supported themselves from payments from students and/or a stipendiary post at a college (*madrasa*). These were centres of higher religious education, but not like universities—they were not necessary for becoming a religious scholar or for teaching and they issued no formal qualifications. Rather they were one of a number of arenas in which state and society bartered together for power. Rulers and governors established colleges from charitable funds (*waqf*), a useful way of protecting money and property in a world where seizure of assets was rife, since such funds were inalienable. The college would be a mark of status for the founder, a place where inaugural lectures and ceremonies might be held that would redound to his honour, where he and his descendants might be buried so that they remained remembered there after their death, and where judges, notaries, expropriation boards (for the confiscation of assets), etc. might operate. Most importantly the rulers and governors supported the civilian elite they depended upon by rewarding them with stipendiary posts (lecturers, preachers, judges, etc.) in colleges. On the negative side, this meant that post-holders might be dismissed as easily as they were appointed, just for criticizing powerful men, teaching subjects out of favour, finding themselves on the wrong side in a factional struggle, or simply to make way for a favourite. However, on the plus side, competitors for posts would often demand of rulers that they fight for their candidateship, and because they did need civilian supporters rulers would have no choice but to wade into disputes on behalf of their candidate, and we often see several powerful people enlisted in a conflict over a post. Thus colleges were one of the arenas in which we see rulers and ruled wrestling with each other to get what they wanted.[100]

For student payments and stipendiary posts alike it was religious knowledge (*'ilm*) that made one eligible, but one had also to be seen to be eligible, and for this it was important how one exhibited one's eligibility. Some flaunted

[100] On Islamic colleges see Makdisi (1981) and Chamberlain (1994).

it, wearing extra-large turbans and wide-sleeve shirts,[101] riding on finely decked donkeys, and ostentatiously and scrupulously observing the religious prescriptions pertaining to each social situation. Moreover, they would assiduously woo the rich and powerful in order to win backers for their claim to a post. Others did the opposite, wearing rough clothes, living ascetic lives, and refusing to compete for appointments, or even to accept them when offered. But given the strong feeling in more pious Islamic circles that contact with power is corrupting, this might well earn even greater kudos. Certainly, it would be more likely to attract students and the masses, and the scholar with a large following might well then, for that very reason, catch the attention of the rulers as a useful appointment.

The right way for a Muslim scholar to act, indeed for any good Muslim, is laid down in the great legal compilations of the second to fourth/eighth to tenth centuries, which would all include a section on *adab*, a collection of reports about the doings and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions of relevance to proper conduct and good manners. Many illustrated general moral principles: dutifulness to one's parents, respecting bonds of kinship and old people, keeping one's word, cooperation between believers, honouring the guest, being generous, gentle, and polite, avoiding lying, pride, and arrogance, and so on.[102] A large part, however, were concerned with what one might call etiquette, the right way of going about one's everyday business. And getting such things right was a part of the faith, as is graphically demonstrated by the story of Hatim al-Asamm (d. 237/851) who upon entering the mosque with his left foot forward felt that he had violated one of the '*ādāb* of religion'.[103] Such material circulated already in the formative stages of Islam, as we can see from the substantial section on it in the legal compilation of the early scholar Ibn Abi Shayba (d. 235/849), who was himself relying on earlier authorities. The section includes entries on blowing one's nose with the left hand, clipping the moustache and beard, sitting with one leg over the other, not holding secret counsel with someone when a third person is present, how to apply kohl to the eye, how to mount animals, how to greet, ask permission, and address letters, on not plucking out grey hairs, not sitting between sun and shade, blessing sneezers, what to say on waking and sleeping, against excessive laughing, lying on one's front, displaying one's thighs, etc.[104] There is a fair degree of overlap in the various legal compilations, though some lump all the material together in a miscellany section (*kitāb al-jāmi*', thus 'Abd al-Razzaq

[101] Chamberlain (1994) 102 is wrong to say that 'the turban was the mark of the learned Muslim male'; it was the mark of the Muslim male in general, from the caliph to the masses, but it is true that people tailored their turban to their position. Boon companions of the caliphs wore gold-figured silk turbans, sufis and peasants used coarse Indian silk, while the very poor used scraps of cloth (Ahsan 1979: 31–3). The sleeves of the shirt (*qamīṣ*) were used as pockets, in which scholars and students would keep books, inkpots, slates, etc., so a wide sleeve implied greater studiousness, and was in general considered fashionable for the educated and well-to-do (ibid. 36–7).

[102] These are all to be found in Bukhari, *Ṣaḥīḥ* iv. 108–65 (*ādāb*).

[103] Mas'udi, *Murūj* vi. 100.

[104] Ibn Abi Shayba, *Muṣannaf* vi. 86–267.

al-San'ani, d. 211/827), whereas others spread it across different sections (Bukhari, d. 256/870, has some in his chapter on food and some in his chapter on asking permission, etc.).

One reason for such collections of material is that Islam is a highly ritualized religion: it is important to say and do set things at set times in a set way. Here, for example, is the recommendation of one jurist to students attending the lesson of a shaykh:

Do not look at anything but the teacher and do not turn around to investigate any sound, especially during discussion. Do not shake your sleeve. The student should not uncover his arms, nor should he fiddle with his hands or feet or any part of his body, nor should he place his hand on his beard or his mouth, or pick his nose or play with it, or open his mouth or gnash his teeth. He should not lean against a wall or a cushion, or put his hand against them in the presence of his shaykh. Nor should he turn too much without need, nor should he try to say anything funny or offensive; and he should not laugh except out of surprise. If something overcomes him he should smile without giving voice. He should not clear his throat unnecessarily, nor should he spit if he can help it, nor should he drool, but should wipe his expectorate on his sleeve or in a scarf. If he sneezes he should try to do it quietly and cover his face with a handkerchief, and if he should yawn he should cover his mouth after first trying to fight it off. It is a sign of respect to the shaykh not to sit between him and the direction of prayer nor to his side nor on a cushion.[105]

And we find similarly detailed advice in the case of table manners, to which Islamic law pays much attention, as for example in the *Synopsis of Sufi Adab* of 'Abdallah al-Ansari (d. 481/1089):

When the Sufi eats his meal, he shall first wash his hands, sit down on his left leg, and not put his bowl on the bread. In the beginning of the meal he shall say: 'In the name of God' and at the end: 'Praise be to God.' He shall begin the meal by taking some salt, then put into his bowl as much as he wants to eat and not leave anything in his bowl. He shall take small bites and chew carefully, without taking a second bite before swallowing the first. . . . When he has finished, he shall conclude the meal with some salt, then use the toothpick and throw any leftovers in a basin. When he washes his hands (after the meal), he shall crouch on the balls of his feet, putting alkali ashes in his left hand and pouring water with his right. He shall wipe the hands over his mouth and lips and then wash the left hand with the right.[106]

A second reason for such detailed guidelines for correct behaviour was to aid one to live one's life in *imitatio Prophetae*. Thus, as Ghazali (d. 505/1111) says, the Sufi does not recline at table because of the words of the Prophet: 'I do not eat reclining; I am only a servant and I eat as servants eat and I sit as servants sit.'[107] More specifically, pious behaviour manuals aimed to demonstrate how a Muslim should be constantly obedient to and mindful of God, for even the most apparently trivial acts of everyday existence should somehow represent that submission. Thus there was a constant self-grooming

[105] Cited in Chamberlain (1994) 129–30.

[106] Quoted in Reynolds (2000) 207; see also Zayyat (1939).

[107] *Ihya'* 2.6 (ch. 11: *ādāb al-akl*).

process, but not like the *adīb* or *ẓarīf* watching himself for fear of shaming himself before his fellows, but rather for fear of shaming himself before God. But there was also in this ritualism an aspect of social competition, for by scrupulous observance of this divine etiquette, so much of which was about external display (right attire, right expression, right gestures, etc.), one might get noticed as a model of pious conduct and thereby acquire students and/or a stipendiary post.

Others, as mentioned above, preferred to take the path of transgressing social norms and practices in order to win a following. For those already of some repute a certain eccentricity was enough, a subtle deviation from accepted custom, so that one might establish a new norm and become a model to be imitated. Whenever Ibrahim Ibn 'Abd al-Wahid pulled a hair from his beard or picked from his nose, he put it in his turban; whenever he sharpened a reed pen he was careful that the shavings did not fall. If he discovered a spot of dust on his robe in the mosque, he would depart to clean it off; and in prayer Ibrahim raised his voice during the proclamation of God's greatness, contrary to the local practice.[108] By his subtle amendments to tradition Ibrahim paradoxically cast himself as an arbiter of the rules and could thus gently manipulate these apparently fixed cultural forms. Others again fully reversed the norms of society. They disguised themselves as beggars in order to humiliate themselves, went naked, or pretended to be mad.[109] Thus when Bishr al-Hafi (d. 227/842) decided to become an ascetic, he let his hair grow, sported a long moustache, and wore a ragged, patched cloak',[110] flouting Muslim rules about trimming the moustache and wearing modest and clean clothing. Yusuf al-Qamini in thirteenth-century Damascus lived on a refuse heap, wore clothes stained with dirt, and urinated in his robes, contravening the most entrenched purity laws of Islam; and though almost all Muslims would wear headgear, he went bareheaded, and instead of effecting a measured step as is expected of a pious Muslim he would stagger about.[111] Such transgression put one outside the pale, but this vantage point made one the better able to adjudicate disputes, explain society's truths and contradictions, and to heal maladies that no mainstream doctor could remedy, and so such folk were revered and esteemed always by the common people, and even often by the elite.

However, these various forms of behaviour were not random, but carefully selected to send out a particular signal, one that had a specific meaning in Islamic society and could easily be understood by its members. Let me give

[108] Chamberlain (1994) 123–4, citing Ibn Rajab.

[109] On holy fools and feigned madness see Dols (1992) 379–422. Cf. Jahiz, *Tashīḥ* 301, who quotes the view of zealots that 'virtue, leadership, reputation and nobility of character are proportional to roughness of skin, shabbiness of dress, frequency of fasting and preference for solitary rambling'.

[110] Khatib al-Baghdadi, *Ta'rīkh* vii. 70.

[111] Chamberlain (1994) 130–1.

an example from the life of one of the most famous of all Muslim scholars and residents of Baghdad, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855):

> He often seasoned bread with vinegar; at times I saw him eat a slice of bread, shaking the dust off it, placing a plate and sprinkling water on it until it softened, after which he would eat it with salt. I never saw him buy pomegranates or quince or any other fruit except watermelons, which he ate with bread or grapes or dates.[112]

That Ibn Hanbal ate stale bread, rather than the fresh, soft bread of the 'people of elegant taste', and applied to it vinegar, a cheap condiment used by the poor, clearly associates him with the lower echelons of Baghdad society. The fruits he consumed convey a similar message: dates and watermelons were very inexpensive and were served for dessert by the 'common folk' because they could not afford the sweet dishes of the well-to-do.[113] In short, Ibn Hanbal, or his biographer, wanted his contemporaries to comprehend that he shared in the austere life of the Baghdadi poor and eschewed the excesses of the holders of wealth and power and of the extreme ascetics, indulging neither in luxuries nor in self-mortification. Such behaviour is, therefore, as affected as that of the above-mentioned scribe depicted in such censorious terms by Jahiz. It is a part of the social self-positioning that all humans engage in, whether consciously or subconsciously, a transmission of signals that manifest to others what we are or want to be or would have ourselves believed to be that are then received and read by society in a sort of collective physiognomy.

[112] Cited in Hurvitz (2003) 992; I also use some of his insights into this passage.
[113] Ahsan (1979) 88 (bread), 110–11 (fruit), 108 and 134–5 (desserts).

6

The Semiotic Paradigm: Physiognomy and Medicine in Islamic Culture

Antonella Ghersetti

I

Physiognomy is by its very nature a discipline occupying a position where many areas of study intersect, from the zoological to the divinatory, taking in psychology, ethics, and politics on the way. This overlapping generates the polymorphous and at times patently ambiguous features of the discipline. These features are readily applicable to the medieval Arabic tradition, where physiognomy hangs in the balance between medicine and astrology, between the experimental-scientific model and the divinatory, between ethical-political and eminently practical ends. Such ambiguity was particularly strong in Medieval Europe—indeed, it is reflected in discussion still surrounding physiognomy's scientific and epistemological status.[1] But the endeavour to establish the discipline firmly among the sciences enjoying respectability and having recognized epistemological canons is also typical of Arabic culture. In the large body of Arabic treatises—and above all among the more intellectually ambitious offerings—there is no lack of weighty introductions surveying the theoretical groundwork of the discipline and considering its relations—easy or uncomfortably subaltern—with a broader but surer scientific field like medicine. The scientific and epistemological status of Arabic physiognomy (*firāsa*),[2] then, shows a fair degree of stability over time, as is attested by both the position assigned to it in the classification of the sciences and the constant contiguity it exhibits with medical works, sharing the same theoretical foundations and area

[1] As Agrimi (2002) has frequent occasion to note in her stimulating study.

[2] The term, used to define physiognomy of Greek origin, can roughly be translated as 'intuition', but the connotations are so vast as to merit a separate study. For lack of space we shall go no further into the question, but simply point out that it is generally used to refer to the inferential capacity to arrive at what is hidden through the visible evidence. Significant, here, is the well-known anecdote about the sons of Nizar b. Ma'add cited by numerous Arab sources, foremost among these being the *Fākhir* of Mufaddal b. Salama (d. after 290/903); cf. next n. It is also used, in one of the widely recognized technical senses, to denote that form of intuitive knowledge which illuminates the heart of believers as with divine light.

of investigation in the eyes of Arabic scholars. The link between the two sciences lies in the paradigms and logical procedures they have in common: both are characterized by an evidentiary paradigm based on inference.[3] The following discussion explores this connection between physiognomy and medical science as it emerges through Arabic sources.

II

Perhaps the most telling evocation of the connection is found in the oft-cited anecdote which has Polemon and Hippocrates for its protagonists. It is known in many versions. In some the protagonists change (Socrates, or some undefined sovereign instead of Hippocrates) and the emphasis is more firmly on aspects such as control of the passions or on free will. The episode is first found in Graeco-Roman sources. Cicero in *On Fate* refers to it cursorily to advance his argument, but gives it a narrative treatment in the *Tusculans*, and this is taken up at greater length in later sources.[4] The best-known Arabic version is probably that in the Ps.-Aristotelian *Sirr al-asrār*,[5] the celebrated *Secretum secretorum* of the Middle Ages.[6] The last chapter of the treatise is entirely dedicated to physiognomy, and the anonymous author stresses the Greek origins of the discipline, observing that it was used and valued by the 'ancients' (*al-awā'il*) and that it enjoys scientific soundness (*wa-huwa 'ilm ṣaḥīḥ*). Here Polemon, who was held in Arabic culture to be the highest authority on physiognomy (*ṣāḥib al-firāsa*, 'Master of Physiognomy') and by some to be the founder of the discipline,[7] is asked to give a physiognomic evaluation of a portrait of Hippocrates brought to him by the physician's students. His judgement is so negative (Hippocrates was 'extremely lascivious') that the doctor's outraged disciples are of a mind to kill him. In the event, however, Hippocrates himself confirms Polemon's opinion, explaining that he succeeded in overcoming

[3] So Ginzburg (1986) in his illuminating study (including the anecdote about Nizar b. Ma'add's sons, cf. previous n.) defines an epistemological model based on clinical semiotics, in terms of which he sees a logical connection between physiognomy and medicine.

[4] *On Fate* 5. 10, *Tusculans* 4. 80; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Fate* 6: the classical version features Zopyrus the physiognomist and Socrates (see Mourad 1939: 51 and n. 1; Raina 1993: 10–11), and rests ultimately on Phaedo of Elis' lost dialogue, *Zopyrus*: Boys-Stones, Ch. 2, p. 23.

[5] Ed. Badawi (1954) 116–17 (trans. Mourad 1939: 50–1); it is cited by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi in his *Book of Physiognomy*, ed. Mourad (1939) 28 (92), although here we find as protagonists Polemon and an unnamed king. (Henceforth, for texts with translation the double page numbering refers first to the text, then to the translation.) See also Steinschneider (1960) §60 (84).

[6] It was translated by Roger Bacon (*Secretum secretorum cum glossis et notulis*; text in *Rogeri Baconis Opera hactenus inedita*, ed. R. Steele *et al.* Oxford 1920), and later by Philip of Tripoli (text in Foerster ii. 181–221).

[7] Shams al-Din al-Ansari al-Dimashqi (d. 727/1327), showing scant historical sensitivity, describes him as 'the first to discuss physiognomy', totally ignoring Aristotle's chronological priority (*Kitāb al-firāsa*, Bursa İnebey İl Halk Kütüphanesi, MS Hüseyin Çelebi, 882, fo. 2[a]; the attribution is absent from Cairo edition 1299/1882, p. 2 and Cairo edition 1332/1914, p. 2, which appear to show no textual differences).

the passions to which he was inclined by exercising his intellect. The anecdote closes with the author's remarks in praise of Hippocrates and a description of philosophy as offering rational control over the passions. The same anecdote is attested both in the *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn* (*Elucidation of Opinions on the Names of Books and on the Branches of Science*) of Hajji Khalifa (d. 1067/1657),[8] and in the classic biographical collections of lives of the physicians in connection with the life of Hippocrates. We find it related by Ibn Juljul (d. after 384/994),[9] on his authority by Ibn Abi Usaybi'a (d. 668/1270)[10]—who also mentions the version in which Socrates takes the place of Hippocrates—and by Ibn al-Qifti (d. 646/1248).[11] In these sources especially the anecdote serves to demonstrate the moral excellence and intellectual superiority of Hippocrates and, at the same time, to illustrate the Galenic aphorism that all physicians should be philosophers; indeed Ibn Juljul makes explicit reference to this just before recounting the anecdote.[12] Apart from a few other, minor differences which we shall not dwell upon here, the versions cited by the biographical sources make no mention of the hostile intentions of Hippocrates' disciples towards Polemon—a detail that is found only in the *Secretum secretorum* and, somewhat watered down, in the Istanbul (TK) recension of Polemon.[13] Incidentally, the disciples' reaction had already featured in the Ciceronian versions, but in terms of hilarity rather than hostility: in *On Fate* Alcibiades bursts into laughter on hearing that Socrates is lascivious, while the reaction extends to 'everyone present' in the *Tusculans*.

The version of this anecdote that Grignaschi defines as 'la plus ancienne',[14] attested in the TK manuscripts,[15] is nevertheless much more interesting since it focuses in particular on the principles governing *firāsa* and, above all, addresses in metonymic terms its status vis-à-vis medicine. The more strictly narrative part is preceded by a declaration made in the first person by Polemon, who is portrayed as an ambitious young philosopher. Polemon justifies the analogical procedures of physiognomy, citing humoral physiology and arguing that surface similarities find their explanation in similarity of temperament and natural faculties. He then announces his intention of writing a treatise on *firāsa*. It is only at this point that the narrative part proper begins. Polemon's fame was such, we are told, that the disciples of Hippocrates decided to put him to the test. When they came into his presence he gave each of them a correct physiognomic assessment of their natures, inclinations, and professional aptitude. Hippocrates' disciples described this extraordinary

[8] Ed. Flügel (1835–58) iv. 589–90; the anecdote is included in the section on *qiyāfa*, a pre-Islamic discipline similar to *firāsa* but limited to the identification of genealogical links (cf. Hoyland, Ch. 5, pp. 238–41).

[9] Ed. Sayyid (1955) 17. The treatise was composed 377/987.

[10] Ed. A. Müller (1884), part 1, pp. 27–8 = 48 ed. Rida (1965).

[11] Ed. Lippert (1903) 91–2.

[12] Ed. Sayyid (1955) 17.

[13] See Ch. 9, p. 471.

[14] (1974) 285; the thesis is not completely secure.

[15] Ahmet III, 3207, fos. 33^b–37^b and 3245, fos. 2^b–6^b; cf. the acephalous version preserved at Damascus (Zahiriyya, MS 172, *olim* 7840). See further Ch. 9 for text and translation.

expertise to their master, who responded with profound scepticism that anyone could plumb human psychology, nature, and passions simply by observing physical appearances. He therefore had his portrait painted and sent to Polemon via his disciples, who were to report his judgement. The rhetor concluded that Hippocrates was of a lascivious nature, upon which his disciples attacked him, outraged at his disparaging observation. Polemon asked to be conducted to the physician so the soundness of his judgement could be recognized. Hippocrates accuses Polemon of lying and demands to know how he had arrived at his conclusion. Polemon replies that he had observed in him the signs of a lascivious nature, and that physiognomy never lies. Here Hippocrates avers that, although his urges were strong, he never in fact committed abominable acts; and he goes on to advise his interlocutor not to rely on conjecture, and not to attribute to *firāsa* the status of an exact science. He continues with a description of human nature in terms of reason (*'aql*), passion (*shahwa*), and anger (*ghaḍab*), stressing the dominant role of intellect in the control of the passions and the superiority of man over the other animals. Given the scheme and terminology employed, we readily recognize the Platonic theory of the tripartite soul as discussed by Galen in *Powers of the Soul* 2–3, where he elaborates the physiological-temperamental aspects.[16] While Hippocrates is explaining these points Polemon twice asks for clarification, each time receiving a detailed answer on human psychology and the controlling function exercised by the intellect on the passions. After his meeting with Hippocrates, Polemon, 'now better informed', penned his treatise.

The inconsistencies shown by the text in terms of actual chronology (the dates of Hippocrates and Polemon) and narrative chronology (Polemon is said to have drafted his treatise now before, now after, his discussion with Hippocrates) should be interpreted in a metonymic sense. In the narrative economy of the anecdote each of the two protagonists is to be seen in the double capacity as founding father of the discipline and as the discipline itself: this is the only possible explanation for the co-presence of two historical figures who were known by at least the better-versed Arab readers not to have been contemporaries.[17] In terms of the narrative dynamics this co-presence also conveys the relationship of *firāsa* with medicine in the perception of Arab scholars as one of subordination. The reversal of roles occurring in the narrative is to be seen in terms of this perception: at the outset Polemon clearly enjoys a position of prestige, but as discussion with Hippocrates proceeds we see a more humble status emerging: the physiognomist can only bow to the physician's scientific superiority, revealed in detail as he answers Polemon's questions. Thus the moral would be that only medicine, personified by Hippocrates, can endow *firāsa* (otherwise relegated to the category of conjectural knowledge) with sure

[16] This treatise was first translated into Syriac by Hunayn and subsequently into Arabic by his nephew Hubaysh, with the title *Fī anna quwā l-nafs tābi'a li-mizāj al-badan*: cf. Bergsträsser (1925) 50 (41), no. 123. There is an edition with translation, introduction, and glossaries by Biesterfeldt (1973). A much-abridged epitome is published in Badawi (1981) 183–6.

[17] Although some biographical sources show no awareness of the problem: Ibn al-Qifti, for example, ed. Lippert (1903) 60 describes Polemon as a 'contemporary' of Hippocrates.

foundations, so that it can attain a truly respectable epistemological status. Moreover, the choice of Hippocrates is hardly surprising considering that Galenic tradition saw him as the founding father of physiognomy,[18] a science Galen (at least in *Powers of the Soul*) suggested was an indispensable aid for medicine,[19] while others such as Ps.-Aristotle regarded it as an autonomous art with its own methodological rigour. Moreover, it is most probably the Galenic tradition that conditioned both the choice of characters and the terms of subordination relating medicine to physiognomy.

III

The inclusion of physiognomy within the broader and more firmly established realm of medical science eventually found proper formalization in the position that *firāsa* was to occupy in the classification of sciences in the time of Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 428/1037). A significant feature of Ibn Sina's treatise on the intellectual sciences is the position attributed to physiognomy in the encyclopedia of the Muslim sciences, the scientific status ascribed to it, and the analogies defined with other sciences. Ibn Sina's brief study[20] is based on the division of wisdom (*ḥikma*) into two branches, one speculative, the other practical, the former seeking certain knowledge, the latter true opinion. The former thus aspires to truth, the latter to the good. The first of the three subdivisions of speculative wisdom (natural science, mathematical science, and divine science) addresses corporeal matters and their movement, in sections attributed with major or secondary status, the latter embracing medicine, astrology, physiognomy, oneiromancy, the science of talismans, theurgy, and alchemy. The definition that Ibn Sina proposes for physiognomy is somewhat restrictive (the function attributed is to define character on the basis of facial features) but it contains *in nuce* the paradigm of semiotic inference present in the canonical definition (namely 'inference of inner character from outer constitution', *al-istidlāl bi l-khalq al-ẓāhir 'alā l-khulq al-bāṭin*), which is based on correspondence between the visible and the invisible. This is in fact the paradigm that groups together the seven sciences sharing this section, all of which consist in acquiring knowledge of the imperceptible from the perceptible. While they have this in common, the differences lie mainly in object and aim: only medicine and *firāsa* have the human body as object and remain anchored to the present, while the other secondary sciences deal with different categories of material bodies and seek knowledge of the future.[21]

[18] In the classical world this position was also attributed to Pythagoras, described by his biographer Porphyry of Tyre as having acquired scientific ideas and the art of oneirocrisia during his travels in the East (Raina 1993: 11–12). See further Boys-Stones, Ch. 2, pp. 94–9.

[19] In fact, certain physiognomic features were taken as direct indicators of temperament (*Powers of the Soul* 7).

[20] *Fī aqsām al-'ulūm al-'aqliyya*, in Ibn Sina (1298/1880–1); French translation in Anawati (1977).

[21] For a summary of the criticisms levelled at Ibn Sina's subdivision, see Mourad (1939) 23 ff.

Of the secondary natural sciences, therefore, medicine and physiognomy are connected both by the common paradigm of semiotic inference and specifically by the object and area of investigation. It is, moreover, also true that as a special science of man physiognomy can only have medicine as a particular field of reference. In western medieval physiognomic tradition the point is clearly perceived, significantly enough, where the influence of Arab tradition found the keenest response: the court astrologer of Frederick II, Michael Scot (d. 1236), pointedly emphasizes the necessary link between the two sciences in his *Liber phisionomie.*[22]

The position and status ascribed to *firāsa* by Ibn Sina were widely embraced in later works classifying the sciences, although here—it must be said—there is also rather more emphasis on analogies with various forms of divination. The Egyptian physician Ibn al-Akfani (d. 749/1348), himself the author of an important treatise on physiognomy, drew up a complex scheme listing sixty sciences, in which he also provided bibliographic references for the most significant scientific writings. In this treatise, entitled *Irshād al-qāṣid ilā asnā l-maqāṣid* (*Guide for those Aspiring to the Most Elevated Ends*), he identified physiognomy as a natural science of secondary rank, placing it after human and veterinary medicine (treated together with falcon-breeding) but before oneiromancy, astrology, magic, the science of talismans, white magic, alchemy, and agriculture, for a total of ten sciences. Here the definition of *firāsa* is more extensive and, more importantly, the inferential procedure is explicitly formulated:[23] it is, we read, a science that seeks knowledge of a man's character from his appearance and temperament, with inference of the inner nature from the outer constitution. Clearly enounced, too, is the utility of the science, which lies in the possibility of choosing associates with due awareness. The same utility is recognized in various treatises on *firāsa*, such as that by Ibn al-Akfani himself, or the contemporary work by al-Dimashqi, both drawing upon the paradigmatic treatise by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Ibn al-Akfani also mentions as divisions of *firāsa* a series of (other) divinatory sciences, including investigation of footprints and genealogical connections (respectively *qiyāfat al-athar* and *qiyāfat al-bashar*), chiromancy, and reading the lines on the brow, although these are in fact conjectural sciences. In common with *firāsa* they have the semiotic paradigm and inferential procedure, but do not seem to enjoy the same epistemological status. Ibn al-Akfani classifies the secondary natural sciences in terms of their object, which may be a simple body, a composite body, or a body both simple and composite, further differentiation within this tripartition being made on temperamental and psychological bases. Together with oneiromancy, medicine and physiognomy share the same object, defined as a 'composite body having perceptive animate temperament and endowed with reason' (i.e the human being),[24] the same inferential procedure and semiotic

[22] *Editio princeps* by Jacopo de Fivizzano (Venice, 1477). See the observations by Agrimi (2002) 56. On the sources of the treatise see Jacquart (1994).

[23] Witkam (1989) 48.

[24] Ibid. 46. See Mourad (1939) 27 for a scheme of the classification.

paradigm, both looking to visible signs indicative of invisible meanings: in the case of *firāsa* it is a matter of 'outer states that indicate inner ones', while medicine deals with 'signs that indicate the states of the body'.[25]

The classification drawn up by Ibn al-Akfani enjoyed lasting success, being taken up with a little variation by the Turkish scholars Ahmad b. Mustafa Tashkupruzada (Taşköprüzade) (d. 968/1561) and Hajji Khalifa and by the Indian savant al-Tahanawi (twelfth/eighteenth century). The first of these was the author of a vast encyclopedia entitled *The Key to Happiness and the Lamp of Lordship* (*Miftāḥ al-sa'āda wa-misbāḥ al-siyāda*), containing not only descriptions of the individual sciences but also bibliographic and biographical information on works and authors most representative of the various fields. In the case of *firāsa*, the author does not substantially depart from Ibn al-Akfani, but places explicit stress on its empirical nature, scientific status, and its area of concern. It is in fact defined as a science mastered with experience (*tajriba*); it is a secondary part of natural wisdom and comes within the province of the physicians (*ḥukamā'*).[26] As for the utility of physiognomy, the list of applications given here ranges from choosing a wife to the choice of friends and slaves, the latter concern being attested by a considerable bibliographical output. Physiognomy then extends to eleven accessory sciences of a divinatory nature having points of contact with *firāsa* in their semiotic paradigm and inferential procedure.[27] A century later this classification of *firāsa* by eleven divinatory disciplines was faithfully followed by Hajji Khalifa, who made express acknowledgement in his bibliographic *Elucidation of Opinions on the Names of Books* of the excellence of Tashkupruzada's work in surpassing all other systems to classify the sciences.[28] Here once again we find attributed to physiognomy the status of secondary natural science, together with medicine and various other sciences including astrology and oneiromancy. Reference here to Ibn al-Akfani's work is only indirect, but it is again cited directly, although somewhat concisely, in the *thesaurus* by al-Tahanawi (completed in 1158/1745), the *Repertory of Technical Terms in the Sciences* (*Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn*),[29] where physiognomy continues to hold its position as a natural science.

IV

We may conclude that, although its status tended to falter wherever it touched on the sphere of divination, the position of *firāsa* in the taxonomy of Arabo-Islamic sciences remained essentially stable. It was a natural science like medicine, with which it shared the same scientific foundations, inferential procedure, and semiotic paradigm. However, the common features shared with

25 Witkam (1989) 46, 47.
26 Taşköprüzade (n. d.) i. 310.
27 Ibid. 327–35.
28 Ed. Flügel (1835–58) i. 34–5.
29 i. 43–4; ii. 1123–4.

medicine emerged in far greater evidence in specific treatises, especially in the 'osmotic' link between physiognomic and medical scientific writing. By far the majority of the authors of physiognomic treatises were physicians, and while medical works included sections dealing with *firāsa*, treatises on *firāsa* would normally dedicate a part to the Galenic humoral physiology underlying Arabic medicine. A case in point here is the fact that we owe to Hunayn himself both the annotated translation of the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy* and the exposition of humoral physiology set out with exemplary clarity in his *Masā'il* (the *Quaestiones* of Medieval Europe), where he addresses the four elements (*arkān*), the temperaments (*amzija*) from the eucratic to the mixed, the four humours (*akhlāṭ*), and the three faculties (*quwā*), natural, vital, and psychic.[30] Then we have a particular area (typical, however, of Arabo-Islamic culture) where clinical and physiognomic evaluations complement one another—in the production of treatises regarding the purchase of slaves (which came within the province of physicians)—and where assessment extends from the physical state of health to temperament and aptitude, applying the common approach of semiotic inference.

The origins of Arabic physiognomy did not, however, lie in the area of medicine proper, but rather in the rhetorical and philosophical heritage of Greece. Of the link established between humoral physiology and the theory of the temperaments and physiognomy, which was later held to attest the epistemological soundness and scientific rigour of the discipline, we find not the slightest trace in the work of Polemon himself, whereas it is to be found—more or less marked—in the Arabic pseudo-Polemonic tradition. Actually, what emerges from Polemon's treatise is not so much the connection with the world of medicine as links with the forensic and political spheres, physiognomy serving to reveal people's behaviour rather than their characters. Interesting in this respect is the space his treatise dedicates to 'dissimulation'/'affectation' (*taṣannu'*), which falls into three categories, one of which concerns the deceptive use of language (Leiden ch. 49). It takes no great effort of the imagination to see the weight attributed to words—tools of persuasion and political activity—as reflecting Polemon's background in rhetoric and the political world in which his treatise saw the light of day. Moreover, the inclusion of anecdotes and descriptions relating to well-known figures such as Oedipus and Socrates, or anonymous figures like the men of Cyrene, Smyrna, and Corinth, clearly has a persuasive power deriving from its paradigmatic force.[31] The narrative illustrates the qualities of these figures with concrete images, while the anecdotes of physiognomic prediction are recorded almost as examples of professional

[30] Hunayn (1978) 1–17 (French translation in Jacquart–Micheau (1990) 47–53).

[31] The persuasive power of physical characterization (*effictio*) and the need felt by the rhetor to make use of physiognomic portraits as a means of persuasion are elements characteristic of the canons of ancient rhetoric, well formulated, for example, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Aristotle himself had noted the persuasive power shown by the words of the physiognomists (*Generation of Animals* 769^{b}18, in Sassi 2001: 78). The affinity between rhetoric and physiognomy can be traced to important analogies in the mechanisms of articulating language: for discussion see Sassi (2001) 76–81.

performance, occasionally suggesting a didactic use of the text. At the same time, neither the detailed physiognomic indications nor the anecdotal and descriptive episodes, nor indeed the—relatively brief—methodological and explanatory part, contain any reference to a physiological basis of physiognomy. Here the rudiments of the procedure are quite different, the keys being 'classification of the world guided—and guaranteed—by ideological values'.[32] We have the typically Greek value of *metriotēs*, that equilibrium and harmony which, significantly, are represented in the physical type of the 'pure Greek' (Leiden ch. 35); a recognized hierarchy of physical signs indicating personal traits, the most important of which are to be seen on the 'noble' parts of the body like the face, and so on down (although the order of chapters reflects the hierarchy in reverse); familiarity and experience, by virtue of which it can immediately be seen what befits individuals in relation to the categories they belong to, reflecting the established social categorization. What we do not find in Polemon's treatise are the many allusions to—broadly speaking—philosophical themes characteristic of the treatises attributed to Aristotle.

In fact, Ps.-Aristotle's approach is decidedly different from Polemon's. Here, too, we find the essential themes of propriety and general suitability (in Greek *epiprepeia*, which Hunayn renders as *al-amr al-ashbah*, 'the most like thing', reinterpreting a broader concept of 'appropriateness' in the analogical sense).[33] The theme of *metriotēs* is also significant, but the tone and the thought-provoking observations to be found there make Ps.-Aristotle's treatise decidedly more interesting than Polemon's in this respect. Ps.-Aristotle claimed scientific status for the discipline and provided a clear definition of the logical procedure of inference from the known to the unknown, stimulating debate on the peculiarity of the discipline and its epistemological status. The insistence on logical and analogical procedures, theorized in considerable detail above all in the first part,[34] and on the physiological bases of character and passions, mainly in the second, reflects a culture steeped more in philosophy than in rhetoric. It is indeed noteworthy that, especially in the second part,[35] the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy* shows traces of what would become for the Arab world a complete, detailed physiological explanation of the temperaments, with the concepts of heat and cold to account for the characteristics, actions, and passions of animals or slowness or rapidity in movement, mention of haematic flow in relation to speed, reference to dryness and moisture in relation to incompleteness and, finally, some distinctly medical terminology (which the Greek original shows to be of Hippocratic origin) when referring, for example, to the joints of the body.[36] These points

[32] Ibid. 76.

[33] Ed. Ghersetti (1999a) 31 (65) and *passim*.

[34] Ibid. 10–12 (54–5). On the inductive procedures in Greek physiognomy, see Sassi (2001) 73 ff., arguing that the efficacy of physiognomic reasoning depends on soundly based classification rather than the validity of logical procedure.

[35] For a persuasive analysis of the bipartite nature of the treatise see Raina (1993) 24–35, and Boys-Stones, Ch. 2, pp. 44–58, 64–75.

[36] Ed. Ghersetti (1999*a*) 31 (65), 43 (71), 48 (73), 35 (67).

are extensively elaborated upon by Hunayn, himself a leading physician, in his annotations to the text. In relation to the theory of a physical basis for human and animal psychology, already to be found in Hippocrates (*Airs, Waters, Places*) and Aristotle (*On the Parts of Animals* 2. 4), and subsequently discussed by Galen in *Powers of the Soul*, Hunayn pens a note referring to the very treatise by Galen he had himself translated.[37] When he comes to the method of discerning character on the basis of expression, Hunayn inserts a long note referring to the *Epidemics* of Hippocrates (6. 7. 6), where the method of inference based on the analogy of expression was outlined, together with a lengthy citation of Galen's *Commentary* insisting on its validity, both physiognomic and medico-semiotic.[38] Reference to the medical foundations of the argumentation is also found in various other contexts, moving in the direction of an explicitly physiological interpretation of character traits, as for example in Hunayn's comment on the observation that hairless chests and pubes betoken a choleric temperament, or when he takes up for discussion in temperamental terms a point asserted with no further explanation by the writer of the Greek text regarding the type of hair in populations of hot and cold countries.[39] Thus, while the treatise by Ps.-Aristotle offers various interpretative pointers in terms of temperament,[40] it is in the annotations by the Arabic translator Hunayn that they find detailed discussion and a fuller development bringing in the medical sources—evidence that the text was now being read with a more pronounced leaning towards medical knowledge. This was a trend that would find its consummation in the work of the physician, philosopher, and alchemist Rhazes (d. 313/925).

V

In his *Ad Almansorem* (*Kitāb al-manṣūrī fī l-ṭibb*) Rhazes sets out with great clarity the necessity of the link between temperament and character and provides a validation of the physical foundations of individual psychology.[41] The second book considers temperament and physiognomy together. In the more strictly physiological part Rhazes lists the physical and behavioural signs that combine to indicate temperament (colour, appearance, touch, actions), then he goes on to describe the various temperaments (eucratic and eight others), and the temperament of certain internal organs (brain, kidneys, lungs, etc.), faithfully following a descriptive system organized according to the signs previously listed for each of the nine temperaments. The voice is also taken into consideration

[37] Ibid. 4 (51).

[38] Ibid. 5–6 (52–3). NB the text of the commentary is unpublished and the *CMG* translation by Pfaff is regarded as unreliable.

[39] Ibid. 25–6 (62) and 14–17 (57–8); here too Hunayn makes intensive use of the Hippocratic and Galenic sources.

[40] Besides the passages cited above, see also ibid. 13 (56), 43 (71) on colours as indicators of hot or cold temperament, and 48–9 (83) on constancy or inconstancy in relation to dry or moist temperament.

[41] Ed. Sadiqi (1408/1987). The Latin title is that of Gerard of Cremona's translation of 1175.

as a reliable indicator of temperament.[42] In all this we see the Galenic theory of *Powers of the Soul* 7, which suggests that certain physiognomic indicators (colour, hair, voice, and functionality of the parts) may provide direct, unmediated evidence of the temperament,[43] thus taking on an ancillary function to medicine. The same organization is found in Fakhr al-Din al-Razi in the introductory section of his treatise of physiognomy, which we shall be looking at later, while Rhazes' text is adapted concisely in the Ps.-Polemon of Gotha.[44] Rhazes now proceeds to a discussion of the humours and their predominance in the various temperaments. The chapter following this more general part, entitled *Fī shirā l-mamālīk* (*On the Purchase of Slaves*), deals with medical examination of slaves to assess their state of health according to temperamental parameters. The chapter closes with the recommendation to apply to those skilled in identifying temperament by physiognomy: 'as for the other matters, turn to someone with a knowledge of the temperaments which derives from physiognomy'.[45] This sentence marks the transition from physiology to physiognomy, at the same time sanctioning both the specificity of the latter and the necessary link with medicine. The next chapter contains a list of physical signs betokening personal, and in some fewer cases temperamental, traits. The order of presentation of the members *a capite ad calcem*, probably reflecting the hierarchy of physiognomic signs previously set out, is canonical in medical manuals.

The second book of *Ad Almansorem* thus represents a milestone in the progress of Arabic physiognomy towards scientific legitimacy and epistemological status. In no other work does it emerge with such clarity that physiognomy 'has its theoretical principles in anatomy . . . and the treatment of temperaments and can, therefore, together with the other symptoms reorganized in the light of clinical experience, guide the practice of the physician'.[46] Similarly, even the organization of the book shows clearly the continuity between symptoms—which are the object of clinical semiotics—and physiognomic signs, which are the object of the semiotics of the body. This logical continuity also receives lively attention and appropriate emphasis in the medieval European literature: Gilles de Corbeil, a physician and professor of medicine active in Paris between 1180 and 1223, treats physiognomy (*De physionomiis*) in the fourth book of his *Viaticum*, dealing with the signs of disease (*De signis morborum*).[47] Thus clinical semiotics and semiotics *tout court* are identified. It is, moreover, surely significant that the material is drawn from the 'divini miranda Rasi documenta', along with more

[42] Ed. Sadiqi (1408/1987), 79–90.

[43] The epitome published by Badawi (1981) sums up the long quotations from Aristotle (*History of Animals*) in the Galenic treatise with a sentence of graphic simplicity: '*the books on physiognomy* [my emphasis] indicate that the characteristics of the soul follow the temperament of the body because the form of the members follows the temperament.'

[44] Gotha Ar. 85: Latin translation in Foerster ii. 147–60. See Ch. 7, p. 310.

[45] Ed. Sadiqi (1408/1987), 97. A slightly different but essentially comparable reading can be seen in BNF, ms. arabe 2866, fo. 30[a].

[46] Agrimi (2002) 51 (Italian).

[47] Gilles de Corbeil, *De physionomiis*, in Rose (1864) 177–201.

equivocal 'peripatetice problemata physionomie'.[48] In this connection it is worth noting that mentions of *firāsa* in the so-called 'Medicine of the Prophet' (*al-ṭibb al-nabawī*) consistently refer to clinical semiotics rather than physiognomy, being directed at an understanding of temperament and the hidden causes of illness starting from visible signs. The physician versed in *firāsa* is better equipped to cure since he enjoys an advantage in interpreting the humoral structure whose imbalance lies at the root of the pathological state.[49] The evidential paradigm is the same, as indeed is the inferential procedure, but the personality implications are apparently ignored. The scope of *firāsa* seems to stop short at symptoms, and does not extend to signs. The analogies pointed out in Rhazes' *Ad Almansorem* go further, involving the methods shared by medicine and physiognomy: the paradigm of semiotic inference, based on analogical reasoning and the empirical approach pithily and authoritatively summed up for Arabic medicine in the aphorism of Hippocrates cited by Ibn Abi Usaybi'a ('medicine is experience and [reasoning through] analogy'),[50] is also the paradigm underlying physiognomical assessment. Indeed, it becomes a constant factor recurring in texts on physiognomy. For example, in his *Ikmāl al-siyāsa fī 'ilm al-firāsa* (*Perfection of the Conduct of the Science of Physiognomy*), Ibn al-Akfani, the Egyptian physician we have already mentioned, states openly that the fundamentals of physiognomy include experience and analogical deduction.[51]

The fact that elements of physiognomy make their appearance in various general treatises on medicine is proof that the discipline had effectively been incorporated into medical learning. For example, in the sixth book of his *Zād al-musāfir*, a work translated into Latin by Constantine the African under the title *Viaticum*,[52] the Tunisian physician Ibn al-Jazzār (d. 395/1005), states on the authority of 'Aristotle the philosopher' that abundant hair is a sign of frequent copulation,[53] by analogy with copious plumage on birds, adding an explanation in terms of humoral physiology that is missing from the Ps.-Aristotelian source.[54] A little further on he invokes the authority of Polemon 'Master of Physiognomy' for a series of data on female libido, although they do not in fact derive from the Laodicean rhetor's own treatise but from the body of work ascribed to him by Arab tradition.[55] Observations of a physiognomic nature are also to be found in the treatise on medicine entitled *Luqaṭ al-manāfi'* (*Useful Gleanings*) by the versatile Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/1201),[56] from which signs

[48] Ibid. 178.

[49] Al-Dhahabi (d. 673/1348) (1380/1961) 112; al-Kahhal (d. 650/1320) (1955) 33–4.

[50] Ed. A. Müller (1884), part 1, p. 28=49 Rida.

[51] BNF, ms. arabe 2762, respectively fos. 2b and 3a.

[52] The book was read and commented on in the School of Salerno, and a number of commentaries were dedicated to it in the 13th c. (Jacquart–Micheau 1990: 115–17).

[53] Cf. Ps.-Aristotle, ed. Ghersetti (1999*a*) 17 (57), who held this to be a sign of lasciviousness, although it is taken as a sign of loquacity in the original Greek: the semantic shift is probably due to an erroneous reading in Hunayn's copy.

[54] SLUB Dresden. MS arab. E 209, fo. 215[a].

[55] Ibid., fo. 218[b]. On the attribution, see Ghersetti (1999*b*).

[56] The work is preserved in various manuscripts; see İhsanoğlu et al. (1984), Dietrich (1966) no. 46, pp. 110–12.

relative to noses and teeth were taken by a treatise of the Ottoman period dealing with the medical examination of slaves.[57] The concise manual of Ibn al-Quff (d. 686/1286), *Jāmiʿ al-gharaḍ fī ḥifẓ al-ṣiḥḥa wa-dafʿ al-maraḍ*, translated into Latin with the title *Summa desiderii de sanitate conservanda et morbo sanando*, dedicates a whole chapter—the sixtieth and last—to physiognomy.[58]

The connection between medical learning and physiognomy—or, better, the identification of physiognomist and physician—is tellingly manifested by an interesting phenomenon, which is more closely connected with the reception of Arabic physiognomy in Europe, but nevertheless merits mention in this context, namely the association—as well known as it is ill founded—between physiognomy and the name of Ibn Sina among the physiognomic authorities of the Medieval period. To our knowledge there exists no treatise by him dealing specifically with *firāsa*; Anawati makes mention of a manuscript preserved in Istanbul,[59] but the attribution is extremely doubtful.[60] However, we do have some interesting observations on animal psychology in his *Kitāb al-shifāʾ* (*Book of Healing*),[61] which adopts some of the recognized criteria of physiognomic inference. For example, the method based on sex is systematically used to underline the difference in constitution and character of male and female animals (including humans), as is, to a somewhat lesser extent, the geographical criterion which Hippocrates had extensively dealt with, according to which the environment exerts influence on the physical—and thus also psychic—constitution of living beings. Various other elements relevant to physiognomic investigation which had some importance in the tradition of medieval literature, are to be found in *De Anima*,[62] a treatise through which Ibn Sina's thought was transmitted to medieval Europe by way of the medical tradition of the School of Salerno, together with the more properly zoological works which were taken up for example by Michael Scot in his *Liber phisionomie*. However, Ibn Sina's fame as a physiognomist[63] is probably due to a brief pseudonymous Latin treatise long known as *De physiognomonia libellus*,[64] for which no Arabic original appears to have existed. This short text contains little of the canonical treatises of physiognomy: it lacks all the observations regarding the sexual, zoological, and ethnological methods of deduction, while presentation of the significance of the members stops abruptly at the neck. The combination we

[57] Al-Ghazali's *Hidāyat al-murīd fī taqlīb al-ʿabīd*, in Harun (1411/1991) i. 421–42.

[58] British Library, MS Or. 3690 (Hamarneh 1975: 190); Wellcome Historical Medical Library, Or. 116, fragmentary (Iskandar 1967: 113–14).

[59] Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi 3774, 7, fos. 89^b–96^a; Anawati (1951).

[60] The name of Ibn Sina does not appear in the text of this 13-chapter *Risāla fī ʿilm al-firāsa*, but was later added on the title-page: Fahd (1966) 384 n. 1.

[61] Ed. Madkur et al. (1406/1985–6) 111 ff.

[62] Essentially, the reflection on the body–soul relationship derived from Aristotelian-Galenic psychology: Agrimi (2002) 52.

[63] Both Michael Scot in the *Liber phisionomie* and Pietro d'Abano in the *Liber compilationis physionomie* cite him as an authoritative source.

[64] Pack (1974) 113–38. However, it is to be noted that some of the existing versions cite Aristotle as the source, and that an attribution to Ibn Rushd (Averroes) has also been—inexplicably—proposed.

find here of three main topics—the humours, the planets, and physiognomy proper—broadly reflects the organization of some of the major Arabic treatises associating *firāsa* with humoral physiology and, in some cases, also astrology; we may cite as examples the treatises by Rhazes, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, al-Dimashqi, and the TK Polemon. This particular characteristic does indeed suggest a certain influence from Arab tradition, but it cannot be stretched to the point of confirming the attribution to Ibn Sina.[65]

VI

Further evidence of the place accorded to physiognomy in the field of medicine is offered by the particular genre of treatises on the acquisition of slaves. These constitute an important zone of intersection within scientific writing on *firāsa*. Medical and physiognomic knowledge reinforce each other in the clinical and psychological examination of the slave. Verification of 'value for money' was not a simple matter of ascertaining whether the slave had a sound state of health. It extended to aspects of his personality and aptitude for the tasks required, and this of course came within the field of *firāsa*. The practice of combining clinical and character study of slaves evidently found its inspiration in Rhazes' *Ad Almansorem*, for Rhazes was the first author to consider medical and physiognomic examination, which he did in two successive chapters of his treatise. This was to become general practice in subsequent works. The *Risāla jāmi'a li-funūn nāfi'a fī shirā' al-raqīq wa-taqlīb al-'abīd* (*Comprehensive Treatise on the Arts Useful for the Acquisition and Examination of Slaves*)[66] is possibly the best known work in this field. It was written by the Iraqi scholar Ibn Butlan (d. 458/1066), a refined master of prose and a physician of repute, and closely follows the pattern set by Rhazes. In this book clinical examination of the various parts of the body 'according to the method of the physicians' (ch. 2), which was written independently of Rhazes, is followed by a chapter dedicated to understanding the character of slaves 'according to the criteria of physiognomy' (ch. 3). This is a verbatim copy of the corresponding section of *Ad Almansorem*. Once again symptoms and signs are reviewed in succession as common ground for investigation based on the inferential procedure which characterizes the approach of the physicians and the physiognomists. The treatise also includes a wealth of character indications connected with geographical and ethnic origin (ch. 4). Here the treatise follows (without explicit acknowledgement) one of the methods of Greek physiognomy[67] and the Hippocratic principle of the influence of environment on character mentioned in the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy* translated and commented on by Hunayn. Indications concerning environmental influences (north, south, east, west)

[65] As pointed out by Pack (1974) 117–18 given the substantial incongruity with the theories of Ibn Sina and the decidedly lower intellectual level.

[66] Ed. Harun (1411/1991) i. 381–420 (for translations see Bibliography).

[67] On the subject see A. MacC. Armstrong (1958).

contained in Greek treatises known to the Arabs are developed in detail with evident practical intent: in fact, it is the aptitude for particular types of work that receives the most explicit formulation, with a view to the profitable employment of slaves.

We see the development of the ethnological method in combination with clinical and physiognomic examination in a later treatise on the acquisition of slaves called *al-Qawl al-sadīd fī khtiyār al-ʿabīd* (*Correct Account of Choosing Slaves*). This was written in 883/1478 by the Egyptian al-Amshati (d. 902/1496),[68] a scholar who ranged over law, medicine, and the martial arts. In this work the scheme adopted by Ibn Butlan is reversed: clinical examination (the closing section) follows racial and geographical considerations (chs. 1 and 2) and physiognomic description of the various members (ch. 3). Of course, we cannot be sure that the order has any hierarchic value, but it certainly has its own significance in a comparison with the text that had prompted the production of this work: in his introduction al-Amshati remarks that he had considered the treatise by the Egyptian physician Ibn al-Akfani, *al-Naẓar wa-l-taḥqīq fī taqlīb al-raqīq* (*Consideration and Verification of the Examination of Slaves*), but had found it wanting to the extent that he decided to reformulate it with a number of additions drawn from sources of a medical and physiognomic nature. It is true that at least in its extant versions the treatise by Ibn al-Akfani has come down to us in an extremely concise redaction.[69] The author himself describes it as a *risāla mukhtaṣara* ('a succinct treatise'), which suggests that he was not aiming at completeness so much as conciseness. As it has come down to us, the treatise goes no further than the clinical assessment of the slave's state of health together with a brief description of the tricks of the slave merchants, but with not the slightest reference to physiognomic examination in the text itself or indeed in the statement of intentions or list of contents which as usual precede the body of the work. The fact that al-Amshati finds the treatise wanting and in need of additional material suggests that the omission of physiognomic assessment was felt to be a lacuna in this type of literature. As a matter of fact, al-Amshati dedicated a long, detailed chapter to the physical signs marking the character of a slave, drawing upon medical sources (Galen is cited on various occasions) and more generally upon 'experts in the field' (*ahl al-tajriba*). Once again the link between the medical and the empirical emerges strongly. No less evident in the author's formulation is the principle that medicine and physiognomy rest on the same foundations (*al-firāsa* ... *mithl al-ṭibb*, fo. 39^b), and that the authorities who prescribe the rules for global semiotic analysis (body and soul) are physicians and physiognomists on an equal footing (fo. 44^a).

[68] Brief introduction by H. Müller (1980) 116–19 and extracts in Witkam (1989) 76–9. I have used a copy of Cambridge University Library, MS Or. 1023 (7) kindly supplied by the Universiteitsbibliotheek Leiden (no. A 979).

[69] Istanbul, Köprülü Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, MS I 46 (6), fos. 150^a–152^b and Paris, BNF, ms. arabe 2234 (3) fos. 148^a–150^b: I have used the latter (German translation in H. Müller (1980) 177–80).

The need for a physiognomic judgement to complement clinical assessment is clear enough in a rather later treatise by the Eygptian Muhammad al-Ghazali, even if the organization of the chapters does not serve to emphasize it. Muhammad al-Ghazali was a somewhat obscure figure living in the thirteenth/nineteenth century who also wrote a treatise on *firāsa*.[70] His *Hidāyat al-murīd fī taqlīb al-'abīd* (*Guidance for Those Wishing to Examine Slaves*),[71] dedicated to one of the leading figures of Ottoman Egypt, is divided into seven chapters plus a concluding section. While none of the chapters deal specifically with physiognomy, as was the practice in earlier treatises, physiognomic signs and evaluations pervade every part, whether dealing with temperament and general aspects of the body such as colour, proportions, slimness, etc. (chs. 1, 6, and 7), or with the various members, from head and chest to organs and legs (chs. 2–5). The first chapter draws on the *Ad Almansorem*, presenting the indicators of temperament and so immediately defining the physiological foundations of the examination. In the following chapters assessment made on the single parts of the body is developed on three complementary levels, namely clinical, for sound health, physiological, to determine the type of temperament, and physiognomic, to ascertain personality. The physiological and psychological aspects are attributed equal importance, and indeed almost total interchangeability. In the section dedicated to the head, for example, baldness, a sign of dyscrasia of the brain, comes close on flabbiness, indicative of cowardice, while alopecia, signalling harmful humours, is treated alongside healthy skin, which indicates eucrasia of the brain and courage.[72] In short, medical and physiognomic assessments are juxtaposed on the same level, temperament underlying both physical state and psychological trait. The sources cited by al-Ghazali are, as usual, both medical (Galen, 'some physicians') and physiognomic (*aṣḥāb al-firāsa*), together with wide-ranging writers like Ibn al-Jawzi and Jahiz (d. 255/868).

VII

Explicit recognition of the common epistemological and procedural foundations of physiognomy and medicine is attested with the utmost clarity in the major treatises on *firāsa*. Despite the fact that in some respects physiognomy failed to shake off contamination from the divinatory arts (astrology in particular), it is consistently referred to as a science like medicine. It is indeed true that the ambiguous nature of *firāsa*, between science and divination, emerges quite clearly when the TK Polemon attributes competence in the field to two categories of writers—physicians (*aṭibbā'*) and astrologers (*munajjimūn*)—who apply analogical principles to determine people's character and nature. Nevertheless, the insistence on logical-analogical (*qiyās*) and

[70] *Madārik ūlī l-riyāsa li-masālik 'ilm al-firāsa*, Cambridge University Library, MS Or. 1025, fos. 24–43.

[71] Ed. Harun (1411/1991) i. 421–42.

[72] Ibid. 428.

empirical (*tajriba*) paradigms, and on the need to practise the discipline with prudence and to work on the basis of close observation, signals a distinctly medical environment: in fact, 'physiognomy is a science of *experience*, resemblance, careful consideration, caution and *analogical reasoning*'.[73] Moreover, it is founded on inference (*istidlāl*), legitimated by resemblance, and at the same time on experience (*tajriba*). Thus again we have the two fundamental principles of medicine according to the Hippocratic aphorism 'medicine is experience and [reasoning through] analogy'. The first stage in physiognomic procedure is collection of data (the other two are comparison with data of physiognomic significance and analogical deduction that leads to formulation of judgement),[74] accomplished through scrupulous observation of the actual forms, thus revealing the strong influence of the empirical procedure characteristic of medicine. It is also to be noted that in enunciating the principles applied in physiognomic inference the author has recourse to notions of humoral physiology typical of medicine.

In this respect the treatise by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209), which is based, with considerable expansion, on Ps.-Aristotle, emerges as a work of exemplary clarity and systematic exposition. The points present in the brief text by Ps.-Aristotle are reformulated on the basis of material drawn from *Ad Almansorem*, thus making firm links with medical learning. Here the premiss, again of Hippocratic origin, is the correspondence between psyche (*nafs*) and temperament (*mizāj*) which had already found expression in Ps.-Aristotle. Now, however, the stress is on the common physiological foundations of character and appearance,[75] and this is also used to account for the difference between male and female.[76] This subject was already present in the Greek sources, but in solely descriptive terms: Polemon presents his catalogue of physical features and personality traits without adding any real explanation to account for the differences in male and female, while Ps.-Aristotle only offers vague reference to the moist nature of female creatures. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi returns to the two paradigms—male and female—but reinterprets them on the basis of temperamental physiology, extensive treatment of which precedes the by now familiar catalogue of characteristics. In this treatise we find the stress placed, possibly for the first time, and indeed very firmly, on the common epistemological status of medicine and *firāsa*: if the foundations of the latter science (*ʿilm*) rest on the natural sciences and are developed in the light of experience, then it is exactly like medicine, to the extent that any criticism levelled at physiognomy also strikes at medicine.[77] Consistent with these

[73] MS Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3207, fo. 39^{a-b}.

[74] Ibid. fo. 40^{b}.

[75] Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, ed. Mourad (1939) 21 (88) *anna l-khuluqa l-bāṭina wa-l-khalqa l-ẓāhira maʿlūlāni li-l-mizāji l-aṣli.*

[76] Ibid. 24 (89): the difference between the hot, dry temperament of the male and cold, moist temperament of the female determines different physical and psychological states (*yaqtadi aḥwālan fi l-badani wa-aḥwālan fi l-nafsi*), which are then described in detail.

[77] Ibid. 6 (78). The criticisms mentioned by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi probably came from Ibn Rushd, lamenting the shaky scientific status of physiognomy.

premisses, and following the scheme previously proposed in *Ad Almansorem*, he deems knowledge of the human body necessary on both anatomical and temperamental grounds; the physiognomist must be thoroughly acquainted with the way elements (*arkān*), humours (*akhlāṭ*), and temperaments (*amzija*) typically reveal themselves in the character, and the figure that emerges is very much that of a physician with particular skills in the semiotic field.[78]

The author now proceeds to bring the areas of overlap between the two disciplines into yet greater clarity. Discussing the methods of inference, and in particular the ethological approach, he explains that the same premisses are applied in physiognomy and medicine alike,[79] and in support of the observation cites the same passage of Galen's commentary on the *Epidemics* of Hippocrates previously cited by Hunayn in his glosses on Ps.-Aristotle.[80] Moreover, when setting out the criteria for assessment he stresses the need to bring great perseverance and experience to bear, just as in medicine, astrology, and the other arts.[81] In this passage, where reference is made to Ptolemy,[82] the author takes astrology together with medicine and physiognomy in his considerations, but the reason lies not so much in common scientific principles as in the same semiotic procedure which permits interpretation of signs (and symptoms) and evidential inference. Since, however, inference can lead to the wrong results if the premisses are no more than plausible or probable, as is the case with physiognomy, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi feels the need to determine which are the most reliable signs (and, by its very nature, the need points up a certain weakness in the criteria for logical soundness, which Aristotle himself had sought to strengthen[83]): of necessity these must be the fundamental signs regarding humours, temperaments, faculties, age, and race—all essential, primordial indicators[84] relating to the physical constitution of the individual—as previously identified in *Ad Almansorem*.[85] At the other end of the hierarchy we have the signs offered by resemblance to animals, which rest solely on analogical criteria and prove weaker at the logical level inasmuch as they are associated with a pre-established system of reference offering clues rather than sound evidence.

Thus in the rigorous treatment accomplished by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi the analogical basis is found to be weaker than the physiological basis, which rests on the necessity of a clear correspondence between physiology and psychology.

[78] Ibid. 8–9 (79–80).

[79] Ibid. 19 (87).

[80] Ibid. 7–8 (52–3).

[81] Ibid. 28 (92).

[82] Cf. ibid. 7 (79), a partial citation of an aphorism in the (pseudonymous) *Karpos*, arguing that the astrologer can judge (*a*) on the basis of his own illuminated intuition, and (*b*) from exterior signs, and that the physiognomist does the same: in the first case they are guided by a mystic *firāsa*, the insight that God inspires in the chosen few, while in the latter case they proceed by scientific *firāsa* and the inferential procedures they have learnt.

[83] With the three assumptions of *Prior Analytics* 2. 70^{b} ff.: see Raina (1993) 20, Boys-Stones, above, Ch. 2, pp. 64–75.

[84] Ed. Mourad 28 (93).

[85] Ibid. 89.

This accounts for the ample room he dedicates to the description of the nine temperaments according to a composite scheme covering activities, faculties, and reactions, where psychological and physical description are juxtaposed and consistently complementary,[86] as we shall later see in the treatise on the acquisition of slaves by al-Amshati. The description of the temperament of the principal organs (brain and heart) is clearly inspired by the indications set out in the second book of *Ad Almansorem*, where a specific correlation is postulated between the temperament of these organs and of the body as a whole: the more closely the temperament of the body matches that of the brain and heart, the more positive this correlation will prove.[87] Thus in the approach adopted throughout it is the physical datum of the temperament that constitutes the intermediary element between outer and inner self, both in the clinical semiotic identification of symptoms and in the semiotic detection of the signs of the psyche, and it consequently figures as the necessary theoretical premiss of the following part dealing with physiognomic interpretation of the various members. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's treatise develops and consolidates the scientific foundation of physiognomy previously delineated in *Ad Almansorem*, providing precise definition of the connection with medical learning and corroborating its epistemological status. Indeed, it stands as an example for later physiognomic literature, including works by al-Dimashqi, Ibn al-Akfani, and al-Amshati, who take it more or less as a model in terms of both structure and theoretical approach.

By now the link between physiognomy and humoral physiology was so firmly established that even the authors furthest removed from the world of science had to reckon with it. An interesting reinterpretation of the scientific foundations in theological terms was advanced by Ibn 'Arabi (m. 638/1240), the great Andalusian mystic, who is mentioned as one of the major physiognomic authorities in later sources. He addresses the subject in two works: *al-Tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-mamlaka al-insāniyya* (*Divine Regulations for the Improvement of the Human Realm*),[88] and, at considerably greater length, in *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya* (*Meccan Triumphs*). Ibn 'Arabi approaches the matter starting from the well-known dichotomy between *firāsa shar'iyya*, of an intuitive nature, a gift of God to the chosen few, and *firāsa ḥikmiyya*, an inferential process that can be communicated and learnt, and upon which those not so chosen, and lacking the divine light, must rely to select the company they should keep or the subjects with whom they may collaborate profitably.[89] The former, shorter treatise contains concise illustration of the aims, essentially political (as indeed also in the *Secretum secretorum*,[90] quoted directly for the signs of the various

[86] Ibid. 31 (95) ff.

[87] Ed. Sadiqi 79.

[88] Ibn 'Arabi (1919) 161 ff. (for the physiognomic part).

[89] Which justifies the inclusion of a long passage on physiognomic matters in a treatise like *al-Tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya* which is dedicated to considerations about good government: *firāsa* is taken to be a property of the shrewd vizier (ibid. 161).

[90] This treatise on the art of good government, containing information on astrology, chemistry, and medicine, offers interesting disciplinary alliances, physiognomy here occupying an area of intersection between natural philosophy, medicine, rhetoric, and ethics.

members), a brief description of the two types of *firāsa*, and a succinct review of the signs of the various members with a description of the eucratic temperament, expressly attributed to the Prophet—all derived from medical learning (*al-ḥukamā'*) and tested through personal experience (*tajriba*).[91]

For exposition of the theoretical premisses and broader contextualization of the foundations, we must look to the *Meccan Triumphs*,[92] where the main body of text is preceded by a detailed theoretical introduction. The chapter dedicated to *firāsa* opens with an etymological note, and goes on immediately to define the bipartition between the types, divine (*ilāhiyya*) and natural (*ṭabī'iyya*) or scientific (*ḥikmiyya*), the former, of a more general nature, based on spiritual and psychological signs, the latter on natural and temperamental ones.[93] Lacking the ethical scope of the divine type, the latter seeks to identify the personality traits of individuals. The basic principles of scientific *firāsa* are explained by invoking the by then well-established humoral physiology and the notions of element, humour, and temperament, but with the stress consistently placed on the divine origin: mention of the creative work of God is recurrent, resulting in a sort of humorally organized Genesis, God creating the elements (*'anāṣir, arkān*) and living bodies from the four humours (*ṭabā'i', akhlāṭ*). The physiological, psychological, and ethical aspects go hand in hand: disease and unseemly behaviour derive from a humoral imbalance, which the scientific physician must rebalance and the divine physician (the Prophet or a sage) must rectify with admonition.[94] Evidently the assessment of dyscrasia is not only clinical but also ethical, and a balanced temperament ensures sound morals (significantly this is the temperament represented by the Prophet in *al-Tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya*) and positive traits in behaviour, defined in essentially ethical terms as upright (*mustaqīma*), creditable (*mustaḥsana*), and commendable (*maḥmūda*).[95] The composition of the eucratic temperament is, of course, a divine creation, described in detail by Ibn 'Arabi as coming about through a combination of divine choice of eucratic parents, a favourable astral situation, and a happy balance in elements of diet and environment. Thus genetics, astrology, dietetics, and environment combine as a sign of a general eucrasia in which the part enters into organic unity with the whole in a micro-macrocosmic interrelation.[96] On the other hand, the signs of the various members are described with no particular theoretical elaboration, and the material is drawn—as the author explicitly acknowledges—from the fields of medicine and the natural sciences, both being involved in the practice.[97] Characteristic of this treatise is a constant mixing together of medical knowledge, ethical evaluation, and religious belief, with the result that material moulded by other authors into a systematic exposition of scientific principles flows from the pen of Ibn 'Arabi as a sustained hymn to creation. Moreover, the mystic and

[91] Ibn 'Arabi (1919) 162–4.
[92] Ibn 'Arabi (1293/1876) ii. 235–40.
[93] Ibid. 235.
[94] Ibid. 236–7.
[95] Ibid. 238.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid. 239.

(inferior) scientific *firāsa* are taken together in close connection, and together elaborated upon, which marks this treatise out from other canonical studies where the mystic *firāsa* receives only brief mention before a lengthy exposition of the scientific type.

By devoting to physiognomy an extensive treatment of the philosophical and scientific aspects and thereby bringing a degree of autonomy and scientific dignity to a discipline precariously balanced between scientific rigour and the epistemological vagueness of the divinatory arts, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi had set a pattern that was to be followed in two later treatises of some importance. The first, entitled *Kitāb al-firāsa* (*Book of Physiognomy*),[98] was the fruit of the labours of (Shams al-Din) al-Dimashqi (d. 727/1327), also known as *Shaykh al-Rabwa*, an author whose interests ranged wide, from gastronomy to theology and cosmology. Composed at Acre in 723/1323, the treatise adds up to a *summa* of the physiognomic learning of the times, with the declared aim of being fully comprehensive. Al-Dimashqi drew upon the by now canonical sources of the sector (al-Shafi'i,[99] Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Ibn 'Arabi, Aristotle, Polemon,[100] Hippocrates and Rhazes (plus three unidentifiable Indian sources cited in abbreviated form with an identifying sign). The second discourse contains a substantial section on the excellence of *firāsa*, asserted on grounds both religious (the canonical sources) and rational, faithfully following the text of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. The rational grounds are: the science serves to regulate social relations thanks to the knowledge it provides about characters, its empirical validity has been tested by animal trainers, it is founded on scientific principles, based on temperamental physiology, and it has a rightful place among the natural sciences.[101] In fact, here too we find temperament identified as the intermediary element between outer and inner, which must needs correspond to it. On this cogent, common temperamental basis rests the correspondence between visible, physical signs and invisible psychological traits which legitimate the inferential process. Thus physiognomy shares the same position with medicine, having in common the same foundations of the natural sciences which are elaborated in the light of experience,[102] with the effect that any criticism of the one will also apply to the other. This is clearly the same line

[98] Thus on the title-page of Bursa, MS Hüseyin Çelebi 882; in the Cairo edition of 1299/1882, however, it is given as *Kitāb al-siyāsa fī 'ilm al-firāsa*, and also in various other MSS (see Fahd 1966: 386 n. 2). Here we use the Bursa MS, which is a copy from the autograph. The two Cairo editions show a number of significant differences from this in terms of contents (for example, the chapter on slaves is missing, and there are additional chapters on the astrological signs and two Hippocratic treatises) and in readings. Cf. Ch. 5, pp. 265–6.

[99] The degree of physiognomic learning of the imam al-Shafi'i is in fact quite interesting and I hope to return to it in a separate study. He does not appear to have written any treatise on *firāsa* (in the technical sense of the term): I have not yet had the opportunity to consult the *Risāla fī l-ṭabā'i'* under his name in Tunis, Dār al-kutub al-waṭaniyya, Ḥasan Ḥusnī 'Abd al-Wahhāb no. 18020, but the title suggests the field of humoral physiology. For further discussion see Hoyland in this volume, Ch. 5, pp. 241–3.

[100] It is fairly clear that these citations come from the TK recension and not the Leiden Polemon.

[101] Fo. 2^{a-b}.

[102] Fo. 2^{b}, cf. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi 6 (78).

of reasoning taken by the philosopher and theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, quoted *verbatim*, as is, later in the text, the attribution to *firāsa* of sound foundations but conjectural subdivisions.[103]

One cannot help wondering whether, despite their centuries-long experience of physiognomy—a discipline of foreign origin but by then holding a rightful place in the encyclopedia of sciences of classical Islam—learned Muslims might still have felt that the status and scientific dignity of physiognomy was threatened by a certain ambiguity, given the emphasis they place on the medical foundations of the discipline in these treatises. This also marks the ninth discourse (*maqāla*)[104] on the bodily temperaments in the work by al-Dimashqi, which is entirely dependent on *Ad Almansorem*. Here we see an interesting reversal of perspective, for the section on temperaments is cited in this context as 'one of the sections of physiognomy'.[105] Thus the hierarchy shows radical change, whereby physiology now forms part of a broader science of physiognomy, and the Galenic framework of physiognomy as an aid to medicine, institutionalized in the Arab world by Rhazes, is turned upside-down. In this discourse the debt to *Ad Almansorem* is very obvious. It faithfully follows Rhazes' scheme setting out the meanings of the individual elements (first the voice, then the way of speaking, then the gaze, and so on) for the purpose of identifying temperament. Much the same can be said of the eleventh discourse on the acquisition of slaves, although the addition of a few new expressions to the underlying text is significant of the autonomy of a genre of physiognomic learning by now thoroughly canonized and indeed in fair demand by virtue of its generally acknowledged utility.[106] We have a further, significant addition with the whole of the twelfth discourse on the physiognomy of slave women, focusing on their amorous propensities.[107] The author attributes this part to the two scholars from Rayy (Rhazes and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi), although their treatises show not the slightest trace of the topic. It is, however, true that both Ibn al-Akfani and Ibn Butlan make passing reference to a female physiognomy (*firāsat al-nisā'*), the former associating it with the literature on slaves in general and erotological studies and undertaking to write a specific treatise on the subject,[108] the latter glossing over a subject that offended his sense of decency with—so he deemed them—obscene expressions.[109] If we still find reference here to the disciplinary links with divinatory arts such as astrology and various

[103] Fo. 3b, cf. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi 7 (78).

[104] According to the numbering of the Bursa MS, fo. 10^{a}: probably some pages are missing from the MS since the catchword on fo. 9^{b} is not reprised on the next page, and the Cairo edition gives this *maqāla* as the seventh.

[105] Fo. 10^{a}: *ma'khūdhun dhālika min Kitābi l-Manṣūrī wa-kalāmihi idh huwa qismun min aqsāmi l-firāsa.*

[106] Fo. 13^{b}.

[107] Fos. 15^{a}–18^{a}.

[108] Ibn al-Akfani, *Ikmāl al-siyāsa fī 'ilm al-firāsa*, Paris, BNF, ms. arabe 2762, fo. 27^{a}. We propose reading *nisā'* for the incongruous *'anā'* (?): as the context makes clear, reference here is to a *firāsat al-nisā'* which, lying between physiognomy, treatises on slaves, and erotology, became a genre on its own.

[109] Ibn Butlan ed. Harun (1411/1991) 401.

other sciences having to do with physiognomy, the connection with medical learning is confirmed both in the organization of the treatise and in the attention dedicated to the principles of humoral physiology, adopting the scheme pioneered by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.

The same type of organization can be seen in the treatise by the Egyptian physician Ibn al-Akfani, *Ikmāl al-siyāsa fī 'ilm al-firāsa* (*Perfection of the Conduct of the Science of Physiognomy*), which we have already had occasion to mention. In many respects similar to the previous work, this treatise sets out to offer a *summa* on the subject, summarizing the opinions of the most famous physiognomists (Aristotle, Polemon, Hippocrates, Rhazes, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, al-Shafi'i, and Ibn 'Arabi) on the various signs. The introductory part, defining the science, its aims, and its utility, and setting out the theoretical principles, once again states the assumption of a character–temperament correspondence,[110] but its equal standing with medicine is asserted in more peremptory terms (*fa-huwa ka-l-ṭibbi fī l-rutba*, 'it has the same rank as medicine'), while the epistemological justification is less comprehensive, granting that physiognomy is purely empirical, which detracts from its status.[111] Nevertheless, to dignify the exclusively empirical foundations, which are likened to the practice of animal breeders and the knowledge they accrue of the animals' characters, the author invokes as necessary the knowledge of the temperaments, in the case of human beings, and of the related signs manifested in the members. Only the signs associated with temperament, and thus also those of sex and age, can be drawn upon for physiognomic inference since the psychological traits connected with them are inherent in the physical nature itself of the individual. Conversely, signs that are not natural but associated with use of the intellect, and therefore not inherent in the physical nature of the individual, cannot be taken to serve for reliable inferences.[112]

The physiological nature of the sign and consequent legitimacy of physiognomic inference are here enunciated with a perspicuity that arguably places this treatise in a class of its own. At the same time, we have distinct echoes here of the controversy underlying the discussion between Polemon and Hippocrates in the anecdote with which we began this chapter, and indeed of the stress placed by the TK Polemon on the scant reliability of physiognomic signs generated by *taṣannu'* (affectation, artifice), which are due to the distorting action of the intellect.[113] In this connection it is worth noting that for Ibn al-Akfani the

[110] Ibn al-Akfani, fo. 2^a.

[111] Ibid. fo. 2^b: 'the foundations and divisions of this science are empirical' (*wa-uṣūlu hādhā l-'ilmi wa-furū'uhu tajribiyya*); contrast Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, who speaks of absolute foundations (*uṣūl yaqīna*) and empirical divisions (*furū' tajribiyya*).

[112] Ibid. fo. 2^b.

[113] Ibn al-Akfani explicitly takes the point up again at the end of the treatise (fo. 32^a) when he invites the physiognomist to recognize the artifice (*taṣannu'*) which is used to conceal negative features, as practised for example by slave merchants who artfully alter certain physical features of their slaves. This was evidently nothing less than commercial fraud, but was widespread, as attested, for example, by the detailed observations offered by Ibn Butlan. Thus the physician and physiognomist must both seek the realities of body or character without allowing themselves to be taken in by fake signs.

soundness of the zoological method lies in the reliability of the signs: untouched by any regulating action of the intellect, animals react solely as their temperament leads them to, and the analogy between man and animal ultimately lies in an analogy of elements and humours—physical attributes—rather than superficial similarities in appearance.[114] The fact that physiognomic inference cannot be based on signs that do not belong to the realm of temperament[115] demonstrates just how deeply *firāsa* is rooted in medicine, and in particular in the humoral physiology which constitutes its basis. In this we see a return to the analogical paradigm which had given way to the purely empirical aspect of physiognomy: asserting the physiological foundations of semiotic inference in general and in particular at the level of clinical semiotics, Ibn al-Akfani paraphrases the oft-cited passage of Galen's commentary on the *Epidemics*, where it is said that the physician can formulate diagnostic prognoses on the basis of physical similarities.[116] Temperamental physiology also underlies physiognomic assessment of the two sexes. Characterization of male and female types is preceded by a description in terms of temperament,[117] as previously outlined in greater detail by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Actually, in this approach description by type which is characteristic of the Greek treatises gives way to close examination of temperament in physiological terms with all the visible differences, both physical and in character, coming very much into evidence. The temperamental basis is also pivotal to the ethnological and zoological methods: every ethnic group and every animal species is characterized by a specific temperament which determines physical and character traits. Thus, if the Indians have a certain character it is not because they are Indians, but because of the *mizāj* shared by all the individuals belonging to that race.[118] Much the same can be said of the zoological method, where the human–animal analogy rests not so much on a superficial physical resemblance—as it did, for example, in the treatises of Polemon and Ps.-Aristotle—as on a common temperament: a man showing features corresponding to the hot temperament—a sign of courage in man and lion alike—is accordingly judged brave. The intermediate term between animal and man is explicitly identified in temperament, and not external resemblance.[119]

The criterion of 'maximum relevance' (physiologically justified), which attributes to certain body parts the greatest semantic pregnancy for determining personal traits, had already been enounced by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, and we find it taken up by Ibn al-Akfani without any particular originality. Here is the hierarchy of signs (*marātib al-adilla*), the most reliable

[114] Fo. 4^{a-b}. The examples of justified analogy—physical, and thus in character, too—between men and animals closely resemble those in the tradition of the Arabic Ps.-Polemon: see, e.g. the Topkapı recension, MS Ahmet III 3245, fos. 18^{b} ff.

[115] Ibn al-Akfani, fo. 2^{b}: *wa-hādhihi lā yumkinu l-istidlālu 'alayhā wa-lā bi-hā li-annahā mustanidata ilā mā khārijun 'ani l-mizāj wa-aḥwālihi.*

[116] Ibid., fo. 3^{a}.

[117] Ibid., fo. 3^{b}.

[118] Ibid., fo. 4^{a}.

[119] Ibid., fos. 4^{b}–5^{a}.

being those regarding temperament,[120] which moreover call for proper acquaintance with medical learning. In keeping with these basic principles, the following description of the individual temperaments (both simple and compound) is presented in semiotic terms, listing both the physical signs and those of character, but without following the scheme elaborated by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Not even in this treatise, however, does *firāsa* shake itself completely free from some of the divinatory sciences, which are considered part of the discipline and are listed at the end of the theoretical introduction—although what all of these sciences share with it is the evidential paradigm rather than deep theoretical foundations. In the chapters that follow the single parts of the body are described in what had by then become the canonical (and physiognomically hierarchic) order *a capite ad calcem*, following a bipartite scheme beginning with description of the optimal form and then going on to the various features and their physiognomic significance. Evident in this scheme is the return to the Aristotelian model of *metriotēs* as a balance between two extremes, but also the eucratic model typical of temperamental physiology, which reckons what is well balanced (*mu'tadil*) as the best and most preferable element. Oddly enough, the reproductive organs are also included in this catalogue—for the first time, as far as we can tell—together with the more customary legs and knees.[121] This must surely have to do with the scientific background of Ibn al-Akfani, given that a physician's anatomical expertise would have been sadly lacking without a knowledge of these parts, but we may also reasonably wonder whether the inclusion might reflect a eugenic approach, considering that eucratic reproductive organs guarantee a good temperament in the future offspring, as indeed emerges in the passage of Ibn 'Arabi cited above. Aristotle himself had argued that the faculties of the soul depend on the temperament of the mother's blood (*On the Parts of Animals* 2. 4), thus associating genetics with the theory of temperaments.

It is this vision, drawing genetics and temperamental physiology into close association, the one being the premiss for the other, that also imbues the *Liber phisionomie* by Michael Scot, the Scottish astrologer versed in Arabic and the works of Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), and Rhazes. In his book the more strictly physiognomic part is preceded by a substantial *prima pars* replete with notions ranging from gynaecology and embryology to neonatology (to the extent that the colophon refers to the treatise as *De procreatione et hominis physionomia*). In the treatise by Ibn al-Akfani discussion of the physiognomic signs continues with descriptions of individual ethnic groups and animal species: the ethnological and zoological methods characterizing Greek physiognomy are here juxtaposed by virtue of their common physiological matrix. The source expressly cited for deductions of an ethnological nature, consisting essentially in characterological description, is *al-Ahwiya wa-l-buldān* (*Airs and Countries*), by which is meant Hippocrates *Airs,*

[120] Ibid., fo. 5ᵃ.
[121] Ibid. fos. 25ᵃ–26ᵃ.

Waters, Places,[122] a medical source belonging to the specialists' cultural baggage. However, a clearer picture of the background to the work of Ibn al-Akfani emerges when we turn our attention to the zoological information: the sources cited do not include Polemon, although his treatise contained a lengthy zoological section, but we do find Aristotle, the versatile Jahiz, who draws copiously on the zoological output of the Stagirite in his *Kitāb al-ḥayawān* (*Book of Animals*), and above all the physician Ibn Abi l-Ash'ath (d. 360/970), author of various books on Galenic theory and a *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*. This latter work is completely independent of the Aristotelian tradition, dealing systematically with the animal world on the basis of humoral theory, and describing each category of animals in temperamental terms. Preserved as far as we know only in the Oxford *codex unicus*, the book enjoyed great renown among Arab scholars, as indeed is attested by the numerous references made to it by later authors.[123] The choice here made, which is strongly marked from an ideological point of view, sees the symbolic culmination of the development of Arabic *firāsa* from a science of a rhetorical-philosophical background to a science belonging to the sphere of the medical learning which impregnated its very foundations and represented the epistemological status it aspired to.

VIII

Although its development is fairly linear, the theoretical ambivalence of physiognomy, hanging in the balance between scientific certitude and divinatory conjecture in the name of a common semiotic paradigm, causes it to veer now to one side, now to the other. The tendency to extrapolate physiognomic signs from their scientific frame of reference is attested by the dry, paratactic style of certain treatises and epitomes which simply line up lists of signs to which lists of meanings are made to correspond mechanically. This tendency obscures the profound connection that had been instituted between the principles and procedures of medicine and *firāsa*. Here treatment of physiognomic signs is integrated in wider-ranging considerations of signs of an ominous or divinatory nature in general. Indeed, in a certain sense the medical semiotics that acted as a powerful motor for the discipline is broadened into a more general science of the sign. This semiological perspective is what we find, for example, in the *Kitāb al-dalā'il* (*Book of Signs*) of the Nestorian Ibn Bahlul (or Bar Bahlul; fourth/tenth century),[124] an author who was famous as a lexicographer and translator and who studied medicine in his youth.

[122] Known in Arabic as *Kitāb al-ahwiya wa-l-miyāh wa-l-buldān or Kitāb al-ahwiya wa-l-buldān*: Ibn Abi Usaybi'a 31 Müller=54 Rida.

[123] Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Arab. 456, 6=Huntington 534, fos. 347^a–500^b; see Uri (1787) 117, and on the work and its fortunes Kruk (1986) 427–9.

[124] On the author and the work, see *GAS* vi. 231, vii. 332–3; Ullmann (1970) 102; Fahd (1966) 225–6; Habbi (1984); Lamoreaux (1999).

The book is an example of what is called the *malḥama* genre,[125] and probably written in AD 942. It is a veritable encyclopedia of all the signs, divided into forty-nine chapters. Here we find the omens that can be drawn from the seasons, months, and weeks, and from the various calendars and festivities, together with the signs of diseases, the symptoms of poisoning, meteorological signs, and the interpretation of dreams. There is also a chapter on physiognomic signs (ch. 43), and one on the signs to take account of when acquiring slaves (ch. 46);[126] both faithfully cite Rhazes' *Ad Almansorem*. However, the two chapters which are consecutive in Rhazes (in order: humoral physiology, signs of humours, examination of slaves and physiognomy) are now separated, and above all are isolated from any broader theoretical context that could confirm the connection made clear by the organization of the *Ad Almansorem*. What Ibn Bahlul does is to insert the physiognomic chapter drawn from Rhazes between the chapters on meteorological signs and the signs of poisoning, thus eluding the semiotic link that creates common ground between physiognomy and the slave trade. Moreover, humoral physiology is no longer the necessary premiss for physiognomic inference, but is treated separately after it (ch. 45), between poisons and the examination of slaves. Consequently, all we are left with are two lists of—apparently disconnected—signs.

The tendency of the clinical semiotic perspective to slip into a more generically semiological mode is also to be seen in the later European physiognomic tradition in the person of Giovan Battista Della Porta, who aspired to achieve a 'semeiotica universale'[127] with his works *Coelestis physiognomonia*, *De humana physiognomonia*, and *Phitognomonica*. The same tendency is also to be seen in the *Qabs al-anwār wa-bahjat al-asrār* (*The Lighting of Lights and the Splendour of Secrets*), preserved in a Leiden manuscript (Universiteitsbibliotheek, Or. 5, catalogue no. 1220), a work of a composite nature containing in twenty chapters notions of astrological, erotological, divinatory, hermetic, and medical interest. Among these we find a table of physiognomy,[128] which, as the title makes clear, is a rearrangement of the last part of the famous *Secretum secretorum*, also known as the *Kitāb al-siyāsa fī tadbīr al-riʾāsa* (*Book of Government and Leadership*), and which also contains a section on the physiognomy of women drawn from other sources, and very probably from the TK Polemon.[129] This work was evidently intended to provide rapid reference to a readership that included people with no specific grounding, as can be deduced from the organization of the table in columns, and the absence of any theoretical or methodological introduction, reflecting, albeit with different graphic organization, the plain presentation of the *Secretum secretorum*. Nevertheless, the basic notions underlying physiognomic evaluation unquestionably remain rooted in the medical field: although the concepts of temperament (*mizāj*) and eucrasia

[125] The term indicates a composition of a divinatory nature: Fahd (1991), cf. (1966) 244 ff.

[126] Translation and comment in Ghersetti (2001).

[127] Agrimi (2002) 57–8.

[128] Publication, translation, and annotation in Ghersetti (1994).

[129] Ahmet III, 3207, fos. 78^b ff., explicitly mentioned in a *Faṣl fī l-ʿayn al-maḥmūda* preserved in Bursa, MS Hüseyin Çelebi, 882, fo. 54^a.

(*i'tidāl*), and the idea of the 'decoction' of the humours receive no more detailed treatment or searching discussion here than in the *Secretum secretorum*, they do make an appearance as background material.

Despite developments at a purely semiological level and mechanistic applications which were dictated by the needs for practical usage so frequently claimed as one of its great virtues, physiognomy in the Arabic-Islamic world established important links with the epistemologically strong discipline of medicine, sharing with it—as our sources underline—the same analogical model *(qiyās)* and empirical nature (*tajriba*). Indeed, it was quite probably the analogical model that boosted the fortunes of physiognomy in the Arab world. While on the one hand Arabic physiognomists never lost sight of the alien origins of the science, the principle of *qiyās*, analogy, is a scientific paradigm typical of the legal and linguistic thinking that permeates the mentality of Muslim scholars in the classical age, and it is probably to this common paradigm that the pseudo-science of physiognomy owed its success in the Arab world.

7

Polemon's *Physiognomy* in the Arabic Tradition

*Antonella Ghersetti with Simon Swain**

In his *Kitāb al-ḥayawān* (*Book of Animals*) al-Jahiz (d. 255/868) includes three quotations from Polemon on the pigeon (*al-ḥamām*).[1] None of them is extant in the manuscripts of the Arabic tradition which are considered in this chapter. The passages quoted refer to suggestions by Polemon about the suitability of pigeons as pets. They have a zoological character rather than a physiognomical one, and this does not accord with any of the known versions of Polemon's *Physiognomy*. Nevertheless, al-Jahiz refers to Polemon as the *ṣāḥib al-firāsa* ('Master of Physiognomy', 'Physiognomist') which would imply that the Polemonian *Physiognomy* is the book from which the quotations are taken, and might just indicate the existence of a recension of the work which has not been preserved.[2] In any case they prove that both the work and its author were well known in the third century AH/ninth century AD.

In the Arabic tradition there is, as we have seen in Ch. 5, a kind of myth around the personality of Polemon and his skills as a physiognomist. His name is in fact mentioned in almost all the sources in connection with his treatise, and he is defined as 'Master of Physiognomy' by antonomasia. Under the entry *Aflīmūn* the well-known seventh/thirteenth-century biographer Ibn al-Qifti describes him not as a philosopher or as the rhetorician he really was, but as a scientist and an expert on physiognomy who was a contemporary of Hippocrates:

> Polemon was outstanding and great, and expert in one of the natural sciences. He was contemporary with Hippocrates and, I think, of Syrian origin. He was a specialist in physiognomy and knowledgeable about it; when he saw somebody and his constitution he could infer his character. He is the author of a well-known treatise on this subject, which has been translated from Greek into Arabic. There is also a strange story about him and the companions of Hippocrates. . .[3]

* Simon Swain is responsible for the comparative table and for nn. 7, 16–40.

[1] Ed. Harun, iii. 146, 269, 284. Cf. Hoyland, Ch. 5, p. 236.

[2] Though the anecdotal, oral tradition of the Greek sages (*ḥukamā'*) is perhaps a likelier source: the story about the usefulness (*naf'*) of the dove (p. 284 Harun) is explicitly a *ḥadīth* ('anecdote'). Cf. similarly sayings of Polemon in Mubashshir ibn Fatik, Hoyland, Ch. 5, p. 238.

[3] *Ta'rīkh al-ḥukamā'*, ed. Lippert, p. 60. Ibn al-Qifti directs us to the biography of Hippocrates for the full version of the story, pp. 91–2.

The best witness to the myth of Polemon is indeed the well-known anecdote Ibn al-Qifti refers to, which was incorporated in the Istanbul recension of his work (henceforth TK)—probably for the first time—and is presented in Arabic and English in Ch. 9 of this volume.

The celebrity of Polemon as an authority in the field of physiognomy is attested by pseudonymous attributions in Arabic. Sometimes the presence of the Hippocrates anecdote before a list of physiognomical signs constitutes the pretext for the false attribution, as in the case of the short treatise preserved in the Vatican Library (see I. ii. 3 and II. ii. 3 below). In another case, the St Petersburg text (see I. ii. 2 and II. ii. 2), a treatise dealing with temperaments and humoral physiology, is attributed to Polemon simply because of his fame as a physiognomist. He is mentioned in more than one source as the author of a treatise on the physiognomy of women which is preserved in at least three manuscripts (see below, II. i. 2*c*). His name also appears in another small work (the Physiognomonia Gothana; below I. ii. 4), which is based on the third part of the *Kitāb al-firāsa* of the theologian and philosopher Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209).[4] The attribution to Polemon of two longer treatises—the TK recension—has far more justification. However, these texts are not 'by' Polemon but represent major reworkings of what seems to be the lost original Arabic translation (PA), which is the source of all the surviving Arabic Polemoniana including the Leiden recension.

This rather puzzling situation is well summarized in T. Fahd's words: 'Les manuscrits de son œuvre présentent des divergences importantes; seule une étude comparative approfondie permettrait d'en retrouver la structure primitive.'[5] While we remain very sceptical about the possibility of finding the 'primitive structure' of the book as it appeared in Arabic unless new manuscripts are discovered, we nevertheless believe that an analysis of the various physiognomical works presented under the name of Polemon will be useful both for clarifying the problem of pseudonymous attributions and for fulfilling one of this project's major aims of studying the transmission of physiognomical knowledge from Classical Antiquity to medieval Islam.

The following is, then, an attempt to present the extant manuscripts of the Arabic Polemon together with the major Ps.-Polemonic material.[6] What we may suppose to be closest to the original text of Polemon in Arabic translation has been preserved in the Leiden manuscript edited and translated in this volume by Robert Hoyland (Ch. 8). It is virtually certain that the TK recension,

[4] The second half of the Gotha recension draws like Fakhr al-Din (for whom see text and translation in Mourad 1939) on the *Kitāb l-manṣūrī fī l-ṭibb* (the *Ad Almansorem)* of the great Abu Bakr al-Razi (Rhazes; d. 313/925). Fakhr al-Din himself includes additional material from Polemon and Ps.-Aristotle (cf. Grignaschi 1976: 39), as well as having his own theoretical input.

[5] Fahd (1966) 386.

[6] The data collected are based on the perusal of the catalogues of Arabic manuscripts kept in European and other libraries which were available to me, and principally those kept in the Universiteitsbibliotheek Leiden, in the Università Ca' Foscari in Venice, in the Université de Liège, and in my private collection. Only treatises carrying the name of Polemon in the title have been included in the list, which is not of course exhaustive, nor pretends to be.

which is partly translated in Ch. 9, represents an alternative direct reworking of PA.[7] All the other texts we have been able to consult are epitomized and elaborated versions of TK or the results of false attributions. They show clearly the importance attributed to Polemon's treatise in Islamic culture.

I. LIST OF SOURCES

(i) The Arabic Polemon: Manuscripts

1. *Kitāb Aflīmūn fī l-firāsa*, Leiden, Bibliotheek der Universiteit, Or. 198, fos. 2ᵇ–50ᵃ, clearly written naskhi, cm 18.5 × 13.5, occasionally vocalized, 15 lines per page, dated Damascus 757/1356 (de Jong and de Goeje 1865: 165–8, no. 1206; NB: '1206' should not be used to designate the MS).
2. *Kitāb Afīlāmūn fī l-firāsa wa-l-tawassum*, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3207, fos. 33ᵃ–75ᵃ, beautiful naskhi, cm 20.5 × 13, almost completely vocalized, 15 lines per page, dated 680/1281 (Karatay 1966: 90, no. 7484).
3. *Kitāb Aflīmūn fī 'ilm al-firāsa*, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3245, 65 fos., beautiful naskhi, cm 24.5 × 17, completely vocalized, 9 lines per page, not dated (ibid., no. 7485).
4. *Kitāb li-Falīmūn ... fī l-firāsa*, Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi 1556, 66 fos., beautiful naskhi, cm 19 × 14, completely vocalized, 9 lines per page, not dated.

5*a*. Nuruosmaniye 1957 (Hajji Khalifa, ed. Flügel, vii. 297), 135 fos., fully vocalized, 9 lines per page; see Foerster i, pp. lxxxvii–cxi.

5*b*. Nuruosmaniye, *Defter*, no. 2388, the same (?) as Nuruosmaniye 1957 (see Witkam 2004: 45 bibliography; cf. Holford-Strevens 1997: 115).

6. Quotations in al-Dimashqi, *Kitāb al-siyāsa fī 'ilm al-firāsa* (see e.g. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3589; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. arabe 5928; Bursa İnebey İl Halk Kütüphanesi, Hüseyin Çelebi 882; printed edition Cairo 1299/1882, cf. Hoffmann ap. Foerster i. 96 'quam neglegentissime edito'; further, II. i. 6 below).

[7] Note errors and displacements of material in Leiden corresponding to the portraits of the Androgynous, Bitter, and Mild types of Ad. B52–4 and Anon. Lat. 98–100. (i) In Leiden we have chs. 61 Effeminate Man and 62 Humble Man. The material relating to the Bitter Man comes in Leiden chs. 66 Hypocritical Man. 'Hypocritical', *al-murāʾī*, may be (?) a confusion/error for *al-murr* ('bitter'; both are written similarly) which Hoffmann wanted to read; though note that TK has *marāra*, 'bitterness'. This suggests that the deviation arose in the Leiden tradition, not the lost PA. (ii) Leiden ch. 61 has only half the material of the original (Adamantius and Anon. Lat.); the other half is used at the end of ch. 65 Evil Man. In the TK tradition (which is represented faithfully in Latin by Foerster 1893: i, p. xcvi, translating the same section of the Nurusomaniye epitome, which he calls Epitoma Constantinopolitana) the portrait of the *mukhannath* ('effeminate') shortens but clearly keeps together the material in Ad. B52 'Androgynous' = Anon. Lat. 98, which the Leiden MS splits up between chs. 61 and 65. This again suggests that TK drew on a better version, which must be PA, and that the Leiden Polemon represents a later confusion.

7. Aleppo Ahmadiyya 1370: edited by M. R. al-Tabbakh; see I. iii. 2 for details.

(ii) Manuscripts of Ps.-Polemon

1. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207, fos. 75^b–92^a; see below under II. i. 2(*c*).
2. *Maqāla li-Aqlīmūn fī l-tabāʾiʿ li-Abī ʿAlī b. Sīnā* (?), St Petersburg State University Scientific Library, Oriental Section, MS Arab. 678 h, fos. 108^a–114^a, *nastaʿlīq*, 18 lines per page, copied in 1049/1640 (Frolova and Deryagina 1996: 182, no. 928).
3. *ʿIlm al-firāsa l-ṭabīʿiyya wa-huwa ʿilm bi-umūr badaniyya ẓāhira tadull ʿalā mā khafiya min al-sajāyā wa-l-akhlāq taʾlīf Iflāmūn*, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgiani arabi 260, fos. 384^b–387^b, modern Western writing, cm 20 × 13, not vocalized, 22 lines per page, not dated (Levi della Vida 1935: 273).
4. *Physiognomonia Gothana*. MS Gotha ar. 85: see Pertsch 1878–92, i. 151, Foerster, i, p. clxxvii, ii, 147–60 (Latin translation).

(iii) Printed Editions

1. *Kitāb Aflīmūn fī l-firāsa*, ed. G. Hoffmann (Foerster i. 98–294).
2. *Kitāb al-firāsa li-Fīlīmūn al-ḥakīm wa-yalīhi jumal aḥkām al-firāsa li-Abī Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyā al-Rāzī*, ed. M. R. al-Tabbakh, Aleppo (1347/1929): uncritical edition based on MS 1370, Aleppo, Maktaba Ahmadiyya (cf. Zonta 1992: 27 n. 82; Fahd 1966: 385 n. 2 erroneously identifies it with the Ps.-Polemon Gotha ar. 85). The text corresponds very closely to the one preserved in MS Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3245.
3. *al-Firāsa li-Fīlamūn al-ḥakīm wa-yalīhi jumal aḥkām al-firāsa li-Abī Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyā al-Rāzī* ([Cairo]: Maktabat al-thaqafa al-diniyya, 1421/2001), 72 pp.: a popular edition of Tabbakh without his brief introduction.

II. DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES

(i) Manuscripts of the Arabic Polemon

1. Leiden or. 198

See above. The *Kitāb fī l-firāsa*, fos. 2^b–50^a, is followed in the same hand by the *Kitāb al-ʿirāfa wa-l-zajr*, fos. 50^b–72^b, a treatise of 'divination and augury according to the discipline of the Persians and others' ascribed to Jahiz and other material relating to Indian and Persian physiognomy, and finally the *bāb min al-istidlāl bi l-firāsa*, fos. 72^b–76^a, a short treatise of physiognomical deduction from spots and pimples allegedly based on Hippocrates and translated by Hunayn ibn Ishaq.

2. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207

This manuscript contains:

(*a*) fos. 1^{b}–32^{b}: *Kitāb Arisṭāṭālīs fī l-firāsa*; the Arabic translation of the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy* by Hunayn.[8]

(*b*) fos. 33^{a}–75^{a}: *Kitāb Afīlāmūn fī l-firāsa wa-l-tawassum*; a recension of PA. This will be analysed below, III. i, with the other TK text.

(*c*) fos. 75^{b}–92^{a}: a treatise on the physiognomy of women attributed to Polemon (*wa-li-Aflīmūn fī firāsati l-nisā'*) mentioned by Ibn al-Akfani and Hajji Khalifa, which is in fact a treatise of erotology already known in the 10th c. as *Kitāb al-bāh*.[9] The same text is preserved in a manuscript at Granada, Sacro Monte, under the title *Kitāb al-bāh ... waḍḍa'ahu Aflīmūn al-faylasūf*,[10] and in MS Ar. 5367, Tehran University Library, under the title *Kitāb al-bāh wa-waṣf al-nisā' wa-khalwatihinna ... min Kitāb Aflīmūn al-ḥakīm ṣāḥib Kitāb al-firāsa*.[11]

3. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3245

This manuscript is not dated but was probably written in the 13th or 14th c.; there is a mistake in the numeration of the folios: fo. 48 is *recte* 43 *bis*. The script is fully vocalized and has a beautiful, easily readable hand. The text preserved here is closely related to Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207 and will be analysed below, III. i.

4. Manisa 1556

This manuscript, in a beautiful and easy to read naskhi, has no colophon and is not dated. It was probably written in the 13th or 14th c. The text of the *Kitāb al-firāsa* is preserved in fos. 1^{b}–66^{a}; it is the same as Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3245. Both were most probably copied from the same source: there is no significant difference in readings, except in two cases: Manisa fo. 14^{b} has *al-ibil* 'the camel(s)' instead of *al-asad* 'the lion' in Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3245 fo. 16r.; Manisa fo. 22^{a} has *mudawwar al-ra's* 'with a round head' instead of *idhā naẓarta* 'if you observe' in Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3245 fo. 23^{a}.

5. Nuruosmaniye 1957

Left by Osman III to the Nuruosmaniye mosque in 1755 (see Holford-Strevens 1997: 115 n. 74 correcting the report of Foerster i, p. lxxxvii). A Latin translation of some parts of the text (by G. Hoffmann on the basis of notes taken by C. Lang) is published in Foerster i, pp. lxxxvii–xcix. The passages translated demonstrate that the text derives from an interpolated version of Polemon,

[8] Ghersetti (1999*a*).

[9] See Ghersetti (1999*b*).

[10] Asin Palacios (1911) 261–2 no. VII.

[11] A photocopy of this MS is held at the Universiteitsbibliotheek Leiden, or. 23.424.

where the original order has been changed. Foerster concluded (p. xcix) that the Nuruosmaniye codex was an epitome of Leiden, and—because of the several corruptions and interpolations—should not be used as a trusted source. But from a thorough comparison with the other Arabic versions it is reasonably certain that the text is an epitome of the tradition preserved in the two TK manuscripts; see further below, III. ii.

6. *Quotations in al-Dimashqi, Kitāb al-siyāsa fī ʿilm al-firāsa*

Quotations of Polemon made by al-Dimashqi (d. 727/1327) in his *Book of Physiognomy* (*Perfection of the Conduct of the Science of Physiognomy*). The comparison was made on the basis of MS Bursa, Hüseyin Çelebi 882 which has been copied from the autograph. We have not used the Cairo edition (cf. I. i. 6) since it bears no indication of the manuscripts it is based on and furthermore has important differences in the arrangement and wording of the text. A comparison between the text of al-Dimashqi and the text of Polemon (Leiden and the TK recensions) was made on the chapters concerning head, hair, ears, and nose. Although al-Dimashqi is summarizing and his quotations are therefore not completely reliable as regards actual wording, the comparison of the texts shows clearly that he is dependent on the TK tradition rather than on the Leiden recension. In general there are many similarities with Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207 and one or two signs are quoted *verbatim* from it; there is only one sentence identical with Leiden, and this is also found identically in Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207.

(ii) Manuscripts of Ps.-Polemon

1. *Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207, fos. 75ᵇ–92ᵃ*

See above under II. i. 2(*c*).

2. *St Petersburg State University Scientific Library, Oriental Section, Arabic 678*

This treatise, which bears the title *Maqāla li-Aqlīmūn fī l-ṭabāʾiʿ*, was copied in 1049/1640 at the Dār al-salṭana of Isfahan.[12] It is not a work on physiognomy and has nothing in common with the genuine Arabic recensions of Polemon. Rather, it is a short treatise on the nature of living creatures, above all man, and the four elements (hot, cold, wet, dry) that determine their temperaments. The catalogue mentions a probable attribution to Ibn Sina (Avicenna), but there is no textual evidence to prove this. It may be remarked that the treatise is part of a *majmūʿa* which contains *inter alia* two works of Ibn Sina (*Risālat al-ʿarūs* and *Risāla fī anna lā makhāfa fī l-mawt*) that precede Ps.-Polemon: it is perhaps

[12] I wish to thank Dr Marina Karpova of St Petersburg University Scientific Library for her promptness in sending a copy of the MS, and Professor Efim Rezvan of the Academy of Sciences of St Petersburg for his generous assistance in responding to my request.

because of this and because of the medical subject-matter of the treatise that Ibn Sina's authorship has been proposed.[13]

3. *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgiani Arabi 260*

This physiognomical treatise is part of a miscellaneous volume of 474 fos. entitled *Majmū' al-funūn* (*The Totality of Arts*) and including fragments of various origin collected by Archbishop Giuseppe David (Yusuf Dawud) during a stay in Rome in 1849. The writing is modern and the presence of elements extraneous to the Arabic script (question marks indicating doubtful readings, brackets) must be stressed. The text has nothing to do with the work of Polemon: it is in fact the chapter on physiognomy from the *Sirr al-asrār* (*Secret of Secrets*). The text corresponds exactly to that edited by 'A.-R. Badawi (pp. 116 ff.). The attribution to Polemon is due to the presence of the Hippocrates anecdote (cf. above) and demonstrates once again that in the Islamic world Polemon was considered the most authoritative source in the field of *firāsa*.

III. COMPARISONS BETWEEN SOURCES

(i) Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207 and 3245

(*a*) In 3207 the division into chapters is more in evidence than in 3245: (1) at the end of each chapter the scribe uses a formulaic closure (*qad fassartu laka*, 'I have explained to you'), which is picked up in the formulaic opening of the following chapter (*wa-anā mufassirun laka*, 'And I am explaining to you'), whereas the formulaic closure is lacking in 3245; (2) the titles of chapters are accorded a greater graphic emphasis.

(*b*) There are some differences in the transcription of Greek and Latin names. For Hippocrates the standardized form *Buqrāṭ* (the normal transcription) is used in 3245 versus the more archaic *Hīwāfaqrāṭīs* (?) of 3207;[14] the name of the emperor Hadrian is written as *Hadharyūs* (fo. 35^b) in 3245 while the dots are lacking in 3207 (fo. 51^a): probably the copist could not identify the name. The name of Polemon has different transcriptions in the two MSS: *Aflīmūn*, *Iflīmūn* or *Falīmūn*, *Filīmūn* in 3245, *Afilāmūn*, *Filamūn*, or *Filāmūn* in 3207.

[13] The humoral-medical content is also responsible for the attribution to Polemon as the physiognomist *par excellence*.

[14] A similar transcription, whose distinctive characteristic is to start with *h*, is found in the anonymous treatise kept at the Zahiriyya in Damascus (see Ch. 9, p. 466) where Hippocrates is written as *Hibūqrātis*. Ibn Abi Usaybi'a (*'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, ed. Müller, p. 28 = pp. 48–9 Rida) says that 'the original form of his name in Greek is *Īfūqrātis*, and he is called *Hūbuqrāṭīs*; but the Arabs are in the habit of making names lighter and shortening the senses [Ibn abi Usaybi'a has just explained the literal meaning of the Greek name] and they made this name lighter and said *Abuqrāṭ* and *Buqrāṭ*.'

(*c*) The famous anecdote of Polemon and Hippocrates is more concise in 3245, where the character portrait of Polemon is lacking; in this part we find various elliptical expressions in comparison with 3207.

(*d*) In the theoretical/methodological introduction, 3245 presents material which is lacking in 3207: apart from some lines here and there, we have supplementary categories of physiognomonists (e.g. on *nabāt al-arḍ*, 'plants of the earth', fos. 11^{b}–12^{a}), and some general considerations on the inductive sciences (12^{b}).

(*e*) Eleven animals listed in fo. $17^{a(end)-b}$ of 3245 are lacking in 3207 (fo. 43^{a}). Among them is the pigeon.

(*f*) Some portraits of people resembling animals in 3245 (fos. 18^{a}–23^{a}), introduced by the words *wa-idhā naẓarta ilā l-insāni . . . fa-qḍi 'alayhi bi. . .*, 'and when you consider someone . . . judge them by. . .', are lacking in 3207. They seem to be an addition to the Arabic tradition as it is otherwise known, since there is no trace of them in 3207 or Leiden.

(*g*) In the list of parts of the body and their physiognomical interpretation there are about 20 omissions in 3245 in comparison with 3207.

(*h*) There is a group of human psychological portraits with a different position in the two MSS: the portraits of fos. 57^{b}–59^{b} in 3245 are placed at the end of the text in 3207 (fos. 72^{b}–74^{a}). Therefore, while they are apparently in the correct position, or anyhow in a more consistent position, in 3245 (where they are part of a chapter on human characters), they have probably been misplaced in 3207, where they follow the ethnic portraits. In these passages there are some slight differences in wording.

(*i*) Three psychological portraits (the philosophical man, the covetous man, the vicious man) fos. 72^{b}, l. 2–73^{a}, l. 13 of 3207 are lacking in 3245.

(*j*) At the end of 3207 (fo. 74^{b}, l. 5–75^{a}) there are some observations on positive signs and some methodological notes on the interpretation of limbs which are lacking in 3245. These have most probably been misplaced, since they refer to the parts of the body and the general criteria for analysing them (cf. the title *bāb al-a'ḍā'*, 'chapter on parts of the body/limbs') which have been treated in the introductory part of the text.

(*k*) There are various different readings: e.g. 3207 has the rarer *annā*, 'from where?', 'how come?' (fo. 35^{b}) instead of the common *min ayna* of 3245 (fo. 4^{a}); 3207 has *al-sinnawr*, 'cat' (fo. 43^{a}) instead of 3245 *al-ḍaywan*, 'tom cat' (fo. 15^{a}); 3207 has *al-ḥamrā'*, 'red' (fo. 39^{a}) for 3245 *al-ṣafrā'*, 'yellow' (fo. 9^{b}).

Conclusions: in 3245 Greek names are written in a more standardized form and there are fewer grammatical mistakes. Nevertheless, the readings given by the scribe of 3207 are often more consistent with the sense. As regards the text in general, while some small parts extant in 3207 are absent from 3245 (and vice versa), the general arrangement of 3245 seems more coherent, while 3207 presents two important misplacements (*h*, *j* above). However, there are only slight differences in wording overall and it may be concluded that the two TK texts are variants.

(ii) Nuruosmaniye 1957 and Topkapı Sarayı Recension

A comparison between the Latin excerpts published by Foerster and the TK texts shows that we are dealing with a summarized version of the same text in the Nuruosmaniye manuscript (cf. II. i. 5 above). While the wording is exactly the same, there are some omissions (e.g. in the chapter on ears), and in some cases long passages extant in the two TK manuscripts are lacking in Nuruosmaniye (e.g. the long dialogue between Hippocrates and Polemon and the long discussion of the three properties of the soul in the 'preface'). It is most probably an epitome of the tradition preserved in Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207 and 3245.

(iii) Leiden Or. 198. 1 and Topkapı Sarayı Recension

(*a*) The material treated is the same but the subdivision into chapters is more precise in Leiden: for example, in the TK tradition *al-afkhādh wa-l-rukab wa-l-sūq wa-l-aqdām* ('the thighs, the knees, the legs, and the feet') and *mā bayna l-ka'b wa-l-'urqūb* ('the part between the ankle and the heel') are treated in the same chapter, whereas in Leiden they are treated over five consecutive chapters (5–9).

(*b*) Specific blocks of material appear in a different order: see below, where the contents of both traditions is set out comparatively.

(*c*) The treatment of the body parts is in a different order: in Leiden the order is more or less upward, from feet to head (cf. Ps.-Aristotle), whereas the opposite order is used in the TK tradition. The top-to-toe order is also found in later treatises of *firāsa*. It follows the Islamic-Galenic medical tradition.[15]

(*d*) The TK texts begin with the long, spurious anecdote about Polemon and Hippocrates which stresses the physiognomical ability of Polemon. They also feature an introduction explaining the scientific basis of *firāsa* and the methods of physiognomical analysis.

(*e*) In both the Leiden and TK texts the eye has a special status: in both the eye has first place, even if in what follows the order of the signs from the other body parts is reversed. It should be stressed that in the TK texts the eye is placed after the description of animals and stands at the beginning of the list of the parts. This is not consistent with Leiden, where it is in the very first place and all other signs are secondary to it. Nevertheless, the extent of the treatment in the TK tradition is much the same as Leiden at roughly 30 per cent of the whole.

(*f*) In both the Leiden and the TK texts the block of the general elements (colour and hair, movement) which concern various parts of the body comes after the section on the individual members but does not have the same general arrangement. In Leiden the blocks limbs–colour/hair are separated by the section of ethnic portraits.

[15] Anon. Lat. also uses a roughly top-to-toe ordering.

(*g*) In general all the anecdotes and the personal experiences referred to by Polemon in Leiden (e.g. in the chapter on the eye and chs. 68–70) have been deleted in the TK tradition. Only two Greek personal names have survived in the TK texts and these are found in the chapter on the eye: Alexander the Great (*al-Iskandar*) and the emperor Hadrian (*Hadharyūs*).[16]

(*h*) The many animals listed in Leiden ch. 2 have been reduced in the TK versions (where there are one or two animals not present in Leiden). While the criteria of physiognomical deduction (from animals) are abbreviated in comparison with Leiden, the passages concerning sexual criteria and the portraits of male and female and the lion and leopard are exactly the same.

(*i*) In the TK MSS ethnic names of the Islamic empire have been substituted for the ethnic names familiar to the classical Greeks which appear in Leiden chs. 31 and 35, though the 'Egyptians' of ch. 31 remain and the 'pure Greek' type of ch. 35 also survives.[17]

(*j*) Some psychological portraits (based on an ethical evaluation) have been inserted into the TK MSS (*ahl al-sharr, ahl al-khayr*, 'people of evil', 'people of good'); this kind of ethical evaluation based on the accomplishment of religious duties is also present elsewhere (e.g. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207, fo. 70^b).

(*k*) As regards wording, the TK MSS present only a few passages which correspond exactly to Leiden (e.g. animals in general, the lion and the leopard, some short passages in the chapters on eyes, neck, and voice). The TK texts present important differences in: 1. phraseology (same meaning but different words); 2. meaning of the physiognomical signs; 3. position of the signs in the chapters; 4. additions of signs; 5. expansions of the physiognomical meanings of signs (more psychological characters corresponding to one sign). Furthermore, the usual invitation to express a physiognomical judgement in Leiden (*fa-qḍi 'alā*) has become in Topkapı Sarayı 3207 a dogmatic and mechanical correspondence between a physical sign and its psychological trait (*dalīl 'alā*, 'is a sign of'), though there are some examples of *fa-qḍi 'alā* in 3245.

IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

We may divide the text of the *Kitāb al-firāsa* in the Arabic tradition into two parts; a central unit (composed of the list of signs of body parts and the

[16] They occur in Leiden in the same chapter, ch. 1 (A14, A16). The other personal names in Leiden (also in the eye chapter) are Laius, Oedipus, Pelops (A5), *Alwqyds* (A11), and Socrates and Apollo (A13). Note that Adamantius and his derivatives add only Thyestes (A5), Tereus (A5; see translation n. 14), and Heracles (B6; but see translation n. 73). See also Ch. 3 n. 206 for the Homeric names preserved by Bar Hebraeus.

[17] *al-Yūnān*, meaning 'ancient Greeks'. The Byzantines, *al-Rūm*, are mentioned in the substitutions along with peoples of Syria, Hejaz, Iraq, India, Khurasan, China, and Yemen.

ethnic portraits) and peripheral units (comprising the anecdote about Polemon and Hippocrates, the theoretical/methodological introduction, and the psychological portraits). The central unit is the more stable, as can be seen from the comparative tables below, while the peripheral ones are more likely to be changed around. It has been remarked already that the TK tradition probably derives from PA directly. In comparison with Leiden it can be seen to be rearranged, summarized in some points, and expanded in others, and quite different in wording and phraseology. The most important changes are the deletion of the rich series of anecdotes and references to contemporaries of Polemon and to Greek personalities or ethnic names, and the addition of elements pertaining to the Islamic world. We can in fact say that there has been a kind of adaptation to the Arab Islamic encyclopedia and its geographical horizon. This adaptation is obvious in the references to the religious sphere: e.g. *ṣalāh*, 'salat/prayer', and *tasbīḥ*, 'glorification of God' are characteristics of the pious lifestyle in Islam (Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207, fo. 70^b, cf. ch. 49 of Leiden), while the insistence on the unity (*waḥdāniyya*) of God (e.g. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207, fo. 41^b) must be connected with this central Islamic dogma. The substitution of ethnic categories of the Islamic empire for those of the Greek classical world further testifies to this adaptation. Besides this, the opposite order of the signs must be stressed again, since the original upward order of the Greek tradition (both Polemon and Ps.-Aristotle) has been inverted; the opposite, downward order is typical of the great medical treatises of the Arabic tradition and certainly shows the influence of medicine on the books of *firāsa*. The rearrangement of the chapters, the dogmatic form of correspondence between sign and meaning (cf. the formula *dalīl 'alā*, 'is a sign of'), and the adaptation to Arab culture testifies to a wish to simplify the subject-matter and to adapt it to a public that wanted the book for practical purposes.

In general, the manuscripts of the Arabic Polemon may be broken down into:

(i) one tradition represented by the Leiden text, which on a comparison with Adamantius is clearly similar in its arrangement to the Greek original (and represents a direct and close reworking of the lost Arabic original translation PA);

(ii) an alternative tradition, more typically Arabic or, better put, 'Islamicized', which is represented by Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207 and 3245 and their derivatives.

V. TABLES OF CONTENTS OF LEIDEN OR. 198.1 AND OF TOPKAPI SARAYI, AHMET III 3207

The cumulative table of contents below shows the special status of the eye in Leiden as well as the opposite order of the body parts in the two versions. The following blocks of material have been distinguished by line divisions: A. prolegomena, B. parts/members, C. ethnic portraits, D. general signs, E. psychological portraits. The key words in the Arabic titles are given here.

An English translation follows which includes the titles of the chapters in Adamantius (with an indication of their rough equivalents in the Anonymus Latinus). The order of the Leiden is taken as basic.

(i) Chapter Titles (Key Words) of Leiden Or. 198.1 and Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3207: Arabic

Leiden	Topkapı
A	**A** (خبر بقراط وافليمون)
	الثلثة الأصول
	اشباه من الدواب
	التذكير والتأنيث
العين	حركة الأوصال
شبه سائر الحيوان (التذكير والتأنيث)	(شبه سائر الحيوان، التذكير والتأنيث)
B الاظفار	**B** العين
الاصابع	الاذنان
القدمان	الانف
الكعبان والعرقبان	الافواه
الساقان	الجباه
الركبتان	اللحي والوجنات
الورقان والفخذان	الذقن
الحقوان	الرؤوس
الظهر	الأعناق
انحناء الظهر	الاكتاف
الاضلاع	الصدور والاضلاع
البطن	الاعضاء والسواعد والاكف
ما بين السرة الى رأس الصدر	الظهر والأحقي
الصدر	الافخاذ والركب والسوق والاقدام
الثدان	
الكتفان والمنكبان	**D** الاشعار
ما بين المنكبين	الالوان كلها
الكتفان	سكون النفس
العضدان والساعدان	الاصوات والكلام
اليدان	المشية وحركة الأوصال
الرقبة	
الذقن	**E** اخلاق الرجال واختلاف طبائعهم

(شديد شجاع)
(خبيث)
(عاقل فطن..سيء الظن محب للنساء)
اهل العقل
اهل الحمق
اهل الخير
اهل الشر
اهل التصنع

C اهل كل بلد
اهل الشمال
اهل الجنوب
اهل الصباء
اهل الدبور
اهل المغرب
(اليوناي الخالص)

E (الفيلسوف الحكيم الصالح)
(قليل الفهم رغيب البطن)
(خبيث النية قليل الرؤية في الخير)
(صالح فهم)
(قليل الحياء ماجن شجاع)
(مخنث محب لما تحب النساء)
(مر النفس)
(متواضع قليل طموح النفس)
(حارص على الجمع قليل الخير)
(صاحب لهو وعبث واستهزاء)
A (الاعضاء)

الفم والشفتان
الانف
الجبهة وما بين العينين
الوجه والخلين
الأذنان
الرأس

C اسم العالم
اهل الشمال
اهل الجنوب
اهل المشرق والمغرب
اجناس اليونان

D لون الجسد
لون الصدر
لون الوجه
لون الحدقة
لون الشعر
اختلاف الشعر
كثرة شعر العرقوبين
الشعر في الفخذين والحقوين
الشعر في الصدر والبطن
الشعر في الكتفين
كثرة الشعر في البدن
كثرة الشعر من الرقبة الى الرأس
شعر الحاجبين
حركة عضو عضو
الحركة والمشي
النفس
الصوت

E الرجل الجري القوي
الرجل الجبان
الرجل المحب العلم والفلاسفة
الرجل القصير الهمة القليل المبالاه
الرجل القليل الحياء
الرجل المحب للزينة والتصنع
الرجل اللبيب الكيس
الرجل الكثير الحزن الكئيب
الرجل المخنث المؤنث

الرجل المتواضع
الرجل المستهزي بالناس
الرجل المحب لجمع المال
الرجل الشرير الأحمق
الرجل المرآي النفس
الرجل الذي قد دنا أجله من غير مرض ظاهر
الرجل الذي قد دنا منه الشر والبلا وهو لا يعلم
عشق النسا لكل غريب
الرجل الذي تفكر في بلايا عظام من قبل ان يصل اليه شيء منها

(ii) Chapter Titles (Key Words) of Adamantius, Leiden Or. 198.1, and TK Ahmet III 3207: English

Under Adamantius I give roughly corresponding chapters in Anonymus Latinus.

Adamantius (section nos.)	Leiden (chapter nos.)	TK[18]
A	A	A (Story of Hippocrates and Polemon)
		Three Foundations
		Resemblances to animals
(Prefatory material) (A1–4; B1 = Lat. 45)		Masculine traits and feminine traits
Eye (A4–23, B3[19] = Lat. 21–42[20])	Eye (1)	Movement of the joints
(Similarity to animals) (B2 = Lat. 4, 6, 8, 46, 118–31;[21] cf. A4, 5)	Similarity to animals (2)	(Similarity to animals; Masculine traits and Feminine Traits)
B Nails (B4 = Lat. 60[22])	**B** Nails (3)	**B** Eye
Digits (B5 = Lat. 60[23])	Digits (4)	Ears
Feet (B6 = Lat. 72)	Feet (5)	Nose
Ankles (B7 = Lat. 71)	Ankles and heels (6)	Mouths
	Shanks (7)	Foreheads

[18] Parentheses mean no specific heading in text.

[19] B3, on congenital and created eunuchs, has been split from A20 (part of the eye section). Otherwise Leiden and Adamantius run in parallel on the eye.

[20] Anon. Lat. deploys this material with differences of order.

[21] Note that in chs. 118–31 Anon. Lat. says he is following Loxus (most of the material has resonances in Leiden ch. 2).

[22] Note the roughly top-to-toe ordering of the body parts in Anon. Lat.

[23] Anon. Lat. gives fingers primacy.

Calves and thighs (B8 = Lat. 69)		
Knees and hips (B9 = Lat. 68, 70)	Knees (8)	Jaw and cheeks
(B9)	Hips and thighs (9)	Chin
Loins (B10 = Lat. 67)	Flanks (10)	Heads
Back (B11 = Lat. 66)	Back (11)	Necks
Stooping (B12 = Lat. 66)	Bend of the back (12)	Shoulders
Flanks (B13 = Lat. 65)	Ribs (13)	Chests and ribs
Stomach (B14 = Lat. 64)[24]	Stomach (14)	Limbs, forearms, and palms
Chest and breast (B15 = Lat. 61, 63)	What is between the navel and the beginning of the chest (15)	Back and flanks
(B15)	Chest (16)	Thighs, knees, shanks, feet
(B15) + Back (B16 = Lat. 62)	Breast (17)	
(B16)[25]	Shoulders and tops of the shoulders (18)	D Hairs
Collar bones (B17 = Lat. 57)	What is between the tops of the shoulders (19)	Colours of the whole
Shoulders (B18 = Lat. 58)[26]	Shoulders (20)	Quietness of breathing
Upper and lower arms (B19 = Lat. 59)	Upper arms and forearms (21)	Voices and speech
Hands (B20 = Lat. 59)	Hands (22)	Gait and movement of the joints
Neck (B21 = Lat. 53–55); throat (B22 = Lat. 56)[27]	Neck and larynx (23)	
Jawbones (B23 = Lat. 52)	Chin (24)	E Characters of men and diversity of their natures
Lips and mouth (B24 = Lat. 48)[28]	Mouth and lips (25)	(Strong and courageous man)
Nose (B25 = Lat. 51)	Nose (26)	(Bad and evil man)
Forehead (B26 = Lat. 17)	Forehead and what is between the eyes (27)	(Intelligent, strong man who loves women)
Cheeks (B27 = Lat. 49); Face (B28 = Lat. 50)[29]	Face and cheeks (28)	People of intelligence
Ears (B29 = Lat. 47)	Ears (29)	People of stupidity
Head (B30 = Lat. 16)	Head (30)	People of goodness
C Races (B31 = Lat. 9)	C Nations of the world (31)	People of evil
(B31)	People of the North (32)	People of Dissimulation[30]
(B31)	People of the South (33)	C People of every land
(B31)	People of the East and West (34)	People of the North

[24] B13 and 14 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.
[25] B15 and 16 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.
[26] B17 and 18 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.
[27] No separate title in the MSS of Adamantius.
[28] B23 and 24 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.
[29] B27 and 28 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.
[30] *tasannu'*. See n. 34.

Greek and Ionic race (B32)	Pure Greek (35)	People of the South
D Colours of whole body (B33 = Lat. 79)	**D** Colour of the body (36)	People of the East Wind
Colour of the chest (B34 = Lat. 79)	Colour of the chest (37)	People of the West Wind
Colour of the face (B35 = Lat. 79)[31]	Colour of the face (38)	People of the West (Maghrib)
Colour of the eye (B36 = Lat. 79)	Colour of the iris (39)	(Pure Greek)
(Colour of the) hair (B37 = Lat. 14, 73)	(Colour of the) hair (40)	**E** (Philosophical, wise, pious man)
(B37)	Diversity of hair (41)	(Unintelligent, greedy man)
(B37)	Abundant hair (of the ankles) (42)	(Bad tempered and evil man)
(B37)	Hair on flanks and thighs (43)	(Pious, intelligent man)
(B37)	Hair on chest and stomach (44)	(Man lacking embarrassment, impudent, courageous)
(B37)	Hair on shoulders (45)	(Effeminate man who loves what women love)
(B37)	Abundant hair on the body (46)	(Bitter man)
(B37)	Abundant hair from the neck to the head (47)	(Humble man of little ambition)
(B37)	Hair of the eyebrows (48)	(Covetous man of little good)
Movement (B38 = Lat. 74)	Movement, limb by limb (49)	(Man of amusement, joking, and mockery)
Movement and gait (B39–40 = Lat. 75–6)[32]	Movement and gait (50)	**A** (Members/limbs) [see III(i) (*j*)]
Breathing (B41 = Lat. 77)	Breathing (51)	
Voice (B42 = Lat. 78)	Voice (52)	
E Manly man (B44 = Lat. 90)[33]	**E** Bold and strong man (53)	
Cowardly man (B45 = Lat. 91)	Cowardly man (54)	
Talented man (B46 = Lat. 92)	Man who loves knowledge and philosophy (55)	

[31] B33, 34, and 35 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.

[32] B38, 39, and 40 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.

[33] For the following character types in Adamantius cf. Ps.-Aristotle 807ᵃ32 ff. Manly, Cowardly, Talented (cf. Appendix n. 4), Insensible, Shameless (*anaidēs*; Adamantius has *anaischyntos*), Orderly, Cheerful, Sad (*athymos* not in Adamantius, whose Troublesome—*aniaros*—shows a slight correspondence), *Kinaidos* (see Ch. 11 n. 68; corresponding in order but not wholly in material to Adamantius' *androgynos*; *kinaidos* is not used by Adamantius, and in fact only occurs in the Aristotelian corpus in the *Physiognomonica*), Bitter, Fierce-Tempered (*thymōdēs*, not used by Adamantius, but found in the Byzantine Ps.-Pol. and Epit. Matr.; see Ch. 10, p. 490), Mild, Dissembler, Petty-Minded (*mikropsychos*; some of material corresponds to Adamantius' Fond of Money type which follows in order), Fond of Gambling, Fond of Abuse (*philoloidoros*, not in Adamantius, but cf. Ps.-Pol. 70), Merciful (*eleēmōn*, not in Adamantius). Clearly Ps.-Aristotle's choice and order of types proved very influential, though material in any given example varies. Note that B43 is Adamantius' brief introductory to the character types; cf. Foerster (1893) i, pp. ciii f. Anon. Lat. 80–9 does not use Polemon.

Insensible man (B47 = Lat. 93)	Man of limited ambition and indifference (56)
Shameless man (B48 = Lat. 94, 106)	Man of little modesty (57)
Orderly man (B49 = Lat. 95)	Man who loves decoration and affectation[34] (58)
Cheerful man (B50 = Lat. 96)	Sensible and astute man (59)
Distressed man (B51 = Lat. 97)	Very sad and depressed man (60)
Androgynous man (B52 = Lat. 98)[35]	Effeminate and womanly man (61)
Mild man (B54 = Lat. 100, 109)[36]	Humble man (62)
Dissembler (B55 = Lat. 101)	Man who mocks people (63)
Fond of money (B56 = Lat. 102); Man fond of gambling and dancing (B57 = Lat. 103)[37]	Man who loves to amass money (64)
Gentle and savage (B58–9[38] = Lat. 104)/wickedly stupid (B60 = Lat. 105); Androgynous man (B52 end)[39]	Man who is evil and stupid (65)
Bitter man (B53 = Lat. 99)[40]	Man of hypocritical soul (66)
	Man whose time (of death) approached without apparent illness (67)
	Man whom evil and trouble approached without his knowledge (68)
	Women's passion for unknown men (69)
	Man who thinks about great trials before any of them happen to him (70)
A (brief conclusion) (B61)	

[34] *tasannu'*. This is the correct translation in Leiden ch. 58; in ch. 49 on 'movement limb by limb' the subject-matter (closely following Ad. B38) concerns hiding one's nature and the translation should be '(dis)simulation' or 'artifice' (in the sense of hiding one's natural character) to correspond with the TK introductory material (see text and translation in Ch. 9) and the chapter on 'People of Dissimulation' (cf. n. 30).

[35] Material at the end of B52 has been moved in Leiden to ch. 65.

[36] For B53 see below.

[37] The Arabic has amalgamated two types separated in Adamantius (cf. Anon. Lat. §§102–3).

[38] B58 and 59 are grouped together in the MSS of Adamantius.

[39] The Leiden recension has amalgamated material rightly separate in Adamantius. This is evidence for the separate development of the TK tradition. See above n. 7.

[40] 'Bitter' versus 'hypocritical': the material is the same and the different character type and the change of order represent an error in the Leiden recension. See n. 7.

Part III
Texts and Translations

8

A New Edition and Translation of the Leiden Polemon

Robert Hoyland

I. INTRODUCTION

In producing his edition of the Arabic translation of Polemon's *Treatise on Physiognomy* for Teubner (1893), Georg Hoffmann strove to present what he thought the Arabic text should have looked like. This required him to 'correct' the text of MS Leiden Or. 198. 1, which is probably our best extant witness to the original Arabic translation of Polemon (henceforth PA). His 'corrections' fall into four main categories: (*a*) supplying diacritical marks where they are missing; (*b*) making the sense clear and flowing; (*c*) bringing the language of the manuscript into line with the norms of classical Arabic; (*d*) bringing the contents of the manuscript into line with Polemon's treatise as attested to by the surviving Greek and Latin versions. The emendations of types (*a*) and (*b*) are of course necessary, though he seems to have been a little over-zealous with type (*b*), but those of types (*c*) and (*d*) are problematic. With regard to (*c*), the language of the Leiden manuscript contains a number of colloquialisms (e.g. use of adjectives in the plural, rather than in the feminine singular, to qualify plural nouns denoting inanimate objects; use of the accusative/genitive masculine sound plural for the subject), which were so common in speech as not necessarily to be seen as errors requiring correction. With regard to (*d*), the problem is that in general the Leiden manuscript is easy to read and clearly written, so one cannot simply assume that it has been incorrectly transmitted and that PA was necessarily any different. Moreover, the surviving Greek and Latin witnesses are not faithful to Polemon's original Greek treatise (henceforth PG), but have, by their own admission, abridged and paraphrased it and blended it with other authors. Hence, we cannot necessarily be sure that they are better witnesses to PG than PA.

In producing a new edition and translation of the Arabic version of Polemon's treatise I have therefore decided to make my principal objective an edition and translation of the Leiden manuscript. Hoffmann's attempt to collate it with the Greek and Latin versions was impressive, even if to some extent misguided, and I have put all his emendations and suggestions in footnotes and tried

to explain the reason for them. Where it is certain that his emendation is correct, Leiden being clearly defective, I have incorporated it into the text and explained Leiden's error in the footnote. Hoffmann did not have a high opinion of the Leiden text (*tot tantisque mendis scatet*). However, one should bear in mind that in general it is written in reasonably good classical Arabic (non-literary style, but that is to be expected of a scientific treatise), and the deviation from this (in the form of colloquialisms and simple grammatical/typographical errors) is probably not more than 5 per cent. This is by no means excessive or uncommon—classical Arabic is difficult and artificial, and most authors would make a few errors and accidentally let slip a few colloquialisms.[1] There are also certain orthographical deviations from the strictest standards of classical Arabic—especially omission of *hamza*, *tanwīn*, and the diacritical marks of the *tā' marbūṭa* (though he does occasionally insert them, and I have then done likewise in the text), and writing of اء as ا —but these are all common practice.

As has been demonstrated by Antonella Ghersetti in the previous chapter, the TK recension of Polemon's treatise is too different from Leiden to make a critical edition possible. The reason we have chosen to edit Leiden is that it represents PA better than TK, which was evidently intended to be an Islamicized version of PA. Thus whereas Leiden retains all the anecdotes about Greek characters and locations, the TK MSS cast them all out. Whereas Leiden attempts to render all the Greek names of people and places, TK omit them all bar Alexander and Hadrian and replace Greek provinces with Muslim ones. Whereas Leiden maintains the toe-to-head order of limbs found in the Greek, TK favours the head-to-toe order used by Muslim medical thinkers (e.g. by Ibn Zakariyya al-Razi in his medical encyclopedia known as the *Ḥāwī*). The TK manuscripts are certainly based on PA, and in a few cases they do represent it better (and for this reason I have cross-referenced to them throughout the translation below). For example, TK follow Adamantius' ordering of the chapters on the effeminate, hypocritical, and humble man (B52–4; cf. TK 3207, 73^{b}–74^{a}; TK 3245, 58^{b}–59^{a}), whereas Leiden displaces the chapter on the hypocritical man. And, like Adamantius, TK keep as one chapter the sections on knees, thighs and hips (B9), on the navel to the chest (B15), on the peoples of the world (B31) and on hair (B37), whereas Leiden subdivides them, seemingly in order to have the number of chapters reach the magical figure of seventy. Nevertheless, Leiden is the best witness that we have to PG, and hence its privileged position here.

Since PA does not survive, it is not possible to say for sure how good a witness to PA Leiden is. The aforementioned deviations from TK illustrate that Leiden certainly introduced some changes, but these are merely in the arrangement of chapters; did Leiden also change the content? It is true that Polemon's introduction to his treatise is missing in Leiden, but this could already have been absent from PA, perhaps due to defects in the Greek (or Syriac) manuscript used by PA. It is also absent from TK, but that may be because the latter preferred to compose one according to their taste (see next chapter) rather than because

[1] For discussion and further references on this subject see W. Fischer, 'What is Middle Arabic?', in A. S. Kaye (ed.), *Semitic Studies in Honor of Wolf Leslau* (Wiesbaden, 1991), 430–6.

Polemon's introduction was not available. Leiden also transposes, corrupts, and abbreviates the introduction to the chapter on eyes found in TK.[2] Since the wording of its first part is very similar in Leiden and TK, it very likely derives from PA (and probably PG, since the gist of it is in Adamantius), so this would appear to be a clear instance of reworking by Leiden of PA. However, whether it is an isolated incident or part of a widespread phenomenon is difficult to say.

If we cannot say much about the relationship between Leiden and PA, what about the relationship between PA and PG? Was the translation made directly or via an intermediary, and how faithful was the translation? We know that there was a Syriac translation (PS) because a very abridged version of it was incorporated into a scientific encyclopedia known as the *Ḥewât ḥekmtâ* ('Cream of wisdom'), which was compiled by Bar Hebraeus (BH), head of the West Syrian church in the east in the thirteenth century AD and an able writer in both the Syriac and Arabic tongues. Zonta (1992) 25–47 has compared BH with Adamantius and Leiden and has concluded first that PS (as represented by BH) was made from the Greek and secondly that PA was made from PS. The first conclusion seems irrefutable, since there are certainly many occasions where BH is very close to the Greek of Adamantius. The second conclusion is more problematic. Certainly, there does appear to be a relationship between PA and PS.[3] However, Zonta does exaggerate the faithfulness of BH over PA,[4] and he focuses on the few cases of possible dependence of Leiden on BH while ignoring the wide discrepancy between them that obtains for much of the time. Moreover, there are occasions where PS deviates from PG[5] (and where it makes better sense to assume that PA is derived directly from PG).[6] Finally, it must be borne in mind that not only did BH heavily abridge PS (unless PS was only ever meant to be a selection from PG), but some later copyists abridged it further and perhaps introduced other changes. Now it occupies between two folios (BL Or. 4079, 304ʳ–306ʳ) and seven folios (Vat. syr. 615, 54ʳ–61ʳ) in the extant manuscripts of Bar Hebraeus' encyclopedia, which compares ill with Leiden's forty-eight folios.[7] What is clear from a comparison of Leiden, BH, and Adamantius is that Leiden is much longer than the other two. In fact, Leiden is twice as long as Adamantius, even after leaving out the introduction. This is partly because Adamantius abridges PG; for example he omits the last three long anecdotes found in Leiden, compresses (into A4 and B2) the substantial theoretical sections on gender and animals (since they feature in

[2] See below, trans. n. 24.

[3] See nn. 45, 52–3, 204, 210, 240, 268, 308 for instances where they both diverge from or mistranslate Ad.

[4] See e.g. below, n. 115.

[5] See e.g. below n. 29.

[6] See nn. 52, 145, 205, 210, 224, and 265 below, and Foerster (1893) i, pp. lxxxi f., who inferred that PA was made from PG (*patet eum e graeco exemplari, non e syriaca interpretatione vertisse*).

[7] See N. P. Joosse, 'Bar Hebraeus' *Butyrum sapientiae*: A Description of the Extant Manuscripts', *Le Muséon*, 112 (1999) 444, and G. Furlani's edition from Florence Laurentianus syr. 83 in *ZfS* 7 (1929) 3–10.

both Leiden—at the end of ch. 2—and TK, they almost certainly go back to PG), and renders many passages more succinct.[8] Yet BH and Adamantius are often very close, so (unless BH is translating Adamantius) Adamantius and PG cannot have been too far apart, though of course BH is very short as it stands. Moreover, it is evident from even a cursory comparison of Leiden, BH, and Adamantius that Leiden often presents an extended or round-about expression for something concise in the other two, and it omits certain adjectives/phrases and adduces extra ones.[9] This means that one should not regard the Leiden and TK texts as simply distorted versions of Polemon's original treatise, but rather as examples of Muslim Arabic literature in their own right.

II. CONVENTIONS

Numbers in italics in the texts below refer to the folios of the Leiden manuscript; numbers in bold together with the letter A or B refer to the ordering of Adamantius, inserted here so as to facilitate comparison of the Arabic and Greek texts. Cross-references are given in square brackets to the TK manuscripts 3207 and 3245, and also to the physiognomy text of (Shams al-Din) al-Dimashqi (abbreviated to Dim.) as represented by Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. arabe 5928/the Cairo edition of 1882. Question marks in the footnotes of the Arabic text indicate that the word is only a suggestion of Hoffmann and not an emendation. So as not to overburden the text with footnotes, I indicate the following very frequently occurring deviations from classical Arabic norms (either very minor scribal slips or common colloquial intrusions), where the correct reading is patent (but I do not correct the Arabic text), by these symbols:

* = masculine gender used instead of feminine; note that this is often because of attraction to a nearby masculine noun;

° = nominative case used instead of accusative/genitive case;

ˈ = accusative/genitive case used instead of nominative case;

! = letter(s) added accidentally or mistakenly (the word as it appears in the Leiden MS is placed within brackets);

!! = letter(s) omitted accidentally or mistakenly (the word as it appears in the Leiden MS is placed within brackets);

˙ = too many dots (some of which may also be in the wrong place);

ˇ = too few dots (some of which may also be in the wrong place);

• = dots misplaced (but right number of them).

[8] See below, n. 268.
[9] See e.g. below, nn. 145, 246, 265.

كتاب افليمون
في الفراسة

(ب2) بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

كتاب افليمون في الفراسه وهو كتابهˉ
في الفوسيا[1] وهو يشتملˉ على سبعون° بابًا

الباب الأول في فراسه العين وعلاماتها
الباب الثاني يذكر فيه ما يوجد في الانسان من شبه ساير الحيوانات ذوات الاربع قوايم والطير وساير ما يدب على الأرض وما يعرف به التذكير والتانيث وانك لست ترى احدًا الا وفيه شبه من دابه وطبيعتها تظهر في الانسان مثل طبيعه الدابه وكيف ينبغي ان تميز ذلك في الإنسان
الباب الثالث في فراسه الاظفار وعلاماتها
الباب الرابع في فراسه الاصابع وعلاماتها
الباب الخامس في فراسه القدمين وعلاماتها
الباب السادس في ما بين الكعبين[2] والعرقوبين وعلاماتها
الباب السابع في فراسه الساقين وعلاماتها
الباب الثامن في فراسه الركبتين وعلاماتها
(أ3) الباب التاسع في فراسه الوركين والفخذين وعلاماتها
الباب العاشر في فراسه الحقوين وعلاماتها
الباب الحادي عشر في فراسه الظهر وعلاماته
الباب الثاني عشر في انحناً الظهر وعلاماته
الباب الثالث عشر في الاضلاع[3] وعلاماتها
الباب الرابع عشر في فراسه البطن وعلاماتها
الباب الخامس عشر في ما بين السرة الى راس الصدر وعلاماته

[1] م. فيسيافوسيقا.
[2] ل. الكفين.
[3] ل. الاصابع. م. الأصابع.

[2b] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate The Book of Polemon on *Firāsa*, that is, his Book on Physiognomy,[1] Containing Seventy Chapters

The first chapter: on the physiognomy of the eye and its signs.

The second chapter: in which is mentioned the similarity found in people to four-legged animals, birds, and the other things that crawl on the earth. Also (it is mentioned) how masculinity and femininity are recognized, and the fact that you do not see a person who does not have some similarity with an animal nor an animal whose nature does not appear in a person, and how you should distinguish that in a person.

The third chapter: on the physiognomy of the nails and their signs.

The fourth chapter: on the physiognomy of the digits and their signs.

The fifth chapter: on the physiognomy of the feet and their signs.

The sixth chapter: on what is between the heels[2] and the ankles, and their signs.

The seventh chapter: on the physiognomy of the calves and their signs.

The eighth chapter: on the physiognomy of the knees and their signs.

[3a] The ninth chapter: on the physiognomy of the hips and thighs and their signs.

The tenth chapter: on the physiognomy of the flanks and their signs.

The eleventh chapter: on the physiognomy of the back and its signs.

The twelfth chapter: on the bend of the back and its signs.

The thirteenth chapter: on the ribs[3] and their signs.

The fourteenth chapter: on the physiognomy of the stomach and its signs.

The fifteenth chapter: on what is between the navel and the beginning of the chest, and its signs.

[1] Thus Hoffmann, who suggests that Leiden's *qwsy'* is a corruption of the Syriac *fwsywgnwmyq'* found in the text of BH (Zonta 1992: 25), though it could as easily be from the Greek φυσιογνωμονικῶν.

[2] Leiden has 'shoulders', but we can assume with Hoffmann that 'heels' (*talos*) was meant and a *tā'* has accidentally been written instead of an *'ayn*.

[3] Leiden accidentally inverts the *lām* and *alif*. Hoffmann assumes the copyist was trying to write *asābi'* 'fingers' (*digitis*), but it seems to be just a slip of the pen.

الباب السادس عشر في فراسه الصدر وعلاماته
الباب السابع عشر في فراسه الثديين وعلاماتها
الباب الثامن عشر في ما بين الكتفين والمنكبين وعلاماتها
الباب التاسع عشر في فراسه ما بين المنكبين[4] وعلاماته
الباب العشرون في فراسه الكتفين[5] وعلاماته
الباب الحادي والعشرون في فراسه العضدين والساعدين وعلاماتها
الباب الثاني والعشرون في فراسه اليدين وعلاماتها
الباب الثالث والعشرون في فراسه الرقبه وعلاماتها
(ب3) الباب الرابع والعشرون في فراسه الذقن وعلاماتها
الباب الخامس والعشرون في الفم والشفتين وعلاماتها
الباب السادس والعشرون في فراسه الانف وعلاماتها
الباب السابع والعشرون في فراسه ما بين العينين وعلاماتها
الباب الثامن والعشرون في فراسه الوجه و الجبين وعلاماته
الباب التاسع والعشرون في فراسه الاذنين وعلاماتها
الباب الثلثون في فراسه الراس وعلاماتها
الباب الحادي والثلثون في ذكر أمم العالم
الباب الثاني والثلثون في ذكر هيئه اهل الشمال
الباب الثالث والثلثون في ذكر هيئه اهل الجنوب
الباب الرابع والثلثون في ذكر هيئه اهل المشرق والمغرب
الباب الخامس الثلثون يذكر فيه الخالص من اجناس اليونانيه
الباب السادس والثلثون يذكر فيه لون الجسد كله
الباب السابع والثلثون يذكر فيه لون الصدر وعلاماته
الباب الثامن والثلثون يذكرفيه لون الوجه وعلاماته
(4أ) الباب التاسع والثلثون في لون الحدقه وما يختلف" مما لم يذكر قبل
الباب الاربعون في فراسه لون الشعر وعلاماته
الباب الحادي والاربعون يذكرفيه اختلاف الشعر وعلاماته

[4] م. و الترقي .
[5] ل. الكفين.

The sixteenth chapter: on the physiognomy of the chest and its signs.

The seventeenth chapter: on the physiognomy of the breasts and their signs.

The eighteenth chapter: on what is between the shoulders and the tops of the shoulders and their signs.

The nineteenth chapter: on the physiognomy of what is between the tops of shoulders[4] and its signs.

The twentieth chapter: on the physiognomy of the shoulders[5] and their signs.

The twenty-first chapter: on the physiognomy of the upper arms and the forearms and their signs.

The twenty-second chapter: on the physiognomy of the hands and their signs.

The twenty-third chapter: on the physiognomy of the neck and its signs.

[3ᵇ] The twenty-fourth chapter: on the physiognomy of the chin and its signs.

The twenty-fifth chapter: on the mouth and the lips and their signs.

The twenty-sixth chapter: on the physiognomy of the nose and its signs.

The twenty-seventh chapter: on the physiognomy of what is between the eyes and their signs.

The twenty-eighth chapter: on the physiognomy of the face and the forehead and its signs.

The twenty-ninth chapter: on the physiognomy of the ears and their signs.

The thirtieth chapter: on the physiognomy of the head and its signs.

The thirty-first chapter, mentioning the nations of the world.

The thirty-second chapter: mentioning the form of the people of the North.

The thirty-third chapter: mentioning the form of the people of the South.

The thirty-fourth chapter: mentioning the form of the people of the east and the west.

The thirty-fifth chapter: in which is mentioned the purest types of the Greeks.

The thirty-sixth chapter: in which mentioned the colour of the whole body.

The thirty-seventh chapter: in which is mentioned the colour of the chest and its signs

The thirty-eighth chapter: in which is mentioned the colour of the face and its signs.

[4ᵃ] The thirty-ninth chapter: on the colour of the iris and other things not mentioned before.

The fortieth chapter: on the physiognomy of the colour of the hair and its signs.

The forty-first chapter: in which is mentioned the diversity in hair and its signs.

[4] Hoffmann adds 'and the upper part of the chest' (*et pectoris initia*) without explanation, presumably for clarity. Note that in these footnotes I translate Hoffmann's Arabic emendation, *not* his Latin rendering (which I give in parentheses afterwards); sometimes he stretches the meaning of the Arabic word to bring it closer to the word he is thinking of in Ad. and/or Anon. Lat., and in this case my English translation will appear to differ somewhat from his Latin translation.

[5] Leiden has 'palms', but we can assume with Hoffmann that 'shoulders' (*scapularum*) was meant and a *tā'* has accidentally been omitted between the *kā'* and the *fā'*.

الباب الثاني والاربعون يذكر فيه كثرة[6] شعر العرقوبين وعلاماته
الباب الثالث والاربعون في الشعر في الحقوين والفخذين وعلاماته
الباب الرابع والاربعون في الشعر في الصدر والبطن وعلاماته
الباب الخامس والاربعون في الشعر في الكتفين وما بينهما
الباب السادس والاربعون يذكر فيه كثرة الشعر في البدن وعلاماته
الباب السابع والاربعون في كثرة الشعر من الرقبه الى الراس
الباب الثامن والاربعون في شعر الحاجبين وعلاماتها
الباب التاسع والاربعون ما يدل عليه[7] حركه عضو عضو
الباب الخمسون في فراسه الحركه والمشي وعلاماتها
الباب الحادي والخمسون في فراسه النفس وعلاماتها
الباب الثاني والخمسون في فراسه الصوت وعلاماته
الباب الثالث والخمسون في فراسه الرجل الجري القوي وعلاماته
(ب4) الباب الرابع والخمسون في فراسه الرجل الجبان وعلاماته
الباب الخامس والخمسون في علامه الرجل المحب للعلم والفلسفه
الباب السادس والخمسون في علامه الرجل القصير الهمه القليل المبالاه
الباب السابع والخمسون في علامة الرجل القليل الحيأء
الباب الثامن والخمسون في علامه الرجل المحب للزينه والتصنع
الباب التاسع والخمسون في علامه الرجل اللبيب الكيس
الباب الستون في علامة الرجل الكثير الحزن الكئيب
الباب الحادي والستون في علامه الرجل المخنث المؤنث
الباب الثاني والستون في علامة الرجل المتواضع
الباب الثالث والستون في علامه الرجل المستهزي بالناس
الباب الرابع والستون في علامة الرجل المحب لجمع المال
الباب الخامس والستون في علامه الرجل الشرير الأحمق
الباب السادس والستون في علامه الرجل المرأى النفس[8]
الباب السابع والستون في علامه الرجل الذي قد دنا اجله من غير مرض ظاهر
الباب الثامن والستون في علامه الرجل الذي قد دنا منه[9] الشر والبلا وهو لا يعلم
(5أ) الباب التاسع والستون في علامه عشق النسأ لكل غريب

[6] ل. لين.
[7] ل. على.
[8] م. الذ النفس.
[9] يدعي هوفمان أن هذه الكلمة ناقصة ولكنها واحدة وواضحة.

The forty-second chapter: in which is mentioned abundance[6] of the hair on the ankles and its signs.

The forty-third chapter: on hair on the flanks and thighs and its signs.

The forty-fourth chapter: on hair on the chest and the stomach and its signs.

The forty-fifth chapter: on hair on the shoulders and on what is between them.

The forty-sixth chapter: in which is mentioned abundant hair on the body and its signs.

The forty-seventh chapter: on abundant hair from the neck to the head.

The forty-eighth chapter: on the hair of the eyebrows and their signs.

The forty-ninth chapter: what the movement of each limb indicates.[7]

The fiftieth chapter: on the physiognomy of movement and gait and their signs.

The fifty-first chapter: on the physiognomy of the breathing and its signs.

The fifty-second chapter: on the physiognomy of the voice and its signs.

The fifty-third chapter: on the physiognomy of the bold and strong man and his signs.

[4[b]] The fifty-fourth chapter: on the physiognomy of the cowardly man and his signs.

The fifty-fifth chapter: on the sign of the man who loves knowledge and philosophy.

The fifty-sixth chapter: on the sign of the man who has limited ambition and indifference.

The fifty-seventh chapter: on the sign of the man who has little modesty.

The fifty-eighth chapter: on the sign of the man who loves decoration and affectation.

The fifty-ninth chapter: on the sign of the intelligent and shrewd man.

The sixtieth chapter: on the sign of the very sad and depressed man.

The sixty-first chapter: on the sign of the effeminate and womanly man.

The sixty-second chapter: on the sign of the humble man.

The sixty-third chapter: on the sign of the man who mocks people.

The sixty-fourth chapter: on the sign of the man who loves to amass money.

The sixty-fifth chapter: on the sign of the evil and stupid man.

The sixty-sixth chapter: on the sign of the man of hypocritical[8] soul.

The sixty-seventh chapter: on the sign of the man whose time of death approached without any apparent illness.

The sixty-eighth chapter: on the sign of the man whom[9] evil and trouble approached without his knowledge.

[5[a]] The sixty-ninth chapter: on the sign of woman's passion for every stranger.

6 Thus Hoffmann (*multitudo*); Leiden has 'softness', but see n. 288 below.

7 Leiden: 'what indicates the movement of each limb'; Hoffmann's correction makes better sense.

8 Hoffmann: 'bitter' (*amari*); no explanation given, but see n. 358 below.

9 Hoffmann asserts that Leiden has omitted this word, but it is very clearly present. He does this a few times in the course of his edition, particularly in the case of diacritical marks, signalling an error or omission where none exists.

الباب السبعون في علامه الرجل الذي يفكر[10] في بلايا عظام من قبل ان يصل اليه شئ منها

الباب الاول في: في فراسه العين و علاماتها
[اعلم ان العينين باب القلب الذي منه تطلع هموم النفس وتبدو (تبدوا)! اسرار الضمير وذلك لصفايتهما ورقتهما واتصالهما بموضع القلب الذي تتحرك" فيه الهموم فهما مستشف حديث النفس ومطلع عين البصر وسأصف لك من خلق العيون وهيئتها واعلامها واياتها ما تكتفي به من علامة ايات الفراسة فانها من اصدق شواهد الفراسة خبرًا عما التمست معرفته من خير أو شر...]

A5 من[11] علم الفراسه بعلامات العين وفضل" البيان فيها على ما سواها من الجوارح ○ اذا رايت العينين" مضيئتين براقتين[12] فامرهما حسن تدلان" على صلاح شان صاحبها واكثر اهل هذا النعت الصبيان واذا رايت الناظر رحيبًا" عريض الحدقه فاقض على صاحبها بالحمق وقله الفهم وصغر الناظر يدل على الفجور وقله الفهم[13] و كثره الحب[14] وكل من كانت عينه صغيره دلت على كثره المكر يشبه صنفًا من الحيات[15] والقردة والثعالب وما اشبههن واما العيون

[10] م. تفكر.
[11] م. الأكثر من؟ (تدل علامة الاستفهام على أنه اقتراح موقمان ولا تصحيح ثابت منه).
[12] م. مروقتين.
[13] م. الفهد.
[14] م. الخبث.
[15] م. تشبه صنفًا من الحيوان.

The seventieth chapter: on the sign of the man who thinks about[10] great trials before any of them happen to him.

THE FIRST CHAPTER ON: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE EYE AND ITS SIGNS (CF. DIM., FOS. 21ᴬ–25ᴬ/PP. 22–7)

(Introduction to eyes: only in TK 3207, fos. 44^b1–46^a5 and TK 3245, fos. 25^b3–28^a5;cf. A4)

[Know that the eyes are the gateway to the heart, from which arise the cares of the soul and appear the secrets of the conscience. That is because of their purity, fineness, and connection with the place of the heart, in which the cares move. They are translucent, young in spirit, and the place where the gaze arises. I shall now describe to you the external form of the eyes, their shapes, indications, and signs, such as will suffice you to practise physiognomy, for they are among the witnesses that provide the truest information for physiognomy as regards the knowledge you seek about good and bad... [*there follows a list of the different features and aspects of the eye, and then a description of 'the praiseworthy eye' and the eye that is 'detested, blameworthy'.*]

A5 (TK 3207, fo. 46^a5–^{b}13; TK 3245, fos. 28^a6–29^b1)

Of the physiognomical knowledge of the eye and the superiority of clear understanding of it over other bodily organs.[11] If you see that the eyes are luminous and shining,[12] then that is good; they indicate that the condition of their owner is well. Most of the people of this description are children. If you see that the pupil is spacious, with a broad iris, judge for its owner stupidity and lack of understanding. Smallness of the pupil indicates immorality, lack of understanding,[13] and much love.[14] As for everyone who has a small eye, it indicates much cunning, resembling[15] kinds of snakes, monkeys, foxes, and the like. As for eyes with large pupils, judge that the owners have the stupidity,

[10] Hoffmann emends to *tafakkara* (lit.'has contemplated') and translates it as 'feigns' (*simulantis*) because, as he says in a note at ch. 70, 'the narrative demands it'. However, this stretches too far the sense of the Arabic root, which only means 'to reflect upon, contemplate'.

[11] Hoffmann suggests: 'The culmination (*summa*) of physiognomical knowledge is in the signs of the eye...', since otherwise this sentence lacks a subject. However, a dividing symbol after 'bodily organs' hints that this sentence may still be part of the title and not the beginning of the main text.

[12] Hoffmann: 'cleansed' (*colatos*); he also proposes *ra'iqatayni*, 'pure', citing Ad.: 'shine like pools' (λάμποντες ὡς λιβάδες).

[13] Hoffmann: 'commitment' (leaves blank in text, but suggests *fidei* in footnote); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[14] Hoffmann: 'deceit' (*fraudulentiam*); no explanation given, presumably feeling the sense requires a negative quality.

[15] Hoffmann makes the verb feminine to agree with 'much'; this would be the most correct, but it is acceptable to make it masculine, as in Leiden, by attraction to 'cunning'. He also, unnecessarily, suggests adding 'of animals' after 'kinds'.

الكبار النواظر فاقض (فاقضي)! على اهلها بالحمق واللين والبله الذي في البقر والحمير والغنم وما اشبه ذلك من الدواب واذا قست الناظر بالعين فوجدته اعظم من قدر العين ووجدت سواده *(ب5)* غير مسبّو فاقض على صاحبها بسوء العمل ومن كان سواد عينه مسبّو فاقض عليه بالأمانه والصلاح واذا رايت حول الناظر من سواد العين دقيقاً[16] وكان بصاحبه حزن وكآبه وكان بين عينيه سواد مثل سواد السحاب أو خضره أو صفرة ورايت عينيه مستخفتين[17] كثير الحركه فيهما فمن اجتمع ذلك فيه فاعلم انه قد سلط عليه شيطان مريد غضوب منتقم يحلّ به بلايا شداذا[18] فان كانت دايمه الدوران فان صاحبها قد عمل عملا فاحشا مثل قتل قرابه او ركوب محرم من الامور التي نهى الله تعالى عنها كمثل ما فعل ابن فالبوس[19] فانه وجد ياكل ولده أو مثل اوديفوس[20] ابن لايوس الذي حكى عنه انه جامع امه فمن كانت فيه هذه العلامه فحقيق ان تحذره وكذلك صفه اهل ثراقيه[21] من بلاد القسطنطينيه عيونهم تدور وتتحرك وهم معروفون بالشر ويمنعهم من إمضاء شرورهم شدة الخوف والحذر وهمهم[22] أبدا مقرونه بالشر واعلم بان القلب الذي منه تتطلع هموم النفس وتبدو(تبدوا)! شرّا ذا الضمير[23] وكذلك اتصال العين بموضع *(6أ)* القلب الذي تتحرك فيه[24] الهموم والفكر وتستشف حديث النفس.

16 و. دقيقا.

17 و. مستحثين.

18 و. شرائا؟

19 ل. فالنوش.

20 ل. اوديفوش.

21 ل. براقيه.

22 و. همتهم.

23 و. سرا ذو الضمير.

24 و. التي تتحرك فيها.

softness, and folly that is in cows and donkeys, sheep and goats, and other such animals. If, then, you compare the pupil with the eye, and you find it very large in proportion to the eye, and you find that its black is [5^b] not even, judge for its owner bad conduct. And whoever has an even black to his eye, judge for him reliability and goodness. If you see the black of the eye around the pupil to be slight,[16] and its owner is sad and depressed, and between his eyes there is black like the black of clouds, or green, or yellow, and you see his eyes are flurried,[17] with much movement in them—know that the one in whom these features combine is governed by a rebellious, angry, and vengeful demon, visiting harsh[18] trials upon him. If the eye is always circling about, then its owner has done some foul act, like killing a relative or committing a forbidden thing, which God Almighty has proscribed, such as the son of Pelops[19] did, for he was found eating his son. Or like Oedipus[20] son of Laius, of whom it is said that he had intercourse with his mother. So it is appropriate that you be wary of whoever has this sign. The description of the people of Thrace,[21] from the regions of Constantinople, is like that, their eyes circling about and moving, and they are known for evil. However, great fear and caution prevents them from carrying out their evil acts. Their preoccupation[22] is always linked with evil. Know that the heart, from which the cares of the soul rise up and first appear as an evil,[23] is the master of the conscience. In this way the eye is related to the place [6^a] of the heart, in which[24] the ambitions and thoughts move, and you look through to the conversation of the soul.

[16] Hoffmann: 'swift-moving' (*incitatam*) citing Ad.: 'driven' (ἐλαυνομένους).

[17] Hoffmann: 'roused up' (*concitatos*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[18] Hoffmann: 'fleeing' (*fugacissimum*) citing Ad.: 'drives' (ἐλαύνει).

[19] Leiden: *F'lmwsh*.

[20] Leiden: *'wdbqwsh*.

[21] Leiden: *Br'qyh*. This is probably a mistake for Tereus the Thracian (cf. Ps.-Polemon 9; Anon. Lat. 33). Cf. p. 499 n. 14.

[22] Hoffmann: 'ambition' (*studium*); no explanation given; cf. Ad.: 'they have lawless deeds in mind' (καταθύμια δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἔργα ἀθέμιτα).

[23] Hoffmann: 'secretly' (*clam*); no explanation given, but probably influenced by TK's 'secrets of the conscience'. 'Master', put in the nominative (*dhū*) by Hoffmann, is in the accusative (*dhā*) in Leiden, presumably by attraction to 'the heart', of which it is the complement.

[24] The relative is masculine in Leiden, so refers to 'the heart', whereas Hoffmann makes the relative feminine in order to make it refer to 'the eye'. Note that this and the previous sentence (found also in part at the end of ch. 1, fo. 20^a) would seem to be a corruption of the introduction to the chapter on the eye found in TK, which I edit and translate above for comparison. It is a further indication that Leiden (and PA?) is a reworking of PG.

A6 واذا رايت العينين راكدتين لا تتحرك كانهما مركبتان[25] في الوجه فاعلم انه رجل مبغض عدو والعين الرطبه تدل على الخير[26] والعين اليابسه تدل على الحمق والعين الخضراˇ وحول السواد خضره فانه يدل على الحمق ووسواس (سواس)!! الفكر وفساد الراس وعقل مختلط واذا رايت اشفار العين ثقيله[27] واذا كلمك صاحبها تنفس[28] الصعداً فاعلم انه متهم بشر مفكر فيه فاقض عليه بالغدر (الغدر)!! والنكث واذا رايت العينين راكده بين العظمين[29] حمراتين فاقض (فاقضي)! على صاحبها بالزنا وحب البطاله واذا اجتمع مع ذلك ارتفاع شعر الجفن الاعلى[30] وتفرق شعر الجفن الاسفل فان ذلك يدل على قله الحياً وكثرة الشر واذا صغرت العينان وركدتا فاقض على صاحبها بالحرص والجمع وحب الامساك والاقتار على نفسه واذا اجتمع مع ذلك انقباض (انقاض)!! الجبههˇ والحاجبين فاقض عليه بالخديعه والمكر فاذا اجتمع مع[31] ذلك علامات فيˇ جسده تصدق ذلك فاقض عليه بالشر[32] وشده الغضب واذا رأيت العينين زرقاتين *(ب6)* راكدتين فان صاحبها بعيد من النسا[33] بعيد من الخيرات[34] شديد الحرص على جمع المال فاحذره اشد الحذر وان كان ذا رحم ولا تشاوره[35] ولا تقبل مشورته فانه يعجب بشهرته الشر[36] ويعجبه ضرر اصحابه ولم ابلغ كل الذي فيه كراهيه التطويل واذا رايت العينين راكدتين صغيرتين في القدر وهما رطبتان ورايت الجبهه ملساً ليس فيها انقباض ورايت شعر العينين

[25] هـ. مركزتان.

[26] هـ. الغين.

[27] هـ. مستقله.

[28] هـ. يتنفس.

[29] يبدو أن الصواب: راكدتين عظيمتين.

[30] ل. جفن العين.

[31] ل. من.

[32] هـ. بالوبره.

[33] هـ. الناس.

[34] هـ. الحيوان.

[35] هـ. تسايره .

[36] هـ. يعجبه بسهرته الشر.

A6 (TK 3207, fos. 46^b13–47^b5; TK 3245, fo. 39^a8–$^b3$, fos. 29^b1–30^b5)

If you see the eyes are still and do not move, as if fixed[25] in the face, know that he is a hated man and an enemy. A moist eye indicates goodness[26] and a dry eye indicates stupidity. A green eye, with greenness around the black, indicates stupidity, delusion of the thoughts, corruption of the head, and a confused intellect. If you see the lids of the eye heavy,[27] and when its owner speaks to you he sighs deeply,[28] know that he is suspected of evil and is contemplating it, so judge for him treachery and faithlessness. If you see the eyes motionless between the bones,[29] red, judge for their owner fornication and love of idleness. If there combines with this elevation of the hair of the upper lids[30] and the parting of the hair of the lower lids, this indicates lack of modesty and much evil. If the eyes are small and still, judge for their owner desire, hoarding, love of restraint, and stinginess towards himself. If there combines with this contraction of the forehead and eyebrows, judge for him perfidy and cunning. If signs on his body combine with[31] this to verify this, judge for him evil[32] and fierce anger. If you see that the eyes are blue [6^b] and still, then their owner is remote from women,[33] remote from blessings,[34] and very desirous in hoarding money. So be very cautious of him, even if he be a blood-relation, and do not seek his counsel[35] nor accept his counsel, for he admires his own evil repute[36] and is pleased at harm coming to his companions. I have not reported everything about him out of a dislike of prolixity. If you see that the eyes are still, small in size, moist, and you see that the brow is smooth, without contraction, and if you see that the hair of the eyes move about, know that he is a lover

[25] Hoffmann: 'fixed' (*defixos*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it better conveys the corresponding Greek word πεπηγότες 'made fast'; cf. Anon. Lat. 22 (*pupillae defixae et status oculorum propemodum defixus*).

[26] Hoffmann: 'cowardice' (*timiditatem*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'cowards' (δειλούς).

[27] Hoffmann: 'independent, raising itself' (*elata*) citing Ad.: 'raise' (ἐγείρουσι).

[28] Hoffmann makes the verb imperfect, whereas the perfect, as used in Leiden, would be expected in a conditional sentence.

[29] Presumably this is a copying error for *rākidatayn 'aẓīmatayn*, then 'eyes motionless, large, red'; cf. Ad.: 'still, reddish, and large'. BH oddly has 'projecting, reddish, and large', a deviation not discussed by Zonta (1992) 37 when noting that here 'the Greek and Syriac versions agree almost to the letter'.

[30] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'of the eyelid'. Hoffmann's emendation to 'upper lid' seems likely given the subsequent mention of the 'lower lid'.

[31] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'from', presumably just a mistake for 'with'.

[32] Hoffmann: 'confused talk' (which he translates *vociferationem*) citing Ad.: 'clamorous' (βοητήν).

[33] Hoffmann: 'men' (*hominibus*) citing Ad.: 'never make friends with' (μήποτε φιλίαν συνάψῃς).

[34] Hoffmann: 'neighbours' (*vicinis*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'nor wish to have him as a neighbour' (μηδὲ γείτονα σχεῖν).

[35] Hoffmann: 'accompany him' (*iter facias cum eo*) citing Ad.: 'nor wish him... as a companion' (συνοδίτην, Foerster's emendation for πολίτην).

[36] Hoffmann: 'enjoys spending nights in evil-doing' (which he translates as *cum vigilantia sua malo gaudet*) citing Ad.: 'alert' (ἀγρυπνῶν).

كثير التحرك فاعلم انه محب للعلم جماع للخبر[37] واذا رايت العين راكده وهي في نفسها تتحرك دون الاشفار[38]

A7 فان العيون غير البطيه[39] الحركه تدل على الشر[40] وسوء الظن وقله الصدق[41] واما ما[42] يفرق بين الجبان والجرى اذا رايت العينين تتحرك اشفارها وجوفها فاقض على صاحبها بالجبن واذا رايتها لا تكاد تتحرك واحد منها[43] فاعلم ان صاحب ذلك جرى شديد النفس لا يهوله كثير مما يهول الناس واعلم ان الذين[44] لا تتحرك عيونهم عجزه كسله وربما كانت هذه العلامه في اولاد الزنا وربما كانوا عير فطناً ولا علماً يقتدون[45] برأيهم ومن كانت[46] وسطاً بين السكون والحركه فانه في جميع أموره *(?)* وسط بين ذلك واما العين التي تسرع نظرها الى كل جانب فانها تدل على حب الزنا وكثره التعب[47] واما

[37] ل. للخير.

[38] م. فهي في نفسها تتحمد دون الاشفاء.

[39] ل. البطيه.

[40] م. الشوش.

[41] ل. الصديق.

[42] م. وما.

[43] م. الا في جوفها.

[44] ل. الذي.

[45] م. و لاعلما يقيدون.

[46] م. كانت له.

[47] م. التعب.

of knowledge and a collector of information.[37] If you see that the eye is still, and it moves on its own to the exclusion of the eyelids,[38] [that is good].

A7 (TK 3207, fos. 47^{b}6–48^{a}6; TK 3245, fos. 30^{b}7–31^{b}6)

Fast-moving[39] eyes indicate evil,[40] wicked conjecture, and lack of truth.[41] Regarding[42] what distinguishes the coward from the bold man, if you see that the eyelids and the interiors of the eye move, judge for their owner cowardice. If you see that one of them (i.e. either the eyelids or the interiors) hardly moves,[43] know that the owner of that is bold and strong-minded, and much of what terrifies people does not terrify him. Know that those[44] whose eyes do not move are weak and lazy, and this sign is sometimes found in the children of fornication, and they are often neither intelligent nor learned, following[45] their own opinion. The one whose[46] eye is between rest and movement is likewise in all his affairs [7^a] between the two states. As for the eye whose gaze moves quickly from side to side, this indicates love of fornication and much fatigue.[47] As for the eye that quivers or trembles, and that is also large, judge

[37] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'collector of good'. Hoffmann's emendation makes sense and is supported by Ad.: 'fond of learning' (φιλόλογον).

[38] Hoffmann: 'it is praised above anything like it' (*haec sola laudabilis est similibus exclusis*) citing Ad.: 'only this form of fixed eyes is very good' (τοῦτο μόνον πεπηγότων ὀφθαλμῶν σχῆμα βέλτιστον).

[39] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'slow-moving'. Hoffmann's supposition that a negative has accidentally been omitted seems to fit the sense better (slow-moving eyes are dealt with further on in this section) and is supported by Ad.: 'move quickly' (κινούμενοι ταχέως).

[40] Hoffmann: 'disturbance' (*perturbationem*) citing Ad.: 'troubled' (ταραχώδη).

[41] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'lack of the truthful person', clearly a scribal slip.

[42] Hoffmann omits this word in order to put this clause with the previous sentence (*et quod medium est inter ignavum et audacem*), evidently feeling it corresponds to Ad.: 'is a delayer rather than a doer'.

[43] Hoffmann: they hardly move 'except for their interior' (*nisi in interiore parte*) referring to Ad. A7: 'those who move their eyes quickly, but do not move their eyelids in a similar fashion, are bold and daring in dire straits', cf. Anon. Lat. 23.

[44] Leiden has a singular relative pronoun but plural possessive pronoun and adjectives, so Hoffmann makes the relative pronoun plural.

[45] Hoffmann: 'nor do they acquire knowledge' (which he translates as *nec litteras mente sua adsequuntur*) citing Ad.: 'insensible' (δυσαίσθητοι). BH has: 'he whose eyes are slow-moving is lazy and a bastard (*bar gawrā*)'. Zonta (1992) 38 argues that PG had νωθεῖς ('sluggish'), which the Syriac translator misunderstood as νόθοι ('bastards'; cf. Hoffmann's 'νωθεῖς cum νόθοις videtur confudisse') and so translated *bar gawrā*, and the Arabic translator, finding this statement strange, attempted to mitigate it by making the sense less certain. However, the Greek νωθεῖς ἀργοί ('sluggish and lazy') corresponds well to the Arabic *'ajaza kasala* ('weak and lazy'), and if the Syriac translator misunderstood νωθεῖς, why did he invert the order and write 'lazy and a bastard' instead of 'a bastard and lazy'? One could argue that the next word in Polemon was νόθοι, which Ad. omitted thinking he had already put it (i.e. confusing it in his mind with νωθεῖς), but why then did the Syriac translator not translate νωθεῖς?

[46] Hoffmann adds 'belonging to him' to refer back to the indefinite relative pronoun, as would be usual in classical Arabic.

[47] Hoffmann: 'corruption' (*turpitudinem*); no explanation given, but gives better sense (though it is a rare word in Arabic).

العين التي تختلج او ترتعد ولها مع ذلك عظم فاقض على صاحبها بالبطاله والكسل والجبن[48] والزنا والسكر والعين الصغيره الزوايا[49] الذي* ترتعد فاقض على صاحبها بقله الحيا[50] ومد النفس[51] واكل الحرام وقله الايمان وكلما يجمعه ينفقه فيما لا يحل و يحمد و ينبغي ان تجتنب˜ من عينه كدره تشبه لون الخمر الصرف ولا تخالطه واحذر منه والعين الصغيرة الشهلاً او الكحلاً او السوداً وهي (اوهي)! ترتعد فاقض على صاحبها بالزنا كما قضيت على صاحب العين الحمرا واقض على صاحب العين الشهلا برداه الفكر وعلى السودا بقله الحركه[52] والقحه واذا رايت العين كلها تتحرك كان بها قذاه[53] فاعلم ان صاحبها كثير شهوه النكاح يحب اللهو واللذه

A8 واما العين الزرقا فان امرها كامر غيرها من العيون التي على مثل صورتها غير ان الزرقاً اذا صغر ناظرها وجدت صاحبها حريص° على
(ب7) جمع المال والعيون الزرق تختلف˜ زرقتهن بعض الى البياض وبعض الى لون الاسمانجون وفيما بين هذين اللونين الوان (اللوان)! شتى من الزرق ومنها ما يشبه لون المرارة وغير ذلك من الالوان ومنها ما يبين فيها نقط صغار مختلفه الالوان واذا رايت العين الزرقاً يابسه الناظر كانما صبغ˜ ناظرها بالمرة الصفراً فاقض على صاحبها بسوء السيره واذاعه الظلم واذا كانت العين الزرقاً رطبه فهي من علامه الخير واذا كانت في ذاتها معتدله وزرقتها مضيه حسنه فاقض عليها بحسن المذهب وقله الغضب واذا كانت ضعيفه الزرقه غير صافيه فاقض على صاحبها بالجبن˜ وضعف النفس وربما وجد في العيون الزرق نقط مختلفه وانا انعت لك ذلك اذا رايت في العين الزرقاً او الشهلاً نقطاً على لون الأسمانجون يكون* حول الناظر ويكون* مثل حب الجاورس ويكون* في عيون اخر نقط تضرب الى حمرة مطبقه بالناظر مثل الخرز المنظوم في خيط وقد يكثر*˜ بكثرة النقط وتقل ويحمر بعضها

[48] م. و البخل.
[49] م. الزرقا.
[50] ل. بالحيا.
[51] م. و قصد النفس.
[52] م. الحرد.
[53] الترجمة السريانية: حلا.

for its owner idleness, laziness, cowardice,[48] fornication, and drunkenness. Regarding the small-angled eye that trembles,[49] judge for its owner lack of modesty,[50] of extensive desire,[51] eating what is forbidden, and lack of faith. Everything he amasses he spends on what is not permitted or reputable. You should avoid whoever has a clouded eye that resembles the colour of unmixed wine; do not mix with him and be cautious of him. Regarding the small, bluish-black, or dusky, or black eye, that trembles, judge for its owner fornication, just as you judge for the owner of the red eye. Judge for the owner of the bluish-black eye baseness of thought, and of the black eye lack of activity,[52] and impudence. If you see an eye all of which is moving about, as if a speck were in it,[53] know that its owner has a great desire for sexual intercourse, and he loves entertainment and pleasure.

A8 (TK 3207, fo. 48ᵃ7–ᵇ11; TK 3245, fos. 31ᵇ7–32ᵇ8)

As for a blue eye, the same applies to it as to other eyes that have the same form as it, except that in the case of the blue eye with a small pupil you find that its owner is desirous of [7ᵇ] hoarding money. Blue eyes differ in their blueness, some towards whiteness, others towards the colour of the hyacinth, and between these two are various shades of blue. There are some that resemble the colour of gall and other colours. In others small dots of different colours are apparent. If you see a blue eye with a dry pupil, as if its pupil has been dyed with yellow gall, judge for its owner an evil way of life and the spreading of oppression. If the blue eye is moist, this is a good sign. If it is in its essence of even proportions, and its blue is luminous and beautiful, judge for its owner good behaviour and lack of anger. If its blueness is weak, and not clear, then judge for its owner cowardice, and weakness of will. There are often various dots in blue eyes. I shall describe this to you. You may see in a blue or bluish-black

[48] Hoffmann: 'insanity' (*apoplexiam*) citing Ad.: 'madness' (ἀποπληξίαν).

[49] Hoffmann: 'the small, blue eye that trembles' (*oculi parvi caerul qui tremit*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'small and quivering and light blue' (ὀφθαλμοὶ μικροὶ ὑπότρομοι γλαυκοί), which is also the reading of TK 3207, fo. 47ᵇ (*al-'ayn al-zarqā al-ṣaghīra*).

[50] Thus Hoffmann, citing Ad.: 'shameless' (ἀναιδεῖς); Leiden is clearly defective (*hinā'* = desire of ewe/cow for the male).

[51] Hoffmann: 'aiming at desire' (*optati adpetitum*) citing Ad.: 'unjust' (ἄδικοι). Leiden is certainly defective here, but there are other possibilities: TK 3207, fo. 47ᵇ, has 'weakness of mind' (*ḍu'f al-nafs*).

[52] Hoffmann: 'lack of anger' (*excandescentiae defectum*) citing Ad.: δυσοργητότεροι, implying that he thinks that PA has mistakenly taken the initial δυσ- to have a negative rather than an intensive sense, and that PA is therefore translating directly from the Greek. BH has a totally different wording here ('dull of heart to the point of disdaining God').

[53] For Zonta (1992) 38–9 this is another illustration of PA's dependence on PS. Ad. has 'eyes which are swelling and seething', words which are used of the sea; BH renders this as 'eyes which are agitated as if by waves'. Zonta posits that PA has read *galilē* 'waves' as *gelā* 'straw, hay', which explains Leiden's 'speck'. This is certainly possible, but the Arabic *qadhāh* means any foreign body in the eye, not straw/hay in particular, and one could equally argue that he has quite cleverly conveyed the rather flowery Greek by thinking of a speck in the eye, which of course makes one's eye agitate violently and water a lot.

(أ8) ويخضر ويصفر بعضها ويعظم¯ بعض وتتفاضل¯ وتختلف[54]
ولقد رأيت رجلاً لا أسميه من اهل قورينيس[55] في عينيه نقط مثل الجاورس مطبقه على الناظر بعضها حمر وبعضها سود وكانت تبرق مثل النار وكان كاملا في الشر مسامحًا نفسه في الشهوة كالزنا والفجور والقحه ولا دين ولا أمانه وكل المخازي كانت مجموعه فيه ولم اشاهده غير مرة واحده على ان ايات الشر تشهد بعضها على بعض فاذا نظرت اليه فاقض[56] عليه بما شاهدت من الايات فان الناس لا يعرفون بأيه واحده على اختلافهم[57] وانا اشرح لك بعد ذلك ساير الايات فانني قد عرفت ذلك وفهمته وان احد (احدًا)! من الناس لا يستطيع جمع ذلك في كتاب غير انك اذا عرفت ساير الايات واخذت من كلها شهادة كما نعت لك كان ذلك[58] اصلا بعلم الفراسه كتعليم الغلام الادب حالا فحالا و نحن متممون ما بدانا من ذكر العيون و اختلافها ان شآ الله تعالى

<u>ذكر العيون و اختلافها</u>

(ب8) اذا رايت العين الزرقا و النقط مطبقا* بناظرها فهي عين غادر سارق ويكون فيه رفق[59] وفهم يسر حاله عليه فان رأيت هذه النقط المطبقه (المتطبقه)! بالناظر محيطه وكانت صغارًا وهم صغار العيون فاقض عليهم بكثره الفجور والمكر والشح وكثره الفكر الرديه مع لين وحلاوة لسان ولست واجدًا[60] بعده بحب جمع المال وشدة الحرص وربما منعهم الفزع والجبن من أسباب رديه

[54] يدعي هوفمان إن هذه الجملة غير كاملة.

[55] ل. قورينس.

[56] م. فضيت.

[57] م. اختلافها.

[58] م. كان ذلك لك.

[59] م. تدقيق او دقة.

[60] م. ولست واحدا واحدا.

eye dots the colour of hyacinth, around the pupil, like the grains of millet. And in other eyes there may be dots turning to redness that are spread throughout the pupil like beads strung on a thread. There may be a great multitude of dots or else few, some of them being red, [8ᵃ] some green, or yellow, and some are large, and they are various and diverse.[54]

I have seen a man, whom I will not name, of the people of Cyrene,[55] who had dots in his eyes like millet, spread throughout the pupil, some red, and some black, and they glittered like fire. He was completely immersed in evil, indulging himself in desire, like fornication, immorality, and impudence, and he had no religion or faith. All disgraceful things were combined in him. I only observed him once, but the signs of evil corroborated one another. If you see (one like) him, judge[56] against him on the basis of the signs I had observed. Indeed, people cannot be known by one sign on account of their[57] diversity. After this I will explain to you the other signs, for I have learnt this and understood it, although no one can gather this in a single treatise. You, however, when you have learnt the other signs and taken note of all of them, just as I have described to you, this will be a foundation[58] in the science of physiognomy, just like teaching a boy refinement stage by stage. We shall now complete what we began of the account of the eyes and their diversity, God Almighty willing.

An Account of the Eyes and their Variety

[8ᵇ] If you see a blue eye where the dots are spread throughout its pupil, it is the eye of a traitor and thief, although he possesses gentleness[59] and understanding, which makes his condition easier for him. If you see that these dots that are spread throughout the pupil form a circle and are small, and the eyes are small, then judge for them much immorality, cunning, desire, many wicked thoughts, together with softness and sweetness of tongue. You will not find any[60] with a greater love of hoarding money or greater greed than them, although often base causes like fear and cowardice restrain them.

[54] Hoffmann posits a lacuna here, because in the Arabic the sentence begins 'if/when you see' and then has no apodosis. Probably, however, Polemon is just describing the various types of dots found in eyes and not drawing conclusions about the character of people possessing them (so I have translated: 'you may see. . .').

[55] Leiden: *Fwryns.*

[56] Hoffmann: 'when I looked at him, I judged' (*simulatque eum conspexi iudicavi*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[57] Hoffmann makes this feminine, feeling it should refer to 'signs' rather than 'people', though this does not seem compelling.

[58] Hoffmann adds 'for you' to complete the sense.

[59] Hoffmann: 'subtlety' (*subtilitas*) citing Ad.: 'shrewdness' (ἀγχινοίας).

[60] Hoffmann adds 'someone' to complete the sense.

A9 واذا رايت العينين منقلبتين" الى العلو فان فيها مشابه[61] من عيون البقر فتلك آيات الحمق والغفله ونقصان في العقل لانهم اصحاب نهم ونكاح وسكر فان كانت هذه العيون تضرب الى خضرة دلت على حب القتل والشديدي (الشديدين)! الفكر والبطش" محبين للدماً وان كانت حمراً (حمر)!! كباراً فانها تدل على صاحب السكر والحديث[62] والنساً وكلامهم لايخلو من الفحش والردى وحب الخصومه والكسل واذا رايت انقلاب العينين الى اسفل فاقض عليه بما قضيت على الاول الذي كان انقلاب عينيه الى فوق غير ان هاتين العينين اشد غضبًا وأشد نفسًا وعبثًا[63] ولا يقدر *(9/)* أحد يردهم عن رأى او فهم[64] بكل حيله لان ما يثبت في قلوبهم كانه في حديد واذا رايت احدى الطرفين طامحه الى العلو والاخرى الى أسفل وهما يرعدان* مع ذلك ومع هذا النعت ان يكون في الحاجبين انقباض والنفس عالي[65] شديد فاخلع صاحب ذلك من العلم والعقل والفطنه

A10 واما العينان المايلتان الى الجانب الايمن [فهي][66] تدل على الحمق والكسل فان كان ميلهما الى الجانب الأيسر فان ذلك يدل على الزنا والعين القليله النظر التي كانها تدور تدل على حب النساً خاصه ان كانت العين رطبه وفي الاحيان تلك تدل على كثره النكاح والعين الثاقبه النظر الذي* تدور وتراها مخالطه الانف تدل على الزنا[67]

A11 واما الذين (الذي)!! في اعينهم نقط سود[68] فامرهم مختلف والعيون[69]

[61] م. مشابهه.

[62] م. و اللعب.

[63] م. و عبثا.

[64] م. مهم.

[65] م. غليظ؟

[66] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[67] م. والعين القائلة النظر التي تدور و تراها كانها ملاحظة الانف تلك تدل على حب النسا وكثرة النكاح و الزنا خاصه ان كانت العين رطبه وامية الاجفان والعين اليابسة النظر التي تدور ...

[68] م. وسواد.

[69] م. فالعيون.

A9 (TK 3207, fo. 49^{a}2–^{b}3; TK 3245, fo. 33^{a}4–^{b}9)

If you see eyes that are turned upwards and there are in them similarities[61] to the eyes of cows, these are the signs of stupidity, carelessness, and deficiency in the intellect, because they are people of gluttony, sexual intercourse, and drunkenness. If these eyes turn towards greenness, this indicates a love of killing, men vehement in thought and force, and lovers of blood. If the eyes are red and large, this indicates a devotee of drunkenness, conversation,[62] and women. Their words are never free of lewdness, wickedness, love of disputation, and laziness. If you see the eyes are turned downwards, judge for their owner as you judge for the former, whose eyes were turned up, except that these eyes are more irascible and more vehement in spirit and mischief.[63] No one can [9^{a}] cause them to change from an opinion or understanding[64] by any stratagem, because what is established in their hearts is as if set in iron. If you see one of the eyes directed upwards and the other downwards, while both also tremble, and, together with this description, there is a contraction in the eyebrows, and the breath is deep[65] and strong, then discount their owner from knowledge, intellect, and intelligence.

A10 (TK 3207, fo. 49^{b}3–8; TK 3245, fos. 33^{b}9–34^{a}5)

As for eyes that tend to the right side, [it][66] indicates stupidity and laziness. If their tendency is to the left side, this indicates fornication. An eye with little vision that seems to circle about indicates love of women, especially if the eye is moist, and sometimes this indicates much sexual intercourse. The eye with penetrating vision that circles about and is apparently blended with the nose indicates fornication.[67]

A11 (TK 3207, fo. 50^{a}9–13; TK 3245, fo. 35^{a}2–5: end of A11 only)

As for those who have black dots[68] in their eyes, they are diverse. The[69] eyes that are bluish-black differ from the dusky eyes, because their colour and their

[61] Hoffmann assumes this, not necessarily rightly, to be an error for 'a resemblance'.

[62] Hoffmann: 'play' (*ludo*) citing Ad.: 'fond of dice' (φιλόκυβοι).

[63] Hoffmann: 'rebuke', which he however translates (stretching its connotations too far) as 'furious' (*excandescentiae*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'wild and cruel anger (μῆνιν ἀγρίαν καὶ ἀμείλικτον).

[64] Hoffmann: 'task'; no explanation given; presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[65] Hoffmann suggests this might be a corruption for 'harsh', as in Ad. (τραχύ).

[66] Thus Hoffmann; this word is not present in Leiden, but would be required in classical Arabic.

[67] To bring it closer to Ad. and the Anon. Lat. Hoffmann suggests rewording this paragraph to read: 'If the eye has cross-vision (cf. Ad.: παραβλῶπες) and circles about and you see it as though looking towards the nose, that indicates love of women, much sexual intercourse, and fornication, especially if the eye is moist and broad-open [H.'s *nictat* translates another suggestion: *rámiza*]. The eye with dry vision that circles about...'.

[68] Hoffmann: 'dots and blackness' (*puncta et nigredo*); he states *certe corruptum* without giving an explanation.

[69] Hoffmann: 'For the...'.

الشهل مخالفه للعيون الكحل لان لونهم وامرهم [غير][70] واحد وانا قايل في العيون الكحل فان العين الكحلا لها اخلاق ضعيفه الا ان أهلها يحبون الربح والنفع وفيهم ضعف الدين واما العيون الشهل فان رايت فيها نقط سود[71] فقط فان ذلك آيه حسنه وربما كانت هذه النقط (ب9) التي شبه الجاورس حول ناظره* ويوجد* حول تلك النقط[72] دايره سوداً ومنها حمراً وفي اخر بيضاً فاذا رايت العين الشهلاً التي[73] لا تستبين حمرتها التي يخالطˇ سوادها من بعد ولا تشتد تلك الحمرة فاعلم ان صاحبها يقظان القلب شديد النفس حسن العقل حكيم امين ذكي الحفظ سريع التعليم فان اشتدتˇ تلك الحمرة ورايت فيها كالنقط الحمر او الصفر او الخضر ورايت لها مثل ابراق النار ووجدت الحدقه التي تحدق بالناظر بيضاً و[74] حمراً ورايتها تتحرك حركه الانسان الذي ينظر الى[75] نفسه كان فيها شي من الاشيأ وتكون الجفون مفتوحه فاذا رايت هذه العين فاعلم انك لست واجد° بعدها عينًا اكمل منها في الشر لاعين دب ولا عين جرذ[76] بري ولا راحه لصاحب تلك العين من الهم بالشر والكباير من الأمور وغلظ الطبع
ولم أر (ارى)! مثل هذه الجماعه (جماعه)!! بل رايت رجلًا واحدًا فقد[77] كان من لوديا[78] وكان هذا الرجل يتحدر الى بلاد بون[79] ويجول فيها وكان له مثل هذه العينين التي وصفت لك واما لونه فاسود يميل الى (10أ) الحمرة كانه شارب خمرًا أو حردان وكان خنيثˇ الفم متصلقًا في كلامه طويل الانف ذقنه وخديه[!] بعيدين[!] من عينيه وهي كثيره اللحم غليظ الرقبه وفيها قصر وبطنه كبير مرتفع مستو (مستوى)! كثير اللحم شديد وعراقيبه غلاظ واصابع يديه ورجليه قصار ولحم يديه شحم وفي صوته بحوحه سمجهˇ وكان نظرته (نظره)!! نظرة رجل مغموم

[70] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[71] م. سوادًا.

[72] م. ذلك الناظر؟

[73] م. ان.

[74] م. او.

[75] م. يغضب في.

[76] م. ذيب و لا عين خنزير.

[77] م. فقط.

[78] ل. الاوديا.

[79] ل. تون.

condition are [not][70] the same. I shall now speak of the dusky eyes. The owners of the dusky eye have timid dispositions, except that they love profit and gain, and they are weak in their religion. As for bluish-black eyes, if you see only black dots[71] in them, this is a good sign. Often these dots [9^b^], which are like millet, are around their pupil. Around those dots[72] is a black circle, in some of them red, and in others white. If you see a bluish-black eye, the red of which[73] is mixed with its black and is not visible from a distance and is not strong, know that its owner is alert of heart, strong-minded, of fine intellect, wise, trustworthy, astute in memory, and quick in learning. If, then, that red is strong and you see in the eye the like of red dots or yellow or green, and you see it has things like flashes of fire, and if you find the iris that surrounds the pupil is white and[74] red, and you see the eyes move as in a man who is looking at[75] himself as if something were in them, and the eyelids are open—if, then, you see this eye, know that you will not find another eye which is more perfectly evil than it, not the eye of a bear nor the eye of a wild rat.[76] The owner of this eye takes no rest from interest in evil and from those things which are great sins and the crudities of nature.

I have not seen the like of this type, though I did see one man,[77] and he was from Lydia.[78] He was going down to the land of Ionia[79] and travelling about there. He had eyes like those I have described to you. As for his colour, it was black turning towards [10^a^] redness, as if he had drunk wine or were angry. He had an effeminate mouth, was boastful in his speech, with a long nose, and chin and cheeks far from his eyes. He had much flesh, a thick short neck, and his stomach was large, protruding, even, and fleshy. He was strong, his ankles were thick, the digits of his hands and feet were short, the flesh of his hands was fatty, and in his voice was an ugly hoarseness. His glance was the glance of a grieving and bilious man, and he seemed like one bearing threats towards

[70] Thus Hoffmann; this word is not present in Leiden, but the sense would seem to require it.

[71] Hoffmann: 'blackness' citing Ad.: 'their colour appears to be black at first glance' (ἡ μὲν χροιὰ ἐπιπρέπει αὐτοῖς μέλαινα ὡς ἁπλῶς ἰδεῖν).

[72] Hoffmann says one expects 'around that pupil' (*circa hanc pupillam*) citing the sentence in Ad. A11: 'Others do not have eyes with dotted appearances, but the outside rim of the whole circle is black. . .', cf. Anon. Lat. 26.

[73] Hoffmann emends this to a (rather awkward) noun clause: 'If in a bluish-black eye you see the red mixed with the black' (*oculi charopi si vides rubedinem nigredine permixtam*).

[74] Hoffmann: 'or', and he wonders if it should be 'blue' rather than 'white', as Ad. has 'blood-red or dark rims' (ἴτυες δὲ αἱματώδεις ἢ κυαναῖ). He also posits a lacuna after this, saying that Ad. has 'these are very bad' (οὗτοι κάκιστοι) at this point. However, this is bracketed by Foerster (320. 1–2) and seems out of place since the sentence concludes further on with 'these are the worst of all' (πάντων οὗτοι χείριστοι).

[75] Hoffmann: 'is angry with' (*excandescit*) citing Ad.: 'such as angry (θυμούμενοι) men look'.

[76] Hoffmann: 'not the eye of a wolf nor the eye of a wild pig' (*neque lupi oculum neque suis feri*) citing Ad.: 'of wolves and wild boars' (λύκων γὰρ καὶ ὑῶν ἀγρίων).

[77] Hoffmann: 'just one man', taking the following connective and adverbial particle (*qad*) to be a mistake for the word 'only/just' (*qat*).

[78] Leiden: '*llwdhy*'. Hoffmann's suggestion of Lydia is plausible, but not certain.

[79] Leiden: *Nwn*. Hoffmann's suggestion of Ionia is plausible, but not certain.

ممرور وكان شبيه المهدد للناس كلهم وربما حد[80] أسنانه شبه الخنزير البري اذا حمل على الرجل الصياد ليأتي عليه وكان عالي الصوت بالضحك اذا ضحك وكان نفسه كانه يلتهب فعرفت ان هذا النفس مملوّا[1] شرّا وكان دايم الهم والفكر في المكاره والتعلم بالفحشاً ومملو° ظلمًا وعدوان° كثير التوعد بالشر قتال مهريق للدماً وكان يكثر الكلام في الزنا والشباب والنساً وانه لا يشتهي من الادوات الا النغوله وكان لصديقه اشر منه لعدوه مع حرص" على ضر الصديق والعدو والحر والعبد وكان يستحدث ضروبًا من الشر لا تحصى ومن عجايب البلايا التي لا يفطن لها احد انه جاور مرة قوم° *(ب10)* صالحين في يوم عيد لهم يتادون فيه فاهدى اليهم سفطًا لا يدري ما فيه فلما وضعه الرسول وانصرف قال القوم بعضهم لبعض قد وجه الينا هذا بطعام كثير وأمروا فادنى الطعام اليهم فقدم السفط فيما قدم وفتح فاذا في أعلاه سكرجات صدف واذا تحتها راس انسان فافزعهم" ذلك وفرق جمعهم كل الى منزله واكثروا الدعاً عليه ويسالون الله ان يستدرجه كما نجس طعامهم وشرابهم" وكنت انا فيمن دعا عليه ولست مقصرًا في ذلك ما حييت

وكذلك اخبرني رجل من اهل سوريه كان عارفًا به انه أفسد طعامهم عليهم مرارًا كثيرةً وكان يسقي قومًا الخمر فاذا ناموا حلق لحاهم وربما كان يخنقهم" وهم ينامون (ينام)!! و كان يفعل (يفل)!! من الشر ما لا يهتدي اليه أحد وما كان يحضر طعام° ولا شراب° الا ينجسه بالخبث والنجس من الأمور وكذلك كان يفعل بالغرباً[81] وكان عالمًا بالسحر والسمومات المسكره القاتله وبكل ضرب ردي وما رايت ذكر° ولا انثى على طبعه وكان شديد الخلق على النبيذ[82] ومن اشد الناس *(أ11)* غمزًا ونميمه وكان الناس كلهم اعداه يحب" الضرر بهم وكان اذا فتح عينيه رايتها كثيرة الرطوبه مثل عين النهم من الناس اذا اكل فوق المقدار واذا شرب الشراب الصرف الكثير وكان اذا فعل باحد (باحدًا)! شرًا رأيته فرحًا ياخذه الضحك قرير العين ويتكلم بما لا يعلم وكان اذا تهيا له ظلم رايته فرحًا مثل الكلب النابح" وقد بلغني انه قتل اباه وامه اما اباه! فانه قتله بشربه سم سقاه اياها واما أمه فحملها (حملها)!! في سفينه كانه يريد بها الى مدينه فلما توسط بها البحر قذفها فيه فقذفتها" الامواج الى جزيره

[80] د. ضر.

[81] د. بالاقربا.

[82] د. الشر.

all people. He often honed[80] his teeth like a wild pig when it attacks the huntsman to kill him. He laughed in a high voice, and his spirit seemed ablaze. So I knew that this individual was full of evil, and he was always interested in and thinking about plotting and learning vile deeds. He was full of tyranny and enmity, often threatening evil; a killer, and shedder of blood. He would often speak of fornication, of young men and women, and that he desired no trappings but bastard children. To his friend he was more evil than to his enemy, desirous in harming friend and foe, freedman and slave. He would invent innumerable kinds of evil. Among the astonishing calamities which no one was aware of was that he was once neighbour to some good people [10^{b}], on a feast day of theirs on which they were giving out invitations. He presented to them therefore a basket, the contents of which were not known. When the messenger had set it down and left, the people said to each other 'he has sent this to us with much food'. They gave orders for the food to be brought to them, and the basket was put among the offerings, and was opened. On top of it were saucers of oyster-shells, and underneath them was the head of a man! This terrified them, and their gathering broke up, each returning to his house. They cursed him much, asking God to lay him low, just as he had debased their food and drink. I myself was among those who cursed him, and I will not be neglectful in this as long as I live.

Likewise, a man from Syria who knew him told me that he had corrupted their food many times. He would give people wine, and when they slept he would shave their beards, and he would often strangle them while they slept. He would do evil things that no one would contemplate, and food and drink would not be prepared without him defiling it with bad and impure substances. He would do the same to strangers.[81] He also knew about magic, intoxicating and fatal poisons, and about every wicked kind of thing. I have never seen male or female with his nature. He had a strong disposition for wine,[82] and was one of the most vehement of people [11^{a}] in denunciation and defamation. All the people were his enemies, whom he liked to harm. When he opened his eyes you would see they were very moist, like the eyes of a gluttonous person when he eats more than he is capable of and drinks much unmixed wine. When he did evil to anyone, you would see him joyful, overcome with laughter, delighted, and talking about he knew not what. If an act of oppression presented itself to him, you would see him happy like a barking dog. I was informed that he killed his father and mother. In his father's case, he killed him with a drink of poison that he gave him. As for his mother, he took her in a boat as if he wanted to take her to a town. When he had taken her to the middle of the sea he hurled

[80] Hoffmann: 'gnashed' (*stridebant*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[81] Hoffmann: 'relatives' (*propinquos*), pointing out that strangers would not be guests.

[82] Hoffmann: 'reviling' (*conviciandum*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

يقال لها فلوفينا[83] فوجدها قوم اخذوها وعنوا (عنو)!! بها حتى رجعت نفسها ولم تزل تتصدق وحدثني الوقيدس انه سار اليه وهو يريد التوبه من ذنبه بفعل يفعله فساله ان يقرب عنه قربانًا يكفر بذلك خطيئته فاخرجه الكاهن الى خارج المدينه قريبًا من البحر واخذ الكاهن موضعº لذبيحته تلك فاذا هو على قبر انسان فامتنع القوم من الحفر وقال له الكاهن أيها الرجل جد في امر اخر فان هذه الضحيه والقربان لا يقبل فزجر الكاهن وقال له امض (امضى)! لما أمرت فحذر *(ب11)* منه الكاهن واخذ في شانه واتاه بكبش حسنًا¹ سمينًا¹ ليس فيه عيب فلما هم الكاهن ان يذبحه مات الكبش˝ في ايديهم بلا سبب يعرف فلما نظر الكاهن الى ذلك هرب من بين يديه ورجع الى المدينه يلتمس لنفسه ما يطهره عن ذلك الملعون

ونقول في ذكر العين الشهلاً ذات النقط فانه على قدر حمرتها كذلك تكون الاخلاق الرديه لها وكثرة الشر[84] والقتال[85] والزنا والتربه فيها اذا وجدت النقط كبارًا واما اذا كانت صغارًا فانها تدل على اللين وحب الملاّمه واما النقط التي تشبه الدم في العيون السود فانها تدل على السحره واذا كانت النقط خضرº فانها تدل على الفكر السوء والمكر والخديعه واما العيون الشهل التي لا نقط بها التي تحيط بها دواير[86] ذو* الوان (اللوان)! فانظر الى ذلك في الكبر واللون فان الدايره (الداره)!! اذا كانت سوداً دقيقه واخرى تكون حمراً ووجدت هذه الايه في العيون الرطبه فاقض˝ عليها بشده النفس وكبر الهمه والفطنه والفهم والتقى وسرعه التعلم وحب الصبيان والرأفه[87] بهم واذا رايت *(12أ)* الحدقه التي تحدق بالناظر خضراً يخالطها سواد فتلك علامة الحمق والمكر والاثم وحب جمع المال وكثره شهوة النساً والجلوس معهن وقد تكون الحدقه تجمع الوانًا (لونًا)!! كلون قوس قزح˝ فاذا رايت هذه العلامه في العيون اليابسه فاقض عليها بكثره الكذب و التعب[88] فان وجدتها في عيون رطبه دل ذلك على الحمق والوسواس غير ان صاحب هذه الايه يحمد[89] ان يكون واسع الفكر شجاع النفس كثير الكلام كثير الغضب˝ شديد شهوة النكاح

[83] م. فلومنيا.

[84] م. الشفقة.

[85] م. والفتاك او الفتك.

[86] م. يحيط بها دائر.

[87] م. و الغرام.

[88] م. و التعب.

[89] م. يحتمل.

her into it, and the waves hurled her to an island called *Flwfyn*.[83] Some people found her, and took her and cared for her until her spirit returned. She is still begging for alms there now. *Alwqyds* told me that he went to him when he was wishing to repent of his sin by doing some deed. He asked him to offer a sacrifice for him in atonement for his errors. So the priest brought him outside the town, near to the sea, and he took the priest to a place for that sacrifice of his, and it was on someone's grave, so the people were prevented from digging there. The priest said to him: 'man, take up some other course; this sacrifice and offering will not be accepted'. He then scolded the priest and said to him: 'proceed to what you were ordered'. The priest was wary [11^{b}] of him and set about his task. He brought him a fine, fat ram without blemish. Then, when the priest was on the point of sacrificing it, the ram died in his hands for no apparent reason. When the priest saw this, he fled from his presence, and returned to his town to seek something that would purify him from that accursed man.

I will speak now on the subject of the bluish-black eye that has dots. In proportion to its redness, its owner will have a wicked character, and there will be much evil,[84] fighting,[85] fornication, and hypocrisy in him, and this is if you find that the dots are large. As for if they are small, they indicate softness and love of harmony. As for dots that resemble blood in black eyes, they indicate magicians. If the dots are green, they indicate evil thoughts, cunning, and deception. As for bluish-black eyes that do not have dots, but are surrounded by coloured circles,[86] examine that with regard to size and colour. If the one circle is black and another is red, and if you find this sign in moist eyes, judge strong-mindedness, great resolve, insight, understanding, respect, quickness to learn, love of young boys, and compassion[87] for them. If you see [12^{a}] that the iris that surrounds the pupil is green mixed with black, this is a sign of stupidity, cunning, sin, love of hoarding money, great desire for women and association with them. The iris may combine colours like the colour of a rainbow. If you see this sign in dry eyes, judge for its owner much lying and fatigue.[88] If you find it in moist eyes, that indicates stupidity and delusion, although the owner of this sign is praised for being[89] capacious of thought, courageous of soul, talkative, often angry, and very desirous of sexual intercourse.

[83] Hoffmann suggests Calymna here, and in the next but one sentence, regarding Alwqyds, he suggests Olympius/Olympiadas or Pelopidas.

[84] Hoffmann: 'vehemence' (*iracundia*) citing Ad.: 'quicker to anger' (δυσοργητότερα).

[85] Hoffmann suggests 'assault' (*impetus*) citing Ad.: 'more wantonly violent' (ὑβριστικώτερα).

[86] Hoffmann: 'round'; he translates *orbis*, so he perhaps intended to read 'circle' (*dā'ira*).

[87] Hoffmann: 'passion' (*cupiditatem*) citing Ad.: 'a pederast beyond moderation' (παιδεραστὴν πέρα τοῦ μετρίου).

[88] Hoffmann: 'corruption' (*pravitatem*); see n. 47 above, where he has suggested the same Arabic word (though translating it differently).

[89] Hoffmann: 'is likely to be' (*potest*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

A12 وانا امدح[90] العين التي ليس توجد غايرةً جدًا فاما العين الغايره التي كانها في انا قد بلغ الماَ منه بمقدار نصفه كانه يتحرك وتكون العينين[1] كبيرتين فليس لك ان تقضي عليها بالشر الا ان تجد فيها أو في غيرها من الجسد (الجد)!! ايات[91] توجب الشر فاما هذه العيون فقد نفا[92] عنها عظمها عيب غورها لكن اذا رايت العين صغيره غايره فاقض على صاحبها بالمكر والريبه[93] والحسد والغيره فان جمعت الى [ذلك][94] العين الصغيره يبسًا فزد عليها من الشر قلة (وقلة)! *(ب12)* الورع والسرقه لكل صنف[95] واستباحة[96] المساجد فاذا رايت بالطرف انفتاحًا[97] وانكسارًا فاقض عليه بالحمق والاثم[98] والعيون التي تكثر سيلان الدموع فاقض عليها بالمكر والسرقه وما أشبه ذلك فان سالت مع رطوبه فاقض عليه* بالمكر[99] وما أشبه ذلك

فاني رايت مرة رجل° من قورينن[100] صغير العينين غايرها (غايرة)!! جدًا وكانت بين الصغيره والكبيرة وكانت شهلاتين يابستين منكسرا طرفهما بحاجبين مرتفعتين[101] من راس بيض الخدين[102] واسفل الحاجبين وحش مع

[90] م. لا امدح.

[91] م. ايات اخر.

[92] م. عفا.

[93] م. و الرثه.

[94] هذه الكلمة التي ندرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[95] م. ضيف.

[96] هذا هو اقتراحي. في ل يوجد: لو يتاح وفي م: لو تباح. تستباح؟

[97] م. انفتاحا.

[98] م. و الاثم.

[99] م. بالسكره؟

[100] م. قورنان.

[101] ل. مرتفعا.

[102] ل. تبض الخديد.

A12 (TK 3207, fo. 50^{a}14–^{b}8)

I praise[90] the eye that is not found to be very hollow. In the case of the hollow eye which is as it were in a container half-full of water and appears to move, and the eyes are large, then you should not judge for them evil unless you find in it or in other parts of the body signs[91] that necessarily imply evil in it. In the case of these eyes, their magnitude deflects[92] from them the blemish of their being hollow. If, however, you see an eye that is small and hollow, judge for its owner cunning, suspicion,[93] envy, and jealousy. If the small eye combines dryness with [this],[94] add to its evils lack of [12^b] piety, thieving of every kind,[95] and plundering[96] of holy places. If you see an opening[97] and a languidness of the eye, judge stupidity and sin.[98] Regarding eyes that often flow with tears, judge for its owner cunning, stealing, and things like that. If they flow and there is also moistness, judge for him cunning,[99] and the like.

I once saw a man from Corinth[100] with small eyes, very hollow, and they were between small and large. They were bluish-black, dry, languid of sight, with eyebrows raised[101] from atop the main part of the cheeks.[102] At the bottom part

[90] Hoffmann: 'I do not praise'; no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'very hollow eyes are not praiseworthy' (οὐκ ἐπαινετοί). However, Leiden translates Ad. perfectly well, but puts the negative in the second half of the sentence ('is not found'), which is what Hoffmann effectively does too in his translation: *laudo equidem oculum qui non nimis cavus reperiatur.*

[91] Hoffmann adds 'other', so 'other signs' (*alia signa*), in order to complete the sense.

[92] Hoffmann: 'erases', which he translates as *compensat*, presumably thinking of the other sense of the word 'to pardon, excuse', but this requires the preposition *'an* after it; Ad. has 'counteract' (παραμυθοῦνται).

[93] Hoffmann wants to get closer to Ad.: 'treacherous' (ἐπίβουλα); he picks the word *rabi'a*, which is close in form to Leiden's 'suspicion' (*rība*), and translates it as 'ambush' (*insidias*). However, the root means simply to overlook from a high place (for the purposes of observation or guarding, not for ambush).

[94] Thus Hoffmann; this word is not present in Leiden, but the sense would seem to require it.

[95] Hoffmann: 'from every guest' (*cuiusvis hospitis*), citing Ad.: 'betrayal' (προδοσίαν).

[96] This is my suggestion. In Leiden, followed by Hoffmann, there is a conditional particle (*law*) plus verb here (Leiden: 'even if they were sold'; Hoffmann: 'even if they were permitted/plundered'), but a noun seems required (e.g. *istibāḥa*, 'plundering'); cf. Ad. (Ps.-Pol.) 'sacrilege' (ἱεροσυλίαν).

[97] Hoffmann: 'suppleness/laxness/weakness' (which he stretches in translation to *obtusiorem*); no explanation given, but it does make better sense and goes better with the next word 'languidness' or 'subduedness'. Hoffmann translates the latter word well as *infractam*, which also has the sense of 'subdued', but adds: i.e. *nictantem* ('blinking/winking'), which is totally wrong (he uses it in his translation two sentences further on).

[98] Hoffmann: 'abiding' or, in his rather forced translation, *tarditatem*, citing Ad. (Matr. 2): 'staring' (ἀτενεῖς).

[99] Hoffmann emends to *al-sakra*, which he translates as 'foolishness' (*stultitiam*), though it really means 'intoxication' (one could stretch it to 'confusion of the intellect'). Though he gives no explanation (except *per securitatem librarii*), he is clearly basing himself on Ad.: 'more stupid' (μωρότερα).

[100] Hoffmann's suggestion (also 'Cyrene' and 'Cyzicus'); Leiden has *Qwrynn*.

[101] I follow Hoffmann in making this adjective agree with 'eyebrows', but in Leiden it is accusative singular.

[102] Thus Hoffmann, citing Anon. Lat. 31: 'they have broad eyebrows which overhang the cheeks, as it were' (*genis imminentia*). Leiden, which literally has 'the pulse of the iron', is clearly defective.

[ان][103] حول عينيه من ظاهرهما خضره تشبه خضرة الموضع اذا ضرب فكان رجلٌ° قليل الحياً غليظٌ˘ الوجه[104] كثير الشغب˘ حتى انه يشغب على ذي سلطان وكان رجلٌ° منقطع°[105] من الناس يبغض الصالحين ويجتري˘ على السيات ليست له راحه عن الشر لاصحابه وكان سكير° ضيق الصدر وساذكر ما بدا لي منه فاني صحبت الملك الاكبر مرةً فبينما نحن نسير معه من براقه الى أسيه ومع الملك جيوشه ومراكبه فاختلط بهم ذلك الرجل فمررنا على مداين كثيره حتى بلغنا البحر فركب الى بون والسروس *(13أ)* وبلاد لوديه وفروجيه ومواضع كثيره ثم رجعنا الى أسيه على البحرين[106] في البحر وشرق الى روكس ثم سار في السفن الى اينس وعلى هذا الطريق اخذت سفن البحر تلقاً˘ الملك فلما بلغنا أسيه فنزلت على ذلك الرجل فاذا هو واصحابه مطيفون بالملك عليهم سلاح ولم يكن ذلك منه[107] لكرامه الملك ولا شوقا اليه لاكن باغيا˘ شراً في صدده وهموم سوء لا تقره وكانت له اصحاب سوء وهو راسهم ومعلمهم فبينما نحن كذلك والملك على عدته وهو يريد ان يخرج الى الصيد ونحن لا نقدر ان نكلمه اذ قعدت انا واصحابي نتحدث ونذكر الملك وما هو فيه من العياً والبعد من النعمه الذي* يذكر الناس انه فيها فجرى بيننا حديث اذ ذكرنا ذلك الرجل نتعجب من خزيه˘ وفجوره واثباته[108] نفسه في طلب الشر فبينما نحن كذلك اذ ترأى لنا[109] من جوف الشجر فاشتد فزعنا فنظرنا فاذا هو ذلك الرجل السوء الذي كنا في حديثه قد كان يمشي رويدًا كانه حيه يسمع حديثنا فقال ما هذا الحديث كله الا في شاني فقلت له *(13ب)* في ذكرك كنا ومن أمرك تعجبنا هلم فاخبرنا عن نفسك كيف احتملت هذه المؤنه ونصبت نفسك هذه الأنصاب

[103] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.
[104] ه. القحه.
[105] ه. منقطعا.
[106] ه. المحرز ويقترح: التحرير.
[107] ل. منهم.
[108] ل. اثباته.
[109] ه. شي او شخص.

of the eyebrows was a blank, together with [the fact that][103] around the outside of his eyes was greenness, similar to the greenness of the place that is bruised. He was, then, a man lacking in modesty, with a coarse face,[104] a great troublemaker, even to the extent that he made trouble for those in power. He was a man who was isolated[105] from people, who loathed good people, was bold in doing evil things, taking no rest from doing evil to his companions, a drunkard, and intolerant. I will mention how he appeared to me. I accompanied the great king once and, while we were travelling with him from *Br'qh* to *Asyh*, and with the king were his armies and boats, that man mixed with them. We passed through many towns until we reached the sea. Then he sailed to *Bwn*, *'Isrws*, [13ᵃ] and the lands of Lydia and Phrygia, and many places. Next we returned to *Ásyh* through the two seas[106] in the sea, and he went east to *Rwks*. Then he went in the ships to *'yns*, and by this route the ships of the sea began to catch up with the king. When we reached *Ásyh*, and I went to see that man, there he was with his companions surrounding the king, bearing weapons. This was not on his part[107] for the honour of the king nor out of strong attachment to him, but rather because he was seeking evil concerning him and had ill intentions that would not please the king. He had bad companions, and he was their leader and teacher. While we were thus, with the king in a state of readiness and wanting to set out on the hunt, we were unable to speak with him. I and my friends sat down to converse, talking of the king and his weakness, and his remoteness from the blessed state which people say he is in. The conversation went on until we mentioned that man, wondering at his baseness, immorality, and determination[108] in seeking evil. While we were doing so, he[109] presented himself to our view from within the trees. Our fright was great, then we looked, and it was this man of evil about whom we were talking, who had walked softly as if he were a snake to hear our conversation. So he said: 'Is not all this conversation about me?' I replied to him [13ᵇ]: 'We were talking about you, and we were astonished about you. Come on and tell us about yourself. How did you bear this inconvenience and exhaust yourself with these

[103] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to make the sentence correct Arabic.

[104] Hoffmann: 'coarse impudence' (*crassa inverecundia*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[105] Hoffmann: 'found to be abominable by' (*aversarentur*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[106] Hoffmann reads 'impregnable parts', and emends to 'sewing/stringing together', a root used mostly of beads, skins, etc., which he rather implausibly translates as 'straits' (*fretum*) and takes to refer to the Hellespont or Bosphorus. He notes that, except for Lydia and Phrygia, all the placenames in this passage are clear. For *Br'qh* he suggests Thrace; for *Bwn* Bithynia or Ionia; for *'Isrws* Isauria or Ephesus or Sardis; for *Asyh*/*Ásyh* he prints 'Asia' but footnotes 'Achaia' for the last two instances; for *Rwks* Rhoeteus or Rhodes; for *'yns* Athens or Aenea. For discussion of 'the two seas' and all the placenames see Ch. 3, pp. 163–5.

[107] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'on their part', thinking of the preceding 'companions', but the subject of the following verbs is the Corinthian man.

[108] Thus Hoffmann (which he translates *animi*), which makes better sense than Leiden's 'disorganization' and is very close to the form of the word there.

[109] Hoffmann adds 'something', and says maybe 'someone', presumably feeling it illogical to say 'he' when Polemon and his friends only recognize him in the next sentence.

فاعترف عند ذلك فقال بحق انه من عمل الشيطان وهمه السوء (سو)!! الذي* ملقيها في نفسي وجعل يبكي على نفسه ويدعوا عليها بالويل والثبور فهذا ما رايت من العيون الصغار الغايره

A13 ولست امدح مع ذلك العيون الجاحظه الشاخصه المخالفه للعيون الغايره اذا كرهت واما العيون الشاخصه فان بعضها يشخص عن الجفن[110] واعلم انه غاير واما الغاير الأخر فهو ما حول وسط العين فاذا رايت العين ضيقه الناظر حمراً فاقض[111] عليها بحب الخمر والبطاله واذا كانت مع ذلك زرقاً فاقض عليها بحب الاثم والفجور وقله الفطنه واذا رايت هذه الايات في العينين وكانت˜ مع ذلك جفونا¹ ثقالا¹ فاقض عليها بقله العلم والفهم وان اجتمع الى ذلك النعت ان تجد العينين يابستين فاحذر اوليك واهرب من مخالطتهم فانهم من ضرب (الضرب)! الذين˜ يقتلون اباهم وامهاتهم ويوجدون مع *(14أ)* ذلك علماً بالسحر واذا رايت العين البسر* التي بين الغايره والجاحظه البراقه الصافيه فامدحها فانك واجدها فطنه فهمه محبه للعلم والنكاح وقد ذكر لي ان عين سقراطيس الفيلسوف كانت على هذه النعت الذي قال فيها افلون[112] ان علم سقراطيس قد فاق علم الخلق وانما قتله قوما¹ حسدا¹ له على ما رأو من كثره علمه
وقد رايت رجل° مره ذا عينين صغيرتين حمراتين جاحظتين˜ شبيهه بعين السرطان وكان من ارض تسمى لوذيه وكان يدعى بالسرطان لما في عينيه من شبه السرطان فلما ذكر لي خلقه انطلقت اليه حتى لقيته ارادهً [ان][113] اعلم ما الذي يدل عليه خلقه عينيه من باطن طبيعته فرايته في منزله فلم اجد له فطنه ولا عقل لكنه كان رجلا اقطع اللسان وكان طماح النفس الى الشر ولا يكاد يرى شيًا الا اشتهاه لنفسه وكان شديد ارتعاش العينين[114] صغيرهما في شده حمره لا يشبهان* عيون الناس

[110] د. غص.

[111] د. واما الغايرة كالحفير فيما حول وسط العين ضيقة الناظر... فاذا رايت العين حمرا فاقض...

[112] ل. افليمون.

[113] هذه الكلمة التي يقترحها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[114] د. الحسد؟

burdens?' Thereupon he confessed, saying: 'Truly, it is the doing of Satan, and an interest in wrongdoing which has been cast into my soul.' He began to weep for his soul and to curse it with woe and destruction. This then is what I saw concerning small and hollow eyes.

A13 (TK 3207, fo. 51^a4–11, fos. 50^b11–51^a3)

In addition, I do not praise goggling and protruding eyes, which are the opposite of hollow eyes, since they are repulsive. In the case of protruding eyes, some of them protrude from the eyelids,[110] and know that their owner is jealous. As for another type of jealous person, it is (inferred from) what it is around the centre of the eye. And if you see the eye with a narrow pupil[111] and red, judge love of wine and idleness. If it is also blue, judge love of sin, immorality, and lack of intelligence. If you see these signs in the eyes, and also there are thick eyelids, judge for him lack of knowledge and understanding. If there combines with that the characteristic that you find the eyes dry, be wary of those people, and flee from association with them, for they are of the kind who kill their fathers and mothers, and they are also found to be [14^a] knowledgeable about magic. If you see a moist eye that is between hollow and goggling, gleaming, and clear, praise it, for you will find its owner intelligent, understanding, loving knowledge and sexual intercourse. It was mentioned to me that of this description was the eye of Socrates the Philosopher, about whom Apollo[112] said: 'The knowledge of Socrates transcended the knowledge of mankind, and they killed him as a people envious of him on account of his great knowledge that they saw.'

I once saw a man who had eyes that were small, red, and goggling like the eyes of a crab. He was from the land called Lydia, and he was called 'the Crab' because of the similarity of his eyes to those of the crab. When his nature was mentioned to me I set off to meet him out of a wish [to][113] know what the external form of his eyes indicated of his inner nature. So I saw him at his house, and I found that he had neither understanding nor intellect, but was a man of a most cutting tongue, and he was covetous of evil, hardly able to see anything without desiring it for himself. He had eyes[114] that quivered a lot and they were small, and in their great redness they did not look like other people's eyes.

110 Hoffmann: 'as a result of a swelling' (*e tumore*) citing Ad.: 'swelling' (οἴδημα).

111 Hoffmann: 'As for the hollow eye, like a ditch in the part around the centre of the eye, with a narrow pupil...', then he posits that the apodosis is missing in Leiden and that the next sentence begins: 'If you see the eye to be red, judge...'. He refers to Ad. A13, which has: 'Protruding eyes which are not praiseworthy are those surrounded by either a circular swelling or a deep and narrow trench, as it were.'

112 Thus Hoffmann citing Anon. Lat. 32; Leiden has 'Polemon'.

113 Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to make the sentence correct Arabic.

114 Hoffmann wants to read 'body' here, because Ad. and Anon. Lat. 32 (not 33 as Hoffmann says) say the man with small, red, protruding eyes is 'loose in body' (παρειμένον καὶ τὸ σῶμα/*nec corpore stabilem*).

A14 واذا رايت العين الصغيره البصاصه الكثيرة *(ب14)* الحركه فاقض عليها بالمكر والخديعه وسوء الهمة واذا رايت العين ترعد رعده بطيه فاظنن (فاظن)!! بها السوء الا ان تكون عظيمه جدًا فانها ان عظمت نقصت من شرها وزاد[115] بها الخير والشدة ورحب الذراع وحب الخمر والنسوه وضعف الامانه وعلى هذا النعت كانت عين الاسكندر غير انها كانت تضرب الى لون السمانجون فمن رايته كذلك[116] فاقض عليه بالجرأة" وقله الاناة وارتفاع الهمه ورغبه البطن وحب النسأ والمرابط والمزامير ومن العيون الزرق ما هي اشد خضرة من هذه

A15 فاذا كانت مع هذه الايات فانزله بمنزله العيون السود واقض عليها بشر الصحبه واياك ومصاحبه صاحبها فانك تجده فاجر° فاسد الأمانه فان جمعت هذه العين سخفه وظلامًا[117] فزد على ما قضيت بشده الغضب فان كانت مع ما مضى من النعت يابسه فزد على قضايك عليها بالفجور وسوء السيره واعلم أنه اذا اجتمع[118] مع هذا النعت صغرا[1] فزد" في شرها فانك واجدها *(15أ)* فاجره نمامه تقتل الأصحاب بنميمه فاحشه واذا رايت العينين مستحسنتين[119]" غايرتين وهما مع ذلك مصمتين (مصمتتين)!! حسب فاقض عليها بالحرص وشده الحيأ والرغبه في العلم والخير وحب النسأ

[115] م. وزد لو زدت.

[116] م. من عيبه خصاء؟

[117] ل (القرائة م). سخفه واظلاما.

[118] م. جمعت.

[119] م. مسحتين.

A14 (TK 3207, fo. 51^{a}11–^{b}7)

If you see a small, shining eye that moves a lot [14^b], judge cunning, perfidy, and evil intentions. If you see that the eye trembles slowly, think evil of it, unless it is very large. If it is large, it is less evil, and it increases in[115] goodness, forcefulness, broad-ranging power, love of wine and women, and unreliability. The eye of Alexander was of this description, except that it tended to the colour of hyacinth. So judge for whomsoever you see like this[116] boldness, lack of patience, high ambition, desires of the stomach, love of women, string- and wind-instruments. There are some blue eyes that have more greenness than these.

A15 (TK 3207, fo. 51^{b}8–13; TK 3245, fo. 35^{a}6–9)

If they have these signs, put them in the same category as black eyes, so judge for them bad company. Beware of the company of their owner, for you will find him immoral and of bad faith. If this eye combines insubstantiality with darkness,[117] add fierce anger to what you have judged. If it is dry together with the above description, add immorality and bad conduct to your judgement of it. Know that, if there combines[118] smallness with this description, add to your estimation of its evil, for you will find them [15^a] immoral, calumniating, killing companions with calumny, and abominable. If you see that the eyes are of good account,[119] hollow, and also still enough, judge for them desire and great modesty, desire for knowledge and for what is good, and love of women.

[115] Hoffmann: 'add!' or 'you should add', presumably feeling it makes better sense. Zonta (1992) 39 shows his bias in favour of PS here, stating that PS 'follows faithfully the original Greek as it appears in the compendium of Ad., whereas there is no passage in PA that corresponds to it'. In reality this passage, like so many others, shows how much PA, PS and Ad. have reworked PG. PS (as preserved in BH) begins 'small eyes that are projecting and quivering show lofty thoughts', which is made up of elements from the first three sentences of section A14 in Ad. It then lists four further qualities ('mighty deeds, daring, greatness of mind, and love of glory and pomp') that are all found in Ad., but it omits all verbs, a number of additional qualities found in Ad., and the reference to Alexander. Readers can compare Leiden and Ad. for themselves, but it is evident that, though divergent in many respects, Leiden preserves more of the general sense of the Greek than BH.

[116] Hoffmann says one would expect 'he whose eye is tumorous all around' (*cuius oculus circumtumet*) without giving a reason, though clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'eyes with swelling around them (περιοιδοῦντες) are hateful, savage-minded, gluttonous, lascivious, and in thrall to the lyre, aulos, and music in general'. The word I have translated 'string-' in this sentence literally means 'cables/ropes', but it seems clear that a musical instrument is meant ('fiddle'/*rabāb*?).

[117] Hoffmann cites a divergent reading for Leiden, but it is just that the dots are badly spaced on the first word and an *alif*-like mark has accidentally been made at the beginning of the second word.

[118] Hoffmann: 'it combines', making the verb feminine, to agree with eye, and transitive, so that it can take 'smallness' (*ṣughran*) as an object.

[119] Hoffmann: 'of good condition' (*recte formatos*) citing Ad.: 'of sufficient size' (αὐτάρκως μεγέθους ἔχοντες).

A16 واما العيون الذي* كانها ينبث منها شعاع فانها ماكره غداره بالاصحاب خفيفه الامانه غير بعيده من شهوة الزنا وساير الشهوات وسنخبر عن هذه العيون واخلاقها[120] وانداداها من العيون الصافيه التي تبرق فانك واجدها صالحه ان لم تفسدها أيات اخرى فقد اشرت للمتفرس ان لا يعجل بالقضاً حتى يشتدˇ فحصه عن جميع الأيات التي تتناقض فقد كانت عينا (عين)!! هدريانسˇ الملك على هذا النعت غير انهما كانتا ممتليتين نورًا حسنًا وكانتا شهلايين حديدتي النظر لم ير (يرى)! فيˇ الناس احدًا! انور عين منه فاذا رايت في هذه العين هذا النور ولم تر فيها مثل لمع صفاً الزجاجˇ لكن ترى فيها مثل شعاع الشمس واكثر ما يوجد هذا النعت في العيون الزرق فاذا رايت مع ذلك شي° من حمره فاقض عليها بشده الحده *(ب15)* والقحه ولا تبعدها من الجنون واذا رايت الشهلاً مثل شعاع الشمس فانها تدل على الجبن والرعب والحذر من كل شي والمصاحبهˇ للفقرآ واذا رايت العين الكحلاˇ لها شعاع فالحقها بالعيون السود والزمها مع ذلك الجبن واقض (اقضى)! عليها بشدة الهم بالسوء فانها تفارق[121] ما في غيرها من العيون فان اجتمع الى ذلك كثرة الضحك فالحق به الشر وكثره السوء

فاني رايت رجل° من اهل الجزيرهˇ التي في فونيقي شاهدًا على نفسه بالخنأ والحمق مما ظهر من المنظرˇ ومما شهد به صورة عينه وساير اعضايه ومفاصله فانه كان رجلˇ الحاجبين ضخم الجبهه شاخص البصر طويلا دقيقًا لين اللحيينˇ منتفخهما رحب الفم رقيق الشفتينˇ عريضهما قد قاربتا (قارب)! من رحب فمه يشبه فم حيه البحر فان حيات البحر ارحب افواهًا من حيات البر وكان لا يوجد الا ضاحكًا ولا يكلم أحد° الا وهو يضحكˇ ولا يمنعه ضحكه من ان ياتي بالدواهي في ضحكه وكان قد حمل منه العضو الذي يشتهي (يشتهون)!! النساء وكان شديد الشهوة لهم* يعمل فيˇ ذلك اعمالاً يقبح ذكرها *(أ16)* وكان عتيًاˇ مداهنًا بالسوء مواربًا حسودًا وكان يتخذˇ السم القاتل وكان شهد عليه اهله انه قتل غير واحد من ذوي رحمه بالسم وكان لا يحتشمˇ من كل

[120] م. وستخبر على هذه العيون اخلاقها.

[121] م. تفوق.

A16 (TK 3207, fos. 51^b13–52^b4; TK 3245, fos. 35^a9–36^a7)

As for eyes from which it is as if rays of light emanate, they are cunning, treacherous to companions, of little faith, and never far from a desire for fornication and the other desires. We will talk about these eyes and their character, and also those clear shining eyes that are like them,[120] because you will find them good, if other signs do not spoil them. For I have indicated to the physiognomist that he should not hurry to judgement until his examination of all the signs which contradict each other has been thorough. The eyes of King Hadrian were of this description, except that they were full of beautiful light. They were bluish-black, with sharp vision. No one has been seen with more luminous eyes than he. If you see this light in such an eye, and if you do not see in it the like of the sparkle of clear glass, but rather you see the like of the rays of the sun—and this description is most often found in blue eyes—and if in addition you see some redness, judge for its owner sharpness [15^b] and impudence, and do not exclude him from madness. If you see the bluish-black eye to be like the rays of the sun, this indicates cowardice, fear, caution about everything, and companionship with the poor. If you see that a dusky eye has rays, put it together with the black eyes and stick cowardice with it also, and judge a strong concern with evil, for they stand apart from[121] what is in other eyes. If much laughter is combined with this, associate with it evil and much wickedness.

I have seen a man from the people of the island that is in Phoenicia, who was a witness to his own obscene language and stupidity, since this was apparent from his appearance and from what the form of his eye and the rest of his limbs and joints testified to. He had curly eyebrows, a huge forehead, and protruding eyes. He was tall and thin, with soft and bulging jawbones, an expansive mouth, slim and broad lips, which were almost as broad as his mouth, resembling the mouth of a sea snake, for sea snakes have larger mouths than land snakes. He was always found laughing. He did not speak to anyone without laughing, and his laughing did not prevent him talking about calamities while still laughing. The member that desires women was taken from him, and yet he was very desirous of them, and in this respect he committed deeds too unpleasant to mention [16^a]. He was insolent, gripped by evil, a double-crosser, and envious. He would make use of fatal poison, and his family testified against him that he had killed more than one of his blood relations with poison. He was not ashamed of any forbidden thing, neither false testimony nor great slander, and he also did not believe that he had a god, nor did he

[120] Hoffmann: 'You will prefer to these eyes those clear shining eyes that are opposite and contrary to them'; no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense. On the meaning of the word I have translated 'like' (*nidd*), see the discussion in Ch. 3 n. 177.

[121] Hoffmann: 'surpass' (*excedit*) citing Ad.: 'they reach the pinnacle of all wickedness' (εἰς ἀκρότητα πάσης κακίας ἥκουσιν), but this refers to those who 'laugh as well' and more likely corresponds to the next sentence in the Arabic text.

حرام وشهاده زور وعظم فريه ولم يكن مع ذلك يومن ان له آله ولا يقرب قربانًا (قرابانًا)! ولا يقَربه له احد[122] ولا يتحرى˜ طاعه ربه ولا ياتي حسنًا من الاعمال

واما العيون الحديده النظر الخفيفه[123] فاقض˜ عليها بالفجور واقض على العين الذي ترى ناظرها رطبًا بالشجاعه والجرأة˜ وشدة الغضب وشده الباس وحضور الجواب˜ وكماشه العمل والجسور على الامور بقله الانثنا عنها وان كانت على هذا النعت وناظرها يابسًا فاقض˜ عليها بالفجور وكمال الشر واذا رايت العين الصغيرة الغايره فاقض على صاحبها بالاهتمام بالشر والاكتمام (الاكتام)!! لما في نفسه من اهلاك (هلاك)!! الناس وبالبخل وان كانت العين على هذا النعت والناظر رحبًا ثقيلا منقبضًا[124] وشعر الحاجب متناثر°[125] بعضه من بعض فاقض˜ عليه بالجرأة وشده الغضب وصغر الهمه وقله الامانه[126] وان لم تر (ترى)![127] هذا النعت بالحواجب ولم تر (ترى)! اشفارها سبطه ولا ما بين عينيه هابط° ورايت نواظره *(ب16)* متواضعه والانف[128] منقبض صلب فاقض عليه بالجراه وشدة المنظر[129]

A17 واذا رايت العين الحسنا[130] ورايت فيها سهوله˜ فلا تمدحه فانه غدار مكاتم لما في قلبه ذو جراه[131] وعزة نفس وقوة في العمل ومن رايته ينظر الى الارض اذا ضحك ورايت عينه عند ضحكه جافه فالحقها بالاعين السود[132] فلا خير في كثرة الضحك مع شر العين ولا سيما اذا كانت العين كانها من غورها في انا[133] وان جمع˜ مع ان ترى جبهته وحاجبيه ولحييه وشفتيه (لحيته

[122] د. اخر.

[123] د. الخفيفه.

[124] د. والناظر (او بالناظر) حين ثقيل منقبض؟

[125] د. متنائر.

[126] د. وكثرة الامانة؟

[127] د. وترى؟

[128] د. الطرف؟

[129] د. بالغا وشده القشار.

[130] د. فيها الحسن.

[131] د. حيلة وسوية في النفس وسوية في العمل؟

[132] د. السود.

[133] د. مرآته.

make offerings, nor did anyone[122] offer on his behalf. He would not strive to obey his master nor perform good deeds.

As for light[123] eyes with sharp vision, judge for them immorality. Judge for the eye that you see with a moist pupil courage, boldness, fierce anger, great fortitude, responsiveness, vigour in acting, and audacity in his undertakings, rarely giving up on them. If the eyes are of this description and their pupil is dry, judge for them immorality and total evil. If you see a small and hollow eye, judge for its owner concern with evil, concealment of his thoughts about the ruin of people, and miserliness. If the eye is of this description, and the pupil is broad, heavy, and contracted,[124] and the hair of the eyebrow is scattered,[125] one part from the other, then judge for him boldness, fierce anger, little ambition, and lack of faith.[126] If you do not see[127] this description in the eyebrows, and you do not see the eyelids to be lank nor that the space between his eyes dips, and you see that his pupils [16^b] are downcast, and the nose[128] is contracted and hard, judge for him boldness and a forceful appearance.[129]

A17 (TK 3207, fos. 52^b4–53^a4)

If you see a very beautiful eye[130] and you see in it evenness, do not praise its owner, for he is treacherous, concealing what is in his heart, and has boldness, potency of spirit, and strength in action.[131] Regarding the one you see who looks towards the ground when he laughs, and whose eye is dry when he laughs, put it together with black[132] eyes. For there is nothing good in much laughter when the eye is evil, especially if the eye is as it were, by reason of its hollowness, in a container.[133] If, combined with this, you see that his forehead, his eyebrows,

[122] Hoffmann: 'another' (*alius*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[123] Hoffmann: 'dry' (*siccis*) citing Ad.: 'those with a dry look (οἱ δὲ ξηροί) are very wicked and lawless', but this would seem to correspond to the next but one sentence in the Arabic text.

[124] Hoffmann says that one would expect 'by the pupil is a forehead broad, heavy, and contracted', presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[125] Hoffmann: 'projecting' (*emineat*) citing Ad.: 'the brows are rough and the eyelids straight' (ὀφρύες εἰσὶ τραχυνόμεναι βλέφαρά τε ὀρθά).

[126] Hoffmann suggests 'much faith' citing Ad. (Matr. 6) and Ps.-Polemon 19: 'guilelessness' (ἀκακίαν).

[127] Hoffmann says that one would expect 'if you do see', but cf. Ad.: 'All those whose skin of the brows and brows and eyelids are not like this . . .'.

[128] Hoffmann suggests 'the gaze' (*obtutum*) without giving a reason.

[129] Hoffmann: 'coarseness and violent harm' (*immanitatem et vehementem noxam*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[130] Hoffmann emends to 'if you see the eye in which is the most beautiful thing' (which he translates *ubi in oculo vides voluptatem*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[131] Hoffmann says that one would expect something like 'has artifice, evil in spirit and evil in action' (*praeditus dolo, malignus animo malignus agendo*), presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[132] Hoffmann: 'evil' (*pessimis*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'are the worst of eyes'.

[133] Hoffmann: 'as it were observing from its hollow position' (*quasi e caverna sua insidiatur*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'the hollow eyes which have laughter cook up some evil as if they were lying in wait (λοχῶντες)'; see also n. 90 above for the evil in hollow eyes.

وشفته)!! [متحركه][134] اذا هو ضحك˜ فلا خير في ذلك فانه يدل على ان صاحبها فيه همه وحيله يهم بالانسان فان كانت على هذا النعت ورايتها تنفتح وتنغمض فاعلم ان صاحبها قد هم بخطيه واثم يفعله واذا رايت العينين منفتحتين[135] وكان صاحبها يريد ان يغمضها فاعلم انه قد ارتكب الفواحش كلها واذا رايت الرجل يضحك حتى يفخم˜ فاقض عليه بالغدر وسوء (سو)!! الصنيعه واذا رايت الضاحك لا يرى*[136] في˜ عينيه رطوبه ورايت ما بين العينين لينًا وجفن العين رقيقًا[137] فان صاحبها الى الخير اقرب منه الى الشر وانت واجد *(17أ)* له اخلاق حسنه رفيقه˜ وفيه صدق ولين ورحمه وقرب من المساكين وتجده مع ذلك عالمًا حكيمًا يهم بالخير ويرغب في العلم[138]

A18 واذا رايت هذه العين فامدحها ولا تكثر الخوف منها مع ذلك من ساير العيون الخاشعه البصر الا ما[139] كان فيها بيان رطوبه فاحذر اوليك فانك واجدهم مستكنين لا يستفيقون[140] واذا رايت مع هذا النعت الحاجب هابط° والجبهه رخوه لينه وفي البصر خشوع فلا تمدحه[141] فما فيه من المدح شي لكن الحقه[142] باهل هذه الصفه فانهم اهل وفاً والعين الخاشعه اليابسه والجبهه الخاسره الباينه من الطرف الخاشع والشعر المعتدل[143] فهو* من ايات كمال الشره[144] شبيه بالبهايم فاقض عليه بجور وشر

[134] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[135] ل. منفتحتين.

[136] م. الضاحك يرى.

[137] م. رخوا.

[138] م. و يرغب في العلم.

[139] م. ما لا.

[140] م. متفكرين ومتفتين.

[141] م. فلتمدحه.

[142] م. إلا أن تلحقه.

[143] م. الجبهه الخشنه والنابته من الطرف والحاجب فيها الشعر المعتدل.

[144] م. الشدة.

his jawbones, and his lips [move][134] when he laughs, there is nothing good in this, for it indicates that its owner has ambition and trickery in mind for mankind. If the eye is of this description, and you see it opening and closing, know that its owner intends committing sin and wrongdoing. If you see that the eyes are open[135] though their owner wants to close them, know that he has committed all manner of lewd acts. If you see that the man laughs so as to make it emphatic, judge for him treachery and evil acts. If you see one laughing in whose eyes moisture is not visible,[136] and you see that what is between his eyes is soft, and the eyelid is delicate,[137] then their owner is closer to good than he is to evil. You will find [17^a] that he has a good and gentle character, and he has truthfulness, softness, mercy, and affinity with the wretched. You will also find him learned and wise, intending good, and desirous of knowledge.[138]

A18 (TK 3207, fo. 53^{a}5–15; TK 3245, fo. 36^{a}7–^{b}2)

If you see this eye, praise it, and also do not greatly fear it above other eyes with submissive glance, except those that have[139] evidence of moisture. Be wary of these latter, for you will find that they seek repose and are not wakeful.[140] If you see, together with this description, that the eyebrow turns down and the forehead is slack and soft, and there is a submissiveness of the eyes, you should not praise it,[141] for there is nothing praiseworthy in it. Rather[142] you should link it with people of the (former?) description, for they are people of loyalty. The submissive, dry eye, the bare forehead that is exposed at the lower edge, the straight hair,[143] these are signs of complete greed,[144] similar to beasts. Judge, therefore, for its owner injustice and evil.

134 Added by Hoffmann; Leiden omits the verb. Hoffmann gives no explanation, but he is clearly basing himself on Ad.: 'if the parts outside the eye move, such as the forehead, the cheeks, the brows, and the lips'.

135 Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'puffed-up', but Hoffmann's emendation is obviously right given the contrast to 'close' in the next clause.

136 Hoffmann: 'is visible' (*conspici*) citing Ad., who here speaks of laughing and moist eyes.

137 Hoffmann: 'slack' (*laxum*) citing Ad.: 'relaxed eyelids' (βλέφαρα ἀνειμένα).

138 Hoffmann: 'he embraces fully sexual pleasure' (*libidine mersum*) citing Ad.: 'full of love' (ἔρωτος πλέα).

139 Hoffmann: 'do not have'; no explanation given, but presumably because he feels the description of this eye is contrary to that of the previous moist one. However, Ad. speaks here of 'sullen and moist' eyes.

140 Hoffmann: 'thoughtful and skilled in various sciences' (*cogitantes artium cultores*) citing Ad.: 'are thoughtful or artistic' (φροντίζουσιν ‹ἢ› φιλοτεχνοῦσιν).

141 Hoffmann: 'you should praise it'; no explanation given, but presumably because Ad. gives a very positive assessment of this eye. Cf. Ch. 11, trans. n. 55 (André's suggestion).

142 Hoffmann: 'except that'; no explanation given, but presumably feeling it makes better sense.

143 Hoffmann: 'the rough forehead, the fixed glance, and the eyebrow with straight hair' (*frons aspera et acies fixa et supercilium in quo capilli recti sunt*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'if the forehead is also rough, the look staring and the eyelids straight' (εἰ δὲ καὶ μέτωπον εἴη τραχὺ καὶ βλέμμα ἀτενὲς βλέφαρά ‹τε› ὀρθά).

144 Hoffmann: 'vehemence' or 'evil'; no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'they have wild plans ... and there is no evil that they would not do'.

A19 واذا رايت العينين دايمه الطرف تنفتح وتنغمض واذا تغمضت تلبث ثم تنفتح فاقض عليها بالغدر واخذ ما ليس له الا ان تجد فيها شيًا من الرطوبه فانك تجده حريصًا[145] على اخذ ما ليس له وحبهم لأولادهم والشفقه عليهم واذا رايت هذه العين مع ما نعت لك فيها رعده مع خضره فالحق بها الجنون فانك تجد الجنون قد *(ب17)* اصابه او يصيبه واذا رايت العين مع تغميضها تنظر الى أسفل[146] فاظنن باهلها زنا وحمق واذا رايت العين معتدله التغميض وفيها رطوبه وكانت عظيمه صافيه والجبهه لينه رخوه فاقض عليه بشده حياً وحسن الهمه والعلم واذا رايت العين يابسه تتغمض وتلبث ثم تنفتح فاظنن باهلها جرأة وسوء همه وبطاله فان رايت مع هذه الايات الجبهه حسنه والحاجبين هابطين[147] والاشفار خشنه فالزم صاحبها الغضب الشديد والتقدم في الشر واذا رايت العين لين كل شان منها فاقض عليه بالخير من دون ما سواها من العيون واذا رايت اهل هذه العين على هذا الحال ورايت اشفارها غير مستويه وحواجبها (حواجبه)!! غير مستويه ولا بالمعوجه[148] وتكون الحدقه كانها تتحرك فاعلم ان هذا النعت هو نعت الاناث وان كان يوجد[149] في الرجال

145 د. لهم حرصا.

146 د. اعلى؟

147 د. الجبهه خشنه والحاجبين غير هابطين.

148 د. و الا بالمترجفه.

149 د. يوجب؟

A19 (TK 3207, fos. 53^a15–54^a4; TK 3245, fos. 36^b3–37^b1)

If you see eyes with lasting gaze which open and close, and when they close they remain so, and then open, judge for their owners treachery and taking what is not theirs. If, however, you find some moistness in them, you will find that they are desirous to take what is not theirs[145] and they have love and sympathy for their children. If you see that this eye has trembling and greenness as well as what was described to you, ascribe madness to its owner, for you will find that madness has already [17^b] afflicted him or will afflict him. If you see that the eye looks downwards[146] when it closes, assume for such people fornication and stupidity. If you see that the eye closes evenly and has moisture, and it is large and clear, and the forehead is soft and slack, judge for him great modesty, good intentions, and knowledge. But if you see that the eye is dry, and it closes and remains so, then opens, assume for people with it boldness, evil intentions, and bravery. If you see, together with these signs, that the forehead is handsome, the eyebrows turn down,[147] and the eyelids are rough, then associate with its owner fierce anger and an advanced state of evil. If you see that everything about the eye is soft, judge for it goodness without equal in other eyes. If you see people with this eye in this condition, and you see that the eyelids are not straight, and its eyebrows are neither straight nor crooked,[148] and it is as if the iris moves, know that this description is that of females, even though it is found[149] in men.

[145] Hoffmann: 'that they are given to conjecturing' (which he stretches to mean *providentes*) citing Ad.: 'if they are moist, they are thoughtful and artistic (φροντισταὶ καὶ φιλότεχνοι)'. Leiden certainly appears defective here in that it repeats a part of the previous sentence and has confused φιλότεχνος ('art-loving') with φιλότεκνος ('children-loving'); this sentence is not in BH. The following 'and compassion for them' is a good example of how PA/Leiden expands upon PG, here using the popular Arabic device of repeating the sense of a phrase with different words. Note that a few times Leiden has 'desire/desirous' where Ad. has 'thoughtful/thoughtfulness', and each time Hoffmann emends to 'conjecturing' (nn. 151, 162, 242, 262, 320), though this does not seem sufficiently close to 'thoughtfulness'. If one posits that PA was made from PG via PS, then one might argue that variants of the Greek φροντίς were translated into Syriac by words from the Syriac root *ysp* ('to take care, mind, attend to'), which was then confused by PA with the root *sp* ('to be eager, rampant, inflamed with thirst/desire'). I am grateful to Dr David Taylor for this suggestion.

[146] Hoffmann says that one would expect 'upwards'; no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'if they water as well as closing up and move upwards (εἰς τὸ ἄνω χωροῖεν)'.

[147] Hoffmann: 'the forehead is rough, the eyebrows do not turn down' (*frontem asperam, supercilia non dimissa*) citing Ad.: 'a rough (τραχύ) forehead, close-packed (συνεστραμμέναι) brows'. Note that in the previous sentence the word for 'bravery' (*baṭāla*) could also mean 'idleness', but Hoffmann translates *strenuitatem*, thinking that the Greek should read ἀνδρεῖοι rather than ἄδικοι.

[148] Hoffmann: 'but rather trembling' (*sed potius trementia*) citing Ad.: 'those who are not able to keep their eyelids straight nor their brows level, but have trembling in them (ἀλλὰ τρόμος αὐτοῖς ἔνεστι)'.

[149] Hoffmann suggests 'it is made necessary' citing Ad.: 'these are androgynous, but make an effort (βιάζονται) to be men'.

A20 واما العيون التي تتفتح انفتاحًا واسعًا متداركًا فاقض على اهلها بسرعه الندم على ما يفعلون ويرجعون عنه وسأذكره لك من يبس˜ العيون ورطوبتها (طوبتها)!! وضوها وظلمتها *(18أ)* وصغرها وكبرها وانحطاطها وارتفاعها وشدتها مع انى قد اجريت من ذكر ذلك وبينته ووصفته (وصفته)!! لك ان كان عندك من ذلك حفظ قدرت على معرفه امر نفسك وغيرك[150] ان شا الله تعالى اذا رايت العين الدايمه الانفتاح وهي مظلمه وفيها شي من رطوبه فان صاحب ذلك شديد الحرص[151] فان كان مع هذا النعت النظر ليًنا فصاحبه بخير واذا كانت العين منفتحه ولها تلالى كتلالى الرخام حادة الطرف فانه يدل على قلة الحياً وهذه طبيعه في اعين الرجال الذين ليسوا (الذي ليس)!! كسايرالرجال مثل الخصى وليس بالخصى بل يكون يولد بلا خصى

ولا اعلم اني رايت مثل هذا النعت غير رجل واحد كان من ارض تسمى فلطس[152] وكان شره° فجور° قد فاق كل نعت فعيناه من راس اشرار الناس وكانت عيناه مثل هذا النعت وانا واصف لك جسده فانه كان منتفخ العينين[153] وخديه[1] رخوه وفمه واسع ورقبته (رقبه)!! طويله دقيقه وعراقيبه غلاظ˜ كثير لحم الرجلين وكانت رقبته تشبه رقبه المراة[154] وكذلك ساير أوصاله *(18ب)* كلها واطراف أوصاله كلها رطبه[155] وما كان يمشي منتصب° وكانت أوصاله وأعضاه مسترخيه وكان يكثر العنايه بنفسه بخصب الشعر وكان يدلك بدنه بادويه آخرًا (آخر)!! [156] وبكل سبب يدعو الى[157] الشوق في الشهوة

[150] م. قدرت على تعرض من نفسك في غيره.

[151] م. الحرص.

[152] م. فلطس.

[153] م. العين.

[154] م. رقبته تشبه رقبه المراه.

[155] م. رطبه.

[156] او: تخضب الشعر وكان يدلك بدنه بادوية اخر؟

[157] ل. يدعوا الى.

A20 (TK 3207, fo. 54^{a}5–12; TK 3245, fo. 37^{b}2–6: beginning of A20 only)

As for eyes that open wide incessantly, judge for their owners quickness to regret what they do and turn back from it. I will now mention this to you with regard to the dryness of the eyes and their moistness, their light and their darkness, [18^{a}] their smallness and their largeness, their lowering and their raising, and their strength, although I have already made mention of that, explained it and described it. If you have any memory of that, you can learn of the matter of your soul and of others,[150] God Almighty willing. If you see an eye that is always open and dark, with some moistness in it, then the owner of this has great desire.[151] If the gaze is soft together with this description, then its owner is good. If the eye is open, and it has brilliance like that of marble and sharp sight, this indicates a lack of modesty. This nature is in the eyes of men who are not like the other men, like the eunuch who is not a eunuch but who was born without testicles.

I do not know if I have seen any of this description except for one man. He was from a land called Celtas.[152] He was greedy and immoral beyond all description. His eyes were those of the most evil of people, and his eyes were of this description. I shall describe his body to you. He had puffed-up eyes,[153] his cheeks were slack, his mouth was broad, his neck was long and thin, his ankles were thick, with much flesh on the legs. His neck[154] was similar to the neck of a woman, and likewise all the rest of his limbs, [18^{b}] and all his extremities were moist,[155] and he would not walk erect, and his limbs and members were flaccid. He would take great care of himself and his abundant hair,[156] and he would apply medicaments to his body afterwards. (He would give in) to every cause that incited[157] a passion for desire and sexual intercourse. He had a voice resembling the voice of women and slim lips. I never before saw looks like his in the general populace or such eyes. Despite his form he would

[150] Hoffmann: 'you will be able to practise physiognomy by yourself on other things' (*alia ex te ipso physiognomonice cognoscere poteris*), no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'you will also be able to practise physiognomy on things which have not been mentioned, judging for yourself'.

[151] Hoffmann: 'conjecturing' (*providus*) citing Ad.: 'thoughtful' (φροντιστοί).

[152] Leiden: *Flts*. Anon. Lat. 40 speaks of Favorinus, who was from Gaul, so Hoffmann reasons that the allusion here is to the land of the Celts.

[153] Hoffmann: 'forehead' (*fronte*) citing Anon. Lat. 40 (*tensam frontem*); he also suggests emending the qualifying adjective to *muntafij* ('swelling out'/*turgida*) instead of *muntafikh* ('puffed-up'/*inflata*). Note Hoffmann claims that further on in this sentence Leiden has 'his neck was long and neck', but this is incorrect.

[154] Hoffmann: 'his cry is similar to the cry of women' (*clamor eius mulieris clamorem aequiparabat*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Anon. Lat. 40 (*vocem femineam, verba muliebria*); but note that the Arabic word he posits refers to bird-cries.

[155] Hoffmann: 'soft' (*molles*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Anon. Lat. 40 (*membra et articulos omnes sine vigore, laxos et dissolutos*); but note that the Arabic word does not usually apply to limbs.

[156] Or: 'He would take great care of himself by dying his hair and would apply other medicaments to his body', as suggested by A. F. L. Beeston to Leofranc Holford-Strevens (2003: 99 n. 9), an emendation that makes good sense and requires very little change to the Arabic text.

[157] Leiden wrongly adds an otiose *alif* to the verb and uses the wrong preposition.

والنكاح وكان صوته يشبه صوت النسأ رقيق الشفتين لم ار (ارى)! منظرًا قبله مثله بولدˇ العموم ولا مثل عينيه وكان مع صورته مستهزى الهزل[158] وكان يفعل كلما خطر بباله وكان قد تعلم اللغه اليونانيه والكلام عليها وهذا من كثره كلامه وكان يسمى سوفسطاي[159] وكان طوافا في المداين والأسواق ويجامع الناس ليظهر الشر ويطلب (طلب)!! الفجور وكان مع ذلك ساحرًا محتال° وكان يمخرق ويخبر قومًا انه يحييˇ ويميت ويغر بذلك قومًا من الناس حتى كثرت[160] الجموع عليه من النسأ والرجال وكان يخبرˇ الرجال انه قادر على ان يضطر النسأ في المجيˇ اليهم وكذلك الرجال الى النسأ و كان مصدقا بذلك من قوله عن الخفيˇ وكان راسًا في الشر معلمًا له وكان يجمع ضروبًا من السموم القاتله وكان* جمله عقله كله في شي من *(١٩أ)* هذه الأمور

B3 فقد علمت ان الخصيان قوم سوء وان فيهم الشره وجملة خصال متفرقه[161] واعلم ان الخصى الذي يخصيه الناس يتغير خلقه ولونه وجسمه عما كان عليه قبل ان يخصى فاما الذين (الذي)!! يولدون ولا خصى لهم فلهم أمور اخرى سوى أمور الذين يخصون فليس احد اكمل فيˇ الشر من الذينˇ يولدون بغير خصى فاذا رايت العينين الذي* وصفت لك في صدر هذا الخبر فانك واجد صاحبها شبيهًا (شبية)!! بالخصيان

A21 فاما العينان الدايمه الفتح والغمض فتدل على الجبن فان اجتمع الى ذلك يبس العينين فاعلم ان في القلب غشًا وهم° بالسوء للناس فان كانت العين منقلبه وكان فيها شي من الخضره فلا يعدمهاء شي من الجنون واذا رايت هذه العين التي حركتها تدل على الجبن والخوف فاعلم ان صاحبها سوء وعنده علم بالشر فان كانت ساكنه لا تكثر الحركه ولا تسرع اختلاس النظر دل على شده الحرص[162] وعجب بالدين[163] وحب التصنع والترجلˇ واذا رايت عروقًا خضرًا او حمرًا مع يبس في العينين فاخبر بخبث النفس مع طول حقد[164] وشده *(١٩ب)* غضب مع جنون

[158] ل. مشتهري الغزل .

[159] م. سوفسطاس؟

[160] ل. كثره.

[161] م. خلقه.

[162] م. الغرص.

[163] م. بالدعن؟

[164] م. حسد.

poke fun at everything[158] and he would do whatever came into his mind. He had learnt the Greek language and its discourse by virtue of speaking a great deal, and he was called a sophist.[159] He was an itinerant visitor in the towns and markets, gathering the people so that he could display his wickedness, and he sought out immorality. He was also a deceitful magician, and would swindle, telling people that he could give life and bring death, and thereby he would dupe a group of people until the crowds of women and men around him increased.[160] He would tell the men that he had the power to compel women to come to them, and likewise the men to the women. He would corroborate that by his words about the occult. He was a leader in evil and a teacher of it. He would collect kinds of fatal poisons, and the whole sum of his intellect was engaged in one of [19^a] these matters.

B3 (TK 3207, fo. 54^a12–$^b2$; TK 3245, fos. 37^b7–38^a2)

You have learnt that eunuchs are an evil people, and in them is greed and an assembly of various (evil) qualities.[161] Know also that eunuchs whom people castrate have an inner nature, colour, and body that change from their condition before castration. As for those born without testicles, other things apply to them different from those who are castrated. No one is more perfect in evil than those who are born without testicles. If, then, you see the eyes that I described to you at the beginning of this account, you will find their owner is similar to eunuchs.

A21 (TK 3207, fo. 54^b2–11; TK 3245, fo. 38^a3–$^b4$)

As for eyes constantly opening and closing, they indicate cowardice. If dryness of the eyes is combined with that, know there is cheating in the heart and the intention to do evil to people. If the eye is upturned, and there is some greenness in it, then it is not free from a certain degree of madness. If you see this eye, the movement of which indicates cowardice and fear, know that its owner is wicked, and has knowledge of evil. If the eye is still, not moving much nor hurried in its glance, it indicates great desire,[162] admiration of religion,[163] and love of affectation and combing the hair. If you see green or red veins and dryness in the eyes, report malice with lasting spite,[164] and fierce [19^b] anger with madness.

[158] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden does not make sense unless one reads 'he was notorious for jesting (*mushtahir bi-l-hazl*).

[159] Hoffmann suggests that the correct reading is *swfst's*. Cf. Ch. 3 n. 13.

[160] Leiden wrongly gives a noun instead of a verb.

[161] Hoffmann: 'an assembly of qualities pertinent to leading a life of ease and plenty' (which he translates *omnibus moribus effeminatis*).

[162] Hoffmann: 'conjecturing' (*providentia*) citing Ad.: 'thoughtful' (φροντιστάς).

[163] Hoffmann suggests 'admiration of mind' (*mirum intellectum*) citing Ad.: 'fond of learning' (φιλομαθεῖς).

[164] Hoffmann: 'envy' (*invidia*) citing Ad.: 'an attack of envy' (φθόνου προσβολήν).

A22 وسأذكر لك من العيون المنفخه[165] ذكرًا اذا وجدت اشفار هذه العين السفلى غليظه كثيفه فاقض" عليها بحب النسا[166] وان كانت العليا كذلك فاقض" عليها بحب النوم وان كان ذلك في السفل* والعلو* جميعًا [فاقض عليها كذلك][167]

A23 واقض على [العيون][168] الخفيفه الكدره بالاختلاس فاما من يشبه منظره منظر المشتورين (المشتورتين)! وفي اشفاره فضل ارتفاع فاقض عليه بالتخنث" واذا رايت الاشفار مرتفعه والعيون رطبه والناظر شجي[169] لين فاقض عليه بحب الزناً والتصنع ولبس الثياب الجياد فاذا رايت وسط الشفر مرتفعًا ومقدمها ومؤخرها هابطًا الى أسفل فاقض" عليه بالزناً وان كان وسط الشفر منقبضًا ومقدمه ومؤخره مرتفعًا والعين مع ذلك تشبه عين المستهزين[170] فاقض عليها بالزنا

B1 وسنذكر الفراسه في الأوصال والمفاصل والنفس والصوت وغير ذلك وقد اخبرتك ان الأيه الواحده لا تكفيك ولا تحقق قضاك حتى تستشهد بآيات اخر فان تشابهت الأيات وتشاهدت فعند ذلك أوجب قضاك ولكن افهم *(20أ)* راس ذلك واوله وايقنه"[171] في نفسك من آيات العينين فان العينين باب القلب وهو* معدن الهموم وعلى اثر العينين الحاجبين¹ ثم الجبهه والانف والفم واللحيين¹ والرأس فانه ليس اصدق بعد العين ولا اثبت شهاده على ما في القلب من هولاى وعلى اثر العينين[172] الوجه والحلق والصدر وما حول ذلك الى اثر الكتفين وما حولهما والبطن والظهر والساعدين والعرقوبين والقدمان° وغيرهما

[165] م. المنفحه.

[166] م. النسا.

[167] هذه الكلمات التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[168] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[169] م. ساج.

[170] م. المشتورين.

[171] م. أنفه.

[172] م. آيات.

A22 (TK 3207, fo. 54^b11–15; TK 3245, fo. 38^b5–8)

I will mention to you something of swollen[165] eyes. If you find that the lower eyelids of this eye are coarse and thick, judge for them love of women.[166] If the upper ones are like that, judge for them love of sleep. If this is found in the lower and the upper together [judge likewise].[167]

A23 (TK 3207, fos. 54^b15–55^a9; TK 3245, fos. 38^b8–39^a8)

Judge for light and dull [eyes][168] pilfering. As for whoever has an appearance resembling that of people with inverted eyelids and has eyelids that are excessively elevated, judge for him effeminacy. If you see that the eyelids are elevated, the eyes moist, and the pupil anxious[169] and soft, judge for him love of fornication, affectation, and dressing in fine clothes. If you see that the middle of the eyelid is elevated, and its beginning and end are descending, judge for him fornication. If the middle of the eyelid is contracted, and its beginning and end are elevated, and also the eye resembles the eye of people who mock,[170] judge for him fornication.

B1 (cf. TK 3207, fo. 55^a9–^{b}4; TK 3245, fos. 39^b7–40^a7)

We shall now mention the physiognomy of the limbs, the joints, the breath, the voice, and other things. I have told you that one single sign will not suffice you, and your judgement is not confirmed until you consider the testimony of other signs. If, then, the signs resemble each other, and bear witness to each other, at that point your judgement is compelling. But understand it [20^a] from beginning to end, and confirm it[171] to yourself from the signs of the eyes. For the eyes are the gateway to the heart and the source of ambitions. Following on from the eyes are the eyebrows, then the forehead, the nose, the mouth, then the jaw, and the head, for there is nothing more truthful after the eye nor a more sure witness to what is in the heart than these. Following on from the eyes is the face,[172] the throat, the chest and what is around it as far as the shoulders and what is around them, the stomach, the back, the forearms, the ankles, the feet,

[165] Hoffmann: 'bulging', which he translates *vesicis praeditorum* to get closer to Ad.: 'a bag hanging from below the eyes' (κύστις ὀφθαλμοῖς κάτωθεν).

[166] Hoffmann: 'purchasing wine', which he translates *vini amorem* to get closer to Ad.: 'indicates drunkards (οἰνόφλυγας)'.

[167] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense, though it is permissible in Arabic to omit the apodosis if the sense is obvious.

[168] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to make the sense clear.

[169] Hoffmann: 'calm' (*tranquillam*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'who look gently (πράως) and softly (μαλθακῶς)'.

[170] Hoffmann: 'with inverted (*inversas*) eyelids' citing Ad.: 'squint' (ἰλλώπτουσιν).

[171] Hoffmann: 'the commencement of it' (*principium*), which seems to repeat the previous 'its beginning' (*primum eius*); the word is lacking its diacritical marks in Leiden.

[172] Hoffmann: 'the signs of the face' (*signa faciei*) saying 'thus approximately the Greek'. He does the same in the following sentence, giving an Arabic translation of Ad., feeling that Leiden is *valde turbata*.

وليست˝ ايات اللون تبعد مما (ما)!! ذكرناه من الايات وفي البنان[173] وفي الصدر[174] مع ذلك والنفس وتحرك كل مفصل من الجسد فيها آيات عظيمه غير انه ينبغي ان تقصد الى الايات العظيمه فتضعهن[175] على الجسد كما يوضع• الطابع على المطبوع وهن الدال* على الفحش والغضب وكثره الهموم وقلتها وكظم الغيظ وكتم ما في النفس والحفظ والنسيان وآيات الخير والشر وتخلص [منها][176] آيات الخير التي منها البر والتقى وشدة الحيا وتخلص منها آيات الشر التي منها السوء وثقل البور• وآيات التواضع والكبر وآيات المقامره والحسد والجرأة *(ب20)* والحرص والجور والحزم والتخنث[177] فانك واجد لذلك آيات محققه لها وتوافقها آيات العين

B2 فاذا نظرت الى الانسان فقابله وتفكر فيه أم ذكرا تراه أم مونثا[178] ومع ذلك شبه اي دابه (دأبه)! ترى الغالب عليه ومما يدل على ذلك الالوان والأوصال وتحريكها فاجمع تلك الايات الى ايات العين ثم اقض (اقضي)! بقدر الذي ترى من ذلك فان في ذلك بيانًا عظيمًا لا تخطى معه قضاك ان شا الله تعالى وايضا اذا ذكرت لك شبه الدواب في˝ الانسان فان استمر لك من ذلك ما تعرف به غيره وما في طبايع كل دابه من تلك الدواب الغالب شبهها على الانسان ولا بد ايضا من ان تعرف التذكير والتانيث فانك لست واجد° احدًا الا وفيه شبه من دابه وطبع من طبعها

173 م. البيان.

174 م. في الصوت.

175 م. الفيه العيبه فتضعها.

176 هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

177 م. و الحزم والتخنث.

178 ل. و تذكر تراه امرأ مونث.

and other things. Nor are the signs of colour remote from the signs I have mentioned. And in the fingertips,[173] and also in the chest[174] and the breath, and in the movement of every joint in the body there are important signs. It is necessary for you to go to the important signs and place them[175] on the body, just as the stamp is placed on the impress. They may indicate lewdness, anger, many ambitions or lack of them, suppression of fury, concealment of what is in the soul, memory, forgetfulness, and the signs of good and evil. And you can pick out the signs of good [among them][176]—some of which are reverence, piety, great modesty—and you can pick out the signs of evil among them—some of which are wickedness and great corruption. And (you can pick out) the signs of humility and pride, and the signs of gambling, envy, boldness, [20^b] desire, injustice, prudence, and effeminacy.[177] For this you will find signs which confirm them, and the signs of the eye will concur with them.

B2 (Leiden here abridging? cf. TK 3207, fos. 41^{a}1–42^{b}4; TK 3245, fos. 13^{b}2–15^{a}5)

So when you look at a man, compare him and think about him: do you see that he is masculine or feminine?[178] In addition to that, a similarity to which animal do you see dominant in him, and how do the colours, and the limbs and their movement, indicate that? Combine these signs with the signs of the eye and then judge according to what you see of this. For in this there is great enlightenment, with which you will not go astray in your judgement, God Almighty willing. Furthermore, if I mention to you the similarity in man to animals, then what you know of that from elsewhere and what is in the nature of each animal with a similarity to man dominant in it will help you along—and you must also know of masculinity and femininity. For you will not find anyone who does not have a similarity to an animal, and a nature like its nature.

[173] Hoffmann: 'in the demonstration' (*in argumentatione*), which he appends to the previous sentence.

[174] Hoffmann: 'in the voice' (*in voce*) citing Anon. Lat. 45 (*et vocis et spiritus*). The emendation to voice makes good sense since the chest has already been mentioned, though it is very clearly written in Leiden.

[175] Hoffmann: 'the general form (*universam adparentiam*) and place it' citing Ad.: 'the overall appearance' (ἐπιπρέπεια).

[176] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense.

[177] Hoffmann: 'crime and religious devotion' (*criminis et periurii*). Both are problematic; in the former one expects an abstract noun (i.e. criminality, not crime); in the latter case the quality conveyed by the Arabic word is positive (Hoffmann translates *periurii*, thinking of the meaning of the first form of the verb, 'to break an oath', but the fifth form has to do with religious devotion).

[178] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden is clearly defective here ('and bear in mind to see him a man female') and Hoffmann's emendation makes good sense; it also approximates to the import of Ad. ('what is masculine or feminine').

الباب الثاني

يذكر فيه ما تجد ˝ في الانسان من شبه ساير الحيوان ذو الاربع قوايم والطيور وما يدب وغير ذلك ◘ فانك لست واجد° احدًا الا وفيه شبه دابه وطبع من طبعها وكيف *(أ21)* ينبغي ان تذكر ذلك شيًا بعد شي في الانسان

وانت واجد في الناس من فيه مشابهة (مشابه)!! السباع والوحش˝ فمن ذلك **الاسد** شجاع جرى جبار غضوب بعد حلم صبور حي سخي رفيع الهمه خداع **النمر** وقح فجور حقود غبي محب للقتل والقهر لمن عارضه مسالم من سالمه صلف تياه لا يالف ولايولف **الفهد** حي الوف حاد النفس غضوب صلف معجب ذو اذلال˝ يحب˝ الرفاهيه والتكرم والقهر ويتكلف الشر **الهزبر** ويسمى السياكوج˝ وقح جرى عالي الهمه نشيط حذور صلف مهذار نصوح **الضبع** قوي أحمق مغفل منخدع نهم بغا ذليل˝ في عقر داره شجاع في الغربه **الذيب** جرى غدار غشوم لص حريص متظلم محتال مساعد على الظلم˝ موافق الرفيق **الدب** خبيث جهول غفول غدار نكاح لاه يقدم متخبنا˝ ويندل (يذل)!! صبورًا ويعبث[179] غضوبًا! **الكلب** الوف وفي صبور نصور محلم (محامي)! حريص يقظان للحميه مخادع[180] عند حاجته شجاع في عقر داره ذليل في الغربه مبغض الغريب *(ب21)* طماع شحيح لجوج˝ مهذار نهم قذر سي الخلق قليل الحياً وضيع الهمه **ابن اوى** ويسمى الوعوع ضعيف النفس خوار دني النفس متباك (متباكي)! حزين نفور لص **الخنزير** دنى النفس نكاح محلم (محامي)! حقود مقدام مع جهل ولجاجه عباث مستهزي بمن يراه مقهور° معه **القرد** ذكي مع خبث وجهاله عباث محاك (محاكي)! محتال زاني **اليحشور** وهو حيوان متولد من الضبع والذيب شرير جرى خبيث مخادع نفور غشوم دني النفس غيور **الثعلب** محتال مكار ذليل نفور لص مراوغ˝ عباث **الببر** ذكي نصوح ودود صلف مهذار متهور (مهور)!! مخاصم **الارنب** صبور الوف قنوع مذكر

[179] د. يعبث.

[180] د. مخادع.

THE SECOND CHAPTER

(TK 3207, fos. 42^b4–43^b1; TK 3245, fos. 15^b8–24^a2; cf. Dim. 4^a–9^a/5–10)

In which is mentioned the similarity you find in humans to the other animals with four limbs, birds, that which crawls, and other things, for you will not find anyone who does not have a similarity to an animal, and a nature like one of theirs. And (it is also mentioned) how [21^a] you should keep this in mind regarding man, each thing in turn.

You will find some people who have a similarity to predators and wild animals. In this category is the *lion*, which is courageous, bold, mighty, irascible, patient once calm, modest, generous, very ambitious, and perfidious. The *leopard* is impudent, immoral, spiteful, foolish, a lover of killing and coercion for whoever opposes him, peaceable to whoever makes peace with it, disdainful, haughty, neither tame nor tamed. The *cheetah* is modest, tame, keen, irascible, disdainful, vain, with base qualities, a lover of luxury, honour, and coercion, and it undertakes evil acts. The *lynx*, also called the caracal, is impudent, bold, very ambitious, lively, cautious, disdainful, prattling, and sincere. The *hyena* is strong, stupid, absentminded, gullible, gluttonous, desirous, submissive at home, and courageous away from home. The *wolf* is bold, treacherous, tyrannical, a thief, desirous, oppressive, deceitful, supportive of oppression, co-operative with companions. The *bear* is malicious, ignorant, absentminded, treacherous, promiscuous, inattentive, approaches covertly and snatches patiently, playful,[179] irascible. The *dog* is tame, loyal, patient, ready to help, protective, desirous, alert to what should be defended, cheating[180] when necessary, courageous at home and submissive away from home, loathing the stranger, [21^b] covetous, miserly, stubborn, prattling, gluttonous, dirty, bad-natured, lacking in modesty, and mundane. The *jackal*, also called the hyrax, is weak-willed, feeble, vulgar, plaintive, sad, timid, and a thief. The *pig* is vulgar, promiscuous, protective, spiteful, daring together with ignorance and stubbornness, playful, and contemptuous of whomsoever it sees overpowered by it. The *monkey* is clever, together with malice and ignorance, playful, given to imitating, deceitful, and a fornicator. The *thos*, the animal born of the hyena and the wolf, is evil, bold, malicious, contentious, perfidious, timid, tyrannical, vulgar, and jealous. The *fox* is deceitful, cunning, submissive, timid, a thief, fraudulent, and playful. The *beaver* is clever, sincere, loving, disdainful, prattling, irresponsible, and disputatious. The *rabbit* is patient, tame, undemanding,

[179] Hoffmann: 'causes havoc' (*grassatur*); no explanation given, but probably because he feels it suits better 'snatches' and 'irascible'. Note that this chapter is also found in Shams al-dīn al-Dimashqī's *Kitāb al-siyāsa fī 'ilm al-firāsa* and Hoffmann notes many variant readings therefrom. However, since al-Dimashqī is late and dependent upon the TK tradition, and since the variants are mostly the result of inaccurate use of diacritical marks, I do not include them here.

[180] Hoffmann: 'contentious' (*litigans*).

بنفسه صلف عديم الشر ضعيف النفس غرار[181] **الوبر** ذكي الوف قليل الشر ذو كيد ودهاً وتحيل **النمس** شرير نفور وقح مقدام صبور قذر كثير الفساد **ابن عرس** كثير الشر على ضعفه لص محتال مقدام **الهر** الوف صلف معجب بنفسه يحب الرفاهيه نشيط حريص مخادع مراقب متحبب الى الناس *(أ22)* يالف المكان ولا يالف الانسان الا عند الحاجه **السنجاب** ذكي الوف صلف متحيل لص نكاح كثير الولد **اليربوع** ضعيف النفس والبدن خوار عديم الشر رواع ذو تحيل **الفار** خبيث كثير الفساد والعبث لص قذر نكاح صبور محتال كثير النسيان **الخلد** جهول قذر قنوع ضنك المعيشه **الدلدل** وهو القنفذ الكبير خبيث شرير جاهل شبق نفور ردى الطبع **الشيهم** وهو القنفذ الصغير جهول الوف خوون حذور سريع الانقلاب سلط على ضعفه متوحش **الورل** صبور" خاين مضطرب الاحوال **الفيل** شجاع مهاب قوي النفس وقور عالي الهمه خبيث خاين نكاح محب الفساد فيه دعابه و ذكا مسالم لمن سالمه **الكرك** شديد القوه حاد النفس ذكي ضجور نفور شرير محتال لا يالف **الجاموس** ذكي الوف غيور شجاع جبار حقود يكره الغريب ذو نخوه نجى **البقر** الوف صبور غليظ الطبع شبق مقدام **الجمل** صبور كريم ذليل مهذار جاهل حقود الوف **الزراف** معجب بنفسه لطيف *(ب22)* النفس الوف عبث عديم الشر **بقر الوحش** جاهل مقدام نفور فجور عبث ضنين بنفسه **الايل** جاهل غفول متهور (مهور)!! الوف شديد العداوه للاشرار[182] نكاح **الوعل** قوي النفس جاهل تياه الوف **الغزال** جيد الطبع عديم الشر مع القوه تياه غفول ودود مفرط **الضان** خير عديم الشر غفول الوف مقدام في عبثه بغيره **الماعز** ذكي وقح شبق مخادع كثير العبث كثير الشر و القلق **اليحمور** جاهل الوف ضعيف النفس عبث **الفرس** قوي صبور شجاع مقدام مع تخيل" الوف مرح معجب بنفسه ويختلف" أحواله باختلاف أصنافه وليس هذا مكان الاطناب في أوصافه **البغل** قوي ألوف خاين خبيث قابل[183]

[181] ل. غرار. م. عرار.

[182] م. للاشراك.

[183] م. قليل.

self-admonishing, disdainful, without evil, weak-willed, and deceiving.[181] The *Syrian hyrax* is clever, tame, lacking in evil, possessed of artifice, shrewdness, and trickery. The *mongoose* is evil, timid, impudent, daring, patient, dirty, and very depraved. The *weasel* is very evil in spite of its weakness, deceitful, and daring. The *cat* is tame, disdainful, vain, a lover of luxury, lively, desirous, perfidious, watchful, it seeks to please people, [22[a]] it becomes habituated to a place, but does not become habituated to a person except in case of need. The *squirrel* is clever, tame, disdainful, tricky, a thief, promiscuous, and it bears many offspring. The *jerboa* is weak in will and in body, feeble, without evil, spirited, and it employs trickery. The *mouse* is malicious, very depraved and playful, a thief, dirty, promiscuous, patient, deceitful, and very forgetful. The *mole* is ignorant, dirty, and undemanding, and has a hard life. The *porcupine*, which is the large hedgehog, is malicious, evil, ignorant, lustful, timid, and bad natured. The *field sow*, which is the small hedgehog, is ignorant, tame, unfaithful, cautious, easily overturned, tough in spite of its weakness, and wild. The *monitor lizard* is patient, unfaithful, and disorderly. The *elephant* is courageous, feared, strong-willed, dignified, very ambitious, malicious, unfaithful, promiscuous, a lover of depravity, possessing jocularity and cleverness, and he is peaceable towards those who make peace with him. The *rhinoceros* is very strong, keen, clever, given to grumbling, timid, evil, deceitful, and it is not tamed. The *buffalo* is clever, tame, jealous, courageous, mighty, spiteful, inimical towards strangers, dignified, and intimate. The *cow* is tame, patient, coarse-natured, lustful, and daring. The *camel* is patient, generous, submissive, prattling, ignorant, spiteful, and tame. The *giraffe* is vain, [22[b]] fine-minded, tame, playful, and without evil. The *wild cow* is ignorant, daring, timid, immoral, playful, and conservative. The *deer* is ignorant, absentminded, irresponsible, tame, very inimical to evildoers,[182] and promiscuous. The *mountain goat* is strong-willed, ignorant, haughty, and tame. The *gazelle* is good-natured, without evil together with strength, haughty, absentminded, loving, and prodigal. The *sheep* is good, without evil, absentminded, tame, daring in its play with others. The *goat* is clever, impudent, lustful, double-crossing, very playful, very evil, and anxious. The *roebuck* is ignorant, tame, weak-willed, and playful. The *horse* is strong, patient, courageous, daring together with imagination, tame, cheerful, vain, and its attributes differ according to its different kinds, but this is not the place to expatiate on their descriptions. The *mule* is strong, tame, treacherous, malicious, and receptive to training.[183] The *donkey* is vulgar,

[181] This is my suggestion in the face of Leiden's meaningless *ghawār* (or else one might suggest *mighwār*, 'swift in running', though this refers principally to men and horses running on raids). Hoffmann's suggestion, which he translates as *timidus*, is probably to be vocalized as *ʿuwwār*, which Kazimirski lists in the sense 'lâche, pusillanime' (but it is to be noted that this meaning is not found in the medieval Arabic dictionaries and is far from the sense of the root; cf. Lane, s.v. *ʿwr*).

[182] Hoffmann: 'associates' (*rivalibus*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[183] Hoffmann: 'lacking in training' (*educationis expers*); no explanation given, presumably feeling this is more typical of a mule (Leiden's 'receptive to' may just be a scribal slip; for example, the negative particle *ghayr* may have been accidentally omitted).

التربيه **الحمار** دني النفس صبور ردي الطبع قليل الحيله **الحمار الوحشي** نفور حذور جاهل لا يالف شبق غيور محام (محامي)! عن اناثه **السمور** شرير ضعيف القدره ذكي محتال يبادر الى قتل نفسه **كلب الماء** (المأء)! شرير حيول سلط **السمك** جاهل نفور عديم الشر صموت **التمساح** ردي الطبع غدار نهم جرى محتال *(أ23)* **فرس الماء** (المأء)! قوي نشيط نهم قليل الشر في المأ كثيره في البر **الدلفين** عبث طماع قليل الشر **القرش** شرير وقح غدار نفور جرى **البتان** جبار ردي الطبع كثير الشر نفور **اللجاه** جاهل ردي الطبع ضعيف القدره عن الشر **المارماهي** ردي الطبع نفور **السرطان** قوي منقلب لص صياد حذور خبيث محتال شبق **الضفدع** جاهل مهذار ردي الطبع خبيث **العقاب** قوي النفس والبدن الوف مع شراسه غدار عالي الهمه **السنقر** جبار قوي شديد البطش صلف معجب **البارى** قوي جرى صلف بصير حذور صبور **الصقر** حمول للاذى بصير ضار (ضاري)! على الصيد ضجور حذر يرعى ذمه الجوار **النسر** ضعيف النفس قوي عاجز الحيله نفور سيئ الخلق طويل العمر **الرخم** ضعيف شغب سمح الاخلاق مستوحش حزين دني النفس **الحداة** خبيث وقح لجوج غدار نفور قذر **الغداف** وهو الغراب الأسود ذكي حذور لص نفور محاكي غليظ" الطبع محب للوحده **القاق** *(ب23)* وهو الغراب الابقع لص حذور محتال كثير التعصب مع جنسه جماع للقوت **الزاغ** ذكي الوف مرح فيه عبث ودعابه **العقعق** فطن خاين صبور على الشقا محب لفراخه **الاوز** صلف حذر جرى متواعد ظالم ذو حرس وسهر **البط** ضعيف الحيله صبور نشيط في السفر متكلف فوق طاقته **الكركي** قوي ذو عزم جهول مقدام قهور حاد البصر **النورس** جاهل دني النفس الوف قهور طماع خفيف" الروح **النعام** جهول صبور ذو همه ومرح وخفه الروح (روح)!! وحمق **الطاووس** صلف تياه معجب بنفسه عاجز جبان عشاق مغازل **الدجاج** ضعيف النفس عديم الاذى نهم **الديك** كريم موثر فيه قيام على العيال وغيره وحمايه واعجاب [بنفسه][184] ويقظه وتذكير بالأوقات **الدارج** مهذار نفور عشاق **الحجل** شرير قوي محتال مخاصم **الحمايم** الوفه قليله الشر زواني عشاقه ذوات طرب وسرور تارة ونوح وهديل اخرى **السماني** مهذار حذور نفور جاهل عشاق مخاطر بنفسه *(أ24)* **الزرزور** مهذار محاك (محاكي)! شبق ضجور **العصفور** وقح حذور متهور

[184] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

patient, bad natured, with little artifice. The *wild donkey* is timid, cautious, ignorant, unsociable, lustful, jealous, and protective of its females. The *sable* is evil, weak in ability, clever, deceitful, and it hurries to kill itself. The *otter* is evil, wily, and tough. The *fish* is ignorant, timid, without evil, and silent. The *crocodile* is bad natured, treacherous, desirous, bold, and deceitful [23ᵃ]. The *hippopotamus* is strong, active, desirous, lacking in evil in the water, but very evil on land. The *dolphin* is playful, covetous, and lacking in evil. The *shark* is evil, impudent, treacherous, timid, and bold. The *whale* is mighty, bad natured, very evil, and timid. The *sea turtle* is ignorant, bad natured, and weak in ability to do evil. The *eel* is bad natured and timid. The *crab* is strong, easily overturned, a thief, given to hunting, cautious, malicious, deceitful, and lustful. The *frog* is ignorant, prattling, bad natured, and malicious. The *eagle* is strong in will and body, tame together with petulance, treacherous, and very ambitious. The *gyrfalcon* is mighty, with great physical power, disdainful, and vain. The *sparrow hawk* is strong, bold, disdainful, far-sighted, cautious, and patient. The *falcon* bears injury well, is far-sighted, savage in hunting, irritable, cautious, and it sees to the protection of its neighbourhood. The *vulture* is weak-willed, strong, incapable of artifice, timid, bad natured, and long-lived. The *Egyptian vulture* is weak, troublesome, of a tolerant nature, lonely, sad, and vulgar. The *kite* is malicious, impudent, insistent, treacherous, timid, and dirty. The *crow*, namely the black crow, is clever, cautious, a thief, timid, given to imitation, coarse natured, and a lover of solitude. The *raven*, [23ᵇ] which is the spotted crow, is a thief, cautious, deceitful, very gregarious with its kind, and a hoarder of food. The *jackdaw* is clever, tame, cheerful, playful, and jocular. The *magpie* is understanding, treacherous, patient in misfortune, and a lover of its chicks. The *goose* is disdainful, cautious, bold, threatening, oppressive, defensive, and wakeful. The *duck* is weak in artifice, patient, energetic in travelling, and takes upon itself more than it is capable of. The *crane* is strong, determined, ignorant, daring, forceful, and sharp-sighted. The *osprey* is ignorant, vulgar, tame, forceful, covetous, and light of spirit. The *ostrich* is ignorant, patient, ambitious, cheerful, light of spirit, and stupid. The *peacock* is disdainful, haughty, vain, incapable, cowardly, passionate, and flirtatious. The *hen* is weak-willed, harmless, and gluttonous. The *cockerel* is generous, influenced by concern for dependents and others, protection, [self-]admiration,[184] wakefulness, and attention to the time. The *francolin* is prattling, timid, and passionate. The *partridge* is evil, strong, deceitful, and disputatious. *Pigeons* are tame, with little evil, fornicating, passionate, at times joyful and happy, at other times lamenting and sighing. The *quail* is prattling, wary, timid, ignorant, passionate, and it risks its life [24ᵃ]. The *starling* is prattling, given to imitation, lustful, and irritable. The *sparrow* is impudent, wary, irresponsible, concerned for the matters of his household, and very depraved. The *chaffinch*, which is the finch, is without evil, undemanding, tame, easily angered, and prattling. The *black martin*, which is the swallow, is vain, prattling, and undemanding. The *hoopoe* is far-sighted, tame, clever, undemanding, with no tendency to evil, and it gives good news

[184] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden just has 'admiration', but Hoffmann's emendation makes better sense.

معتني بأمور منزله كثير الفساد **الصعو** وهو الصنونو عديم الشر قنوع الوف غضوب مهذار **الخطاف** وهو المنونو معجب بنفسه مهذار قنوع **الهدهد** بصير الوف ذكي قنوع بعيد عن الشر مبشر من يلقاه بالخير **الخفاش** وهو الوطواط شرير موذ˘ على ضعفه وقله حيلته قذر خبيث **القطا** ذكي˘ صبور نفور قنوع **الجراد** الوف متهافت متهور مضطرب الاخلاق **النحل** الوف ذكي صلف حذور مكادح جماع للقوت شره شحيح مطيع لوليه ساهر (ساهرًا)! **الزنبور** جهول شرير في عقر داره ذليل في الغربه وقح ظالم بالطبع خاين حريص نفورلا ياكل بعضه لحم بعض **الذباب** وقح دني النفس قذر لجوج **الحيه** خبيثه عاقله ظالمه حذوره نفوره وربما تالفت سريعه الاستحاله رديه الطبع **العقرب** شريره خبيثه رديه الطبع ظالمه **الحردون** بليد الطبع قذر ردي العيش قليل الشر **النمل** حريص شحيح كداح متحيل *(ب24)* شجاع معتنى بأمور منزله وادخار˘ قوته جبار على ضعفه

واعلم ان المراد من ذكر هذه الحيوانات واخلاقها ان تكون عند المتوسم كالانموذج يقيس عليها في الاخلاق (لاخلاق)!! ما شابهها في الخلقه بعد اعتبار احوال المقيس عليه في اخلاقه وخلقته وتأمله ثم تبدا˘ بذكر ما لا يجهله الاجاهل فلا تغفل عما يبدو (يبدوا)! لك من هذه الايات من العينين فتجمعها الى ما سواها وستجد في كل انسان جزا من اجزآ هذه الدواب والطيور فاجمع من ايات اشباه الدواب في المفاصل الى آيات العينين فانك ربما وجدت في الانسان الواحد اشباه دواب شتى ويجمع˘ الشبه ببعض˘ الطيور وبعض المواشي وشبه° من الكلاب والخنازير جميعًا وقد رايت مره رجل° شبه بالسلحفاه فانظر في ذلك فاني قد بينت لك ما لا تجهله بعد هذه الفراسه والنظر اليه الا متخلف°˘[185] فينبغي ان تعرف من قبل المشيه والصوت وحركه (حركته)! العينين طبيعه كل دابه ثم توجب عليها الفراسه ولست تاركا[186] جميع ما ذكرت لك من اشباه الدواب حتى تعرف ما بقى مما لست *(آ25)* اذكره واعلم ان العيون المتوسطه في الغور شبه بعين الأسد واشد غورهم فتلك ايات كمال الشر وهي عيون القرده والعيون الكثيبه المتواضعه (المواضعه)!! شبه بعيون البقر واذا غارت[187] العين بعض الغور مع ايات الجهل فشبهها بعين الحمار والحق بصاحبها الصياح والصخب

[185] م. لا تتخلف.

[186] ل. ترك.

[187] م. تعلمت.

to whomever it meets. The *pipistrelle*, which is the bat, is evil, harmful despite its weakness and lack of artifice, dirty, and deceitful. The *sand grouse* is clever, patient, timid, and undemanding. The *locust* is tame, fragile, irresponsible, and disorderly. The *bee* is tame, clever, disdainful, wary, hardworking, a hoarder of food, greedy, stingy, obedient to its master, and alert. The *wasp* is ignorant, evil in its home, submissive when away, impudent, of a tyrannical nature, treacherous, desirous, timid, and does not eat the meat of its fellows. The *fly* is impudent, vulgar, dirty, and insistent. The *serpent* is malicious, intelligent, tyrannical, wary, timid, sometimes able to be tamed, quick to change, and bad natured. The *scorpion* is evil, malicious, bad natured, and tyrannical. The *lizard* has a stupid nature, is dirty, with a wicked life and little evil. The *ant* is desirous, miserly, hardworking, changeable, [24b] courageous, concerned about the affairs of its house and the amassing of foodstuffs, and powerful notwithstanding its weakness.

Know that the aim of mentioning these animals and their character is that they should serve the attentive observer as the model by which he can assess the character of those people similar in external form to them. [This he should do] after having considered and contemplated the condition of the one whose character and external form are being measured. You begin by noting that of which the ignorant are not aware, and do not fail to heed the signs of the eyes which are apparent to you. Combine these with other things and you will find in every person some part of these animals and birds. Then combine the detailed signs of the similarities to animals with the signs of the eyes, for you will often find in someone similarities with various animals. Thus he may combine similarities with some birds and livestock, and a similarity both to dogs and pigs. I even once saw a man who was similar to a turtle. So reflect on this, for I have now made clear to you what you should not be ignorant of after this physiognomical insight and examination of it, unless [you are] a straggler.[185] It is therefore necessary for you to know beforehand the gait, the voice, the movement of the eyes, and the nature of each animal, then you will be able to impose upon them your physiognomical insight. You should not neglect[186] all that I have said to you concerning similarities with animals, so that you will come to know the other things that I do not [25^{a}] mention. Know that the moderately hollow eyes are similar to the eyes of a lion. As for those that are very hollow, these are signs of perfect evil, and they are the eyes of monkeys. Eyes that are dejected and downcast are similar to the eyes of cattle. If the eye is somewhat hollow,[187] together with signs of ignorance, its similarity is with the eye of a donkey, so associate its owner with clamour and shouting.

(TK 3245, fos. 18^{b}1–24^{a}2—not found in Leiden or TK 3207—discuss at length what human types are related to what animal nature.)

[185] Hoffmann: 'for I have made clear to you those things which, after this physiognomical insight, should not be ignored and the examination of which should not be relinquished (*ne relinquito*)'.

[186] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden gives the imperative form, perhaps intending 'do not neglect!', but then the jussive form is required (*lā tatruk*).

[187] Hoffmann: 'goes out beyond the hollow somewhat' (*cavitatem alicubi transgreditur*) citing Ad.: 'protruding' (προπαλεῖς).

ولست تاركا جميع ما كنت امرتك به من التفرس في اعلام التذكير والتانيث فاعرف ذلك بالنظر والحركه والصوت ثم قس بعض ذلك ببعض حتى تعرف استقرار الفضل" منها فان في التذكير تانيثا وفي التانيث تذكيرًا وموقع الاسم عليهما كان الفضل" فانه يكفيك من أمر هذا العلم ان تحفظ" ما وصفت لك ثم تعمل بما حفظت فاما انا فلم انله الا بشدة حفظ وطول تجربه وساجمل لك جمله من أمر التذكير وعلامه التانيث فالذكر اشد هذه[188] واجرا واقل عينًا واقرب من الصدق والوفاً واعز نفسًا وأحرص على الكرم[189] وأهيب والانثى على ضد ذلك من الطبايع فانها قليله الجراه كثيره المكر مره المذهب تخفى" فكرتها عاصيه ظلومه تحب الخصومة شديده قويه[190] وساذكر من آيات *(ب25)* خلقه الذكر والانثى وتفسير الفراسه وتنظر" فضل بعضها على بعض وتجعل فضل" فضاك عليه فان الانثى توجد صغيره الراس صغيره الفم اذا قيست الى الذكر لينه الشعر سوداته دقيقه الوجه صافيه العينين براقتها دقيقه العنق صغيره-[191] الصدر غامضته (غامضه)!! ضعيفه الاضلاع عظيمه الكفل والفخذين كثيره لحمها دقيقه الساق حسنه الركبتين حسنه الاطراف لينه المفاصل رخوتهم رطبه ساير الجسد لينه العصب اليدين[1] والرجلين[1] دقيقه وعريضه ضعيفه الصوت قصيرة الخطوه معينه-[192] المشي لينه الاعضا بطيه الحركه سريعه الزلل فاما الذكر فانه بخلاف هذا النعت من كل جهه وانت واجد شبه الذكور في الاناث فواجد بعض الدواب ذكورًا" واناثا وجامع[193] لايات الذكور منه والايات الاناث فتجد" الاجناس الذي* تغلب على ذكورها واناثها ايات التذكير الاسد وايضا التنين مذكر الخلقه والافاعي موتثه تغلب على ذكورها واناثها شبه التانيث وساحكي لك صفه ما أجده (أجدها)!! مذكر الخلقه والآخر مونث الخلقه فقس

[188] د. قوة.

[189] ل. الكثم.

[190] يمكن الصواب: شديد القحة.

[191] د. ضعيفه.

[192] د. معطيه؟

[193] د. ذكوراً كانت او اناثاً جامعة.

(Masculinity/Femininity: TK 3207, fos. 43^b2–44^a13; TK 3245, fos. 24^a2–25^a9; cf. Dim. 9^a–10^a/10–11)

Nor should you ignore all that I have commanded you regarding the physiognomical scrutiny of the signs of masculinity and femininity. You should learn this from the gaze, the movement, and the voice, and then measure up one part with the other until you come to know where resides precedence (of one over the other). For in masculinity there is femininity, and in femininity there is masculinity, and the name (of male or female) falls to whichever has precedence. It will be enough for you regarding this science that you memorize what I have described to you, then that you act on what you have memorized. As for me, I did not acquire this science without much memorization, memorizing a great deal, and long experience. I will summarize for you the subject of masculinity and the significance of femininity. The male is the more powerful of these,[188] bolder, and less shameful, with a greater tendency to truth and loyalty, more strong-minded, more desirous of honour,[189] and more reverent. The female is the opposite of that kind of nature. She has little boldness, much cunning, and bitter outlook. She hides her thoughts, is contrary, tyrannical, loves quarrelling, and is tough and strong.[190] I will mention some of the signs [25^b] of the external form of the male and the female, and the explanation of their physiognomy. You will see the superiority of one over the other, and you will make the best judgement on that basis. The female is found to have a small head, a small mouth when measured next to the male, soft black hair, a thin face, with clear and luminous eyes, a thin neck, a small[191] and depressed chest, weak ribs, large buttocks and thighs with much flesh, thin calves. They have beautiful knees, beautiful extremities, soft and slack limbs, are moist in the rest of the body, with soft tendons, the hands and feet are thin and broad, weak of voice, with a short stride, a fixed[192] gait, soft members, slow movement, and quick to fall over. As for the male, he is the opposite of this description in every aspect. You find similarity to males in females, and you find some animals male and female, and you should combine[193] with the male signs the female signs. And you find species in which the signs of masculinity prevail in both its males and females. The lion and also the python are masculine in external form whereas vipers are feminine, and femininity prevails in their males and females.

I will give you the description of what I find to be masculine in external form and another that is feminine in external form, so assess the masculinity and the

[188] Hoffmann: 'greater in strength', wishing to make the Arabic grammatically more correct.

[189] Thus Hoffmann, which makes better sense than Leiden's 'secrecy' and is supported by Ad.: 'competitive' (φιλότιμον).

[190] Thus Leiden. Possibly one should read: 'very impudent'; cf. Ad.: 'impudently cowardly' (θρασύδειλον).

[191] Hoffmann: 'weak' (*infirmo*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[192] Hoffmann suggests 'successive' (*cunctanti incessu*, i.e. step follows step successively), presumably on the basis of Ad.: 'more frequent (πυκνότερον) step'.

[193] Hoffmann: 'whether males or females, which combine', making the Arabic accord better with the rules of classical Arabic.

التذكير والتانيث بهما وهم الأسد والنمر فالأسد (فلأسد)!! *(26أ)* عظيم الراس عريض الجبهه مشرف الحاجبين غاير العينين اشهلها غليظ˜ الانف رحب الشدق والفم غليظ العنق شديد القصره˜ جعد الشعر واذا أسن احمر شعره كبير الكتفين[194] شديد الاضلاع قليل لحم الفخذين والحرقفتين˜ واسع الصدر كثير عصب العرقوبين والساقين معتدل المرفق جهم[195] الصوت بعيد الخطى متان (متاني)! شديد الحيأ فهذا نعت التذكير واما النمر صغير الراس صغير الجبهه حديد العينين لين الأوصال دقيق العنق ضيق الصدر لطيف الاضلاع عظيم الكفل أملس الجسد لين الشعر فاذا وجدت الغالب على الشبه التانيث فاقض على صاحبه بما يدلك (دلك)!! عليه اعلام التانيث واذا وجدت الغالب على الشبه التذكير فاقض على صاحبه بما يدلك عليه اعلام التذكير واعلم ان الذكر من كل شي اشد قوة واظهر جراةً واقل عيًا وأصبر على مكروه ينزل به من الانثى فافهم ما وصفت لك

الباب الثالث

في فراسه الاظفار وعلاماتها

B4 *(26ب)* اذا كانت الاظفار عراضًا بيضًا حمرًا فان ذلك آيه الفهم والحفظ واما الاظفار الدقاق الطوال المعقفه فانها تدل على سوء الفهم وقله العقل والفطنه وقله الاكتراث˜ والشبه بالبهايم واذا شرفت في التعقف دلت على قله الحيأ واخذ (فخذ)!! ما ليس له اختلاسًا واذا رايتها عظامًا لاصقه باللحم فاقض عليها بالبله وسوء الفهم والشبه بالبهايم وصغر الاظفار يدل على الفطنه والخب وكذلك اقض على الاظفار الخضر والسود والخشنه فذمها واقض على الاظفار الكثيرة˜ الاستداره بكثره الشهوة ولا تقض (تقضي)! على كثيرها˜ بشي الا اذا جاوزت المقدار[196]

[194] ل. لين الكعبين.

[195] د. جهور.

[196] د. المقرد.

femininity in each. They are the lion and the leopard, for the lion [26^a] has a large head, a broad forehead, overhanging eyebrows, hollow and bluish-black eyes, a thick nose, a spacious jaw and mouth, a thick neck, strong in the base of the neck, and curly hair that reddens as it ages. Also it has big shoulders,[194] strong ribs, with little flesh on its thighs and hip-joints, a broad chest, with great tendons on its ankles and calves, straight elbows, a stern[195] voice, far-apart steps, deliberate, and very modest. This is the description of masculinity. As for the leopard, it has a small head, a small forehead, sharp eyes, soft joints, a thin neck, a narrow chest, fine ribs, large buttocks, a sleek body, and soft hair. If, then, you find that it is femininity that is uppermost in similarity (of a person's external form to an animal), judge for its owner what the signs of femininity indicate to you. If you find that it is masculinity that is uppermost in similarity, judge for its owner what the signs of masculinity indicate. Know that the male is in every respect more powerful, more obviously bold, less shameful, and more enduring of adversities that befall him than the female. Understand, then, what I have described to you.

THE THIRD CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE NAILS AND THEIR SIGNS

B4 (TK 3207, fo. 62^{a}9–^{b}1; TK 3245, fo. 49^{a}8–^{b}7; cf. Dim. 34^a–35^a/35–6)

[26^b] If the nails are broad, white, and red, that is a sign of understanding and memory. In the case of thin, long, and crooked nails, they indicate bad understanding, lack of intellect and comprehension, lack of concern, and a similarity to beasts. If they have a predominant curvature, this indicates lack of modesty, and the surreptitious taking of what is not his. If you see that they are large and adhere to the flesh, judge for them folly, lack of understanding, and a similarity to beasts. Smallness of the nails indicates understanding and deceit. Judge in the same way of the green, black, and rough nails, and censure them. Judge for very rounded nails much desire. But do not judge anything about most of these (signs) unless they are excessive.[196]

194 Thus Hoffmann, which seems more likely than Leiden's 'soft ankles'.

195 Hoffmann: 'loud' (*clara*) citing Shams al-din al-Dimashqi.

196 Hoffmann: 'there is more than one', presumably because this is closer to Ad.: 'most of the other signs are not worth consideration, least of all the nails, if they are each considered by themselves'.

الباب الرابع

في فراسه الأصابع وعلاماتها

B5 اذا رايت الاصابع متلاحمه بالاظفار فاقض عليها بشدة الغضب[197] والاستهزآ واذا رايتها منقلبه[198] فاقض عليها بالخب وسو المذهب وحب جمع المال والاصابع المسرفه في الدقه واللطافه (الطافه)!! فاقض عليها بقله الفهم والعقل والاصابع القصار *(27أ)* الغلاظ تدل على القحه وقله التمييز فشبهها بالبهايم ولا تمدح صاحب الاصابع الدقاق الطوال فانها تدل على قله الفهم والبله والهذر وامدح الاصابع المعتدله في الشكل والهينه

الباب الخامس

في فراسه القدمين وعلاماتها

B6 اذا رايت القدمين المنقبضتين شديدتين وعصبهما مستويه شديده معتدله مفاصلها فتلك ايات الرجال الجبابره الشداد واذا كانت القدمين[1] كثيره اللحم لينتين~ فانهما يدلان* على ضعف ولين وفتور واذا رايت القدمان° قصار° غلاظ° فلا تمدحها فانها من أيات الدواب والقدمين[1] الطوال تدل على كثره الشر والغوص في الفكر الرديه واذا رأيت القدمين صغار° دقاق° فانهما يدلان* على الرجل الفجور المرح واقض على القدمين الضامرتين~ بكثره الشر وسوء الهمه وكلما تقوست القدمين[1] من أسفل كان اشر في فراستها ليس* أيه في القدمين اشر من هذه واقض على الاقدام المعدومه~ الخمص المستويه مع العرقوب بالشر *(ب27)* والفجور وينبغي ان تحذر~ هولآى فقد بينت لك ذلك

[197] و. العضب.

[198] و. منقبضة.

THE FOURTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE DIGITS AND THEIR SIGNS

B5 (TK 3207, fo. 62ª2–9; TK 3245, fo. 49ª1–8; cf. Dim. 34ª–35ª/35–6)

If you see that the digits have grown together with the nails, judge for them great anger[197] and mockery. If you see they are inverted,[198] judge for them deceit, bad behaviour, and the love of amassing money. Regarding the digits that are exceedingly thin and fine, judge for them lack of understanding and intellect. Digits that are short [27ª] and thick indicate impudence and lack of discernment; their similarity is with animals. You should not praise the owner of thin, long digits, for they indicate lack of understanding, folly, and prattling. Praise the digits that are evenly proportioned in shape and structure.

THE FIFTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE FEET AND THEIR SIGNS

B6 (TK 3207, fo. 63ᵇ2–9; TK 3245, fo. 51ª4–ᵇ3; cf. Dim. 35ᵇ–36ª/38–9)

If you see contracted, strong feet, and their tendons are straight and strong, and their joints are evenly proportioned, these are the signs of powerful and mighty men. If the feet are very fleshy and soft, they indicate weakness, softness, and laxity. If you see the feet are short and thick, do not praise them, for they are the signs of animals. Long feet indicate much evil and immersion in wicked thoughts. If you see that the feet are small and thin, they indicate the immoral and cheerful man. Judge for emaciated feet much evil and evil intent. Whenever the feet are arched below, evil is in their physiognomy, and there is no sign in the feet more evil than this. Judge for feet lacking an arch, in line with the ankle, evil [27ᵇ] and immorality. It is necessary that you be wary of these; thus I have already explained that to you.

197 Hoffmann: 'light-headedness' (*ludibrium*), referring back to the qualities of the pig mentioned in ch. 2 ('playful and contemptuous'), presumably because Ad. labels such people 'swinish' (ὑώδεις).

198 Hoffmann suggests 'contracted' citing Anon. Lat. 59 *adstrictos*, but presumably referring to ch. 60 *digiti*... *qui collecti sunt et conglobati*.

الباب السادس

في فراسه ما بين الكعبين والعرقوبين وعلاماته

B7 اذا رايت ما بين الكعبين والعرقوبين غاير شديد الغور[199] فاقض" على صاحبها بشده وجراه واذا رايت منه رخاً ليناً[200] فاقض عليه بالغضب[201] ودقه العصب[202] يدل* على الجبن والزنا وغلظ العصبين[203] وكثره لحمهما وغلظ" كعوبهما (كرعوبهما)! واذا كان* مع هذا النعت الاصابع قصار° والساقين[1] غلاظ"° فهذه كلها من آيات الجهل والغضب والاختلاط وما اشبه ذلك

الباب السابع

في فراسه الساقين وعلاماتها

B8 اذا رايت الساقين معتدلين* لا مسرفه الغلظ ولا في الدقه مستويه فاقض على صاحبها بشده حب العلم[204] فان كانتا لينتين غير مستويتين[205] والى الأعوجاج" مايله[206] فاقض على صاحبها بالجبن وضيقه الصدر وسوء الخلق والشهوة وان كان مع *(28أ)* ذلك عصبهما ظاهر° فكل القضيه عليه بكثره الشهوة والزنا واذا رايت وسط الساق مرتفعًا شاخصًا كبطن[207] فاقض عليه

[199] م. ثابتا شديد الثبوت.

[200] م. لبيسًا؟

[201] م. بالجبن.

[202] م. العرقوب.

[203] م. العرقوبين.

[204] يمكن الصواب: بشدة وحب العلم.

[205] ل. لينتين مستويتين.

[206] ل. مائلي.

[207] م. كبطن الحبلى؟

THE SIXTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF WHAT IS BETWEEN THE HEELS AND THE ANKLES, AND THEIR SIGNS

B7 (TK 3207, fo. 63ᵇ9–15; TK 3245, fo. 51ᵇ3–9)

If you see that what is between the heels and the ankles is very hollow,[199] judge for their owner strength and boldness. If you see laxity and softness[200] in it, judge for him anger.[201] Thinness of the tendons[202] indicates cowardice and fornication. Thickness of the tendons[203] and much flesh on them and thickness of their heels, and if together with this description there are short toes and thick calves, all these are signs of ignorance, anger, confusion, and the like.

THE SEVENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE CALVES AND THEIR SIGNS

B8 (TK 3207, fo. 63ᵃ11–ᵇ2; TK 3245, fos. 50ᵇ7–51ᵃ4; cf. Dim. 35ᵃᵇ/37–8)

If you see that the calves are evenly proportioned, without excess of thickness or thinness, and straight, then judge for their owner great love of knowledge.[204] If they are soft, not straight,[205] but tending[206] towards crookedness, then judge for their owner cowardice, narrowness of mind, a bad disposition, and desire. If, together with [28ᵃ] that, the tendon is apparent, the whole judgement of him is of great desire and fornication. If you see that the centre of the calf is protruding and projecting, like a stomach,[207] judge for him a bad

[199] Hoffmann: 'very firm' (*valde solidum*) citing Ad.: 'perfect, solid ankles' (διηκριβωμένα στέρεα).

[200] Hoffmann suggests 'smoothness' (*mollitiem*) citing Ad.: 'smooth' (λεῖα), though Leiden's *līn* ('softness/suppleness') is also a reasonably good translation.

[201] Hoffmann: 'cowardice' (*timiditatem*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'more unmanly' (ἀνανδροτέρου).

[202] Hoffmann: 'ankles' (*tali*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'those (ankles) which are very thin'.

[203] Hoffmann 'ankles' (*talorum*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'thick ankles' (παχέα δὲ σφυρά).

[204] Possibly one should read here: 'strength and love of knowledge', which is exactly what BH has (Zonta 1992: 44: *haylān w-rāḥem yūlfānā*). This is, however, quite far from Ad.'s 'a noble and talented man' (γενναίου ἀνδρὸς καὶ εὐφυοῦς).

[205] Thus Hoffmann. Leiden has 'straight', but Hoffmann's emendation makes sense given the following description of 'crookedness'. Ad. has 'soft and jointless' (ἁπαλαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄναρθροι), and it seems that Leiden/PA have misread ἄναρθροι as ἄνορθοι (see n. 224 below). Hoffmann notes that in the previous sentence there may have been a similar misunderstanding, namely of ἠρθρῶσθαι as ὠρθῶσθαι.

[206] Thus Hoffmann, which seems a reasonable emendation of Leiden's 'not it'.

[207] Hoffmann suggests 'like the stomach of a pregnant woman' (*ventrem gravidae*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'as if they were pregnant' (ὡς κύουσαι).

بسوء الخلق والشده[208] وحب النسأ والشهوة وقله الحيا[209] وغلظ الساقين والعرقوبين دليل على البله وقلة الفهم واخلاق العبيد

الباب الثامن
في فراسه الركبتين وعلاماتها

B9 اذا رايت الركبتين رخوتين لينتين لا ثابتتين˜ كانهما داخلتين فانهما من علامات النسأ والتانيث والامدح (الالمدح)! الاعتدال في الركبتين وغيرها

الباب التاسع
في فراسه الوركين والفخذين وعلاماتها

اذا رايت الوركين والفخذين كثيره اللحم فاقض على صاحبها بضعف القوة والاسترخأ واذا رايت الوركين صلبين ظاهره العظام دل ذلك على شدة ودقه الوركين وقله لحمهما يدل على الخب والمكر والفجور وهي من فراسه الثعالب[210]

(ب28)الباب العاشر
في فراسه الحقوين وعلاماتها

B10 اذا رايت الحقوين شاخصي العظام صلبه فتلك علامه الرجل الشديد القوي واذا كثر لحم الحقوين وكان رخوًا فهو من آيات النسأ واذا رايت في الحقوين دقه مما يلي الاعلى فاظنن فيه الشهوة وحب النسأ والجبن˜

[208] م. و الشره.
[209] ل. والحيا.
[210] يقترح هوفمان أن ليدن أخطأ هنا في معنى النص اليوناني.

disposition, vehemence,[208] love of women, desire, and lack of modesty.[209] Thickness of the calves and ankles is an indication of folly, lack of understanding, and the character of slaves.

THE EIGHTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE KNEES AND THEIR SIGNS

B9 (TK 3207, fo. 63^{a}7–10; TK 3245, fo. 50^{b}5–6; cf. Dim. 35^{ab}/37–8)

If you see that the knees are lax and soft, and not steady, as if they are going inwards, they are among the signs of women and femininity. The most praiseworthy is even proportion in the knees and elsewhere.

THE NINTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE HIPS AND THIGHS AND THEIR SIGNS

B9 (TK 3207, fo. 62^{b}11–13; TK 3245, fo. 50^{a}9–^{b}4; cf. Dim. 33^{ab}/37)

If you see that the hips and thighs have much flesh, judge for their owner lack of strength and slackness. If you see that the hips are solid and the bones apparent, that indicates strength. Thinness of the hips and lack of flesh on them indicate deceit, cunning, and immorality, and this is the physiognomy of the fox [28^{b}].[210]

THE TENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE FLANKS AND THEIR SIGNS

B10 (TK 3207, fo. 62^{b}8–11; TK 3245, fo. 50^{a}2–5; cf. Dim. 33^{ab}/37)

If you see that the flanks have projecting bones and are solid, this is the sign of the strong and powerful man. If the flesh of the flanks is much and lax, this is one of the signs of women. If you see in the flanks thinness in what is next to the highest part, suppose of the owner desire, love of women, and cowardice.

[208] Hoffmann: 'greed' (*gulositatem*); no explanation given, but presumably feeling it is closer to Ad.: 'intemperate' (ἀκολάστους).

[209] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'modesty', but one expects a negative quality, and the emendation is supported by Ad.: 'shameless' (ἀναιδεῖς).

[210] Hoffmann suggests that this is a mistake for 'apes' resulting from a confusion of πιθήκων ('of apes') with ἀλωπήκων [*sic* for ἀλωπέκων] ('of foxes'), though the error could have originated with PS, which also has 'fox' (Zonta 1992: 44).

الباب الحادي عشر

في فراسه الظهر وعلاماته

B11 اذا رايت الظهر عريضًا فهو دليل الرجال الجبابره الأشدآ ويدل على شده الغضب واذا كان على خلاف ذلك دل على الضعف خلاف ما دل عليه العريض الشديد

الباب الثاني عشر

في انحنآ الظهر وعلاماته

B12 اذا رايت في الظهر انحنآ فتلك [من][211] أيات الرجال[212] الا ان تشهد له أيات اخر من لين الاعضآ فانها تشهد له بالخير والظهر *(29أ)* الحسن يدل على حب الصيد فقد رايت رجلًا على هذه الصفه وكان غليظًا سمينًا كبير البطن منتفخ الخدين وكان بمخرق ويحب الصيد وبه صلف ويتكلم غير صدوق في شي من الاشيآ وكان أرمني الجنس على مثل هذه الصفه

الباب الثالث عشر

في فراسه الاضلاع وعلاماتها

B13 اذا رايت الأضلاع دقاقًا ضعافًا فاقض على صاحبها بالجبن والضعف وشده الاضلاع وكثره لحمها دليل على الحمق وقله الفهم والاضلاع المستديره الممتليه مثل الحبل[213] تدل على الرجل الكثير الكلام الردي الفعل

[211] هذه الكلمة التي يشرحها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[212] م. الرجال غير الأخيار.

[213] م. الجبن.

THE ELEVENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE BACK AND ITS SIGNS

B11 (TK 3207, fo. $62^{b}5$; TK 3245, fo. $49^{b}9$; cf. Dim. $32^{ab}/33$–4)

If you see that the back is broad, it is an indication of mighty and strong men, and it indicates great anger. If it is the opposite of that, it indicates weakness and the contrary of what the broad and strong back indicated.

THE TWELFTH CHAPTER: ON THE STOOPING BACK AND ITS SIGNS

B12 (TK 3207, fo. $62^{b}6$–8; TK 3245, fo. $50^{a}1$–2; cf. Dim. $32^{ab}/33$–4)

If you see a stoop in the back, this is [one of][211] the signs of men,[212] unless other signs testify in his favour, such as softness of the members, for this testifies good of him. The good back [29^{a}] indicates love of hunting. I have seen a man of this description, and he was coarse and fat, with a big stomach, and swollen cheeks, and would swindle, and loved hunting, and he was disdainful, and he spoke without sincerity on every topic. He was of Armenian nationality, and of such a description as this.

THE THIRTEENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE RIBS AND THEIR SIGNS

B13 (TK 3207, fos. $60^{b}13$–$61^{a}2$; TK 3245, fo. $47^{a}4$–8; cf. Dim. $32^{ab}/33$–4)

If you see that the ribs are thin and weak, judge for their owner cowardice and weakness. Strength of the ribs and their great fleshiness is an indication of stupidity and lack of understanding. Ribs rounded and full, like the foetus in the womb,[213] indicate a man who speaks much and who does what is wicked.

[211] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense.

[212] Leiden has clearly missed out a word here, since the sense requires some negative epithet to go with men; Hoffmann emends to 'men who are not good' on the basis of Ad.: 'a stooping man is not good' (οὐκ ἀγαθός).

[213] Hoffmann: 'the dropsy' (ὕδρωψ), which gives you a swollen stomach, citing Ad.: 'as if swollen' (ὡς οἰδοῦσαι). Otherwise, one might read 'like the pregnant woman' (*al-hublā*) or, less likely, 'like a hill' (*al-jabal*).

الباب الرابع عشر
في فراسه البطن وعلاماته

B14 دقه البطن ولطافته دليل على صحة العقل وعظم النفس والهمه والافراط في خموصة البطن ودقتها دليل على الجرآه[214] وردآة العقل والنهم وعظم البطن وكثره لحمها وخاصه اذا كان *(ب29)* بها لين وتسافل دلت على كثره[215] الحركه والسكر وحب النكاح فان كانت كثيره اللحم شديده دلت على ردآة الفعل والخبث والخب والمكر وقله العقل

الباب الخامس عشر
في ما بين السرة الى راس الصدر وعلاماته

B15 اذا وجدت ما بين السرة الى راس الصدر اذا هو مسح وجد اطول من[216] راس الصدر الى العنق فاقض عليه برغابه البطن وكثرة الاكل فان اناْ الطعام استوسع فيهم وضاقت آلة العقل والفهم

الباب السادس عشر
في فراسه الصدر وعلاماته

اذا رايت الصدر واسع° منتصف° فامدحه والصدر الضعيف الدقيق يدل على صغر النفس والامانه[217] فاذا كثر لحم الصدر دل على قله العقل والفهم والمعرفه

الباب السابع عشر
***(أ30)* في فراسه الثدي وعلاماته**

اذا رايت الثدي ناسل° ورايت مع ذلك صدورهم كبار لحمهم مسترخيه فانه يدل على الزنا وحب السكر

B16 واذا رايت الصدر عريض° شديد° وكذلك ما ورآ الصدر وهو الظهر

[214] م. الجبانه.
[215] م. قله.
[216] م. من ما بين.
[217] م. جبانه.

THE FOURTEENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE STOMACH AND ITS SIGNS

B14 (TK 3207, fo. 61^{a}5–10; TK 3245, fo. 47^{b}2–6; cf. Dim. 32^{b}–33^{a}/36–7)

Thinness and fineness of the stomach is an indication of a healthy intellect, magnanimity, and enthusiasm. Excessive emaciation and thinness of the stomach is an indication of boldness,[214] wickedness of intellect, and gluttony. Largeness of the stomach and great fleshiness, especially if it has [29^{b}] softness and droop, indicates much[215] movement, drunkenness, and love of sexual intercourse. If it is very fleshy and strong, that indicates wickedness of deeds, malice, deceit, cunning, and lack of intellect.

THE FIFTEENTH CHAPTER: ON WHAT IS BETWEEN THE NAVEL AND THE BEGINNING OF THE CHEST AND ITS SIGNS

B15 (TK 3207, fo. 61^{a}2–5; TK 3245, fo. 47^{a}8–^{b}2; cf. Dim. 32^{b}/36)

If you find that what is between the navel to the beginning of the chest, when it is flat, is found to be longer than[216] the beginning of the chest to the neck, then judge for him desires of the stomach and much eating. For the receptacle of food has become capacious in him, and the instrument of the intellect and understanding has become straitened.

THE SIXTEENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE CHEST AND ITS SIGNS

B15 (TK 3207, fo. 60^{b}8–13; TK 3245, fos. 46^{b}8–47^{a}4; cf. Dim. 32^{b}/36)

If you see that the chest is broad and even, praise it. The weak and thin chest indicates meanness of spirit and loyalty.[217] If there is much flesh on the chest, it indicates lack of intellect, understanding, and knowledge [30^{a}].

[214] Hoffmann: 'cowardice' (*timiditatem*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: '(stomachs) very lean and empty indicate cowardice (δειλίαν), malice and gluttony'; and certainly the sense requires a negative characteristic.

[215] Hoffmann: 'lack of' citing Ad.: 'insensibility' (ἀναισθησίαν); and again the sense requires a negative characteristic.

[216] Hoffmann: 'than what is between', presumably added for clarification.

[217] Hoffmann: 'cowardice' (*timiditatem*) citing Ad.: 'unmanliness' (ἀνανδρίαν).

فامدحه وان كان الصدر دقيق° ضعيف° دل على صغر النفس وضعف البدن[218]

الباب الثامن عشر
في فراسه ما بين الكتفين وعلاماته
اذا وجدت ما بين الكتفين ورآ الصدر فيها لحم كثير دل على قله العلم والبله وضيق الذراع واذا كان [ما][219] بين الكتفين عريض° دل على كثره العلم والقوه واذا كان [ما] بين الكتفين مدورًا دل على العلم والاناة والروايه في العلم والأمور[220] واذا رايت الكتفين كان بهما تحدر[221] والكتفين ملتزقتين بالصدر فاقض عليه بالحسد ورداة الفعل والشر وكذلك الجسد اذا كان ملزقا بالكتفين فاقض عليه بالرحمه[222] وحب المال

(ب30) **الباب التاسع عشر**
في فراسه الكتفين والمنكبين وعلاماتها
B17 اذا رايت المنكبين غايرين فلا تمدحها وذم اهلها وانعتهم بالكسل والتلبث في" الاعمال واذا رايت ما بين التراقي والكتفين متفرقا فاقض عليه بالضعف فان رايت التباعد" الذي بينهما باعتدال ما بين الضيق والسعه دل على العلم

[218] م. والجبن؟

[219] هذه الكلمة التي يشرحها هوغمان غير موجودة في ل كما أنها غير موجودة في الجملة التالية.

[220] م. والرويه في الكلام والامور.

[221] م. تحدب.

[222] م. بالشعر؟

THE SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY AND SIGNS OF THE BREAST

(Cf. Dim. 32^b/36)

If you see that the breast is sagging, and you see together with this their chests are big with flesh and flabby, it indicates fornication and love of drunkenness.

B16 If you see that the chest is broad and strong, and likewise what is behind the chest, which is the back, praise it. If the chest is thin and weak, it indicates meanness of spirit and weakness of the body.[218]

THE EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF WHAT IS BETWEEN THE SHOULDERS AND ITS SIGNS

B16 (TK 3207, fo. 60^a9–12; TK 3245, fo. 46^a5–9; cf. Dim. 31^b–32^a/33–4)

If you find that what is between the shoulders behind the chest has much flesh, it indicates lack of knowledge, folly, and lack of effectiveness. If [what is][219] between the shoulders is broad, it indicates much knowledge and strength. If [what is] between the shoulders is rounded, it indicates knowledge, patience, and transmission of knowledge and affairs.[220] If you see that the shoulders droop[221] and adhere to the chest, judge for the owner envy, wicked deeds, and evil. Likewise, if the body adheres to the shoulders, judge for him mercy[222] and love of money [30^b].

THE NINETEENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE SHOULDER-JOINTS AND THEIR SIGNS

B17 (TK 3207, fo. 60^a13–^{b}1; TK 3245, fo. 46^a9–^{b}3; cf. Dim. 31b–32a/33–4)

If you see that the shoulder-joints are hollow, do not praise it and censure the people possessing them, and describe them as lazy and malingering in actions. And if you see that what is between the top of the chest and the shoulders is separate, judge weakness. If you see that the gap between them is halfway

[218] Hoffmann suggests 'and cowardice' citing Ad.: 'cowardice' (δειλία).

[219] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense, as also in the next sentence.

[220] Hoffmann: 'thoughtfulness in speech and affairs' (*in sermone et rebus perspicacitatem*) citing Ad.: 'shrewdness' (ἀγχινοίας).

[221] Hoffmann: 'are hunched' (*gibbositatem*) citing Ad.: 'a hunched (κυρτόν) back'.

[222] Hoffmann suggests 'hoarding' citing Ad.: 'parsimonious' (φειδωλός).

والعقل والشدة

الباب العشرون

في فراسه الكتفين وعلاماتها

B18 اذا رأيت الكتفين غليظين فانهما غير محمودين واعلم ان الاكتاف الصلبه الشديده تجد عند أصحابها القوة والشده واما الاكتاف الدقاق[223] فانها تدل على الضعف في˜ القوة والجبن˜ والاكتاف الدقاق الشاخصه الحروف تدل على ردآه الاعمال فان كان شخوصها على غير استقامه[224] فانها تدل على البله والحمق

الباب الحادي والعشرون

في العضدين والساعدين وعلاماتها

B19 *(31أ)* اذا طال الذراعان (الذراع)!! والساعدين[1] طولا [حتى][225] اذا بسطها الرجل تنال ركبتيه دل ذلك على حسن الأعمال وحسن التدبير والسيره واذا قصرت الساعدين[1] حتى اذا هم الرجل باكل انكب فاقض عليه بحب الشر واستعماله ومحبه الردى[226] للناس والجرأة[227] فيما يهمون به ويريدونه (يريدوه)!! واقض على العضدين والساعدين الشديدين بالخير وكذلك على العضدين[228] المستديرين˜ واما العضدين[1] الصغيرين[1] الضعيفين[1] الدقيقين[1] فاقض عليهما بالضعف والعضدين[1] والساعدين[1] اذا كانت كثيره اللحم دلت على قله العلم وقله الحفظ والبله[229]

223 م. الرقاق.

224 يقترح هوفمان أن ليدن أخطأ هنا في معنى النص اليوناني.

225 هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

226 م. الأذى.

227 م. والحسد.

228 م. المرفقين؟

229 ل. والحفظ وقله البله.

between narrowness and extensiveness, it indicates knowledge, intellect, and strength.

THE TWENTIETH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE SHOULDERS AND THEIR SIGNS

B18 (TK 3207, fo. 60^{b}1–6; TK 3245, fo. 46^{b}3–6; cf. Dim. 31^{b}–32^{a}/33–4)

If you see that the shoulders are thick, then they are not to be praised. Know regarding solid and strong shoulders that their owners have power and strength. As for thin[223] shoulders, they indicate weakness in strength and cowardice. Thin shoulders with projecting edges indicate wickedness of deeds. If their projection is not straight,[224] this indicates folly and stupidity.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER: ON THE UPPER ARMS AND FOREARMS AND THEIR SIGNS

B19 (TK 3207, fo. 61^{a}12–^{b}10; TK 3245, fos. 47^{b}7–48^{b}1: reverse order to Leiden; cf. Dim. 33^{b}–34^{a}/34–5)

[31^{a}] If the arm and forearms are long [to the point that][225] when the man extends them they reach his knees, this indicates good actions, and good behaviour and conduct. If the forearms are short, so that if the man goes to eat he leans over, judge for him love of evil and practice of it, fondness for the ruin[226] of people, and boldness[227] towards whatever they intend or wish. Judge best strong upper arms and forearms and likewise for upper arms[228] that are rounded. As for upper arms that are small, weak, and thin, judge for them weakness. The upper arms and the forearms, if they have much flesh, indicate lack of knowledge, lack of memory, and folly.[229]

[223] Hoffmann: 'slim/fine' (*tenues*) citing Ad.: 'slack' (λαγαροί), probably also wishing to offer an alternative to 'thin' which comes again in the next sentence (then rendered by λεπτοί in Ad.). Note that the two words are similar in form and meaning, and Hoffmann sometimes exchanges one for the other, though assuming of course that it is Leiden that had (erroneously) done so in the first place (see his note to p. 207, l. 8).

[224] Hoffmann suggests that this is a mistake for 'jointless' (as in Ad.), resulting from a confusion of ἄναρθροι ('jointless') with ἄνορθοι ('not straight'). This sentence is not in BH.

[225] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense.

[226] Hoffmann: 'harm' (*nocendi*) citing Ad.: 'who rejoice at others' woes' (ἐπιχαιρεκάκους).

[227] Hoffmann: 'envy' (*invidiam*) citing Ad.: 'jealous' (φθονεροὺς).

[228] Hoffmann suggests 'elbows' on the basis of Ad.: 'elbows jointed' (ἀγκῶνάς τε ἀρθρώδεις).

[229] Thus Hoffmann. Leiden has 'lack of knowledge, memory, and lack of folly', but it seems right to assume with Hoffmann that this was a copyist's slip, misplacing the second 'lack of'.

الباب الثاني والعشرون
في فراسه اليدين وعلاماتها

B20 اذا رأيت الكف لينه فاقض عليها بالفهم وسرعه كلما اراد علمه واذا رايت الكف العظيمه˘ الحسنه[230] فاقض على صاحبها بالشدة والجرآه ومشقه التعلم واما الكف الصغيره فاقض عليها بالحمق فان اجتمع الى صغرها غلظ *(ب31)* دل على الاستهزأ واقض على الكفين الرقيقين اللطيفين بالخير[231] واقض على الكف الغليظ والاصابع القصيره بالسرقه واذا كان الكف في غايه الصغر دل على الخب والمكر والسرقه واذا كانت رقاق° صلاب° حسنات[232] فاقض عليها بالنهم[233] والميل الى الشهوات[234]

الباب الثالث و العشرون
في فراسه الرقبه وعلاماتها

B21 اذا رايت الرقبه دقيقه طويله فاقض على صاحبها بالخير[235] وسوء العاده واذا كانت طويله غليظه فاقض عليها بالفجور وعجب الراى وفعل لما يريد واذا رايت الرقبه معتدله في الطول والقصر والدقه والغلظ واعتدال موضعها في البدن وهي قويه فامدح صاحبها بالشده والفهم والسرعه للتعلم وجميع الفضايل واذا كانت الرقبه دقيقه[236] ضعيفه فاقض عليها بالفجور وسوء الهمه والفهم واذا رايت الرقبه نادره• العروق ظاهرة العصب منتفخه الأوداج[237] فاقض عليها بالحمق والجهاله وكذلك اذا كانت أعضاها (أعضاه)!! غليظه دلت على الشر وسوء الغضب *(أ32)* والبعد من التعلم وقصر الرقبه وغلظها يدل على شده البدن والجبن في النفس واذا رايت خرز˘ العنق شاخص° عن موضعه فوق المقدار في أصل الكتفين فاقض عليه بالسفه وشده الرقبه دليل على الحقد

230 و. الخشنة.
231 و. بالخطف.
232 و. عبيات.
233 ل. الفهم.
234 و. الهذار.
235 و. بالجبن.
236 و. رقيقة.
237 و. منعقدة الأوداج؟

THE TWENTY-SECOND CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE HANDS AND THEIR SIGNS

B20 (TK 3207, fos. 61^b10–62^a2; TK 3245, fo. 48^b1–9; cf. Dim. 34^a–35^a/35–6)

If you see that the palm is soft, judge for its owner understanding and quickness in all that he wants to learn. If you see the palm is large and handsome,[230] judge for its owner strength, boldness, and trouble in learning. As for the small palm, judge stupidity. If thickness is combined with smallness, [31^b] it indicates mockery. Judge for slim and delicate palms goodness.[231] Judge for the thick palm and short fingers stealing. If the palm is exceedingly small, it indicates deceit, cunning, and stealing. If they are slim, solid, and handsome,[232] judge for them gluttony[233] and an inclination towards desires.[234]

THE TWENTY-THIRD CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE NECK AND ITS SIGNS

B21 (TK 3207, fos. 59^a3–60^a7; TK 3245, fos. 44^a8–46^a3; cf. Dim. 30^b–31^a/32–3)

If you see that the neck is thin and long, judge for its owner goodness[235] and bad habits. If it is long and thick, judge for him immorality and vanity in his opinions and in doing what he wants. If you see that the neck is moderate in length and shortness, and thinness and thickness, and in a central position on the body, and that it is strong, praise its owner for his strength, understanding, quickness to learn, and all the virtues. If the neck is thin[236] and weak, judge for him immorality, bad intentions, and bad understanding. If you see a neck with prominent veins and visible tendons, and with swollen jugular veins,[237] judge for him stupidity and ignorance. Likewise, its parts are thick, they indicate evil and bad anger, [32^a] and remoteness from learning. Shortness and thickness of the neck indicate a strong body and cowardice in the soul. If you see the vertebrae of the neck projecting from its place, more than would

[230] Hoffmann: 'rough' (*asperam*); no explanation given, but presumably feeling it should be in contrast to the 'soft' palm of the previous sentence.

[231] Hoffmann: 'snatching' (*rapacitatem*) citing Ad.: 'most rapacious' (ἁρπακτικώτατοι).

[232] Hoffmann: 'bent' (*intortae*) citing Ad.: 'crooked' (σκολιαῖς).

[233] Leiden has 'understanding' (*fahm*), but it seems right to assume with Hoffmann that this is a copyist's slip for 'gluttony' (*naham*).

[234] Hoffmann: 'prattling' (*garrulitatem*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'nonsense' (φλυαρίαν).

[235] Hoffmann: 'cowardice' (*timiditatem*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'cowardly' (δειλῶν), and of course it fits better with the following 'bad habits'.

[236] Hoffmann: 'slim' (*tenue*) citing Ad.: 'slack' (λαγαροί) and arguing that 'thin' (*daqiq*) corresponds to λεπτός.

[237] Hoffmann suggests 'knotted jugular veins' citing Ad.: 'twisted' (πεπλεγμένα).

والعلم[238] ولين الرقبه يدل على التعلم والفهم واما الرقبه الشديده الشبيه راسها بالنبض الحديد[239] لا أمدحها فانها بعيده من العلم والفهم واقض على الرقبه القصيره غير المايله بالشر وفعل كلما يهمون به وبعدهم من العلم[240] ولست مادح° من الأعناق الا ما اعتدل طوله وعرضه ومجسته ملسًا¹ واذا رايت اعلا العنق متنصبًا منعكسًا" فاقض عليه بكثره الصمت[241] واذا استرخا جانب العنق الايمن ومال فتلك آيه الحرص[242] على المال وحب التزين والكمال واذا كان الاسترخأ الى الجانب الأيسر فتلك علامه الحمق وحب الزنا واذا كان ذلك من ميلانه تاره الى الجانب الايسر[243] فليست تلك علامه حسنه ولكن صاحبها لا يخلو من علامه حسنه وفضل[244]

B22 فان رايت في الحنجره خرزه شاخصه عن يسار[245] *(ب32)* الحلق فانها دلاله على قله العلم[246] في صاحبها وتجده طماح العين الى كل شي محبًا للخمر أشد" ما يكون اذا كان شاربًا وكان فيه مع ذلك شدة الغضب والحزن

الباب الرابع والعشرون

في فراسه الدقن وعلاماتها

B23 اذا رايت الانسان طويل الدقن فانك واجده قليل الشر كظوم الغيظ ويبدي الكلام في غير حينه وفي طبعه استرخأ وضعف وصغر الدقن آيه سوء وتجدهم

238 و. قلة الحفظ والعلم.
239 و. بقشرة الديك.
240 و. ...
241 و. الحمق؟
242 و. الحرص.
243 و. الجوانب سائرا.
244 و. علامة حسنة وحمل.
245 و. سائر.
246 و. قلة الحلم.

be normal, at the base of the shoulders, judge for him foolishness. Strength of the neck is an indication of envy and knowledge.[238] Softness of the neck indicates learning and understanding. As for the strong neck, the head of which is similar to the sharp artery,[239] I do not praise it, for it is far from knowledge and understanding. Judge for the short, straight neck evil, the doing of everything they intend, and remoteness from knowledge.[240] I do not praise any neck except what is moderate in length and breadth, and is smooth to the touch. If you see the top of the neck is erect and turned back, judge much silence.[241] If the right side of the neck is lax and inclines, that is a sign of desire for wealth,[242] love of adornment and perfection. If the laxity is on the left side, that is a sign of stupidity and love of adultery. If that inclination it has is occasionally to the left side,[243] that is not a good sign, but its owner is not without a good indication and virtue.[244] *B22* If you see that a vertebra of the larynx projects from the left side of[245] [32^b] the throat, that is a sign of lack of knowledge[246] in its owner. You will also find his eye covetous of everything and a lover of intoxication to the greatest possible degree when he drinks. Together with that he has great anger and sadness.

THE TWENTY-FOURTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE CHIN AND ITS SIGNS

B23 (TK 3207, fo. 58^{a}9–^{b}4; TK 3245, fo. 43^{a}4–^{b}4; cf. Dim. 28^b–29^b/31–2)

If you see that the man has a long chin, you will find that he has little evil, suppresses fury, and begins speaking at the wrong time. In his nature there is laxity, and weakness. Shortness of the chin is a sign of bad, and you will find

238 Hoffmann: 'lack of memory and knowledge' (*memoriae et scientiae defectum*) citing Ad.: 'ignorant' (ἀμαθεῖς).

239 Hoffmann: 'the comb of a cock' (*cristae galli*) citing Ad.: 'mane' (λοφιά).

240 Hoffmann suggests that after this sentence there is a lacuna in Leiden; it is partially filled by BH (Zonta 1992: 41–2). Note that BH has an even more circuitous translation of Ad.'s 'stubborn' (αὐθάδης) than Leiden: 'without understanding he does whatever comes into his mind'.

241 Hoffmann suggests 'stupidity' (*stupiditatem*) citing Ad.: 'mindless' (ἀνοήτου).

242 Hoffmann: 'conjecturing of wealth' (which he stretches to mean *opum procurationem comptus*) citing Ad.: 'thoughtful' (φροντιστοῦ).

243 Hoffmann: 'the other sides' (*ceteras partes*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'in whichever other direction a neck is turned' (εἰς ὁπότερον δὲ ἂν ᾖ μέρος ἄλλο κεκλιμένος).

244 Hoffmann: 'a sign of madness and unsoundness' (*signo insaniae et mentis alienatae*) citing Ad.: 'damaged mind' (βεβλάφθαι τὰς φρένας).

245 Hoffmann: 'the rest of' (*ceteris*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

246 Hoffmann: 'lack of gravity' (*parum gravitatis*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'light-minded' (κουφονόου). BH and Ad. are quite close here (Zonta 1992: 42), but Leiden is missing some elements, but also has a number of additional elements (e.g. the 'eye covetous of everything', and expands 'drunk' to 'a lover of intoxication to the greatest possible degree when he drinks').

يدخلون في الشر[247] ويدل ايضا على الجراه والقتل وقصر الدقن وتدويره يدل على الضعف والتخنيث واذا رايت الدقن ذا اربع حروف فاقض على صاحبها بالجرأة" والشدة واذا رايت راس الدقن طويلا منفصلا" كانه ذو راسين فلا يعجبك ذلك فان ذلك يدل على المكر والدغل فان لم ينفصل راسه (راسها)! جدًا وكان فيه (فيها)! بعض الاتصال فان ذلك علامة كثرة شهوة النكاح

الباب الخامس والعشرون

***(أ33)* في فراسه الفم والشفتين" وعلاماتها**

B24 دقه[248] الشفتين مع رحب" الفم والشفه العليا واقعه على السفلى [لا][249] علامة سوء فانها تشبه فم الأسد وانت واجد صاحب هذه الصفه شديدًا جريًا فخورًا• متعظمًا واضف اليه ساير ما يضاف الى الأسد من جميع اخلاقه ورقه الشفتين في الفم الصغير" أيه الجبن والضعف والدغل وانا أمدح الفم اذا لم يكن متعاليًا جدًا ولا متسافلا فاما المتعالي فانه يدل على قله العلم وكثره الكلام والشده والمتسافل يدل على الضعف والتواضع وانا امدح المتوسط بين هاتين الحالتين والفم الصغير" شبه افواه النسا ورحب الفم وغلظ الشفه يدل على رغبه البطن و كثره الاكل وهم مع ذلك ظلوم شديد التاني[250] فان هذا يشبه افواه التماسيح البحريه واذا رأيت الفم والاسنان كان بهما شخوصًا فهذا يشبه افواه الكلاب وهو [من][251] آيات السفل ومن يحب الخصومه والغضب[252] واذا كان في الفك وفي الشفتين الغلظ" والتشنج" فاقض عليه بالخب وسوء الخلق *(ب33)* ودناه النفس فان هذا من شبه الخنازير واذا ركبت الشفه العليا على

[247] م. يدخلون في السر.

[248] م. رقه.

[249] هذه الكلمة التي بشرحها هوقفتان غير موجودة في ل.

[250] م. البغي؟

[251] هذه الكلمة التي بشرحها هوقفتان غير موجودة في ل.

[252] م. و الغضب.

their owners entering into evil,[247] and it also indicates boldness and killing. Shortness and roundness of the chin indicates weakness and effeminacy. If you see that the chin has four edges, judge for their owner boldness and strength. If you see that the beginning of the chin is long and separated, as if it had two heads, this should not please you, for it indicates cunning and complicity. If its beginning is not separated very much, and there is some joining, that is a sign of much desire for sexual intercourse.

THE TWENTY-FIFTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE MOUTH AND LIPS AND THEIR SIGNS

B24 (TK 3207, fos. 56^b5–57^a11; TK 3245, fos. 41^b8–$42A^b8$; cf. Dim. 27^b–28^b/30–1)

[33^a] Thinness[248] of the lips together with largeness of the mouth and the upper lip resting on the lower is [not][249] a sign of bad, for it is similar to the mouth of the lion. You find the owner of this description is strong, bold, boastful, and proud. And ascribe to him all the other traits that are ascribed to the lion. Slimness of the lips in the small mouth is a sign of cowardice, weakness, and complicity. I praise the mouth that is not very turned upwards and not drooping. As for the upturned mouth, it indicates lack of knowledge, talkativeness, and strength. The drooping mouth indicates weakness and humility. I praise what is in the middle of these two conditions. The small mouth is similar to the mouth of women. Largeness of the mouth and thickness of the lip indicates desires of the stomach and much eating, and in addition he is tyrannical and very patient,[250] for this one is similar to the mouths of water crocodiles. If you see the mouth and teeth project, this is similar to the mouths of dogs; it is [one of][251] the signs of baseness, and of someone who loves enmity and anger.[252] If in the jaw and in the lips there is thickness and shrivelling, judge for him deceit, a bad disposition, [33^b] and baseness of soul. This is something of the likeness of a pig. If the upper lip rides on the lower lip, judge for its owner

[247] Hoffmann: 'entering circumspectly in secrecy' (*clam insidiantes*) citing Ad.: 'treacherous' (ἐπίβουλοι).

[248] Hoffmann: 'slimness', saying that Leiden uses 'slimness' two sentences on, though *d* and *r* are so similarly written in Arabic that it is difficult to be sure whether *diqqa* (fine, thin, fragile, puny) or *riqqa* (fine, delicate, slim, slender) is meant. Ad. has 'thin' (λεπτά) both times.

[249] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann because one expects a positive statement given the comparison with the lion.

[250] Hoffmann suggests 'very outrageous' (*impius*) citing Ad.: 'unholy' (ἀνόσιον).

[251] Not present in Leiden; I add it to complete the sense and make the sentence correct Arabic. Hoffmann solves this by making Leiden's singular subject plural ('they are the signs. . .'), referring back to 'the mouths of dogs'.

[252] Hoffmann: 'reviling' (*convicia*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'abusive bawlers' (κρᾶκται ἐπεσβόλοι).

الشفه السفلى فاقض على صاحبها بكثره الفكر وان كانت الشفه السفلى هي الشاخصه فاقض عليها باللين (بالين)!![253] وحب السلامة فاما الأفواه الصغار الشاخصه فانها تدل على الأمور الرديه والشر ومن يحب القتل وكذلك لا أحمد الفم الغاير الذي كانه في انحطاط فهو ردي يدل على الشره[254] وسفك الدماً وشهوة النكاح وانا أمدح المعتدل

الباب السادس والعشرون
في فراسه الانف وعلاماته

B25 دقه أرنبه الانف تدل على شدة الغضب وتطاطا الأرنبه وغلظها يدل على الاستهزاً من صاحبها والانف الغليظ الطويل المدور القوي يدل على القوة والشدة وكبر الهمة وهي من اخلاق الكلاب والقردة[255] والانف اذا كان طويّلا دقيقا فهو من صفات الطير فاضف اليه ساير اخلاقها واذا رايت الانف مستويًا معتدلا مع الجبهه *(34أ)* فامدح صاحبه واقض عليه بالقوه وجوده الفكر والعلم وخلاف هذا الانف وهو يشبه اناف النساً وبذلك اقض عليه بقله المعرفه والعلم ولا تمدح الانف القصير الصغير فانه يدل على السرقه والانفس الدنيه والانف المعوج يدل على كثره الفكر والانف الذي به انتشار[256] وفطس يدل على الزنا وحب النكاح واقض على استداره الانف وسعه انفتاحه بالبله وشدة الانف يدل على الشده والفكر

الباب السابع والعشرون
في فراسه الجبهه وما بين العينين وعلاماتها

B26 ضيق الجبهه يدل على قله الفهم ولست أحمد الجبهه العريضه فان أهلها

[253] م. بالين.

[254] م. الحسد.

[255] م. الاسود؟

[256] م. انتسار أو احتسار.

much thought. If the lower lip is the one that is protruding, judge for him tenderness[253] and love of well-being. As for small, projecting mouths, they indicate wicked things, evil, and someone who loves killing. Likewise I do not praise the hollow mouth, which is as though in a depression. It is wicked and indicates greed,[254] bloodshed, and the desire for sexual intercourse. I myself praise the evenly proportioned mouth.

THE TWENTY-SIXTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE NOSE AND ITS SIGNS

B25 (TK 3207, fo. $56^{a}8$–$^{b}4$; TK 3245, fo. $41^{a}7$–$^{b}7$; cf. Dim. 26^{b}–27^{b}/28–30)

Thinness of the tip of the nose indicates great anger, and lowering of the tip of the nose and thickness of it indicates mockery in its owner. The thick, long, round, strong nose indicates power, strength, and great zeal, and this is the character of dogs and monkeys.[255] If the nose is long and thin, these pertain to the attributes of birds, so attribute to him the rest of their character. If you see the nose is straight and central with the forehead, [34^{a}] praise its owner, and judge for him power, good thinking, and knowledge. The opposite of this nose is similar to the noses of women, and by reason of that judge for it lack of experience and knowledge. You should not praise the short and small nose, for it indicates stealing and a base soul. The curved nose indicates much thinking. The nose in which there is spreading[256] and flattening indicates fornication and love of sexual intercourse. Judge for the roundness of a nose and extensiveness of its opening stupidity. Strength of the nose indicates strength of thought.

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE FOREHEAD AND WHAT IS BETWEEN THE EYES AND THEIR SIGNS

B26 (TK 3207, fo. $57^{a}12$–$^{b}14$; TK 3245, fo. $42B^{a}1$–$^{b}6$; cf. Dim. 25^{a}–26^{a}/27–8)

Narrowness of the forehead indicates lack of understanding. I do not praise the broad forehead, for its people are foolish and clumsy. Length of the forehead

[253] Hoffmann: 'piety' (*pietatem*) citing Ad.: 'simple character' (ἄκακα τὰ ἤθη).
[254] Hoffmann: 'envy' (*invidiae*) citing Ad.: 'envious' (φθονερῶν).
[255] Hoffmann suggests 'lions' (*leonum*) citing Ad.: 'lion' (λέοντα).
[256] Hoffmann wants to read 'becoming like a vulture' (*vulturinus*) and to posit a lacuna after this word, because he links this sentence with Ad.: 'great-mindedness is shown by hooked noses (γρυποῖς) and lasciviousness by snub noses (σιμοῖς)'. However, it is probably easier to look for 'hooked noses' in the 'curved nose' of the previous sentence, which is otherwise not represented in Ad. and which is a better translation of γρυποῖς than 'becoming like a vulture'.

بله ثقال وطول الجبهه يدل [على][257] كثرة العلم والحركه ولا أحمد مع ذلك قصر الجبهه فانه آيه الضعف ولا اشراف الجبهه وتدويرها فانه يدل على قله الحياً وقصر الهمه والجبهه الخشنه" الصلبه التي ليس فيها موضع يشرف على موضع وليس بالمستويه فانها آيه الخب والمكر وقله الدين وربما كان
(ب34) بصاحبها" بله وحمق ولكني أمدح الجبهه المعتدله الموافقه لوجه صاحبها وهي الذي* اذا قيست اليه لم تكبر ولم تصغر وذات الحروف الاربع فاني أمدحها فانك واجد صاحبها عاقلا فطنًا جيد الفكر شديد° كبير الهمه رحب الذراع ومن ترى [ما][258] بين حاجبيه غير مستو (مستوي)! فاقض عليه بقله الفكر والعقل ومن كان [ما] بين حاجبيه ممتد° فاقض عليه بالبطاله وكثره لحم الجبهه مع شخوصها قليلا تدل على الفكر والراى ومن له عنايه بالامور

الباب الثامن والعشرون
في فراسه الوجه والخدين وعلاماته

B27 اذا كثر لحم الخدين فانه يدل على السكر والكسل واذا دقت الخدين¹ فاقض عليها بالخب ورداه العقل ومن عظمت تفاحه خديه فاقض عليه بالحسد والقحه وخاصه اذا وجدت عيونه (عيونهم)![259] والخدود المدوره فاقض عليهم* بالمكر مع الجبن والخدود المتطاوله فاقض عليها بكثرة الكلام فيما لا ينتفع به والقحه

B28 واذا كثر لحم الوجه فانه يدل ً على انه يفعل افعال النسا[260] *(35أ)* ويحب الراحه والذي" يحمر[261] وجهه (وجه)!! قليلا فانه يدل على الحرص[262] والمواظبه والخيانه واقض على الوجه الصغير بالأمور الصغار واقض على الوجه الكبير بسرعه الحركه وقله التعليم[263] واذا رايت تشنج" الشفتين وما (ما)!! بين العينين والخدين في الوجه المملح (مملح)!![264] فاقض عليهم بالحمق

[257] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[258] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل كما أنها غير موجودة في الجملة التالية.

[259] د. بعدت عن عيونها.

[260] د. النسا.

[261] د. يتحف.

[262] د. الحرص.

[263] د. بعسرة الحركة وقلة التعلم.

[264] د. الكالح او القبيح.

points [to][257] much knowledge and movement. Moreover I do not praise shortness of the forehead, for it is a sign of weakness, nor (do I praise) protuberance of the forehead and roundness of it, for it indicates lack of modesty and limited ambition. Nor (do I praise) the rough and solid forehead, of which no part is raised above another and which is not straight, for it is is a sign of deceit, cunning, and lack of religion, and often there is [34^b] in its owner folly and stupidity. However, I do praise the evenly proportioned forehead, which is in harmony with the face of its owner. It is this one which, if measured against the face, is neither large nor small, and it has four sides. I praise it, for you will find that its owner is intelligent, understanding, good at thinking, strong, of great ambition, with extensive capabilities. As for the one in whom you see that [what is][258] between his eyebrows is not straight, judge for him lack of thinking and intellect. Regarding the one in whom [what is] between his eyebrows is extensive, judge for him idleness. Much flesh of the forehead, together with its slight protuberance, indicates thought, reasoning, and someone who is concerned about affairs.

THE TWENTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE FACE AND CHEEKS AND THEIR SIGNS

B27 (TK 3207, fos. 57^b14–58^a8; TK 3245, fos. $42B^b7$–43^a3; cf. Dim. 29^b–30^b/32)

If there is much flesh on the cheeks, it indicates drunkenness and laziness. If the cheeks are thin, judge for them deceit and wickedness of intellect. Regarding the one whose cheek apples are large, judge for him envy and impudence, especially if his eyes are agitated.[259] Regarding rounded cheeks, judge for them cunning and cowardice. Regarding long cheeks, judge for them talkativeness about inanities and impudence. *B28* If there is much flesh on the face, it indicates that he does the deeds of women[260] [35^a] and loves rest. Regarding whoever has a face that is a little red,[261] it indicates desirousness,[262] perseverance, and treachery. Judge for the small face small matters. Judge for the big face quickness of movement and lack of education.[263] If you see twitching of the lips and of what is between the eyes and the cheeks on the pretty[264] face, judge for the

[257] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann because it is required by this verb before an object.

[258] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense, as also in the next sentence.

[259] Hoffmann: 'they (the cheeks) are far from their (feminine pronoun!) eyes' (*distent*) citing Ad.: 'those whose cheek bones are thick and set apart (διεστήκασι) from the eyes'.

[260] Hoffmann: 'of youth' (*adulescentium*) citing Ad.: 'young man' (ἡβῶντος ἀνδρός).

[261] Hoffmann: 'emaciated' (*macrescit*) citing Ad.: 'unfleshy' (ἄσαρκον).

[262] Hoffmann: 'conjecturing' (*providentiam*) citing Ad.: 'worried' (φροντιστοῦ).

[263] Hoffmann: 'difficulty of (mental) activity and lack of learning' oddly citing Ad.: 'madness or stupidity (μωρίαν)', which clearly corresponds to the next sentence. Partly on the basis of Hoffmann Foerster read 'sluggishness' for Ad.'s 'stupidity' (cf. Ch. 10, trans. n. 97).

[264] Hoffmann suggests 'gloomy' or 'ugly' (*truci sive deformi*) citing Ad.: 'sullen' (στυγνοῖς).

والبله والجنون واذا كانت هذه الأيات في الوجه الحسن الفرح فاقض عليه بالزنا وشده الشهوة

الباب التاسع والعشرون

في فراسه الاذنين و علاماتها

B29 كبر الاذنين يدل على قله المبالاه في الأمور وصغر الاذنين يدل على الخوونه والافعال الرديه الخفية واذا كانت في غايه الصغر كانها مقطوعتان فانها تدل على البله والحمق والأذن المعتدله في شكل التربيع فانها تدل على كثره التيقظ في الامور والقوة واذا رايت الاذنين كان لها جناحين[1] فانها تدل على العلم والفهم واذا عدمت هذه الصفه فاقض عليهم بالحسد وكثره الشر واستعماله

(*35ب*) الباب الثلثون

في فراسه الراس وعلاماته

B30 صغر الراس جدًا يدل على قله الفهم والعلم وعظم الراس دليل على علو الهمه والفهم والفطنه واذا رايت الراس حسن القدر بين الصغير والكبير فاقض عليه بالعقل والفطنه والفهم والعلم والحلم[265] وعظم الراس جدًا يدل على قله العلم والمعرفه وقله المبالاه والراس المعوج يدل على قله الحيأ والتخالع واذا رايت في الراس موضع[266]o كانه غاير فاقض عليه بانه اذا هم بالشي فعله بلا

[265] يمكن الصواب: قلة\عدم الحلم.

[266] م. موضع القفا.

owners stupidity, folly, and insanity; if these signs occur on a beautiful and happy face, judge fornication and much desire.

THE TWENTY-NINTH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE EARS AND THEIR SIGNS

B29 (TK 3207, fos. $55^{b}4$–$56^{a}8$; TK 3245, fos. $40^{a}8$–$41^{a}6$; cf. Dim. $26^{ab}/28$)

Largeness of the ears indicates indifference towards things. Smallness of the ears indicates treachery, and wicked and hidden desires. If they are extremely small, as if pared, they indicate folly and stupidity. The evenly proportioned ear, having the form of a square, indicates alertness in things and power. If you see that the ears have flaps, this indicates knowledge and understanding. If they are without this attribute, judge for them envy, much evil, and the practice of it [35^{b}].

THE THIRTIETH CHAPTER: ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE HEAD AND ITS SIGNS

B30 (TK 3207, fos. $58^{b}5$–$59^{a}2$; TK 3245, fos. $43^{b}5$–$44^{a}7$; cf. Dim. 18^{b}–$19^{b}/20$)

A very small head indicates lack of understanding and knowledge. Largeness of the head is an indication of high ambition, understanding, and intelligence. If you see that the head is finely proportioned, between small and large, judge intellect, intelligence, understanding, knowledge, and clemency.[265] A very large head indicates lack of knowledge and understanding, and indifference. The crooked head indicates lack of modesty and dissolution of covenants. If you see on the head a place[266] that is as though hollow, judge for its owner the fact that, if he intends something, he does it, without consideration or thought. If you see

[265] Perhaps read 'lack of clemency' to conform to Ad.: 'unmanly and very mean'. BH is very close to Ad. here (Zonta 1992: 39–40), and if it is translating PG rather than Ad., then we must conclude that PA (assuming Leiden is a good witness to it) often expands PG considerably (even with my emendation Leiden has three words for Ad.'s 'perceptive'). In the previous sentence Ad. begins 'the (head) larger than proportional'; BH has 'the one whose head is proportional and inclining a little towards largeness'; though one cannot be sure, the Arabic seems more likely to derive from the Greek here.

[266] Hoffmann: 'the place of the nape' (*occipitis locum*) citing Ad.: 'those with a flat back (τὰ ὄπισθεν) to their head'.

رويه ولا فكر واذا رايت جانب الراس كان فيه شخوصًا! فاقض عليه بالخنا[267] والمكر واذا رايت فيه خطوطًا[268] وفي وسطه انبطاحًا والقمحدوه˝ متسعه وافيه وكان الراس مستويًا فلا تدع شيًا من المجد الا الزمته أهل هذا النعت

الباب الحادي والثلثون
في ذكر امم العالم
B31 فاقول في الالوان والشعر ولونه وذكر المشيه وان ليس من *(36أ)* ذلك شيًا الا ولك فيه شان وبيان ولهذا العلم علامه وغايه ولست تقضي بهذه˝ العلامات على أحد من العالم والامم الا أصبت فيه قضاك وانك تجد العلامه من الاعلام المفسده وقد بدت من الامم فأفسدت عليهم والعلامه (العلامه)!! الصالحه وقد عمت غيرهم فاصلحتهم فانك لا تكاد تجد لاهل مصر فضل علم وفطنه واما اهل ماقدونيه فان الفطنه فاشيه فيهم والسلامه والانبساط تجده في اهل فونيقي وقليقيه وتجد اهل اسقوثيا[269] اهل غدر وفجور وبعض ما ذكرنا من بعض وانت عالم نعت الامم والوانهم (اللوانهم)! واشعارهم

الباب الثاني والثلثون
في ذكر هينه أهل الشمال
اعلم ان سكان جانب الشمال طوال بيض حمر الشعور زرق العيون خشنى المجسه غلاظ˝ العراقيب عبلى الاجسام حسان الشحم رخصى اللحوم عظام

[267] د. بالخب؟
[268] د. خطوطًا.
[269] ل. فونيمي وقلقيه.... اسقوتيا.

that the side of the head has some prominence, judge for its owner abusiveness[267] and cunning. If you see in the head a depression,[268] and in its centre a level patch, and the back of the head ample and full, and the head is upright, do not exclude it from glory, but rather associate it with the people of this description.

THE THIRTY-FIRST CHAPTER: REGARDING THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD

B31 (TK 3207, fo. 71ª1–12; cf. TK 3245, fos. 63ᵇ5–64ª6; cf. Dim. 10ᵇ–12ª/11–13)

I will talk concerning colours, hair and its colour, and the subject of the gait. [36ª] All of this is of importance to you and a clarification for you. This science has a sign and an aim, and you will only be able to pass judgement by these signs on someone of the world and its peoples if you made a correct judgement of him. You will come across the corrupting sign that has appeared among the nations and corrupted them, and (you will come across) the good sign which has become widespread among others and made them good. However, you will hardly find anyone of the people of Egypt who have the virtue of knowledge and intelligence. As for the people of Macedonia, intelligence is widespread among them. You will find wellbeing and enjoyment among the people of Phoenicia and Cilicia. And you will find that the people of Scythia[269] are a treacherous and immoral people. When I have mentioned each part in turn, you will know the description of the nations, their colours, and their hair.

THE THIRTY-SECOND CHAPTER: REGARDING THE FORM OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH

B31 (TK 3207, fo. 71ª12–ᵇ2; TK 3245, fo. 64ª7–9; cf. Dim. 10ᵇ–12ª/11–13)

Know that the inhabitants of the northern parts are tall, white, red-haired, blue-eyed, rough to the touch, with thick ankles, chubby bodies, good fatness, soft

[267] Hoffmann suggests 'deceit' citing Ad.: 'malignant' (πολίγκοτον), though Leiden's 'abusiveness' does not seem inappropriate.

[268] Hoffmann: 'depression' (*depressionem*); but both the TK texts have 'lines' and al-Dimashqi, fo. 19, has 'wrinkled' (*mughaddan*). Ad., who simply has 'a medium-sized head which is slightly flat', is, to judge from Leiden and BH, abridging PG. BH (Zonta 1992: 40) has: 'a head in which there is a crack (*srāyā*) and the middle of it and end of it are lowered, and (the head is) big and upright'. Note that TK is very close to Leiden here.

[269] This and the previous two place-names are suggested by Hoffmann; Leiden has *Qwny'y* and *Fl'qyh*. . . *'sfwny'*.

البطون قليل[270] غضبهم ومناظرتهم (مناظرهم)!! وفيهم الغفله والصدق وسوء التحفظ˝

(ب36) الباب الثالث والثلثون
في ذكر هيئه أهل القبله
اعلم ان سكان جانب الجنوب سود جعدي الشعور دقاق الكعوب كحل العيون سود الشعور قليله لحومهم سمحه افعالهم فيهم الذكا والحفظ والخفه والترف˝ وكثره الفكر والكذب والحرص والسرقه وكما ان الشمال نقيض الجنوب فكذلك القضا على اهلها بنقيض (بنقايض)! القضايا على اهل الجنوب وما كان متوسّطا بين الحالتين فاقض عليهم بمثل ذلك

الباب الرابع والثلثون
في ذكر هيه اهل الشرق والغرب
ثم اقض (اقضي)! على اهل جانب الصبا واهل جانب الدبور بوسط من القضايين الذي* قضيت على اهل الشمال واهل الجنوب وفي اهل المغرب مع ذلك اختلافا! شديدًا! فيما بينهم فاما سكان سواحل البحر فانهم مخالفون في الهيئه والشكل لأهل ضواحيها فانك تجد فيمن كان منهم قريبًا من البحر شبه اهل الجنوب *(أ37)* وتجد فيمن سكن الضواحي منهم شبه أهل الشمال وأرض اهل الهند غير بعيده الشقه من اهل الجنوب لقربهم من البحر ولما انتجز في ارضهم من شبه أهل الشمال فلذلك (فذلك)!! حسنت اجسادهم ووجوههم (وجوهم)!! واعتدلت قاماتهم وكذلك من كان محلته بين الشمال والجنوب من اهل نوسا[271] وهم أعدل مزاج° واحسن عقولا ووجوهًا فاما الخالص من الكل فهو المعتدل في كل خلقه

[270] م. عجلى.
[271] بونا؟

flesh, large bellies, and they are lacking[270] in anger and investigation. They have forgetfulness, sincerity, and bad memory [36^b].

THE THIRTY-THIRD CHAPTER: REGARDING THE FORM OF THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH

B31 (TK 3207, fo. 71^b2–5; cf. Dim. 10^b–12^a/11–13)

Know that the inhabitants of the southern parts are black, curly-haired, with thin heels, dusky eyes, black hair, and little flesh. They are tolerant in their actions and have cleverness, memory, lightness, opulence, much thought, lying, desire, and stealing. Just as the north is the opposite of the south, likewise the judgement of its people is contrary to the judgements of the people of the south. Regarding whoever is in the middle of the two conditions, judge for them accordingly.

THE THIRTY-FOURTH CHAPTER: REGARDING THE FORM OF THE PEOPLE OF THE EAST AND THE WEST

B31 (TK 3207, fos. 71^b6–72^a7; cf. Dim. 10^b–12^a/11–13)

Then judge for the people of the easterly parts and the people of the westerly parts by what is in the middle of what you judged about the people of the north and the people of the south. Concerning the people of the west there is also a great difference among themselves. As for the inhabitants of the coasts of the sea, they are different in structure and shape from the people of its hinterland. For you find, regarding those of them near the sea, a similarity with the people of the south, [37^a] and you find in those who dwell in its hinterland a similarity to the people of the north. The people of the land of India are not very different from the people of the south because of their closeness to the sea and because of the similarity of the produce of their land to that of the people of the north. For this reason their bodies and faces are beautiful, and their figure is evenly proportioned. It is like this with whoever resides between the north and the south among the people of *Nws'*,[271] who are very moderate in temperament, with very fine intellects and faces. As for the purest of all, it is the one who is evenly proportioned in all his external form.

[270] Hoffmann: 'hasty' (*praecipiti*) citing Ad.: 'spirited (θυμοειδεῖς) ... hot-tempered (θερμόβουλοι)'.

[271] Probably Ionia; see the discussion in Ch. 3, p. 200. Hoffmann guesses Libyans or Iberians.

الباب الخامس و الثلثون

في ذكر اليونانيين والجنس الخالص منهم

B32 وساذكر صور اليونانيين" اذا كانت صورهم خالصه ولم يخالطها شي من الأجناس فانهم قوم مشاركون في ارضهم قد كثر غيرهم فيهم لرغبه الناس فيهم وفي ارضهم اما لرفاهيه عيشهم واعتدال مزاجهم وهواهم واما لرغبه (الرغبه)! في علمهم وحسن سيرتهم وسنتهم وهم اهل ارغوس وقرنتوس[272] وغيرهم من بلدانهم فاما اليوناني (اليونان)!! الخالص فمعتدل القامه بين الطويل والقصير والعريض والضعيف[273] منتصب القامه حسن الوجه *(ب37)* والمنظر أبيض اللون مشرب بحمره معتدل اللحم معتدل الكفين والمرفقين متيقظ سريع التعليم[274] غير صغير الراس ولا عظيمه في رقبته غلظ وشده وشعره لين أحمر فيه جعوده وفيه رجل من سبوطه وفي وجهه تربيع وفي شفته رقه وانفه مسنون[275] معتدل وفي عينيه رطوبه وشهوله كثير الحركه فيها ضياً كثيراً! وهذا النعت اليوناني الخالص.

الباب السادس والثلثون

في ذكر لون الجسد كله

B33 اللون الأسود دليل على الجبن وطول الهم والكابه وكذلك اهل الجنوب وهم الحبشه والزنج واهل مصر وما قرب منهم واللون الحسن الأبيض الذي يضرب الى حمره يدل على الجرأه" وشده الغضب والبياض البياض البارع يدل على الضعف وحمرة الوجه وحمره البدن يدل على المكر وكثره الفكر واللون الذي يخالطه بعض الصفره دليل على سوء الهمه والفزع والجبن الا ان تكون الصفره من مرض واذا رايت الصفره *(38أ)* تضرب" الى سواد من غير مرض فانه يدل على الجبن والنهم وقله[276] الكلام والغضب وطول اللسان والذي فيه

[272] ل. ارموس و قريوس.

[273] م. و الضيق.

[274] م. سريع التقليب؟

[275] م. مستوى.

[276] م. كثره.

THE THIRTY-FIFTH CHAPTER: REGARDING THE GREEKS AND THE PURE RACE AMONG THEM

B32 (TK 3207, fo. $72^{a}8$–$^{b}2$; TK 3245, fo. $64^{b}1$–7; cf. Dim. 10^{b}–12^{a}/11–13)

I will mention the forms of the Greeks whose forms are pure and nothing from the other races is mixed with them. They are a people who share in their land. Others have become numerous among them, because people want them and their land, either for the pleasantness of their life and their moderate temperament and passion, or out of a desire for their knowledge, their good way of life and their laws. They are the people of Argos, Corinth,[272] and other lands of theirs.

The pure Greek is of medium stature, between tall and short, broad and weak.[273] He is of erect posture, beautiful in face [37^{b}] and appearance, white in colour, mixed with red, medium in flesh, with medium palms and elbows, alert, quick to learn,[274] neither small nor large of head, in his neck thickness and strength. His hair is soft and red, with some curliness and some waviness on account of its lankness. In his face there is squareness, in his lip slimness, and his nose is pointed[275] and evenly proportioned. His eyes are moist, bluish-black, very mobile, and very luminous. This is the description of the pure Greek.

THE THIRTY-SIXTH CHAPTER: REGARDING THE COLOUR OF THE WHOLE BODY

B33 (TK 3207, fo. $65^{a}9$–$^{b}1$; TK 3245, fos. $53^{b}6$–$54^{a}6$; cf. Dim. 13^{a}–^{15a}/13–16)

The colour black is an indication of cowardice, long-lasting ambition, and dejection. Such are the people of the south, the Ethiopians and the Zanj, the people of Egypt, and what is near them. The beautiful white colour that turns towards red indicates boldness and great anger. Whiteness of surpassing whiteness indicates weakness. Redness of the face and redness of the body indicate cunning and much thought. The colour in which some yellow is mixed is an indication of bad intent, fear, and cowardice, except when the yellow is from an illness. If you see that the yellow [38^{a}] turns towards black, without illness, it is an indication of cowardice, gluttony, little[276] speech, anger, and

[272] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has *'rmws* and *Qrybws*.

[273] Hoffmann: 'narrow' (*angustam*); one expects an opposite to 'broad', so Hoffmann's emendation to 'narrow' is plausible.

[274] Hoffmann suggests 'quick to turn around' (*celeriter vertens*), wondering if it corresponds to Ad.'s περιαγῆ, 'a round head of medium size'.

[275] Hoffmann: 'straight' (*rectus*) citing Ad.: 'a straight (ὀρθήν) nose'.

[276] Hoffmann: 'much' (*multitudinem*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'loquacious' (λάλον).

حمرة قليله تدل على قله[277] الفهم والعلم

الباب السابع والثلثون
في لون الصدر وعلاماته

B34 الصدر الأحمر يدل على كثره الغضب والعروق الذي* تظهر في الرقبه والصدغين تدل على شده الغضب وشده حمرة الوجه تدل على قله الحياً

الباب الثامن والثلثون
في لون الوجه وعلاماته

B35 اذا احمر لون الوجه دون ساير الجسد فاقض على صاحبه بقله[278] الحيا واذا احمر الخدان فقط دلت على حب السكر والشره[279]

الباب التاسع و الثلثون
في لون الحدقه وعلاماتها

B36 العين اذا احمرت قليل° مع يبس دل على شدة الغضب فان كان مع *(38ب)* حمرتها رطوبه دلت على السكر وحب الشراب والزرقه في العين تدل على قله الادب وشده الخلق واذا كانت كحلاً دلت على لين الاخلاق واما عيون الحيوان البرى الصعب[280] فان عيونه (عيونها)! زرق والحيوان اللين[281] (الين)!! الطيب النفس عيونه كحلاً واما الزرق التي تضرب الى البياض فانها تدل على الجبن˜ والخوف ومن كانت عيناه تشبه لون المراره يكون صعب الأخلاق وحشي° ومن اشبهت عيناه لون الزيت فاقض˜ عليه بشدة القوه والعين

[277] م. كثره.

[278] م. بكثره.

[279] م. والشراب.

[280] م. السبع؟

[281] م. الانس.

prolixity. As for the one who has a little redness, this indicates lack of[277] understanding and knowledge.

THE THIRTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER: ON THE COLOUR OF THE CHEST AND ITS SIGNS

B34 (TK 3207, fo. 65^{b}2–3; TK 3245, fo. 54^{a}6–8; cf. Dim. 13^a–15^a/13–16)

The red chest indicates much anger. Veins that appear on the neck and temples indicate great anger. Great redness of the face indicates lack of modesty.

THE THIRTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER: ON THE COLOUR OF THE FACE AND ITS SIGNS

B35 (TK 3207, fo. 65^{b}3–5; TK 3245, fo. 54^{a}8–9; cf. Dim. 13^a–15^a/13–16)

If the colour of the face is red to the exclusion of the rest of the body, judge for its owner lack of modesty.[278] If only the cheeks are red, it indicates love of drunkenness and of greed.[279]

THE THIRTY-NINTH CHAPTER: ON THE COLOUR OF THE IRIS AND ITS SIGNS

B36

If the eye is a little red and also dry, it indicates great anger. If, together with [38^b] its redness, there is moisture, it indicates drunkenness and love of drinking. Blueness of the eye indicates lack of refinement and strength of disposition. If they are dusky, it indicates soft character. In the case of the eyes of a wild and difficult[280] animal, its eyes are blue, and the soft,[281] good-natured animal has dusky eyes. As for blue that turns towards whiteness, it indicates cowardice and fear. Whoever has eyes similar to the colour of bile has a difficult character and is wild. Whoever has eyes resembling the colour of oil, judge for him great strength.

[277] Hoffmann: 'much' (*multitudinem*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'good at learning' (εὐμαθές).

[278] Hoffmann: 'much modesty' (*multam pudicitiam*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'bashful' (αἰσχυντηλούς).

[279] Hoffmann: 'of wine' (*vini*) citing Ad.: 'drunkards' (οἰνόφλυγας).

[280] Hoffmann suggests 'predatory', though the Arabic word for this (*sabu'*) is generally only used as a noun, not as an adjective; cf. Ad.: 'most of the wild animals (ἀγρίων ζώων) have light blue eyes'.

[281] Hoffmann: 'tame' (*cicuris*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'the tame animals (τὰ ἥμερα) have black eyes'.

السوداً الشديده السواد تدل على الجبن والخيانه فان ضربت الى حمره دلت على القوه وشده النفس والعيون البراقه التي يشبه بريقها لون الرخام فاقض عليها بالزنا وحب الشهوة فلذلك تشبه عيون العنز[282] وما ضرب الى الحمرة فانه يدل على قله الحيأ والقحه لانها تشبه عيون الكلاب وما كان من العيون التي تضرب الى الخضرة وفيها الوان (اللوان)! اخر دلت على الجبن والخوف والعيون الكثيرة اللمع التي تزهو تدل على حب النسأ والجماع فانك تجد مثل هذه العيون للديوك فاحسن تدبيرك *(39أ)* فيما اشرت اليك

الباب الاربعون

في الشعر وعلاماته

B37 اعلم ان جعوده الشعر تدل على الجبن والحرص وانت عارف ذلك من[283] الشعور في الامم والبلدان فالشعر الشاخص المنتصب يدل على قله الفهم والفطنه لكني أمدح الشعر الذي ليس بشاخص كثير° ولا منحنى كثير° وهو لزوم الاعتدال فاما كثره تكاثف الشعر فانه يشبه الحيوان البرى المستوحش واما قله الشعر وتفرقه فانه يدل على الخيانه ورداًة الفعل وانا أمدح الشعر المتوسط بين الأمرين واما الشعر اللين فانه من علامات النسأ فاقض بذلك وكذلك تجد في الطير والدواب ما له شعر لين ولين الجناح فهو يتصرف بين الناس ويانس بهم لسكون غضبه وقله حقده وهو خير من المخالف لهذه الصفه وانا أمدح الشعر المتوسط اللين المجسه بين اللين والخشن

الباب الحادى والأربعون

في اختلاف الشعر وعلاماته

(ب39) وقد اعلمتك ان سواد الشعر دليل المكر والخب[284] فاما الشعر الاحمر

[282] ل. العين.

[283] ل. ل.

[284] م. الغرص.

The black eye, which is very black, indicates cowardice and treachery. If it turns towards red, it indicates power and strength of spirit. Regarding luminous eyes, the luminosity of which is similar to the colour of marble, judge for them fornication and love of desire, and for this reason they are similar to goat's eyes.[282] Regarding that which shades into redness, it indicates lack of modesty and impudence, because it resembles the eyes of dogs. Those eyes that turn towards greenness, in which are other colours, indicate cowardice and fear. Very shiny eyes that gleam indicate love of women and of sexual intercourse. You find such eyes in cockerels. So consider well [39^a] what I have pointed out to you.

THE FORTIETH CHAPTER: ON THE HAIR AND ITS SIGNS

B37 (TK 3207, fo. 64^{a}4–13; TK 3245, fo. 52^{a}1–^{b}1; cf. Dim. 19^b–20^a/20–1)

Know that curliness of the hair indicates cowardice and desire, and you will recognize that type of[283] hair among the nations and lands. Hair that projects and sticks up indicates lack of understanding and intelligence. However, I do praise the hair that is not very projecting and not very bent down, for it adheres to moderation. As for great thickness of the hair, it resembles wild and savage animals. As for lack of hair and its dispersal, it indicates treachery and wickedness of action. I praise hair that is between the two conditions. As for soft hair, it is one of the signs of women, so judge accordingly. You also find in birds and animals those with soft hair and soft wings. Such a one manages people well and is friendly with them because of the quietness of his anger and his lack of spite. He is better than the one who is the opposite of this description. I praise hair that is moderately soft to the touch, between soft and rough.

THE FORTY-FIRST CHAPTER: ON DIVERSITY OF THE HAIR AND ITS SIGNS

B37 (TK 3207, fo. 64^{a}13–^{b}7; TK 3245, fo. 52^{b}1–9; cf. Dim. 19^b–20^a/20–1)

[39^b] I have informed you that blackness of the hair is an indication of cunning and deception.[284] As for red hair that turns towards whiteness, you find this

[282] Leiden has 'the eye', evidently a copyist's slip; read 'goat' with Hoffmann, since the sense requires an animal name; cf. Ad.: 'sparkling eyes ... such is the look of the goat (αἶξ)'. Hoffmann states that in the following sentence 'Regarding that which shades into redness...' the preposition 'into' (*ilā*) is missing in Leiden, but this is not so (see n. 9 above).

[283] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'in', probably a copyist's slip.

[284] Hoffmann: 'desirousness' (*avaritiae*) citing Ad.: 'great craftiness' (πολυκέρδειαν). However, Leiden would seem to offer a much better translation (Lane, s.v. *khibb*: 'deceit... guile, art, craft, or cunning'); it is true that Leiden has *khubb*, but its use of short vowels is rare and erratic, and should clearly be ignored here.

الذي يضرب الى البياض فانك تجد ذلك في الصقالبه والترك فانه يدل على قله الفهم والعلم وسوء السيره فحقق ذلك جدًا واما الشعر الذي يضرب قليًلا الى الصهوبه فاني أمدحه وانعته بالعلم والمعرفه والسكون وكبر النفس[285] وهذا الجنس من الشعر الذي يلايم الناس فاما الشعر الاحمر البشع[286] فاني لا أمدحه ولا أمدح صاحبه وربما رايت من الشعر ما هو اكثر حمرة من هذه فان اخلاقهم تشبه أخلاق الحيوان وفيهم قله [الحيا][287] وحب الطمع

الباب الثاني والأربعون
في كثره[288] شعر العرقوبين وعلاماته
كثره شعر العرقوبين وطوله يشبه البهايم ويدل على قله العلم واخلاق رديه

الباب الثالث والأربعون
في شعر الفخذين والحقوين وعلاماته
شعر الفخذين والحقوين وكثرته دون ساير الجسد يدل على *(أ40)* شده الشهوة للنكاح لما فيه من شبه شعر التيس

الباب الرابع والأربعون
في الشعر في الصدر والبطن وعلاماته
كثره شعر الصدر والبطن يدل على قصر الهمه واختلاط الخلق والفكر فاما كثره شعر الصدر خاصه حتى يغطي الصدر فانه يدل على جدة الفكر وكبر

[285] م. كثره النفس.
[286] م. الشبع.
[287] هذه الكلمة التي يشرحها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.
[288] ل. اين.

among Slavs and Turks. It indicates lack of understanding and knowledge and an evil way of life, so be very sure about this. As for hair that turns a little towards ruddiness, I praise it, and I describe it as characterized by knowledge, experience, quietness, and magnanimity.[285] This kind of hair is one that suits people. As for ugly[286] red hair, I do not praise it, nor do I praise its owner. You will often see hair that is redder than these, and their character resembles that of animals. In them is a lack of [modesty][287] and a love of covetousness.

THE FORTY-SECOND CHAPTER: ON ABUNDANT[288] HAIR OF THE ANKLES AND ITS SIGNS

B37 (TK 3207, fo. $64^{b}7$–8; TK 3245, fos. $52^{b}9$–$53^{a}1$; cf. Dim. 19^{b}–20^{a}/20–1)

Abundant hair of the ankle, and its lengthiness, is similar to beasts, and indicates lack of knowledge and a wicked character.

THE FORTY-THIRD CHAPTER: ON HAIR OF THE THIGHS AND FLANKS AND ITS SIGNS

B37 (TK 3207, fo. $64^{b}9$–10; TK 3245, fo. $53^{a}1$–3; cf. Dim. 19^{b}–20^{a}/20–1)

Hair of the thighs and flanks, and its great quantity, to the exclusion of the rest of the body, indicate [40^{a}] great desire for sexual intercourse, because of the similarity that it bears to the hair of the billygoat.

THE FORTY-FOURTH CHAPTER: ON HAIR ON THE CHEST AND STOMACH AND ITS SIGNS

B37 (TK 3207, fo. $64^{b}10$–12; TK 3245, fo. $53^{a}3$–5; cf. Dim. 19^{b}–20^{a}/20–1)

Much hair on the chest and stomach indicates limited ambition and confusion of disposition and of thought. As for much hair on the chest, especially to the

[285] Hoffmann: 'much skilfullness' (*multam in artibus eruditionem*) citing Ad.: 'skill in art' (εὐτεχνίαν).

[286] Hoffmann: 'satiated' (*saturum*) citing Ad.: 'unmixed' (ἄκρατος).

[287] Not present in Leiden; Hoffmann supplies 'modesty' on the basis of Ad.: 'shameless' (ἀναίσχυντα).

[288] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'softness', but this would seem to be a copyist's slip given the content of the chapter; cf. Ad.: 'very hairy (τετριχωμένα πάνυ θριξί) legs . . .'. See n. 6 above.

النفس

الباب الخامس والأربعون
في الشعر في الكتفين وما بينهما
اذا كثر الشعر في الكتفين وما بينهما فذلك من آيات المكر[289] لان ذلك من علامات الطيور المكره فان مكر هولاً (هولآى)! لا يثبث على حاله واحده

الباب السادس والأربعون
في الشعر في البدن وعلاماته
اذا كثر الشعر في البدن كله وكان متكاثفـº دل على الحمق ورداة العقل

الباب السابع والأربعون
(ب40) في الشعر المتكاثف من الرقبه الى الراس
كثره شعر الرقبه الى الراس اذا كان متكاثفº دل على الشده والقوة وكبر النفس بشبهه بشعر الأسد وهبوط الشعر [الى][290] ما بين العينين من الحاجب[291] يدل على كبر النفس لانه من صفات الفرس واذا انتصب وكان شاخصًا فهو دليل على الجبن وسو الهمه والفكر الردى

[289] م. التكركر.
[290] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.
[291] م. الجبينين من الجبهه.

point that it covers the chest, it indicates seriousness of thought and magnanimity.

THE FORTY-FIFTH CHAPTER: ON HAIR ON THE SHOULDERS AND WHAT IS BETWEEN THEM

B37 (TK 3207, fo. 64^b12; TK 3245, fo. 53^a5–6; cf. Dim. 19^b–20^a/20–1)

If there is much hair on the shoulders and what is between them, that is one of the signs of cunning,[289] for that is one of the signs of cunning birds. The cunning of those is not fixed to any one condition.

THE FORTY-SIXTH CHAPTER: ON HAIR ON THE BODY AND ITS SIGNS

B37 (TK 3207, fo. 64^b13–14; TK 3245, fo. 53^a6–7; cf. Dim. 19^b–20^a/20–1)

If there is much hair on the whole body and it is thick, it indicates stupidity and wickedness of the intellect.

THE FORTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER:[40^B] ON THICK HAIR FROM THE NECK TO THE HEAD

B37 (TK 3207, fos. 64^b14–65^a3; TK 3245, fo. 53^a7–9; cf. Dim. 19^b–20^a/20–1)

Much hair from the neck to the head, if it is thick, indicates strength, power, and magnanimity, because of its similarity with the hair of the lion. Hair falling down [to][290] what is between the eyes from the eyebrow[291] indicates magnanimity, because it is one of the attributes of the horse. If it stands upright and projects, it is an indication of cowardice, bad intent, and wicked thought.

[289] Hoffmann: 'flighty' (*ultro citroque currentis volitantium*), and for the next two occurrences, citing Ad./Anon. Lat. 73: 'flighty and not firm thoughts' (μετάρσια καὶ οὐ σταθερά/*levis et instabilis*).

[290] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense. Hoffmann says that the preposition 'to' (*ilā*) is also missing in the first sentence of this chapter, but this is not so (see n. 9 above).

[291] Hoffmann: 'to the borders of the forehead' (*in locum inter frontis latera*) citing Ad.: 'the middle of the forehead' (τοῦ μετώπου τὸ μέσον).

الباب الثامن والأربعون
في شعر الحاجبين وعلاماته

اذا طال شعر الحاجبين حتى يكاد يمسان الجبينين[292] والصدغين فهو دليل على كثرة الشهوة وطبايع الخنازير واذا كان شعر الحاجب متكاثفا جدًا دل على الغم والحزن وانا أمدح المعتدل في كل الحالات

الباب التاسع و الأربعون
فيما يدل على حركه عضو عضو

B38 فاما قوم فانهم يحتالون" ويتصنعون باشكال ليس في[293] طبيعتهم لكنها[294] أيات التطبع[295] والتكلف وانا ذاكره لك لتعرف *(41أ)* به ذلك اعلم ان ابواب التصنع ثلاثه فمنها اكتسأ شعر لم ينبت وحلق شعر قد نبت وتغطيته ولو تصنع لما سوى ذلك من الشكل الذي يتقرب به الى السلطان ويخالط به الاشراف او(و)!! يتشبه بالنساك وباهل التواضع واهل الفقر[296] او يبدون من انفسهم الحزن او (و)!! الفرح فينزلهم الناس منازل الذين (الذي)!! يشبهونهم• فينالون بذلك حاجتهم ومن ذلك أيات اخر ليس* من التصنع في الخلقه لكنه* تصنع في الدين والسيرة[297] الحسنه التي يدين[298] بها بعض الناس لبعض النسأ ويتحبب بذلك اليهم ومنهم من يطلب بذلك الغلمان ومنهم من شهوته شهوة النسأ مثل المخانيث فانهم يتصنعون للرجال كتصنع النسأ الفواجر فاما الباب الثالث

[292] ل. الحاجبين.
[293] م. ليست من.
[294] ل. ولا لي.
[295] ل. الطبع.
[296] ل. الفخر.
[297] م. الزين والستره.
[298] م. يتزين.

THE FORTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER: ON HAIR OF THE EYEBROWS AND ITS SIGNS

B37 (TK 3207, fo. 65^{a}3–5; TK 3245, fo. 53^{b}1–5; cf. Dim. 19^{b}–20^{a}/20–1)

If the hair of the eyebrows is long, so that it almost touches the borders of the forehead[292] and the temples, that is an indication of much desire and the natures of pigs. If the hair of the eyebrow is very thick, it indicates grief and sadness. I praise what is moderate in all conditions.

THE FORTY-NINTH CHAPTER: ON WHAT MOVEMENT INDICATES, LIMB BY LIMB

B38 (TK 3207, fo. 70^{a}8–^{b}15; TK 3245, fos. 62^{b}4–63^{b}4; cf. Dim. 10^{a}/missing)

People use deception and affect appearances that are not in[293] their natures, but rather they are[294] signs of simulation[295] and adoption. I mention it to you so that you may thereby know [41^{a}] of that. Know that there are three categories of affectation. Among them is putting on hair that has not grown and cutting hair that has grown and covering it. And if a person were thus to affect an alternative appearance, he might approach the ruler with it and mix with notables with it, or he might become like ascetics and humble and poor[296] people, or manifest sadness or joy, so that people gave them the status of those whom they resemble, and thus they might attain their object. There are other signs like these, which are not from affectation of external form, but they are affectation in piety and good conduct,[297] by which some people act piously[298] towards each other and towards women, and become pleasing to them thereby. There are some who seek young boys thus, and others who have the desire that belongs to women, like effeminate people, so that they put on airs for men in the same way as immoral women would do. As for the third category of affectation,

[292] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'the eyebrows', which is clearly a scribal slip.

[293] Hoffmann: 'are not part of', making the verb feminine and changing the preposition in order to conform better to the norms of classical Arabic.

[294] Thus Hoffmann, which makes better sense than Leiden's 'nor in'.

[295] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'nature', but it makes better sense to assume, with Hoffmann, that an initial *ta'* has accidentally been omitted.

[296] Only suggested by Hoffmann, but it certainly makes better sense than Leiden's 'magnificent' and is supported by Ad.: 'thrift and parsimony' (εὐτέλειαν καὶ φειδωλίαν).

[297] Hoffmann: 'adornment and fine dress' (*ornatu et pulcro vestitu*); cf. TK: 'dress and aspect/bearing' (*al-ziyy wa-l-hay'a*). The words for 'religion/piety' and 'dress' are written so similarly in Arabic that Leiden quite likely should be read 'dress' as well. Ad. has the more general expression: 'others of them give themselves airs' (ἁβρύνονται).

[298] Hoffmann: 'adorn themselves'.

من التصنع فليس من باب الخلقه ولا من باب الدين[299] وذلك ان من اهل هذه المنزله من يتكلم بالكلام الصادق ليظن به الصدق[300] او بكلام الشجعان ليظن* به الشجاعه ومنهم من يريد به الحيا ويوضع (ويوضعه)! بصره ويتواضع[301] في كلامه ومنهم من يشتد وفيه لين المجسه ولهم *(ب41)* علامه تدل عليهم وعلى طبايعهم اذا تأملتهم وتفرست فيهم ومن أياتهم اعتدال الجسد وحلاوة المنظر واسترخآ العناق ولين المفاصل وتعرفهم بذلك وبأيات الخلقه وبالأمور[302] اذا وردت عليهم مفاجاه بطل ذلك الشكل منهم وردتهم˜ الى طبايعهم ومن اهل هذه المنزله من غير لونه واحواله بالادويه فاعرف ذلك بايات النظر وحسن التفرس كما[303] ذكرت لك

الباب الخمسون

في علامه المشي والحركه

B39 اعلم ان سعه الخطوة˜ دليل على الوفآ والنصيحه ورحب الذراع وشدة النفس والغضب[304] وهم قوم يصلحون في˜ الكينونه مع الملوك وقصر الخطوة تدل على ان صاحبها لا يكاد يتم عمل° ابتدا به ويدل مع ذلك على غضب وسوء خلق لكنك واجد في من قصر الخطوة الرحمه والرافه[305] والشبه بالسراق في بعض اخلاقهم وطبايعهم واذا رايت الرجل خفيف حركه الأوصال مع استوآ قامته فاقض عليه بجوده[306] الراى والفكر *(أ42)* فان الرجل اذا كان

[299] م. الزين.

[300] م. الصلف.

[301] م. ومنهم من يريد به الخطآ ويوضع في بصره ويوضع في كلامه.

[302] م. و باسباب الخيفه و السرور.

[303] ل. لما.

[304] م. قله الغضب.

[305] م. الرحمه والرقه.

[306] م. بحراره.

it is neither the category of external form nor the category of piety.[299] It is that there are people of this status who speak with the speech of the truthful so that they be thought truthful,[300] or with the speech of the courageous so that they may be thought courageous. Among them are those who aspire thereby to modesty and lower their gaze and are humble in their speech.[301] And among them are those who are strong, and in these is softness of touch. But they have [41ᵇ] a sign that indicates them and their natures when you examine them and practise physiognomical scrutiny of them. One of their signs is even proportion of the body, sweetness of appearance, slackness of the neck, and softness of the joints. You will recognize them by that, and by reasons of external form and circumstances[302] that come upon them suddenly, annulling their (affected) form and returning them to their (true) natures. Among the people of this status is the one who changes his colour and condition through medicaments. So recognize that through the signs of reflection and careful physiognomical scrutiny, just as[303] I have told you.

THE FIFTIETH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF WALKING AND MOVEMENT

B39 (TK 3207, fo. 67ᵃ5–ᵇ14; TK 3245, fos. 56ᵃ9–57ᵇ6)

Know that length of stride is an indication of loyalty, good counsel, extensive ability, strong-mindedness, and anger.[304] They are a people who excel in being with kings. Shortness of step indicates that its owner can hardly complete an action that he has begun, and it also indicates anger and bad disposition. However, you will find in the one who has a short stride compassion and mercy,[305] and similarity to thieves in certain aspects of their character and nature. If you see that the man has light movement of the limbs and upright stature, judge for him excellence[306] of opinion and thought [42ᵃ]; for the man

299 Hoffmann: 'adornment'.

300 Hoffmann: 'disdainful' (*superbi*)—both occurrences; no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

301 Hoffmann: 'among them are those who increase thereby their step and are assertive in their sight and speech' (*sunt quoque qui eo gressum augeant et obtutum intendant et orationem intendant*) citing Ad.: 'they strive to imitate the walk and speech and look of a man' and Anon. Lat. 74.

302 Hoffmann: 'by reasons of fear and happiness' (*metus et gaudii occasionibus*) citing Anon. Lat. 74: 'sudden fear or unexpected joy' (*timor subitus et gaudium improvisum*).

303 Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'on account of/according to what', but most likely the crossbar of the *kāf* has accidentally been left off and one should read, with Hoffmann, 'just as'.

304 Hoffmann: 'lack of anger' (*irae absentiam*), which makes sense given that the description is otherwise positive.

305 Hoffmann: 'curses and spells' (*susurrum et incantamentum*) citing Ad./Anon. Lat. 75: 'make secret plots' (λαθραῖα βουλευόμενοι/*dolorum artifices*).

306 Hoffmann: 'hotness' (*calidum*) citing Ad.: 'hot-tempered' (θερμόβουλον).

يضم شيًا[307] فحركته تشبه ذلك فاذا رأيته يسرع المشي وهو ينظر الى أسفل وقد جمع نفسه وحركته فاقض عليه بالخوف وضيق الذراع وسوء الهمة ولوم الخلق فان جمع الى سرعه المشي خفه حركه العينين واختلاطهما وكثر تحريك الراس وشدة النفس فذلك نعت رجل حديد" عهد بسوء قد عمله وان رأيته يبطى المشيه قصير الخطوة فاقض عليه بحب الانتفاع من ابواب السوء فان عمله عمل سوء وانه من عمله على خوف ووجل وان كان سوسه ثقيل المشي وبطيه[308] فاقض عليه بالبلاده ومشقه التعليم الا ان ترى به من الأيات الحسنه ما يزيل ذلك عنه او بعضه واذا تباطا في مشيته وهو يعرف[309] الطريق الذي يسلك ولا تراه يلتفت يمينًا ولا شمالا وقد عقد رقبته فاقض عليه بالفجور والفحش[310] والسلاطه

B40 وان رأيته مرسًلا يديه ومرخيًا رجليه ومحرًكا كتفيه وكانه منحني قليًلا فاقض عليه بالعظمه والجرأة والشدة فان هذه من نعت الأسد في مشيته وان *(ب42)* رأيته يحرك كتفيه اذا مشى ورايته كثير شعر العنق[311] ورايته منتصب القامه فاقض عليه بالصخب[312] والاقدام اذا هم بشى وقله المؤامره للناس فان ذلك نعت مشي الفرس وان رأيته اذا مشى يحرك جنبيه ويزعزع أوصاله فالحق به الزنا فان هذه مشيه النسا[313] وكذلك ان كان في قامته ميًلا¹ الى الجانب الايمن في حركته فاما من يميل الى ناحيه يساره فاقض عليه بالجهل والحمق فاما من يمشي ويتلوى" (يلتو)!! في مشيه فاقض عليه بحب السعب وكره الكلام[314] فان هذه من أيات الكلب

307 م. يعزم شيًا.

308 ل. و بطوها.

309 يقترح هوفمان أن ليدن أخطأ هنا في معنى النص اليوناني.

310 م. الفجر.

311 م. كثير عقد العنق.

312 م. بالتحم؟

313 م. الخنثى.

314 م. حب الثلث ولذه الكلام؟

who embraces a thing[307] has movement like this. If you see that he has a quick walk, while looking downwards, having combined his breathing and his movement, judge for him fear, limited ability, bad intent, and vile disposition. If he combines quickness of walk with lightness in the movement of the eyes and their confusion, much movement of the head, and strength of breath, that is the description of the man who is keen, and he is aware of an evil that he has done. If you see that he has a slow walk, with short strides, judge for him love of profiting from kinds of wickedness; his work is the doing of evil, and he is in fear and dread because of his action. If his deportment is heavy in gait and slow in it,[308] judge for him stupidity and trouble with learning, except if you see some of the good signs in him, which dispel that from him or a part of it. If he goes slowly in his walk, though he knows[309] the road he is following, and you do not see him turn to the right or the left, and his neck is craning, judge for him immorality, abomination,[310] and sharpness of tongue.

B40 If you see that he throws his hands about, and makes his feet slack, and moves his shoulders as if he is a little bent over, judge for him glory, boldness, and strength, for this is a part of the description of the lion when it walks. If [42^{b}] you see that he moves his shoulders when he walks, and you see that he has a lot of hair on his neck,[311] and you see that he is of upright stature, judge for him clamour,[312] daring whenever he intends something, and a lack of consultation with people, for this is the description of the walk of the horse. If you see that when he walks he moves his sides and shakes his joints, associate him with fornication, for this is the walk of women.[313] It is the same if there is an inclination to the right side in his stature when he moves. As for the one who inclines in the direction of the left, judge for him ignorance and stupidity. As for the one who walks and bends to and fro when he walks, judge for him love of viscosity and hatred of speech,[314] for these are some of the signs

[307] Hoffmann: 'resolves upon a thing' (*aliquid persequitur*) citing Ad.: 'adventurous' (ἐγχειρητήν, δράστην). But note that Foerster inserts 'not' before 'achiever' (Ch. 10, trans. n. 117).

[308] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'slowness of it' and uses the feminine pronoun, most likely a scribal slip.

[309] Hoffmann suggests that this is a mistake for 'stands in' (thus in Ad.), resulting from a confusion of ἐφιστάμενος ('standing in') with ἐπιστάμενος ('knowing'). The sentence is in BH (Furlani 1929: 9), but not this particular phrase. Note that in both Ad. and BH the following part is positive ('looking around'), not negative as in Leiden.

[310] Hoffmann: 'boasting' (*iactationem*) citing Ad.: 'arrogant' (ὑπερήφανον).

[311] Hoffmann: 'he cranes his neck a lot' (*collum crebro erigentem*) citing Ad.: 'with neck held high' (ὑψαυχένων).

[312] Hoffmann suggests 'haughty' (*insolentiam*) citing Ad.: 'aggressive' (ὑβριστήν). However, this latter is the last quality Ad. names and seems covered by 'lack of consultation with people'; the first he names is 'stubborn' (αὐθάδης), which could be rendered by the Arabic word *sa'b*, very little different in letter form from 'clamour' (*sakhab*).

[313] Hoffmann: 'the effeminate' (*androgyni*) citing Ad.: 'androgynous' (ἀνδρόγυνοι).

[314] Hoffmann suggests 'love of blandishment and pleasure in speaking' (*blanditiarum amorem et suavitatem sermonis*) citing Ad.: 'flatterers' (κόλακες). There is obviously a problem with the second word of the phrase in Leiden; possibly the copyist omitted some dots and meant to write *hubb al-sha'b* ('love of people') or, less likely, *shaghab* ('love of discord').

وكذلك[315] يحرك ذنبه ويلينه˜ فاما حركات العينين فقد تقدم ذكرها

الباب الحادي والخمسون
في النفس وعلاماتها

B41 اذا رايت الانسان ساكن النفس لا يكاد يستبين نفسه فاقض عليه بشدة الحزم[316] فان أفرط سكون نفسه حتى كانه مآ راكد لا يتحرك فاعلم انه حزين وان كان قد جمع الى ذلك تحريك رأسه ويتنفس أحيانا الصعدآ فاعلم انه نادم *(43أ)* على فعل قد عمله او الى كلام قد تكلم به ويريد التوبه منه وان استدللت من عينه على مثل هذا فاعلم انه قد هم بشر يعمله وعزم عليه واذا وجدت النفس لينًا طويًلا لا يكاد يسمع فاقض عليه بحسن الهمة واذا رايت النفس شديدًا من غير سعي ولا ربو فاقض عليه بشده الغضب وقله المودة[317] ورداة الفكر وهذر الكلام واذا رايت النفس عاليًا رفيعًا سريعًا فاقض عليه بالجبن˜ وقصر الهمه و[لا][318] تبعده من شبه النسا[319] اذا حققت ذلك بغيره من الأيات

الباب الثاني والخمسون
في الصوت وعلاماته

B42 اذا سمعت الصوت ثقيًلا ضعيفًا فاقض عليه بقصر الهمه وقله الفكر والاثام وسوء الطبع في الغضب ورغبه البطن فاذا رأيت الرجل فاتح° فاه يصيح˜ بصوت مثل صوت التيس[320] فاقض عليه بقصر الهمه والتهاون في الأمور واذا رايته ثقيل الكلام دل على طول الهم والحزن وشده الحرص[321] واذا رأيته *(43ب)* عالي[322] الصوت حديده فاعلم ان له غرورًا[323] فان سمعت

[315] ل. و لذلك.

[316] م. الحرص.

[317] م. الشوره.

[318] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[319] م. الخنثى.

[320] م. الكبش. ل. العيس.

[321] م. الحرص.

[322] م. يابس؟

[323] ل. غورا.

of the dog and like that[315] it moves its tail and makes it pliant. As for the movements of the eyes, they have already been mentioned.

THE FIFTY-FIRST CHAPTER: ON THE BREATH AND ITS SIGNS

B41 (TK 3207, fos. 65^b8–66^a5; TK 3207, fos. 54^b1–55^a3)

If you see that the man breathes calmly, and his breath is hardly apparent, judge for him great prudence.[316] If the calmness of its breath is excessive, so that it is as if it were stagnant, motionless water, know that he is sad. If he combines this with movement of his head, and sometimes he sighs, know that he regrets [43^a] a deed that he has done or words that he has spoken, and that he wishes to atone for it. If you also infer from his eye something like this, know that he has fixed upon an evil that he will do and has resolved to do it. If you find that the breath is gentle and long, and almost inaudible, judge for him good intent. If you see that the breath is heavy, without exertion or asthma, judge for him strong anger, lack of friendship,[317] wickedness of thought, and prattling speech. If you see that the breath is high, thin, and quick, judge for him cowardice and limited ambition, and do [not][318] exclude him from a similarity to women,[319] if that is confirmed by other signs.

THE FIFTY-SECOND CHAPTER: ON THE VOICE AND ITS SIGNS

B42 (TK 3207, fos. 66^a7–67^a4; TK 3245, fos. 55^a4–56^a7; cf. Dim. 36^{ab}/38–9)

If you hear that the voice is heavy and weak, judge limited ambition, lack of thought, sins, a bad nature as regards anger, and desire of the stomach. If you see that the man opens his mouth and shouts with a voice like the voice of a he-goat,[320] judge for him limited ambition and carelessness in affairs. If you see that he is heavy in speech, it indicates long-lasting ambition, sadness, and strong desire.[321] If you see that he has [43^b] a high[322] and sharp voice, know

[315] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'for that reason', but most likely the crossbar of the *kāf* has accidentally been left off and one should read, with Hoffmann, 'like that'.

[316] Hoffmann: 'conjecturing' (*curam*) citing Ad.: 'thoughtful' (φροντιστοῦ).

[317] Hoffmann: 'lack of consultation' (*consilii absentiam*) citing Ad.: 'thoughtless' (ἄβουλοι).

[318] Not present in Leiden; evidently added by Hoffmann to give better sense.

[319] Hoffmann: 'the effeminate' (*androgyni*) citing Ad.: 'androgynous' (ἀνδρόγυνοι).

[320] Hoffmann: 'ram' (*arietis*) citing Ad.: 'more bleating' (βληχωδεστέρα). Leiden actually has 'dates with clarified butter' (*hays*), but this must be a scribal slip for 'he-goat' (*tays*).

[321] Hoffmann: 'conjecturing' (*curam*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[322] Hoffmann suggests 'dry' (*sicca*) citing Ad.: 'to speak with a rough (αὐχμηρόν) [voice]'.

الصوت حديدًا لينا فلا تبعده من التخنث واذا سمعت الصوت غايرًا ثقيلا يتقعقع فاقض عليه بالشدة والجرآه العظيمه والصدق والنصيحه واذا كان الصوت رخوًا ثقيلا فاقض عليه بالضعف واللين وحب التصنع واذا كان الصوت حديدًا ويسرع صاحبه الي الكلام[324] كمثل صوت الطير فاقض عليه بالزنا مع الضعف والانقطاع[325] واذا كان الصوت ضعيفًا ورايت صاحبه مع ضعف صوته يحزن الصوت في المعنى[326] فاقض عليه بحب المنفعه وطول الحزن واذا رأيته اخن كان صوته يخرج من تحت منخريه فاقض عليه بقصد الكذب وكثره الحسد والحرص على مضره الاصحاب وان جمع الى ذلك ضعف الصوت فزد في قضايك عليه بشدة الغضب وحب الخصومه واللجاجه واذا كان الصوت حديدًا ضعيفًا فاقض عليه بالرحمه والحزن[327] وضيق الذراع وثقل الصوت المستعجل يدل على الحمق وقلة الفطنه ومما يتم لك هذا العلم ويصوب قضايك فيه ان *(أ44)* تشبه كل انسان بصوت الدابه الذي* يشبه صوته بصوتها فانك واجد في الناس من يشبه صوته بصوت الكلب أو صوت القرد وتجد اوليك شديد غضبهم لما فيهم من شبه الكلب والقرد ومنهم من يشبه صوته بصوت الحمار والفرس واخرون يشبهون بصوت الدب وبعضهم بصوت الكبش فالزم كل انسان طبيعه الدابه الذي* يشبه˜ صوته بصوتها

الباب الثالث والخمسون
في علامات الرجل القوى الجرى

B44 علامه الرجل القوى الجرى ان تراه معتدل الجسم مستوي القامه وترى

324 م. ويصرع في الكلام.
325 م. والارتفاع؟
326 م. كمثل المغني.
327 م. والحين.

that he has delusions.[323] If you hear that the voice is sharp and soft, do not exclude him from effeminacy. If you hear that the voice is hollow and heavy, and rattles, judge for him strength, great boldness, truth, and good counsel. If the voice is languid and heavy, judge for him weakness, softness, and the love of affectation. If the voice is sharp, and its owner hurries to speak[324] as with the voice of birds, judge for him fornication together with weakness and detachment.[325] If the voice is weak and you see that its owner, together with the weakness of his voice, has a voice that is sad in import,[326] judge for him love of profit and enduring sadness. If you see that he makes nasal noises, as if his voice comes out from below his nostrils, judge for him intent to lie, much envy, and the desire to harm his companions. If he combines with that weakness of the voice, add to your judgement of him great anger, love of disputing, and stubbornness. If the voice is sharp and weak, judge for him mercy, sadness,[327] and limited ability. Heaviness in a quick voice indicates stupidity and lack of intellect. That which perfects this science for you and directs your judgement in this is that [44^a] you should liken every man to the animal voice that resembles his voice. For you will find among people some whose voice resembles the voice of a dog, or the voice of a monkey. You will find these have great anger, because of their similarity to the dog and the monkey. And (you will find) others whose voice resembles the voice of the donkey and the horse, and others whose voice resembles the voice of a bear, and some of them the voice of the ram. So link every person to the nature of the animal whose voice resembles his.

THE FIFTY-THIRD CHAPTER: ON THE SIGNS OF THE STRONG AND BOLD MAN

B44 (TK 3207, fo. 68^{a}5–11; TK 3245, fos. 59^{b}3–60^{a}1; cf. Dim. 38^b–39^a/41)

The sign of the strong and bold man is that you see that he is of evenly proportioned body and upright build, and you see that the heads of his limbs

[323] Thus Hoffmann citing Ad.: 'changeable' (ποικίλος); Leiden has 'a lowest part' (*ghawr*), but this must be a scribal slip.

[324] Hoffmann: 'shouts in speaking' (*in sermone vociferatur*) citing Ad.: 'screech' (κλαγγηδὸν φθεγγόμενοι).

[325] Hoffmann suggests 'elevated' (*elatione*) because Ad. literally has 'thinking flighty thoughts' (μετάρσια νοοῦντες), but the sense is 'airy, empty thoughts'.

[326] Hoffmann: 'like one concerned' (*more sollicìti*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

[327] Hoffmann: 'cowardice' (*timiditatem*) citing Ad.: 'cowardice' (δειλία). Hoffmann also feels the previous word, 'mercy', must be corrupted, as Ad. has 'idleness' (ἀργία).

رؤوس أوصاله واصابعه شديده مستويه وعظامه كبار على الالواح حسن[328] الشعر فظه[329] عريضه˘ غايره عريض الكتفين بعيد ما بين المنكبين عريض الصدر شديده ممسوح[330] الاليتين فيهما يبس شديد الكعبين كبير عظمهما ولحمهما معتدل القدمين وهي مستويه لين النظر خفيف العينين غير عظيمهما ولا صغيرهما ولا مفتوحه فوق *(ب44)* المقدار ولا مغمضه و[لا][331] ممدود الحاجبين ابلج˘ الجبهه جهير الصوت شديد الغضب والحقد فمن كان بهذه الايات فاقض عليه بالجرأة وشدة النفس

الباب الرابع والخمسون

في علامه الرجل الجبان˘ الكسلان

B45 علامة الرجل الجبان هو ان يكون ضيق الذرع ضعيف° لين الشعر[332] خاشع° متواضع° طويل الرقبه أسود اللون واخضره يابس العينين غايرهما صافيهما[333] كثير حركه اشفار عينيه شديد النفس دقيق العرقوبين طويل الظهر عريضه (عريض)!! ضعيف الصدر طويل اليدين ضعيف الصوت دقيقه[334]

الباب الخامس والخمسون

في الرجل المحب للعلم وعلاماته

B46 الرجل المحب للعلم هو ان يكون معتدل القامه مستويها أبيض اللون

[328] م. خشن.

[329] م. بطنه.

[330] م. ممسوح.

[331] هذه الكلمة التي يدرجها هوفمان غير موجودة في ل.

[332] م. وهو ضيق الذرع ضعيفه ان يكون لين الشعر.

[333] م. غير صافيهما.

[334] م. رقيقه.

and fingers are strong and straight. His bones are large, with high surfaces, and beautiful[328] hair that is coarse,[329] broad, and hollow. He has broad shoulders and a large distance between the edges of his shoulders, a broad and strong chest, smooth dry buttocks,[330] strong ankles with large bones and flesh, evenly proportioned feet which are straight, and a soft appearance. He has light eyes, neither large nor small, neither excessively open [44^b] nor closed, and [without][331] extended eyebrows. And he has a clear forehead, a loud voice, vehement anger, and spite. Regarding whoever has these signs, judge for him boldness and strength of spirit.

THE FIFTY-FOURTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE COWARDLY AND LAZY MAN

B45 (TK 3207, fo. 68^a11–15; TK 3245, fo. 60^a1–5; cf. Dim. 39^a/42)

The sign of the cowardly man is that he is of limited ability, weak, soft-haired,[332] submissive, humble, with a long neck, black and green in colour, dry, hollow, and clear eyes,[333] with much movement of the eyelids. And he has heavy breath, thin ankles, a long, broad back, a weak chest, long hands, and a weak and thin[334] voice.

THE FIFTY-FIFTH CHAPTER: ON THE MAN WHO LOVES KNOWLEDGE AND HIS SIGNS

B46 (TK 3207, fo. 72^b2–10; cf. Dim. 36^b–38^a/39–41)

The man who loves knowledge has an evenly proportioned and upright build, a white colour mixed with red, wavy hair turning towards ruddiness, and lank

[328] Hoffmann: 'rough' (*asperum*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'stiff (σκληρά) hair', and perhaps also because it would seem to suit the context better.

[329] Hoffmann: 'His stomach is broad and hollow' (*ventrem eius latum cavum*), which makes better sense and is matched by Ad. ('a broad and hollow belly'), but we must then assume that the final *hā'* on the adjectives 'broad' and 'hollow' is a mistake (Leiden presumably takes it to be a personal pronoun referring to 'hair').

[330] Hoffmann: 'lean (*macris*) dry buttocks', feeling this must somehow be a corruption for Ad.'s 'hard hips' (ἰσχίον σκληρόν).

[331] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to give better sense.

[332] Hoffmann emends to: 'The sign of the cowardly man, who has limited and weak ability, is that he has soft hair. . .', saying this is how ch. 56 begins and presumably also influenced by Ad.: 'The cowardly man is as follows. He has soft hair. . .'.

[333] Hoffmann: 'dry, unclear eyes', presumably because one expects a negative quality (i.e. so not 'clear' eyes) in keeping with the rest of the qualities listed here.

[334] Hoffmann: 'soft/delicate' (*tenui*); no explanation given, but clearly on the basis of Ad.: 'his voice clear and soft (μαλακή)'.

مشرب بحمرة رجل˜ الشعر يضرب الى الصهوبه سبط° لا يكون جعد الشعر ولا شاخصه معتدل القامه ثقيل الالواح *(أ45)* ولا يكون كثير الشعر[335] في الجسد˜ ولا قليله وعراقيه وافخاذه مملوه وساقيه[1] شديده ممتلى العضدين شديدهما (شديده)!! سبط الاليتان[336]° منفرج ما بينهما عظيم الجبهه غير حاد ضعيف الجسم غير عظيمه[337] رطب العينين˜ اشهلهما يخالطهما˜ السرور

الباب السادس والخمسون

في علامات الرجل القصير الهمه

B47 الرجل القصير الهمة القليل المبالاه الذي لا يكاد يهم بشي علامته ان يكون أبيض اللون جدًا أو أسوده (اسود)!! جدًا كثير اللحم على البطن غليظ العرقوبين دقيق الاصابع[338] قصير العنق غليظه كثير لحم الخدين مستدير الوجه[339] خالى النظر من الفطنه وليس بمعتدل النظر أيضا

الباب السابع والخمسون

في الرجل القليل الحيا وعلاماته

B48 علامه الرجل القليل الحيا ان يكون منتفخ˜[340] العينين˜ شديد النظر طويل الاشفار منقلبهما غليظ اليدين والرجلين لا ينظر *(ب45)* أبدا[341] الى خلفه منحنى اليدين والرجلين الى الظهر لونه يشبه لون النار حديد الصوت متقحم الكلام وليس[342] هذا من نعت الرجل الشرير الردي الطبع

[335] ه. الشحم.

[336] ه. البنان.

[337] ه. عظيم الوجه غير حاد ضعيف اللحم غير عظيمه.

[338] ه. الاوصال .

[339] ه. الجبهه؟

[340] ه. منفتح.

[341] ل. ينظر أبدا.

[342] ه. وتين.

hair that is neither curly nor projecting. He is of evenly proportioned build, with heavy surfaces, [45ª] neither much hair[335] on the body nor little. His ankles and thighs are full, and his calves are strong. He is full and strong in the upper arms, shapely in the buttocks[336] and parted widely in between them. He has a large and not a sharp forehead, a weak and large body,[337] and moist eyes that are bluish-black and mixed with happiness.

THE FIFTY-SIXTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGNS OF THE MAN WHO HAS LIMITED AMBITION

B47 (TK 3207, fo. 72ᵇ10–14)

Regarding the man of limited ambition and indifference, who scarcely cares for anything, his sign is that he is very white in colour, or very black, and with much flesh on the stomach. He has thick ankles, thin fingers,[338] a short and thick neck with much flesh on the cheeks, and a round face.[339] His gaze is devoid of intellect and immoderate.

THE FIFTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER: ON THE MAN WITH LITTLE MODESTY AND HIS SIGNS

B48 (TK 3207, fo. 73ᵇ2–7; TK 3245, fo. 58ª5–ᵇ1; cf. Dim. 39ᵇ/missing)

The sign of the man who has little modesty is that he has puffed-up[340] eyes, with strong gaze, long and turned-up eyelids, thick hands and feet, and he never looks[341] [45ᵇ] away. He has bent-back hands and feet and his colour resembles the colour of fire. He has a sharp voice and is precipitate in speech. This does not belong to[342] the description of the evil, bad-natured man.

335 Hoffmann: 'fat' (*pinguedinem*) citing Ad.: 'his flesh is moderate and soft' (σάρξ μετρία ἁπαλή).

336 Hoffmann: 'fingertips' (*digitorum extremitatibus*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'his fingers (δάκτυλοι) soft and long.

337 Hoffmann: 'a large and not sharp face, weak and not large flesh' (*facie magna non acuta tenui carne nec magna*) citing Ad.: 'his face is not very fleshy nor very thin' (πρόσωπα οὐ πάνυ σαρκώδη οὐδὲ μὴν λεπτά).

338 Hoffmann: 'joints' (*articulis*) citing Ad.: 'his joints (ἄρθρα) are small'.

339 Hoffmann suggests 'forehead' citing Ad.: 'his forehead round (μέτωπον στρογγύλον)'.

340 Hoffmann: 'wide-open' (*patentibus*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'his eyes are open (ἀνεπτυγμένοι)'.

341 Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has 'always looks', but this is clearly a scribal slip. The literal meaning is 'he never looks behind him', evidently meaning that he never averts his gaze out of shame; cf. Ad.: 'he looks straight at you' (ἀντίον ὁρῶν).

342 Hoffmann: 'this is clear with regard to' citing Anon. Lat. 94: 'an impudent and harmful man is of this type (*huiusmodi*)'.

الباب الثامن والخمسون

في علامه الرجل المحب للزينه والتصنع

B49 هو ان يكون غليظ الصوت ثقيل° في مشيه متوسط° في حركه اشفار عينيه لا بالمسرع ولا بالثقيل اشهل العينين غير حديد النظر رطب البطن[343] شديد حمرتها

الباب التاسع والخمسون

في علامه الرجل اللبيب الكيس

B50 علامته ان يكون كثير لحم الجبهة كثير لحم الوجه مريد° كانه[344] مستيقظ من نومه رطب العينين مضربهما غير حديد النظر ساكنًا وذريعًا[345]

الباب الستون

في علامه الرجل الكئيب الحزين

B51 *(46أ)* علامته ان تراه متقرف الوجه مجتمع ما بين العينين ضخم[346] الجبهه منقفل[347] الحاجبين خلوس النظر اشفاره مضمومه مروع بالفزع[348]

الباب الحادي والستون

في علامه الرجل المخنث˜ المؤنث

B52 علامه ذلك ان تراه رطب النظر شديد تبريق العينين وتحريكها˜ ضيق[349] الجبهه كثير حركه الحاجبين والخدين مايل˜ العنق كثير حركه الظهر

343 د. البطر .

344 د. مرايه كانه.

345 د. وديعا.

346 د. ضحم.

347 د. منفتل.

348 د. مزعزع كالفزع.

349 د. مفضن؟

THE FIFTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGNS OF THE MAN WHO LOVES ADORNMENT AND AFFECTATION

B49

It is that he has a coarse voice and a heavy stride. He is moderate in the movement of his eyelids, not hurried or heavy, with bluish-black eyes, not sharp-sighted, with a very red, moist stomach.[343]

THE FIFTY-NINTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE SENSIBLE AND ASTUTE MAN

B50 (TK 3207, fo. $73^a13–^b2$; TK 3245, fos. $57^b8–58^a4$; cf. Dim. $36^b–38^a/39–41$)

His sign is that he has much flesh on the forehead and much flesh on the face. He is morose as if[344] he had just woken from his sleep, with moist and luminous eyes, not sharp-sighted, quiet and brisk.[345]

THE SIXTIETH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE DEPRESSED AND SAD MAN

B51

[46^a] His sign is that you see he has a peeling face, bringing together what is between the eyes, with a huge[346] forehead, eyebrows locked together,[347] a furtive gaze, eyelids joined together, and frightened by fear.[348]

THE SIXTY-FIRST CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE EFFEMINATE AND FEMININE MAN

B52 (TK 3207, fo. $73^b7–12$; TK 3245, fo. $58^b1–5$; cf. Dim. 39^a/missing)

The sign of that is that you see him with moist vision, a strong brilliance and movement in the eyes, a narrow[349] forehead, with much movement in the

[343] Hoffmann: 'gaze' (*obtutu*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'moist look' (ὑγρὸν ὁρῶν).

[344] Hoffmann: 'his aspect is as if' (*adspectus est tamquam si*) citing Ad.: 'his appearance (τὸ εἶδος) is drowsy'.

[345] Hoffmann: 'gentle' (*mansuetus*) citing Ad.: 'his voice is kind (ἠπία)'.

[346] Hoffmann: 'distorted' (*obliqua*); no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'his forehead is wrinkled (ῥυσσόν)'.

[347] Hoffmann: 'turned away' (*retortis*) citing Ad.: 'brows turned back (ἀπεστραμμέναι)'.

[348] Hoffmann: 'agitated like one emptied' (*agitatus ut vacuo*) citing Ad.: 'he moves like those who are purged violently' (κινεῖται ὥσπερ ὑπέρινοι).

[349] Hoffmann suggests 'drawn together' citing Ad.: 'he draws in his forehead' (μέτωπον σπᾷ).

والأوصال كانها مسترخيه كلها[350]

الباب الثاني والستون
في علامه الرجل المتواضع

B54 علامة ذلك ان يوجد فخم" المنظر كثير اللحم رخصه رخوه معتدل القامه مستوى الأوصال خاشع النظر لين الحركه جهير الصوت شاخص الشعر

الباب الثالث والستون
في علامه الرجل المستهزي بالناس

B55 علامه الرجل المستهزي ان يوجد حديد[351] النظر خفى الصوت دقيق[352] أطراف ما حول عينيه واذا مشى حرك جميع أوصاله *(ب46)*

الباب الرابع والستون
في علامه الرجل المحب لجمع المال

B56–7 علامته ان يكون صغير الأوصال صغير الوجه والعينين ساكن[353] المشيه وفيه بعض انحناً حديد الصوت شديد حمره اللون حسن الشعر كثيره[354] أسوده مرتفعه كثير[355] شعر الدقن رخو[356] الصدغين منتفخ العينين شديد الشهوله[357]

[350] م. يبدو أن يوجد استمرار هذا الباب في الجزء الثاني من الباب الخامس والستين.

[351] م. حديد.

[352] م. رقيق.

[353] م. سابق.

[354] م. خشن الشعر كثيفه.

[355] م. كثيف.

[356] م. وحف.

[357] م. ملتمع العينين شديد التهافا (؟).

eyebrows and the cheeks. He has an inclining neck, and much movement of the back and the joints, as if they were all slack.[350]

THE SIXTY-SECOND CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE HUMBLE MAN

B54 (TK 3207, fo. 74ª1–5; TK 3245, fo. 59ª1–5; cf. Dim. 38ᵇ/missing)

The sign of that is that he is found with a grand appearance, with much flesh, which is supple and slack, of evenly proportioned build, straight limbs, a submissive gaze, soft movement, loud voice, and projecting hair.

THE SIXTY-THIRD CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE MAN WHO MOCKS PEOPLE

B55 (TK 3207, fo. 74ª10–12; TK 3245, fo. 59ᵇ1–3)

The sign of the man who mocks is that he is found with sharp[351] sight and a muffled voice, [46ᵇ] thin[352] around the edges of his eyes, and when he walks all his limbs move.

THE SIXTY-FOURTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE MAN FOND OF AMASSING MONEY

B56–57 (TK 3207, fo. 74ª5–10; TK 3245, fo. 59ª5–9)

His sign is that he has small limbs, a small face and eyes, and a calm[353] gait. He has something of a stoop, a sharp voice, strong redness of colour, and much beautiful,[354] black, sticking-up hair. He has much[355] hair on the chin, slack[356] temples, and puffed-up, very bluish-black eyes.[357]

[350] As Hoffmann points out, in Ad. this chapter continues and conforms to what appears in Leiden at the end of ch. 65.

[351] Hoffmann: 'new' (*recenti, i.e. vigenti, grato*) citing Ad.: 'his look is rather elegant' (τὸ βλέμμα ὑπόκομψον).

[352] Hoffmann: 'delicate' (*tenuibus*) citing Ad.: 'has hollows (λαγαρά) around his eyes', though 'delicate' seems no better than 'thin' as a translation of 'hollows' (see n. 248 above).

[353] Hoffmann: 'outstripping', which he translates *praecipiti*, wishing to get close to Ad.'s 'walks quickly' (ταχυβάδιστον), but *praecedens* would be more accurate. Otherwise, says Hoffmann, one might assume a negative has dropped out from the Arabic text, so read: 'not calm' (*ghayr sākin*).

[354] Hoffmann: 'thick, rough hair' (*horrido et spisso*) citing Ad.: 'shaggy (δασύς) hair'.

[355] Hoffmann: 'thick' (*spissa*); cf. Ad.: 'shaggy (δασεῖαν) beard'.

[356] Hoffmann: 'luxuriant (hair)' (*crinibus spissis*) citing Ad.: 'shaggy (δασεῖς) temples'.

[357] Hoffmann: 'shining (*fulgentibus*), strongly blazing eyes' ('strongly blazing' is only his suggestion) citing Ad.: 'shining, gleaming, and sparkling (λιπαρὸν καὶ στίλβον καὶ ἀμαρύσσον) look'.

الباب الخامس والستون

في علامه الرجل الشرير الأحمق

B58 علامه الرجل الشرير الاحمق ان تكون فيه آيات الحمق والجنون لما في طبيعته من اشباه الدواب وكما ان الدواب بعضها اسكن من بعض وبعضها اشر من بعض وكذلك الرجال من الناس بعضهم اشر من بعض

B52cont. ومن علامة الأحمق ضعيف الركبتين كثير النظر الى نفسه وأوصال جسده رقيق الصوت حديده طويله شديد حركه الرأس

(*47أ*) الباب السادس والستون

في علامه الرجل المرآى النفس[358]

B53 علامته ان يوجد اخضر اللون يضرب الى السواد حفيف الجسم[359] حسن القامه يابس النظر ضيق ما بين العينين كثير الكلام كبير[360] النفس شديدها وكثير° ينفض كفيه˝ ويدلك احداهما (احدهما)!! بالاخرى ويكثر الوطى برجليه الارض ويضرب بهما عليها خفيف الحركه

الباب السابع والستون

في علامه الرجل الذي قد دنا اجله من غير مرض ظاهر

علامته ان يكون غاير العينين مصفر اللون قلق° بارد[361] الرجلين واليدين فتلك علامته

[358] ه. المر النفس.

[359] ه. الخفن.

[360] ه. كثير.

[361] ه. بادر؟

THE SIXTY-FIFTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE EVIL AND STUPID MAN

B58 (Leiden here abridging? cf. TK 3207, fos. $69^{a}10$–$70^{a}5$; TK 3245, fos. $61^{a}6$–$62^{b}3$)

The sign of the evil and stupid man is that there are in him signs of stupidity and madness because of the similarities in his nature to animals. Just as some animals are calmer than others and some are more evil than others, so it is with men: some of them are more evil than others.

B52 cont. Among the signs of the stupid person are weakness of the knees, much looking at himself and the limbs of his body, a reedy, sharp, long voice, and he moves his head much.

[47^{A}]THE SIXTY-SIXTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE MAN OF HYPOCRITICAL[358] SOUL

B53 (TK 3207, fos. $73^{b}12$–$74^{a}1$; TK 3245, fo. $58^{b}5$–9; cf. Dim. 38^{ab}/41)

His sign is that he is found to be green in colour, turning towards black, and has a depilated body,[359] a good stature, dry gaze, narrow in what is between the eyes, talkative, big[360] and heavy breath. He often shakes his palms and strokes one with the other, and he often stamps the ground with his feet and strikes it with them, and he is light in his movement.

THE SIXTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE MAN WHOSE TIME OF DEATH HAS APPROACHED WITH NO APPARENT DISEASE

His sign is that he is hollow-eyed, yellow of colour, anxious, and he has cold[361] feet and hands. That is his sign.

[358] Hoffmann: 'bitter' (*amari*) citing Ad.: 'bitter' (πικροῦ); cf. TK: 'bitterness' (*mardra*). Probably this is a scribal slip by Leiden. Cf. p. 311, n. 7.

[359] Hoffmann suggests 'eyelid', citing Anon. Lat. 99: 'oval-shaped eyelids' (*ovatis palpebris*). The accompanying adjective in Leiden (*hafif*) is likely to be corrupt (note Hoffmann translates it as 'dry'/*arida*, reading *jafif*); perhaps read 'light, agile' (*khafif*) or 'weak' (*da'if*).

[360] Hoffmann: 'much (*multa*) heavy breath'; no explanation given, but clearly based on Ad.: 'pant' (ἀσθμαίνειν). Hoffmann also opines that in the previous phrase in Leiden *kathir* should be *kabir* (*magniloquus* instead of *multiloquus*), thinking that this would be closer to Ad.: 'speaks vehemently (σφοδρόν)'.

[361] Hoffmann suggests 'fast-moving' (*poperantibus*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it gives better sense.

الباب الثامن والستون

في علامه الذي قد دنا منه الشر والبلا وهو لا يعلم

اعلم اني كنت في ارض فمفوليه[362] في مدينه تسمى فرجا[363] وفيها هيكل خارج المدينه يقال له هيكل أرطميس[364] عجيب في˝ الكبر والحسن والبنأ وكان يحجه الناس من اطراف البلاد وزى *(ب47)* نسأ تلك الأرض [ان][365] يلبسون* البياض والأرجوان وغيره مما يشاكلهن لباسه وكانت إحداهن تلتحف بملحفه عظيمه تغطي˝ كل شي منها ولا يظهر* منها الا عينيها وانفها فرأيت هناك امرأه بين النسأ داخله ذلك الهيكل وفيها علامة شر عظيم قد دنا حلوله منها وكثر تعجب من اخبرته ممن قرب مني كيف قضيت بذلك من النظر الى العينين وأرنبه الانف فقلت ما اعظم شرًا قد دنا يحل بهذه الامرأة فكانت العلامة ان منخريها وأنفها قد أظلما وهما يضطربان وعيناها° مفتوحتان فوق المقدار وقد اخضرتا وراسها شديد التحرك ورجليها عند المشي منتضلتان (نضلتان)!! كانما تحركهما من وجل ولا ترى هذه الآيات بأحد ليس به جنون الا قضيت عليه بانه قد حضره شر فبينما انا انظر اليها واذا بامرأة اخرى قد اقبلت اليها تسعى ويصيح* فاخبرتها ان ابنة (ابنتا) كانت أحب الناس اليها وليس لها غيرها قد سقطت في بير الدار فغرقت فلما سمعت المرأة ذلك القت عنها قناعها وخمارها *(أ48)* وحليها ثم˝ شقت جيبها ثم تجردت˝ حتى قامت عريانه وهي صايحه ذاهبه على وجهها وهي تنادي وابنتاه حتى ان ميزرًا كان تحت ثيابها مصرى° أو من عمل رومي (روميه)! سقط عنها حتى اجتمع قومًا! فاعطوها (فعطوها)!! بثوب من ثياب ذلك الهيكل فستروها به

الباب التاسع والستون

في علامه عشق النسأ للرجال الغربا

اعلم اني كنت في مدينه تسمى دمسوس[366] فدعيت مع قوم من أهلها الى عرس فلما ارادوا ان يزفوا العروس الى زوجها انطلق اهل المرأة الى عند الزوج فاكلوا عنده وشربوا ثم رجعوا جميعًا وهو معهم وعلى رأسه الاكليل وبايديهم

[362] ل. مسقوليه.

[363] ل. فرجل.

[364] ل. ارطيس.

[365] هذه الكلمة التي ندرجها معقوفان غير موجودة في ل.

[366] م. سوس.

THE SIXTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE PERSON WHOM EVIL AND TROUBLE APPROACHED UNEXPECTEDLY

Know that I was in the land of Pamphylia,[362] in a city called Perge,[363] and there was a temple outside the town called the Temple of Artemis,[364] astonishing in size, beauty, and structure. People would visit it on pilgrimage from the ends of the land. The fashion [47^b] of the women of that land was [that][365] they wore white and red and whatever else it suited them to wear. One of them was wrapped in a great mantle that covered everything of her, and it revealed only her eyes and nose. And I saw there among the women a woman who was entering that temple and upon whom a sign of great evil had just descended. Someone near me whom I told about it was greatly astonished at how I had judged that just from looking at the eyes and the tip of the nose, for I had said: 'What a great evil is about to descend on this woman!' The sign was that her nostrils and nose had darkened and were troubled, and her eyes were opened more than average and had become green. Her head was moving much, and her feet as she walked were knocking against each other, as if their movement were from fear. You do not see these signs on someone who is not mad without judging that some evil has come upon him. And while I was looking at her, another woman approached her running and shouting, and informed her that a daughter, who was the most beloved of people to her and the only one she had, had fallen into the well of the house and drowned. When the woman heard that, she threw her veil from her, her head covering [48^a] and her jewels, then she tore the front of her dress and stripped until she stood naked. She was screaming and falling onto her face, as she cried 'O my daughter!' Even an Egyptian or Greek-made loin-cloth, which was under her clothes, fell from her until some people gathered round and gave her one of the gowns of that temple and covered her with it.

THE SIXTY-NINTH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE WOMAN'S PASSION FOR UNKNOWN MEN

Know that I was in a city called *Dmsws*,[366] for I was invited with some of its people to a wedding. When they wanted to escort the bride to her husband, the family of the woman set off to the groom's house, and they ate with him and drank, then they returned together. He was with them, and on his head was a coronet, and in their hands were sprigs of basil, and lamps were borne among

[362] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has *Fmqwlyh*.

[363] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has *Frjl*.

[364] Thus Hoffmann; Leiden has *ʾrtys*.

[365] Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to make the sentence conform better to the norms of classical Arabic.

[366] Hoffmann reads Samos in accordance with Anon. Lat. 133. See Ch. 11, trans. n. 219, and Ch. 3 n. 164.

قضبان الرياحين وقد حملت (حمل)!! بين ايديهم المصابيح ومعهم المغنيون حتى وردوا بالعروس الى بيت زوجها فصحبتهم ثم قلت لمن حولي دون باقي الجماعه ان العروس مختطفه قبل ان تصل الى بيت زوجها وانه سينكحها من ليلتها رجل سوى زوجها الذي تزف اليه ثم لم ازل اتوقع تصديق ما قلت حتى بلغنا

(ب48) باب منزل زوجها فثار علينا كمين كانوا كمنوا حول الباب معهم السلاح فبادروا الى تلك العروس فقتلوا من قدروا عليه وتفرقت تلك الجموع وكنت انا فيمن هرب (هربت)! لما رايت شرهم وغلبوا على العروس وانطلقوا بها فسمعت الناس بعد ذلك يتحدثون (يتحدثوا)!! ان ذلك كان عن رضاها وساذكر لك من الايات التي كنت قضيت بها رايت العروس تمشي وحولها الناس ورايت فتى من اصحاب زوجها وأصدقايه الذين جاوا (جاو)!! معه عن يسار الجاريه فنظرت في وجهه فاذا هو مبتسم حديد النظر وعيناه غريقتان بالمآ فدنوت منه فسمعت له نفسًا عاليًا ورايت عرقًا قد بل ثيابه ورايت انفه يختلج ورايت لونه يتلون الوانا صفره بعد حمرة وذلك لما عنده من الزمع وخوف الفضيحه ورايت العروس وعيناها غريقتان بالمآ ونظرها حديدًا١ وقد استبان فيها الوجل فقضيت عند ذلك بما قضيت

وقد كنت مره بارض يقال لها زمورني[367] ووافيت فيها عرسًا فدعيت اليه فبينما نحن نزف العروس الى زوجها في كثرة (أ49) من الناس اذ بدت لي الفراسه فقلت لنفر ممن حولي ان هذه العروس مختطفه الليله ومنكوحه قبل ان تصل الى زوجها فانطلقنا بالعروس حتى دخلت دار زوجها وبها٢ الرصد الذي لها منهم على موعد اذ خرجت من البيت كانها تقضي حاجه فاتت الذين رصدوها فانطلقوا بها سراعًا بسرقه من الليل وساذكر لك الايات التي قضيت بها رايت فتى من اهل تلك المدينه يماشي زوج تلك العروس فنظرت الى وجهه فرايت عيناه٥ خضراوتان٥ فسمعت كلامه ورايت مشيته وهيئته وذاتيته٢ فرأيته مزور٥ لفعل يريد يفعله وكان كالذي قد غلب عليه المراد واذا هو مفتخ٢ الاوصال سريع الحركه والكلام كانه يهم بأمر (بامرًا)! واذا نظر الى زوج العروس نظر غضبان٥ ونظرت الى العروس واذا هي تضحك من غير ضحك فعل[368] الحزين الذي يظهر الفرح وليس بفرح فلما رايت ذلك بوجهه نظرت الى من حوله من الفتيان هل ارى له شبهًا في المنظر والهيئه بينهم فلم ار (ارى)!! من ذلك باحد منهم شيًا فقضيت عند ذلك بما قضيت

[367] ل. زمرون.

[368] م. مثل؟

them, and the singers were with them, until they brought the bride to the house of her husband. So I accompanied them. Then I said to those around me, to the exclusion of the rest of the gathering, that the bride would be abducted before reaching the house of her husband, and that a man would marry her that very night who was not the husband to whom she was being escorted. Then I remained awaiting the confirmation of what I said until we reached [48^b] the door of the dwelling of her husband, when there rose up against us armed ambushers, who had been lying in wait around the door. They rushed to that bride and killed whom they could. The crowds dispersed, and I was among those who escaped on seeing their evil. They overpowered the bride and made off with her. Afterwards I heard the people saying that it had been with her approval. I will mention to you some of the signs by which I made the judgement. I saw the bride walking with people around her and I saw a young man among the companions of her husband and his friends who came with him, to the right of the maiden. I looked at his face and he was smiling, with a keen gaze, and his eyes were flooded with water. I got near to him and I heard that he had heavy breath. I saw that sweat had soaked his clothes, and I saw that his nose quivered, and I saw his colour taking on different hues, yellow after red. This was because of the disquiet and fear of scandal in him. I looked at the bride, and her eyes were flooded with water and her gaze was keen. Dread was evident in her. Thereupon I judged as I judged.

I was once in the land of Smyrna[367] where I attended a wedding that I was invited to. While we were escorting the bride to her husband in the company of many [49^a] people, a physiognomical insight came to me, and I said to a group of those around me that this bride would be abducted that night and married before she reached her husband. So we set off with the bride until she entered the house of her husband, and in it were the men lying in wait, with whom she had an appointment. Then she left the house as if to discharge a need, and she came to those who were lying in wait for her and they hurriedly made off with her, stealing into the night. I will mention to you the signs by which I made the judgement. I saw a young man from the people of that town walking with the husband of that bride. I looked at his face and I saw his eyes were green. I listened to his speech, and I looked at his walk, build, and his personality. I perceived he was disguising a deed that he wanted to do, and he was like one overcome by the object of his intent. He was supple of limb and quick in movement and speech, as if he was about to do something. When he looked at the husband of the bride, he looked with anger. I looked at the bride, and she laughed without laughter, the action of a sad person,[368] who feigns joy but is not joyful. When I saw that in his face, I looked at those young men around him to see if there was one of them similar to him in appearance and build. I did not see anything of that in any of them, whereupon I judged what I judged [49^b].

[367] Suggested by Hoffmann; Leiden has *Zmrwyn*.
[368] Hoffmann suggests 'like a sad person' (*ut tristis*).

(ب49) الباب السبعون

في علامه الرجل الذي يفكر[369] في بلايا عظام من قبل ان يصل اليه شي منها

اعلم ان علم الفراسه لا ينتهي الى علم قد سميت لك [اعظم][370] من علم ما قد كان وما هو كاين حتى تكذب[371] مما ذكر انه كان مما لم يكن وتنقضه˝ ولقد كنت في ارض يقال لها قلودنا[372] فجاني˝ من أخبرني عن رجل له سفينه في البحر وقد انكسرت وغرق أهلها والمال الذي كان فيها في البحر وكان لصاحب السفينه ولد وكان في˝ السفينه فاشتد جزع الناس لذلك وكثر صياح الرجل حتى اجتمع اليه عامه رجال من اهل المدينه وقد خرق قميصه ونتف شعر راسه وحضره أهله وغيرهم وكان الرجل خبيثًا مكارًا سريعًا[373] وكان ولده في السفينه وحيدًا فوافيته على تلك الحال فقلت لتلك الجماعه حين رايت جموعهم حوله ورحمتهم له ويذكرون انه كان في السفينه التي غرقت غير واحد من مدينتهم منهم الولد والوالد والاخوه والمال الكثير فقلت لهم اني ارى رجّلا ما أصابه الذي تذكرون وليسلمن من هذه *(50أ)* المصيبه ولينتقض هذا الخبر وليعودن أمره الى السلامه فلم يلبث الا قليل° حتى جاء الخبر بالسلامه والعافيه وتكذيب˝ الخبر الاول وانما قضيت بذلك˝ لاني نظرت الى ذلك المتخرص˝ مع كثره خوفه وجزعه ولم تدمع له عين ولا تنكس له شعر ولا حاجب ورايته سبط الجلد وتاملت بكاه فاذا هو بالضحك أشبه˝ مع اشياً سوى ذلك قد اقتصرت على ذكرها كراهه التطويل لعلمي لفهم المتعلم ولم اذكر الا ما لم أجد من ذكره بدًا مع ان العلم لا يطول على اهله الذين يرغبون فيه وتقوى عقولهم عليه ولكيما يبان للحمقا[374] الذين لا يومنون به ولا يعرفون حقيقته والسلم.

تم كتاب الفراسه نحمد الله تعالى وصلى الله علي سيدنا محمد واله وصحبه اجمعين وسلم ويتلوه كتاب العرافه والزجر على مذهب الفرس وغيرهم والحمد لله وحده.

[369] و. تفكر.

[370] هذه الكلمة التي يشرحها موغسان غير موجودة في ل.

[371] و. يكذب.

[372] ل. قلوذيا.

[373] و. بديعا ، بريعا؟

[374] و. ولكنما يباس منه الحمقا.

THE SEVENTIETH CHAPTER: ON THE SIGN OF THE MAN WHO THINKS[369] OF GREAT TRIALS BEFORE ANYTHING OF THEM AFFLICTS HIM

Know that the knowledge of physiognomy does not attain to a knowledge of those things I named to you [more important][370] than the knowledge of what has happened and what will happen, with the result that it can refute[371] what was said to have happened and did not happen, and disprove it.

I was in a land called Calydna,[372] and a person came to me who told me about a man who had a boat on the sea, and it was destroyed, and its people sank in the sea, together with the wealth which was in it. The owner of the boat had a son, and he was in the boat, so the people's anxiety was for that reason great, and the cries of the man grew until all the men of the people of the town gathered round him. He tore his shirt and pulled out the hair of his head. His family and others came to him. Now this man was wicked, cunning, and quick,[373] and his son was in the boat alone. I appeared before him as he was in that state, and I spoke to that group when I saw their gathering about him, their compassion for him, and their saying that more than one person of the people of that town had been in the boat: son, father, brothers, and much wealth. So I said to them: 'I see a man not afflicted by that of which you speak. Indeed, he is spared this [50^a] disaster, and this report will be disproved and his affairs restored to safety'. It was only a short time before the report of his safety and good health came to him and the contradiction of the original report. I judged that because I looked at that liar, with his great fear and anxiety, and no eye of his wept, and no hair or eyebrow of his was upturned. I saw that he had smooth skin, and I considered his crying, and it was more similar to laughter, together with other things the mention of which I have curtailed out of dislike for prolixity in my science and for the sake of the understanding of the student. I have only mentioned what I had to mention—even though knowledge is not too lengthy for its devotees, who desire it and whose minds are able to cope with it—in order that it be clear to the stupid,[374] who do not believe in it and who do not recognize its true nature. Peace.

The *Book of Physiognomy* is completed, we praise God Almighty, and may God's prayers and greetings be upon Our Lord Muhammad, his family, and all his companions. What follows it is the *Book of Divination and Augury* according to the discipline of the Persians and others, and praise be to God alone.

369 Hoffmann: 'has thought', which he translates 'feigns' (*simulatorem egit*), feeling that this better suits the import of the story; see n. 10 above.

370 Not present in Leiden; added by Hoffmann to complete the sense.

371 Hoffmann makes this verb (and the next one) masculine, making 'knowledge' the subject; but Leiden is justified in making it feminine, making 'physiognomy' the subject.

372 Tentatively suggested by Hoffmann (with Calynda), cf. Strabo 13. 1. 46; Leiden has *Flwdhyn'*.

373 Hoffmann suggests 'original' (*inauditus*) or (assuming his *bazi'* is a mistake for *bari'*) 'skilful' (*sollers*).

374 Hoffmann: 'but the stupid despair of it' (*sed desperant de ea stulti*); no explanation given, presumably feeling it makes better sense.

(76أ) وافق الفراغ من نسخه بدمشق المحروسه حماها الله تعالى يوم الاثنين ثامن شهر رمضان المعظم سنه سبعه وخمسين وسبعمايه والحمد لله وحده.

نسخه العبد الفقير الى الله تعالى عبد الله بن سلمان بن الريحاني الموصلي عفا الله عنه.

[76[a]] The completion of the copy occurred in Damascus the Protected, may God Almighty defend it, on Monday the eighth of the month of Ramadan the magnified, in the year seven hundred and fifty-seven, and praise be to God alone.

The copy of the slave, poor before God Almighty, 'Abdallah son of Sulayman son of al-Rayhani al-Mosuli, may God pardon him.

9

The Istanbul Polemon (TK Recension): Edition and Translation of the Introduction

Antonella Ghersetti

The following is an edition and translation of the introductory part of the Arabic physiognomy attributed to Polemon in the Topkapı tradition. The anecdote which precedes the theoretical/methodological part is clearly spurious but tells us much about the Arabs' perception of the personality of Polemon. It is also of some importance since it represents the fullest version[1] of the anecdote extant also in the famous Ps.-Aristotelian *Sirr al-asrār*[2] and in other sources. In chronological order these are the *Tabaqāt al-aṭibbā' wa-l-ḥukamā'* of Ibn Juljul (written 377/987),[3] *Ta'rīkh al-ḥukamā'* of Ibn al-Qifti (d. 646/1248),[4] *'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'* of Ibn Abi Usaybi'a (d. 668/1270),[5] always in connection with the biography of Hippocrates, and Hajji Khalifa (d. 1067/1657), *Kashf al-ẓunūn*.[6] The story is based on the encounter between Zopyrus and Socrates in classical sources.[7] The Topkapı MSS place the anecdote before the *incipit* of what is stated to be the book of Polemon, clearly identified by the words: 'This book of his begins with his statement…'. The introductory part where the theoretical bases of physiognomy are explained is obviously considered part of the original book, but is extant only in the Topkapı tradition and is plainly not Polemonic.

This is not a critical edition, which would have been impractical given the differences in wording between the two versions. It has been made on the basis of Topkapı, Ahmet III 3207, which has been collated with Topkapı, Ahmet III 3245 in the case of problematical readings. The vowels have been reproduced according to the MSS, except where they needed correction. The form of words has been corrected according to the rules of standard orthography in Arabic. Diacritical dots, where absent, have been added. The writing of the *hamza* has

[1] Grignaschi (1974) 285 describes it as 'la forme la plus ancienne de cette anecdote'. Cf. Ch. 6 n. 14.

[2] Ed. Badawi (1954) 117.

[3] Ed. Sayyid (1955) 17.

[4] Ed. Lippert (1903) 91.

[5] Ed. A. Müller (1884) 27–8 = 48 ed. Rida (1965).

[6] Ed. Flügel (1835–58), iv. 589–90.

[7] Cicero, *De fato* 10; *Tusc. Disp.* 4. 80; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato* 6; Steinschneider (1960) § 60 (84), Mourad (1939) 51.

been corrected in accordance with the standard rules of Arabic. The different readings have been put in the notes only when there was a difference in *ductus*.

Some passages of this introductory part are reproduced with exactly the same wording in an anonymous treatise, acephalous and mutilated, found in MS 172 (formerly 7840) at the Zahiriyya Library, *Fī l-firāsa* (18 fos.).[8]

[8] See al-Hamarna (1389/1979) 518.

كتاب افيلامون
في الفراسة
والتوسم

[33a] كِتابُ افيلامون في الفِرَاسَة وَالتوسُّم

[33b] بِسْمِ اللهِ الرَّحمنِ الرَّحيمِ وَبِهِ تَوفيقي
هَذَا كِتَابُ الفِرَاسَةِ الَّذِي وَضَعَهُ أفيلاَمُون الفيلَسُوف

وَكانَ فيما زَعَمُوا شَاباً من شَبابِ الفلاَسِفَةِ أديْباً أريباً قد نظر في كُلِّ وَجهٍ مِنْ وُجُوهِ العِلم فرأى أنَّهُ ليس شيء مِن انواع العِلم الاَّ قد سُبِقَ اليه فقَالَ: «ما أبقَى الاوَّل لِلآخِرِ شيئاً لم يسبقهُ اليه من عَقْلٍ ولافضْلٍ وَلاَ نقصٍ ولاَ جَهْلٍ فما الآخِر الاَّ تبعاً للأوَّل وما الناس الاَّ أشْبَاه الباقي منهُم في مثالِ المَاضِي. وإنّي لوَاضِعٌ كتابا في الفِرَاسَةِ تميُّزاً فيما بَين النَّاسِ وَتحصيْل بعضِهِم من بعضٍ وَاتفاق صُورَهم وَاختلاَفها حتّى ألحقَ كُلَّ ضرب منهُم بشكْلِهِ في الخلقَة والهيئة. فإنَّ ذلكَ هُوَ الظاهِر الَّذِي يستَدَلُّ من قبَلِهِ عَلى مَعرفَةَ الطّبَائع وَالأخلاَق فإنَّ العُضو إذَا أشْبَه في الخلقِ عضواً كان مثلهُ في القُوَّة والطبيعَة والمزاج وَليسَ أحَد من المتشابهين الَّذينَ ليسَ بينهُمَا في الخلقَة تميز [34a] بأخلق الأمر في الضّعف وَالقُوَّة والاحتمالِ لِمَا حملَ من صَاحبه إلا أنْ تغيِّر احدَهما[1] قُوَّةَ شيء دَنا مِنهُ أو يُوهنهُ حَادثٌ عرض لهُ أو يزأبه[2]».

فوَضَعَ كِتَاباً فِي الفِرَاسَةِ أثبتَ فيه الأعلاَم التي ميّزها بيْن الأخلاَق والنَّاس فَاستَدَلَّ على الخلق بالخلق وَبالظاهِر عَلى البَاطِنِ وَالحَادثات ببيّنات مِن ظاهِر الصّوَر على مَا خفي منَ الطّبَائع ثمَّ لم يفصِل شيئاً إلا بعْدَ تَواطؤ[3] التجربَة.

فلمَّا اجتمعَ لهُ ذلك وَاستثبتَ مِنَ الأمُور التي يدخلُ منها التمييز بصفة[4] وَنصبَ نفسَهُ للعَامَّة وَادّعى علم الطبائع بتوسُّم العَين والنَّظَر الى الصّوَر حتّى اشتهر بذلكَ وَامتحنَ في ذلك عنْ علمه إلى أن بلغ ذلك تلاَميْذ هيوافقراطيس. فأتتهُ جماعة منهُم ليكشفُوهُ عَن رَأيه وَيُفَاتشُوهُ في ادِّعائِهِ فجعَل يخبرَ كُلّ رَجُل منهُم

1 في الأصل: «احداهما».
2 في الأصل: « ابرا به» بدون نقط.
3 في الأصل: «تواطي».
4 في الأصل أيضا: «التي دخل عليها التمييز».

[fo. 33ᵃ] *The Book of Polemon on Physiognomy and the Reading of Signs*

[fo. 33ᵇ] *In the Name of God the Compassionate the Merciful, on Whom My Success Depends. This is the* Book of Physiognomy *Written by Polemon the Philosopher*

There was once a young philosopher—so it was alleged—who was educated and clever. After having examined all the branches of knowledge, he saw that there was not one where somebody else had not been before him. So he said, 'The first man has left the last man no part of intelligence, superiority, failure, or stupidity where he has not been. The last man can do nothing but follow the first man, and people are no more than imitations of past models that survive. I am writing a book on physiognomy to distinguish between people and to acquire knowledge of the coincidence or difference of their forms in relation to one another, in order to connect every type of person with the form of their external constitution and shape. Indeed this is what is manifest and allows one to infer knowledge of natures and characters, since the part which resembles another in its physical constitution is like it also in power, nature, and temperament. And one of two parts which resemble one another closely without distinction in internal constitution [fo. 34ᵃ] is no more (or less) disposed than the other to weakness or power or tolerating what the other one suffers, unless the force of something approaching changes it or an accident happens to weaken or change it.'

Then he wrote a book on physiognomy in which he established the signs that he distinguished between characters and people. He inferred character from physical constitution, interior and accidentals from exterior, and hidden natures from clear proofs coming from external forms. He only made decisions that were in keeping with experience.

When he had collected all this and had found proof of the matters in which distinction was possible in some way, he presented himself to the public at large and laid claim to a knowledge of (men's) natures from observing the signs of the eye and studying their forms. And so he became famous for this and was tested for his knowledge of these things until the matter came to the attention of the students of Hippocrates. When some of them came to him in order to expose his ideas and to put him in a difficult position in relation to his claims, he began to inform each of them

عَن طَبيعَته وَخُلقِه [34b] وَمَا يصلُحُ لَهُ مِنَ الصَّنعَةِ وينوي[5] علَيْه مِنْ الأدَبِ إلَى أنْ ذَهَبَ بعْضُهُم إلى هيوافقراطيس فأخبرَهُ الخبر. فأعْظمَ التعجّب مِن ذلك وأنكَرَهُ وقَالَ: «مَا ينبغي أنْ يَكُون أحَدٌ يبلُغ بنَظَرٍ إلى هيْئة أو تفرُّسٍ في صورة معْرفة مَا تستنزل النفوس وَأصل مَا ثبت علَيه الطبَائع وتَصرّف مَا يقع عَلَيْه الشهَوات». ثمَّ دَعَا بَاديم فمثّل فيه صُورتَه ثمّ بعثَ بهَا مَع اصحابِه فقَال: «انطلقُوا إلَيه بهَذه الصُّورَة وأروها[6] اياهُ ولاتعلموهُ صُورَة مَن هي وَسلوه عَن طبائع صَاحبهَا وَعن عَقْله وَحَاله وَرضائه وَغضَبه وَعفَّته وَشهوَته ثمّ أعلمُوني مَا يرجع إليكُم». قَالَ فَانطلقُوا إلَيه بالصُّورَةِ وَوَضَعُوهَا بينَ يدَيْه ثمّ سَألُوهُ عَن مَا أمَرهُم فلمَّا توسَّم فيلاَمُون في الصُّورَة قالَ: «ما ينبغي أنْ يكُون أحَدٌ منَ الناسِ أزْنى مِن صَاحب هَذه الصُّورَة».

فلمَّا سَمعُوْا ذَلكَ منهُ وَثَبُوا إلَيه ليضَرِبُوهُ فامتنَع منهُم ثمّ قَالَ [35a] لَهُم: «أيُّها القَوم مَا الَّذي أنكرتُم من قَوْلي فيْ هَذه الصُورَة؟ انطلقُوا بي إلَى صَاحبها فإني اقررُهُ لكُمْ بالَّذي وَصَفتُه به وَأخبرُه من أعلاَم ذلك بمَا لاَ يَستَطيع إنكَارَهُ».

فذهَبُوا به إلى هيوافقراطيْس فلمَّا دَخلوا علَيْه قَالُوا بأجْمَعهم: «مَا ينبغي لنا يا إمَام الحِكمة وَسيِّد الفَلاَسفَة مَا صَحبتنا أن نقبل منكَ أدَباً إذْ كَانَ فيلمُون فيمَا قال محقّاً. وإن كَانَ مُبطلاً فَما يَسعُنَا أن نتركَهُ حياً».

فَقَال لهُم هيوافقراطيس: «مَا الَّذي استحققتمُوهُ كما أرَى وَعَظَّمتمُوهُ حتَّى قلتُم هَذه المقالة؟».

قالُوا: «إنّهُ وَصَفَكَ بأمْرٍ لاَ ينبغي لذِي عَقلٍ أنْ يَكُون كَذلكَ وَزعَم أنّهُ سيقررك بما قال فيك. فإن يَكُن ما ذكركَ به حقّاً فلاَ أحَدٌ أبعَد منَ الحكمَة ولاَ أوْلى باسم الجهَالة منْكَ حَيث تسمَّيت باسْم العَاقِل وَعَملتَ بعَمل الجاهِل. وَإن كَانَ ما ذكركَ به باطلاً فلاَ أحدٌ أعظَمُ عندَ العامَّة جُرماً ولاَ أسْوأ [35b] عَلَى أهلِ الحكمَة تنَاولاً او[أ]ولى بأن لاَ يُترك حياً ممَّن يعي الناس بكَذبه وَيقضي عَلى الفَلاسفَة بظنّه مِنْ هَذا. إنَّ هَذا زَعمَ أنهُ ليسَ أحَدٌ أزنَى منكَ وَلا أركَبُ لفاحشَة فَقُرنا إلَيه لنضربَهُ علماً بيرَاءتكَ وَتنزُّهاً لعَقلكَ وَمَعْرفةً بفَضْلكَ فَزعَم لنا أنَّهُ

5 في الأصل: «ينوا».
6 في الأصل: «اوروها».

about his nature and his character, [fo. 34ᵇ] and to tell what profession was suitable for him and what education was intended for him, until one of them went to Hippocrates and told him the story. He was extremely astonished and refused to accept it, saying, 'There can be nobody who by consideration of shape or physiognomical scrutiny of form can obtain knowledge of what souls harbour, of the foundation upon which natures are established, and of the conduct upon which desires are based.' Then he sent for some leather, drew his picture on it, and sent it along with his companions, saying, 'Take this image and show it to him without letting him know who it represents. Ask him about the nature of its owner and his intellect, his condition, his contentment, his anger, his continence, and his desires. Afterwards let me know his reply to you'. So he spoke, and they took the image (to Polemon), put it down in front of him, and asked him what (Hippocrates) had told them. Once Polemon had observed the signs of the picture, he said, 'There can be nobody more lustful than the owner of this image.'

When they heard his words they jumped upon him to beat him but he drove them back, and then said to [fo. 35ᵃ] them, 'People! What are you rejecting in my analysis of this image? Take me to its owner and I shall make him confess to you that he is as I have described him. I shall also inform him of the signs [of this] so that he will not be able to deny it.'

They brought him to Hippocrates and when they entered his house they all said, 'Master of wisdom, Lord of the Philosophers as long as you are our companion, it is not proper for us to accept an education from you, if Polemon has told the truth; but if he was lying, we cannot let him live.'

Hippocrates said to them, 'What claim have you made, as I see, and regard as so great that you pronounce these words?'

They replied, 'He described you in a way that does not fit a being endowed with intellect; furthermore he asserted he would make you admit what he said about you. If what he alleged is right, then nobody is further from wisdom or more deserving of the name of stupidity then you, since you are called by the name of the intelligent man but act as the stupid man. If what he alleged is wrong, nobody is more criminal among the public at large and more evil [fo. 35ᵇ] to people of wisdom in his offensiveness and more deserving to be killed than someone who raises a tumult by lies and judges philosophers on the basis of his own suppositions. The fact is that he asserted there is nobody more lustful and no one who commits greater depravities than you. We jumped upon him to beat him because we know your innocence, we esteem your intellect, and we are aware of your superiority; but he asserted

يقرّركَ بما لاَ تستطيعُ إنكارَهُ وَيظهرُ منكَ مَا لا تطيقُ سترهُ. فاقبلنا به إليكَ لتفصح فيه عَنْ نفسكَ وَتأمُر فيْه بأمْركَ».

قَالَ هيوافقراطيس: «الأخذ بالفضْل أحْسَن منَ المعَارضَة بالجهْل وَالصّفح عَنِ الإسَاءة آثَر عندَنا من المكَافاة؛ أقِرهُ. نسمَع مقالته وَننظرُ فِي دَعوَاهُ». ثمّ أقبلَ عَلى فيلمون فقال: «أيها المدّعي الكاذب انّى قلتَ مَا قلتَ وَما عُذرك فيمَا وَصَفْتَ؟».

قَالَ لهُ فيلمُون: «مَا قَالَتْ فراسَتي في الصُّورَة إلاّ صِدْقاً وَمَا ازدَادت فراسَتِي فيك حَيث رَأيتُ سجيّتك إلاّ بَصيرَة. الأمرُ كمَا ذكرتُ وَالصّدق أفضَل [36a] مَا تكلّم به: أعْلاَم الزِّنَى فيكَ ظَاهرَة وَشهوة النّسَاء عَليكَ غَالبَة فإنْ رَددتّها بعقْلك فعَسَى وَإنْ غَلبتْكَ فبالحرى».

قَالَ هيوافقراطيس: «مَا كذبتَ في المعْنَى ولاَ صَدقتَ في الدّعوَى: أمّا الشّهْوَة فشَديدة وَأمّا الفَاحشة فبعيدَة. فلاَ تهجّن علمك بالظّنُون ولاَ تجعَلنّ فراستك كاليَقين، فَإنّ الظنّ يخطئ وَيصيبُ وَالظّنّ منَ البَاطل قَريب فإيّاكَ وَاللإدعاء وَعليكَ بالاستبْراء. فإنّ في غريزة كُلّ إنسانٍ خصَالاً ثلَثاً: عقلاً يُدبّر به الأشيَاءَ وَشهوة يهتَاج بهَا للنّسَاء وَغضباً يمتنعُ به من الظّلْم. فالعَقْل سائس الجسَد وَبه يردّ الشّهوة والغضَب لأنّ الشّهْوة إذَا اهتَاجَتْ منكَ نازَعتك نفسَك الى قضاء اللذّة وَدعَاكَ الهوَى إلى رُكُوب الفَاحشَة، فإنْ لم تطلق نفسكَ عَن مَا دَعتكَ إليه الشّهوة وَلم تمتنعْ بعقلك من رُكُوب الفَاحشَة عريتَ من اسْمِ [36b] العقْل وَالزمتَ اسْم الجهْل. فَإنّما وضَعَ اللّهُ العقْل ليبْصر به حسن مَا يَأتي وَقبيح مَا يتقي لئلاّ يكون كالبهيمَة الّتي وضعَتْ فيها الشهوَة وجعلَ فيها الغضَب وَعريت منَ العقْل الّذي تبصرُ بِه القَبيح وتقبل به الأدَب وَتتفكّر به في الأشياء. فإن الإنسَان إنّما فُضّل عَلَى البَهيمَة بعقله وَلسَانه النّاطق وَلولاَ ذَلك لاستوتْ الغرائز في طبائع مَا جُبلاَ عَليْه لأنّ في البَهائم الشّهوَة الّتي تأكُلُ بهَا الطعَام وَتهتاج بهَا لِلسّفاد وَفيها غضَب تعاطي به الأذَى وَتهيج[7] عَلى الامتناع».

قَال فيلاَمُون: «وكيفَ يستطيعُ هَذا الإنسَان الذي وُضعَتْ فيْه الشّهوَة وَجعلَ تلك منهُ غَريزة أن يَردّ الشّهوة بعَقله أو يذهب الغَريزة بعقله؟ أو مَا بَال العَقْل إذَا

7 في الأصل: «وتهيجا».

he would make you admit what you cannot deny and would show what you cannot conceal. We have come here with him to you so that you can speak frankly about yourself in relation to this matter and give your orders concerning him.'

Hippocrates said, 'Accepting out of superiority is better than opposing from stupidity and avoiding misdeeds is preferable to us than being rewarded. I shall make him confess: we shall hear his speech and consider his claims.' Then he approached Polemon and said, 'You who make false claims, you liar, how come you said what you said? What is your excuse for the description you gave?'

Polemon replied, 'My physiognomy of your image only told the truth and when I saw your personal nature my physiognomy was only enlarged in its powers of perception. The matter is as I stated and truth is the best thing that was uttered [fo. 36^a]: the signs of lust in you are manifest and a desire for women dominates you. That you reject this by means of your intellect is possible; that it dominates you is more likely.'

Hippocrates said, 'You did not lie about the meaning (of the signs) nor did you tell truth in your assertion: as to the desire, it is violent, as to the depravity, it is far removed (from me). Do not impute failings to your science on account of suppositions and do not turn your physiognomy into certainty, because supposition can be wrong as well as right, and supposition is akin to falsehood. Be wary of false claims: you must refrain. In every man's natural disposition there are three properties: intellect, by means of which he manages things; desire, by means of which he is excited for women; and anger, by means of which he defends himself against wrong (done to him). In fact the intellect is the ruler of the body and thanks to it he can reject desire and anger. Indeed, when aroused in you, desire fights against you until pleasure is accomplished, and passion urges you to commit depravity; if you do not free yourself from what desire urges you to and you do not abstain, thanks to your intellect, from committing a depravity, you are not to be called [fo. 36^b] intelligent and are necessarily to be called stupid. For God established the intellect so that (a man) can discern with it the good of what he carries out and the ignominious in what he avoids, lest he be like a beast in which desire was established and anger was introduced but which is devoid of intellect with which it can discern what is ignominious, receive education, and contemplate things. Indeed man was made superior to beasts only by his intellect and his speaking tongue: if it were not for that, the natural dispositions would correspond to natures in the condition they were both created in, since in beasts there is desire by means of which they eat food and are excited to mount as well as anger by means of which they commit harm and are provoked to defend themselves.'

Polemon said, 'And how can this man, in whom desire was established and was made (his) natural disposition, reject desire or remove the natural disposition by means of his intellect? Or what about the intellect, since

كانَ إنّما هُوَ كإحدَى هَذه الخصَال الّتي وصفت؟ كانَ أولى بأن يذهب الشهوَة مِنهَا بأن تذهبه[8] او أخرى بأن يقهرهَا منهُ بأن تقهره».

قالَ لَه هيوافقراطيس: «إنّي لاَ أزعمُ بأنّ العَقل [37a] يَستَطيع أن يذهب الشّهوَة حتّى لاَ تكوُن وَلاَ أن يقهر الغضَب حتّى لاَ ينبَعث وَلكنّه قد يستَطيع أن يَرُدّ الشهوَة عن اهتياجهَا وَأن يسكن الغضَب بعدَ انبعاثِه حتّى يرُدّ كُلّ واحدٍ منهُمَا إلَى أصلِ الغَريزة بغَير اهتِيَاج». قالَ فيلاَمُون: «وكيف يَستطيع العَقل تسكِين المهتَاج وَقَد ضَعُفَ عنهُ قبل الاهتياج؟».

قالَ هيوافقراطيس: «إنْ كَانَت الشّهْوة والغضَب قد يَسكُنَان ويَهْتَاجَان وَيدخلهُمَا الزيادَة وَالنقصَان فقَد يستَطيع العَقل تسكينهُمَا بَعْد اهتيَاجهمَا وَنقصَانهمَا بَعدَ زيادَتهما. وَإن كَانَا[9] عَلى حَالٍ وَاحدَة فليسَ ينبَغي أنْ يُسَمَّى وَاحد منهُمَا مُهتاجاً ولا سَاكناً لأنّهُ لاَ يقالُ لمَا لم يسكُنْ أنّهُ مُهتاج ولاَ لما لم يهج أنهُ سَاكِن ولاَ يُوصَفُ بالسُّكُون إلاّ مَا قَد يقع عَلَيْه الاهتِياج ولاَ [بالاهتياج][10] إلاّ مَا قَد يَدْخلهُ السُّكُون فليسَ تسكين المهتَاج بأعجَب مِن اهتياج السّاكِن. وَأنتَ قَد تقِرّ [37b] أنّ الشهوة قَد تكُون سَاكِنَة بشَيءٍ منهَا بقي عَلَيله] صَاحبهَا ثمّ تهتاج لشَيء[11] يفكّر فيْه الإنسَان ممّا تَرى عينهُ أو تنالهُ مجسّته. فإن غلبَ تفكيرهُ نَفَا ذَلكَ عَن عينه وكَفّ شَهْوتهُ وَجَعَلَ تفكيرَهُ عِناناً لنَفْسه وَ بصر عينه فيمَا يذهلهُ عمّا أعجبَ بمحَاسنه وَمجسة يده فيما يكره إليْه ممّا استلَذّ من صَاحبِه سَكنَتْ شَهْوتهُ وأبصر قصدهُ وَاقتصرَ عَلى حده فلم يفتقر بلذّة أصَابها عبثا لرجية ولاَ بغضبة غضبها ملمة لحقتهُ[و]كانَ ذلكَ مُتهماً».

ثُمّ إنّ فيلاَمُون ازدَادَ بمُرَاجَعة هيوافقراطيس يَقيناً ثم ان فيلامون بَعْدمَا فرغَ من مُراجعَة هيوافقراطيس أحبّ أن يبلُغ في علم الفراسَة بتوسّم العَين وَالنّظَر منَ الصُّورَة فجعَل مُعتمَد نَظره عَلى العَيْن وَاللّوْن وَالشّمائل وَالتذْكير وَالتأنيث فوضَعَ كِتَاباً في الفراسَة أثبت فيه الأعلام[12] التي ميّز بهَا بيْن النّاسِ وَالأخلاَق

8 في الأصل: «بأن تذهبه» (بدون نقط).
9 في الأصل: «كانتا» والتصحيح من ٣٢١٥.
10 في الأصل: «الاهتياج» والزيادة من ٣٢٤٥.
11 في الأصل: «للشيء».
12 في الأصل: «أعلام».

it is only one of these properties you have described? Would it be more appropriate for it to remove desire than for (desire) to remove it, or more likely for it to overcome (desire) than for (desire) to overcome it?'

Hippocrates said to him, 'In fact I do not declare that the intellect [fo. 37^a] can remove desire so it ceases to exist, nor that it can overcome anger so that it does not arise; but it is possible that it can return desire from its arousal and placate anger after it has been provoked with the result that it can drive both of them back to the foundations of the natural disposition without them being aroused.' Polemon said, 'And how can the intellect placate what has already been aroused since it was too weak to accomplish this before it was aroused?'

Hippocrates said, 'If desire and anger can (both) rest and be aroused, and (both) increase and diminution can affect them, then the intellect can placate them after they have been aroused and diminish them after they have increased. And if they were always in one and the same condition, it would not be possible to call one of them "aroused" or "quiet", because it cannot be said of something that was not quiet that "it is being aroused" nor of what was not aroused that "it is becoming quiet". In the same way you can describe as "becoming quiet" only something that is subject to arousal and the fact of being aroused can be attributed only to something that is subject to quiet; since quietening what has been aroused is no more astonishing than arousing what is quiet. You can admit [fo. 37^b] that desire sometimes remains quiet thanks to its master's continuing to control some part of it. Then it is aroused by something the man is thinking about when his eye sees it or his touch feels it. If his thought prevails he dismisses it from his eye, puts an end to his desire, and makes his thought a bridle to his soul. And his eye distinguishes what distracts him from the things whose attractions he appreciates, and the touch of his hand perceives on the part of its master what is disgusting to him from what he finds pleasant. Then his passion becomes quiet and he clearly discerns what he had in mind and stops himself on the verge of it; for he was not in need of a pleasure that he attained to idly and out of a mere wish, nor of an outburst of anger that he wrongly felt and that came over him out of suspicion.'[1]

Now Polemon stood better informed after his consultation with Hippocrates. Afterwards, when he departed from the consultation with Hippocrates, he wished to attain to a high degree in the science of physiognomy through observation of the signs of the eye and the consideration of form, and he chose as the trusted basis of his theory the eye, colour, good qualities, masculine and feminine traits, and he wrote a book on physiognomy in which he established the signs on the basis of which he distinguished people, the characters

[1] Possible corruption in text.

التي دلّ عليهَا وَالتَّمييز.

فكانَ أوّلَ مَا يبدأ [38a] بهِ كتَابَهُ ذَلِكَ أن قَالَ: إنِّي رأيتُ النَّاسَ عَاقلاً وجَاهلاً وَصَالحاً وَفَاسِداً وقوياً وَعَاجزاً وَفي كُلّ هَذا تفاضُل وَالعِلم الظَّاهِرُ في ذَلِكَ الفعَال. وَالفعل كلهُ على وجهَيْن: غريزة وَتصنُّع، وَلِكُلّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ الأمرَيْن شَواهِد تخبر عَنْهُ قبل ظهُورِه وَأعلام تَدلّ عليْهِ مَع الظهُور فَمَا دَلّك الشَّاهِد عليه فغريزة[13] وَما دَلّكَ عَليه العِلْم فتصَنُّع وَتَمَام المعرفَة لذلك بحُسن القياسِ. وَأَصْل القِياس في علمِ ذَلِكَ عَلَى وَجْهين: أحَدهُمَا يَدُلّ علَى الغَرِيزة وَالآخر يدُل على التَّصنُّع. فَأمَّا قياس الغَريزة ففراسَة في الخِلْقَة قَبل ظهُور الفعال وَأمَّا قيَاس التَّصنُّع فَوزن العَقْل بشَاهد العَقْل وَظَاهِر الصُّورة وَتأمُّل الهيئَة. وَسأُفَسِّرُ لكَ أعلامَ الوجْهَين جَميعاً فَلاَ تضيعنَّ التَّحفُّظ ولاَ تقضينَّ إلاَّ بعْدَ تثبُّت وَليكُن اليقظَة وَالحذَر منْكَ عَلى بالٍ، فإنَّ التَّصنُّع سيبينُ صنعة الفعْل فالعادة دُوْن الغَرِيزة ليخفى به فعَالهَا وَلولا [38b] ذَلِكَ ظَهَر فعَال كُلّ امرئ عَلى غريزته وَفهمتْ حَالَهُ من قِبل طبيعَته ورؤيته كما عرفت أخلاَق البهَائم وَفعَالها برُؤيتها وَهيئتها إذْ لم يكُن فيهَا تَصنُّع يَستُر أخلاَقهَا وَلا تداري به عمَّا في أنفُسهَا. وَإنَّما فضّل الله الإنسَان علَى سَائر الحيوَان بما جَعَل فيْه منْ قوَّة العَقْل التي يقيم بها نفسَهُ على القَصْد ممَّا تَدْعُوه إليه[14] الغَريزة حتَّى لاَ يكُون في حَالِ تقصِيْر وَلاَ إفراطٍ فيدخُلُ في حَدّ الفسَاد فمَن[15] قلّ عقلهُ استَقلَتْهُ غَرِيزتهُ وكانَت المعرفَة به أيسَر.

إعْلَم أنَّ فعَال كُلّ شيءٍ منَ الحيوَان إنَّما يكُون عَلى قَدرِ ما فيْه من القواتِ الثلاَث وَهيَ الشَّهوَة وَالغضَبُ وَالعَقْل فمدَار كُلّ فعَالٍ عَلى هَذِه الوُجُوه الثلثَة وعَن علّتها يَبدُو العَقْل وَتظهَر الحركَة. وَلِكُلّ قُوَّة منْ هَذِه القُوى فروع من الأخلاَقِ وَالعَقل لاَ يشبهُ بعْضُهُ بَعْضاً إلاّ أنَّها مُستحقَّة لكُلّ خلقٍ [أن] توصف من غلطٍ وَلينٍ وَسخاء وَبُخلٍ وَحرصٍ وَقنُوع وَنخانة وَترف [39a] وَشجَاعَة وَفرَق وَذَلِكَ عَلَى قَدرِ اتّفاقها وَاعتدَالهَا وَزيَادتَها وَنُقصَانها.

13 في الاصل: «الأول بغريزة»
14 في الاصل: «يدعوه إليها» والتصحيح من ٣٢٤٥.
15 في الاصل: «بمن» والتصحيح من ٣٢٤٥.

they indicated, and the manner of differentiation (between them).

This book of his begins [fo. 38ᵃ] with his statement that he perceived people to be intelligent and stupid, virtuous and corrupt, strong and feeble, and in all of this there is much variation. The apparent knowledge in this field is then (the consideration of) actions. Each action has two sides: natural disposition and dissimulation, and for each of these two there are pieces of evidence that inform us of it before it appears and signs that point to it as it appears. The evidence demonstrates to you natural disposition; the science demonstrates to you dissimulation. Perfect knowledge in this area comes from correct analogical deduction. The basis of analogical deduction in this science has two aspects: one of them demonstrates natural disposition and the other demonstrates dissimulation. Analogical deduction of the natural disposition consists in physiognomy of the internal constitution before actions are apparent; analogical deduction of dissimulation consists in evaluation of the intellect by the testimony of the intellect and of the external form together with careful consideration of the shape. I shall explain to you at the same time all the signs of the two aspects. Do not omit caution, do not judge unless you are completely certain, and have always in mind vigilance and care, since dissimulation will show fabrication of action and habit aside from the natural disposition and concealing its actions. Were it not [fo. 38ᵇ] for this, the actions of every man would be manifest according to his natural disposition and his state would be understood from his nature and the sight of him, just as the characters and actions of beasts are known by the sight of them and by their shape because there is no dissimulation in them to veil their character and to mask their psychological traits. Indeed God favoured man over the other animals with the faculty of the intellect He instilled in him, by which he steadies his soul against the goal towards which his natural disposition urges him, so that he shall not be in a condition of limitation or of excess and then enter into the confines of iniquity. In fact the natural disposition of the person whose intellect is small nearly overwhelms him and it is easier to know him.

Know that the actions of each animal are in proportion to the presence in it of the three faculties, viz, desire, anger, and intellect, and the crucial factor in all actions rests on these three aspects, and for this reason the intellect manifests itself and the impulse to act appears. For each one of these faculties there are derivatives of character and intellect and these are mutually dissimilar. Rather, for each physical constitution they deserve to be described in terms of coarseness and gentleness, generosity and meanness, craving and satisfaction, toughness and softness, [fo. 39ᵃ] courage and fear, and this according to their coincidence and proportion, their augmentation and diminution.

وَقد ادّعَى علم الطّبائع والأخلاَق صنفَان من أهْلِ العِلْم وَهُمُ المنجّمُون والأطِبّاء. فأمَّا المنجّمون فزَعمُوا أنّ الأخلاَق والصُّوَر إنمَّا وَقعَت عَلَى مَواليد النجُوم في الوَانها وَهَيْآتها وَسُعُودهَا ونُحُوسِهَا وَمِزَاجها وَطبَائعها ثم إذا رأوا القِياس عَلى هَذَا وما دلتهُم عَلَيْهِ النجُوم. وَأمّا الأطِبّاء فزعَمُوا أنّ الأخلاق وَالصُّوَر إنما كَانت عَلَى مزَاج الأخلاطِ الأرْبَعَة: المِرَّة السَّوْدَاء وَالمِرَّة الحمْراء[16] الدَّم وَالبَلغَم فِي زيَادَة بعْض ذَلك إلى بعْضٍ وَنقصَان بعضه عَنْ بعضٍ وَاعتلاء هَذَا لهَذَا وَهَذَا لهَذا. ثمّ حملُوا القِيَاس في ذَلكَ عَن مَا دلّتْهُم عَلَيْه المِزَاج من الحرَارَة وَالبُرُودة وَاليُبْس وَالرّطُوبَة وَأشبَاه ذَلكَ. وكُلّ هذَين الصّنفَين لعلم الفراسـ[ـة] مُقَوٍ[17] ولأهلهَا عَلى حُسن القيَاسِ شَاهِدٌ إن كانتِ الأمُور عَلى مَا وَصَفْنَا أو لَم تكُن، لأنّ علم الفراسَةِ إنّما هُوَ علم تجربةٍ وَشبْهٍ [39b] وَتأمّلٍ وَتحفُّظٍ وَقيَاسٍ وَاحترَاسٍ.

وَقَد تَفرّس قَومٌ فِي الخَيل وَالغَنَم والكِلاَبِ وَضُروب مِنَ الدّوَابِّ وَأدركوا بفراستِهم علم أسْرَارهَا وَأخبَارهَا قَبل أن يبدُوَا منهَا فعَالٌ وَذلِكَ عَلى التّجربَة الّتي وَقعَت علَى أشْبَاه تِلك الصّوَر في طُول الدّهْر لاَ يخلف أن يكون اختلاَفها وَجُودتها [و] غرائزهَا علَى نعتهَا وَصُوَرهَا. وَإنّما منَعَهُمْ مِنَ الفراسَة في الإنسَان مَا شبهَ عليهِم بهِ أهْل العَقْل من ضرُوب الأخلاَقِ السّيّئة الّتي ينازِعُونهَا بعُقُولهِم لِعَقْلهِم حتّى يردُّونهَا وَيشبّهُونهَا بمحاسِن الإنسَانِ الّتي ابدَاهَا[18] مِنهُم التّصنّع على غيْرِ حقيقَةٍ وَلاَ أصْل غَريزةٍ.

فامَّا أهل العُقول القليْلَة فقدْ كادَ النّاس يَعرفُون أخلاَقهُم لأنّهُ ليس فيهِم مِنَ العقْلِ مَا يخفي عَلَى المتأمّلِ طبيْعَة مَن نظَر إليْهِ وَليس من كَايدَكَ عَنْ طَبِيْعتهِ وَأدرَاكَ عَن خَلقهِ وَالقى دون[19] مَا غرّكَ منْهُ بستْر يخفيه عَلَيْك كَمَنْ إنّما بَاطِن أمْرِه وَظاهِرُه سَوَاء: [40a] مَا دَعَتهُ إليه الشّهوة اتّبعَهُ وَمَا حرّكَهُ علَيْهِ الغَضَب رَكبَهُ وَمَا غيشه من أمرٍ لمْ يدَارك عَنْهُ بعقْلٍ وَلم يستتر منك مُستتر.

وَقَد تفرّس قَوْمٌ في الأرضين وَالزُّرُوع وَالبِقَاع وَمنَابت الزُّرُوع وَالأشجار

16 في ٣٢٤٥ «الصفراء».
17 في الأصل وفي ٣٢٤٥: «مقوى».
18 في الأصل: «ابتداها» والتصحيح من ٣٢٤٥.
19 في الأصل: «العادونة» والتصحيح من ٣٢٤٥.

Two types of men of science have laid claim to the science of (human) natures and characters: astrologers and physicians. As for the astrologers, they declared that characters and forms are subject to the nativities of the celestial bodies, as regards their colours and shapes, their good or bad luck, their temperament and natures. Then they saw fit to apply analogical deduction to this and to the evidence of the celestial bodies. As for the physicians, they declared that character and forms are in accordance with the mixture of the four humours: black bile, red[2] bile, blood, and phlegm, in their mutual increase and decrease and the domination of one over the other and vice versa. Then in this they had recourse to analogical deduction on the basis of the level of hot, cold, dry, wet, etc. that the (man's) temperament showed. Each one of these two types (i.e. astrology and medicine) invigorates physiognomical science and proves to its exponents the excellence of analogical deduction, whether things are as we have described or not, because the science of physiognomy is simply a science of experience, resemblances, [fo. 39^b] careful consideration, caution, analogical reasoning, and prudence.

Some have practised physiognomy on horses, sheep and goats, dogs, and various types of beasts, and by physiognomizing them have attained knowledge of their secrets and information about them before the appearance of their actions. This was on the basis of their experience with similar forms over a long time, and it is not to be disputed that their differences, excellences, and natural dispositions accord with their description and forms (as given by the physiognomists). What has prevented their practising physiognomy on man is the kinds of bad character which people of intelligence can keep hidden (from physiognomists) and which they struggle against with their intellects, because of their cleverness, so that they may resist them and make them look like the good traits in people which dissimulation brings out in them with no regard for the truth or their fundamental natural disposition.

As for those endowed with little intelligence, people can almost know their characters (immediately) since they do not have enough intelligence to hide from someone who contemplates the nature of the one he observes carefully. Someone who tricks you about his nature, steers you away from his physical constitution, and throws a veil round the object of his deception to conceal it from you, is not like one in whom the internal and the external are the same: [fo. 40^a] the latter follows what desire urges him on to, commits what his anger incites him to, and cannot conceal from you, thanks to intelligence, what blinds him and is not hidden from you in any way.

Some have practised physiognomy on lands, fields, places, plantations of crops, and trees,

[2] 'yellow' in 3245.

فأبصَرُوا جُودَتَها وَطيبها وَرِقّتها ووَخامتها وَصحّتها وَمَا يصْلُح في بقعَةٍ من ضرُوب النّبات وَيعلق في كُلِّ مغرِسٍ من أنواعِ الشّجرِ بالأعلامَ التي فيها وَبِالاتٍ تَدلُّ عليهَا. وَإنّما أعطاهُم الله عزَّ وَجلَّ من علمٍ ذَلِكَ عَلَى طُول التّجربَةِ وَتَعليم أهْلِ المعرِفَة.

وَتفرّس قومٌ آخرُون في الغيُوم وَتَنَسُّم[20] الرّياح فعَرفُوا الحَوامِل مِنْهَا وَالمواطِر والعَواصِف وَاللواقح.

وَتَفرّس قومٌ آخرُون في الجواهِر فعَرفُوهَا عَلَى تشابه ألوَانهَا واتّفاقِ هَيْآتها بأعْلاَمهَا وَألوَانهَا وَآياتها فإنّ لكُلِّ باطنٍ ظاهِرًا يَدلُّ علَيْهِ وَلِكُلِّ غائبٍ شاهِدًا يخبرُ عَنْهُ وَذلك أنّ الله تبارك وَتعالى وَصَلَ ظاهِرَ الخَلْقِ [40b] ببَاطِنه وَخَفِيّهِ بوَاضِحِه ليُستَدلّ بهَذَا عَلَى هَذا وَيعرفُ هَذا بهَذا.

فأوّل علم الفِرَاسَة حُسْنُ التّأمّل وَإثبات التّوسُّم وَحفظ الصّورة عَلى خِلقتها وَالشمائل عَلى هيئتها ثم عرض ذلكَ شيئًا فشيئًا على اعلام الفراسة التي يستَدلُّ بها على الغرائز ثمّ الحُكْم بما وَقَعَ علَيه القِياس إلا أن يردّ فضْل عقل عَنْ سُوءِ الطبيعَة فلاَ يبدُو[21] من صَاحبها إلاّ الجميْل وَأولئك في النّاسِ قَليْل. وَسأفَسّرُ لكَ أعْلاَمَ الفرَاسَةِ وَآياتها وَالوُجُوه التي تقبس بهَا فإنّ علم الفراسة لاَ يُدرك مِن وَجْه وَاحدٍ فلْيكنِ التحفُّظ مِن شأنِك إن شاء الله.

بابُ الثلثَةِ الأصُول التي يدُورُ عليهَا عِلم الفراسَة

إعلم أنّ الفراسَة تدُورُ على ثلثة أصُول أوّلُهَا مَعْرِفة الصُّوَر بأشباهِهَا مِنَ الدّوابّ والثّاني مَعْرِفة خِلقَة التّأنيْث وَالتذكِيْر وَالثالِث مَعرِفة [41a] الشمائل بحَرَكَة الأوصَالِ.

بَابُ الفراسَة في الصُّوَر بأشباهِهَا من الدّوابّ

فأمّا الصّوَر فإن الله تبارَك وَتعالى جَعل في كُلِّ ضَربٍ مِنَ الخَلْق مُشابهًا مِنْ

20 في الأصل: «وتَنَسُّموا» والتصحيح من ٣٢١٥.
21 في الأصل: «يبدوا».

and have tried to perceive their excellence, goodness, fineness, unhealthiness, and healthiness and what type of plants were suitable for a certain place and what kind of trees would take in each plantation, using the signs that were in them and instruments that pointed to them: God—He is Powerful and Lofty—granted them to acquire some skill in this domain by virtue of the experience and the teaching of people of knowledge.

Others have practised physiognomy on clouds and the blowing of winds, and knew those which bring something: those which bring rain, those which are violent, and those which pollinate trees.

Others practised physiognomy on gems and classified them by the similarity of their colours and the coincidence of their shapes, by their signs, colours, and marks, since everything secret has something manifest that points to it and everything absent provides evidence giving information about it. In other words God—He is Blessed and Most High—connected the manifest part of the physical constitution [fo. 40[b]] with its secret part, and its hidden part with its apparent one, so that this can be inferred from that and that can be known from this.

The first principle of the science of physiognomy is attentive consideration, documentation of signs observed, memorizing of form in relation to internal constitution and of qualities in relation to its shape; then comes the gradual subjecting of all this to the signs of physiognomy on the basis of which natural dispositions are inferred; then judgement according to the principles of analogical deduction—except in cases where superior intelligence restrains (the person) from his evil nature so that only the good qualities appear in their master; but such people are rare. I shall explain you the signs of physiognomy, its marks, the methods of judging by analogy, since the science of physiognomy is not attained by one method alone: you must be cautious, God willing!

CHAPTER ON THE THREE FOUNDATIONS WHICH ARE THE PIVOT OF THE SCIENCE OF PHYSIOGNOMY

Know that physiognomy turns upon three foundations: the first is the knowledge of forms according to their similarities with animals, the second knowledge of the internal constitution of the feminine and the masculine, the third knowledge [fo. 41[a]] of innate qualities from the movement of the joints.

CHAPTER ON THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF FORMS ACCORDING TO THEIR SIMILARITIES WITH ANIMALS

As for the forms, God—He is Blessed and Most High—made for every type of creature another resembling it,

غَيره ففي بعض هَذا مشابه مِن هذا[22] ليعرف أنّ خالق الخَلق وَاحِدٌ وَأن الذِي صنَع هَذا هُو صَانعُ هَذا. ثم جعَل الإنسَان أجمع الخلق لتلك الأشباه لموضع الحجّة في غريزة العَقْل التي فضّلهُ الله بها ليعرفَ ذِلّتهُ مِنْ عزّته وَشبهه بما هُو دُونه وَفوقه فلاَ تبطَرْ وَلاَ تَستكبِرْ ولاَ تَستكثِر. ثمّ جَعَل الحيوَان مِنَ البهَائم كُلّها وَالسّباع وَالطّير وَالهوَام أقرب الخلقِ شبهاً بالإنسَان لموضع اللّحم وَالدّم وَالرّوح وَالعَقْل[23] وَالفِعَال وَالاحتِيال. ثم جَعَل الهِمَم وَالشِّيَم والشّهوة والغضَب وَالحركَة علَى قدْر الخلقِ وَالصُّورة. فأنتَ ترَى فيك مشَابه مِن غيْرك وَترى فِي غيْركَ مَا شبهك [41b] فَفعَلُ[24] كُلّ إنسانٍ عَلَى قَدر فِعَالِ شبْهه مِنَ الحيوَان. وَهَذا أصْل القياس فِي صوره فإذَا تحقق عندكَ فِي الإنسَانِ شَبيه دَابّة من الدّوابّ الحقت بِهِ من خلقه وَطبيعَتِه علَى مَا لَزمَهُ مِن شبهه.

بَابُ مَعْرفة التذكِير والتأنيث

فأمّا التذكير وَالتأنيث فإن الله تبارَك وتعَالى جَعَل كُلّ شيءٍ زَوجاً ليعرف وحدانيّته وَأنهُ لاَ شبيهَ لَهُ وَليكون النّسل في كُلّ أصْلٍ من اثنَين ذكَر وَأنثَى فَيصيرُ ذَلِك لقَاحاً نتاجاً وتكثُر بهِ العدّة ويعرف بهِ حَدث الخلق وزَواله وكون بعْضه ببعْضٍ وَتشابه بَعْضه ببَعْضٍ إذ لَمْ يَكُن لهُ تبارك وَتعالى شبهٌ ولاَ عدْل. فجعَل للذكورِ من الأشياء قوّة وَهمّة وَطوْلاً وَارتفاعاً عَن خلْقَة نظِيره من الإناثِ، فالتّذكِير دَلِيل مِنَ الذكور عَلى صَلاحِهم وَنَحْوِه والتّأنِيث فيهِم دَليلٌ علَى غيْر ذَلِك مِنَ الفسَادِ؛ وَكذلكَ التأنيث فِيْ [42a] الإناث دَلِيلٌ عَلى صَلاَح وَالتّذكير فيها دَلِيلٌ علَى فسَادٍ فهَذا قياس التذكير وَالتأنيث جَامعٌ لعلم ضروبٍ مِنَ الصّلاح وَالفسَادِ كثيرة فِي نحوهَا وسأفسّرُ لك وُجُوه ذَلك إن شاء الله.

بابُ مَعْرِفة الشمَائل بحركةِ الأوْصَالِ

وَأمّا مَعرفة الشمائل عَلَى تحريك الأوصَالِ فإنّ الله تبَارك وَتَعالى جَعل حَركة

22 فِي الاصل ايضا: ففي بعض هَذا مشابه من هَذا.
23 الرّوح والعقْل: فِي ٣٢٤٥ الأخلاط.
24 في الاصل فيعقل بدون نقط والتصحيح من ٣٢٤٥.

and for this last another resembling it, so that we might know that the Creator of the creation is One and the Maker of the first is also the Maker of the last. Then he made man the creature who more than others unites (all) these similarities with the objective of demonstrating the natural disposition of the intellect by which God favoured him (over the other creatures), so that (man) may know of his lowliness with respect to His glory, and his similarity to the ones that are inferior or superior to him. So do not be proud, display arrogance, and demand too much! Then He made the animals—the domestic and the wild beasts, the birds and the reptiles—the most like man out of all His creation in respect of flesh, blood, spirit, intellect,[3] actions and cunning. Then He made the intentions and the traits, desire, anger, and movement in accordance with the physical constitution and the form. So you can see in you what is similar to another [i.e. an animal] as you can see in another [i.e. an animal] what is similar to you [fo. 41^b], since the actions of every man correspond to the actions of the animal which is similar to him. This is the foundation of analogical deduction from forms. When you are certain of the similarity of a man to a particular beast, then you can attribute to him the same temper and nature that pertain to (the beast) which is similar to him.

CHAPTER ON KNOWING MASCULINE AND FEMININE TRAITS

As to masculine and feminine traits, God—He is Blessed and Most High—made everything in pairs so that man can know that He is One and has no Similar, and so that procreation in every generation would come from two, male and female, and this would be by insemination and parturition, and by this the number would grow, and by this would be known the coming-to-be and ceasing of creatures, their mutual existence and their mutual similarity, since He—He is Blessed and Most High—has no Like and no Equal. For the male He made force, resolution, power, and superiority in comparison with the corresponding internal constitution of the female. Having masculine traits is a sign in males of their (enjoying a) proper condition and the like, while having feminine traits in them points to something different, pertaining to corruption. And equally feminine traits in [fo. 42^a] females points to (their enjoying) a proper condition, while masculine traits in them points to corruption. This process of analogical deduction of masculine and feminine traits assembles the knowledge of manifold types of properness and corruption. I shall explain to you the ways of this, God willing.

CHAPTER ON KNOWING THE QUALITIES THROUGH THE MOVEMENT OF THE JOINTS

As to knowledge of the qualities through the movement of the joints, God—He is Blessed and Most High—made the movement

[3] 'humours' in 3245.

كُل ذي عَقْلٍ عَلى طبيعَته وَهمَّتهِ وَعَلى قدر ضعفهِ وَقوَّتهِ الباطِنة او همَّته الغَالبَة بما استَرخَى منهُ أو آشتدَّ وَمن ضَعْف تِلك القُوَّة التي تقيم ذَلك الشَّيء منهُ او قوَّتها أوْ زيادَتها أو نقصَانها وَما تحرّك منهُ أوصَالهُ أو حَواشيه أو جَوانبه وَمنْ همَّته وَمَا حَدَّثَ بِهِ نفسهُ.

ففِي هَذِه الأصُول الثَّلَثة جَميع علم الفراسَة وَلكُلّ أصْلٍ منها معَالِم كثيرةٌ ومقاييس مُختلفة محقوق بالتَّحفُّظ وَالتثبيت بهَا. وسَأفسّرُ لكَ منْ كُلّ أصْلٍ من هَذِه الأصُول الثلاثَةِ وُجُوهاً [42b] تَعتَبر بهَا وَأضَع لكَ أئمة تحتَذي عليهَا وَأخبركَ عَمَّا أنتَ عليه بتجربتي فِي تأمُّل مَا تأملت وَصُحبَة من صَحبت لِتتَّخذ ذَلكَ عَوناً على قياسك وَنَظركَ وَتجربتك إنْ شاء الله.

of each creature endowed with intellect accord with its nature and intention, and corresponding to its weakness and internal power, or corresponding to its dominant intention, by means of its loose and tight (elements) and because of the weakness of that faculty which governs this with respect to him, or its force or its increase or decrease, (and by means of) the movements of his joints, or his extremities or his flanks, and in relation to his intention and what he makes up his mind to do.

The entire science of physiognomy consists of these three foundations. Each one of them has many marks and different criteria which have been verified through attentiveness and corroboration. For each one of these three foundations I shall explain to you factors [fo. 42^b] you can take into account and I am writing for you criteria you can be guided by. I am also informing you about what you must do on the basis of my experience of considering my thoughts and associating with people, so that—God willing—you can take this as an aid for your (employment of) analogical deduction, observation, and experience.

10

The *Physiognomy* of Adamantius the Sophist

Ian Repath

I. THE AUTHOR AND HIS DATE[1]

A pagan,[2] and described as a sophist by the manuscripts, Adamantius' (Ad.) dates are not easy to determine with any great precision. He is probably identical with the Adamantius who wrote a treatise 'On Winds', the style of which dates it to after the third century AD. On the other hand he did not live later than the middle of the next century, if, as seems likely, the Adamantius to whose cures Oribasius refers at many points of his *Synopsis* (an epitome of his medical compendia sent to the Emperor Julian) was identical with the physiognomist. Indeed at one of these points (7. 6) Oribasius talks of Ad. in the past tense, implying that he was dead by that time.[3] A potential clue to his date can be found at the end of the first chapter, where he addresses a certain Constantius: 'But since, dearest Constantius, you have challenged me to provide you with this work, I have been encouraged by your desire and I have given it without hesitation, or "willing but with unwilling heart", to quote Homer. To such an extent can the desire to please a friend change a decision based on one's wishes' (A1). However, the identity of this Constantius is completely unknown, and Foerster is rightly sceptical that Ad. could have been in a position to address the Emperor Constantius in this way.

II. THE WORK

The *Physiognomy* of Ad. is essentially an abridgement of Polemon's treatise, even if the author does start by citing Aristotle and anonymous others as sources: 'Having studied the system of physiognomy in Aristotle and acquired more knowledge of it from Polemon than from others. . .' (A1). He soon describes his

[1] In what follows, esp. Parts I–IV, I am indebted to Foerster (1893) i, pp. c–cxxiii. On Ad. see Follet (1989).

[2] 'I decided I should establish in writing a great benefit for posterity, like a holy image in a sacred enclosure, as it were' (A1).

[3] Oribasius also refers to him on weights and measures, 2. 59.

work more accurately: 'And so I chose to paraphrase the work of Polemon' (A1), but even then this is misleading; for firstly, to judge by the Leiden Polemon, he clearly omits both the examples by which Polemon had illustrated his verdicts, especially in the long eye section, and also the lengthy 'predictive' chapters from the end.[4] Second, he radically abbreviates the chapter on the importance of the signs positioned outside the eyes, with which the first chapter in the Leiden Polemon finishes, and the following chapter on the physiognomical calculation to be had from animals and the masculine and feminine types (B1 and 2).[5]

The argument that we are dealing with an abridgement rather than a paraphrase or amalgamation of previous sources encounters a potential problem when Ad. says that he also chose 'to add to the discipline the things I have discovered' (A1). But in fact it seems that what he might have added amounts to almost nothing; for the *prima facie* plausible argument, that whatever is missing in the Leiden Polemon is Adamantian, does not stand up to closer scrutiny, since there are several things missing in this too, most obviously any kind of prologue. It is very unlikely that Polemon's treatise should have lacked a prologue, and it is as improbable that so unoriginal an author as Ad. could have written such a prologue as we find in his work itself. And in any case some of A2–4 is paralleled in Anon. Lat. and the Topkapı Arabic recension (see Chs. 7 and 9). Moreover we can be certain that several things in the description of signs which survive in Ad., but which are lacking in the Leiden manuscript, are not the work of Adamantius, and were instead omitted by either the Arabic translator or his later copyists, because Anon. Lat. has them.

It even seems that Ad. did not depart far from his model in sentence structure, for the sole intact sentence of the Polemonian work which comes down to us is nearly identical with the beginning of Ad. A5. More broadly the contents of Ad.'s work are very similar to those found in the Arabic and Latin treatises, and they are ordered almost exactly as in the Leiden Polemon. The statement that in his 'paraphrase' he will be 'preserving by clarity of expression a universal boon for those who will encounter it' (A1) is also open to doubt: as far as we can tell from Anon. Lat. he retained the vast majority of terms he found in the original, and even where his choice of word differs from that of his Latin counterpart, it is not always easy to tell whose term is the commoner.

III. THE TEXT

Twelve of the thirteen known manuscripts were collated by Foerster. Of these the first five below contain the whole text, while the remaining seven stop halfway through B36.

[4] 'It is not necessary to indicate all the definitions of the appearances of men, but only those which are worth mentioning; for from these it is not difficult to know the rest too' (B43). See Leiden Polemon, chs. 67–70 with Ch. 1, p. 12 and Ch. 3, pp. 177–8.

[5] He does show some divergence, displacing 'on eunuchs from birth' (B3) from A20 and making it independent. Cf. p. 177 n. 204.

Siglum	*Date (century)*	*Library information*
M	15th	Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, gr. 234 (667)
L	15th	Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana Medicea, plut. 71. 30
P	16th	Paris, Bibliotheque nationale de France, ms. gr. 2119
F	16th	Paris, Bibliotheque nationale de France, ms. gr. 1943
U	1656	Munich, Bayerische Staatbsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 583
V	15th	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1411
H	15th	London, British Library, Harley 6299
K	15th	Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III, Garp 19
A	16th	Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Q. 13 Sup.
N	15th	Naples, Biblioteca dell'Oratorio dei Gerolamini, XXII.1
B	16th	Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Voss. gr. Q. 28
C	16th	Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin — Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Phillipps 1576

Most are of no independent value in determining the text, because they flow from surviving manuscripts or editions. According to Foerster, U is dependent on an edition which is itself dependent on an edition of F, P comes from L, and L and F from M. B and C come from V through a common source, N,[6] A comes from K, and K and H from V. Thus two manuscripts remain, one intact, M, one truncated, V. A third, non-extant manuscript should be added, S, made known to us by Sylburg, who in 1587 accurately reported its readings. S, like M, contains the whole work, and since it agrees with M in many places, even in bad readings, it should be thought to have flowed from the same source, y. There are places at which M and S retain the correct reading, and others at which V is more reliable, so the authority of both families needs to be considered. Where M and S and V agree is denoted by x.

After Foerster's death Adolf Deissmann reported another fifteenth-century manuscript of Adamantius in the same library as K. This will need to be consulted by anyone proposing to re-edit the text scientifically; but it is plain that it descends from V.[7]

The state of the text which the archetype, x, of the manuscripts preserves has not left as many errors for posterity to correct as there are in the other physiognomical writers.[8] Having said that, Foerster, as will be clear from the notes to the translation, was a relatively interventionist editor. I have noted the

[6] N is the source postulated in Foerster (1893) i, pp. cxiv, cxviii and there termed z. See Foerster (1897), (1925–6).

[7] This is Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III, Garp 64. See Deissman (1933) 96.

[8] Cf. the corresponding section on the textual tradition of Anon. Lat., pp. 552–3. Nevertheless the number of those who have edited or commented on the text is not negligible: see Foerster (1893) i, pp. cxvi–cxxiii. No help can be obtained from the 15th-c. Latin version of Ad., since it is merely a translation of V or of a MS cognate with it.

points at which he either inserts or deletes, or suggests inserting or deleting, a word or phrase on the basis of Anon. Lat., the Leiden Polemon, Ps.-Polemon, or the Madrid epitome (see Section IV for these last two), or where he proposes his own reading or follows that of another editor. I have not noted relatively trivial emendations which are obvious corrections. The dangers of emending, and to a certain extent reconstructing, a text which is an epitome on the basis of other texts which are themselves not, and do not necessarily claim to be, entirely faithful renderings of the same text, are obvious. The notes should enable the reader to judge whether or not Foerster's interventions enhance the text justifiably.

IV. AN EPITOME OF AN EPITOME AND PS.-POLEMON

Ad.'s work itself was epitomated in the early Byzantine period: this is known as the Madrid epitome (Matr.), a badly mutilated and defective fragment of which is extant in Ma, a manuscript of the fourteenth century.[9] It starts part of the way through Ad. A11, breaks between the end of A23 and the beginning of B3 and again between the end of B9 and the beginning of B33, and finishes at the end of B59.[10]

The complete version of this epitome, or something similar, was the main source of the text which has come down to us under the name of Polemon (Ps.-Pol.), but which was written by a late Byzantine author.[11] There are six extant manuscripts of this work, with another lost, but only two are of any value; neither flows from the other and each has its own authority. Matr. or its cousin was not the sole source, for in the descriptions of the bitter and the mild man (equivalent to Ad. B53–4) Ps.-Pol. mixes Ps.-Arist. in with Ad.; he also adds to these from 70 to 86 what he saw or thought was missing from Ad., drawing both from other sources and from a version of Ps.-Aristotle which was slightly fuller than the one which has reached us.[12] This explains why Ps.-Pol. is fuller than Ad. at certain places (e.g. A5) and may go some way to explaining the different order. Ps.-Pol. covers the equivalent of A2 to part-way through A4, A5–13, A15–23, B3–31, B33–7, B41–2, and B44–61.[13]

Although Matr. and Ps.-Pol. do not expand our knowledge of ancient physiognomy, they contribute a great deal to correcting the text of Ad., to which end Foerster includes them below his edition of Ad.[14] Given that they are witnesses rather than valuable texts in their own right, and in spite of their lacunose state, Foerster endeavoured to make corrections only where he could

[9] See Foerster (1900) for the Paris Epitome (Codex Parinus gr. 2506) (Par.), which came to light after the publication of *Scriptores Physiognomonici*, and which is a similar, but fuller, version of the text contained in Matr. Its readings are taken into account at A5 and B53.

[10] Discounting smaller lacunae.

[11] For the relationship between these later epitomes, see Foerster (1886) and (1900).

[12] Foerster prints these chapters separately, (1893) i. 427–31.

[13] Discounting smaller lacunae.

[14] Foerster reorders the chapters of Ps.-Pol. so that they correspond to those of Ad.

do so with any certainty, even though the rest of the text does not always make sense.

V. THE TRANSLATION

My aim in this translation, where the constructions of the original allow, is to be as accurate and literal as possible. This does not always lead to the production of the most aesthetically pleasing English, but at places the Greek itself is repetitive, and it is not the duty of a translation of this sort to misrepresent the original. I have tried as far as is practicable to translate individual words consistently throughout, except where the same word clearly or possibly carries different meanings in different situations. One example is *phrontistēs*, which generally seems to mean 'thoughtful' (A6, 15, 19, 20, 21, B21, 41), but in negative contexts has been translated as 'worried' (B21, 26, 28).[15] A related problem is where Anonymus Latinus and/or Leiden interpret a Greek word quite differently from the way we have. A clear example is the word *aniaros*, which can mean 'troublesome' or (less frequently) 'distressed'. Adamantius (Polemon) seems to use it only in the active sense, and that is how it has been rendered here. But the ambiguity is recognized by Anonymus Latinus in his 'tristem atque tristificum' (ch. 56 = B22). Elsewhere Anonymus and Leiden take it passively. Another sort of problem is caused by words that are, or are nearly, synonyms; for instance, at A19 we are told that a certain sort of eye denounces *machlosynē* and *margosynē*, between the meanings of which (lust, lewdness, gluttony, wantonness, etc.) there would not seem at first glance to be much to choose. Yet help can be gleaned from the lists of traits which are signified by the various signs. At A7 we are told that 'large trembling eyes' are signs of 'madness and wantonness (*machlosynē*) and gluttony (*gastrimargia*) and drunkenness (*oinophlygia*) and lasciviousness (*lagneia*)',[16] where the last three terms have reasonably specific meanings and seem to be a list of what the first comprises. So at A19 I have taken *machlosynē* and *margosynē* to mean 'lewdness and wantonness', but it should be clear from this that translating such words occasionally involves distinctions which force the meaning of the Greek.

One particular minefield for the translator is colour terms, and I have aimed overall for plausibility and consistency. Some terms are relatively straightforward (e.g. 'black' and 'white'), but given the importance of the physiognomy of the eye and its manifold colours in texts descended from Polemon's treatise, there are some subtleties and obscurities which are hard either to reproduce in

[15] It should be noted that it occurs twice in B21 in the space of three lines with each meaning.
[16] Cf. A9.

English, or even to decipher, especially given occasional textual complications. Below is a list of the more difficult terms and their translations:

glaukos	Light blue
charopos	Dark blue
aiolos	Variegated/changeable
ōchros	Pale-yellow
xanthos	Pale (B31, B32), pale-yellow (A11), yellow (B37, B46)
hypochlōros	Pale
melanchlōros	Sallow
chlōros	Yellowy-green
kyanous	Dark
pyrros	Red
pyrōdēs	Red
haimatōdēs	Blood-red

See Elsner in Ch. 4, pp. 218–24 on Polemon's likely approach to colour (taking account of brilliance as well as hue) and for specific discussion of some of the terms in this list.

ΑΔΑΜΑΝΤΙΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΟΥ
ΦΥΣΙΟΓΝΩΜΟΝΙΚΑ

ΑΔΑΜΑΝΤΙΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΟΓΝΩΜΟΝΙΚΩΝ Α΄

A1. Τὴν φυσιογνωμονικὴν μέθοδον ἀπό τε Ἀριστοτέλους ἀναλεξάμενος καὶ ταύτην ⟨ἐκ Πολέμωνος⟩[1] ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ ἐξ ἄλλων ἐρανισάμενος αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιτυγχάνων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγγυμνασάμενος ἔγνων χρῆναι καθάπερ σηκοῖς ἱεροῖς ὡς ἄγαλμα σεμνὸν ἐνιδρῦσαι τοῖς γράμμασι μέγα τοῖς μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἐσόμενον ὄφελος· ἐπεὶ σιγώντων μέν ἐστιν ἀπόκρισις, λαλεῖ δὲ οἷον τοῖς σημείοις ἡ φύσις τοὺς τρόπους ἑκάστου κηρύττουσα. διὸ παραφράσαι[2] μὲν τὰ Πολέμωνος εἰλόμην τῷ κοινῷ τῆς λέξεως κέρδος κοινὸν τοῖς ἐντευξομένοις περιποιούμενος προσθεῖναί τε καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν γνωσθέντα τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ ταῦτα γράψας ἐτήρουν τὴν ἔκδοσιν μετὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον βίον τοῖς φιλολόγοις χρήματα καλὰ παιδείας θησαυριζόμενος· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐκπονηθέντων ἡμῖν προῃρούμην ἀγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον τὴν κατὰ τῶν ζώντων ἐπιβουλὴν ὑφορώμενος ἀπὸ φθόνου μὲν φυομένην, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ κατὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀκολουθεῖν εἰθισμένην. ἐπεὶ δέ, φίλτατε Κωνστάντιε, παρασχεῖν σοι τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς προεκαλέσω τὸ σύγγραμμα, τῷ πόθῳ σου παρακληθεὶς δέδωκα τὴν συγγραφὴν μὴ μελλήσας ἑκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ κατὰ τὸν Ὅμηρον εἰπεῖν.[3] τοσοῦτον ἄρα φιλικὴ χάρις οἶδε μεταθεῖναι κρίσιν βουλήσεως.

A2. Θείων δὲ ἀνδρῶν εἴπερ ἄλλο τι καὶ τὸ φυσιογνωμονεῖν εὕρημα πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα τοὺς μαθόντας δυνάμενον ὠφελεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ παρακαταθήκην δοίη τις ἂν οὔτε τι κειμήλιον, ἢ γαμετὴν ἢ παῖδας πιστεύσειεν, ἢ καὶ φιλίας ἁπλῶς ἡστινοσοῦν κοινωνήσειε τοῖς ἀπιστίας ἢ ἀσελγείας ἤ τινος κακουργίας ἐπὶ τῆς μορφῆς σημεῖα προλάμποντα φέρουσι. πάντων γὰρ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπων καθάπερ ἀπό τινος θεοπέμπτου καὶ ἀπλανοῦς μαντείας ἦθος καὶ πρόθεσιν βίων ὁ φυσιογνώμων ἐπίσταται, ὡς τὰς μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν φιλίας μόνων αἱρεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν κακίας πρὸ πείρας φυλάττεσθαι. διόπερ τοῖς σώφροσι προσήκει πάσῃ σπουδῇ ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐκπονεῖν τὴν σημείωσιν. φυσιογνωμονεῖν δὲ ⟨δεῖ⟩[4] μάλιστα σκοποῦντα τὸ ἐξηλλαγμένον παρά τε τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὸ χωρίον εἶδος. πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀπᾴδοντα τῆς τε ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦ ἔθνους σημεῖα πρόσεστιν, ἅτινα πρόδηλον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ εἴδους κατάληψιν, προδηλοτέραν δὲ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ ἔθνη προσόντα σημεῖα. ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ὅλου γένους κατὰ φῦλα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιγνῶναι τοὺς τρόπους, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ἐθνῶν τὰ μὲν

Note: The text of Adamantius is lightly adapted from Foerster (1893) i, 297–426

[1] Foerster adds the necessary ἐκ Πολέμωνος.

[2] See above, Section II.

[3] The allusion is to Hom. *Il.* 4. 43, where Zeus reluctantly accedes to Hera's request that the

THE *PHYSIOGNOMY* OF ADAMANTIUS THE SOPHIST, BOOK 1

A1. Having studied the system of physiognomy in Aristotle and acquired more knowledge of it from Polemon[1] than from others, and practising it in the very deeds of men I came across, I decided I should establish in writing a great benefit for posterity, like a holy image in a sacred enclosure, as it were; for it is the response of things that are silent, although the nature of each man speaks, as it were, announcing his character traits by signs. And so I chose to paraphrase[2] the work of Polemon, preserving by clarity of expression a universal boon for those who will encounter it, and also to add to the discipline the things I have discovered. Having written this over a period of time, I was reserving its publication until after my life, storing up fine elements of learning for educated men; for I did not choose to bring into the open any of my other works, since I suspected the plot against the living that arises out of envy and very commonly follows against the good. But since, dearest Constantius, you have challenged me to provide you with this work, I have been encouraged by your desire and I have given it without hesitation, or 'willing but with unwilling heart', to quote Homer.[3] To such an extent can the desire to please a friend change a decision based on one's wishes.

A2. Physiognomy in particular is a discovery of divine men which is able to confer the most and the greatest benefits on those who study it; for no one would give a deposit or entrust an heirloom, his wife, or his children, or even share any kind of friendship whatsoever with those who bear obvious signs of dishonesty, licentiousness, or any wrongdoing in their appearance; for the physiognomist knows, as if by some God-given and unerring art of prophecy, the character and purpose of the lives of practically all men, in order to choose the friendships of the good alone, and to guard against the vices of the bad before having to experience them. Therefore sensible men should work at the observation of this art with all enthusiasm. It is necessary[4] for the physiognomist to pay particular attention to an appearance which has been changed contrary to both age and place; for many men have signs which are dissonant with both their age and race, which make the understanding of their appearance clear, but the additional signs of city and race make it clearer; for it is easy to recognize the character traits of the men of a whole race, tribe by tribe, but the signs common

fighting, which will lead to the destruction of his favourite city, should recommence.

[4] Foerster inserts δεῖ.

ἐπίκοινα σημεῖα πάνυ ὀλίγα, κατ' ἄνδρα δὲ μάλα διαφέρει τὰ σημεῖα. Αἰγυπτίοις μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἔπεστι κοινὰ σημεῖα, ἐξ ὧν τὸ γένος ἅπαν φυσιογνωμονεῖται, καὶ Αἰθίοψιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Σκύθαις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις κατὰ γένος, ὡς καὶ ἐν ὑστέρῳ λεχθήσεται,[5] ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ μεγάλα τὰ διάφορα τῶν σημείων. καὶ γὰρ δεῖ γνῶναι μᾶλλον κατ' ἄνδρα, ὡς ἰδίᾳ διαφέρουσιν, ἢ κατὰ ἔθνη. οὕτω τὸ κατ' ἄνδρα φυσιογνωμονεῖν ἀτρεκέστατόν[6] ἐστι.

A3. Τῶν δὲ σημείων αἱροῦ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ δοκιμώτατα καὶ ἄλλοις ἄλλων μᾶλλον πείθου· ἄλλα γὰρ ἄλλων δυνάμει προέχει. μέγιστον δὲ αἱ μίξεις τῶν σημείων τὸ διάφορον ἀπεργάζονται ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ ἤθη καὶ βουλεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῆς μίξεως τῶν σημείων κατανοεῖται. συμβαίνει δὲ ⟨καὶ⟩ ἐκστάσεις[7] τινὰς γίνεσθαι τοῦ εἴδους παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς χαρέντων ἢ λυπουμένων ἢ θυμωθέντων ἢ φοβουμένων[8] ἢ ἐπὶ νηστείᾳ ἢ ἐπὶ πλησμονῇ ἤ τινι ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἢ σκεπτομένων ἢ ὁρώντων ἢ ἀκουόντων. καὶ πᾶν μὲν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συντυχίαις οὐ τρέπεται τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἀκίνητα μένει τῶν σημείων. ὁπόσα δὲ καὶ μεθίσταται, οὐκ ἴσον πᾶσι μεταστήσεται, ἀλλὰ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἑκάστῳ ἐγγύς. χρὴ δὲ ἐννοεῖν, ὡς ὁποῖα ἐν πάθει ἑκάστῳ σημεῖα ἐπιγίνεται, τοιαῦτα εἴ τις ἔχει, μάλιστα τὸ πάθος αὐτῷ ἐνίδρυται, ὅπερ ὑπὸ τῶν σημείων δηλοῦται. οἷον ἐὰν σημεῖα ἔχῃ, ὁποῖα τοῦ βουλευομένου ἐστί, φροντιστικὸν καὶ εὔβουλον τοῦτον λέγε. ἕτερος ἐὰν ἔχῃ σημεῖά τινα τοῦ δόλον ἢ ἀπάτην τινὰ τυρεύοντος, κἂν μὴ παρ' ὃν καιρὸν αὐτὸν ὁρᾷς δόλον τότε ἀρτύῃ τινά, τοῦτον ἀποφαίνου δολερόν. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κἂν ⟨εἰ⟩ θυμουμένου τις ἔχων σημεῖα [κἂν] μηδεμιᾷ τότε συνέχοιτο ὀργῇ, ὀργίλον αὐτὸν ἐρεῖς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν παραφυλάξεις ὁμοίως.

A4. Ὁπόσοις γε μὴν γυναικεῖον εἶδος ἐπιπρέπει[9] ἔν τε τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὰ μὲν εἰς ἡδυπάθειαν καὶ ἀφροδίτην εἰσὶ γυναικεῖοι, τολμηροὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναιδεῖς καὶ πανουργίαις καὶ ἀπάταις καὶ ἀπιστίαις χαίροντες· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα γυναικεῖα. ὅσοι δὲ νέοι ὄντες εἶδος ἔχουσι γηραιόν, οὗτοι δειλοὶ καὶ δύσκολοι καὶ ὕποπτοι καὶ φειδωλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς καὶ εὔβουλοι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ τῷ γήρᾳ πρόσεστιν, ἔχουσιν.

Ὅσοι δὲ αὖ εἰς γῆρας εἴδη διαφυλάττουσι παιδικά, οὗτοί εἰσι φιλοπαῖκται φιλογέλωτες κακῶν ἀπαθεῖς ἁπλοῖ καὶ συνελόντα εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὅ τι κέκτηνται. γίνεται δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ⟨καὶ⟩ εἴδη ὀρνιθοειδῆ τε καὶ θηριοειδῆ, οὐ παντελῶς, ἀλλὰ τρόποις ἐξεικασμένα τοῦ

[5] See B31–2.

[6] Foerster replaces x's ἐντρεχέστατον ('most skilful') with ἀτρεκέστατον from Ps.-Pol.

to the races themselves are very few, and the signs vary a great deal from man to man; for all Egyptians have signs in common, from which the whole race can by analysed physiognomically, as do Ethiopians, and Scythians too, and the other races of men, as will also be mentioned later,[5] but the differences of each individual man's signs are great; for it is also necessary to judge man by man how they differ individually, rather than by race. Thus conducting physiognomy on a man-by-man basis is the most exact.[6]

A3. Choose the greatest and most notable of the signs and believe some more than others; for some are more significant than others. And the combinations of the signs make the greatest difference in the art; for the many characters and plans of men are discerned from the combination of the signs. Sometimes there are alterations[7] of the appearance from what is normal in those who are rejoicing or grieving, angered or fearful,[8] who are fasting, full, or desirous of something, or who are considering, seeing, or listening. But the whole appearance is not changed in such circumstances, for there are also those signs which remain unmoved. And those signs which change do not do so equally in every case, but according to the nature of each man. And one must consider that if someone has the sort of signs that occur in each state, the state that is indicated by the signs is particularly established in him. So if he has the sort of signs which belong to a man who is deliberating, say that he is thoughtful and prudent. If another man has some signs of one who is cooking up some deceit or treachery, mark this man down as treacherous, even if he is not devising some kind of treachery at the moment at which you see him. In the same way, even if someone with signs of an angry man is not afflicted by any anger at that point, you will say that he is irascible. And you will similarly watch out in the case of the other states.

A4. Those who have a conspicuous[9] feminine appearance in their eyes and the other signs, are womanly in luxury and sex, but are daring and shameless and rejoice in villainy, treachery, and faithlessness; for these things also belong to women. Those who are young, but who have an aged appearance, are cowardly and bad-tempered and suspicious and parsimonious and cautious and prudent and possess all the other good and bad qualities which belong to old age.

On the other hand, those who preserve a childish appearance into old age are playful, fond of laughter, unbowed by sufferings, simple and in sum are like the appearance which they have. There are also in men birdlike and bestial appearances, not completely,

[7] ἐκστάσεις. Schneider's emendation of x's ἐνστάσεις ('objections' or 'interferences').
[8] Foerster replaces x's θυμουμένων ('being angry') with φοβουμένων from Ps.-Pol.
[9] Foerster replaces x's ἐπιτρέχει ('runs at/over') with ἐπιπρέπει from Ps.-Pol.

μὲν πλέον, τοῦ δὲ ἔλασσον τοῦ θηριοειδοῦς ἔχοντος. εἰς ὅ τι οὖν τοῦ θηρίου ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φέρει καὶ εἰς ὅσον, κατὰ τοῦτο χρὴ φυσιογνωμονεῖν αὐτόν. καὶ εἰ πολλῶν δὲ θηρίων συντρέχοιεν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον τύποι, ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων χρὴ φυσιογνωμονεῖν αὐτόν· ὅσα γὰρ εἴδη οἱ ἄνθρωποι, τοσαῦτα καὶ ἤθη κέκτηνται. σημεῖά τέ ἐστι παντὶ τῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σώματι, καὶ φωνὴ δὲ καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ χρόα εἰς τὸ φυσιογνωμονεῖν συντελεῖ· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν σημείων καὶ τὰ σύνολα τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐνίδρυται, καὶ ὥσπερ διὰ πυλῶν, τούτων ἡ ψυχὴ διαφαίνεται. δεῖ δὲ ἀκριβῶς τε καὶ λεπτῶς ὁρᾶν τε καὶ καταμετρεῖν τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτοῖς σημεῖα· μικρὰ γὰρ ὄντα μεγάλας ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς. χρὴ μέντοι μὴ προλέγειν τοῦτον ὃν μέλλεις φυσιογνωμονεῖν, ἵνα μὴ κατασκευάσῃ ἑαυτὸν μετασχηματίζων καὶ ταράξῃ τὰ σημεῖα.

A5. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν.)[10] Ὀφθαλμοὶ ὑγροὶ λάμποντες ὡς λιβάδες ἤθη χρηστὰ φαίνουσι·[11] παίδων (γὰρ) ὀφθαλμοὶ τοιοῦτοι. εὐρύτης κορῶν ἠλιθιότητα,[12] μικρότης δὲ κακομηχανίαν κατηγορεῖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ὄφεις μὲν καὶ ἰχνεύμονες καὶ πίθηκοι καὶ ἀλώπεκες καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κακομήχανα λεπτὸν δέδορκε, πρόβατα δὲ καὶ βόες (καὶ ὄνοι)[13] καὶ ὅσα εὐήθη πλατὺ δέδορκεν. ὅσα δὲ φρενῶν εὖ ἔχει, τούτων αἱ κόραι κατὰ λόγον τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν εἰσιν. ὅσοι δὲ ἀνίσους τοὺς τροχοὺς τῶν κορῶν ἔχουσιν, ἀθέμιτοι, οἱ δὲ ἴσους ἔχοντες φίλοι δίκης. καὶ οἱ περιδεδινημένους ταῖς κόραις τοὺς κύκλους ἔχοντες καθάπερ ἐλαυνομένους ἀθέμιτοι. εἰ δὲ (πρὸς) τὸ σημεῖον τοῦτο ἐφίζοιτο αὐτῶν τῷ μετώπῳ οἷον νέφη χλωρὰ ἢ κυανᾶ ἢ ἑτερόχροα ἢ ἀχλυώδη ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀφρύων φανταζόμενα, τούτων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα δαίμων κατασκήψας παντοίαις ἄταις αὐτοὺς ἐλαύνει. εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν νέφη μὴ ἐφίζοιτο ταῖς ὀφρύσιν, οἱ δὲ κύκλοι τὰς κόρας περιθέοιεν, δεῖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, εἰ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιθέουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ δεῖγμα τοῦ ἀθέμιτα αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι, ἢ τινας φόνους συγγενῶν ἢ μίξεις ἢ βρώσεις ἀθεμίτους καὶ Θυεστείους[14] . . . εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ κινήσει οἱ κύκλοι

[10] Foerster does not include the titles in his text, presumably on the assumption that they are not original. However, since the Arabic does contain titles, for ease of reference I shall include them in parentheses where they are found in the manuscript tradition.

[11] This corresponds to the only surviving fragment of Polemon's original (with a change of φαίνουσι for ἐκφαίνουσιν): Foerster (1893) i, p. lxxvii, ii: 315, Cramer (1837) 255.

[12] Reading Foerster's ἠλιθιότητα rather than ἠλίθιον.

[13] See Foerster (1900) 141 for this addition from the Paris Epitome (Par.).

but resembling their character traits, with one man having more of the bestial in him, and another less. One must assess the physiognomy of a man according to the respect in which his appearance resembles that of the animal, and to what extent. And if the marks of many animals coincide in the same man, one must take all these into account when practising physiognomy on him; for men have as many characters as they have appearances. And there are signs on the whole body of a man, and his voice and his breathing and his colour contribute to practising physiognomy. But many of the signs and the sum of them is located in the eyes, and the soul appears through these as if through gates. One must accurately and finely observe and measure the signs in them; for although they are small, they mark big differences. However, you must not warn the man on whom you are about to practise physiognomy beforehand, lest he prepare by changing himself and disturb the signs.

A5. (On eyes.)[10] Eyes that are moist and shine like pools reveal good characters.[11] For such are the eyes of children. Wide pupils denounce stupidity[12] and small ones mischief, since among the other animals too snakes and rats and monkeys and foxes and all the others that are mischievous see with narrow eyes, whereas sheep and cattle and asses[13] and all animals that are simple see with broad eyes. The pupils of all those that are mentally sound are in proportion to the eyes. All those whose pupils' circles are unequal are lawless, while those whose circles are equal are friends of justice. Also lawless are those whose pupils' circles spin as if they were being driven. If in addition to this sign pale or dark or multi-coloured or misty clouds, as it were, appear above the brows and reach their forehead, a demon is attacking their possessions and drives them with all sorts of disasters. But if the clouds do not reach the brows, and the circles run around the pupils, one must examine whether they always run around in the same direction, which is evidence of their doing lawless things, either some murder of relatives, or incest, or lawless and Thyestean eating.[14] If the circles reverse in the course of

[14] Foerster indicates a lacuna here, and although the text makes sense as it stands, we can tell from Ps.-Pol. and Par., which agree closely, that several lines are missing. The copyist of Adamantius here uses the adjective Θυεστείους rather than the name Thyestes presumably in an attempt to deal with a lost or damaged piece of text. Ps.-Pol. reads: 'either murder of relatives, or incest, or lawless and idolatrous [the epitomizer was of course Christian] eating, such as the (deeds) of Thyestes the son of Pelops in the city of Mycenae and of Oedipus the son of Laius in Thebes and of Tereus the Thracian are said to have been. And if the circles of the eyes always run around in the same place, these are maddened' (Foerster's addition of the names Thyestes and Tereus, presumably on the basis of Anon. Lat. 21, was justified by Par., cf. Foerster 1900: 142). Cf. Leiden A5, where it is the people of Thrace, rather than Tereus the Thracian, who have this sign. It should also be noted that Ps.-Pol. contains 4 lines at the end of this ch. which do not appear in Ad.; these appear to be simple glosses.

ἀναστρέφονται καὶ μεταξὺ στάσιν τινὰ ἢ κίνησιν λαμβάνουσι, τούτοις δέδραται μὲν οὐδέν, καταθύμια δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἔργα ἀθέμιτα, καί ποτε μὲν ὀρέγονται τοῦ ποιῆσαι, ἄλλοτε δὲ ὑπὸ φόβου ἢ ὄκνου κωλύονται.

A6. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν πεπηγότων.) Πεπηγότες ὀφθαλμοὶ πάντες ἄτοποι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑγρότεροι δειλούς, οἱ δὲ ξηρότεροι μάργους, οἱ δὲ ὠχρότεροι ἐμβροντήτους σημαίνουσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς ἐπαίρουσι[15] καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἀνασπῶσι, δύσβουλοι, ὠμόφρονες, κακοφραδέες, κενεόφρονες,[16] παλίγκοτοι. ὀφθαλμοὶ ἑστηκότες ὑπέρυθροι μεγάλοι γαστριμαργίας καὶ λαγνείας μάρτυρες. ἐὰν δὲ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τὰ κάτω τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀποσχίζοιτο, ταῦτά τε κατηγορεῖ καὶ ἀναίδειαν, ἀδικίαν, ἀπληστίαν, ἀμηχανίαν. ὀφθαλμοὶ μικροὶ ἑστῶτες φαίνουσι φιλοχρήματον καὶ πάντοθεν κέρδη περινοοῦντα. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέτωπον ἅμα ταῖς ὀφρύσι σπῴη εἰς τὸ μέσον, κερδαλεώτερός ἐστιν ὁ ἀνήρ. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ἅμα τοῖς σημείοις τούτοις καθέλκοιτο, πρόσεστι καὶ τὸ ὀργίλον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ βοητήν. γλαυκοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς πεπηγότας ἀλαμπεῖς ἔχοντι μήποτε φιλίαν συνάψῃς μηδὲ γείτονα σχεῖν ἢ συνοδίτην[17] εὔξῃ· δολερὸς γὰρ οὗτος καὶ εἰς τὰ δεινὰ ἀγρυπνῶν ἐπὶ συμφοραῖς ἑταίρων. ὀφθαλμοὶ ἑστῶτες μικροὶ ὑγροί, μέτωπον ἀνειμένον, βλέφαρα κινούμενα δεικνύουσιν ἄνδρα φροντιστήν, φιλόλογον, φιλομαθῆ. τοῦτο μόνον πεπηγότων ὀφθαλμῶν σχῆμα βέλτιστον.

A7. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν κινουμένων.) Ὀφθαλμοὶ κινούμενοι ταχέως ταραχώδη, ὑπονοητήν, ἄπιστον, μελλητὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δραστήριον δηλοῦσι. καὶ οἱ μὲν μετὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κινοῦντες τὰ βλέφαρα ἐπιπλεῖστον (δειλοὶ)[18] καὶ ἀνάλκιδές εἰσι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς μὲν ὀφθαλμοὺς ταχὺ κινοῦντες, τὰ δὲ βλέφαρα οὐχ ὁμοίως, θαρσαλέοι οὗτοί εἰσι καὶ τολμητίαι ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς. οἱ δὲ βραδυκίνητοι νωθεῖς, ἀργοί, δυσαίσθητοι, χαλεπῶς ἀρχόμενοι, δυσκατάπαυστοι. τὸ δὲ μέσον τῆς κινήσεως μέσα πάντων ὧν εἶπον σημαίνει. ὀφθαλμοὶ πάντῃ περιθέοντες ἀχλυώδεις μαργοσύνης κατήγοροι. ὀφθαλμοῖς μεγάλοις τρέμουσιν ἀποπληξίαν καὶ μαργοσύνην καὶ γαστριμαργίαν καὶ οἰνοφλυγίαν καὶ λαγνείαν[19] τεκμαίρου. ὀφθαλμοὶ μικροὶ ὑπότρομοι γλαυκοὶ ἀναιδεῖς, ἄπιστοι, ἄδικοι, τὰ ἀλλότρια πράσσοντες κακά, ζῶντες ἀπὸ συμφορῶν. ὀφθαλμοὶ μικροὶ ὑπότρομοι χαροποὶ ἢ μέλανες τὰ αὐτὰ σημαίνουσι, παρόσον οἱ μὲν χαροποὶ ἐμπληκτότεροι καὶ ἀβουλότεροι, οἱ δὲ μέλανες δυσοργητότεροι καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι. ὀφθαλμοὶ κλυζόμενοι κυμαίνοντες ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰς ἀφροδίσια καὶ εὐπάθειαν ἐπτόηνται, οὔτε δὲ ἄδικοι οὔτε κακοῦργοι οὔτε φύσεως φαύλης οὔτε ἄμουσοι.

[15] Foerster has ἐπαίρουσι even though both x and Ps.-Pol. have ἐγείρουσι. The meaning is unaffected.

[16] Foerster argues for the deletion of κενεόφρονες on the grounds that it is a lectio varia of κακοφραδέες ('foolish'). However, both words are poetic, and it seems unnecessary to think that one is a gloss on the other. Ad. (Polemon) is hardly averse to lists of near-synonyms when describing the character traits revealed by a particular physiognomical sign.

their motion and are sometimes still and sometimes moving, they have done nothing, but they have lawless deeds in mind, and sometimes they strive to do them, and sometimes they are prevented by fear or hesitation.

A6. (On fixed eyes.) All eyes that are fixed are strange. Those that are moister indicate cowards, those that are drier indicate those who are wanton, those that are paler-yellow fools. All those who also raise[15] their eyebrows and suck in their breath are imprudent, savage-minded, foolish, empty-minded,[16] and malignant. Eyes which are still, reddish, and large are witnesses of gluttony and lasciviousness. And if the parts below the eyes of such men are separated, they denounce both these things and shamelessness, injustice, greediness, and helplessness. Eyes which are small and still reveal a man who is fond of money and who conjures up profit from every avenue. And if he contracts his forehead towards the middle at the same time as his eyebrows, the man is more cunning. And if in addition to these signs the whole body is dragged down, he is also irascible and clamorous. Never make friends with a man who has light blue, fixed, and dull eyes, nor wish to have him as a neighbour or a companion.[17] For this man is treacherous and is alert to the terrible possibilities caused by the misfortunes of his fellows. Eyes that are still, small, and moist, a relaxed forehead, and moving eyelids show a man to be thoughtful, educated, and fond of learning. Only this form of fixed eyes is very good.

A7. (On moving eyes.) Eyes which move quickly show a troubled, suspicious, faithless man who is a delayer rather than a doer. And those who move their eyelids with their eyes are to a very great extent cowardly[18] and feeble in spirit, whereas those who move their eyes quickly, but do not move their eyelids in a similar fashion, are bold and daring in dire straits. Those who move their eyes slowly are sluggish, idle, insensible, get going with difficulty but are hard to stop. Moderate movement indicates the mean of the things I have been discussing. Eyes that run all over the place and which are misty denounce wantonness. By large trembling eyes judge madness and wantonness and gluttony and drunkenness and lasciviousness.[19] Eyes which are small and quivering and light blue, are shameless, faithless, unjust, commit crimes against what belongs to other people, and live from misfortunes. Eyes which are small and quivering, but dark blue or black, show the same things, insofar as those that are dark blue are more rash and imprudent, while those that are black are quicker to anger and shameless. Eyes which are swelling and seething in themselves are excited by sex and luxury, but they are neither unjust nor villainous nor naturally inferior nor uncultured.

[17] Reading Foerster's conjecture συνοδίτην (cf. Leiden A6) rather than x's πολίτην ('citizen').
[18] Foerster inserts δειλοί. Cf. Ad. A8 and Anon. Lat. 23.
[19] Foerster replaces x's ἀργίαν ('idleness') with λαγνείαν on the basis of Ps.-Pol.

A8. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν γλαυκῶν.) Ὁπότε γλαυκοὶ ὄντες μικρὰς τὰς κόρας ἔχουσιν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί, ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ πανοῦργοι καὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλοι εὑρίσκονται. γλαυκοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ ξηρότεροι ἄγρια καὶ ἄνομα ἤθη τίκτουσι· χολῇ γὰρ βεβαμμένοι εἰσίν{, ἀλλ' οὐ κυανῇ}.[20] οἱ δὲ κυανοῖ ἐπίπαν ὑγρότεροί εἰσι, καί εἰσιν οὗτοι πολὺ κρείσσονες τῶν ἑτέρων. ὅσοι δὲ ὑγροὶ ὄντες εὐσταθεῖς εἰσι καὶ εὐλαμπεῖς καὶ μεγάλοι, ἤθη ἄριστα ὀφθαλμῶν παρέχονται, θυμοειδεῖς δὲ καὶ οὗτοί εἰσιν. ὅσοι δὲ ἀσθενῆ τὰ γλαυκὰ ἔχοντες ὑπολευκότεροί εἰσιν, ἀνάλκιδες καὶ δειλοὶ πάντων μάλιστά εἰσιν ὧν εἶπον. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὡς τοῖς ἄλλοις σημείοις χρῶ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων.[21]

Ὀφθαλμοὶ αἰόλοι[22] μᾶλλον γίνονται ἐν τοῖς χαροποῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς γλαυκοῖς. τέως δὲ περὶ τῶν γλαυκῶν αἰόλων λέγω. ψηφῖδες[23] εἰσὶ κυαναῖ περὶ τὰς κόρας κατὰ μέγεθος κέγχρου,[24] ἕτεραι δὲ ξανθαὶ ἴσαι ταῖς ἄλλαις· τούτων ἐν στοίχῳ οὐσῶν παραλλήλων ὡς ὅρμος περιθέει τὴν κόρην.[25] οἱ τοιοῦτοι τοίνυν ὀφθαλμοὶ δολερὰ ἤθη καὶ ἐπίκλοπα μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν κέκτηνται, ἀγχινοίας δὲ καὶ συνέσεως ἱκανῶς αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, ἄτολμοι δέ εἰσιν. οἷς δὲ αἰόλοι ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ μικροί εἰσιν, οὗτοι κερδαλεώτεροι καὶ δουλοπρεπεῖς καὶ θῶπες τῶν ἐν δυνάμει καὶ φιλοχρήματοι καὶ πράττοντές τι κρύφα χαίρουσι κἂν εἰ μηδὲν εἴη τὸ διάφορον κρύφα ἢ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ εἰπεῖν ἢ ποιῆσαι, κακά τε πάντα ἐπὶ κέρδει ποιεῖν ὀρέγονται, πλὴν ὅσα ὑπὸ δειλίας κωλύονται· ἀνάλκιδες γάρ εἰσι κατὰ τοὺς λαγωούς, οἷς τὸ εἶδός ἐστι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὅμοιον.

A9. Ὀρθὴ στάσις ὀφθαλμῶν ἀρίστη. ὀφθαλμοὶ ἄνω ἐσταλμένοι μαργοσύνης καὶ ἀποπληξίας σημεῖον ἢ νόσου τῆς ἱερᾶς καλουμένης λαγνείας τε καὶ γαστριμαργίας καὶ οἰνοφλυγίας. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τρόμος ἐνείη, οὐ πόρρω ἥκουσιν ἐπιληψίας. εἰ δὲ ὠχροί εἰσιν, ὠμόφρονες, φιλόφονοι, μιαιφόνοι, ὑπέρυθροι δὲ μᾶλλον ὄντες καὶ μεγάλοι φιλοπόται, φιλόκυβοι, φιλογύναιοι, ἄκοσμα φθεγγόμενοι, κεκρᾶκται, μάργοι δὲ μάλιστα. ὀφθαλμοὶ κάτω ἐστραμμένοι ⟨ὡς⟩[26] δυόμενοι τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἄνω ἐστραμμένοις δηλοῦσι, περιττότερον δέ, ὅτι ἔγκοτοί εἰσι καὶ μῆνιν ἀγρίαν καὶ ἀμείλικτον ἔχουσιν. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ μὲν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἄνω χωρῇ, ὁ δὲ κάτω καθέλκηται καὶ τρόμος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνῇ αἵ τε ὀφρύες σπῶνται καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ ἆσθμα τραχὺ καὶ πυκνὸν ἀναφέρηται, οὗτος εἰς τέλος ἐλήλακεν ἐπιληψίας.

[20] Following Schneider's deletion of x's ἀλλ' οὐ κυανῇ ('but not black [bile]'), which is a near-dittography of what follows. The reading of Ps.-Pol. at this point reinforces this.

[21] This sentence is very obscure and may result from a marginal note.

[22] Or 'variegated': ὀφθαλμοὶ αἰόλοι. See Elsner, Ch. 4, p. 220 and the end of A11.

[23] Foerster suggests ψεκάδες, 'drops', to accord with Anon. Lat. 25 'droplets' (though x and Ps.-Pol. have ψηφῖδες).

A8. (On light blue eyes.) Whenever eyes are light blue and have small pupils, they are found to be mean and villainous and fond of money more than others. Light blue, drier eyes produce wild and lawless characters, for they are steeped in bile.[20] Black eyes are generally moister, and these are much better than the others. Those eyes which are stable and bright and large, as well as being moist, provide the best characters of eyes and they are also spirited. Those eyes which have weak light blue areas and which are paler, are the feeblest and most cowardly of all the sorts which I have discussed. In other respects, as you use other signs, use them in these cases too.[21]

Eyes changeable in colour[22] are more common among those that are dark blue than among those that are light blue. Hitherto I have been speaking about light blue eyes that are changeable in colour. There are black pebbles[23] about the size of a millet seed[24] around the pupils, and others are pale yellow and of the same size. These are in a row beside each other like a necklace and run around the pupil.[25] Therefore such eyes in particular have treacherous and thievish characters, they are sufficiently shrewd and intelligent, but are not daring. Those whose eyes are changeable in colour and small are more cunning, are slavish and flatter those in power, are fond of money and rejoice in doing something secretly, even if it makes no difference whether they say or do it secretly or openly. They strive to do every kind of evil with a view to profit, except those things which they are prevented by cowardice from doing; for they are feeble like hares, the appearance of whose eyes is similar.

A9. The level position of eyes is the best. Eyes set upwards are a sign of wantonness and madness or of the holy disease and of lasciviousness and gluttony and drunkenness. If in addition to these things they also tremble, they are not far off epilepsy. If they are pale-yellowish, they are savage-minded, fond of murder, blood-guilty; if they are reddish instead and large, they are fond of drink, dice, women, speak out of order, are bawlers and very wanton. Eyes turned down as if[26] sinking show the same things as those turned upwards, but more so, because they are malignant and have wild and cruel anger. And if one of the eyes goes upwards, and the other is dragged down and there is trembling in them, the eyebrows are drawn together, and the breathing is harsh and rapid, this man has gone to the extreme of epilepsy.

[24] What is distinctive about millet seeds is that they are quite round. Therefore, although 'fleck' might seem a more natural term to use when discussing the appearance of eyes, henceforth κέγχρος shall be translated 'dot'.

[25] Here Leiden A8 includes the Polemonic example of the man from Cyrene, whose dots show him to be thoroughly evil.

[26] Foerster inserts ὡς. Cf. Anon. Lat. 29.

A10. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν παρατετραμμένων.) Ὀφθαλμοὶ παρατετραμμένοι εἰ μὲν εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ χωροῖεν, μωρίαν, εἰ δὲ εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά, μαχλοσύνην κατηγοροῦσιν· εἰ δὲ παραβλῶπες ὄντες εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν ῥῖνα νεύοιεν, χάρισι καὶ ἀφροδίτῃ καὶ ἔρωσίν εἰσι φίλοι. ἐὰν δὲ ξηρότεροι ὦσι καὶ ἀναπεπταμένοι μὴ ἐνόντος τρόμου, κακοὶ καὶ πονηροί, οὐ μέντοι κεχαρισμένοι χάρισιν ἢ ἔρωσιν, αἰδὼς δὲ σφᾶς προλέλοιπε[27] καὶ δίκη· εἰ δὲ τρόμος ἐνείη, κακοῦργοι καὶ πάντολμοι.

A11. (Περὶ αἰόλων ὀφθαλμῶν.) Οἱ χαροποὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μελάνων χωρίζονται τῷ αἰόλῳ·[28] πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ εἴδη. καὶ οἱ μὲν μέλανες ὀφθαλμοὶ ἄνανδρα ἤθη καὶ φιλοκερδῆ καὶ ἄπιστα δηλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ χαροποὶ τοιοίδε εἰσίν. ἡ μὲν χροιὰ ἐπιπρέπει αὐτοῖς μέλαινα ὡς ἁπλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἐσαθροῦντι δὲ κέγχροι ἔνεισιν (αἱ μὲν)[29] πυρραὶ οὐ σφόδρα, αἱ δὲ λευκαὶ καὶ ἐπιλευκότεραι, ἄλλαι δὲ ὠχραὶ καὶ ἄλλαι (κυαναῖ)[30] τοῦ ὠχροῦ τῷ πυρρῷ μεμιγμένου ἢ τοῦ μέλανος τούτοις.

Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱματώδεις κέγχροι ἐν τοῖς μέλασιν. ἄλλοι δὲ κεγχρωτὰ μὲν οὐ φέρουσι τὰ εἴδη τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, παντὸς δὲ τοῦ τροχοῦ τὴν ἔξω ἴτυν μέλαιναν φοροῦντες, τὴν ἐπὶ ταύτῃ πυρράν.[31] ἕτεροι δὲ ὑπολευκότερα ἔχουσι τὰ πυρρά. ἐν τοῖς μέλασι τὰ μὴ πάνυ πυρρά, ὁπόσοις πόρρωθεν τὸ μέλαν μόνον ἐπιπρέπει, γενναῖα τὰ ἤθη, συνετά, δίκαια, εὐφυῆ, μεγαλόνοα[32] σημαίνει. ὅσοις δὲ τὰ πυρρὰ ταῦτα πάνυ πυρρά, τετράγωνα καὶ μὴ κεγχρωτὰ ἔνι καὶ ὑπολάμπει ἔσω ὥσπερ πῦρ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κέγχροι ὠχραὶ ταῖς πυρώδεσι μεμιγμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ ἕτεραι γλαυκαί, ἴτυες δὲ αἱματώδεις ἢ κυαναῖ περιθέουσι τὰς κόρας, [οὗτοι κάκιστοι·] μεγάλοι δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ στίλβοντες κινούμενοι δεδορκότες, οἷον θυμούμενοι δεδόρκασιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τὰ βλέφαρα σφέων ἀναπέπταται, πάντων οὔ τοι χείριστοι· λύκων γὰρ καὶ ὑῶν ἀγρίων τοιαῦτα εἴδη, οἱ δὲ καὶ τούτων ὠμότεροι, ἀγριώτεροι, ἁρπακτικώτεροι.[33]

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς χαροποῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὅσον ἂν αἱ κέγχροι (πυρρότεραι)[34] ὦσιν, ἀγριώτερα τὰ ἤθη, δυσοργητότερα καὶ ὑβριστικώτερα καὶ μοιχιδιώτερα ἀποτελοῦσι· μείζους δὲ οὖσαι ἢ ἐλάσσους ἠπιώτερα σημαίνουσιν.

Αἱ δὲ αἱματώδεις τῶν κέγχρων ἐν τοῖς μέλασι φαρμακεῖς ἀνθρώπους μηνύουσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ ὠχραὶ μαγγανείας καὶ φαρμάκων ἐπιστήμονας. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὠχροὶ δολερώτεροι,[35] οἱ δὲ αἱματώδεις ἀβουλότεροι καὶ θερμότεροι.

[27] Foerster replaces x's περιλέλοιπε ('remain') with προλέλοιπε on the basis of Ps.-Pol.

[28] τῷ αἰόλῳ: cf. n. 22.

[29] Foerster inserts αἱ μὲν.

[30] Foerster adds κυαναῖ, presumably, although he does not specify this, from Anon. Lat. 26.

[31] Taking 'circle' (τροχός) as referring to the iris-cum-pupil seems to make the best sense of this rather obscure passage.

A10. (On eyes turned to the side.) If eyes which are turned to one side go to the right, they denounce stupidity, if they go to the left, they denounce lewdness. If they are crossed so that they incline towards the nose, they are fond of pleasures and sex and desires. If they are drier and wide-open, and there is no trembling in them, they are bad and wicked, although they do not rejoice in pleasures or desires, and shame and justice have left[27] them. If there is trembling in them, they are villainous and all-daring.

A11. (On eyes changeable in colour.) Dark blue eyes are separated from black ones by the changeability of their colour.[28] For their appearances are many. And black eyes show unmanly and greedy and faithless characters, while dark blue eyes are as follows. Their colour appears to be black at first glance, but the close observer notices that there are dots in them, some[29] red, although not very, some white and rather pale, others are pale yellow and others are dark[30] with the pale yellow mixed with the red or the black mixed with these.

There are also blood-red dots in black eyes. Others do not have eyes with dotted appearances, but the outside rim of the whole circle is black, and the rim on this is red.[31] The red bits of others are somewhat paler. Not very red bits in black eyes, so that from a distance only the black appears, indicate noble, intelligent, just, talented, and great-minded[32] characters. Those in whom these red bits are very red, square-shaped, and not dotted and gleam inside like fire and in addition to these have pale yellow dots mixed in with the red ones and other light blue ones, and blood-red or dark rims run around the pupils, the eyes are big and gleaming and moving and looking such as angry men look, and their eyelids are wide open—these are the worst of all; for such are the appearances of wolves and wild boars, and they are more savage and more wild and more rapacious than even these are.[33]

In dark blue eyes the redder[34] the dots are, the wilder, quicker to anger, more wantonly violent, and more prone to adultery they make the characters. If the dots are rather large or small they indicate kinder characters.

Blood-red dots in black eyes reveal men who are poisoners, just as pale yellow dots reveal trickery and knowledge of poisons. And so pale yellow eyes are more treacherous[35] and blood-red ones are more imprudent and rash.

[32] Foerster's correction of x's μεγάλα ('large'). Cf. Ad. A11.

[33] Leiden A11 includes here the long Polemonic example of the man from Lydia.

[34] Foerster inserts πυρρότεροι. Cf. Leiden A11.

[35] Foerster has δολερώτεροι, rejecting x's δειλότεροι ('more cowardly'), presumably on the basis of Matr. and Ps.-Pol.

Ὅσοις δὲ οὐ κέγχροι εἰσὶ χαροποῖς, ἀλλ' ἴτυς[36] ἔνεστι πεποικιλμένη, τῆς ἴτυος τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν χροιὰν ἐπισκέπτου. ἴτυς μέλαινα στενή, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ πυρρὰ ἐν ὑγροῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, εἴ γε μηδὲν ἄλλο ἄτοπον φαίνοιτο, ἄνδρα δηλοῦσι μεγαλόνουν, συνετόν, δίκαιον, εὐφυῆ, παιδεραστὴν ⟨δὲ⟩ πέρα τοῦ μετρίου, ἡ δὲ χλωρὰ ἴτυς ἐπὶ τῇ μελαίνῃ δολερόν, ἄδικον, κλῶπα ἀργυρίου, γυναιξὶν αἰσχρῶς ὁμιλοῦντα. ἴτυες αἰόλαι τὴν χροιὰν ταῖς ἴρισιν ἐμφερεῖς ἐν μὲν ξηροτέροις ⟨τοῖς⟩ ὀφθαλμοῖς μαργοσύνην δηλοῦσιν, ἐν δὲ ὑγροῖς μεγαλόνοιαν καὶ εὐθυέπειαν καὶ ἀνδρίαν καὶ ὀρθοβουλίαν, ταχύτεροι[37] δὲ εἰς ὀργὴν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἔργα πάντα ἐπτοημένοι.

A12. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν κοίλων.) Κοῖλοι πάνυ ὀφθαλμοὶ οὐκ ἐπαινετοί· ὁπόσοι δὲ κοῖλοι ὄντες ὥσπερ ὕδωρ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ⟨ἡμιδεεῖ⟩[38] ὑποκινοῦνται, εἰ καὶ μεγάλοι εἶεν, οὐ πονηροί, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο σημεῖον κατηγοροίη· τὴν γὰρ κοιλότητα ἥ τε ἰκμὰς καὶ τὸ μέγεθος παραμυθοῦνται· κοίλων γὰρ καὶ μικρῶν ἤθη δόλια, ἐπίβουλα ἀνθρώποις, ζήλῳ καὶ φθόνῳ τετηκότα, ξηρότεροι δὲ ὄντες πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις κακοῖς ἀπιστίαν, προδοσίαν, ⟨ἱεροσυλίαν⟩[39] σημαίνουσιν . . .[40] οἱ δὲ ὑπορρέοντες δολερώτερα, εἰ μέντοι ἅμα ὑγρότητι ὑπορρέοιεν, μωρότερα.[41]

A13. (Περὶ ἐξεχόντων ὀφθαλμῶν.) Τῶν ἐξεχόντων ὀφθαλμῶν, οἳ οὐκ εἰσιν ἐπαινετοί, τοῖς μὲν οἴδημα περίκειται κύκλῳ, τοῖς δὲ ὡς τάφρος βαθεῖα καὶ στενὴ περιθέει· δολεροὶ τὸ ἦθος· οἱ δὲ ⟨πάντῃ⟩[42] ἀνεστηκότες μαργοσύνην κατηγοροῦσι. προπετεῖς ὀφθαλμοὶ αἱματώδεις οἰνοφλύγων καὶ γαστριμάργων. εἰ δὲ γλαυκοὶ οὗτοι εἶεν, ἀδίκους μέν, ἀσυνέτους δὲ ἴσθι. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ βλέφαρα αὐτοὺς βαρύνει, πλείων ἡ ἄνοια. εἰ δὲ οἰδοῦντες εἶεν ξηροί,[43] πατροφόνται καὶ μητροφόνται παιδοκτόνοι τε καὶ φαρμακεῖς. εἰ δὲ ὑψηλοὶ ὄντες ὀφθαλμοὶ μεγάλοι τε καὶ λαμπροὶ καὶ εὐαγεῖς εἶεν καὶ ὑγρὸν βλέποντες, δίκαιοι, συνετοί, φιλομαθεῖς, ἔρωτος πλήρεις, οἷος ἦν ὁ φιλόσοφος Σωκράτης.[44] ὀφθαλμοὶ τοῦ προσώπου πολὺ ἐξέχοντες μικροὶ πάνυ καὶ πυρροὶ οὐ φρενήρη, ἀλλὰ παρειμένον καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν εἶναί φασιν.[45]

[36] This is better taken as referring to the rim of the iris rather than the pupil.

[37] Franz's emendation of x's τραχύτεροι ('rougher') to ταχύτεροι.

[38] Foerster adds ἡμιδεεῖ. Cf. Leiden A12 and Anon. Lat. 31.

[39] Foerster adds ἱεροσυλίαν, which is found in both Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Leiden A12 and Anon. Lat. 31.

[40] Although there is no sign of one in x, Foerster posits a lacuna here on the evidence of Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 31. On the basis of these the missing clause should be reconstructed along the following lines: 'And so those which are staring reveal more excessive (Matr.)/useless (Ps.-Pol.)/mad (Anon. Lat.) characters, . . .'.

When it comes to those dark blue eyes which do not have dots, but which have a speckled rim,[36] consider the size and colour of the rim. A narrow black rim with another red one on this in moist eyes, as long as nothing else strange is apparent, shows a great-minded man, who is intelligent, just, talented, but a pederast beyond moderation; but a yellowy-green rim on a black one shows a treacherous man, who is unjust, steals money, and consorts shamefully with women. Rims variegated in colour like rainbows, if they are in drier eyes, show wantonness, if in moist eyes, show great-mindedness and straight speaking and manliness and right thinking, but they are quicker[37] to anger and excited by every sexual activity.

A12. (On hollow eyes.) Very hollow eyes are not praiseworthy. Those which are hollow and move slightly, like water in a half-empty[38] container, if they are also large, are not wicked, unless some other sign denounces them; for both their moisture and their size counteract their hollowness; for the characters of hollow and small eyes are deceitful, treacherous towards men and consumed with jealousy and envy, whereas those which are drier indicate, in addition to the aforementioned evils, faithlessness, betrayal, and sacrilege.[39] . . . ,[40] while watering eyes indicate more deceitful characters, unless they are watering and there is moisture, in which case they show more stupid characters.[41]

A13. (On protruding eyes.) Protruding eyes which are not praiseworthy are those surrounded by either a circular swelling or a deep and narrow trench, as it were. They are deceitful in character. Those which are raised all around[42] denounce wantonness. Prominent blood-red eyes belong to drunkards and gluttons. If these are light blue, know that they are unjust and unintelligent. If the eyelids also weigh down on them, their mindlessness is greater. If swollen eyes are dry,[43] they are parricides, matricides, child-killers, and poisoners. If eyes are high and large and bright and pure and with a moist look, they are just, intelligent, fond of learning, and full of loving, as was the philosopher Socrates.[44] Eyes which protrude a long way from the face and which are very small and red say that a man is not of sound mind, but is loose in both body and tongue.[45]

[41] Leiden A12 here includes the Polemonic example of the man from Corinth.
[42] Foerster adds πάντῃ from Matr. and Ps.-Pol.
[43] Foerster replaces x's μικροὶ with ξηροί, following Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 32.
[44] This is a condensed version of what we find at Leiden A13. Cf. Anon. Lat. 32.
[45] This is an abridgement of the example of the man from Lydia known as 'the Crab'. Cf. Leiden A13.

A14. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν παλλόμενων.) Ὀφθαλμοὶ μικροὶ παλλόμενοι κακομηχάνους καὶ δολίους, μεγάλοι δὲ ἀνοήτους καὶ μάργους ἐλέγχουσιν. ὅσοι δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκθρώσκοντες πάλλονται, κακοὶ οὗτοι, ἐὰν μὴ μεγέθους εὖ ἔχωσι καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ λαμπρὸν βλέπωσιν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ὀφθαλμοὶ νοήματα ἁδρά, ὑψηλά, δραστήρια ἔργων μεγάλων παρέχονται, τόλμης καὶ μεγαλονοίας εἰς ἄκρον ἥκοντες, ὀργῆς δὲ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μέθης, μεγάλαυχοι, κουφόνους, οὐ πόρρω ἐπιληψίας, κλέος δὲ ἔχειν ὀρέγονται μεῖζον ἢ κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ ὁ Μακεδὼν Ἀλέξανδρος. περιοιδοῦντες ὀφθαλμοὶ ἀστεργεῖς, ὠμόφρονες, γαστρίμαργοι, λάγνοι, κιθάρας καὶ αὐλοῦ καὶ (πάσης)[46] μουσικῆς ἥττους. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων τεκμαίρου. ὀφθαλμοὶ περιπελιδνοί,[47] εἰ καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς σημεῖα ὁμολογοίη, ἄπιστοι, ἄδικοι, πάντολμοι.

A15. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν σκοτίων.) Ὀφθαλμοῖς σκοτίοις ἄτη ἐνοικεῖ, ξηρότεροι δὲ ὄντες ἀπιστότεροι· εἰ δὲ καὶ μικροὶ εἶεν, δολεροί, ἐπίβουλοι, κακότεχνοι, παλίμβουλοι. ὀφθαλμοὶ σκότιοι ὑγροὶ (κοῖλοι)[48] αὐτάρκως μεγέθους ἔχοντες εὐσταθῆ[49] φροντιστήν, πολυθεάμονα, εὐμαθῆ, εὐλαβῆ, δειλὸν καὶ ἐγγὺς φειδωλίας δηλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀχλυώδεις αὐτῶν δολεροί, ἄπιστοι, ἀκόλαστοι.

A15 *bis*. (Περὶ εὐφεγγῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.) Οἱ δὲ ἐναντίοι τούτοις εὐφεγγεῖς ἄριστοι ὀφθαλμῶν, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο ἀντιλέγει σημεῖον· πάντα γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ἐπισκέπτεσθαι δεῖ.

A16. (Περὶ μαρμαρυσσόντων ὀφθαλμῶν.) Ἐὰν μαρμαρύσσωσιν οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ κἂν φῶς ἐν αὐτοῖς ᾖ, οὐκ ἀγαθοί·[50] μαρμαρυγὴ γὰρ εἰ ἐν γλαυκοῖς καὶ αἱματώδεσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἴη, θερμουργίαν καὶ παντολμίαν δηλοῖ, ὡς ἐγγὺς μανίας ἥκειν, εἰ δὲ ἐν χαροποῖς εἴη, δειλίαν· πᾶν γὰρ χρῆμα οὗτοι φοβοῦνται καὶ πτώσσουσι καὶ πάντα ὑπονοοῦσι· μέλανες δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ μαρμαρύσσοντες κάκιστοι καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ κακομήχανοι σφόδρα. εἰ δὲ οἱ τοιούτους ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες καὶ γελῷεν, εἰς ἀκρότητα (πάσης)[51] κακίας ἥκουσιν.[52] ὀφθαλμοὶ γοργὸν βλέποντες δεινοί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑγρὸν βλέποντες θυμοειδεῖς, ἄλκιμοι, ἀρειμανέες, εὐθυεπεῖς, ταχύεργοι, ἀπρονόητοι, ἄκομψοι, ἄκακοι, οἱ δὲ ξηρὸν κάκιστοι, ἀθέμιστοι. εἰ δὲ καὶ μικρότεροι εἶεν καὶ κοῖλοι, χείρους, ὠμόφρονες, ἐπίβουλοι, κρυψίνους,

[46] Holford-Strevens adds πάσης since lyre and aulos themselves represent kinds of music.

[47] Foerster writes περιπελιδνοί for x's πελιδνοί, using Matr. and Anon. Lat. 33.

[48] Foerster adds κοῖλοι on the basis of Anon. Lat. 34 and Leiden A15. It is also found in Matr., but not Ps.-Pol.

[49] Foerster makes εὐσταθῆ plural and takes it with eyes rather than the MSS 'thoughtful man'; but x is supported by Matr. and Ps.-Pol.

A14. (On quivering eyes.) Small quivering eyes prove that men are mischievous and deceitful, while large ones prove that they are mindless and wanton. All eyes which quiver as if they are leaping out are bad, unless they are of a good size and have a moist and bright look; for such eyes suggest powerful, lofty thoughts which accomplish great deeds, they reach a peak of daring and great-mindedness, but cannot control anger and drink, boast a great deal, are light-minded, not far from epilepsy, and strive to have glory greater than that which befits men, like Alexander of Macedon. Eyes with swelling around them are hateful, savage-minded, gluttonous, lascivious, and in thrall to the lyre, the aulos, and music in general.[46] Judge the other things from the other signs. Eyes which are surrounded by livid colours,[47] if the signs inside agree, are faithless, unjust, and all-daring.

A15. (On dark eyes.) Folly dwells in dull eyes, and the drier they are, the more dishonest they are. If they are also small, they are deceitful, treacherous, wily, and untrustworthy. Dull eyes which are moist, hollow,[48] and of sufficient size reveal a steadfast[49] and thoughtful man who has beheld much, is good at learning, cautious, cowardly, and almost parsimonious, while those of them that are misty are deceitful, faithless, and intemperate.

A15 *bis*. (On bright eyes.) Eyes which are the opposite of these and bright are the best, unless some other sign contradicts this; for you must consider everything accurately.

A16. (On sparkling eyes.) If the eyes sparkle and a light is in them, they are not good.[50] For a sparkle in light blue and blood-red eyes reveals recklessness and shamelessness so as to come near to madness, while in dark blue eyes it reveals cowardice; for these fear and cower before everything and suspect everything. Black sparkling eyes are very bad and cowardly and extremely mischievous. If those who have such eyes laugh as well, they reach the pinnacle of all[51] wickedness.[52] Eyes with a fierce look are terrible; for those with a moist look are spirited, brave, warlike, plain-spoken, swift to act, improvident, boorish, and simple, whereas those with a dry look are very wicked and lawless. If they are also smaller and hollow, they are worse, savage-minded, treacherous, dissembling,

[50] Leiden A16 mentions Hadrian here, though in a positive light. Cf. Ch. 3, pp. 167–8.

[51] Foerster supplies πάσης from Matr. and Ps.-Pol.

[52] Leiden A16 here includes the example of the man from Phoenicia.

παντορέκται. εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐπισκύνιον βαρὺ νεύει καὶ ὀφρύες εἰσὶ τραχυνόμεναι βλέφαρά τε ὀρθά, ⟨θυμὸν⟩[53] σημαίνει καὶ ἀλκὴν μετ᾽ ἀβουλίας....[54] ὅσοι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπισκύνιον καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς τά τε βλέφαρα μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσι, τὸ δὲ βλέμμα τραχὺ καὶ πικρόν, χείριστοί εἰσιν οὗτοι πάντων.

A17. ⟨Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν γελώντων.⟩ Ὀφθαλμοὶ οἷς ἡδονὴ καὶ γέλως ἐνοικεῖ οὐ πάντες ἐπαινετοί·[55] εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τούτοις δολεροί, κρυψίνοοι, κακομήχανοι, κακοῦργοι. ὁπόσοι δὲ ἅμα τῷ γελῶντι ὑποβλέπουσι καὶ ξηροί εἰσι, κάκιστοι ὀφθαλμῶν. καὶ οἱ κοῖλοι δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ γέλωτα ἔχοντες ὥσπερ λοχῶντες κακόν τι τυρεύουσι. καὶ εἰ τὰ ἐκτὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κινοῖτο, οἷον μέτωπον καὶ παρειαὶ καὶ ὀφρύες καὶ χείλη, κακὸς γέλως οὗτος. βουλὴν γὰρ ἐπί τινι[56] πονηρὰν ἢ πρᾶξιν ἄδικον σημαίνει. κἂν μὲν πρὸς τῷ σεσηρότι μύωσί τε καὶ ὁρῶσιν ἀτενές, βουλεύονται ἔργα ἄδικα, εἰ δὲ ἀναπεπταμένους καὶ σεσηρότας ἔχοιεν, πέπρακται αὐτοῖς ἀθέμιτα ἔργα. τοὺς δὲ καὶ μάλα γελῶντας ἐπιβουλοτέρους καὶ κακουργοτέρους μαντεύου, εἰ ξηροὶ εἴησαν· εἰ δὲ ὑγροί εἰσιν, ἄκακα μὲν ἤθη, μάταια δὲ παρέχονται, κακῶν ἀπαθῆ, ἀνόητα, ἄστοργα, ἀκόλαστα. ὀφθαλμοὶ μειδιῶντες ἅμα ὑγρότητι, βλέφαρα ἀνειμένα, μέτωπον μαλακόν, τὰ ἀμφὶ τὰ βλέφαρα λαγαρὰ ἤθη δηλοῦσι μεγαλοπρεπῆ, δίκαια, ἥμερα, εὐσεβῆ, φιλόξενα, συνετά, εὔβουλα, ⟨εὐμαθῆ,⟩[57] ἔρωτος πλέα.

A18. ⟨Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν σκυθρωπῶν.⟩ Ὀφθαλμοὶ σκυθρωπάζοντες ἅμα ὑγρότητι φροντίζουσιν ⟨ἢ⟩ φιλοτεχνοῦσιν· ἐὰν δὲ συμμύωσι ⟨καὶ⟩ αἱ ὀφρύες ὦσι χαλαραὶ καὶ τὸ μέτωπον χαλαρὸν ἅμα τῇ σκυθρωπότητι, πιστὰ τούτων ἤθη, βέβαια, χρηστά, εὔβουλα, πινυτά. ξηροὶ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ λυπηρὸν βλέποντες ἄτης εἰσὶ πλήρεις· εἰ δὲ καὶ μέτωπον εἴη τραχὺ καὶ βλέμμα ἀτενὲς βλέφαρά ⟨τε⟩ ὀρθά, ἄγρια βουλεύματα τούτοις πᾶν τε ἔργον οὗτοι ποιήσειαν ἄν, καὶ οὐδὲν κακὸν ἀτέλεστον αὐτοῖς.

A19. ⟨Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν συγκλειόντων καὶ μυόντων.⟩ Ὁπόσοι δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ πυκνὰ συγκλείονται καὶ αὖθις ὑπανοίγονται, ἐπίβουλοι οὗτοι καὶ ἐπίκλοποι· εἰ μέντοι ὑγροὶ εἶεν, φροντισταὶ καὶ φιλότεχνοι. εἰ δὲ τρόμος αὐτοῖς ἐνείη καὶ ἅμα ὠχρότης, μαργοσύνην ἢ ἐπιληψίαν δηλοῖ. ὁπόσοις δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ στάσις ἀεί ἐστιν, εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ συγκλείεσθαι ὑπορρέοιεν[58] καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄνω χωροῖεν, μαχλοσύνην καὶ μαργοσύνην κατηγοροῦσιν. εἰ δὲ ὀρθοὶ ὄντες συγκλείοιντο, εἰ μὲν ὑγροὶ εἶεν μετὰ μεγέθους καὶ τοῦ εὐλαμποῦς καὶ μετώπου λείου, εὐλαβεῖς, εὔβουλοι, φιλομαθεῖς καὶ γλυκύθυμοι καὶ ἐρωτικοί, εἰ δὲ ξηροὶ εἶεν, θρασεῖς, κακομήχανοι, ἄδικοι. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τούτῳ μέτωπον ἔχων τραχύ, ὀφρῦς συνεστραμμένας, βλέφαρα σκληρὰ πεπηγότα,

[53] Foerster adds θυμὸν from Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 36.

[54] Foerster argues on the basis of Matr. and Ps.-Pol. that καὶ ἀκακίαν καὶ εὐτολμίαν ('and guilelessness and courage') has fallen out.

[55] Foerster replaces x's πάντη ἀναίτιοι ('completely guiltless') with πάντες ἐπαινετοί, which is closer to Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 37.

and of evil ambition. If the skin of the brows weighs heavy on such eyes, the brows are rough and the eyelids straight, it indicates spirit[53] and bravery with thoughtlessness ...[54] All those whose skin of the brows and brows and eyelids are not like this, but whose look is rough and bitter, are the worst of all.

A17. (On laughing eyes.) Eyes in which pleasure and laughter dwell are not all praiseworthy.[55] For there are deceitful, dissembling, mischievous, and villainous ones among these also. All which look suspiciously while laughing and which are dry are the worst of eyes. And the hollow eyes which have laughter cook up some evil as if they were lying in wait. And if the parts outside the eyes move, such as the forehead, the cheeks, the brows, and the lips, this laughter is bad; for it indicates a wicked plot against someone[56] or an unjust deed. And if the eyes are shut and stare in addition to the grinning, they are plotting unjust deeds, whereas if they have open and grinning eyes, they have already done lawless deeds. Divine that those which laugh a lot are more treacherous and villainous, if they are dry. If they are moist, they suggest simple and frivolous characters which are insensitive to their misfortunes, mindless, heartless, and intemperate. Smiling, moist eyes, relaxed eyelids, a soft forehead, and loose parts around the eyelids show magnificent, just, gentle, pious, hospitable, intelligent, prudent, characters who are good at learning[57] and full of love.

A18. (On sullen eyes.) Eyes which are sullen and moist are thoughtful or artistic. If they are closed and the brows and forehead are loose in addition to the sullenness, their characters are honest, firm, good, prudent, and wise. Dry eyes with a painful look are full of folly. And if the forehead is also rough, the look staring and the eyelids straight, they have wild plans and would do every deed, and there is no evil that they would not do.

A19. (On eyes which are closed and shut.) All eyes which are often closed and which open from below are treacherous and thievish. However, if they are moist, they are thoughtful and artistic. If there is trembling in them and pale-yellowness too, it shows wantonness or epilepsy. Of those whose position is always the same, if they water[58] as well as closing up and move upwards, they denounce lewdness and wantonness, but if they are closed and are level, if they are damp with size and brightness and a smooth forehead, they are cautious, prudent, fond of learning, sweet-tempered, and given to love, but if they are dry, they are bold, mischievous, and unjust. The man who, in addition to this, has a rough forehead, close-packed brows, and eyelids fixed and stiff

[56] Reading Foerster's emendation ἐπί τινι of x's ἐπιτείνει. The sense is not much affected.

[57] Foerster adds εὐμαθῆ on the basis of Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 37.

[58] Schneider's emendation ὑπορρέοιεν of x's ἀπορρέοιεν, presumably on the basis of Matr. and Ps.-Pol., but cf. A12 ad fin.

ἀγριώτερος τὸν θυμόν, τολμᾶν ἑτοιμότερος, χαυνούμενος μέντοι [τοῖς] ἐπαίνοις καὶ τιμαῖς, πειθόμενος δὲ καὶ δώροις. ὅσοι δὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσι τὰ βλέφαρα ἔχειν ὀρθὰ οὐδὲ τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀκλινεῖς, ἀλλὰ τρόμος αὐτοῖς ἔνεστι καὶ ἅμα τὸ βλέμμα ὑποκινεῖται, οὗτοι ἀνδρόγυνοι ὄντες ἄνδρες εἶναι βιάζονται.

A20. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἀναπεπταμένων.) Ὀφθαλμοὶ πυκνὰ ἀνοιγόμενοι ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἅμα ἱστάμενοι ἤ τι νοοῦντες ἢ μετανοοῦντες, τὴν γὰρ ἔννοιαν αὐτῶν ὁποία ἐστὶ σημαίνει καὶ ἀναγορεύει[59] σοι τὸ ξηρόν, τὸ ὑγρόν, τὸ σκότιον, τὸ λαμπρόν, τὸ μικρόν, τὸ μέγα, κοῖλον, ὑψηλόν, μαλθακόν, ἀτενές, τἆλλα ἐπὶ τούτοις ἃ πολλάκις εἴρηται. ταῦτα μνημονεύων δυνήσῃ καὶ περὶ ὧν μὴ εἴρηται ἐξ αὐτοῦ κρίνων φυσιογνωμονεῖν. ὅσοι οὖν ὀφθαλμοὶ ἀεὶ ἀνεῳγμένοι εἰσὶ σκότιοι μὲν ὄντες καὶ ὑγροί, φροντισταί· εἰ δὲ πρὸς τῷδε ἤπιον βλέποιεν, προσέσται καὶ χρηστοῖς εἶναι. ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐκπεπετασμένοι ξηροὶ μαρμαρύσσοντες ἱλαρὸν καὶ λαμπρὸν δεδορκότες ἀναισχύντους καὶ παντόλμους δηλοῦσιν.[60]

A21. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν σκαρδαμυττόντων καὶ ἀσκαρδαμύκτων.) Ὀφθαλμοὶ σκαρδαμύττοντες δειλίας κατήγοροι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ξηροὶ εἶεν, ἐπιβουλεύουσί τινι ἢ δόλον κρύπτουσιν ἢ κακόν τι λαθραῖον ἀρτύουσιν. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι διάστροφοι ἢ ὕπωχροι ὄντες μωρίαν μαρτυροῦσιν. ὀφθαλμοὶ ἀσκαρδάμυκτοι δεινὸν δεδορκότες κακόν τι ἐοίκασι μηχανᾶσθαι. πράως[61] δὲ ἑστῶτες {ἢ}[62] καὶ νοτίδος ἐνούσης φροντιστάς, φιλομαθεῖς, ἥμερα ἤθη κεκτημένους, ἐρωτικοὺς δηλοῦσιν. εἰ δὲ ἀσκαρδάμυκτοι ὄντες ὠχροὶ ἢ φοινικοῖ φαίνονται ἅμα ξηρότητι, ἄτην καὶ μνήμην κακῶν[63] καὶ μῆνιν καὶ φθόνου προσβολὴν ἢ ἄλλην δή τινα δαιμονίαν κακότητα ἐμφαίνουσιν. εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ὄντες αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς περιδινοῖντο, μανίᾳ κρατερᾷ συνέχονται.

A22. (Περὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κύστεων.) Κύστις ὀφθαλμοῖς κάτωθεν προσκειμένη οἰνόφλυγας, ἄνω δέ, ὑπνηλούς, ἄμφω δὲ οὖσαι καὶ ἀμφότερα σημαίνουσιν.

[59] Foerster's emendation of x's nonsensical ἀπαγορευτέοι.

[60] Leiden A20 here includes the example of Favorinus.

[61] Reading Foerster's suggestion (1893: i, p. cxci) πράως for πρᾶοι. Cf. Matr., Ps.-Pol., and Anon. Lat. 41.

is more savage in spirit, readier to dare, but puffed up by praises and honours and also bribable. As to those who are not able to keep their eyelids straight or their brows level, but have trembling in them along with a look that moves slightly—these are androgynous, but make an effort to be men.

A20. (On open eyes.) Eyes often open and wide and also still are either thinking something or changing their mind, for the nature of their thought is indicated and proclaimed[59] to you by the dryness, moistness, dullness, brightness, smallness, largeness, hollowness, height, softness, staring, and the other things as well as these which have often been mentioned. With this in mind you will also be able to practise physiognomy on things which have not been mentioned, judging for yourself. And so eyes which are always open and dull and moist are thoughtful. But if they have a gentle look in addition to this, they are also good. Eyes which are spread wide, dry, sparkling, and with a cheerful and bright look show shameless and all-daring men.[60]

A21. (On blinking and unblinking eyes.) Blinking eyes denounce cowardice. And if they are also dry, they are plotting against someone or hiding deceit or devising some secret evil. If these same ones are askew or rather pale, they bear witness to stupidity. Unblinking eyes with a terrible look are likely to contrive some evil. Gently[61] still eyes[62] with moisture in them show men who are thoughtful, fond of learning, possessed of gentle characters, and given to love. If unblinking eyes appear to be pale yellow or bloodshot and dry, they reveal folly and memory of evils[63] and wrath and an attack of envy or some other demonic condition. If eyes are such and spin around in themselves, they are afflicted by terrible madness.

A22. (On bags in eyes.) A bag hanging from below the eyes indicates drunkards, from above, those who are drowsy, and both also indicate both.

[62] Deleting ἢ with Foerster.

[63] Foerster writes μνήμην κακῶν rather than x's μνήμην σκαιῶν, which Franz and Schneider plausibly suggest may be a corruption of μνησικακίαν.

A23. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ὀξέων.[64]) Οἱ ὀξεῖς ὀφθαλμοὶ ταραχώδεις ἅρπαγες· οἱ (δὲ) ἰλλώπτοντες καὶ τὰ βλέφαρα ἐπιβάλλοντες ἀνδρόγυνοι. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν βλεφάρων ἐπιβάλλοντες καὶ ἀνατρεπόμενοι ἅμα ὑγρότητι πράως τε καὶ μαλθακῶς βλέποντες ἁβρυνταί, καλλωπισταί, μοιχικοί. ἔνιοι δὲ τὰ μέσα τῶν βλεφάρων καθέλκουσι, τὰ δὲ ἑκατέρωθεν ἀνασπῶσι καὶ ἅμα ἰλλώπτουσιν· οὓς καὶ αὐτοὺς μοιχικοὺς λέγων οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοις· ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς τὰ μέσα τῶν βλεφάρων ἀνασπῶντας, τὰ δὲ ἑκατέρωθεν συγκλείοντας.

[64] Or 'sharp'. Cf. Foerster's emendation *citi* at Anon. Lat. 42.

A23. (On quick[64] eyes.) Quick eyes are troubled and rapacious. Those who squint and flutter their eyelids are androgynous. Those who flutter and turn up one of their eyelids with moisture present and who look gently and softly, are fops, dandies, adulterers. Some drag down the middle parts of their eyelids, draw them up on either side, and squint at the same time. And if you said that these too were adulterers, you would not be wrong. The same goes for those who draw up the middle parts of their eyelids, and close them on either side.

ΑΔΑΜΑΝΤΙΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΟΓΝΩΜΟΝΙΚΩΝ Β´

B1. Φυσιογνωμονεῖν δεῖ καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ μέλη ἕκαστα καὶ χροιὰν ἑκάστην καὶ κινήσεις καὶ πνεύματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐστὶ μετὰ τούτων. χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς ἀφ' ἑνὸς σημείου καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀπὸ δύο οὐ χρὴ βεβαίως δοκεῖν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ πλειόνων καὶ μειζόνων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογούντων [πάντων], πάντα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα σημεῖα πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀνακρίνεσθαι. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπικρατεῖ· εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐκτὸς τούτοις ὁμολογοίη, ἀψευδὴς ἔσται ἡ φυσιογνωμονία. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων σημείων δυνατώτερα μὲν τὰ πλησίον τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, οἷον μέτωπον, ῥίς, στόμα, παρειαί, κεφαλή· δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἀμφὶ τράχηλον καὶ στέρνα, τρίτα δὲ τὰ ἀμφὶ ὤμους καὶ χεῖρας καὶ σκέλη καὶ πόδας, ὕστατα δὲ τὰ περὶ γαστέρα. μεγίστη δὲ εἰς ἐπίκρισιν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιπρέπεια ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις φανταζομένη,[65] ἣν ἐπὶ πᾶσι σφραγῖδα πάντων χρὴ ἐφορᾶν.[66] τοῦτο δὲ λόγον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα σημεῖα, τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοῦ συντίθησι τὸ πᾶν εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. πάντων γὰρ ἀθροισθέντων ἤδη τὸ πιστὸν φαίνεται.

B2. Τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῆς διακρίσεως τῆς ἐπιπρεπείας καὶ φανερώτατα τὸ τῳ ἄρρενι ἐοικὸς ἢ τῷ θήλει ἢ καὶ τῶν ζώων τῶν ἄλλων ⟨τινί⟩.[67] ἕκαστα γὰρ ἤθη τῶν θηρίων ἑκάστου καταφανῆ ἐστι τοῖς εἴδεσιν {ἤθεσι τοῖς ἐκείνοις ἕκαστα}[68] ἐοικότα, οἷον λέοντος ἦθος θυμικὸν καὶ ἄλκιμον καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοιοῦτον, παρδάλεως δὲ ἁβρὸν καὶ ὀργίλον καὶ λοχητικὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον, δειλὸν ἅμα καὶ θρασύ, καὶ ἡ μορφὴ τούτοις ἔοικεν· ἄρκος δὲ ὠμόφρων, δολία, σκαιά. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ ζῴοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιφαίνεται τὸ οἰκεῖον ἦθος·[69] συὶ ἀγρίῳ ὀργὴ ἀπρονόητος, βοῒ σεμνότης, ἀκακία, ἵππῳ μεγαλαυχία, φιλοτιμία, ἀλώπεκι τὸ δολερὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον, πιθήκῳ τὸ βωμολοχικὸν καὶ εἰρωνικόν, προβάτῳ τὸ εὔηθες, τράγῳ τὸ μάργον, ὑὶ τὸ μιαρὸν καὶ γαστρίμαργον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἑρπετῶν τε καὶ πετεινῶν τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἔοικεν. εἰ τοίνυν ἄνθρωπος μέρος τι ἢ μέλος θηρίῳ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἐοικότα ἔχει, ἀπὸ τούτων χρὴ αὐτὸν φυσιογνωμονεῖσθαι. χαροποὺς

[65] φανταζομένη (translation suggested by George Boys-Stones).

[66] Foerster is probably right to suspect fault with the text here, though sense can be made of it. Perhaps read πάντων ⟨οὖσαν⟩ (Holford-Strevens).

THE *PHYSIOGNOMY* OF ADAMANTIUS THE SOPHIST, BOOK 2

B1. You must practise physiognomy with a view to each part and limb, each colour, movement, breath, and noise, and all the other things which come after these. You must know that you should not think that you can make a firm pronouncement from one sign by itself or from two, but from the majority and the more important ones which agree with each other, and you must examine all the other signs with regard to those in the eyes; for these are the most important; for if the signs outside the eyes agree with those in them, your physiognomical assessment will be true. Among the other signs the most powerful are those near the eyes, such as the forehead, nose, mouth, cheeks, and head. Second are those around the neck and chest, third those around the shoulders, hands, legs, and feet, and last are those around the stomach. The overall appearance of the whole man which supervenes on[65] all these signs is the most important factor in verification, and one must observe this seal of all the signs on every man.[66] This does not provide an account in its own right, but each sign in itself, both those in the eyes and the others, together comprise the whole appearance of the man; for when all these have been gathered together the reliable truth emerges.

B2. The greatest and more obvious signs when it comes to distinguishing the overall appearance are those which are similar to what is masculine or feminine or even to one of the other animals.[67] For each character of each animal is apparent and resembles its appearance.[68] For example, the character of a lion is spirited and brave and such is its appearance, and the character of a leopard is elegant and irascible and cunning and treacherous, cowardly as well as bold, and its shape shows a resemblance to these traits. The character of a bear is savage-thinking, deceitful, and clumsy. And the particular character[69] of the other animals is apparent in the same way: improvident anger is apparent in a wild boar, dignity and simplicity in an ox, boastfulness and competitiveness in a horse, deceit and treachery in a fox, ribaldry and joking in an ape, stupidity in a sheep, lust in a goat, uncleanliness and gluttony in a pig, and similarly in the case of the other animals which creep or fly their appearances resemble their characters. And so if some part or limb of a man resembles an animal or bird, you must practise physiognomy on him from these signs.

[67] Reading τινί at Foerster's suggestion. The rest of this chapter consists of an amalgamation and abbreviation of the long list of animals with the material on what is masculine and what is feminine, both of which are to be found in Leiden ch. 2.

[68] Omitting ἤθεσι . . . ἕκαστα with Foerster.

[69] Foerster's necessary correction of x's κέρδος ('gain').

καὶ κοίλους μετρίως ὀφθαλμοὺς εἴπερ ἴδοις, λέοντος μέμνησο· εἰ πάνυ κοῖλοι, κακοήθεις εἰσί, καὶ πίθηκον ἐννόει· εἰ ἐπίπεδοί εἰσι, βοῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς τοιούτους λέγε· εἰ προπαλεῖς εἶεν ὀφθαλμοί, ἀνοήτου καὶ ὑβριστοῦ, ὥσπερ ὄνου.

Βελτίω δὲ τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν θηλειῶν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπιπλεῖστον τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν γενναῖον, ἄδολον, δίκαιον, θυμοειδές, φιλότιμον, ἄκακον· τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἀγεννές, πικρόν, δολερόν, κουφόνουν, ἄδικον, φιλόνεικον, θρασύδειλον· τὸ θῆλυ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἔχει τοῦ ἄρρενος κεφαλὴν μικροτέραν, σῶμα ἔλαττον, τρίχας μαλακωτέρας μελαντέρας, πρόσωπον στενότερον, ὀφθαλμοὺς στίλβοντας καὶ μαρμαρύσσοντας, τράχηλον λεπτότερον, στήθη ἀσθενέστερα, ἄπλευρον, ἰσχία καὶ μηροὺς περισαρκότερα, λεπτοκνημότερον, γονύκροτον, χειρῶν καὶ ποδῶν ἄκρα κομψότερα, τὴν πᾶσαν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος μαλακωτέραν, ὁμαλεστέραν, ἁβροτέραν, σαρκὶ ὑγρᾷ κεχρημένην, ἀναρθροτέραν τε καὶ λεπτονευροτέραν, φωνὴν ἰσχνοτέραν, τὸ βάδισμα μικρότερον καὶ πυκνότερον, τὰ μέλη καμπτόμενα μᾶλλον, ἡ κίνησις ὑγροτέρα. τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν τὰ ἐναντία τούτων φέρεται. τοίνυν τῶν θηρίων πάντων ὁ λέων ἐπιπλεῖστον τοῦ ἄρρενος εἴδους ἐστὶ μετέχων, ἡ δὲ πάρδαλις θηλυμορφότατον, τῶν δὲ ὀρνίθων ἀετὸς ἀρρενωπότατον, πέρδιξ δὲ θηλυμορφότατον, τῶν γε μὴν ἑρπετῶν ὁ μὲν δράκων ἀρρενικώτατον, ἡ δὲ ἔχιδνα θηλυμορφότατον.

B3.[70] (Περὶ τῶν ἐκ γενετῆς εὐνούχων.) Εὐνούχοις τοῖς ἐκ φύσεως κακίω σημεῖά ἐστιν ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὡς τὸ πολύ εἰσιν ὠμόφρονες, δολεροί, κακοῦργοι, ἕτεροι δὲ ἑτέρων μᾶλλον. τῶν δὲ τομιῶν εὐνούχων ἔνια μεταβάλλει ἅμα τῇ τομῇ σημεῖα, (τὸ) δὲ πλεῖον τῆς συγγενοῦς φύσεως ἐμμένει.

B4. (Περὶ ὀνύχων.) Ὄνυχες[71] πλατέες λευκοὶ ὑπόξανθοι εὐφυοῦς ἀνδρός, οἱ δὲ στενοὶ καὶ προμήκεις καὶ κυρτοὶ ἀναισθήτου καὶ θηριώδους, οἱ δὲ σκολιοὶ σφόδρα ἀναιδοῦς, ἅρπαγος, οἱ δὲ προσφυεῖς τῇ σαρκὶ ἐπιπλεῖον ἀναισθήτου καὶ θηριώδους. μικροὶ πάνυ ὄνυχες πανουργίας σημεῖον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὠχροὶ καὶ μέλανες καὶ τραχεῖς. εἰ δὲ στρογγύλοι πάνυ εἶεν, λάγνων τὸ σημεῖον. ὡς προείρηται μέντοι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων τὰ πολλὰ ἀξιόλογα, εἰ μόνον τι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ σκοποῖτο, ἥκιστα δὲ ὄνυχες.

[70] B3 is displaced from A20 and made independent. Cf. Leiden A20, B3, A21–3.

[71] Although Ad. seems to work his way up the body in the next few chs., ὄνυχες and δάκτυλοι probably refer to both toe- and fingernails and toes and fingers respectively, as no mention is made of fingernails and fingers separately when Ad. deals with the hands in B20; for it is hardly likely that if

If you see dark blue and reasonably hollow eyes, think of a lion. If they are very hollow, they are malicious; think of an ape. If they are flat, say that such eyes belong to oxen. If the eyes are protruding, they belong to a mindless and aggressive man, like an ass.

Masculine parts are better than female. Since for the most part what is masculine is noble, without deceit, just, spirited, competitive and simple. What is female, on the other hand, is ignoble, bitter, deceitful, light-minded, unjust, contentious, and impudently cowardly. In general what is feminine has a smaller head than what is masculine, a slighter body, softer and blacker hair, a narrower face, gleaming and sparkling eyes, a thinner throat, a weaker torso, is narrow-chested, fleshier on the hips and thighs, has thinner calves, is knock-kneed, has daintier fingers and toes, the whole appearance of the body is softer, weaker, daintier, with moist flesh, has less obvious joints and tendons, has a thinner voice, a smaller and more frequent step, more curved limbs and a suppler movement. What is masculine has the opposite traits. And so the lion has the most masculine appearance of all the animals and the leopard the most feminine, the eagle is the most masculine of the birds, the partridge the most feminine, and the python is the most masculine of reptiles and the viper is the most feminine in shape.

B3[70] (On those who are eunuchs from birth.) Those who are naturally eunuchs have worse signs than other men and are largely savage-minded, deceitful, and villainous, some more than others. Some signs of those who are eunuchs by castration change with the castration, but most of the congenital nature remains.

B4. (On nails.) Wide, white, yellowish nails[71] belong to a talented man, those which are narrow and long and curved to an insensible and beastlike man, those which are very crooked to a shameless and rapacious man, and those which are firmly attached to the flesh mostly to an insensible and beastlike man. Very small nails are a sign of villainy. Similarly with those that are pale yellow or black or rough. If they are very round, it is a sign of lascivious men. However, as has been mentioned, most of the other signs are not worth consideration, least of all the nails, if they are each considered by themselves.

toenails and toes merited treatment, fingernails and fingers would not. Conversely fingernails and fingers would be out of place here. I have therefore translated them as 'nails' and 'digits' in order to preserve the ambiguity. Cf. Anon. Lat. 60.

B5. (Περὶ δακτύλων.) Ὁπόσοι δακτύλους ἔχουσι συμφυεῖς, ὠώδεις καὶ μιαροί εἰσιν· εἰ δὲ συνεστραμμένους ἔχοιεν, πανοῦργοι, κακοήθεις, φιλοχρήματοι. μικροὶ δὲ πάνυ ὄντες καὶ λεπτοὶ ἀνοητοτέρους δηλοῦσι. δάκτυλοι κολοβοὶ καὶ παχεῖς τολμητήν, ἀπρονόητον, θηριώδη, καὶ οἱ πάνυ μακροὶ καὶ λεπτοὶ ἀνοητότερον, (ὑποχαυνότερον καὶ φλυαρότερον),[72] οἱ δὲ εὖ μεγέθους καὶ συμμετρίας ἔχοντες ἄριστοι.

B6. (Περὶ ποδῶν.) Πόδες νευρώδεις ἀρθρώδεις γενναῖα ἤθη (καὶ) ἀνδρεῖα,[73] ἁπαλοὶ δὲ καὶ σαρκωδέστεροι μαλακώτερα καὶ (γυναικεῖα)[74] τὰ ἤθη παρέχονται. πόδες κολοβοὶ καὶ παχεῖς θηριώδους φύσεως σημεῖον, οἱ δὲ μακροὶ πάνυ πολυπράγμονος, κακομηχάνου, οἱ δὲ μικροὶ (καὶ λεπτοὶ)[75] πανούργου. πόδες κυρτοὶ κάτωθεν κοῖλοι κακοί· ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ τὰ κάτω ὁμαλὰ ἔχοντες καὶ ὡς τοῖς σφυροῖς[76] βαίνοντες πανοῦργοι.

B7. (Περὶ σφυρῶν.) Σφυρὰ διηκριβωμένα (στερεὰ)[77] γενναίου ἀνδρός, τὰ δὲ μαλακὰ καὶ λεῖα ἀνανδροτέρου, λεπτὰ δὲ πάνυ δειλοῦ καὶ ἀκολάστου. παχέα δὲ σφυρὰ καὶ πτέρνας παχείας καὶ πόδας σαρκώδεις καὶ κολοβοὺς δακτύλους καὶ κνήμας παχείας ὅσοι φοροῦσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον μωραίνουσιν ἢ μεμήνασι.

B8. (Περὶ κνημῶν καὶ μηρῶν.) Κνῆμαι εὖ μεγέθους ἔχουσαι διηρθρωμέναι στερεαὶ γενναίου ἀνδρὸς καὶ εὐφυοῦς, ἁπαλαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄναρθροι δειλοτέρου καὶ ἀνανδροτέρου· αἱ δὲ λεπταὶ πάνυ δειλοῦ καὶ κακοήθους, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τούτῳ νευρώδεις καὶ ἀκολασίας πολλῆς μετέχοντος. ὅσαι δὲ τῶν κνημῶν κατὰ τὸ μέσον πλήρεις εἰσὶν ὡς κύουσαι, βδελυροὺς καὶ ἀκολάστους καὶ ἀναιδεῖς δηλοῦσιν· ὡς τὸ πολὺ δὲ κνημῶν καὶ πτερνῶν παχύτης δουλοπρεπές, ἀμαθές. ὅμοια δὲ ταῖς κνήμαις καὶ περὶ τῶν μηρῶν λέγε.

B9. (Περὶ γονάτων καὶ ἰσχίων.) Οἱ τὰ γόνατα ἔσω νεύοντες ὥστε συγκρούειν, γυναικεῖοι καὶ θηλυδρίαι.

Ἰσχία παχέα γυναικεῖα, ὀστώδη δὲ ἀνδρεῖα, λεπτὰ δὲ ὀλιγόσαρκα ῥικνά, ὥσπερ ἐκτετηκότα, πανούργου πρὸς ἀνδρός. τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ πιθήκων.

[72] Foerster supplies ὑποχαυνότερον καὶ φλυαρότερον from Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Leiden ch. 3 and Anon. Lat. 60.

[73] Ps.-Pol. gives as an example Heracles; we follow Foerster (1886: 14) in thinking this is not Polemonian.

B5. (On digits.) All those who have digits that are webbed are swinish and unclean. If they are twisted together, they are villainous, malicious, and fond of money. Very small and thin digits show more mindless men, stubby and thick fingers someone who is daring, improvident and beastlike, and those which are very long and thin someone who is more mindless, more conceited, and sillier.[72] Those of the right size and proportion are the best.

B6. (On feet.) Sinewy and well-jointed feet suggest noble and manly characters,[73] soft and fleshier ones softer and womanly[74] characters. Stubby and thick feet are a sign of a beastlike nature, those which are very long of a meddling, mischievous nature, and those which are small and thin[75] of a villainous nature. Curved feet which are hollow underneath are bad. And similarly those which are flat underneath and walk as if on the heel[76] are villainous.

B7. (On ankles.) Perfect, solid[77] ankles belong to a noble man, those which are soft and smooth to a more unmanly man, and those which are very thin to a cowardly and intemperate man. All those who have thick ankles, thick heels, fleshy feet, stubby toes, and thick calves are for the most part stupid or mad.

B8. (On calves and thighs.) Well-proportioned, well-jointed, and solid calves belong to a noble and talented man, while those which are soft and jointless belong to a more cowardly and unmanly man. Those which are very thin belong to a cowardly and malicious man, and those which in addition are sinewy belong to a man who is also very intemperate. Those calves which are full in the middle as if they were pregnant show disgusting and intemperate and shameless men. By and large, thickness in calves and heels is slavish and ignorant. Similar things apply also to thighs as to calves.

B9. (On knees and hips.) Those whose knees face inwards so that they knock together are womanly and effeminate.

Thick hips are womanly, bony hips are manly, and thin, wrinkled hips with little flesh, as if they have wasted away, belong to a villainous man; for the hips of apes too are like this.

[74] Supplying γυναικεῖα *vel sim.* with Foerster. Cf. Anon. Lat. 72.
[75] Foerster adds καὶ λεπτοί from Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 72.
[76] τοῖς σφυροῖς βαίνοντες, cf. Ch. 11, trans. n. 108.
[77] Foerster adds στερεά from Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 71.

B10. (Περὶ ὀσφύος.) Ὀσφὺς ὀστώδης (καὶ) καρτερὰ ἀνδρεία, σαρκώδης δὲ καὶ μαλακὴ γυναικεία· ἡ δὲ εἰς ὀξὺ ἀπηγμένη[78] ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν κατηγορεῖ.

B11. (Περὶ νώτου.) Νῶτον πλατὺ στερεὸν ἄνδρα γενναῖον, θυμοειδῆ ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τὰ ἐναντία λέγει.

B12. (Περὶ κυφότητος.) Κυφὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ ὑγρομέλεια αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σημεῖα ἀστεῖα προσείη, τὸν δὲ εὔζωνον φιλόθηρον νόει.[79]

B13. (Περὶ πλευρῶν καὶ γαστρός.) Πλευραὶ λεπταὶ καὶ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνανδρίαν, δειλίαν, αἱ δὲ πάνυ σκληραὶ καὶ σαρκώδεις ἀμαθίαν, αἱ δὲ περιφερεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὡς οἰδοῦσαι, φλυαρίαν καὶ κακοήθειαν σημαίνουσιν.

B14. Γαστέρες λαγαραὶ εὐρωστίαν ψυχῆς καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην σημαίνουσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰσχναὶ πάνυ καὶ κεναὶ δειλίαν καὶ κακοήθειαν καὶ γαστριμαργίαν σημαίνουσι. γαστέρες μεγάλαι σαρκώδεις, εἰ μὲν μαλθακαὶ εἶεν καὶ ἐκκρεμεῖς, ἀναισθησίαν, οἰνοφλυγίαν, ἀκολασίαν, εἰ δὲ σκληραῖς σαρξὶ συμπεπηγυῖαι, γαστριμαργίαν καὶ πανουργίαν ἐμφαίνουσιν.

B15. (Περὶ στηθῶν καὶ μαστῶν καὶ μεταφρένου.) Ὁπόσοις τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ χωρίον ἄχρις ἄκρου στήθους καταμετρούμενον μεῖζον εὑρίσκεται ἢ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἄχρις ἐκφύσεως τοῦ τραχήλου, βοροὶ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι γίνονται. στήθη μεγάλα ἀρθρώδη ἐπαίνει, λεπτὰ δὲ καὶ ἀσθενῆ μικροψυχίαν καὶ ἀνανδρίαν δηλοῖ, πολύσαρκα δὲ ἀμαθίαν[80] καὶ σκαιότητα. ὅσοις δὲ οἱ μαστοὶ ἐκκρεμεῖς εἰσι καὶ τὸ πᾶν στέρνον (μέγα καὶ)[81] ἀμφιλαφὲς σαρκὶ λαγαρᾷ, λάγνοι καὶ οἰνόφλυγες.

B16. Μετάφρενον κρατερὸν ἄριστον· τὸ δὲ ἀσθενὲς καὶ λεπτὸν δειλίᾳ καὶ μικροψυχίᾳ πρέπει· σὰρξ δὲ ἐπιπεφυκυῖα μεταφρένοις ἀμφιλαφὴς ἀναισθησίαν κατηγορεῖ, καὶ ἡ στενότης μωρίαν. μετάφρενον εὐρὺ μεγαλονοίας, τὸ δὲ πράως στρογγύλον ἀγχινοίας καὶ χαρίτων σημεῖον. κυρτὸν ὁ φέρων μετάφρενον καὶ ὤμους εἰς τὸ στῆθος ἐπικεκλασμένους κακοήθης ἐστὶ καὶ βάσκανος· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπικεκλασμένον, φειδωλὸς καὶ φιλάργυρος.

B17. (Περὶ κλειδῶν καὶ ὤμων.) Κλεῖδες συμπεφραγμέναι οὐκ εὐαίσθητον οὐδὲ ἐνεργὸν σημαίνουσιν, αἱ δὲ διεστηκυῖαι ἄνανδρον, τὸ δὲ σύμμετρον τῆς ἀνοίξεως αὐτῶν συνετὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον.

[78] Foerster's emendation of x's ἀφιγμένη ('come').
[79] Leiden ch. 12 has the example of the Armenian.

B10. (On loins.) Bony and strong loins are manly, and fleshy and soft loins are womanly. Loins which taper[78] off to a point denounce intemperance and cowardice.

B11. (On the back.) A broad, solid back makes a man noble and spirited, while the opposite means the opposite.

B12. (On stooping.) A stooping man is not good, unless he also has suppleness of limb and the other signs are elegant, in which case think that he is active and fond of hunting.[79]

B13. (On the flanks and the stomach.) Thin and weak flanks indicate unmanliness and cowardice, those which are very hard and fleshy ignorance, those which are rounded and full, as if swollen, nonsense and malice.

B14. Hollow stomachs indicate strength of soul and greatness of mind, those which are very lean and empty indicate cowardice, malice, and gluttony. Large fleshy stomachs, if they are soft and hanging out, show insensibility, drunkenness, and intemperance, while those which are compacted with hard flesh show gluttony and villainy.

B15. (On the chest, the breast, and the back.) Those on whom the distance from the navel to the bottom of the chest is found, when measured, to be greater than the distance from there to where the neck begins, are greedy and gluttonous. Praise large and jointed chests, but thin and weak ones show meanness of spirit and unmanliness, and very fleshy ones show ignorance[80] and clumsiness. Those whose breasts hang out and whose whole chest is large and[81] abundant in loose flesh are lascivious and drunken.

B16. A strong back is best. A weak and thin one befits cowardice and meanness of spirit. If there is an abundance of flesh on the back, it denounces insensibility, and narrowness denounces stupidity. A wide back is a sign of great-mindedness and a gently rounded one is a sign of shrewdness and graciousness. The man who has a hunched back and shoulders bent in towards his chest is malicious and spiteful. And if his body too is bent, he is parsimonious and fond of money.

B17. (On collar-bones and shoulders.) Collar-bones which are pressed together indicate a man who is not perceptive or energetic, those which are separated too much indicate an unmanly man, and those whose gap is proportional show an intelligent and manly man.

[80] Foerster replaces x's ἀσυμπάθειαν ('lack of sympathy') with ἀμαθίαν, presumably on the basis of Ps.-Pol. Cf. Leiden ch. 15.

[81] Foerster adds μέγα καί from Ps.-Pol. and Leiden ch. 17.

B18. Ὦμοι παχεῖς οὐκ ἐπαινετοί, οἱ δὲ καρτεροὶ ἀνδρείων ἠθῶν εἰσι, λαγαροὶ δὲ ἀνάνδρων καὶ δειλῶν, οἱ δὲ λεπτοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς τὰς κορυφὰς κακοήθων, εἰ δὲ παντελῶς ἄναρθροι εἶεν, μωρῶν.

B19. (Περὶ ὠλενῶν καὶ πήχεων καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ἄκρων.) Ἐὰν ἐπιμήκεις ὦσιν αἱ ὠλέναι, ὡς κατακρεμασθείσας τὰς χεῖρας ἄχρι τῶν γονάτων ἐξικνεῖσθαι, εὐπραξίας καὶ ἰσχύος τὸ σημεῖον· κολοβαὶ δὲ οὖσαι, ὡς μὴ ἀφικνεῖσθαι εἰς γόνατα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν συναντᾶν ταῖς χερσὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, κακοθελεῖς καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκάκους καὶ φθονεροὺς δηλοῦσι. καρτερὰς εἶναι ὠλένας καὶ πήχεις ἀγκῶνάς τε ἀρθρώδεις ἄριστον· τὰ γὰρ ἐξίτηλα ἄνανδρα, τὰ δὲ πάνυ σαρκώδη ἀμαθῆ καὶ ἀναίσθητα.

B20. Χεῖρες ἁπαλαὶ καὶ μαλθακαὶ εὐφυοῦς πρὸς ἀνδρός· αἱ δὲ σκληραὶ ἅμα μεγέθει ἀνδρεῖον μέν, δυσμαθῆ δὲ εἶναι δηλοῦσι. χεῖρες πάνυ κολοβαὶ μωρίας σημεῖον, εἰ δὲ εἶεν παχεῖαι, καὶ μιαρίας· στεναὶ δὲ καὶ λεπταὶ ἁρπακτικώταται. παχεῖαι χεῖρες κοντοὺς ἔχουσαι τοὺς δακτύλους κλεπτίσταται. μικραὶ δὲ πάνυ χεῖρες πανουργίας καὶ κλεπτοσύνης σημεῖον. λεπταῖς δὲ καὶ σκολιαῖς χερσὶ φλυαρίαν καὶ γαστριμαργίαν τεκμαίρου.

B21. (Περὶ τραχήλου.) Τράχηλος ὁ μὲν πάνυ μακρὸς καὶ λεπτὸς δειλῶν καὶ κακοήθων, ὁ δὲ παχὺς ἅμα μήκει θυμικῶν καὶ μεγαλαύχων αὐθαδῶν τε, ὁ δὲ μετρίως μήκους ἔχων καὶ πάχους εὐπαγής τε καὶ ῥωμαλέος ἀλκίμων, εὐμαθῶν, εὐφυῶν πρὸς ἀρετήν, λαγαρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀσθενὴς πανούργων, κακομηχάνων. ὁπόσοις ὁ τράχηλος νεύροις κατατείνεται, σκαιοὶ οὗτοι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα σημεῖα συμβαίνει, [καὶ] μωραίνουσι καὶ μανίᾳ ἐπιλαμβάνονται. καὶ οἱ μεγάλα ⟨δὲ⟩ ἀγγεῖα περὶ τῷ τραχήλῳ πεπλεγμένα ἔχοντες ἐμφανῆ σκαιοί· οἱ δὲ ὑπερφυῶς παχυτράχηλοι δυσόργητοι, σκαιοί, ἀμαθεῖς, ὑώδεις· οἱ δὲ κολοβοτράχηλοι θρασύδειλοι. ὅσοις δὲ τῶν ἐπαυχενίων σπονδύλων τραχέων ὄντων ἐξέχει πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ κατὰ τὴν συμβολὴν τῶν ὠμοπλατῶν, ὅθεν ἐκφύεται ὁ τράχηλος, οὗτοι ὑβρισταί· οἱ δὲ σκληροτράχηλοι ἀμαθεῖς, ⟨οἱ δὲ ὑγροτράχηλοι εὐμαθεῖς⟩.[82] τραχὺς αὐχὴν ὥσπερ λοφιὰ ἀμαθοῦς σὺν ὕβρει. τράχηλον πεπηγότα ἀκλινῆ σκαιὸν καὶ αὐθάδη ⟨λέγε⟩[83] καὶ ἀμαθίαν δὲ ἀνατίθει. τισὶ δὲ διὰ μωρίαν γίνονται ἀκλινεῖς τράχηλοι, οἷς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σημεῖα συμβαίνει. ἄλλοι δὲ ἀκλινεῖς τραχήλους ἔχοντες οἰακίζουσιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τείνουσι τέχναις καὶ πόνοις μεγάλοις μάλα κεκλασμένους ὄντας. οὗτοι δὲ ἀνδρόγυνοι ὄντες εἶτα

[82] Foerster supplies οἱ δὲ ὑγροτράχηλοι εὐμαθεῖς from Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 54 and Leiden ch. 23.

B18. Thick shoulders are not praiseworthy, strong ones belong to manly characters, slack ones to unmanly and cowardly characters, thin ones with sharp points to malicious characters, and if shoulders are completely jointless they belong to stupid characters.

B19. (On arms and forearms and hands and their extremities.) If the arms are long, so that when hanging down the hands reach the knees, it is a sign of good conduct and strength. If they are short, so that they do not reach the knees, but while eating the head has to meet the hands, they show malevolent and jealous men who rejoice at others' woes. It is best for arms and forearms to be strong and for elbows to be jointed; for those that are attenuated are unmanly and those which are very fleshy are ignorant and insensible.

B20. Delicate and soft hands belong to a talented man. Hands which are hard and large show a man who is manly, but not good at learning. Very short hands are a sign of stupidity, and if they are thick, also of brutality. Narrow and slender hands are the most rapacious. Thick hands with short fingers are the most thievish. Very small hands are a sign of villainy and thievishness. By slender and crooked hands judge nonsense and gluttony.

B21. (On the neck.) A very long and thin neck belongs to those who are cowardly and malicious, a thick long one to those who are spirited, boastful, and stubborn, a moderately long and thick one which is firm and strong to those who are brave, good at learning and naturally disposed to virtue, and a slack and weak one to villains and mischief-makers. Those whose neck is stiff with tendons are clumsy. And if the other signs also agree, they are stupid and afflicted with madness. But those who have obvious large veins twisted about their neck are clumsy. Those who have excessively thick necks are quick to anger, clumsy, ignorant, and swinish. Those who are short-necked are impudent cowards. Those whose neck vertebrae are rough, with the one at the meeting of the shoulder blades, where the neck begins, protruding further than the others, are aggressive. Those with stiff necks are ignorant, and those with pliant necks are good at learning.[82] A rough neck like a mane is a sign of ignorance with aggression. Say[83] that a neck that is rigid is clumsy and stubborn and attribute ignorance. Some men's necks become motionless through stupidity, and their other signs agree with this. Others with motionless necks steer themselves and strive artificially and with great effort because they are very degenerate. These are androgynous, and by making themselves upright they think they hide

[83] Foerster adds λέγε.

ὀρθοῦντες αὐτοὺς οἴονται τὴν μαχλοσύνην ἐπικρύπτειν, κατηγοροῦσι δὲ αὐτῶν χειλῶν σπασμὸς καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν παρατροπὴ καὶ ποδῶν παραφορὰ καὶ ὀσφύος κίνησις καὶ χειρῶν ἄλυς καὶ φωνῆς κραυγή. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τράχηλοι αὐτῶν οὐ διαρκῶς πεπηγέναι δύνανται, ἀλλ' ὑποτρέμουσιν ἅτε τῆς τάσεως[84] βιαζομένης. ἡ δὲ τραχήλου κλάσις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀνδρογύνου, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σημεῖα συντρέχει, τὸ δὲ αὔταρκες τῆς τάσεως[85] καὶ τῆς εὐπηξίας ἄριστον. ἄνω ἐστραμμένος τράχηλος ὑβριστοῦ καὶ ἀνοήτου καὶ ὑποχαύνου, εἰ μὴ ἄρα διὰ μανίαν[86] αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· ὁ δὲ ἐπικεκυφὼς τράχηλος δύναται μὲν μωρόν, δύναται δὲ ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ φροντιστὴν καὶ φειδωλὸν καὶ κακοήθη καὶ ἔξω ἁπλότητος καὶ εὐθυμίας καὶ πραότητος[87] σημαίνειν. τράχηλος εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ βλέπων κοσμίου καὶ φροντιστοῦ καὶ σώφρονος, εἰς δὲ τὰ λαιὰ μάχλου καὶ ἀνοήτου. εἰς ὁπότερον δὲ ἂν ᾖ μέρος ἄλλο κεκλιμένος, οὐκ ἀγαθός· βεβλάφθαι γὰρ τὰς φρένας δηλοῖ.

B22.[88] Φάρυγξ τραχεῖα κουφονόου ἀνδρός, φλυάρου, λαβραγόρου· εἰ δὲ εἷς τῶν τοῦ βρόγχου σπονδύλων ἐξέχει,[89] κουφονόου μέν, οὐ μὴν θρασέος εἰς γλῶσσαν. ⟨καὶ⟩ μετέωρα δὲ φρονοῦσι ⟨οἱ τοιοῦτοι⟩[90] νοήματα, οἰνωθέντες μέντοι ὀδύρται, καχύποπτοι, δυσόργητοι, ἀνιαροὶ συμπόται ἐγνώσθησαν.

B23. (Περὶ γενύων καὶ χειλῶν.) Μακρογένυες οὐ πάνυ κακοί, λαλίστεροι δὲ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος καὶ ὑποχαυνότεροι· οἱ δὲ μικρογένυες κακοὶ τὰ πάντα, μάλιστα δὲ ὠμοὶ καὶ ἐπίβουλοι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὄφεις τοιοῦτοι. γένυι τῇ κάτω εἰ πάνυ στρογγύλον σχῆμα περιγέγραπται,[91] ἄνανδρόν ἐστι καὶ γυναικεῖον, τὸ δὲ ὑποτετράγωνον ἀνδρεῖον. γένυος τῆς κάτω τὸ ἄκρον ἐσχισμένον ὥστε δικόρυφον γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ σχίσμα εἴη, δολεροὺς σημαίνει· εἰ δὲ αὐτάρκως ἡ διαίρεσις ἔχοι, εἰς ἀφροδίτην καὶ χάριτας ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον.

B24. Χείλη δὲ λεπτὰ ἐπὶ στόμασι μείζοσιν ἐπὶ τῇ συγχειλίᾳ χαλαρά, ὡς ἐπιβεβλῆσθαι τοῖς κάτω τὰ ἄνω, μεγαλόνοιαν καὶ ἀνδρίαν δηλοῖ, λεόντων γὰρ ταῦτα, χείλη δὲ ἐπὶ μικροῖς στόμασι λεπτὰ δειλὸν δηλοῖ καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ δολερόν. στόμα μήτε ἐπίπεδον πάνυ μήτε προπετὲς ἐπαίνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ προπετὲς ἀνοίας καὶ ματαιολογίας καὶ θρασύτητος, τὸ δὲ χθαμαλὸν δειλίας καὶ παλιμβουλίας σημεῖον. μικρὸν στόμα γυναικείοις ἤθεσι καὶ

[84] Foerster, following Ps.-Pol., emends x's στάσεως to τάσεως.

[85] Foerster makes the same emendation, although without Ps.-Pol.'s direct support.

[86] Foerster replaces x's μαλακίαν ('softness') with μανίαν, presumably on the basis of Anon. Lat. 55, since Ps.-Pol. also has μαλακίαν.

[87] Foerster, on the basis of Anon. Lat. 55, emends the ἁβρότητος ('elegance', 'daintiness') of x to πραότητος.

[88] B22 is taken with B21 in Leiden ch. 23, which is perhaps why there is no separate title here.

their lewdness, but the spasm of their lips, the deviation of their eyes, the noncoordination of their feet, the movement of their loins, the fidgeting of their hands, and the screaming of their voice denounce them; for their necks are not capable of being completely fixed, but they tremble slightly because the tension[84] makes them. The bending of the neck belongs for the most part to an androgynous man, if the other signs also agree; while sufficient tension[85] and compactness is best. An upturned neck belongs to an aggressive and mindless and conceited man, unless it does this because of madness.[86] A neck bent forwards can indicate a stupid man, but sometimes it can indicate a worried, parsimonious, and malicious man who is not simple, cheerful, or mild.[87] A neck looking to the right belongs to an orderly, thoughtful, and moral man, but one which looks to the left belongs to a lewd and mindless man. In whichever other direction a neck is turned, it is not good; for it shows a damaged mind.

B22.[88] A rough throat belongs to a light-minded man who talks nonsense and is a braggart. If one of the vertebrae of the throat protrudes,[89] it belongs to a light-minded man who is not, however, bold in speech. These[90] think fickle thoughts, but are known for being drunk, querulous, suspicious, quick to anger, and troublesome drinking companions.

B23. (On jawbones and lips.) Those with long jawbones are not very bad, but are talkative beyond what is decent and are rather conceited. Those with short jawbones are bad in every respect and are particularly savage and treacherous; for snakes are such. If a very round shape is traced by[91] the lower jaw, it is unmanly and womanly, if it is nearly square, it is manly. If the point of the lower jaw is separated so that it becomes double-pointed, if the gap is large, it indicates deceitful men. If the gap is a reasonable size, it is a sign of a tendency towards sex and pleasure.

B24. Thin lips on rather large mouths which are loose at the point of contact, so that those above rest on those below, show great-mindedness and manliness, for these are the lips of lions, but thin lips on small mouths show a cowardly, unmanly and deceitful man. Praise a mouth which is neither very flat nor prominent; for a prominent mouth is a sign of mindlessness, vain-speaking, and rashness, and a flat mouth is a sign of cowardice and untrustworthiness. A small

[89] This is what Foerster's text contains. From Anon. Lat. 56 and Leiden ch. 23 it is clear that what is being referred to is the Adam's apple. The text should perhaps be amended to εἰ δὲ εἷς (cf. Anon. Lat. *singularis*) τοῦ βρόγχου σπόνδυλος ἐξέχει, *vel sim.*: 'If a single point protrudes from the throat'.

[90] Foerster indicates a lacuna here, and suggests that οἱ τοιοῦτοι should be read.

[91] So Holford-Strevens; MSS περιγράφει.

εἴδεσιν ἔοικε, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον ἀνδρεῖον. ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀνατομὴ στόματος πάνυ βορόν, ὠμόφρονα, ἀνόητον, ἀνόσιον· τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ τῶν κητῶν[92] στόματα. ὅσοις κατὰ τοὺς κυνόδοντας κορυφοῦται τὰ χείλη, κακόθυμοι, ὑβρισταί, κρᾶκται, ἐπεσβόλοι· τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ τῶν κυνῶν στόματα. ὅσοις δὲ τὸ πᾶν στόμα πρόκειται ἐπὶ πολὺ τά τε χείλη ἐστὶ παχέα καὶ στρογγύλα καὶ ἀνεστραμμένα εἰς τὸ ἔξω, ὑώδεις οὗτοι τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα. τὸ ἄνω χεῖλος τῷ κάτω ἐπιβεβλῆσθαι ἐμφρονέστερον· εἰ δὲ τὸ κάτω χεῖλος προέχοι, ἄκακα μὲν τὰ ἤθη, ματαιόφρονα δὲ ὡς ἐπιπολὺ καὶ ἠλιθιώτερα. στόμα μικρὸν προέχον ἔξω κακοήθους καὶ ἐπιβούλου. στόμα κοῖλον ὡς ἐμβοθρευόμενον φθονερῶν καὶ κακοήθων, μάλιστα δὲ ἀκολάστων.

B25. (Περὶ ῥινός.) Ῥινὸς τὸ ἄκρον λεπτὸν ἐπιζέειν[93] τὴν ὀργὴν μηνύει, παχὺ δὲ πάνυ καὶ χθαμαλὸν μιαρίαν ἤθους κατηγορεῖ. ῥινὸς τὸ ἄκρον ἁδρὸν καὶ ἀμβλὺ καὶ στρογγύλον καὶ κρατερὸν εἰ θεάσαιο, τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἀνδρίαν καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν[94] μαρτύρει εἰς λέοντα ὁρῶν καὶ κυνῶν τοὺς γενναίους. ῥὶς μακρὰ καὶ λεπτὴ πάνυ ὀρνιθῶδες. τοιαῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ ἤθη προσδόκα. τῆς ῥινὸς τὸ πρὸς τὸ μέτωπον διηρθρῶσθαι καλόν, ἀνδρεῖον καὶ συνετόν· τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τούτου θῆλυ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον. ἰθύτης ῥινὸς γλώσσης ἀκράτειαν κατηγορεῖ. ῥὶς ἡ μείζων ἀμείνων, ἡ δὲ πάνυ μικρὰ κλεπτοσύνης καὶ παλιμβουλίας κατήγορος. γρυποῖς μεγαλόνοια πρέπει, σιμοῖς δὲ λαγνεία. μυκτῆρας ἀναπεπταμένους θυμοῦ καὶ ἀλκῆς μάρτυρας τίθεσο, στενοὺς δὲ ὄντας καὶ στρογγύλους καὶ πεφραγμένους μωρίας. σκολιαῖς δὲ πάνυ ῥισὶ σκολιὰ καὶ τὰ νοήματα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἕπεται.

B26. (Περὶ μετώπου.) Μέτωπον στενὸν οὐκ ἐλάχιστον σημεῖον ἀμαθίας, καὶ τὸ λίαν δὲ μέγα[95] νωθείας ὡς τὸ πολύ. μέτωπον μακρὸν εὐαισθησίαν καὶ εὐμάθειαν δείκνυσι. μήτε πάνυ χθαμαλὸν ἐπαίνει μέτωπον, ἄνανδρον γάρ, μήτε κυρτὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν καὶ περιφερές, ἀναισχυντίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀναισθησίαν σημαίνει. μηδὲ μὴν τραχεῖ μετώπῳ χαῖρε μηδὲ ὥσπερ λόφους καὶ ὀρύγματα ἔχοντι ἐν ἑαυτῷ· πανουργίας γὰρ καὶ ἀπιστίας κατήγορα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ μωρίας καὶ μανίας συντρεχόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων. μέτωπον τετράγωνον μεγέθους εὖ ἔχον καὶ κατὰ λόγον τοῦ ἄλλου εἴδους ἄριστον εἴς τε ἀνδρίαν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ μεγαλόνοιαν κέκριται. οἱ κατηρεφῆ μέτωπα ἔχοντες αὐθάδεις, οἱ δὲ πάνυ τεταμένα ἀμέριμνοι, οἱ δὲ ῥυσσὰ φροντισταί.[96]

[92] κητῶν Rose for x's κυνῶν, no doubt influenced by the mention of dogs shortly afterwards.

[93] Following Schneider, Foerster replaces x's ἐπαύξειν ('increase') with ἐπιζέειν, presumably on the basis of Ps.-Pol.

[94] Foerster replaces x's μεγαλαυχίαν ('boasting'/'arrogance') with μεγαλοψυχίαν, presumably on the basis of Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 51.

mouth is like the characters and appearances of women, and a larger mouth is manly. A mouth with a wide opening indicates a very gluttonous, savage-minded, mindless, and unholy man; for such are the mouths of sea-monsters.[92] Those whose lips form points at their canines are malevolent, aggressive, abusive bawlers; for such are the mouths of dogs. Those whose whole mouth sticks out a long way and whose lips are thick and round and turned outwards are swinish in character and deed. If the upper lip rests on the lower it shows a more rational man. If the lower lip protrudes, it shows a simple character, but one which is generally weak-minded and rather foolish. A small protruding mouth belongs to a malicious and treacherous man. A mouth hollow as if embedded in a pit belongs to those who are rather envious and malicious and particularly to those who are intemperate.

B25. (On the nose.) If the point of the nose is thin, it reveals that anger boils over,[93] if it is very thick and flat it denounces brutality of character. If you see that the point of a nose is large, blunt, round, and strong, witness that those who have it are manly and magnanimous,[94] judging by lions and those dogs which are noble. A large and very thin nose is bird-like. And so expect their characters to be such as well. If the part of the nose towards the forehead is well jointed, it shows a manly and intelligent man. The opposite of this is feminine and rather ignorant. Straightness of the nose denounces incontinence of the tongue. A larger nose is better, and a very small one denounces thievishness and untrustworthiness. Great-mindedness is shown by hooked noses and lasciviousness by snub noses. Reckon open nostrils witnesses of spirit and strength, but narrow, round, and blocked ones of stupidity. If the nose is very crooked, the thoughts are generally crooked too.

B26. (On the forehead.) A narrow forehead is not the least important sign of ignorance, and an excessively large[95] one is generally a sign of sluggishness. A large forehead shows perceptiveness and quickness of learning. Neither praise a very flat forehead, for it is unmanly, nor one that is curved, high, and round, for it indicates shamelessness and insensibility. And do not find pleasure in a rough forehead nor one that has, as it were, ridges and ditches in it, for all such things denounce villainy and faithlessness, and sometimes stupidity and madness if the other signs also agree. A square forehead which is of reasonable size and in proportion with the rest of the appearance is thought best with a view to manliness and intelligence and great-mindedness. Those who have overhanging foreheads are stubborn, those who have very stretched ones are without care and those who have wrinkled foreheads are worried.[96]

[95] Foerster replaces x's λεῖον δὲ μετά ('smooth with') with λίαν δὲ μέγα, presumably on the basis of Ps.-Pol. Cf. Leiden ch. 27.

[96] Or possibly 'thoughtful'. See B21, where both meanings occur within the space of a few lines.

B27. (Περὶ παρειῶν καὶ προσώπου.) Παρειαῖς σαρκώδεσι ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ οἰνοφλυγίαν παρεῖναι λέγε, ταῖς δὲ ἄγαν λεπταῖς κακοήθειαν καὶ πανουργίαν. βάσκανοι δὲ καὶ ὅσοις παχεῖαι οὖσαι αἱ γνάθοι διεστήκασι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. στρογγύλαι παρειαὶ δολίων, αἱ δὲ λίαν μακραὶ φλυάρων καὶ ματαιολόγων.

B28. Πρόσωπον τὸ πᾶν ἀνθρώπου σαρκῶδες μὲν ὂν εὐπαθοῦς καὶ ἡβῶντος ἀνδρός, ἄσαρκον δὲ φροντιστοῦ καὶ ἐπιβούλου. μικρὰ δὲ πρόσωπα μικρὰ καὶ ἤθη λέγει, τὰ δὲ λίαν μεγάλα νωθείαν[97] καὶ ἀμαθίαν κατηγορεῖ. προσώπῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιφαίνεται μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἀνελευθερία καὶ (εὐήθεια καὶ)[98] κακοήθεια. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀνιαρὸν πρόσωπον καὶ σπουδῆς πλῆρες καὶ παιδιᾶς[99] καὶ εὐμειδές τε καὶ ἀμειδὲς καὶ ὀδυρτικὸν καὶ ὑπνηλὸν καὶ ἐγρήγορον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡς ἔχει φύσεως εὖ μάλα φαίνεται. ὁποίῳ οὖν πάθει ἔοικε, κατὰ τοῦτο χρὴ φυσιογνωμονεῖν. σπασμοὶ προσώπου καὶ παρειῶν, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ στυγναῖς προσόψεσιν εἶεν, μανίαν ἢ μωρίαν, εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ φαιδραῖς, μαχλοσύνην δηλοῦσιν.

B29. (Περὶ ὤτων.) Ὦτα μεγάλα φοροῦσιν ἀναίσθητοι, μικρὰ δὲ κακοήθεις καὶ πανοῦργοι· ὦτα δὲ λίαν μικρὰ καὶ ὥσπερ περιτετμημένα μωροί, τετράγωνα δὲ ὦτα μεγέθους αὐτάρκως ἔχοντα εὐαίσθητοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι. καὶ τὰ διαγεγλυμμένα δὲ οἱ ἔχοντες εὐμαθεῖς καὶ συνετοί, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάγλυφα (καὶ στρογγύλα λίαν)[100] ἀμαθεῖς. (τὰ δὲ στενὰ καὶ ὑπόμακρα βάσκανοι καὶ κακοήθεις.)[101]

B30. (Περὶ κεφαλῆς.) Κεφαλὴ μικρὰ πάνυ ἀναίσθητον καὶ ἀσύνετον σημαίνει, ἡ δὲ μείζων τῆς συμμέτρου εὐαίσθητον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, ἡ δὲ σύμμετρος[102] εὐαίσθητον μέν, ἄνανδρον δὲ καὶ ἀνελεύθερον πάνυ, ἡ δὲ μεγάλη πάνυ δυσαίσθητον καὶ ἀμαθῆ. λοξοὶ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἄνδρες ἀναιδεῖς, οἱ δὲ πάνυ ὑψηλοὶ αὐθάδεις· οἱ τὰ ὄπισθεν τῶν κεφαλῶν χθαμαλὰ ἔχοντες ἄψυχοι.[103] ὅσοι δὲ τὰ παρ' ἑκάτερα τῆς κεφαλῆς κοῖλα ἔχουσι, δολεροὶ καὶ παλίγκοτοι. κεφαλὴ μέση χθαμαλὴ ἠρέμα εὖ μεγέθους τε καὶ ὀρθότητος ἔχουσα ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴς τε εὐαισθησίαν καὶ μεγαλόνοιαν κέκριται.

[97] Foerster reads νωθείαν instead of x's (and Ps.-Pol.'s) μωρίαν ('stupidity') on the basis of Anon. Lat. 50. But see Ch. 8, trans. n. 263.

[98] Supplied by Foerster from Ps.-Pol.

[99] Foerster's emendation of x's παιδείας ('learning').

[100] Foerster inserts καὶ στρογγύλα λίαν from Ps.-Pol. Cf. Anon. Lat. 47.

B27. (On the cheeks and the face.) Say that laziness and drunkenness are present in fleshy cheeks, and malice and villainy in those which are excessively thin. Those whose cheek-bones are thick and set apart from the eyes are spiteful. Round cheeks belong to deceitful men and those which are excessively large to those who talk idle nonsense.

B28. If the whole of a man's face is fleshy it belongs to a bon viveur and a young man, if it is unfleshy to a worried and treacherous man. Small faces indicate small characters, and those which are excessively large denounce sluggishness[97] and ignorance. Magnificence and meanness and simplicity[98] and malice are particularly evident on the face. There is also a troublesome face, one that is full of concern or childishness,[99] one that is smily, one that does not smile, one that is querulous, one that is asleep, one that is awake, and the other natural states appear very well. And so one must practise physiognomy according to the state which the face resembles. Spasms of the face and cheeks, if they are on sullen appearances, show madness or stupidity, if on bright appearances, lewdness.

B29. (On the ears.) Insensible men bear large ears and malicious and villainous men bear small ones. Stupid men have ears which are excessively small, as if they have been trimmed, and perceptive and manly men have square ears which are of a reasonable size. Those who have scooped-out ears are good at learning and intelligent, whereas those who have ears that are not scooped out but are excessively round[100] are ignorant. (Those who have narrow and rather long ears are spiteful and malicious men.)[101]

B30. (On the head.) A very small head indicates an insensible and unintelligent man, one which is larger than proportional a man who is perceptive and manly and magnificent, one that is proportional[102] a man who is perceptive but unmanly and very mean, and a very large head shows a man who is not good at perceiving and who is ignorant. Men with slanting heads are shameless and those with very high heads are stubborn. Those with a flat back to their head are faint-hearted.[103] Those with hollow sides to their head are deceitful and malignant. A medium-sized head which is slightly flat and of a good size and shape is thought best of all with a view to perceptiveness and great-mindedness.

[101] Foerster suggests, on the basis of Ps.-Pol., that a sentence along these lines has dropped out. Cf. Anon. Lat. 47 and Leiden ch. 29.

[102] In comparison with Leiden ch. 30 and Anon. Lat. 16, Foerster amends x's ἀσύμμετρος ('out of proportion') to the σύμμετρος demanded by the context.

[103] Foerster reads ἄψυχοι instead of εὔψυχοι (M and V; 'courageous'), citing Leiden ch. 30. His reading does not seem secure.

B31. (Περὶ χροιῶν καὶ τριχῶν.) Οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ εἰς τὸ φυσιογνωμονῆσαι τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν χροιῶν καὶ τριχῶν σημεῖα, ὅθεν οὐδὲ κατὰ ἔθνη ῥάδιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ὅστις ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλως τε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπιμεμῖχθαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ Σύρους μὲν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ, Λίβυας δὲ ἐν Θράκῃ καὶ ἄλλους ἀλλαχοῦ διεσπάρθαι. ὡς δὲ (ἐπὶ τὸ) πολὺ οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῇ ἄρκτῳ οἰκοῦντες εὐμήκεις εἰσί, ξανθοί, λευκοὶ τὰς κόμας, ἁπαλότριχες, γλαυκοί, σιμοί, παχυσκελεῖς, περιπληθεῖς σαρκὶ λαγαρᾷ, προγάστορες, ἁπλοῖ, θυμοειδεῖς, ὀλιγόβουλοι, θερμόβουλοι, δυσμαθεῖς, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ μελανότριχες, οὐλότριχες, μελανόφθαλμοι, λεπτοσκελεῖς, εὐμαθεῖς, πολυγνώμονες, κουφόνοοι, ψεῦσται, κερδαλέοι, ἐπίκλοπα νοήματα ἔχοντες. ἧσσον δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἑκάτεροι αὐτῶν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔχουσιν, ὅσῳ προσεχεῖς μᾶλλόν[104] εἰσιν ἢ πάλιν διαστήματι πλείονι κεχωρισμένοι τῆς μεσημβρίας ἢ τῆς ἄρκτου. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῆς οἰκήσεως μέσην ἔχει τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ συμμιγῆ (τά τε) σημεῖα καὶ τὰς γνώμας. οἱ δὲ ἑῷοι καὶ ἑσπέριοι, καθὸ μεσημβρινώτεροι καὶ ἀρκτικώτεροί εἰσιν, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν διαφέρουσιν. ἔχουσι γὰρ διαφορὰν Λιβύων[105] οἱ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Λιβύης τὰ ἑσπέρια νεμόμενοι καὶ Ἰβήρων οἱ εἰς τὴν ἔξω θάλασσαν καθήκοντες, καίτοι ἀμφότεροι ἑσπέριοί εἰσιν· ἀλλὰ οἱ μὲν Λίβυες Αἰθίοψιν ὅμοιοι, οἱ δὲ Ἴβηρες Κελτοῖς. ὡς γὰρ ἐν βραχεῖ δηλῶσαι, ἡ μὲν μεσημβρία ξηρότητι καὶ θερμότητι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον κέκραται, ἡ δὲ ἄρκτος ὑγρότητι καὶ ψυχρότητι· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα χωρία, καθόσον τούτων ἑκατέρᾳ πλησιάζει, καὶ τῆς κράσεως (μεταλαμβάνει καὶ φύει τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἀνθρώπους κατὰ λόγον τῆς οἰκείας κράσεως)[106] τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἤθη παρεχομένους, πλὴν αἴτιον τοῦ ποικίλους εἶναι[107] γεγένηται τὸ πολλοὺς ἀπὸ ἄλλων ἐθνῶν εἰς ἕτερα μετελθόντας κατῳκηκέναι.

B32. (Περὶ εἴδους Ἑλληνικοῦ.) Εἰ δέ τισι τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν καὶ Ἰωνικὸν γένος ἐφυλάχθη καθαρῶς, οὗτοί εἰσιν αὐτάρκως μεγάλοι ἄνδρες, εὐρύτεροι, ὄρθιοι, εὐπαγεῖς, λευκότεροι τὴν χρόαν, ξανθοί, σαρκὸς κρᾶσιν ἔχοντες μετρίαν εὐπαγεστέραν, σκέλη ὀρθά, ἄκρα εὐφυῆ, κεφαλὴν μέσην τὸ μέγεθος, περιαγῆ, τράχηλον εὔρωστον, τρίχωμα ὑπόξανθον ἁπαλώτερον οὖλον πράως, πρόσωπον τετράγωνον, χείλη λεπτά, ῥῖνα ὀρθήν, ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑγροὺς χαροποὺς γοργοὺς φῶς πολὺ ἔχοντας ἐν ἑαυτοῖς· εὐοφθαλμότατον γὰρ πάντων (τῶν) ἐθνῶν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν.

[104] Foerster plausibly amends x's ἀλλήλων to μᾶλλον, but cf. Ps.-Pol. προσεχεῖς ἀλλήλοις. Otherwise it would have to be translated: 'according to how much they are near each other or in turn separated by a greater distance from the north and the south.'

[105] Foerster's emendation of x's τινῶν on the basis of Ps.-Pol.

B31. (On colours and hair.) The signs from colours and hair are not sufficient in themselves for the purposes of physiognomy, and it is not easy to judge from them even in terms of races who is from a particular race, especially because there has been racial mixing, with Syrians spread in Italy, Africans in Thrace, and others elsewhere. Generally those living in the north are tall, pale, with white soft hair and light blue eyes, are snub-nosed, thick-legged, very large with loose flesh, pot-bellied, simple, spirited, with little discretion, hot-tempered, and bad at learning, whereas those in the south have black, curly hair, black eyes, thin legs, are good at learning, very sagacious, light-minded, liars, wily, and have thievish thoughts. And each of them have each of these traits to a greater and lesser extent, according to how much they are nearer to,[104] or in turn separated by a greater distance from, the south or the north. Those who dwell in between have an intermediate appearance and their signs and thoughts are a mixture. Those from the east and the west, according to how far south or north they are, differ among themselves; for those Africans[105] who dwell in the far west of Africa and those Spaniards who reach the outer sea are different, even though they are both from the west. But the Africans are similar to the Ethiopians, whereas the Spaniards are similar to the Celts. To demonstrate this briefly, the south is mostly mixed with dryness and heat, while the north is mixed with moistness and coldness. And the other places, according to how near they are to each of these, both share in the mixture and in particular produce men whose appearances and characters accord with their own mixture;[106] except that variation[107] occurs because many peoples have moved and settled elsewhere.

B32. (On the Greek appearance.) Any who have guarded the Hellenic and Ionic race and kept it pure are sufficiently large men, rather broad, upright, strong, with a rather white colour, pale, having a moderate and rather firm mixture of flesh, straight legs, shapely extremities, a round head of medium size, a strong neck, rather pale and soft hair that curls gently, a square face, thin lips, a straight nose and moist, dark blue, fierce eyes with plenty of light in them; for the Hellenic race has the best eyes of all races.

[106] Foerster inserts μεταλαμβάνει καὶ φύει τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἀνθρώπους κατὰ λόγον τῆς οἰκείας κράσεως from Ps.-Pol.

[107] On the basis of Ps.-Pol. Foerster replaces x's πολλοῖς with τοῦ ποικίλους εἶναι.

B33. (Περὶ χροιᾶς.) Δῆλον δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προλελεγμένων, ὡς ἡ μὲν μέλαινα χροιὰ δειλίαν καὶ πολυμηχανίαν μηνύει, ἡ δὲ λευκὴ καὶ ὑπόξανθος ἀλκὴν καὶ θυμὸν λέγει, τὸ δὲ πάνυ λευκὸν ἄκρατον εἰς ἀνανδρίαν φέρει, πυρρὸν δὲ τὸ σῶμα πᾶν δολεροῦ καὶ πολυτρόπου ἀνδρός ἐστι δεῖγμα. χροιὰ δὲ ἀνακεκραμένη[108] ὑπόχλωρος δειλίας ἅμα καὶ κακομηχανίας σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ νόσου γεγένηται. τὸ δὲ μελάγχλωρον[109] καλούμενον χρῶμα δειλόν, γαστρίμαργον, λάλον, ὀργίλον, γλώσσαλγον, τὸ δὲ φλογοειδὲς χρῶμα ἐμμανές, τὸ δὲ πράως ἐρυθρὸν εὐφυές, εὐμαθές, ὀξυκίνητον.

B34. Ταῦτα μὲν περὶ παντὸς (τοῦ) σώματος· κατὰ μέρος δέ, τὰ στέρνα ὑπέρυθρα ὄντα ζέειν ἔνδον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀπαγγέλλει, ὥσπερ εἴ τις καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν αὐχένα φλέβας καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς κροτάφοις οἰδούσας ἔχει, ὡς ἐμφανεῖς εἶναι καὶ αἱματώδη ἔχειν τὴν χρόαν.

B35. Πρόσωπα αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐρυθρὰ αἰσχυντηλοὺς δηλοῖ· εἰ δὲ μόναι αἱ παρειαὶ τοιαῦται εἶεν, οἰνόφλυγας σφᾶς λέγε.

B36. (Περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν χροιῶν.) Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς χροιῶν εἴρηται μὲν ἤδη, καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὅσα ἡ χρεία ἀπαιτεῖ λεχθήσεται. ὅσοι ὀφθαλμοὶ ὑποφοινίσσουσιν, εἰ μὲν ἅμα ξηρότητι διακαεῖς εἶεν, ὀργίλους εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοις· εἰ δὲ ἅμα ὑγρότητι, οἰνόφλυγες. γλαυκότης ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀγριώτερον, μελανότης ἡμερώτερον· γλαυκὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀγρίων ζώων τὰ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἥμερα μελανόμματά πως εὑρήσεις. τῶν δὲ γλαυκῶν τὸ μὲν λίαν λευκὸν[110] δειλόν, τὸ δὲ χολῶδες ἄγριον, τὸ δὲ ταῖς ἐλαίαις κατὰ τὴν χροιὰν ὅμοιον ἄλκιμον· τοῦ γε μὴν μέλανος τὸ μὲν πάνυ μέλαν δειλόν τε καὶ δολερόν, τὸ δὲ ὑπόξανθον καρτερόν τε καὶ μεγαλόψυχον. τὰ γὰρ μαρμαρύσσοντα ὄμματα μαργοσύνην κατηγορεῖ, τοιοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἡ αἲξ βλέπει, τὰ δὲ πυρώδη ἀναισχυντίαν, κυνὸς γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τεκμαίρου. ὠχρὰ δὲ ὄμματα καὶ ἀλλοχροίας ἔχοντα πτῶκα ἄνδρα καὶ ὑποπτευτὴν σημαίνει. στίλβοντες ὀφθαλμοὶ ἀφροδίσιοι, οἵους ἔχουσιν οἱ ὄρνιθες.

B37. (Περὶ τριχῶν.) Ἄνδρα οὐλότριχα (πάνυ)[111] δειλὸν καὶ κερδαλέον λέγε, τὸν δὲ ἰθύτριχα ἀγριώτερον καὶ ἀνοητότερον. ἀρίστη δὲ κόμη ἡ τὸ μέσον τούτων ἔχουσα, ὥσπερ καὶ πυκνότης τριχῶν ἄκρα θηριώδης καὶ ψεδνότης δὲ κακοηθείας καὶ δόλου σημεῖον, τὸ δὲ τούτων μέσον ἐπαινετόν. μαλακαῖς δὲ πάνυ θριξὶ τετριχῶσθαι γυναικεῖον. οὐ μὴν αἱ πάνυ σκληραὶ τρίχες ἀγαθαί, ἀγριότητος γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον· τὸ δὲ μέσον καὶ

[108] Foerster's suggestion (along with ἀνατεταραγμένη, 'disturbed') for MSS ἀνατετραμμένη ('upset'). Cf. Leiden ch. 36 and Anon. Lat. 79.

[109] Foerster follows Rose's suggestion at Ps.-Arist. *Physiogn.* 812ᵃ19 that μελάγχλωρον should be read instead of MSS μελίχλωρον ('honey-pale'). Cf. Leiden ch. 36 and Anon. Lat. 79.

B33. (On colour.) It is clear from what has been said that a black colour reveals cowardice and guile, that a white and rather pale colour indicates courage and spirit, that a pure, very white colour tends towards unmanliness, and that if the whole body is red it is evidence of a deceitful and cunning man. A mixed[108] pale colour is a sign of cowardice and mischief, unless it occurs as a result of disease. The colour known as sallow[109] is cowardly, gluttonous, loquacious, irascible, prattling; a colour like flame is mad; that which is gently blushing is talented, good at learning and quickly moving.

B34. These things apply to the whole body. Part by part, however, a reddish chest shows that anger is seething within, just as if someone has both the veins around the neck and those on the temples swelling so that they are obvious and have a blood-red colour.

B35. Faces which are red by themselves show bashful men. If only the cheeks are red, say they are drunkards.

B36. (On the colours of eyes.) The colours of the eyes have already been discussed. Here I shall just mention what I need to. Those eyes which are a bit red, if they are very hot and dry, you would not be wrong in saying that they were irascible, but if they are moist, that they were drunkards. Light blue in eyes is wilder, blackness is gentler; for most of the wild animals have light blue eyes, while you will find that the tame animals have black eyes. And of light blue eyes, the excessively white[110] is cowardly, the bilious is wild and that similar to olives in colour is strong. And of black eyes, the very black is both cowardly and deceitful, whereas that mixed with yellow is both strong and magnanimous; for sparkling eyes denounce wantonness, for such is the look of the goat too, and fiery eyes indicate shamelessness, for judge this by the eyes of a dog. Eyes which are pale yellow or change colour indicate a cowering and suspicious man. Gleaming eyes, such as birds have, are passionate.

B37. (On hair.) Say that a man with curly hair is very[111] cowardly and wily and that a man with straight hair is rather wild and mindless. The best hair is in between these, as also excessive thickness of hair is beastlike and baldness is a sign of malice and deceit. The mean of these is praiseworthy. To have very soft hair is womanly. Yet very hard hair is not good, for it is sign of wildness.

[110] y has γλαυκόν ('light blue'), but Foerster reads λευκόν on the basis of Matr., Ps.-Pol., Leiden ch. 39. Cf. Anon. Lat. 24.

[111] Inserted by Foerster, presumably from Matr. and Ps.-Pol.

ἐν τούτοις ἄριστον. μέλαινα κόμη δειλίαν καὶ πολυκέρδειαν ἀγγέλλει, ἡ δὲ ἄγαν ξανθὴ καὶ ὑπόλευκος, ὁποία Σκυθῶν καὶ Κελτῶν, ἀμαθίαν καὶ σκαιότητα καὶ ἀγριότητα, τὸ δὲ πράως ὑπόξανθον εἰς εὐμαθίαν καὶ ἡμερότητα καὶ εὐτεχνίαν συντείνει. πυρρότης δὲ ἄκρατος κατὰ τὸ τῆς ῥοιᾶς ἄνθος οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν τὰ ἤθη θηριώδη καὶ ἀναίσχυντα καὶ φιλοκερδῆ. σκέλη τετριχωμένα πάνυ θριξὶ πυκναῖς καὶ μεγάλαις δυσμαθίαν καὶ ἀγριότητα σημαίνει. ὅσοις δὲ ὀσφύες καὶ μηροὶ χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν πολύτριχές εἰσι, λαγνείας εὐτυχοῦσι. γαστέρα καὶ στήθη ἐπὶ πολὺ κομῶντας κουφόνους καὶ ἀλλοπροσάλλους καὶ ἀσελγεῖς λέγε. στέρνα δὲ αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ τετριχωμένους θριξὶν ἀμφιλαφέσι θερμοβούλους καὶ εὐψύχους[112] λέγε. ὤμους δὲ καὶ μετάφρενα τετριχῶσθαι ὀρνίθιον ἄντικρυς· μετάρσια γὰρ νοήματα καὶ οὐ στερεὰ δείκνυται.[113] τὸ δὲ πᾶν σῶμα δεδασύνθαι τριχὶ στερεᾷ καὶ ἀμφιλαφεῖ βοῶδες. τοῦ δὲ αὐχένος τὸ πρὸς τῇ κεφαλῇ δεδασύνθαι πρὸς ἀλκῆς τε καὶ εὐψυχίας νόμιζε. καὶ τοῦ μετώπου δὲ εἰ εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐπικαταβαίνοι ἡ χαίτη, εἰς δὲ τὰ ἑκατέρωθεν ὑποχωροίη, μεγαλοψυχίας καὶ ἀλκῆς πλήρης ὁ τοιοῦτος. τρίχες δὲ ὀρθαὶ ἑστῶσαι δειλίας καὶ κακομηχανίας μάρτυρες.
ὅσοις τῶν ὀφρύων τὰ ⟨μὲν⟩ πρὸς τὴν ῥῖνα κάτω νεύει, τὰ δὲ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα εἰς τοὺς κροτάφους χωρεῖ, τούτους ὑσὶν εἴκαζε. οἱ δὲ σφόδρα συνόφρυες[114] ἀνιαροί· πρέπει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀνία.

B38. (Περὶ κινήσεως.) Περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τάδε ἴσθι, ὡς τὸ μὲν αὐτοφυὲς αὐτῆς καὶ ἀπρονόητον χρὴ διαγινώσκειν κατὰ τὸ πρέπον. ὅσοι δὲ σχηματίζουσιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ κινοῦνται ἐπιτετηδευμένως,[115] φυσιογνωμόνει καὶ τούτους. τριπλοῦν δὲ τὸ γένος τούτων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότητα περινοοῦσιν ἀρχὰς καὶ δυνάμεις ἐν πόλει μνώμενοι καὶ γάμους ἐνδόξους, ἐνίοτε δὲ εἰς εὐτέλειαν καὶ φειδωλίαν καὶ εἰς περιχαρίαν καὶ εἰς στυγνότητα ἑαυτοὺς μετατυποῦσι, δι' οὕπερ ἂν ἀρέσειν τρόπου τούτοις νομίσωσιν οὓς θεραπεύουσιν. ἕτεροι δὲ ἁβρύνονται αὐτῶν, οἱ μὲν{γὰρ}[116] παιδικοῖς ἀρέσαι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρας ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ὥσπερ γυναῖκες προκαλούμενοι. τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἶδός ἐστι τῶν ἀνδρογύνων μὲν ὄντων φύσει, πλαττόντων δὲ ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον· οἳ φωρῶνται ῥᾳδίως. καὶ γὰρ βάδισμα καὶ φθέγμα καὶ βλέμμα μιμεῖσθαι σπουδάσαντες ἀνδρός, εἴπερ ἐξαίφνης φοβηθεῖεν ἢ καὶ ἀνιαθεῖεν, ταχὺ παλινδρομοῦσιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν. καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τούτου τὸ ἐπιτηδευόμενον αὐτοῖς οὐ χαλεπῶς ἄν τις καταμάθοι.

112 y has διψύχους ('in two minds'). Foerster reads Schneider's εὐψύχους, presumably from Matr. and Ps.-Pol. Cf. Leiden ch. 44.

113 Foerster has placed these last two sentences after the one about chests in order to follow the same pattern as Matr. and Ps.-Pol., which also happens to be the order in which Ad. discusses the parts of the body (Ad. B15–18). Cf. Leiden chs. 44–5.

The mean of these is also best. Black hair announces cowardice and great craftiness, excessively yellow and pale white hair, such as the Scythians and Celts have, reveals ignorance and clumsiness and wildness, and that which is gently yellow points towards an aptitude for learning, gentleness, and skill in art. Unmixed fiery hair like the flower of the pomegranate is not good, since for the most part their characters are beastlike and shameless and greedy. Legs which are very hairy with thick black hair indicate slowness at learning and wildness. Those whose loins and thighs have lots of hair separately from the other parts of the body are very lascivious. Say that those with very hairy stomachs and chests are light-minded and fickle and wanton. Say that those whose chests alone have abundant hair are hot-tempered and courageous.[112] To have hairy shoulders and backs is just like a bird; for it shows flighty and not firm thoughts.[113] To be hairy over one's whole body with stiff and abundant hair is ox-like. Reckon that to be hairy on the part of the neck near the head is a result of strength and courageousness. And if the hair goes down into the middle of the forehead, but recedes either side, such a man is full of magnanimity and strength. Hair which stands up straight bears witness to cowardice and mischief. Liken those whose brows dip down at the nose and go towards the temples at either side to swine. And those whose brows are joined together closely[114] are troublesome; for trouble suits them.

B38. (On movement.) Know these things about movement, that one must distinguish the natural and unpremeditated in relation to what is appropriate. Use physiognomy on those who fashion themselves and practise their movements.[115] Their type is threefold; for some contrive dignity, soliciting positions of power in the city and glorious marriages, but sometimes they transform themselves to look thrifty and parsimonious and excessively joyful or sullen, through which method they think they might please those whom they cultivate. Others of them give themselves airs, some[116] wanting to please boyfriends, some acting like women and enticing men to themselves. The third sort consists of those who are androgynous by nature, but who mould themselves towards the masculine. They are easily detected; for although they strive to imitate the walk and speech and look of a man, if they are suddenly frightened or even distressed, they quickly revert to their own nature. And apart from this one would learn without difficulty the element of practising in them.

[114] Foerster follows Schneider in reading συνόφρυες rather than y's δασόφρυες ('shaggy-browed') on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 812b25 (cf. also Ps.-Pol. and Matr.); but cf. Leiden ch. 48.

[115] Foerster's plausible reading from a diverse tradition.

[116] Omitting γάρ with Foerster.

B39. Οἱ μακρὰ βαίνοντες τελεστικοὶ παντὸς πράγματος, μεγαλόνοι· οἱ μικρὰ βαίνοντες ἄπρακτοι, πικροί, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ φειδωλοὶ καὶ ἐπίκλοποι τὰ ἤθη καὶ λαθραῖα βουλευόμενοι. ταχυτὴς δὲ ἐν κινήσει ἅμα μὲν ὀρθότητι καὶ λαμπρότητι εἴδους θερμόβουλον, ἐγχειρητήν, (οὐ)[117] δράστην ἔφηνεν. εἰ δὲ ταχὺ βαίνων ὑφορῷτο καὶ πτώσσοι καὶ τὸ πᾶν εἶδος καθέλκοι καὶ συνάγοι ἑαυτόν, φειδωλίας καὶ δειλίας καὶ κακομηχανίας και ἀνελευθερίας πιστὰ παρέχει τεκμήρια. ἅμα δὲ κινήσει ταχείᾳ τάραχος ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ κεφαλῆς ἀστασία καὶ ἄσθματα ταῦτ' εἴδη κακορέκτου καὶ μεγαλορέκτου καὶ φευκτέου ἀνδρός. ὁ δὲ ταχὺ μέν, μικρὰ δὲ βαίνων φιλοκερδής, κακοῦργος δειλίας τε εἰς ἄκρον ἥκων. σχολαία βάδισις αὐτοφυὴς μὲν νωθεστέρα, βαθυγνώμων δὲ καὶ πραεῖα, εἰ μὴ ἀντιλέγοι τὰ μείζω σημεῖα. εἰ δὲ ἑκὼν βραδύνοι καὶ ἐφιστάμενός γε ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς περιβλέποι ὑψαυχενῶν, ἴσθι ὑβριστὴν ὄντα καὶ ὑπερήφανον καὶ μοιχικόν.

B40. Χεῖρας δὲ καὶ πόδας καλόν ἐστι φορᾶς[118] τε ἔχειν κατὰ ταὐτὸν τῷ παντὶ (σώματι)[119] καὶ κινήσεως. ὁ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὤμοις ὑποκινούμενος καὶ ἅμα πράως κεκυφὼς μεγαλονοίας καὶ ἀνδρίας εὖ ἥκει· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ λέων βαίνει. ὁ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὤμοις ὑποκινούμενος, ὀρθὸς δὲ ὢν καὶ ὑψαυχενῶν αὐθάδης τε καὶ (ἀπειθὴς καὶ)[120] ὑβριστής· οὕτω γὰρ βαίνει ἵππος. καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων συμβαλεῖν ἂν δύναιο. οἱ δὲ παντὶ τῷ σώματι κινούμενοι ὁμοῦ[121] τε καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν ἀνδρόγυνοί εἰσι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἄντικρυς γυναικεῖον. ἀνδρόγυνοι δὲ καὶ οἱ κλίνοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ (ἐν) τῇ κινήσει· οἱ δὲ εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ ἀποκλίνοντες ἀνοητότεροι. ὅσοι δὲ κατακλῶσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐγκλίνουσι, κόλακές εἰσι· τοῦτο γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ κύων, ὅταν σαίνῃ καὶ θωπεύῃ.

B41. (Περὶ πνεύματος.) Πνεῦμα τὸ λίαν ἀτρεμοῦν, ὡς ἀπνόῳ ἐοικέναι, φροντιστοῦ ἀνδρός· ὁποία δὲ ἡ φροντίς, παρὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μάνθανε. εἰ δὲ ἀτρεμὲς ὂν ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀθρόως ἐπίοι ὥσπερ ἐκ παλιρροίας καὶ πλημμυρίδος, λύπῃ τινὶ συνέχεται. εἰ δὲ καὶ κεφαλὴν ἐπικινῶν ἅμα ἐπιστένει, μετανοεῖν ἔοικε κακόν τι δράσας ἢ εἰπών. ἐὰν δὲ δεδορκόσι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ταῦτα ποιῇ, προβουλεύει κακὰ μᾶλλον ἢ μετανοεῖ. πνεῦμα λεῖον σχολῇ καὶ ἀψοφητὶ χωροῦν τὴν γνώμην εὖ ἔχειν δηλοῖ. ὅταν δὲ ὑποβρυχᾶται καὶ μεγάλα ἀναπνέῃ, ἀγριότητα καὶ οἰνοφλυγίαν κατηγορεῖ· οἱ δὲ ἀσθματίαι, ὁπόσοις καθάπερ ἐκ δρόμου τὸ πνεῦμα ἐλαύνεται, ἄβουλοι, κακόθυμοι, παντορέκται, παντοεπεῖς. ὅσοι δὲ μετάρσιον ἐμπνέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς πυκνόν τε καὶ ἐλαφρὸν τὸ πνεῦμα ἐν ταῖς ῥισὶν ἐμπνεῖ, δειλία καὶ ἀθυμία ἐν τούτοις ἐστί· γίνονται δὲ καὶ ἀνδρόγυνοι, ὅταν τὰ ἄλλα σημεῖα συμμαρτυρῇ.

[117] οὐ is supplied by Foerster from Ps.-Arist. 813a9. Cf. Matr. and Anon. Lat. 75.
[118] Foerster amends γ's ἐστι φωρᾶσθαι to ἐστι φορᾶς τε on the basis of Matr.
[119] Foerster supplies σώματι on the basis of Anon. Lat. 76 *totius corporis*.

B39. Those who take large steps accomplish every deed and are great-minded. Those who take small steps are unsuccessful, bitter, and some are also parsimonious and thievish in character and make secret plots. Swiftness in movement with uprightness and brightness of appearance shows a hot-tempered man who is adventurous but not[117] an achiever. If a man walks quickly, looks up with suspicion, crouches, drags down his whole form and pulls himself in, he provides reliable signs of parsimony and cowardice and mischief and meanness. If there is a disturbance in the eyes and unsteadiness of the head and panting in addition to swift movement, this is the appearance of a man of wicked and far-reaching ambitions who is to be avoided. The man who is swift, but who takes small steps, is greedy, villainous, and a consummate coward. A leisurely gait, if natural is rather dull, but deep-thinking and gentle, unless the more important signs contradict this. If he loiters willingly and stands in the street looking around with his neck held high, know that he is aggressive and arrogant and adulterous.

B40. It is good to have hands and feet in synchronization with the motion[118] and movement of the whole body.[119] And the man who moves lightly in the shoulders and at the same time stoops gently is very great-minded and manly; for a lion also walks like this. The man who moves lightly in the shoulders, but who is upright with his neck held high, is both stubborn and disobedient[120] and aggressive; for a horse walks like this. And you would be able to work out the rest from these examples. Those who move with the whole body, both altogether[121] and in each limb, are androgynous, for this is very feminine. And those who incline themselves to the right in their movement are androgynous. And those who incline themselves to the left are rather mindless. And those who bend over and lean forwards are flatterers; for dogs do this, whenever they fawn and wheedle.

B41. (On the breathing.) Excessively still breathing, so that is seems lifeless, belongs to a thoughtful man. What the thought is, learn from the eyes. If the breath, having been still, comes on all at once as if from the ebb and flow of the sea, he is afflicted by some grief. If he also moves his head and groans at the same time, it is likely that he is repenting some evil deed or word. If he does these things with piercing eyes, he is plotting evil things rather than repenting them. Smooth breathing which moves at leisure and without noise shows a man of sound judgement. When a man roars a little and takes large breaths, it denounces wildness and drunkenness. Those who pant, whose breathing makes it seem as if they have been running, are thoughtless, malevolent, of evil ambition, and indiscreet. Those whose breathing is shallow, and whose breath in the nose is both frequent and light, are cowardly and faint-hearted. They are also androgynous, whenever the other signs bear the same testimony.

[120] Foerster inserts ἀπειθὴς καὶ on the basis of Matr. However, cf. Anon. Lat. 76.
[121] Foerster replaces γ's ὤμοις ('shoulders') with ὁμοῦ on the basis of Matr.

B42. (Περὶ φωνῆς.) Φθέγγεσθαι βαρὺ πάνυ καὶ σαθρὸν ἀνοήτῳ καὶ ὑβριστῇ καὶ γαστριμάργῳ πρέπει· ἠχὴ δὲ κακοηχεστέρα βληχωδεστέρα ἀναισθήτου. ὅσοι δὲ ἀπὸ βαρέος ἀρξάμενοι φθόγγου εἰς ὀξὺν τελευτῶσιν, ὀδύρται, δύσθυμοι· ὀξὺ δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν φθέγγεσθαι ποικίλου ἀνδρός ἐστιν. ὁ δὲ ὀξὺ καὶ μαλακὸν καὶ εὐκαμπὲς φθεγγόμενος ἀνδρόγυνον ἐπισημαίνει. ὅσοι δὲ κοῖλον καὶ βαρὺ καὶ ἀκαμπὲς ἠχοῦσι, γενναῖα τούτοις τὰ ἤθη καὶ μεγαλόνοια αὐτοὺς κοσμεῖ καὶ δικαιότης. ὅσοι δὲ μαλακόν τε καὶ βαρὺ φθέγγονται, ἤπια καὶ τούτοις τὰ νοήματα. οἱ δὲ κλαγγηδὸν φθεγγόμενοι ὀξύ τε καὶ ὀρνίθιον φθέγμα ἱέντες μάργοι καὶ χαῦνοι καὶ μετάρσια νοοῦντες. ἀσθενὴς δὲ φωνὴ καὶ ἅμα γοερὰ φιλοκερδῆ καὶ ἀνιαρὸν καὶ ὕποπτον ἐν πᾶσιν ἄνδρα σημαίνει. ὁπόσοι δὲ ἐν ῥινὶ φθέγγονται, ψευδεῖς, κακοήθεις, βάσκανοι, πήμασιν ἄλλων χαίροντες. σφοδρὸν φθέγγεσθαι καὶ ὑπόσαθρον ὀργὴν καὶ βίαν καὶ ἀνομίαν καὶ μισανθρωπίαν σημαίνει. ὀξὺ δὲ καὶ ἀσθενὲς φθέγγεσθαι ἀργίας καὶ δειλίας, ταχὺ δὲ ἀβουλίας καὶ ἀνοίας σημεῖον. οἱ χαλεπῶς φθεγγόμενοι κακοὶ καὶ ἀνόητοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο, καὶ φωνὴν τῶν ζώων πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὅτῳ ἄν τις ὅμοια φθέγγηται, ἀναφέρειν τε χρὴ καὶ διαιρεῖν εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον ἦθος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κυσίν, οἱ δὲ πιθήκοις, οἱ δὲ ὄνῳ, οἱ δὲ ἵπποις, οἱ δὲ ἄρκῳ, ἄλλοι δὲ προβάτῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὁμοίαν φθογγὴν ἀφιᾶσιν.

Εἰδέναι γε μὴν καθόλου προσήκει, ὡς ἐν κινήσει καὶ φωνῇ καὶ χροιᾷ καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μελῶν ἁρμονίᾳ τὸ μέσον τῆς κράσεως χρηστὸν ὡς τὸ πολύ, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον κακόν.

B43. (Περὶ εἰδῶν ἀνθρωπείων.) Ὅρους δὲ εἰδῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑποδεῖξαι ἀναγκαῖον οὐ πάντας, ἀλλ' ὅσοι ἀξιόλογοι αὐτῶν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων οὐ χαλεπὸν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ γινώσκειν.

B44. (Εἶδος ἀνδρείου.) Εἶδος οὖν ἀνδρείου ὄρθιον τὸ πᾶν σχῆμα, πλευραὶ καὶ ἄρθρα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ σώματος ἐρρωμένα, ὀστέα μεγάλα, κόμη σκληρά, κοιλία πλατεῖα καὶ κοίλη, ὦμοι καρτεροί, ὠμοπλάται εὐρεῖαι διεστηκυῖαι, στέρνα ῥωμαλέα καὶ μετάφρενα, ἰσχίον σκληρόν, σκέλη σαρκώδη, περὶ τοῖς σφυροῖς καρτερία, πόδες ἀρθρώδεις, χρῶμα ὀξύτερον, βλέμμα ὑγρὸν γοργόν, οὐ μεγάλοι ὀφθαλμοὶ οὐδὲ πάνυ ἀναπεπετασμένοι οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μύοντες, ὀφρύες οὐ τεταμέναι, μέτωπον οὔτε λεῖον οὔτε τραχύ, φωνὴ ἀπηνεστέρα ἰσχυρὰ μεγάλη, πνεῦμα εὐσταθές. τοιοῦτος μὲν ὁ εὔψυχος καὶ ἰσχυρός.

B42. (On the voice.) To speak with a very deep and cracked voice is consistent with a mindless and aggressive and gluttonous man. A more dissonant, bleating sound belongs to an insensible man. Those who start from a deep voice and end in a high one are melancholy complainers. To speak with a high and rough voice belongs to a changeable man. The man who speaks with a high and soft and flexible voice indicates that he is androgynous. Those who speak with a hollow and deep and inflexible voice have noble characters and are graced by great-mindedness and righteousness. Those who speak with a voice both soft and deep have kind thoughts. Those who screech, emitting a high and bird-like noise, are wanton and frivolous and think flighty thoughts. A voice which is weak and querulous at the same time indicates a greedy, troublesome man who is suspicious in everything. Those who speak through their nose are malicious, spiteful liars and rejoice in the sufferings of others. To speak excessively and with a slightly cracked voice indicates anger and violence and lawlessness and misanthropy. To speak with a high and weak voice is a sign of idleness and cowardice and to speak quickly is a sign of thoughtlessness and mindlessness. Those who speak with difficulty are for the most part bad and mindless. One must especially relate the voice to each of the animals which someone makes similar noises to and distinguish for him a similar character; for some make a noise similar to dogs, some to apes, some to an ass, some to horses, some to a bear, others to a sheep, and so on.

And so in general one must know that in movement and speech and colour and size and harmony of limbs the mean is by and large the best mixture and the opposite is bad.

B43. (On the appearances of men.) It is not necessary to indicate all the definitions of the appearances of men, but only those which are worth mentioning; for from these it is not difficult to know the rest too.

B44. (The appearance of a manly man.) And so the appearance of a manly man is upright in its general carriage, strong in the flanks, all joints and the extremities of the body, with big bones, stiff hair, a broad and hollow belly, strong shoulders, the shoulder blades broad and set apart, strong chest and back, hard hips, fleshy legs, strength around the ankles, well-jointed feet, rather bright in colour, a moist and fierce look, eyes neither big nor very wide open nor squinting, brows not stretched, a forehead neither smooth nor rough, a rather harsh, strong, loud voice, and stable breathing. Such is the courageous and strong man.

B45. (Εἶδος δειλοῦ.) Ὁ δὲ δειλὸς τοιοῦτος· τρίχες μαλακαί, τὸ πᾶν σχῆμα ἀνειμένον, τράχηλος μακρός, τὸ χρῶμα μελίχλωρον,[122] τὸ ὄμμα ταραχῶδες, βλέφαρα ταχυκίνητα, ἄσθμα θορυβῶδες, σκέλη λεπτά, ὀσφὺς μακρά, στέρνα ἀσθενῆ, μακρόχειρ, φωνὴ λιγυρὰ μαλακή.

B46. (Εἶδος εὐφυοῦς.) Τὸν δὲ εὐφυῆ τοιοῦτον εἶναι χρή· μεγέθους εὖ ἥκοντα, λευκὸν ὑπέρυθρον ξανθόν, οὐ πάνυ οὖλον οὐδὲ εὐθύτριχα, τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ὄρθιον ὄντα, μέλη μεγάλα, τὰ ἄρθρα ἀπολελυμένα ἀλλήλων, σὰρξ μετρία ἁπαλή, σκέλη καὶ μηροὶ εὐτραφεῖς, σφυρὰ καρτερά, ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν ἄρθρα γενναῖα, δάκτυλοι ἁπαλοὶ εὐμήκεις διεστῶτες ἀλλήλων, πρόσωπα οὐ πάνυ σαρκώδη οὐδὲ μὴν λεπτά, ὀφθαλμοὶ ὑγροὶ εὐλαμπεῖς χαροποί, τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦθος γεγηθός.

B47. (Εἶδος ἀναισθήτου.) Τὸν δὲ ἀναίσθητον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πρέπει· λευκὸν πάνυ (ἢ μέλανα πάνυ),[123] σαρκώδη, προγάστορα, παχυσκελῆ, τὰ δὲ ἄρθρα μικρὰ συνδεδεμένα, κλεῖδας συμπεφυκυίας, τράχηλον κολοβὸν παχύν, ἄκρα ἀτελῆ, παρειὰς σαρκώδεις, μέτωπον στρογγύλον, βλέμμα κωφὸν ἀχανές.

B48. (Εἶδος ἀναισχύντου.) Ἀναίσχυντον δὲ ἄνδρα οὕτω χρὴ πεφυκέναι· ὀφθαλμοὶ ἀνεπτυγμένοι λαμπροί, βλέφαρα ἀναπεπετασμένα παχέα, παχύπους, παχύρριν, ἀντίον ὁρῶν, ἄνω τείνων ἑαυτόν, πυρρὸς τὴν χροιάν, τὴν φωνὴν ὀξύς.

B49. (Εἶδος κοσμίου.) Ὁ δὲ κόσμιος βαρὺ φθέγγεται, βραδὺ βαίνει, τὰ βλέφαρα κινεῖ μέσως, οὔτε συνεχῶς οὔτε διὰ χρόνου, χαροπὸς οὐ λαμπρόν, ὑγρὸν δὲ ὁρῶν, ἐρυθήματος ὑπόπλεώς ἐστιν.

B50. (Εἶδος εὐθύμου.) Σημεῖα εὐθύμου· μέτωπον σαρκῶδες λεῖον χθαμαλὸν καὶ τὸ πᾶν πρόσωπον σαρκωδέστερον, τὸ εἶδος ὑπνηλόν, ὀφθαλμοὶ ὑγροὶ εὐλαμπεῖς, οὐ δεδορκότες, κίνησις σχολαία, φωνὴ ἠπία.

B51. (Εἶδος ἀνιαροῦ.) Πρόσωπον ἀνιαροῦ ἰσχνόν, μέτωπον ῥυσσόν, ὀφρύες ἀπεστραμμέναι, βλέφαρα ἐντεταμένα, κινεῖται δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ ὑπέρινοι.

[122] Foerster writes μελίχλωρον for γ's μελανόχρουν, but it is hard to see why he does not favour μελάγχλωρον, given that he reads it in Ad. B33, where it is a sign of cowardice. Cf. Leiden ch. 54.

B45. (The appearance of a cowardly man.) The cowardly man is as follows. He has soft hair, his whole appearance is relaxed, his neck long, his colour pale like honey,[122] his look disturbed, his eyelids quick-moving, his breathing noisy, his legs thin, his loins large, his chest weak, his hands large, and his voice clear and soft.

B46. (The appearance of a talented man.) The talented man should be as follows. He is of good size, he is white, reddish, and yellow, his hair is neither very curly nor straight, his whole body is upright, his limbs are long, his joints are loose, his flesh moderate and soft, his legs and thighs fat, his ankles strong, the joints of his hands and feet are good, his fingers are soft and long and separated from each other, his face is not very fleshy nor very thin, his eyes are moist and shining and dark blue, and their character is joyful.

B47. (The appearance of an insensible man.) The insensible man should be as follows. He is very white, or very black,[123] fleshy, pot-bellied, thick-legged, his joints are small and fixed together, his collar-bones are joined, his neck is short and thick, his extremities imperfect, his cheeks fleshy, his forehead round, and his look is dull and blinkered.

B48. (The appearance of a shameless man.) A shameless man must be as follows by nature. His eyes are wide-open and bright, his eyelids are open and thick, his feet are thick, his nose is thick, he looks straight at you, he stretches himself upwards, his colour is ruddy, and his voice is high.

B49. (On the appearance of an orderly man.) The orderly man speaks with a deep voice, walks slowly, moves his eyelids moderately, that is neither continuously nor occasionally, with dark blue eyes, a look not bright but moist, and he is full of blushing.

B50. (The appearance of a cheerful man.) These are the signs of a cheerful man. His forehead is fleshy, smooth, and flat and his whole face is rather fleshy, his appearance is drowsy, his eyes are moist and bright, not piercing, his movement is leisurely and his voice is kind.

B51. (The appearance of a troublesome man.) The face of a troublesome man is lean, his forehead is wrinkled, his brows are turned back, his eyelids are taut, and he moves like those who are purged violently.

[123] Foerster inserts ἢ μέλαινα πάνυ, presumably from Matr. and Ps.-Pol.

B52. (Εἶδος ἀνδρογύνου.)[124] Ὁ δὲ ἀνδρόγυνος ὑγρὸν βλέπει καὶ ἰταμόν, καὶ δονεῖται τὰ ὄμματα καὶ περιτρέχει, μέτωπον σπᾷ καὶ παρειάς, αἱ ὀφρύες (οὐ)[125] μένουσι κατὰ χώραν, τράχηλος κέκλιται, ὀσφὺς οὐκ ἀτρεμεῖ, κινεῖται πάντα τὰ μέλη, καὶ ἐπιθρώσκει, ἁλματίας ἐστί, γονύκροτος, χειρῶν φοραὶ ὕπτιαι, περιβλέπει ἑαυτόν, φωνὴ λεπτὴ ἐπικλάζουσα λιγυρὰ σχολαία πάνυ.

B53. (Εἶδος πικροῦ.) Πικρὸν δὲ ἄνδρα χρὴ σεσηρέναι, ὕπωχρον εἶναι, τραχὺ καὶ ξηρὸν βλέπειν, μέτωπον ῥυσσοῦν,[126] φθέγγεσθαι σφοδρόν, ἀσθμαίνειν, χεῖρας συγκροτεῖν ἢ ἀνατρίβειν πολλάκις, πόδας ἐπιρρήσσειν.

B54. (Εἶδος πράου.) Ὁ δὲ πρᾶος ὧδε πέφυκε· καρτερὸς τὸ πᾶν εἶδος, εὔσαρκος σαρκὶ ὑγρᾷ μαλθακῇ, τοῖς μέλεσι σύμμετρος, τὸ βλέμμα εὐσταθές, βραδυκίνητος, σχολαία φωνὴ μαλακή, τῶν τριχῶν ὁ περίδρομος ἄνω θρῴσκων.

B55. (Εἶδος εἴρωνος.) Ὁ δὲ εἴρων καὶ παλίμβουλος τὰ ἀμφὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς λαγαρὰ ἐχέτω, τὸ βλέμμα ὑπόκομψον, φωνὴν ὑφειμένην, βαινέτω εὔστροφον καὶ κινείσθω πάντη εὐρύθμως.

B56. (Εἶδος φιλαργύρου.) Τὸν δὲ φιλάργυρον ἄνδρα τοιόνδε εἶναι λέγε· μικρομελῆ, μικρόμματον, μικροπρόσωπον, ταχυβάδιστον, ἐγκεκυφότα, ταχύφωνον, ὀξυβόην, τὴν χροιὰν ὑποφοινίσσοντα.

B57. (Εἶδος φιλοκύβου.) Δασὺς ἀνὴρ θριξὶν ἰθυτενέσι μελαίναις, δασεῖαν τὴν ὑπήνην ἔχων, κροτάφους δασεῖς, ὄμμα λιπαρὸν καὶ στίλβον καὶ ἀμαρύσσον. ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλόκυβος, φιλορχηστής, φίλοινος.

B58. (Περὶ ἡμέρου καὶ ἀγρίου.) Γινώσκονται δὲ καὶ μωροπόνηροι[127] ἔχοντες μικτὰ σημεῖα μωρίας καὶ πονηρίας. (ἕτεροι δὲ τὰ τῆς μωρίας σημεῖα ἔχουσι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ χαλεπώτεροι καὶ ἀγριώτεροι πεποίηνται.)[128] κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν εἰσι μωροπόνηροι, ὥσπερ τῶν θηρίων ὅσα τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἥμερα, τὰ δὲ ἄγριά ἐστι. τούτων γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπισκοπῶν εἴσῃ, ὡς ἔοικε μὲν ἀλλήλοις τὰ εἴδη ἑκατέρων, ὅμως δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων ἐστὶν εὐηθικώτερα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀγρίων τραχύτερα καὶ σκαιότερα καὶ ταραχωδέστερα ὡς τὸ πολύ. ὅπερ ἂν ἐπισκέψαιο μάλιστα

[124] See ch. 7 n. 7 for Leiden's redistribution of material in Ad. B52–4.
[125] Foerster inserts οὐ with Schneider.
[126] See Foerster (1900) 148 for this emendation.

B52. (The appearance of an androgynous man.)[124] The androgynous man has a moist and reckless look, his eyes dart and run about, he draws in his forehead and cheeks, his brows do not[125] stay in one place, his neck is curved, his loins are not still, all his limbs move, and he leaps and is a person of tripping gait, he is knock-kneed, he carries his hands palms up, he gazes about himself and his voice is thin, shrill-sounding, and very laid-back.

B53. (The appearance of a bitter man.) The bitter man should grin, be rather pale, have a harsh and dry look, wrinkle[126] his forehead, speak vehemently, pant, clap or rub his hands often, and dash his feet.

B54. (The appearance of a mild man.) The mild man is as follows. His whole appearance is strong, he has plenty of moist, soft flesh, his limbs are in proportion, his look is stable, he moves slowly, his voice is soft and leisurely, and the fringe of his hair leaps upwards.

B55. (The appearance of a dissembler.) The dissembler or untrustworthy man has hollows around his eyes, his look is rather elegant, his voice is relaxed, he should walk nimbly and move rhythmically in every respect.

B56. (The appearance of a man who is fond of money.) Say that the man who is fond of money is as follows. He has small limbs, small eyes, a small face, he walks quickly, he stoops, he speaks quickly, he shouts with a high voice, and is a slightly purple colour.

B57. (The appearance of a man who is fond of gambling.) A man with shaggy straight black hair, a shaggy beard, shaggy temples, and a shining, gleaming and sparkling look, is fond of gambling, of dancing and of wine.

B58. (On the gentle and wild appearance.) Those who are wickedly stupid[127] are recognized because they have mixed signs of stupidity and wickedness. Some have the normal signs of stupidity but have become more difficult and more wild.[128] And so they are accordingly wickedly stupid, just as of all those beasts which belong to one species, some are tame and some are wild; for you will know by examining each of these individually that the appearances of each are similar to one other, but nevertheless the appearances of those which are tame are better-natured, while the appearances of those which are wild are largely harsher and more awkward and more disturbed. You could observe this and all

[127] The word μωροπόνηρος occurs only in Ad. Cf. Anon. Lat. 104–5 on the 'harmfully stupid' man (μωροβλάπτης; unknown elsewhere). See Ch. 3 n. 307.

[128] Following Foerster's suggestion that Matr.'s ἕτεροι δὲ τὰ τῆς μωρίας σημεῖα ἔχουσι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ χαλεπώτεροι καὶ ἀγριώτεροι πεποίηνται, *vel sim.*, has fallen out of the text. Cf. Anon. Lat. 104.

ἐπὶ αἰγῶν ἀγρίων καὶ προβάτων καὶ ἵππων καὶ ὄνων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· ἐοικότα γὰρ τοῖς εἴδεσιν ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἥμερα (πραότερα καὶ λειότερα)[129] καὶ ἠπιώτερα, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια [καὶ] τραχύτερα καὶ σκληρότερα καὶ σφοδρότερα καὶ ξηρότερα, καὶ τὰ ἤθη οὖν αὐτῶν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἀκολουθεῖ.

B59. Καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων τοίνυν οὕτω χρὴ διαιρεῖν. τὸ γὰρ διπλοῦν τοῦτο τῆς ἰδέας καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις φαίνεται καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῶν σημείων. δίκαιοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν σημείων γινώσκονται, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἀγριώτερα τὰ ἤθη ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἡμερώτερα· καὶ σώφρονες ὁμοίως καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι. τὸ δὲ διάφορον τῶν σημείων τραχύτητι καὶ λειότητι[130] καὶ τῷ ὑγρῷ τε καὶ ξηρῷ διαιρετέον. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀκολασίας ἔχει. καὶ ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς σημείοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἥμερόν τε καὶ ἄγριον προσπεφυκὸς τὴν μὲν ἀγριωτέραν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ ἠπιωτέραν δείκνυσι· καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνδρογύνοις οἱ μὲν ἄγριοι, ἕτεροι δὲ τιθασσοί εἰσι, καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μόνοις οἷς εἴρηκα διαιρεῖται.

B60. (Εἶδος μωροπονήρου.) Ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦ μωροπονήρου τετανόθριξ ἡ κεφαλὴ στενὴ λοξή, ὦτα ὑπερμεγέθη ἐπικεκλασμένα, αὐχὴν καὶ τράχηλος σκληρός,[131] (κρόταφοι στρογγύλοι γλαφυροί, μέτωπον στενὸν τραχύ,)[132] ὀφθαλμοὶ ξηροὶ σκότιοι μικροὶ κοῖλοι ὑπορρέοντες ἀτενεῖς, παρειαὶ στεναὶ ἐπιμήκεις, γένειον μακρόν, στόμα ἄθυρον περίμηκες ἄκλειστον, ὡς διεσχισμένα τὰ πρόσωπα φαίνεσθαι, κυρτός, προγάστωρ, παχυσκελής, ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν ἄρθρα (περιμήκη)[133] παχέα καὶ σκληρά, ὑπόχλωρος, κυλοιδιῶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὕπνου καὶ κραιπάλης, φωνὴ βληχώδης μικρὰ θρασεῖα.

B61. (Ἐπίλογος.) Ταῦτα ὅσα εἴρηται καθάπερ ἐν γραφαῖς ἀχρόοις γραμμῇ μόνῃ τύποι ἀνδρῶν εἰκασμένοι εἰσί· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ εἴδη ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μέρος ὄντων σημείων ταῖς μίξεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἄλλοις τε πρὸς ἄλλο πειθόμενός τε καὶ ἀπιστῶν τεκμαίρου.

[129] Foerster inserts πραότερα καὶ λειότερα from Matr. and Ps.-Pol.

[130] Foerster argues that, on the basis of Matr. and Ps.-Pol., καὶ σκληρότητι καὶ μαλακίᾳ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ πραότητι (*vel sim.*), has fallen out: 'and hardness and softness and competition and mildness'.

such things particularly in the case of wild goats and sheep and horses and asses; for although they are similar in appearance, nevertheless the tame ones are milder and smoother[129] and meeker, while the wild ones are rougher and harder and more violent and drier, and so their characters follow their appearances.

B59. And in the case of men you must make a similar distinction; for this twofold appearance is also seen among men in each of the signs; for just people are recognized from the same (set of) signs, but some have wilder characters and some quieter ones. And similarly for moral and for manly people. The difference in the signs must be distinguished by harshness and smoothness[130] and both moistness and dryness. This also applies to wrongdoing and intemperance; for in these too the signs are the same and the quiet and the wild nature show the gentler or the wilder wrongdoing. And among those who are androgynous, some are wild, others are docile, and their signs are distinguished only by what I have mentioned.

B60. (The appearance of a 'wickedly stupid' man). Just as the head of the man who is 'wickedly stupid' is narrow and slanted and covered with long straight hair, his ears are too large and flop forwards, his throat and neck are hard,[131] his temples are round and hollow, his forehead is narrow and rough,[132] his eyes are dry, dull, small, hollow, watery, and staring, his cheeks are narrow and long, his chin is large, his mouth is open, very long, and gaping so that his face appears to be split, he is hunched, pot-bellied, thick-legged, with very long,[133] thick, hard joints in his hands and feet, he is rather pale, baggy-eyed as if from sleep or a hangover, and his voice is small, bold, and bleating.

B61. (Epilogue.) These things which have been said in colourless drawings, as it were, are the types of men represented in writing alone. You must judge the many and manifold appearances of men from the many signs which occur in each part, relying on their combinations and significations in some cases and distrusting them in others.

[131] Foerster writes σκληρός on the basis of Anon. Lat. 105. y has στρογγύλος ('round'), as has Ps.-Pol.

[132] Foerster inserts κρόταφοι στρογγύλοι γλαφυροί, μέτωπον στενὸν τραχύ, adapting Ps.-Pol.

[133] Foerster inserts περιμήκη from Ps.-Pol.

11

Anonymus Latinus, *Book of Physiognomy*

Ian Repath

I. THE AUTHOR AND HIS DATE[1]

We have not even a name for the author (Anonymus Latinus: Anon. Lat.) of the Latin treatise, which makes dating it more difficult than it might otherwise have been.[2] In the older manuscripts (for which see Section III) the book is entitled merely *Physiognomonia* (L) or *liber Phisiognomoniae* (B); in the more recent manuscripts it is falsely ascribed to Loxus, Aristotle, or Palemon (*sic*; see below), apparently on the basis of its first words: 'I had at hand the books of three authors who have written on physiognomy, Loxus the physician, Aristotle the philosopher, and Polemon the orator ...' (1).[3] An opinion once popular among scholars, but now not generally held, was that it was written by Apuleius, the author most famous for his novel the *Metamorphoses*. However, the ascriptions are of questionable value at best; and the enthusiasm for physiognomy which we see in Apuleius' genuine writings[4] is not so great as to point to his authorship, or, for that matter, any greater than that found in other authors.[5] Moreover, Anon. Lat.'s attitude to translating, or rather not translating, certain Greek words—'Of course, where I have found the translation or interpretation difficult, I have used the Greek names and words themselves' (1; see Section IV)[6]—is in opposition to what Apuleius says at *Apol.* 38: 'Here you will notice not only lesser known facts, but also words not used before even by the Romans and, as far as I know, non-existent to this day. Through my own effort and study I have derived these names from the Greek in such manner

[1] In what follows, especially sections I–III, I am indebted to Foerster (1893), i, pp. cxxxi–clxxv, and André (1981) 24–47, who himself relies heavily on Foerster.

[2] All that can be said with anything approaching certainly is that, like Ad., he was a pagan: *non ab iniuria hominum vel deorum hi oculi abstinebunt* ('these eyes will not abstain from ... injury to men or the gods', 27).

[3] *Ex tribus auctoribus quorum libros prae manu habui, Loxi medici, Aristotelis philosophi, Palemonis declamatoris, qui de phsyiognomonia scripserunt.*

[4] e.g. *Met.* 2. 2, 10. 2.

[5] See e.g. Foerster (1893) ii. 233–352 for a collection of excerpts which show an interest in physiognomy from an extremely wide range of authors.

[6] *sane ubi difficilis mihi translatio vel interpretatio fuit, Graeca ipsa nomina et verba posui.*

that they are coined by a Latin mint.'[7] Nor are the vocabulary and style recognizable from Apuleius' extant works.

A clue to the date can be gleaned from a phrase repeated several times more or less verbatim (27, 31, 40, 105), that Polemon wrote about examples of appearances he saw in men *sui temporis* ('of his own time'). This implies that Polemon's time (*c.* 88–145) was earlier than Anon. Lat.'s, and probably by some distance. This too counts against Apuleius (*c.* 125–?) being the author. Another factor is that, with one exception,[8] the manuscripts do not even contain the correct form of Polemon's name and instead have *Palemon* in the majority of cases. It is possible that Anon. Lat. found this mistake in the title of the copy of Polemon's treatise he was using, that he misread it himself, that a copyist of Polemon had altered it, or even that an early copyist of Anon. Lat. thought he knew better and changed the name to a more familiar one. At any rate it seems that Anon. Lat. probably did not know Polemon's real name.[9] Allied to these points, many factors of style and vocabulary point to a date certainly beyond the middle of the third century AD and more probably somewhere near the end of the fourth (see below).

II. THE WORK

Anon. Lat. says in his first chapter (quoted above) that he used three authors—Loxus, Aristotle, and Polemon. However, it is clear that by far his greatest debt is to Polemon, from whom he seems more or less to have translated the larger part of his work.[10] For almost everything about signs from the head (16) to colours (79) and about appearances from the brave (90) to the harmfully stupid (105) comes from Polemon, as does the example of prophetic physiognomy of which only the beginning survives (133). Unfortunately the rest of this chapter, along with the end of work, is lost. There are a few things derived from Ps.-Aristotle, which, marked with his name (48, 55, 72) have been mixed in with or added to the Polemonian signs. The signs described in 83–8 are explicitly taken from Ps.-Aristotle, and the appearances which follow the Polemonian ones—from the shameless to the strong of memory (106–14)—derive ultimately from the same source. From Loxus come the relation of the blood to the soul (2, 20), the lower, protruding lip (48), the signs appended to the Polemonian ones (81–2), animal phsyiognomy (118–31), and the note on prophetic physiognomy (133). It is tempting to attribute everything else, which cannot be found in the Leiden

[7] *animadvertes cum res cognitu raras, tum nomina etiam Romanis inusitata et in hodiernum, quod sciam, infecta, ea tamen nomina labore meo et studio ita de Graecis provenire, ut tamen Latina moneta percussa sint*; trans. V. Hunink, from Harrison (2001).

[8] MS A has *Polemone* in 89, although it must be noted that the same MS has *Palamonis* later in the same chapter.

[9] As Apuleius surely would have done.

[10] Polemon's name is cited 20 times by Anon. Lat. Although Aristotle is mentioned 18 times by name, 12 of those mentions occur in 80–9, where he is the principal source. Loxus is mentioned 9 times.

Polemon and Ad. or Ps.-Aristotle, to Loxus, but it must be borne in mind that none of the other texts represents a full and complete treatise.[11] What is reasonably certain is that little, apart from the ordering of the material, can be attributed to Anon. Lat. himself, except perhaps the quotation of Vergil's eighth *Eclogue* in 84, since Ps.-Aristotle is the source there. This treatise, then, in addition to being another witness to Polemon's work, is important as the sole surviving evidence for Loxus.

Anon. Lat. was not over-careful in the composition of his work, or perhaps did not revise it; for instance he takes the shameless, orderly, and gentle appearances (94, 95, 100) from Polemon, but adds supplements from Ps.-Aristotle (106, 107, 109), albeit that the first two occur under different designations in their respective places. There is no explicit contrast between how the two sources describe the two sets of appearances, even though there are one or two disconsonant details, so Anon. Lat. has done this either inadvertently or through a lack of desire to amalgamate his sources thoroughly.[12] To take another potential example of a lack of revision, he does not simply relate what he finds on hair in Polemon, but says: 'As to varieties of hair the following distinction was made above: curly hair shows a timid man; straight hair a wild man' (73).[13] He is referring to what he said on hair in ch. 14, but forgets that he was using Loxus there, who did not in fact make the distinction he is describing (only the first half of this difference is mentioned).

Anon. Lat.'s treatise also contains mistakes, which are most easily spotted in the case of his use of Polemon rather than his other sources, because Loxus does not survive and we cannot be sure what state the Ps.-Aristotle he used was in. This, of course, is also a risky business, since in the case of Polemon we have only an Arabic translation and the epitome by Ad. Nevertheless at certain points either Anon. Lat. was using a defective copy,[14] or he himself made mistakes in his reading of it.[15] In comparison with the surviving models he shows an enthusiasm for exaggeration, for instance adding *admodum, satis, aliquanto, nimium* to positive adjectives, *multo* to comparative adjectives, and using comparatives or even superlatives instead of positives. He very often uses two words to represent one Greek word, especially when it allows him to deploy alliteration, although, as André points out,[16] this is not unique to him. One other point to make is that Anon. Lat.'s Latin is correct and not without stylistic merit in places, and so does not belong to the rather crude translationese of

[11] Cf. Foerster (1893) i, p. cxxxii, where he attributes a large part of chs. 2–12 and the epilogue (132), along with chs. 13–15, 115 to Loxus, and André (1981) 26. In fact it seems reasonable to suppose that chs. 13–15 are derived from Loxus—see G. Boys-Stones (pp. 58–64)—but chs. 3–11 are not too distant from parts of the Leiden Polemon and Ad.

[12] Cf. chs. 80 and 89, where the joins between Anon. Lat.'s treatment of his sources are apparent.

[13] *De capillorum varietate haec superius quidem discretio facta est, quod crispi timidum ostendant, quod directi ferum.*

[14] Which may have had Polemon's name as 'Palemo', for instance.

[15] On how far correction is required, or even desirable, see Section III.

[16] André (1981) 36.

some of the late Latin medical texts, but instead finds parallels in fourth-century writers like Theodorus Priscianus and Pelagonius.[17]

III. THE TEXT

There are fifteen surviving manuscripts, dating from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, of which eight are of no use in determining the text, through being partially epitomized, corrupt, lacunose, or badly copied. The remaining seven are:

Siglum	*Date (century)*	*Contents*	*Library information*
L	12th	1–133	Liège, Bibliothèque de l'Université 77
B	12th	1–24, 105–8	Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin — Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Lat. qu. 198
A	14th	1–24, 49, 51–133	Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Ashmole 399
C	13th	1–80	British Library, Cotton Galba E. IV
E	13th/14th	1–80	Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha, Amplon. 2 378
S	14th	1–80	British Library, Sloane 3469
H	14th	9–80	British Library, Harley 3969

A non-extant manuscript, Mo, should also be added, known to us from the *editio princeps* which depends on it, made by Du Moulin in 1549. This editor said he would leave any mistakes he found so as not to distort the author's meaning: from the large number of faults which remain it seems very probable he stood by his promise and showed everything as he found it in his manuscript, with a few orthographic exceptions. This manuscript, for the reason that it seems to have contained many readings peculiar to it, cannot be identical with any of the surviving manuscripts, and therefore has unique authority (see below).

The seven manuscripts and Mo all need to be consulted in order to establish the text, for this is how they relate to each other according to Foerster: there was an archetype, o, from which two copies were made. The first, s, was copied very carefully, while the second, x, was corrected and changed with considerable abandon. Both these copies are now lost, but they are recoverable from manuscripts which descend from them. From s come L and t (lost). From t come Mo and u (lost), which was the common source of B and A. From x come C and y (lost); from y come E and z (lost), which was the common source of S and H.

The x family is very corrupt, but since in the s family the copies of t come to us mutilated, and the scribe tampered with and changed several things in L,

[17] See e.g. Adams (1995*b*) e.g. on *vastus* as 'thick' (index s.v.), André (1991) 87 on *metaphrenum*, and in general Langslow (2000).

it nevertheless has its own authority; for example, it preserves a different order of the parts of the body from s, and at places it alone has readings which are supported by the Leiden Polemon. In this family it should be noted that: S is better than H; there are writings in a second hand in the margin of E (e) which were taken from another manuscript, but they are largely of no value and at some distance from the readings of the other manuscripts; C frequently agrees with s, which means that the scribe of the lost copy y made mistakes or what he thought were corrections; and there are readings which a second correcting hand (c) made in C from E and e.

As to the s family, A is not as reliable as B; Mo reproduced t much more faithfully than u did; and Mo not only very often agrees with L against u, but also in places shows a genuine reading with x, because L is corrupt or only retains one or other reading from two in the archetype.[18] And so since the scribe of Mo did the very important thing of making his copy of t as diligently as possible, it alone retains the genuine reading, not only in the last fifty-three chapters, which are missing in x, but also in that part of the work which survives in the manuscripts of the x family. This is especially true when it comes to those Greek terms which Anon. Lat. has left untranslated in his text (on which see Section IV). Therefore this manuscript, since not even the scribe of L could resist tampering, is the most important. It is accordingly a pity that Mo does not have the whole text, but like all the other manuscripts lacks the end, a fact that shows that all these manuscripts descend from the same hyparchetype. Beside the end, however, not so much seems to have fallen out of the archetype to make us think the text was once much more intact. However, the text of the archetype has contracted faults in individual words, which makes emendation necessary, a task from which Foerster and André have not shied away.

Foerster in particular, as will be clear from the notes to the translation, was a relatively interventionist editor, although it should be noted that he retains numerous medieval spellings. There was a reasonable amount of editing for him to do—for example the manuscripts contain many transpositions of words and phrases—and I have not noted at each and every stage from which variants he could choose. On the other hand I have noted the points at which Foerster, in defiance of the manuscript tradition, either inserts or deletes, or suggests inserting or deleting, a word or phrase on the basis of Ad. and/or the Leiden Polemon, or where he proposes his own reading or follows that of another editor. Much of what he does seems sensible, and my notes should enable the reader to judge whether or not his interventions enhance the text justifiably. At a small number of points, indicated in the notes, I have followed André's text rather than Foerster's (in general the divergences are not especially numerous or significant), and at others (2, 48, 84, 112) I have made proposals or suggestions of my own.

[18] Several places, at which the reading of the x family (with the particle *vel* added) is found above the reading of the text in L, prove that the archetype had such double readings.

IV. THE TRANSLATION

As with Ad., I have endeavoured, where the constructions of the original allow, to be as accurate and literal as possible in my translation of this text. This means that it is not always as elegant as it might be, but this should be taken as a reflection of the original, which in places is little more than a repetitive list of parts or signs. I have tried to translate individual words consistently throughout, even where one Latin word represents at different points a variety of Greek words.[19] For instance, I have mostly rendered *animus* 'character', even though 'mind' is the more usual English translation, since 'character' is what we find most frequently in Ad. At any rate, the following clause indicates that *animus* must be rendered different from *mens*: *iocundum animum et mansuetum mentemque timidam indicent* (81)—'will indicate a jovial and gentle character and a timid mind'. Similarly I have translated *crus* 'shank' where it is distinguished from the thigh or it is explicit or clear that it is that which is being referred to,[20] but elsewhere 'leg'.[21]

It should not be forgotten that Anon. Lat. was himself a translator and that he may have made mistakes or decided to adapt his models. It is therefore important to translate what he wrote, not what he was translating, and so be true to his text rather than its sources, unless, of course, the text is faulty or his mistake is easily identifiable. One area in which there is less of a problem is Anon. Lat.'s reluctance to translate Greek words which he found difficult,[22] or for which he presumably could find no suitable Latin equivalent. I have retained these words in Greek and translated them in parentheses where necessary.[23]

[19] See André 37, where he discusses the examples *animosus* and *(in)docilis*.

[20] Chs. 69, 71, 72, 86, 87, 88, 92.

[21] Chs. 40, 45, 73, 90, 91, 93, 105, 112, 119, 125, 126, 131.

[22] See above, p. 549.

[23] For example where Anon. Lat. does not explain the term himself. If, on the other hand, a word is repeated several times in succession, I have only supplied a translation at the first instance.

INCERTI AVCTORIS
PHYSIOGNOMONIA

INCERTI AVCTORIS PHYSIOGNOMONIA

1. Ex tribus auctoribus quorum libros prae manu habui, Loxi medici, Aristotelis philosophi, Palemonis declamatoris, qui de physiognomonia scripserunt, ea elegi quae ad primam institutionem huius rei pertinent et quae facilius intelliguntur. sane ubi difficilis mihi translatio vel interpretatio fuit, Graeca ipsa nomina et verba posui.

2. Primo igitur constituendum est, quid physiognomonia profiteatur. <profitetur> itaque ex qualitate corporis qualitatem se animi considerare atque perspicere. et Loxus quidem sanguinem animae[1] habitaculum esse constituit, corpus autem omne et partes eius quae signa dant, pro vivacitate vel inertia sanguinis et prout tenuis seu crassus magis fuerit vel cum liberos habuerit ac directos meatus vel cum perversos et angustos, dare signa diversa. ceteri autem tam figuratricem corporis animam esse arbitrantur,[2] quam ex qualitate corporis animam speciem mutuari, sicuti humor constitutus in vasculo qui speciem ex vasculo mutuatur et sicut spiritus infusus in fistulam vel in tibiam vel in tubam. nam cum uniformis sit spiritus, diversum tamen sonat tuba, fistula, tibia.[3]

3. Prima igitur divisio observationis huius atque discretio ea est, ut alterum masculinum genus sit, alterum femininum. quod non ea ratione accipiendum est, qua naturaliter sexus et genera discreta sunt, sed ut plerumque etiam in feminino masculinum genus et in masculino femininum deprehendatur. denique quod masculinum nos dicimus, ἀρσενικόν, quod femininum, θηλυκόν physiognomones dicunt.[4] primo igitur constituendus est animus masculini et econtra feminini, deinde corporis utriusque designanda indicia sunt {et} si non omnia, ea tamen quae viam pandere[5] considerationis huiusce possint. nam sicut in studio litterarum, cum sint viginti quattuor elementa secundum Graecos

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Note: The text of Anonymus Latinus is lightly adapted from Foerster (1893) ii. 3–145.

[1] *anima* ('soul') occurs only in this chapter, in ch. 12, where Loxus' theory is mentioned again, and in ch. 10, where the importance of the eyes as a sign is explained by the assertion that through them the soul can be seen: cf. Ad. A4.

[2] Foerster adds *per* συμπάθειαν ('through sympathy') from Molinius, but this seems merely to be a (correct) gloss on the mutual relationship between the appearances of the body and soul which is being described here. Note: all Greek terms in Anon. Lat. are from the (lost) MS used by Molinius for his *editio princeps*, or are corrected from his record of what the MS offered.

ANONYMUS LATINUS, *BOOK OF PHYSIOGNOMY*

1. I had at hand the books of three authors who have written on physiognomy, Loxus the physician, Aristotle the philosopher, and Polemon the orator, and I have chosen those parts which pertain to the main principles of the subject and which can be understood fairly easily. Of course, where I have found the translation or interpretation difficult, I have used the Greek names and words themselves.

2. And so at first it needs to be established what physiognomy promises: it promises that it examines and perceives the quality of the mind from the quality of the body. Loxus, for example, established that the blood is the dwelling-place of the soul,[1] and moreover that the whole body and the parts of it which give signs give different signs according to the liveliness or inertia of the blood and whether it is thinner or thicker or according to when it has free and direct or crooked and narrow channels. But others think that just as the soul is the shaper of the body,[2] so the soul derives its appearance from the quality of the body, just like liquid in a small vessel which derives its appearance from the vessel and just like air breathed into a pipe, aulos, or trumpet: for although the breath is uniform, a trumpet, pipe, and aulos make different sounds.[3]

3. The primary division and distinction in this type of observation is the existence of a masculine type on the one hand and a feminine type on the other. This is not to be understood according to the system by which the sexes and types are naturally separated, but in the general sense that the masculine type may be detected even in the feminine and the feminine in the masculine. Next, what we call masculine, the physiognomists call ἀρσενικόν, and what we call feminine, they call θηλυκόν.[4] And so in the first instance the masculine character and on the other hand the feminine character need to be established; then the signs of both sorts of body need to be pointed out, if not all, then those which might be able to open up[5] the way for this examination; for just as in the study of the alphabet where, according to the Greeks, there are twenty-four

[3] See George Boys-Stones, pp. 62–3, for a different interpretation of this passage.

[4] Foerster inserts this sentence from B and Molinius.

[5] Foerster replaces the MSS' *dare* ('to give') with *pandere* on the basis of *panditur* five lines later.

quibus omnis vox et omnis sermo comprehenditur, ita et in physiognomonia propositis elementis latissima observationis huius via panditur. nam et si syllabas omnes in prima aetate didicimus, concepta vi syllabarum, prout quisque sermo provenerit, mox litterarum ex quibus constat ordinem pervidemus.

4.[6] Masculinus animus est vehemens, ad impetum facilis, odii immemor, liberalis, apertus, qui hebetari et circumveniri ingenio atque arte non possit, vincendi per virtutem studiosus, magnanimus. femininus animus est sollers, ad iracundiam pronus, tenax odii, idem immisericors atque invidus, laboris impatiens, docilis, subdolus, amarus, praeceps, timidus.

5. Veniamus ad indicia corporis masculini. caput grande, capillus crassior, rubeus vel niger cum rubore, stabilis, modice inflexus, color rubeus non clari ruboris vel niger, suffusus tamen rubore, oculi paulo impressiores, minaces, subnigri, quos Graeci χαροποὺς vocant, vel glauci.[7] cervix esse debet moderatae plenitudinis, aliquanto prolixior, vertex capitis subrectior, scapulae ingentes, humeri et superiores corporis partes usque ad umbilicum latiores, inferiores deductae paulatim plenitudine desinente, lacertosus, ossibus magnis, nodis et articulis summorum pedum et summarum manuum firmis, non tamen rigidis, sed absolutis, prope imum seiunctis atque discretis, pectore alto et prominente, iugulis absolutis, ventre lato compresso paululum intrinsecus, pectus non nimia carne contectum, solido et[8] spisso corpore, ossibus quae sunt sub ilibus, quae a Graecis ἰσχία dicuntur, siccioribus et solidis. item masculinum corpus forte et tolerans laborum est, vocis solidae, aliquanto raucioris, interdum gravis tanquam ex abdito et concavo resonantis, ut est leonum, spiritus densior, multum aëris concipiens ac referens, passibus longis, motus corporis, cum tranquillus est animus, tardior est, cuius minor sit pars inferior ab umbilico quam est a summo capite ad umbilicum.

6. Veniamus ad indicia corporis feminini. caput breve, capillus niger vel a rubeo fuscior, quem Graeci φαιὰν τρίχα,[9] rarior, idem flexibilior ac mollior, cervix exilior eademque longior, color candidus vel cum pallore nigrior, quem Graeci μελάγχλωρον vocant, pupillae, quas Graeci κόρας dicunt, subnigrae vel evidenter nigrae, vultus omnis lenis, inoffensus ac mollis, serenus, affabilis, labia compressa tanquam sint incisa, iuguli cohaerentes atque constricti, ab humeris usque ad umbilicum corpus angustius et brevius, ab umbilico usque ad genua prolixius ac plenius, a genibus usque ad pedum ima deductius, imae manus ac pedes subtiles et eleganter circumscripti, planta concava et a reliquo vestigio elatior, vox tenuis, moderata, acceptissima auribus, sermo volubilis ac facilis, incessus decens, brevibus passibus et acceleratis.

[6] Note: equivalents in Ad. are for guidance only, since Anon. Lat. frequently rewrites and reorders the material he found in Polemon.

[7] *glauci*; cf. Ch. 10, p. 492.

elementary letters of which all sounds and speech are comprised, so in physiognomy too the broadest way for this type of observation is opened by establishing the basic elements; for even if we learnt all the syllables when young, once the force of the syllables is understood, as each utterance comes forth, soon we discern the order of the letters which it consists of.

4 (= B2).[6] The masculine character is forceful, impetuous, forgetful of hatred, generous, open, unable to be blunted and outmanoeuvred by guile or artifice, preferring to overcome through manliness, and is magnanimous. The feminine character is clever, prone to anger, clings to hatred, also pitiless and envious, not enduring hard work, teachable, deceitful, bitter, rash, and timid.

5. Let us come to the signs of the masculine body. The head is large, the hair rather thick, red or black with red, straight, moderately wavy, the colour is red, but not bright red, or black, although suffused with red, the eyes are a little sunken, threatening, somewhat black, which the Greeks call χαροποί ('dark blue'), or light blue.[7] The neck should be of moderate thickness, somewhat extended, the top of the head rather upright, the shoulder-blades huge, the shoulders and upper parts of the body to the navel rather broad, the lower parts rather drawn in with decreasing width. He should be muscular, with big bones, the knuckles and joints at the ends of the feet and hands solid, yet not stiff, but just right, apart and separate near the end, with a high and prominent chest, detached collar-bones, a broad stomach pressed slightly inwards, a chest not excessively covered in flesh, a hard and[8] compact body, with the bones which are below the loins, which are called ἰσχία ('hips') by the Greeks, rather dry and hard. Also the masculine body is strong and tolerant of hard work, has a strong voice which is rather hoarse and occasionally deep as if echoing from somewhere hidden and hollow, like that of lions, rather frequent breath which draws in and expels much air, and long steps; the movement of the body, when the mind is peaceful, is rather slow, and the part below the navel is smaller than that from the top of the head to the navel.

6 (= B2). Let us come to the signs of the feminine body. The head is small, the hair black or darker than red, which the Greeks call φαιὰ θρίξ ('grey hair'),[9] rather thin, at the same time somewhat flexible and soft, the neck is rather slender and also long, the colour is white or rather black with paleness, which the Greeks call μελάγχλωρος, the pupils, which the Greeks call κόραι, are somewhat black or obviously black, the whole face is smooth, placid and soft, calm and affable, the lips are compressed as if incised, the collar-bones are bound and stuck together, the body is narrower and smaller from the shoulders to the navel, from the navel to the knees it is more extended and thicker and from the knees to the ends of the feet it is more drawn in, the ends of the hands and feet are slender and elegantly delineated, the soles are hollow and higher than the rest of the step, the voice is thin, moderate, very pleasing to the ears, the speech is fluent and easy, and the gait is comely, with short and quick steps.

[8] Foerster prefers A's *solido et*, comparing ch. 66; other MSS have *solide* or nothing.

[9] φαιός is not found in any of the extant phsyiognomical writings.

7. Accidunt praeterea species feminino generi, quas quidem masculino assignavimus. quae in quocunque sexu fuerint, magis edent ex sese fetum generis masculini. ea vero accidentia quae feminino generi assignata sunt in quocunque sexu fuerint, edunt magis sobolem femininam. item in quocunque corpore pars aliqua dextra maior fuerit vel oculus vel manus vel mamilla vel testiculus vel pes, vel vertex capitis ad dextram magis se conferat, vel si ex duobus verticibus vel tribus maior in dextris partibus fuerit, assignantur haec omnia indicia generi masculino. si aliqua pars ex sinistris maior inventa fuerit, assignatur his indiciis generi feminino. et si vertex capitis ad sinistram partem magis conversus fuerit vel ex duobus aut tribus maior sinister fuerit, assignabitur generi feminino. sed et nares et labia cum ad dextram partem magis conversa sunt, masculinum, cum ad sinistram, femininum genus profitentur. si autem vel in femina dextras partes maiores vel in masculo sinistras perspexeris, scito iactantem, qui Graece ἀλαζὼν dicitur, ac mendacem esse huiusmodi personam. nam et vitia congruenti ratione contrahunt corpora. nam in masculino quidem genere sinistrae partes magis infirmitatem concipiunt ac vitia, dextrae vero in genere feminino.

8. Iuxta hanc generum divisionem etiam animalia multa discreta sunt et terrena et pennata et aquatilia et serpentina. nam leo, aper ad masculinum genus referuntur, pardus, cervus, lepus ad femininum, aquila, accipiter ad masculinum genus, pavus, perdix, pica ad femininum.

9. Denique tria genera veteres instituerunt quibus physiognomoniam exercuerunt. nam primo gentium vel provinciarum propositis moribus ad similitudinem singulos quosque homines referebant, ut dicerent: hic Aegyptio est similis, Aegyptii autem sunt callidi, dociles, leves, temerarii, in venerem proni; hic Celto[10] id est Germano est similis, Celti autem sunt indociles, fortes, feri; hic Thraci est similis, Thraces autem sunt iniqui, pigri, temulenti. processu autem temporis etiam hoc genere physiognomoniam assecuti sunt homines, quod observarent, quo quis esset vultu vel in quo corporis statu per singulos animi sui motus, id est quis esset vultus irati, quis cogitantis, quis timentis, quis in libidinem proni quisque furentis. quemcunque igitur perspexissent physiognomones nulla existente furoris causa furenti habere proximum vultum nec existente ira irascenti nec proposita cogitatione cogitanti, vel furiosum vel iracundum vel cogitatorem pronuntiabant. tertium accessit, ut ad similitudinem animalium de animis hominum pronuntiaretur. et certior ac facilior haec via visa est nec tamen omissae sunt priores. denique signa plurima ad similitudinem animalium referuntur.

[10] The extremely rare form Celtus not only shows Anon. Lat.'s dependence on Greek (cf. André ad loc.), but perhaps also his awareness that the Greek form refers more generally to the peoples of

7. Moreover sorts of appearance which we have assigned to the masculine type occur in the feminine. Whatever sex they are in, they will produce from themselves more offspring of the masculine type. And those occurrences which were assigned to the feminine type, whatever sex they are in, produce more feminine offspring. Also if some part on the right is larger, in whatever body, be it eye or hand or breast or testicle or foot, or if the top of the head leans more to the right, or if from two or three points the larger is on the right, all these indications are assigned to the masculine type. If some part on the left is found to be larger, it is assigned by these indications to the feminine type. And if the top of the head is turned more to the left or out of two or three points the left is the larger, it will be assigned to the feminine type. But also the nose and lips, when they are turned more to the right, announce the masculine type, when they are turned more to the left, the feminine type. But if you see that the parts on the right are larger in a woman, or that the parts on the left are larger in a man, know that a person of this type is a boaster, who in Greek is called an ἀλαζών, and a liar; for the bodies incur the faults too in due proportion; for in the masculine type the parts on the left take in more weakness and faults, but in the feminine type the parts on the right do this.

8 (= B2). Many animals too are separated according to this division of types, those that dwell on land, those that are winged, those that dwell in water, and those that crawl; for the lion and wild boar are compared to the masculine type, the leopard, deer, and hare to the feminine, the eagle and hawk to the masculine, the peacock, partridge, and magpie to the feminine.

9 (= B31). Finally, the ancients established three ways in which they practised physiognomy; for first they established the characters of peoples and provinces and compared individuals with regard to their similarity to them, so that they might say: 'This man is similar to an Egyptian, and Egyptians are clever, teachable, fickle, rash, and prone to sex; this man is similar to a Celt,[10] i.e. a German, and Celts are difficult to teach, brave, and wild; this man is similar to a Thracian, and Thracians are unjust, lazy, and drunken.' But with the advance of time men also pursued physiognomy in this way: they observed that whatever expression or posture of body a man had through the particular movements of his mind, that was the expression of an angry man, of a thinking man, of a fearful man, of a man prone to desire and of a man who was mad. And so whomever the physiognomists saw to have an expression like one who was mad, even though there was no cause for his madness, or like one who was angry, even though there was no anger, or like one who was thinking, even though there was no obvious thought, they pronounced mad or angry or a thinker respectively. A third way was added so that they made pronouncements about the characters of men with regard to their similarity to animals. And this way seemed surer and easier, but the earlier ones were not omitted. Thus very many signs are referred to the similarity to animals.

northern Europe (i.e. a 'German'), whereas the Latin word Celtae referred specifically to the inhabitants of Gaul.

10. Haec praedicta sunt ad indicia utriusque speciei[11] sincera et mera concipienda, quo discretio masculini et feminini generis intellectui clara et evidens esse monstretur. verum sciendum permixtionem plurimam esse signorum tam in hominibus quam in animalibus ceteris, et quae generalia posuimus et quae mox specialia subsequentur. nec aliter ingenium bonum constat, nisi virtutem ex masculina, sapientiam ex feminina specie conceperit. ubi itaque multa compugnantia signa convenerint, pronuntiandum quidem secundum ea quae vel plura sunt vel clariora vel potiora. nam multa paucis praeponenda sunt, clara obscuris, potiora minoribus. pro modo autem oppugnantium signorum quae obtinebunt mitigabuntur. potissima autem signa iudicabuntur oculorum. hos enim tanquam fores animae videri volunt: nam et animam dicunt per oculos emicare et solum hunc aditum esse, per quem animus adiri atque introspici possit, subsequi autem indicia cetera, quae in vultu et capite constituta sunt et prout est singularum dignitas corporis partium, ita et signorum vis habetur.

11. Quicunque igitur physiognomoniam assequitur, primo memoriae mandare debet significationes signorum, secundo dignitates eorum cognitas habere, tertio quaecunque signa reppererit, conicere atque ea inter se conferre, ut ita verbi causa constituat: habet hic homo cilia quidem loquacis, frontem vero cogitatoris, oculos furiosi. frons loquacem non in totum patitur esse et cilia cogitationi et fronti derogant, rursum oculorum asperitas non nihil statum frontis infringit. secundum haec minus importunae loquacitatis et calidi ingenii potius quam evidenter furiosus homo iudicabitur. sed non tam parvum interest inter oculos furiosos et prope furiosos vel iratos quam videtur, nec tam parvum interest inter frontem cogitantis et saevientis quantum interesse facile aestimatur. parva etenim haec magna sunt et effectus vehementes habent, quamquam ita pleraque obscura sint, ut non oculis interdum, sed vix animo comprehendantur et ex accidentibus potius quam ex semet intelligantur. nam multa signorum et casus fortuiti et conversatio humana et propria industria nostrae facultatis obscurat et celat. nam et aetates et aegritudines et dolor et iracundia et tristitia et sollicitudo temporalis licet non omnia signa, nonnulla tamen permiscent atque permutant. quare artifex rei huius et diutius considerabit, ut a temporalibus naturalia discernat, et non uni vel duobus indiciis se committet, sed plura et potiora semper denotabit et ex improviso nec praecaventem aut se praemunientem considerabit, quamvis et praecaventem attentus artifex detegat. nam et maledicus qui se latere facilius posse credebat inducto ab aliis maledicendi initio libidinem suam lacrimis prodidit, ut voraces, cum suavitatem cibi, temulenti, cum vini copiam nanciscuntur. alium in balneis vox absque sermone profecta detexit libidinibus subiugatum, alius sternutamento subito virum se non esse confessus est.[12]

[11] The sexes.

10. What has been said relates to understanding the simple and pure signs of the two sorts of appearance,[11] so that the separation of the masculine and feminine type will be rendered clear and evident to the intellect. But it must be known that there is a great mixture of the signs in human beings as in the other animals, both as regards the general points we have made and the particular points that will soon follow. And a good character cannot be composed unless it takes manliness from the masculine type of appearance and wisdom from the feminine. And so when there are many conflicting signs, a pronouncement must be made according to those things which are either greater in number or clearer or more significant; for the many are to be preferred to the few, the clear to the obscure, and the more significant to the less. But according to the proportion of the opposing signs, those which persist will be softened. The most significant signs are judged to belong to the eyes. They want these to be seen as gates of the soul—for they say that the soul even shines out through the eyes and that this is the only avenue by which the mind can be approached and looked into. And they say that the other signs follow, those which are set in the face and head, and the force of the signs is thought to correspond to the worth of the individual parts of the body.

11. And so whosoever pursues physiognomy should first commit to memory the importance of the signs, second learn their worth, and third interpret whatever signs he finds and compare them among themselves, so that the discussion proceeds as follows: 'This man has the eyelids of a chatterer, but the brow of a thinker and the eyes of a madman. The brow does not allow him to be a complete chatterer and the eyelids detract from the thoughtful brow; then again the fierceness of the eyes rather affects the state of the brow.' According to these things the man is judged less of an inopportune chatterer and impetuous character rather than obviously mad. But the difference between eyes which are mad and those which are nearly mad or angry is not as small as it seems, and the difference between the brow of a man thinking and of one who is in a rage is not as small as it may too easily be judged to be; for these small things are important and produce significant effects, although most of them are obscure, so that sometimes they are not grasped by the eyes, but only with difficulty by the mind, and they are understood from accidentals rather than from themselves; for both fortuitous events and human society and the effort of our own ability obscures and hides many of the signs. Both age and sickness and grief and anger and sadness and worry, albeit temporary, mix and change, not all signs, but several of them; for which reason the practitioner of this skill will both study over a longer period of time, so that he might distinguish the natural from the temporary, and not commit himself to one or two signs, but will always take note of the more numerous and significant signs and will examine a man unexpectedly and not when he is taking precautions and protecting himself—though the attentive practitioner will detect even the man who is taking precautions; for even the abusive man who thinks he can escape notice with ease betrays his desire by his tears when others start up the abuse, and likewise the greedy and drunken, when they obtain pleasant food or an abundance of wine. It was the sound of his voice, without any speech being made, that uncovered one man at the baths as a slave of lust, and another man confessed that he was no man by a sudden sneeze.[12]

[12] See the discussion of the sneeze in Ch. 2, p. 78.

12. Sed priusquam ad singula veniamus indicia vel signa, sciendum est, quod sanguis, in quo sedem Loxus animae esse constituit, si quidem multus sit, corpori quidem praebet augmentum et ruborem et capillis soliditatem et densitatem, sensus tamen et intellectus humani acumen constringit et hebetat atque intercipit, si tenuis et parvus, corpus infirmat, colorem deformat, corporalia omnia extenuat et minuit, mentis autem ingenium confovet et acumen animi excitat nec intercludit mobilitatem eius ac motum, velocitatem denique confert omnibus sensualibus membris quae sunt in nostris vultibus constituta, ut sunt aures, oculi, lingua, nares et quaecunque venae sunt sanguinis. unde medium temperamentum corporis perfectum animum indicat, is autem perfectus est animus, qui pari virtute est atque sapientia, et ita fit, ut omne ingenium ex modo et temperamento sanguinis originem sumat.

13. Sciendum etiam de capillis his qui cum homine nascuntur quod certiora sint signa, ut capitis, superciliorum et oculorum. Incipiamus a capite.

14. Capilli stabiles[13] idemque nigri vel sordidi et aquati ruboris et crassi violentum hominem indicant: referuntur ad suem. capilli molles et ultra modum tenues rubei et rari penuriam sanguinis, enervem, sine virtute ac femininum animum indicant et quanto rariores fuerint, tanto magis subdolum. capilli crispi nimium subdolum, timidum, avarum, lucri cupidum hominem ostendunt. referuntur autem tales ad gentem Aegyptiorum, qui sunt timidi, et ad Syrorum, qui sunt avari. capilli densi imminentes fronti nimium ferum animum declarant, quia referuntur ad speciem ursi. capilli supra medium frontis resupini ad cerebrum respicientes calidum et minus sapientem animum dicunt, referuntur enim ad gentes barbaras. capilli rigidi et rari frigidum hominem et timidum profitentur. capilli flavi et crassi et albidiores indociles et indomitos mores testantur. referuntur autem ad gentem Germanorum. capilli densi et vasti iuxta tempora et circa aures calidum et libidinosum ingenium manifestant. capilli iuxta tempora tenues et rari frigidum et sine viribus hominem detegunt. capilli subnigri, quos Graeci οἱνωποὺς dicunt, et tenues bonos indicant mores, si non sint nimis densi. capilli flavi tenues bonos mores ostendunt, si sint minus densi. capilli subflavi tenues aliquanto densiores bonos mores significant. cum autem ultima linea capillorum capitis fronti imminet, animosum ac semiferum indicat hominem. cum autem a fronte recedit, minus calidum et parvi intellectus animum declarat. ultima linea capillorum ex parte posteriori cum per mediam cervicem demittitur atque in acutum longius desinit, calidum, insipientem, libidinosum animum indicat. ultima linea capillorum ex posteriori parte cum longe superior a cervice est, tardum, timidum, femineum, iracundum animum indicat.

[13] Lit. 'standing', *stabiles.*

12. But before we come to the individual signs or signals, it must be known that the blood, in which Loxus placed the seat of the soul, if it is copious, provides the body with bulk and redness, the hair with strength and thickness, but constricts, dulls, and obstructs the senses and the sharpness of the human intellect, whereas if it is thin and not abundant, it weakens the body, mars the colour, thins and diminishes all bodily parts, but fosters the character of the mind and excites the sharpness of the spirit and does not block off its mobility and movement, and finally it confers speed on all the organs of sense which are situated in our faces, the ears, eyes, tongue, nose and whatever blood vessels there are. And so a balanced temperament of the body indicates a perfect spirit, and that spirit is perfect which is as brave as it is wise. And so it is that the whole character takes its starting point from the type and temperament of the blood.

13. It must also be known that those hairs with which a man is born are rather sure signs, such as those which belong to the head, the eyebrows, and the eyes. Let us begin with the head.

14 (= B37). Hair which is straight[13] and at the same time black or dirty and of a watery redness and thick indicates a violent man; it is referred to the pig. Hair which is soft and excessively fine, red and thin indicates a lack of blood and a weak, feminine mind without manliness, and the thinner it is, the slier the man. Curly hair shows a man who is excessively deceitful, timid, greedy and desirous of money. And such men are referred to the race of the Egyptians, who are timid, and to that of the Syrians, who are greedy. Thick hair overhanging the brow reveals an excessively wild mind, because it is referred to the type of appearance in a bear. Hair above the middle of the brow which lies back and points back towards the head declares that the mind is impetuous and not very wise, for it is referred to the barbarian races. Hair which is stiff and thin announces a spiritless and timid man. Hair which is blond and thick and rather white testifies to characters which are difficult to teach and tame. It is referred to the race of the Germans. Hair which is thick and abundant next to the temples and around the ears shows an impetuous and lustful character. Hair next to the temples which is fine and thin reveals a man who is spiritless and without strength. Hair which is somewhat black, which the Greeks call οἰνωποί, and thin indicates a good character, if it is not too thick. Hair which is blond and fine shows a good character, if it is less thick. Hair which is somewhat blond and fine and rather thicker signifies a good character. But when the fringe of the hair on the head overhangs the brow, it indicates a spirited and semi-wild man. But when it recedes from the brow, it reveals a less impetuous mind of small intellect. When the fringe of hair on the back of the head goes down over the middle of the neck and finishes in a rather long point, it indicates an impetuous, unwise, and lustful mind. When the fringe of hairs on the back of the head is far above the neck, it indicates a slow, timid, feminine, and angry mind.

15. Cutis capitis rugosa vel laxior si fuerit, animum resolutum, mollem, femineum indicat; si dura vel tensa vel astricta est, laudis appetentem et prope stolidum hominem demonstrat. optimum ergo est in cute capitis temperamentum, quod nec laxum satis neque satis strictum sit.

16. Caput cum aliquanto maius est quam exigit modus, sensibus viget, sed et virtutem et magnificentiam indicat. caput breve sine sensu, sine sapientia est. caput prolixum imprudentiae signum est. caput humile planum insolentiae nota est. caput breve prope rotundum impudentiae argumentum est: refertur ad rapaces aves. caput moderatum ingenium indicat sapiens et vigens sensibus, aliquando tamen timidum et minus liberale. caput immensum stultum et stolidum et indocilem vehementer ostendit. caput obliquum impudentiam designat. caput ex priori parte eminens insolentem notat. caput ex posteriori parte concavum dolosum et iracundum indicat. caput magnum cum fronte lata et omni vultu prominenti tardum, mansuetum, fortem, indocilem hominem demonstrat: refertur ad bovem. caput malleo simile ante ac retro <prominens>[14] impudentem monstrat. caput rectum quod sit in medio leniter humile ac prope planum, aliquanto maius quam si sit mediae magnitudinis, sensibus vigentem magnanimumque declarat.

17. Frons angusta indocilem, inquinatum, voracem significat: refertur ad porcum. qui frontem spatiosam nimium habent, pigrioris ingenii sunt. qui frontem oblongam habent, sensibus praevalent et sunt dociles, ut canes. humilem habere frontem virile non est. curva frons eadem alta et rotunda stoliditatis indicium est. frons quadrata moderatae magnitudinis congruens corpori ac vultui magnae virtutis, sapientiae et magnanimitatis indicium est. qui frontem planam atque continuam habent, plurimum honori suo vendicant et ultra meritum. quibus frons tanquam obducta est capite imminente, insolentes sunt. quibus frons in medium tanquam obstricta convenit, iracundi sunt. qui rugas frontis superius retractas habent et maxime eas quae sunt ad originem narium, cogitatores sunt. qui laxam atque diffusam frontis cutem proferunt et tanquam arridentem, blandi quidem, non tamen innoxii sunt: referuntur ad speciem blandientium canum. quibus frons aspera est, ut in ea existant sicut colles et cava quaedam tanquam defossa, versuti et avari sunt, si non insani sint et stulti. qui tensam habent frontem, securi sunt.

[14] Foerster inserts *prominens* on the basis of 106.

15. If the skin on the head is wrinkled or rather loose, it indicates a relaxed, soft, and feminine mind; if it is hard or tense or tight, it shows a man who seeks praise and who is almost stupid. And so the best temperament in the skin on the head is that which is neither too loose nor too tight.

16 (= B30). When the head is rather larger than proportion allows, it is strong in the senses, but indicates both manliness and magnificence. A small head is without sense and without wisdom. An extended head is a sign of imprudence. A low, flat head is a mark of insolence. A small head which is nearly round is evidence of impudence; it is referred to birds of prey. A moderately sized head indicates a character which is wise and strong in the senses, but sometimes timid and less generous. An immense head is a strong indication of a stupid and dull and difficult-to-teach man. A slanting head points to impudence. A head which projects at the front denotes insolence. A head which is hollow at the back indicates a deceitful and angry man. A large head with a broad brow and with the whole face sticking out shows a slow, gentle, brave man who is difficult to teach; it is referred to the ox. A head which is similar to a mallet, sticking out[14] at the front and back, shows impudence. An upright head which is gently low in the middle and nearly flat, and which is considerably larger than if it were of medium size, announces a man who is strong in the senses and magnanimous.

17 (= B26). A narrow brow signifies a man who is difficult to teach, foul, and greedy. It is referred to the pig. Those who have an excessively large brow are of slower character. Those who have an oblong brow are strong in the senses and are teachable, like dogs. It is not manly to have a low brow. A brow which is curved and at the same time high and round is a sign of stupidity. A square brow of moderate size which is proportional to the body and face is a sign of great manliness, wisdom, and magnanimity. Those who have a flat and continuous brow claim a great deal for their own honour and beyond what they deserve. Those whose brow is overlaid, as it were, and whose head overhangs, are insolent. Those whose brow comes together in the middle as if knotted are angry. Those who have the wrinkles of the brow drawn back up, and especially those at the top of the nose, are thinkers. Those who have the skin of the brow loose and relaxed, as if smiling, are flatterers, although they are not harmless; they are referred to the appearance of wheedling dogs. Those whose brow is rough, so that there are ridges in it, as it were, and hollows as if dug out, are devious and greedy, if they are not insane and stupid. Those who have a tense brow are careless.

18. Supercilia cum sunt directa atque prolixa, mollem atque imbecillem animum declarant: respondent generi feminino. supercilia cum coeunt, tristem maxime hominem, sed et parum sapientem significant. superciliorum capilli cum ad superna et ad frontem sunt retracti, animosum, iracundum, stultum demonstrant, ad tempora subrecti immundum. supercilia quae imminent oculis, invidiae arguunt. supercilia quae contrahuntur parvam et angustam mentem indicant. supercilia quae ex altera parte ad oculos demissa sunt, ex altera ad tempora subrecta, immundum, stultum et insatiabilem indicant: referuntur ad porcum.

19. Cilium plerumque et quod eminet et quod subiacet oculo est inflatum tanquam vena. quod cum ita est, somniculosum superius indicat, inferius vinolentum.

20. Nunc de oculis disputandum est, ubi summa omnis physiognomoniae constituta est. nam et aliarum partium signa si oculi affirmaverint, tunc rata magis et certa sunt. ex oculorum enim indiciis physiognomones sententias suas confirmant et hic omnis eorum est auctoritas constituta. denique et quae iam diximus et quae prosequemur indicia applicanda et adiungenda sunt indiciis oculorum, ut si impugnata non fuerint nec in ambiguitatem deducta, sed potius per oculos confirmata, tunc rata sint.

21. Oculi qui tanquam guttulae liquoris nitidi relucent, mores suavissimos atque gratissimos indicant.[15] pupillae oculorum late iacentes[16] et porrectae vanitatem detegunt, breves malignitatem. hoc utroque signo animalia approbantur: nam ubi moderati sunt orbes pupillarum, secura, innocentia, fortia animalia designant, serpentes autem et ichneumones et simiae et vulpes pupillas parvas habent. cum altera pupilla plus est maior, altera minor, iniquitatem significat. quorum pupillae oculorum in gyrum aguntur tanquam rota axi suspensa, observandum est, utrum uniformiter agantur an varie. si uniformiter, scito eum hominem sceleribus et facinoribus immanibus attineri atque impiis et aut homicidiis domesticis aut infandis cibis vel conubiis esse pollutum, quales Thyestae vel Terei cibi vel qualia Oedipodis conubia fuisse memorantur. cum autem modo involvuntur modo recurrunt oculi modo interquiescunt, ab his nondum perpetrata sunt huiusmodi facinora, verum in animo et in cogitatione versantur. si autem ad huiusmodi pupillarum turpitudinem etiam obscuritas quaedam tanquam nubecula circa supercilia versetur atque oculis ipsis immineat, hi gravi perurgentur fato et praesagiunt in rebus domesticis suis iram aliquam divinitus imminentem.

[15] See Ch. 10, trans. n. 11.

18. When eyebrows are straight and long they reveal a soft and weak mind; they correspond to the feminine type. When eyebrows meet, they signify a very sad man, but one who is also not very wise. When the hairs of the eyebrows are drawn back upwards towards the brow, they show a spirited, angry, and stupid man, but if they rise towards the temples they show a foul man. Eyebrows which overhang the eyes reveal envy. Eyebrows which are drawn together indicate a small and narrow mentality. Eyebrows which on one side are drawn down to the eyes and which rise to the temples on the other indicate a foul, stupid and insatiable man; they are referred to the pig.

19. The eyelid, both the one above and the one below the eye, is often swollen like a vein. When is it such, the upper eyelid indicates a drowsy man, the lower a drunken one.

20. Now the eyes must be discussed, which constitute the sum of all physiognomy; for if the eyes corroborate the signs of the other parts, then these are surer and more certain. From the signs of the eyes physiognomists confirm their own judgements; these are the basis of their whole authority. Therefore both the signs which we have already mentioned and those to which we shall proceed must be brought and added to the signs of the eyes, so that if they are not conflicting or drawn into ambiguity but are rather confirmed by the eyes, then they are sure.

21 (= A5). Eyes which gleam like droplets of shiny liquid indicate a very elegant and pleasing character.[15] Pupils which extend widely[16] and are large reveal vanity, while those which are small reveal malice. Animals are assessed by both these signs: for when the circles of the pupils are of moderate size they denote carefree, harmless, brave animals, but snakes and rats and apes and foxes have small pupils. When one pupil is much larger, and the other smaller, it signifies injustice. As regards those whose pupils turn in a circle like a wheel suspended on an axle, it must be observed whether they turn evenly or unevenly. If evenly, you should know that that man is marked by monstrous and impious crimes and deeds or polluted by either domestic murder or unspeakable foods or sexual unions, such as the food of Thyestes or Tereus or the union of Oedipus are said to have been. But when the eyes sometimes roll, sometimes run back, and sometimes stop, crimes of this sort have not yet been perpetrated by these, but they are being turned over in mind and thought. But if in addition to disgrace seen in the pupils of this type a certain darkness like a small cloud envelops the eyebrows and overhangs the eyes themselves, these men are driven by a grave fate and feel beforehand in their own private affairs the threat of some divine anger.

[16] Foerster reads *late iacentes*. Cf. Ad. A5. André, on the other hand, reads *iacentes* with some MSS and takes it as 'relaxed', 'full'.

22. Pupillae defixae et status oculorum propemodum defixus {hic}[17] omnis ingratum hominem designat, sed si cum humore aliquo stabunt, timiditatis erunt indices, si cum siccitate, insaniae. sed qui etiam pallent, horum non tam minus sanae mentes sunt quam potius attonitae. qui autem cum stabilitate et pallore oculorum et supercilia erigunt et spiritum violentius contrahunt atque concipiunt, inconsulti, immites, maledici, iracundi sunt. oculi stantes subrubentes libidinosum et voracem denuntiant. si his signis accedat, ut inferior pars oculi id est cilium inferius potius ad malas vergat et separetur, cum libidine iniquitatem, avaritiam, inconditos et incomprehensos mores, voracitatem etiam et impudentiam indicant. oculi stantes perbreves avarum, lucrorum vehementer cupidum appetentemque declarant. si autem cum brevitate et statu oculorum etiam frontem cum superciliis ad medium contrahat, multo est avarior et lucrorum studiosior. et si his signis accedat, ut etiam ceterum corpus curvetur atque conducatur, iracundus satis erit <et> fellitus et clamosus. oculi stantes glauci sine splendore indicant hominem dolis et audacia plenum, pervigilem et exquisitorem malitiae. oculi stantes parvi humidi, frons relaxata, palpebrae mobiles indicant hominem docilem, cogitatorem, natura disputatorem: haec sola species stabilium oculorum approbatur.

23. Nunc de mobilitate oculorum dicemus. oculi qui raptim et velociter moventur hominem perturbati animi indicant et suspicacem, varium,[18] in agendis rebus tardiorem. est autem in his parvo indicio magna discretio. nam quibus palpebrae tam velociter quam pupillae moventur, timidi ac sine virtute sunt. cum autem oculi multo velocius quam palpebrae moventur, in periculis audaces atque securi sunt. qui autem tardos oculorum habent motus, pigros ac torpentes habent sensus, difficile incipientes et difficile desinentes. unde manifestatur etiam ex mobilitatis modo et temperamento mores optimos indicari. oculi vagi et circumerrantes et obscuriores intemperantiam libidinis arguunt. oculi trementes magni cum pererrant, ut supra dictum est, et obscuri sunt, et voracitatem et intemperantiam vini cum intemperantia veneris et ἀποπληξίαν indicant. oculi parvi trementes glauci sine pudore, sine fide, sine iustitia sunt, aluntur autem malis alienis. trementes vero parvi cum glauci non sunt, sed secundum Graecos χαροποὶ vel nigri, χαροποὶ quidem ad insaniam magis ac dementiam vergunt, nigri autem magis iracundi sunt, minus tamen impudentes quam glaucos diximus. oculi autem fluctuantes et tanquam in aestu instabiles proni in venerem et voluptatem sunt, non tamen iniusti nec maligni nec indociles.

[17] Omitting *hic* on the suggestion of Foerster, who follows x and Sauppe.

22 (= A6). Pupils fixed downwards and the whole position of eyes nearly fixed downwards[17] denotes an unpleasant man, but if they are fixed accompanied by some moisture, there will be signs of timidity, if with dryness, of insanity. But as to those which are also pale, their minds are not so much insane as stunned. And those who, with fixed and pale eyes, both raise their eyebrows and rather violently draw in and inhale breath are imprudent, harsh, abusive and angry. Eyes which are fixed and rather red denounce a lustful and greedy man. If it is added to these signs that the lower part of the eye, that is the lower eyelid, turns rather to the cheeks and is separated, they indicate injustice with desire, greed and a disorderly and uncomprehending character, even voracity and impudence. Fixed eyes which are very small reveal a man who is greedy and strongly desirous of and seeking money. But if in addition to small and fixed eyes he also draws the brow with the eyebrows into the middle, he is far greedier and more devoted to money. And if it is added to these signs that the rest of the body is bent and drawn together, he will be very angry and bilious and noisy. Fixed eyes which are light blue without brightness indicate a man full of deceits and daring, very watchful and a searcher after malice. Fixed eyes which are small and moist, a relaxed brow and mobile eyelids indicate a man who is teachable, a thinker, and a natural arguer; only this type of fixed eyes is to be approved.

23 (= A7). Now we shall speak about the movement of the eyes. Eyes which move violently and quickly indicate a man of disturbed mind who is suspicious, changeable,[18] and rather slow at doing things. But among men like this a small sign makes a great difference; for those whose eyelids move as quickly as the pupils are timid and without manliness. But when the eyes move much more quickly than the eyelids, they are daring in danger and careless. Those whose eye movements are slow have slow and torpid senses, begin things with difficulty and desist with difficulty. From which it emerges clearly that the best character is also indicated by a moderate and measured movement. Eyes which are roving and wandering about and rather dark reveal intemperance of desire. Eyes which are trembling and large, when they wander about and are dark as mentioned above, indicate both voracity and intemperance of wine with intemperance of sex and also ἀποπληξία ('apoplexy'). Eyes which are trembling and small and light blue are without shame, without trustworthiness, and without justice, and are nourished by the sufferings of others. As to trembling small eyes which are not light blue, but as the Greeks have it are χαροποί ('dark blue') or black, if they are χαροποί they incline more to insanity and dementia, whereas black ones are more angry, but are less impudent than we said light blue ones were. But eyes which fluctuate and are unstable as if in a tide are prone to sex and pleasure. They are not however unjust or malicious or difficult to teach.

[18] Foerster emends MSS *verum* to *varium*, on the basis of Leiden ch. 1 A7 and Ad. A7.

24. Oculi glauci parvas habentes pupillas serviles, doli plenos, avidos lucri pronuntiant mores. glauci oculi multas habent species. nam sunt alii cyanei, alii felliti coloris, alii variati diversis coloribus, alii sicci. qui quidem sicci, satis feros mores aperiunt. cyanei igitur, qui plerumque inveniuntur humidi, multo meliores sunt siccis. glauci et albidi timidum et fugacem vehementer hominem nuntiant. secundum ea igitur omnia erit nobis optima species glaucorum, qui fuerint humidi tranquilli magni perlucidi, verum scias etiam in hac specie oculorum animosum esse ingenium.

25. Nunc de variis oculis disputandum. sunt varii interdum et glauci, magis tamen χαροποί. sed prius de glaucis. in his varietas huiusmodi est. guttae quaedam in pupillis[19] pervidentur ad magnitudinem milii, quarum partes rubeae et cyaneae sunt, in gyrum ordinatae.[20] hae subdolum[21] animum <et> insidiosum,[22] verum in acumine ingenii praevalentem, sed minus audacem significant. item cum glaucae et variae fuerint pupillae, dementiam indicant.

26. Inter oculos nigros et χαροποὺς hoc interest, quod χαροποὶ varietatem in se habent et ipsa varietas discreta est. nam partim guttulis tanquam granis milii sublucentibus insigniti sunt, quae guttulae diversos colores habent. nam et pallidae sunt et cyaneae et rubicundae et tanquam scintillae ignis et sanguinei coloris et nigrae et albae, et singula quae praedicta sunt colorum genera vel magis vel minus clara sunt. alia autem varietas est, quam circuli suo colore ac suo tenore quique habent.[23] inter se enim idem circuli varie ordinati sunt. interdum enim[24] exterior circulus niger est, sequens rubeus, interdum albidior. de hac igitur gemina varietate χαροπῶν nunc disputabimus.

27. Primo igitur certus esse debes, quia nigri qui veri et meri sunt oculi imbecillem ac sine virtute animum et lucri avidum indicant. χαροποὶ cum penitus inspiciuntur, tunc varietatem suam produnt. verum αἰόλοι,[25] quorum species ita est, ut nigri pronuntiari possint, ubi guttulae rubicundi coloris non tamen expressi nec vehementer rubentes fuerint, quo intuenti nigra eius oculi species esse videatur, generosum animum, iustum, probum, ingeniosum significant. ubi guttulae fuerint rubicundae vehementer, interdum non rotundae, sed quae ad quadrati speciem subluceant tanquam ignis, et intrinsecus aliae guttulae praeter eas perpallidae permixtae sint et aliae glaucae,

[19] As André points out (1981: 143 n. 4 ad p. 71), Anon. Lat. sometimes, as here, uses *pupilla* to mean 'iris'. 'Drops' = *guttae*, corresponding to Adamantius' κέγχροι, 'millet seeds' (which are of course spherical).

[20] See Leiden ch. 1 A8 for the man from Cyrene.

[21] Foerster emends L's and x's *turbidum* ('confused') to *subdolum* on the basis of Ad. A8. But note André's argument for retaining *turbidum* (1981: 143 n. 5 ad p. 71).

24 (= A8). Light blue eyes with small pupils declare that the character is servile, full of deceit and greedy for money. Light blue eyes have many types of appearance; for some are sea-blue, some are of the colour of bile, some have a variety of different colours, some are dry. Those which are dry reveal a very wild character. And so the sea-blue ones, which are generally found to be moist, are much better than dry ones. Light blue and white eyes announce a man who is timid and very prone to flight. And so following all these things the best appearance of light blue eyes will be those which are moist, still, large and very bright, but you should know that even in this appearance of eyes the character is spirited.

25 (= A8). Now eyes which contain varied colours must be discussed. Even light blue eyes are sometimes varied, but this is more often a characteristic of eyes which are χαροποί ('dark blue'). But first light blue ones. Among these the variedness is of this type. Certain drops the size of grains of millet are seen in the pupils,[19] of which parts are red and sea-blue, ordered in a circle.[20] These signify a deceitful[21] and insidious[22] character, very strong in sharpness of mind, but less daring. Likewise when the pupils are light blue and variegated, they indicate dementia.

26 (= A11). The difference between black and χαροποί eyes is that χαροποί eyes have the variation in themselves and the very variation shows differences; for they are partly marked by gleaming droplets like grains of millet, and the droplets have different colours; for they are both pale and sea-blue and red and like sparks of fire and the colour of blood and black and white, and the individual types of colour which have been mentioned are more or less clear. But another variation is that formed[23] by circles with their own colour or shade; for[24] the same circles show a variety of orders between them. Sometimes the outer circle is black and the next one is red or sometimes rather white. And so we shall now discuss this double variation of χαροποί eyes.

27 (= A8, 11). At first, then, you should be informed that black eyes which are true and pure indicate a weak mind without manliness which is greedy for money. When χαροποί eyes are looked into deeply, then they show their variation. But in the case of αἰόλοι ('variegated'[25]) eyes whose appearance is such that they can be called black, when the droplets are of a red colour which is not, however, deep or bright, so that the appearance of that eye seems black to the observer, these signify a noble, just, honest, and talented mind. When the droplets are very red, if they are sometimes not round, but have a square form and gleam like fire, and if in addition some very pale droplets and other light

[22] Foerster emends L's and x's *invidiosum* ('invidious') to *insidiosum* on the basis of Ad. A8.

[23] Foerster emends L's and x's *ambiunt* ('surround') to *habent*.

[24] Foerster emends L's and x's *tamen* ('however'/'but') to *enim*, but see n. 50.

[25] See Elsner, Ch. 4, p. 220 for this difficult term.

circuli autem forinsecus easdem pupillas[26] ambiant sanguinolenti vel cyanei, et magnitudo sit oculorum et nitor, et pupillae quidem ita moveantur, ut ira moveri solent, palpebrae autem pateant, in huiusmodi oculis inhabitat animus qui ferarum omnem immanitatem excedit. nam quicquid infandum cogitari vel non cogitari potest, huiusmodi oculis perpetrabile est: non a domestico sanguine, non ab impietate ulla, non ab iniuria hominum vel deorum hi oculi abstinebunt. Palemon auctor huius speciei exemplum ex homine temporis sui posuit, quem sceleratissimum fuisse asseveravit.[27] in huiusmodi igitur oculis guttulae quanto magis rubicundae fuerint et minutae, tanto magis iracundum, iniuriosum, adulterum indicabunt, maiores autem et obscuriores vitia haec leniunt. guttulae sanguinolentae vel pallidae in nigris pupillis vel utraeque permixtae maleficos et venenarios indicant, sed pallidae dolis et obscuriori malignitati magis studentes, sanguineae audaces magis indicant. summa observationis huius ista est: quanto certiores et vehementius clari colores guttularum fuerint, tanto vehementiora designant vitia.

28. Veniamus ad varietatem χαροπῶν, quae ex circulis constat. si niger[28] circulus, secundus[29] fuerit rubeus in humidis oculis et nulla alia asperitas interveniat, magnanimum hominem et sapientem, iustum, ingeniosum declarat, iuxta pueros <dementem>.[30] hoc solo vitio non carebit. si autem post nigrum circulum pallidus insequatur, fallacem, furem, pecuniae deditum dicit, iniustum, turpiter cum mulieribus convenientem. sunt interdum circuli tam varii quam est arcus in nubibus, quem Graeci irim[31] vocant. haec varietas si in siccis oculis fuerit, insaniam profitetur, si in humidis, non eos quidem longe ab insania constituit, verum magnificentiam, sapientiam, veritatem, virtutem ostendit, iracundiores tamen et iuxta venerem proniores sunt.

29. Nunc de statu oculorum disputandum est. cum sine ulla pravitate sunt oculi et statum {non} obtinent rectum,[32] optimum mentis indicant statum. oculi ad superiorem partem conversi insaniam declarant, sed et voracem venerique ac vino deditum ostendunt. praeterea si et tremor eos exagitet, quae praedicta sunt vitia erunt in his vehementiora. nam et ἐπιληψίᾳ non carebunt. idem oculi qui ad superna versi sunt, si etiam pallidi fuerint, immites, homicidas faciunt; si subrubeant et magni sint, vinolentos, aleae deditos, furiosos in mulieribus, intemperatos lingua, promptissimos ad clamorem ostendunt. summa autem horum omnium vitiorum in huiusmodi oculis insania est. oculi deorsum conversi tanquam occidentes eo addunt,[33] quod immites faciant et implacabiles. si autem ad superna conversus fuerit alter—nam et huiusmodi species oculorum plerumque reperta est—et accedat huic tremor ac supercilia subregantur et

[26] See n. 19 above on *pupilla* = 'iris'. Cf. also below in text.
[27] See Leiden ch. 1 A8 for the long example of the man from Lydia.
[28] Foerster's emendation of the MSS readings on the basis of Ad. A11.
[29] Foerster's emendation of L's and x's *si* ('if') on the basis of Ad. A11.
[30] Reading *dementem* with F's suggestion. Cf. 74 *in pueros dementes*. André's *pronum* is also attractive, cf. end of ch.

blue ones are mixed on the inside, while blood-red or sea-blue circles run around the same pupils[26] on the outside, and the eyes are large and bright, and the pupils move as they tend to move in anger, and the eyelids are wide open, then in eyes of this type there dwells a spirit which exceeds all the savageness of wild beasts. Any horrible thing that is imaginable or unimaginable can be perpetrated by such eyes. These eyes will not abstain from family blood, nor from any impiety, nor from injury to men or the gods. Our authority Polemon described an example of this type of appearance in a man of his own time, whom he declared to be an outright criminal.[27] And so in eyes of this sort the redder and smaller the droplets are, the more angry, injurious, and adulterous is the man they indicate; but larger and darker eyes mitigate these vices. Blood-red or pale droplets in black pupils or both mixed together indicate evil-doers and poisoners, but pale ones indicate men who are devoted to deceit and a more hidden malice, while red ones tend to indicate men who are daring. The main point of this type of observation is this: the surer and more certainly clear the colours of the droplets are, the stronger the vices they denote.

28 (= A11). Let us turn to the variation seen in χαροποί eyes, which consists of circles. If the circle is black[28] and the next one[29] is red in moist eyes and no other unevenness intervenes, it reveals a magnanimous, wise, just, and talented man who is mad[30] when in the company of boys: this vice alone he will not lack. But if after the black circle a pale one follows, it tells of a deceitful, thieving man who is devoted to money, unjust, and who consorts disgracefully with women. There are sometimes circles which are as varied as a rainbow in the clouds, which the Greeks call the *iris* ('rainbow').[31] If this variation occurs in dry eyes it announces insanity, if in moist eyes, it establishes that they are not far from insanity, but shows magnificence, wisdom, truth and manliness; they are however angrier and more prone to sex.

29 (= A9). Now the position of the eyes must be discussed. When the eyes are without distortion and have the correct[32] position they indicate the best state of mind. Eyes turned upwards reveal insanity, but also show that a man is greedy and devoted to sex and wine. Moreover if a trembling agitates them as well, the above-mentioned vices will be stronger in them. They will be afflicted by ἐπιληψία ('epilepsy') too. The same eyes turned upwards, if they are also pale, make men cruel and murderous. If they are a bit red and are large, they show men who are drunken, addicted to gambling, mad about women, intemperate in tongue, and very quick to shout. But in eyes of this type insanity is the greatest of all these vices. Eyes turned downwards as if setting add[33] the fact that they make men harsh and implacable. But if one is turned upwards—for eyes of this appearance are frequently found—and along with this there is trembling, the

[31] Neither Adamantius (A11) nor Anon. Lat. uses *iris* to mean 'iris of the eye'. But cf. already Rufus of Ephesus, *Names* 25.

[32] Foerster's emendation of L's and x's *certum* ('certain'), on the basis of Ad. A9.

[33] Foerster emends L's and x's *accedunt* ('approach'/'occur') to *addunt*.

anhelitus sit asperior ac spissior, de hoc pronuntiandum est, quod sit ἐπιληπτικός.

30. Oculi pravi si ad dextram se conferant, stultitiae, si ad sinistram, libidini deditum arguunt. cum autem pravi sunt oculi, si inter se conveniunt et iuxta nares utrique sibimet occurrunt, venerium signum est. et quanto magis humidi fuerint et si plerumque palpebras iungunt, veneri et amori gratos et obnoxios profitentur. si autem sicciores et patuli fuerint, impudentiae et iniquitatis esse designant. si trementes fuerint, nihil non audebunt quod iniquum sit et improbum.

31. Cavi {igitur} nimium oculi, quantum ad generalem regulam pertinet, in deterioribus signis habentur. verum si idem submoveantur, ut aqua <in> conceptaculo semipleno movetur, et magni sint, si nullum signum aliud molestum interveniat, non sunt recusandi. nam quod cavi sunt, mali nota est; quod maiores et humidi sunt, revocat ac reformat vitium. oculi cavi parvi subdoli sunt atque invidi; si accedat et siccitas, etiam infideles facit et proditores et sacrilegos; sed cum rigidi sunt, insaniae arguunt. diffluentes similiter dolorum[34] et malignitatis signa sunt. qui in obscuritate[35] diffluunt, stulti sunt. oculi cavi nimium mediae magnitudinis χαροποὶ sicci rigidi praeterea si habeant supercilia lata tanquam genis imminentia et circa oculos pallorem atque livorem, impudentem, malignum, potentibus inimicum,[36] concinnatorem negotiorum atque causarum, nunquam quietum, nunquam non mali aliquid cogitantem declarant. Palemon auctor etiam hac de causa huius <speciei>[37] exemplum in libro suo extulit ex homine suorum temporum.[38]

32. Alti atque elati oculi in deterioribus signis habendi sunt, sed ubi tumor circum oculos paulatim attollitur, insania inhabitat; ubi ambitus oculi cavus tanquam fossa est, subdolam mentem insidiosamque declarat. prominentes oculi sanguinolenti temulentum hominem asseverant, glauci iniustum et stolidum et plus quam stolidum, si superioribus ciliis onerentur ac praegraventur. si autem promineant et sicci sint...[39] una species prominentium bona est oculorum: si magni sint nitentes perlucidi humidi, iustum, docilem, prudentem,[40] amatorem[41] indicant. tales existimantur oculi Socratis philosophi fuisse, quem Apollo Pythius prudentissimum pronuntiavit.[42] oculi nimium prominentes rubicundi parvi incompotem mentis hominem et linguae effrenatae, sed nec

[34] Foerster's correction of the MSS *doloris* ('grief').

[35] As Foerster points out, Ad. A12 has ἅμα ὑγρότητι ('with moisture') here, which would be more apposite in contrast with the dry eyes which follow. Anon. Lat.'s copy of Polemon must have had the ἀμαυρότης ('darkness') read by Matr.

[36] Foerster emends MSS *iunctum* ('joined') and *inobedientem* ('disobedient') to *inimicum* on the basis of Leiden ch. 1 A12.

[37] Foerster inserts *speciei* on the basis of 27.

eyebrows stand up, and the breathing is rather harsh and frequent, one must call the man ἐπιληπτικός ('epileptic').

30 (= A10). If distorted eyes deviate to the right, they reveal a man characterized by stupidity, if to the left, by lust. Distorted eyes which join together and meet each other at the nose are a sign of lasciviousness. In proportion to the moisture in them and the more they close the eyelids, they announce men delighting in and addicted to sex and love. But if they are drier and open they denote men who are impudent and unjust. If they are trembling there is nothing unjust or wicked that is beyond their daring.

31 (= A12). Excessively hollow eyes, as far as it concerns the general rule, are regarded as being among the worse signs. But if the same eyes move slightly, as water moves in a half-full vessel, and they are large and no other troublesome sign intervenes, they are not to be objected to; for their hollowness is a mark of evil; but their size and moistness retracts and reforms this vice. Hollow eyes which are small are deceitful and envious, if they are also dry, it makes men unfaithful and treacherous and sacrilegious; but when they are stiff they reveal insanity. Watery eyes are likewise signs of deceit[34] and malice. Those which are watery in darkness[35] are stupid. Excessively hollow eyes of medium size which are χαροποί, dry, and stiff, and moreover have broad eyebrows which overhang the cheeks, as it were, while around the eyes there is a pallor and leaden colour, reveal an impudent, malicious man who is hostile[36] to those in power, a contriver of troubles and problems, never quiet and never failing to think up something bad. On this matter, our authority Polemon produced in his book an example of this appearance[37] from a man of his own time.[38]

32 (= A13). High, protruding eyes are to be regarded as among the worse signs, but when a swelling is gradually raised around the eyes, insanity dwells within; when the eye's surrounding is hollow as if it is a ditch, it reveals a deceitful and insidious mind. Eyes which protrude and are blood-red prove that a man is drunken; if they are light blue they prove that he is unjust and stupid and, if they are oppressed and weighed down by the upper eyelids, more than stupid. But if they protrude and are dry...[39] One form of protruding eyes is good: if they are large and glistening and very bright and moist, they indicate a just, teachable, prudent,[40] and amorous[41] man. The eyes of Socrates the philosopher, whom Pythian Apollo pronounced the wisest of men, are thought to have been like this.[42] Eyes which protrude excessively and are red and small declare a man to be

[38] The man from Corinth. Cf. Leiden ch. 1 A12.

[39] To judge from Ad. 13 'they are parricides, matricides, child-killers, and poisoners', *vel sim.* should be inserted.

[40] Foerster emends L's and x's *providentem* ('provident') to *prudentem* on the basis of Ad. A13.

[41] Foerster emends MSS *ammonitorem/amonitorem* ('admonisher') to *amatorem* on the basis of Ad. A13.

[42] Cf. Leiden ch. 1 A13.

corpore stabilem esse declarant. huiusmodi exemplum tanquam a se cognitum Palemon posuit.[43]

33. Addidit praeterea, quod trementes micantesque oculi et salientes, quos Graeci παλλομένους dicunt, si parvi, dolos et versutias ostendunt, si magni, stultitia ac furiis attinentur. at ubi moderatae magnitudinis et humidi sunt atque perlucidi, magnificum hominem, magnarum rerum cogitatorem atque perfectorem indicant; sed et[44] iracundum et vino deditum et iactantem sui et cupidum gloriae ultra condicionem humanam ostendunt, cui huiusmodi oculorum signa contigerint. scias quia his oculis aestimatur etiam Alexander Magnus fuisse. circumtumentes oculi immites, sine pietate, ventri et veneri studentes et aliis voluptatibus dediti; quod per aures et oculos insipiunt, etiam sola ratione molliuntur atque mitigantur. sunt oculi plerumque livore circumdati: qui si interiora signa non meliora habuerint, inter malarum partium indicia accipito. nam et audaces et infideles et iniusti sunt.

34. Oculi qui tanquam tenebrosi sunt, nocentes sunt, tanto magis, si fuerint sicci, nec interest, an magni vel parvi sint, nisi quod maiorem nequitiam cum parvi sunt profitentur. supradicta species oculi id est tenebrosi, si cavus, temperatae magnitudinis et quietus fuerit, sollicitum, docilem, visendi cupidum,[45] maturum,[46] verum timidum et satis parcum ac nimis[47] continentem significat. oculi caligine obsiti malis artibus imbuti sunt, infideles, intemperantes. unde intelligendum est optimos esse contrarios id est perlucidos oculos, si nullum extat aliud indicium quod impugnet. tales Palemon auctor refert fuisse oculos Hadriani imperatoris: χαροπούς, humidos, acres, magnos, luminis plenos.[48]

35. Lumen autem <non>[49] ita bonum est, si corusci sint. oculi enim[50] corusci si quidem glauci sint et sanguinolenti, temeritatem indicant et prope insaniam, χαροποί[51] autem suspicacem in omnibus rebus hominem declarant. nigri corusci taeterrimi oculi: timidum ac subdolum designant. cum autem risui permixti sunt, summae[52] notam impudentiae ac malitiae proferunt.[53]

[43] The Lydian man known as 'the Crab'. Cf. Leiden ch. 1 A13.

[44] Reading *sed et* on Foerster's suggestion instead of MSS *sane* ('of course') printed by Foerster and André.

[45] Foerster's emendation of MSS *discendi cupidum* ('curious to learn') to *visendi cupidum* on the basis of Ad. A15 πολυθεάμων (a rare word Polemon has taken from Plato).

[46] Retaining *maturum* with André. Foerster emends to *cautum* on the basis of Ad. A15 εὐλαβής, but see André's comment ad loc.

[47] Foerster replaces L's and x's *minus* ('less'/'not') with *nimis*. There is no help to be obtained from Ad. A15, but Foerster is presumably trying to ensure a contrast with the description which follows, in particular *intemperantes* ('intemperate').

of unsound mind and unbridled tongue but not stable of body. Polemon described an example of this sort as if he had seen it himself.[43]

33 (= A14). Moreover we may add that trembling, quivering, and jumping eyes, which the Greeks call παλλόμενοι, if they are small, show deceit and cunning tricks, if large, they are subject to stupidity and madness. But when they are of moderate size and are moist and very bright, they indicate a magnificent man who thinks and does great things; but they also[44] show that the man who has signs of this sort in his eyes is angry and devoted to wine and boasting of himself and desirous of glory beyond human measure. You should know that Alexander the Great is thought to have had these eyes. Eyes which have swelling around them are cruel, without piety, devoted to food and sex and dedicated to other pleasures; since they are foolish through their ears and eyes, they are softened and mitigated by reason alone. There are eyes mostly surrounded by a leaden colour: if they have interior signs which are not better, receive them among the signs of the bad parts; for they are daring and unfaithful and unjust.

34 (= A15). Eyes which are dark, as it were, are harmful, the more so if they are dry, and it makes no difference whether they are big or small, except that when they are small they announce greater badness. The eye of the type mentioned, that is dark, if it is hollow, of moderate size and still, signifies a worried, teachable man, curious in his gaze,[45] experienced,[46] but timid and very mean and excessively[47] restrained. Eyes covered with darkness are imbued with evil arts, unfaithful and intemperate. From which it should be understood that the best eyes are the opposite, that is very bright, if no other contrary sign is present. Our authority Polemon reported that the eyes of the emperor Hadrian were such: χαροποί, moist, sharp, large, and full of light.[48]

35 (= A16). But light is not[49] good if the eyes are sparkling. For[50] sparkling eyes, if indeed they are light blue and blood-red, indicate rashness and near insanity, but if χαροποί,[51] they reveal a man suspicious in all things. Black sparkling eyes are the foulest: they denote a timid and deceitful man. But when they are mixed with a smile, they reveal a mark of the utmost[52] impudence and malice.[53]

[48] Cf. Leiden ch. 1 A16.

[49] Foerster inserts *non* on the basis of Ad. A16.

[50] Foerster emends L's and x's *autem* ('but') to *enim* on the basis of Ad. A16. But cf. André (1981) 144 n. 5 ad p. 79.

[51] Foerster emends L's and x's *curvi* ('curved') to χαροποί. Cf. Ad. A16.

[52] Foerster emends L's and x's *summam* to *summae* so that it agrees with *impudentiae ac malitiae* rather than *notam*.

[53] See Leiden ch. 1 A16 for the man from Phoenicia.

36. Oculi acriter intuentes <id est γοργόν>,[54] ut a Graecis dicitur, molesti sunt, sed qui humidi sunt, bellatorem indicant, veridicum, velocem in agendis rebus, improvidum, innoxium. qui autem intendunt acriter et sunt idem cavi, parvi, sicci, saevos, insidiosos atque ex occulto nocentes, omnia audentes, omnia perpetrantes indicabunt, eo magis quo superficiem idem oculi habuerint leviorem. praestat enim iuxta huiusmodi oculos frontem obduci, palpebras erigi, supercilia exasperari. est enim haec circumstantia fortitudinis, audaciae, animositatis index, inconsultos tamen ac minus nocentes significat. at ubi frons, supercilia, palpebrae tranquilla et levia fuerint, aciem autem intrinsecus amaram, trucem, asperam idem oculi continuerint, crudelitatem et immanitatem atque saevitiam supradictam et dolos omnes his oculis adiudicabis.

37. Oculi cum risui voluptatique permixti sunt, non omnes laudabiles. nam qui sicci sunt et subterintendunt, malitiae sunt indices. sed et cavi oculi qui arrident, tanquam in insidiis constituti habendi sunt, multo magis, si genae et supercilia et labella commoveantur. nam hic risus aut cogitationes rerum nefandarum aut conceptos dolos indicat. et si quidem cum his signis etiam palpebrae interdum coeant, interdum separentur atque interdum oculus commoveatur, detegunt intra cogitationem adhuc esse iniquam. si vero propateant oculi cum risu et errent, perpetratam iniquitatem esse declarant. quanto igitur oculi magis arridere videbuntur, sicci dumtaxat, tanto erunt magis perniciosi. si vero arrideant et sint humidi, innocentem quidem animum, verum stolidum, sine sensu perspicaci, sine affectu, sine prudentia, sine continentia addicunt. cum subrident molliter oculi atque humidi sunt, ubi totius vultus aperta atque absoluta laetitia fuerit remissis palpebris, fronte molli, ciliis aliquanto laxioribus, in hoc statu oculorum ingenium magnificum, iustum, mansuetum, religiosum, hospitale, gratum, prudens, docile, amatorium erit.

38. Tristes oculi non omnes timendi sunt. nam qui humidi sunt, in cogitatione constituti sunt et studia optimarum artium inesse indicant. et si supercilia laxiora sint et frons laxior cumque tranquillitate conveniant palpebrae, {et}[55] sunt laudabiles, ingenium indicabunt fidum, benignum, pensum gravitate, prudens.[56] si autem tristes oculi etiam sicci sint et accedat ad hoc frontis asperitas, aciei intentio, palpebrae subrectae, <erunt>[57] nocentes, feri, nihil intemptatum facinus, nihil inausum relinquentes.

39. Oculi subclausi et coniungentes palpebras si quidem frequenter concluduntur et reserantur, malignos mores et insidiosos et nocentes dant intelligendos. si autem humidi fuerint, bonae artis studiis indicant hominem occupatum. et cum humidi non sunt, sed tremore et pallore permixti, ἀποπληξίαν[58] vel certe insaniam nuntiant. quibus autem status suus permanet, cum palpebras quidem propemodum coniungunt, ipsi autem superius

[54] Added by Foerster.
[55] Following André (1981) 81 n. 3 (though Hoffmann cannot be relied on).
[56] Foerster emends MSS *praeditum/preditum* ('endowed with') to *prudens* on the basis of Ad. A18.

36 (= A16). Eyes looking sharply, that is γοργόν,[54] as the Greeks say, are troublesome, but those which are moist indicate a warrior, a man who tells the truth, who is swift to do things, improvident, and harmless. But those which strain sharply and are at the same time hollow, small, and dry will indicate fierce, insidious, and secretly harmful men who dare and perpetrate everything, and the more so the more the area above these eyes is smooth; for it is better that the brow next to eyes of this type be covered, the eyelids be raised, and the eyebrows stick up; for this example is a sign of bravery, audacity, and spiritedness, but it signifies imprudent and less harmful men. When however the brow, eyebrows, and eyelids are still and smooth, but the same eyes contain an intrinsically bitter, savage, and hard look, you will ascribe cruelty and savageness and the above-mentioned fierceness and every deceit to these eyes.

37 (= A17). When eyes are mixed with a smile and pleasure, they are not all laudable; for those which are dry and strain downwards are indicators of malice. But also hollow eyes which smile should be thought of as established in ambushes, as it were, far more so if the cheeks and eyebrows and lips move with them; for this smile indicates either the thoughts of abominable things or conceived deceits. And indeed if in addition to these signs the eyelids also sometimes meet, sometimes are separated, and sometimes the eye moves with them, they reveal the inner thoughts are still unjust. But if the eyes are open with a smile and wander, they reveal the injustice to have been perpetrated. And so the more the eyes seem to be smiling, as long as they are dry, the more pernicious they will be. But if they are smiling and are moist, they attest a mind which is harmless, but stupid, without perceptive sense, without feeling, without prudence, and without self-control. When the eyes smile softly and are moist, when the happiness of the whole face is open and pure, with relaxed eyelids, a soft brow, the edge of the eyelids loose, in this state of the eyes the character will be magnificent, just, gentle, religious, hospitable, pleasing, prudent, teachable, and given to love.

38 (= A18). Sad eyes are not all to be feared; for those which are moist are established in thought and indicate that the pursuit of the best arts is in them. And if the eyebrows are rather loose and the brow is rather loose and the eyelids close together calmly, [the eyes][55] are laudable, they indicate a faithful character which is benign, weighed down with seriousness, and is prudent.[56] But if sad eyes are also dry, and roughness of the brow, strain of gaze, and rising eyelids are added to this, they will be[57] harmful, wild, leaving no crime untried and nothing undared.

39 (= A19). Eyes which are closed and joining the eyelids, if they frequently open and close, show characters which should be understood to be malicious and insidious and harmful. But if they are moist, they indicate a man occupied with the pursuit of a good art. And when they are not moist, but are mixed with trembling and paleness, they announce ἀποπληξία[58] ('apoplexy') or certainly insanity. But those whose position remains fixed, when they nearly join

[57] Foerster inserts *erunt*.
[58] Ad. has 'epilepsy'.

extolluntur, insaniam[59]...[60] at hi potius feminae quam viri sunt, sed celare vitium gestiunt atque hoc ipso magis apud experientes deteguntur.

40. Satis de conclusis; nunc de patentibus disputemus. oculi cum frequenter et late patescunt atque consistunt, cogitationem quidem indicant, verum bona necne sit cogitatio, ex supra memoratis qualitatibus colligendum erit. constat enim, si humidi, si lucidi, si maiores, si profundi, si molles fuerint, meliores cogitationes continere, si autem sicci, si obscuri, si parvi, si cavi, si duri, si directi fuerint, malas cogitationes et male cogitatae rei paenitentiam eos profiteri. semper[61] autem patentes oculi vanum et attonitum faciunt. oculi late patentes micantes leniter intendentes tanquam concinnati ad suavitatem et gratiam, <si cetera signa>[62] congruunt, ...[63] <tales fuisse oculi Celti cuiusdam>[64] a Palemone quidem auctore referuntur, qui eunuchum[65] sui temporis fuisse hunc hominem descripsit.[66] nomen quidem non posuit, intelligitur autem de Favorino eum dicere. huic cetera corporis indicia huiusmodi assignat: tensam frontem, genas molles, os laxum, cervicem tenuem, crassa crura, pedes plenos tanquam congestis pulpis, vocem femineam, verba muliebria, membra et articulos omnes sine vigore, laxos et dissolutos. hunc dicit impatientia libidinum quae turpia sunt omnia passum esse et egisse quae passus est, praeterea maledicum, temerarium, sed et maleficiis studentem. nam et letiferum venenum dicebatur clanculo venditare.

41. Oculi qui frequenter clauduntur atque reserantur, timidum atque imbecillem declarant; sed cum etiam sicci sunt, dolos versare atque ex occulto insidias tendere, si autem perversi sunt vel pallidi, stultitiam indicare noscuntur. cum autem non coniunguntur oculi, sed, ut {hoc} Graeci aiunt, ἀσκαρδάμυκτοι sunt praetereaque aciem terribiliter intendunt, hi iniquis cogitationibus attinentur. si vero status oculorum sit mansuetus et habeant aliquid humoris, cogitatores sunt, studiosi, mansueti, amatores. at si immobiles idem pallidi vel rubicundi erunt cum siccitate, sit certum his iras et furias imminere et divinitatis iram. si autem cum supradictis signis etiam in tempore semet ipsos tanquam in gyrum torqueant, insaniam vehementissimam produnt.

[59] C has *significant* and E has *notant*, neither of which Foerster puts in his text.

[60] Foerster notes a lacuna here on the basis of Ad. A19.

[61] Foerster emends MSS *si* ('if') and *sin* ('if not') to *semper* on the basis of Ad. A20 and Leiden ch. 1 A20. André's objection to this (1981: 145 n. 6 ad p. 82) has some force.

[62] Inserting *si cetera signa* on Foerster's suggestion.

the eyelids, and they themselves are raised up, [indicate[59]] insanity...[60] And these eyes belong to a woman rather than to a man, but they long to hide their defect and because of this are readily detected by experienced observers.

40 (= A20). That is enough about closed eyes; now let us discuss open eyes. When eyes open and shut frequently and wide they indicate thought, but whether it is a good thought must be ascertained on the basis of the above-mentioned qualities; for it is known that if they are moist, bright, rather large, deep, and soft, they contain better thoughts, but that if they are dry, dark, small, hollow, hard, and staring, they declare bad thoughts and regret for bad thoughts. But eyes which are always[61] open make a man vain and stunned. Eyes which are open wide and flashing and gently straining as if dressed up for delight and charm, if the other signs[62] agree, ...[63] The eyes of a certain Celt were reported to have been like this[64] by our authority Polemon, who described this man as a eunuch[65] of his own time.[66] He did not write down his name, but it is understood that he was talking about Favorinus. He assigned the other signs of a body of this type to this man: a tense brow, soft cheeks, a loose mouth, a thin neck, thick legs, thick feet as if congested with flesh, a feminine voice, womanly words, limbs, and all his joints without strength, loose and badly connected. He says that this man suffered everything which is disgraceful by his inability to bear his desires, and that he had practised what he had put up with; moreover, that he was abusive, rash, but also devoted to wrongdoing; for he was even said secretly to hawk deadly poison.

41 = (A21). Eyes which frequently open and close reveal a timid and weak man; but when they are also dry, they are known to be considering deceits and to be secretly laying traps; if they are askew and pale, they are held to indicate stupidity. But when the eyes do not close, but, as the Greeks say, they are ἀσκαρδάμυκτοι ('unblinking') and moreover strain their gaze terribly, these are beset by unjust thoughts. But if the state of the eyes is gentle and they have some moisture, they are thinkers, studious, gentle and given to love. But if they are unmoving and at the same time pale or red with dryness, it is certain that anger and fury and divine wrath are threatening them. But if in addition to the above-mentioned signs they turn themselves in time as if in a circle, they betray a very great insanity.

[63] A description of what kind of person such eyes indicate seems to be missing, and *impudentes et audaces significant* ('signify impudent and audacious men') *vel sim.* should be inserted on the basis of Ad. A20.

[64] Inserting *tales fuisse oculi Celti cuiusdam* on Foerster's suggestion.

[65] Foerster emends L's and x's *innocuum* ('harmless') to *eunuchum*.

[66] Cf. Leiden ch. 1 A20.

42. Oculi citi[67] perturbati rapacem dicunt. qui autem incertas palpebras permovent atque coniungunt sub diversis motibus pupillarum ac superius cilium molliter oculis superducunt, cinaedi[68] sunt. qui autem alteram ex superioribus palpebris paulatim deprimunt et molliter revocant et aciem dirigunt, affectatores pulchritudinis sunt, sed <et> moechos et adulteros se profitentur. interdum palpebra superior ad medium ita deducitur, ut hinc atque illinc reflexis atque retractis angulis subluceat oculus simulque incertas palpebras agunt. haec etiam signa moechis et adulteris attributa sunt.

43. Palpebrarum capilli cum sunt nigri ac rigidi ac solidiores in eo capite, cuius deteriora sunt signa, meliorem ac fortiorem animum indicant. rari autem et tenues et rubicundi infirmitatem animi declarant et prorepere senectutem, sed nec perseverant huiusmodi capilli: facile enim defluunt.

44. Haec de oculis. nec putes ea sola signa in oculis inveniri quae enumerata sunt, sed multo plura et quae accuratius[69] considerari queant et debeant. sed si quis imbutus his quae dicta sunt fuerit, sunt enim prope[70] generalia, etiam meliora perspiciat[71] atque perpendat, et nimirum debet esse perspicuus, nam his quae exposita sunt <potius> deteriora quam bona signa sunt comprehensa. nam et maiorem partem in rebus humanis veteres deteriorem[72] esse dixerunt, quod est potissimum. nam malitiae res multiformis est, ut etiam si non latius tendatur, constet tamen per multas diversitates. denique et fabulae, quae hydras et chimaeras et gigantes ex variis corporibus fingunt atque constituunt, malitiam multiformem intelligi volunt. at si quis ad diffinitionem signorum respiciat, signa quidem malitiae <multa>,[73] quae tamen ex signis his colliguntur atque intelliguntur, non adeo multa esse percipiet. nam et multis et variis signis feritas et immanitas, diversis inhumanitas et imbecillitas et avaritia deputantur. igitur non tam malitia quam malitiae indicia multa atque diversa sunt.

45. Post oculos igitur vis signorum est, quae iuxta oculos et in vultu sunt. nam prout quaeque signa proxima sunt oculis, potiora sunt ceteris. nam post oculos frontis et narium <et> oris et genarum ipsiusque capitis idonea signa atque efficacia[74] sunt. sequuntur autem cervicis signa et pectoris et post haec

[67] Foerster emends L's and x's *ceci* ('blind') to *citi* on the basis of Ad. A23. His other conjectures, *acuti* and *acres*, would mean 'sharp' and thus bring out the alternative meaning of the Greek, which is ambiguous.

[68] *cinaedi*. This Greek loan is a difficult term to translate: it signifies someone who enjoys same-sex practices and perhaps stigmatizes the way of life he is held to lead rather (?more) than the sex act itself. Cf. Davidson's tirade against Foucault (1997: 167–76). Ad. does not use the word, preferring *androgunos* (on the interesting later history of this word see Browning 1969: 71). The semantic field in Pollux, *Onomasticon* 6. 126–7 at least indicates passivity; see p. 187. All instances of 'deviant' here translate *cinaedus*.

[69] Foerster emends the MSS readings, among which is L's and C's *arcius* ('more briefly', 'more concisely'), to *accuratius*.

42 (= A23). Quick,[67] disturbed eyes tell of a rapacious man. But those who move their eyelids uncertainly and join them with various movements of the pupils and pull the upper eyelid gently over the eyes are deviants.[68] But those who gradually press down one of the upper eyelids and gently bring it back and keep their gaze fixed are claimants to beauty, but confess that they are both philanderers and adulterers. Sometimes the upper eyelid is led down to the middle in this way, so that the eye gleams here and there with turned back, retracted corners and at the same time they move the eyelids uncertainly. These signs too are attributed to philanderers and adulterers.

43. When eyelashes are black and stiff and rather hard on the head whose signs are rather bad, they indicate a better and braver mind. But thin and slender and red eyelashes reveal weakness of mind and old age creeping on, but eyelashes of this type do not last, for they easily drop out.

44. These things apply to eyes. Nor should you think that only those signs which have been recounted are found in the eyes, but there are many more, and ones which can and should be more carefully[69] examined. But if anyone is imbued with the things which have been mentioned, for they are very[70] general, he shall perceive[71] and weigh up still better signs, and he must certainly be perceptive, for our exposition has so far comprised worse rather than good signs; for the ancients said that the greater share in human affairs is the worse one,[72] because it is the most significant. The material of evil is multiform, so that even if it is not more widespread, it is constituted in many varieties. Accordingly stories too, which invent and establish hydras and chimaeras and giants from various bodies, intend evil to be understood as multiform. But if anyone looks back to the definition of the signs, he will perceive that the signs of evil are many,[73] but that the things which are gathered and understood from these signs are not so many; for wildness and savageness are reckoned by many and various signs, and by different signs inhumanity, weakness, and avarice. And so it is not evil so much as the signs of evil that are many and diverse.

45 (= B1). The power of the signs which are near the eyes and in the face comes after the eyes, for the nearer each sign is to the eyes, the more powerful it is than the others; for after the eyes the signs of the brow, nose, mouth, cheeks and of the head itself are suitable and serviceable.[74] The signs of the neck and chest

[70] Foerster suggests inserting *omnia* ('for they are nearly all general'), but André (1981) 33 argues that *prope* meaning 'very' rather than 'nearly' is a late usage.

[71] Foerster emends L's and x's *prospiciat* '(will see') to *perspiciat*, presumably to fit better with *perspicuus* ('perceptive') which follows shortly.

[72] Reading *deteriorem*, Rose's conjecture with Foerster's approval, rather than *posteriorem* ('later'), which makes no sense in the context. André's attempt to save the text (1981: 146 n. 3 ad p. 85) is unconvincing.

[73] Reading Rose's insertion *multa*.

[74] Foerster emends L's *officia* ('functions') and x's *officiosa* ('dutiful') to *efficacia*.

humerorum, manuum, crurum ac pedum. postrema autem sunt signa, ut Palemoni videtur, quae iuxta ventrem sunt. et maxima vis <est> et coloris et vocis et spiritus. et motus magnum est indicium tam totius corporis quam etiam singularum partium, sed et omnis aspectus qui ex omni circumstantia et qualitate corporis occurrit, quem Graeci ἐπιπρέπειαν dicunt, in quo auctores omnes physiognomoniae maximam partem constituunt. eius nominis significatio concipienda tibi est atque dinoscenda. frequenter enim ad eam signa referuntur. nam timidum et audacem, mitem et impium, apertum et subdolum universi corporis facies indicabit, et singula quae minuta sunt et parvula in unam speciem conveniunt ita ut aspicienti faciem occurrat proprietas aliqua quae in eodem corpore conspicitur constituta, quae mentem et animi incerta[75] declarat.

46. ...[76] nam mox etiam ad similitudinem animalis alicuius inspicienti ea quae diximus occurret tibi[77] in animo alium leoni, alium pardo, alium aquilae, alium perdici esse similem: ubi maxime clara est masculini et feminini distantia, quorum discretionem supra prosecuti sumus. nec dubium erit pronuntiare de eo qui ursae est similis, crudelem quidem esse et insidiosum; de eo autem qui leoni[78] est similis, quod violentus, quod fortis, quod simplicior; qui pardo est similis, insidiosus, rigidus, saevus, audax; qui equo[79] est similis, erectus, iactans, honoris <et> laudis cupidus. quotquot sunt species animalium, proprietates suas quaeque habent, ad quas similitudo singulorum hominum referenda est. quare discernes, utrum masculino an feminino respondeat et cui animalium sit propinquius similis, et iuxta animalis ingenium pronuntiabis tam ex consideratione singularum partium quam ex universitate quam frequenter nominavimus.

47. Nunc de auribus disputandum est. Magnae aures stultitiae vel impudentiae, parvae malignitatis sunt indices. aures perbreves tanquam praecisae ad stultitiam referuntur. esse autem quadratae propemodum et mediae magnitudinis debent et quae videantur figuratae atque formatae et quae decenter capiti adhaereant. aures nimium rotundae indociles significant, aures oblongae et angustae invidiae indicium habent.

[75] e has *secreta* ('secrets'), which may be right.

[76] Foerster posits a lacuna here on the basis of Leiden chs. 1–2 B1–2.

[77] Foerster emends L's and x's *ita* ('so') to *tibi* so that there is a pronoun to agree with the participle *inspicienti* ('looking at'), and to be picked up in the second-person verbs towards the end of the chapter.

follow, and after these those of the shoulders, hands, legs and feet. And the last signs, as Polemon thought, are those which are near the stomach. The power of colour and voice and breath is also very great. And movement, as much of the whole body as also of individual parts, is a great sign, but also is the whole appearance which arises from the whole situation and quality of the body, which the Greeks call ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall appearance') and upon which all writers on physiognomy place the greatest emphasis. You are to grasp and distinguish the meaning of that term, for frequently signs are referred to it. The look of the whole body will indicate the timid and the daring, the mild and the impious, the open and the deceitful, and the individual signs which are minute and small unite into one type of appearance, so that if you are considering the look you will find a certain property which is seen to be established in this body and which reveals its mind and the uncertain aspects[75] of its spirit.

46 (= B2) ...[76] For soon when you are looking at those things which we have mentioned with regard to the similarity to some animal, it will occur to you[77] that one man is similar in character to a lion, another to a leopard, another to an eagle, and another to a partridge, especially when the difference between masculine and feminine, whose distinctions we set out above, is very clear. Nor will there be any doubt in declaring that the man who is similar to a bear is cruel and insidious; that the man who is similar to a lion[78] is violent, brave, and rather simple; that the man who is similar to a leopard is insidious, unbending, savage and daring; and that the man who is similar to a horse[79] is upright, boasting, and desirous of honour and praise. However many are the species of animals, they each have their own properties, to which the similarity of the individual men is to be referred. And so you will discern whether he corresponds to the masculine or feminine and to which animal he is most similar, and after the character of the animal you will make a pronouncement as much from the consideration of individual parts as from the whole which we have frequently mentioned.

47 (= B29). Now we must discuss ears. Large ears are indicators of stupidity or impudence, small ones of malice. Ears which are very small, as if they had been trimmed, are referred to stupidity. But ears should be nearly square and of moderate size and should seem moulded and shaped and should cleave elegantly to the head. Ears which are excessively round indicate men who are difficult to teach; oblong and narrow ears are a sign of envy.

[78] Foerster emends L's *lupo* ('wolf') to *leoni* on the basis of Ad. B2.
[79] Foerster emends L's *eogo* (?) and x's *leoni* ('lion') on the basis of Ad. B2.

48. Nunc de labiis et ore disputandum est. Labia tenuia in ore maiore, si aliquanto labium superius sit promptius[80] tanquam superpositum inferiori, magnanimum, fortem indicant. refertur ad leonem. parvo ori cum tenuia sunt labia, imbellem, timidum, versutum ostendunt. optimus autem oris status est, quod nec nimis prominens nec nimis humile est. nam humilitas timidi est et malignitatis arguit, prominentia[81] stultitiam, loquacitatem tribuit et audaciam. os parvum muliebre est potius et tam vultibus quam animis muliebribus convenit; quod maius est, virilibus animis et vultibus convenit. cum autem ultra modum recisum os ac reductum est, voracem, immitem, impium indicat. ita enim et maris beluae sunt. quando eminent labia super eos dentes quos κυνόδοντας Graeci vocant, maledicum, iracundum, clamosum atque ad inferendam iniuriam promptum declarat. canibus enim proxima est huiusmodi species. quando os longe prominet et est rotundum cum crassitate labiorum et retortum, immundum, voracem, stultum ostendit. porcorum enim haec signa sunt. si labium inferius forinsecus excedat, non quidem malignum, verum non prudentem designat. Loxus dicit cum inferius labium excedit, etiam studiosum laudis vel honoris ostendere. cum parvum os sit...[82] declarat idem et cum oris situs in concavo tanquam in defosso est. nam et haec species pariter malignitatis et invidiae et intemperantiae nota est. Aristoteles huiusmodi oris homines id est concavi libidinosos magis ostendit. labia cum soluta dependent, inertem significant. in asinis <enim>[83] et in equis senibus hoc signum est.

49. Qui genas crassiores habent, ignavi et vinolenti sunt, qui nimium tenues habent, maligni sunt. quorum malae tanquam ab oculis abscisae sunt plenitudine ac pondere suo praegravatae et sunt rotundae, invidiae arguuntur. longae[84] malae et prolixae importunam loquacitatem designant.

50. Omnis vultus cum est plenus et crassus, ignavum significat et voluptatibus deditum, deductus cogitatorem, subdolum, timidum, astutum asseverat. vultus parvus parvum et angustum ingenium, enormis stultitiam et ignaviam testatur.

Σπασμοὶ labiorum et genarum et frontis si tristes[85] vultus exagitent, insaniam vel stultitiam indicabunt, si laetis vultibus contingant, libidinosum ostendunt. palam est autem pervidere[86] tristem vultum et laetum, item liberalem atque obscurum et malignum discernere, item pervigilem et eum qui somno est deditus.

[80] Foerster emends MSS *promptius* to *prominentius* unnecessarily; cf. André (1981) 88 n. 2.

[81] e's *prominentia* seems better suited to the context than MSS *pronitas*. Either way, the meaning is clear.

[82] Foerster suggests that *et longe promineat* ('and sticks out a long way') has dropped out here on the basis of Ad. B24.

[83] Foerster inserts *enim*. As André notes, this observation is found only in Ps.-Pol. B77 (428 Foerster) and not Ad.

48 (= B24). Now we must discuss lips and the mouth. Thin lips on a rather large mouth, if the upper lip sticks out considerably,[80] as if placed on the lower, indicate a magnanimous and brave man. He is referred to a lion. When the lips are thin on a small mouth, they show a pusillanimous, timid, and cunning man. But the best state of a mouth is that which is neither excessively prominent nor excessively flat; for flatness is a sign of timidity and malice, and prominence[81] bestows stupidity, garrulousness, and daring. A small mouth is rather womanly and suits womanly faces as much as womanly minds; that which is larger suits manly minds and faces. But when the mouth is split open beyond moderation and is drawn right back, it indicates a greedy, cruel, and impious man; for such are sea-monsters. When the lips stick out over those teeth which the Greeks call κυνόδοντες ('canines'), it reveals an abusive, angry, noisy man and one who is quick to cause injury; for an appearance of this type is nearest to dogs. When the mouth projects a long way, is round with thick lips and is turned back, it shows a foul, greedy, and stupid man; for these signs belong to pigs. If the lower lip sticks out, it denotes a man who is not malicious, but not prudent. Loxus says that when the lower lip sticks out, it also shows a man who is devoted to praise and honour. When the mouth is small,[82] it reveals the same, and when the position of the mouth is in a hollow as if it has been dug out; for this appearance too is a sign equally of malice and envy and intemperance. Aristotle showed that men of this type, that is with concave mouths, are more lustful. When the lips hang down relaxed, they signify an inactive man; for[83] this sign is found in asses and in old horses.

49 (B27). Those who have thicker cheeks are lazy and drunken; those who have excessively thin cheeks are malicious. Those whose cheeks are weighed down with thickness and weight, as if cut away from the eyes, and are round, are convicted of envy. Long[84] and extended cheeks denote inopportune garrulousness.

50 (B28). When the whole face is full and thick, it signifies a lazy man who is dedicated to pleasure; a drawn face declares that a man is a thinker, deceitful, timid and astute. A small face bears witness to a small and narrow mind; a large face to stupidity and laziness.

If σπασμοί ('spasms') of the lips and cheeks and brow disturb sad[85] faces, they will indicate insanity or stupidity; if they happen on happy faces, they show that a man is lustful. But it is easy to perceive[86] a sad or a happy face, likewise to discern a generous or mean or malicious face, likewise one which is alert or one which is dedicated to sleep.

[84] Reading Foerster's suggestion *longae* rather than MSS *lenes* ('smooth'), proposed on the basis of Ad. B27.

[85] Reading Foerster's suggestion *tristes* rather than MSS *truces* ('rough'/'fierce'), presumably proposed given the rest of the chapter.

[86] Foerster emends L's and x's *providere* ('to foresee') to *pervidere*.

51. Nares extimae cum <tenues>[87] et acutae sunt, facilem ad iracundiam hominem ostendunt. crassae nares immundum hominem dant intelligi. porci enim et aves sordidae ita sunt. cum imae nares solidae tanquam obtusae et rotundae sunt, fortem et magnanimum dicunt. huiusmodi nares sunt leonibus et canibus generosis. nares longae et tenues avibus sunt proximae et mores huiusmodi dabunt. narium pars quae iuxta frontem est, si a fronte disposita sit honeste et seiuncta, quod Graeci dicunt διηρθρωμένον, virile signum est. refertur enim ad leonem nec non et prudentiae notam tribuit. si origo narium indiscreta atque indisposita sit, stultitiam et imbecillitatem animi indicat. nam signum est femininum. cum directae sunt nares, linguae intemperantiam produnt. nares maiores esse melius signum est quam minores. minores enim servilibus ingeniis et furibus et tergiversatoribus assignantur. curvae nares, quas Graeci γρυπὰς vocant, magnanimis attributae sunt, humiliores, quas Graeci σιμὰς dicunt, libidinosis. nares patulae alacritatis et fortitudinis indicium produnt. cum autem perangustae sunt et rotundae et conclusae, stultitiam profitentur. nares perversae perversam etiam mentem esse demonstrant.

52. Mentum cum prolixius est, minus iracundum et minus perturbatis moribus esse manifestat <hominem>,[88] aliquanto tamen loquacem, aliquanto sui iactantem ostendit. qui parvum habent mentum, vitandi sunt. nam praeter cetera immites et insidiosi sunt. referuntur ad serpentes. si in rotundum desinat mentum, muliebres mores indicat. nam et signum femininum est. virile autem mentum prope quadratum esse debet. mentum cum in ultimo divisum est ita ut tanquam duos vertices habeat, si quidem longe atque in prolixum discernatur {mentum}, dolis assuetam mentem indicat, sed si non nimium medietas depressa sit, veneris et gratiarum signum est.

53. Cervix longa et tenuis timiditatem et malignitatem declarat. vasta cervix cum prolixitate animosum, iactantem, superbum asseverat. quae ergo moderate et proxila et vasta cervix est ac minus rotunda,[89] et virtutem animi approbat et habilis est corpore. cervix quae soluta et invalida est, nocentes et insidiosos homines praedicat. cervix quae nervis evidentibus tenta est, ineptum atque indocilem demonstrat et si alia signa conveniant, insanum etiam ex claritate nervorum pronuntiabis. sed et venae clarae et enormes intextae cervici idem quod nervi indicabunt. qui vastam nimium cervicem habent, iracundi et indociles sunt. sceleri proxima sunt huiusmodi ingenia. sues huiusmodi sunt.[90] brevis cervix re atque exemplis cognita est, quod sit indicium hominis cum timiditate audacis, qui Graece θρασύδειλος dicitur. cum autem inter coniunctionem scapularum et cervicis originem verticulus eminet nec ceteri leniter sibimet conveniunt, sed per intervalla cohaerent, ut sit nodorum superficies aspera, superbi et insolentes sunt.

[87] Foerster inserts *tenues* on the basis of Ad. B25.

[88] Foerster inserts *hominem*.

[89] As Foerster points out, we should expect 'firm and strong' on the basis of Ad. B21.

51 (B25). When the end of the nose is thin[87] and pointed, it shows a man who is quick to anger. When the nose is thick it shows that a man should be understood to be foul; for pigs and birds are vile in this way. When the base of the nose is solid, as if blunt, and round, it tells of a brave and magnanimous man. Noses of this sort belong to lions and noble dogs. Long and thin noses resemble those of birds and will suggest characters of that sort. If the part of the nose which is near the brow is properly distinct from the brow and separated from it, which the Greeks call διηρθρωμένον, it is a manly sign; for it is referred to the lion, and it also bestows a mark of prudence. If the top of the nose is not separated or distinct, it indicates stupidity and weakness of mind; for it is a feminine sign. When the nose is straight, it betrays intemperance of tongue. A larger nose is a better sign than a smaller one; for a smaller nose is assigned to servile characters and thieves and equivocators. Hooked noses, which the Greeks call γρυποί, are associated with those who are magnanimous; flatter ones, which the Greeks call σιμοί, with those who are lustful. An open nose betrays a sign of keenness and bravery. But when the nose is very narrow and round and closed, it shows stupidity. A crooked nose shows that the mind is also crooked.

52 (B23). When the chin is rather long it shows a man[88] who is less angry and with a less disturbed character, but it reveals one who is considerably garrulous and a considerable boaster. Those who have a small chin are to be avoided; for in addition to everything else they are cruel and insidious. They are referred to snakes. If the chin is round at the end, it indicates a womanly character; for this is also a feminine sign. But a manly chin should be nearly square. When the chin is divided at the end so that it has two points, as it were, if the separation is wide and extended, it indicates a mind accustomed to deceit, but if the middle is not depressed too much, it is a sign of love and charm.

53 (B21). A long and thin neck reveals timidity and malice. A thick, long neck declares that a man is spirited, boastful, and proud. And so a neck which is both moderately long and thick and less round[89] both proves the manliness of the mind and is suitable for the body. A neck which is relaxed and weak foretells that men are harmful and insidious. A neck which is stiff with the tendons obvious shows a man who is inept and hard to teach, and, if the other signs agree, you will pronounce him insane from the very obviousness of his tendons. But veins woven into the neck which are obvious and large will also indicate the same thing as tendons. Those who have an excessively thick neck are angry and hard to teach; for characters of this type are nearest to crime. Pigs are of this type.[90] A short neck is recognized by the fact itself and by examples, that it is a sign of a man who is daring and timid, who is called θρασύδειλος in Greek. But when a vertebra projects between the joining of the shoulder-blades and the start of the neck, and the other vertebrae do not join up smoothly, but are linked with spaces between them giving a rough knotted appearance, such men are proud and insolent.

[90] Foerster recommends the deletion of this sentence, but the problem seems to be with the preceding one. Cf. Ad. B21 'Those who have excessively thick necks are quick to anger, clumsy, ignorant, and swinish.'

54. Cervix dura indocilem hominem ostendit, cervix ὑγρὰ docilem, ὑγρὸν autem in corporibus Graeci molle quidem et flexibile, non tamen evisceratum nec enerve videri volunt, elimanda vero ac retinenda est huiusmodi significatio nominis[91] eo magis quod et a Graecis per metaphoram dicitur, erit enim frequenter necessaria. aspera cervix tanquam[92] cristata non solum indocilem, sed etiam insolentem declarat. rigida et tanquam defixa cervix indoctum et insolentem significat. interdum et stultis hoc signum convenit. ceteris igitur signis discernes, utrum per stultitiam an per insolentiam stabilis ac defixa sit cervix. sed dum quidam student et affectant intendere atque rigore quodam firmare cervicem, cum intelligant se fluxae ac dissolutae esse cervicis, eo magis deteguntur. nam et labiorum spasmo et conversione oculorum et incongruis ac dissonis translationibus pedum et motu[93] lumborum et manuum inconstantia. et vocis tremore quae conatu proficiscitur facillime effeminati deteguntur; sed nec ipsarum cervicum in his status certus est, sed si diligenter consideres, interdum contremiscere eos cervicibus pervidebis: facile enim labat ac deficit omnis imitatio.

55. Cum autem infracta est cervix, palam esse debet, quod vel stultus vel effeminatus sit qui eam gerit. cetera enim signa intellectum dirigent. stabilitas ergo cum temperata est, tunc ostendit optimos mores. cervix superius retorta insolentem, immitem, stultum et inanem indicat, sed considerandum iterum atque iterum est et ceteris signis discernendum, an per insaniam an per insolentiam retorta sit cervix. cum inflexa est cervix ad pectoris partes, potest a cogitationibus occupatum animum ostendere, potest ad parsimoniam, potest ad malignitatem pertinere, prout cetera signa congruerint, certum autem sit nihil simplex huiusmodi, nihil securum, nihil remissum continere...[94] cervix in sinistram partem declinata stultum aliquatenus ac cinaedum magis significat: Aristoteles etiam ad dextram partem declinationem capitis cinaedis attribuit.[95] solida cervix et vasta et quae difficile flectatur rapaces et θρασυδείλους[96] facit: refertur ad lupum et simiam.

[91] Foerster emends the *hominis* ('man') of L, A, Molinius, and x to *nominis*.
[92] Foerster emends the nonsensical MSS readings to *tanquam* on the basis of Ad. B21.
[93] Foerster adopts Rose's *motu* for MSS *statu* ('position').

54 (B21). A hard neck shows a man who is difficult to teach, a ὑγρός neck one who is teachable—the Greeks want ὑγρός in bodies to mean soft and flexible, not eviscerated and weak. But since it will frequently be necessary to use it, the meaning of a term[91] of this sort should be refined and retained, the more so because the Greeks employ it as a metaphor. A neck which is rough, as if[92] crested, reveals a man who is not only hard to teach but also insolent. A neck which is stiff and as if fixed signifies an unlearned and insolent man. Sometimes stupid men have this sign. And so you will discern by the other signs whether the neck is still and fixed through stupidity or insolence. But while some strive and affect to strain their neck and to keep it firm with a certain stiffness, since they realize that they have a loose and relaxed neck, they are the more detectable for this reason; for both by the spasm of the lips, the rolling of the eyes, the clumsy and confused carriage of the feet, the movement[93] of the loins, the restlessness of the hands, and the tremor of the voice which comes out with effort, they are very easily detected as effeminate. But the position of the neck in these men is not sure, and if you examine them carefully, you will sometimes see their necks tremble; for all pretence readily falls down and is deficient.

55 (B21). But when the neck is bent, it should be obvious that the man who bears it is either stupid or effeminate; for the other signs will direct your understanding. When the steadiness is moderate, it shows the best character. If the neck is bent back up it indicates an insolent, cruel, stupid, and worthless man, but you must consider again and again and conclude by other signs whether the neck is bent back through insanity or through insolence. When the neck is bent in towards the parts of the chest, it may indicate a mind occupied with thoughts, it may pertain to parsimony, or to malice, according to how the other signs coincide, but it is certain to comprise nothing simple of this sort, nothing carefree, and nothing relaxed ...[94] A neck inclined to the left signifies to some extent that a man is stupid and more that he is a deviant. Aristotle also attributed an inclination of the head to the right to deviants.[95] A hard, thick neck which bends with difficulty makes men rapacious and θρασύδειλοι:[96] it is referred to the wolf and the ape.

[94] Foerster argues that what we find about necks inclined to the right in Ad. B21 has dropped out here.

[95] Ps.-Arist. 808^{a}13.

[96] Foerster inserts *et* θρασυδείλους on the basis of Molinius' θρασύλους, which is a non-existent word.

56. Guttur asperum levitatem animi significat et loquacitatem: refertur ad aves. si singularis vertex tanquam nodus gutturis eminet, levitatem quidem pari modo indicat, non tamen <lingua>[97] audacem nec maledicum ostendit; tristem quoque ac tristificum et suspicacem asseverat.

57. Si iuguli conclusi sunt et compressi ad humeros et pectus, tarditatem sensuum et stoliditatem animi indicant nec operi vel arti idoneas manus. iuguli qui longe ab humeris separati sunt et largum ac latum sinum faciunt, imbecillitatem animi declarant. secundum haec quoque medietas erit optima et ad virtutem et ad prudentiam.

58. Humeri non crassi, sed solidi virtutem indicant. laxi enim[98] infirmitatem animi et timiditatem ostendunt. humeri tenues et qui in acutum erecti sunt insidiosum hominem indicant. si autem indiscretis articulis et nodis sunt, ad stultitiam referuntur. humeri faciles bene discreti et absoluti honestatem indicant. referuntur ad ἐπιπρέπειαν. humeri contracti et impliciti inhonesti.[99] referuntur ad ἐπιπρέπειαν.

59. Manus cum ita sunt prolixae, ut, cum demittuntur erecto corpore cetero, genibus propinquent, habiles homines aperiunt et fortitudinis sunt indices. cum autem breves <sunt>[100] et intra medium femur desinunt, malivolos homines ostendunt, gaudentes alienis malis. ut autem de huiusmodi homine pronuntiare possis, quicunque cibos appetentes protendunt os et caput, ut occurrant manui, parvas habent manus et malivoli sunt, gaudentes aliorum malis.

Tenues cubiti imbecilles, pleni nimium indociles ostendunt. cum autem mediae soliditatis sunt et articulis et musculis insignes, fortem animum et habile corpus ostendunt. refertur ad ἐπιπρέπειαν. manus cum molles sunt, docilem hominem significant, cum durae, fortem, sed indocilem demonstrant. nimium breves manus et exiguae furtis[101] oportunae et rapaces sunt. crassae quoque manus si digitos ultra modum breves habeant, tergiversatorem, insidiosum et furem indicant. manus tenues et intortae loquacem demonstrant et voracem.

[97] Foerster inserts *lingua* on the basis of Ad. B22.

[98] Foerster emends the MSS *enim* ('for' in its classical sense) to *vero*, but André (1981) 33 notes that *enim* used adversatively is common enough in later Latin.

[99] Reading Foerster's suggestion of *inhonesti* rather than *incongruentes* ('not fitting', his emendation of Molinius' *incongruenter*).

56 (B22). A rough throat signifies levity of mind and garrulousness; it is referred to birds. If a single point like a knot sticks out on the throat, it indicates levity in equal measure, but it does not show a man who is daring in speech[97] and abusive. It also declares that he is sad, ill-boding, and suspicious.

57 (B17). If the collar-bones are confined and compressed into the shoulders and chest, they indicate slowness of the senses and stupidity of mind and hands fit for neither work nor art. Collar-bones which are separated far from the shoulders and make a large and broad curve reveal weakness of mind. Following this the mean will be best both for manliness and prudence.

58 (= B18). Shoulders which are not thick, but hard, indicate manliness. But[98] relaxed shoulders show weakness of mind and timidity. Thin shoulders and those which rise into a point indicate an insidious man. But if they do not have separated joints and knots, they are referred to stupidity. Supple shoulders which are well separated and detached indicate nobility. They are referred to the ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall appearance'). Contracted and closely attached shoulders are ignoble.[99] They are referred to the ἐπιπρέπεια.

59 (= B19–20). When hands are so long that, when they hang down and the rest of the body is upright, they reach the knees, they reveal skilful men and are signs of bravery. But when they are[100] short and stop before the middle of the thigh, they show malevolent men who rejoice in the misfortunes of others. And so that you may be able to pronounce about a man of this sort, whoever stretches his mouth and head when seeking food so that they meet his hand, has small hands and is malevolent, rejoicing in the misfortunes of others.

Thin elbows show men who are weak and thick ones those who are excessively difficult to teach. But when they are moderately hard and have obvious joints and muscles, they show a brave mind and a well-adapted body. This is referred to the ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall appearance'). (B20) When the hands are soft they signify a teachable man; when they are hard they show that a man is brave, but difficult to teach. Very small and short hands are rapacious and suited to thieving.[101] Thick, short hands too, if they have fingers which are immoderately short, indicate that a man is equivocating, insidious, and a thief. Thin and crooked hands show that a man is garrulous and greedy.

[100] Foerster inserts *sunt*.

[101] As Foerster (1893: i, p. cxxxiv) and André (1981: 97 n. 1) note, Anon. Lat.'s copy of Polemon here (and Leiden's; cf. ch. 22) read φωρία ('theft') instead of the μωρία ('stupidity') found in Ad.

60. Ungues albi lati subrubentes optimi ingenii dant indicium, angusti autem et oblongi stoliditatis et feritatis indices sunt. qui inflexi et curvi sunt, impudentes et rapaces sunt. refertur ad aves et ad feras quae violentae sunt. ungues qui impressi sunt et nimium accorporati, magis feri et stolidi sunt. nimium breves ungues malignum hominem declarant. hoc idem significant pallidi et nigri et asperi. ungues qui perrotundi sunt, in venerem proni sunt.

Haec signa quae unguibus attributa sunt, per semet ipsa non sunt satis idonea, verum coniuncta potioribus nonnullam habent efficaciam.

Item digiti cum coniuncti sunt et cohaerent, immundum hominem significant. qui collecti sunt et conglobati, malignum et avarum indicant. parvi et tenues stultum, parvi et crassi improvidum,[102] audacem, ferum hominem declarant. qui nimium prolixi et nimium tenues sunt, longe a sapientia sunt. qui immoderato spatio inter se distant, leves et loquaces sunt. qui autem moderatae magnitudinis sunt et honestae speciei, mores optimos indicant.

Haec tam de manuum quam pedum unguibus ac digitis dicta sint.

61. Pectus latum dispositum et discretum, cuius clarae sunt singulae partes, quod Graeci dicunt διηρθρωμένον, optimum est. pectus tenue et invalidum etiam animi imbecillitatem significat. quod autem congestum est carnibus, indociles et ignaros[103] indicat. quibus mamillae dependent et molli carne circumdatum pectus est, his vinolentia et intemperantia veneris assignatur.

62. Ea quae de pectore dicta sunt, etiam de metaphreno dicta sint, quae pars dorsi est opposita pectori. nam solidum metaphrenum virile est, tenue <et>[104] infirmum timidum. et caro si nimia sit in hac parte dorsi, stultitiae index erit, sed si parvi spatii metaphrenum fuerit, idem indicabit. latum igitur esse metaphrenum viris convenit. sed etiam si rotundum leniter fuerit, non est recusandum, nam praesentis ingenii hominem indicat, habentem aliquid gratiarum tam in sermone quam in factis. quorum autem incurvum est metaphrenum et inflectit humeros ad pectus, malignitatem cum invidia indicat, et tunc magis, si omne corpus ita incurvum atque inflexum sit. nam et lucrorum immoderatum studium cum his quae praedicta sunt indicat.

63. Emetiendum quoque est spatium ab umbilico usque ad pectoris finem, item a pectoris fine usque ad originem colli. si maior pars pectoris fuerit, prudentiam indicat, si quod infra pectus est, usque ad umbilicum maius fuerit, voracem hominem declarat.

[102] Foerster emends MSS *invidum* ('envious') to *improvidum* on the basis of Ad. B5.

[103] Foerster emends MSS *ignavos* ('lazy', 'cowardly') to *ignaros* on the basis of Ad. B15. But André (98 n. 3) may well be right to retain the MSS (comparing Ps.-Pol.'s 'cowardly' in place of Ad.'s 'clumsiness').

60 (= B4–5). White, broad nails which are reddish provide a sign of the best character, but narrow and oblong ones are signs of stupidity and ferocity. Those which are bent and curved are impudent and rapacious. Reference is made to birds and to those beasts which are violent. Nails which are pressed in and excessively bound into the flesh are rather wild and stupid. Excessively short nails reveal a malicious man. Pale and black and rough nails signify this same thing. Nails which are very round are prone to sex.

These signs which are attributed to nails are not in themselves very sufficient, but in conjunction with more important signs are most effective.

(B5) Likewise, when fingers are joined and stick together, they signify a foul man. Those which are grouped and gathered together indicate a malicious and greedy man. Small and thin fingers reveal a stupid man, small and thick ones an improvident,[102] daring and wild man. Those which are excessively long and thin are far from wisdom. Those which have an immoderate distance between them are light-headed and garrulous. But those which are of a moderate size and of noble appearance indicate the best character.

These things apply to the nails and digits of feet as much as to those of hands.

61 (= B15). A broad, properly arranged and articulated chest, whose individual parts are obvious, which the Greeks call διηρθρωμένον, is best. A thin and weak chest signifies a mind that is also weak. But one which is congested with flesh indicates men who are difficult to teach and ignorant.[103] Those whose breast hangs down and whose chests are surrounded with soft flesh are assigned drunkenness and intemperance in sexual matters.

62 (= B16). Those things which have been said about the chest also apply to the part of the back which corresponds to the chest; for a hard upper back is manly; a thin and[104] weak one is timid. And if the flesh on this part of the back is excessive, it will be a sign of stupidity, but if the upper back covers a small area, it will indicate the same thing. And so it is fitting that men's backs should be broad. But if it is also gently round, it is not objectionable, for it indicates a man of resolute character who has something pleasing as much in his deeds as in his speech. But those whose upper back is curved and turns the shoulders into the chest are malicious and envious, and the more so if the whole body is similarly curved and turned in; for it also indicates immoderate pursuit of money in addition to those things which have been mentioned.

63 (= B15). The distance from the navel to the bottom of the chest should also be measured, as should that from the bottom of the chest to the beginning of the neck. If the chest is larger, it indicates a prudent man; if that which is below the chest to the navel is greater, it reveals a greedy man.

[104] Foerster inserts *et* on the basis of Ad. B16.

64. Venter cum est magnus et congestis carnibus, si quidem mollibus et pendentibus, sine sensu hominem et vinolentum atque intemperantem, deditum luxuriae ac veneri indicat. si nimia caro, verum solida sit, malivolum hominem et malorum artificem declarat. venter si nimio recessu est tanquam inanis, timidum, malignum et voracem indicat. venter aliquanto mollior atque impressior virtutem animi et magnificentiam monstrat.

65. Latera tenuia et angusta et depressa timiditatis arguunt, et quae referta sunt carnibus et dura, indociles homines ostendunt. quae autem rotunda sunt tanquam tumentia, loquacem, inanem declarant: nam refertur ad ranas.

66. Dorsum latum solidum virile est, et contrarium muliebre. quorum dorsum incurvum est, si in molli corpore fuerit, quod superius ὑγρὸν nominari a Graecis diximus, non tam malum accipiendum est quam quod in spisso et solido corpore fuerit. qui iuxta ilia angustiores sunt tanquam succincti, et in omni parte virtutis excellent et venationum studiosiores erunt.

67. Spinae pars inferior quae ὀσφὺς Graece dicitur, si late iaceat et nimia sit et molli carne circumdata, femininum est: refertur ad ἐπιπρέπειαν. quae prolixa est et in acutum desinit, intemperantiam libidinis et timiditatem ostendit. virilis ergo est, quae clara ossibus et moderata ac solida est.

68.[105] Ἰσχία sunt ossa concludentia ventrem, quibus etiam ossa femorum impressa sunt. si igitur ἰσχία solida et dura et discreta ossibus fuerint, fortem et bellatorem hominem monstrant: refertur enim ad leones; si vasta et carne complexa, muliebre ingenium designant secundum ἐπιπρέπειαν. quae autem nimium exesa sunt rugosa et tenui cute circumdata, ut sunt simiarum, malignitatem indicabunt.

69. Femorum eadem erunt signa secundum Palemonem quae mox de superiori parte crurum dicentur, quam Graeci κνήμην vocant: cuius prior pars tibia superior est, posterior vero usque ad pedes. ea igitur repetemus quae Aristoteles aliter posuit.[106] κνήμη ergo id est pars cruris quae sub geniculo est posterior id est infra suffraginem, quotiens plena est tanquam gravida, sordidum hominem, intemperantem impudentemque significat, serviles etiam mores comprehendit. cum autem moderatae plenitudinis sunt <κνῆμαι> et moderatae magnitudinis, solidae et discretae, quod Graeci appellant διηρθρωμένον, optimi ingenii sunt indices. molles autem et ἄναρθροι muliebri sexui assignandae sunt.

[105] See also Anon. Lat. 70.

64 (= B14). When the stomach is large and congested with flesh which is soft and hanging, it indicates a man without sense who is drunken and intemperate and dedicated to luxury and sex. If the flesh is excessive but solid, it reveals a malevolent man who devises evils. If the stomach has an excessive recess, as if it were empty, it indicates a timid, malicious, and greedy man. A stomach which is considerably softer and pressed in shows manliness of mind and magnificence.

65 (= B13). Thin and narrow and pressed in sides prove timidity, and those which are packed with flesh and are hard show men who are difficult to teach. But those which are round as if swollen reveal a garrulous and worthless man, for he is to be referred to frogs.

66 (= B11–12). A broad, hard back is manly, and the opposite is womanly. As to those whose back is curved, if it is in a soft body, which we said above is called ὑγρός by the Greeks, it is not to be thought as bad as that which is in a compact and hard body. Those who are narrower at the loins, as if they were girded, both excel in every part of manliness and are rather keen on hunting.

67 (= B10). If the lower part of the back, which is called the ὀσφύς ('loin') in Greek, is broad and is excessive and surrounded with soft flesh, it is feminine. It is referred to the ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall apperarance'). If it is long and finishes in a point, it shows intemperance in lust and timidity. And that which has the bones obvious and is moderate and hard is manly.

68 (= B9).[105] The ἰσχία ('hips') are the bones which close off the stomach, into which press also the bones of the thighs. And so if the ἰσχία are solid and hard and have distinct bones, they show a brave and warlike man, for he is referred to lions; but if they are wide and covered with flesh, they denote a womanly character according to the ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall apperarance'). But those which are excessively eaten away, wrinkly, and surrounded with thin skin, as those of apes are, indicate maliciousness.

69 (= B8). The signs of the thighs will be the same, according to Polemon, as those which we shall now mention concerning the upper part of the shanks, which the Greeks call the κνήμη, whose front part is the upper tibia, while the rear part reaches the feet. We shall recall Aristotle's different view:[106] the κνήμη is the part of the shank which is beneath the knee and at the rear, that is below the ham, and as often as it is full as if pregnant, it signifies a base, intemperate and impudent man and also comprises a servile character. But when κνῆμαι are of moderate thickness and size, hard and separated, which the Greeks call διηρθρωμένον, they are signs of the best character. But if soft and ἄναρθροι ('jointless'), they refer to the female sex.

[106] Rejecting Foerster's emendation of MSS *ea* to *postea* ('afterwards'). See Ps.-Arist. 810ᵃ29–34.

70. Genicula cum in se conversa sunt atque colliduntur, ad femineam speciem referuntur.

71. Σφυρὰ sunt crurum partes imae proximae talis. σφυρὰ igitur et imi pedes et calcanea cum nimium vasta sunt et referta carnibus, stultum hominem indicant vel insanum, hoc a se observatum esse diligenter Palemon refert, et eo magis si et humiles digitos et κνήμας vastas in isdem pedibus esse contigerit. σφυρὰ solida, quorum ambitus certus, circumscriptus et honestus est et qui non offendat oculos, virum sanctum demonstrant. tenuitas timidum et intemperantem declarat.

72. Pedes imi discreti nervis et articulis clari[107] generosum et virile ingenium declarant. molles et ampla carne circumdati molle ingenium et femininum ostendunt. crassi pedes et breves admodum ferinos mores indicant. nimium prolixiores invigilantem dolis hominem multis ac perniciem cogitantem demonstrant. pertenues et breves malignum produnt. curvi pedes et qui plantam longe cavam ac reductam habent, improbandi sunt. qui aequaliter plani sunt et nullum habent recessum in medios pedes, sed cruribus[108] ambulant et ex interiori parte calciamenta atterunt, versutam et malignam mentem ostendunt. Aristoteles addit etiam hos esse versutos, qui habent inflexa supercilia, sicut sunt in personis senum comicorum.[109]

73. De capillorum varietate haec superius quidem discretio facta est,[110] quod crispi timidum ostendant, quod directi ferum, hoc idem et spissi, quod rari insidiosum, quod molles nimium effeminatum, quod nigri timidum nimium et avarum, quod rubei subalbi[111] avaros mores et quod harum omnium contrarietatum medietas optima sit, sed qui vehementer rubicundi sunt, ut flos mali granati, repudiandi sunt: nam et avarum et ferum et indocilem significant. sed quoniam et praeter caput et supercilia et oculos in aliis etiam partibus corporis exoriuntur capilli, retinenda est quidem in his partibus regula de capillis superius dicta, sed et specialiter assignandae proprietates ceteris partibus sunt. crura densis et longis capillis obsita indocilem et ferum hominem indicant. ὀσφὺς id est ima pars spinae et femora similiter capillosa idem[112] indicant. venter et pectus si nimio capillo circumtecta fuerint, levem et instabilem hominem produnt, quem Graeci ἀλλοπρόσαλλον vocant. praeterea sine religione, sine pietate esse hoc ingenium declaratur. cum solum pectus

[107] Foerster emends MSS *clarum* to *clari* so that it agrees with the feet rather than the character.

[108] André (1981: 104 n. 1) rightly takes *cruribus ambulant* (a literal translation of τοῖς σφυροῖς βαίνοντες) as 'marchent sur leur talons'.

[109] Apparently not in the present Aristotelian corpus.

70 (= B9). When knees are turned towards each other and collide, they are referred to a feminine type of appearance.

71 (= B7). The σφυρά are the bottom parts of the shanks nearest the ankles. And so when the σφυρά and the bottom of the feet and heels are excessively thick and packed with flesh, they indicate a stupid or insane man. Polemon reports that he observed this carefully himself, and that it was the more so if it happened both that the toes were stubby and the κνῆμαι thick for the same feet. Solid σφυρά, whose periphery is certain, delineated and noble and which does not offend the eyes, show a holy man. Thinness reveals a timid and intemperate man.

72 (= B6). If the bottoms of the feet have distinctive tendons and clear[107] joints, they reveal a noble and manly character. Soft feet which are surrounded with ample flesh show a soft and feminine character. Thick and short feet indicate a very wild character. Excessively long feet show a man who is intent upon many forms of deceit and who contemplates destruction. Very thin and short feet betray a malicious man. Curved feet which also have a very hollow and drawn up sole are to be disapproved of. Those feet which are uniformly flat and have no recess in the middle, but who walk on their heels[108] and rub their shoes on the inside, show a cunning and malicious mind. Aristotle adds that those who have curved eyebrows, as they are on the masks of old men in comedies, are also cunning.[109]

73 (= B37). As to varieties of hair the following distinction was made above:[110] curly hair shows a timid man; straight hair a wild man, and likewise thick hair; thin hair shows an insidious man; soft hair an excessively effeminate man; black hair an excessively timid and greedy man; red, pale hair[111] a greedy character; and of all these opposites the mean is best. But those who have bright red hair like the flower of the pomegranate, are to be scorned, for it signifies a greedy and wild man who is hard to teach. But since hair grows on other parts of the body too, in addition to the head, eyebrows and eyes, the rules about hair mentioned above should be borne in mind for these parts too, but particular properties are also to be assigned to the other parts. Legs which are covered with thick and long hair indicate a wild man who is hard to teach. An ὀσφύς, that is the lower part of the back and thighs, that is similarly hairy indicates the same thing.[112] If the stomach and chest are covered with excessive hair, they betray a light-headed and unstable man, whom the Greeks call ἀλλοπρόσαλλος ('fickle'). Moreover it is revealed that this character is without religion and without piety.

[110] Ch. 14.

[111] Foerster argues that, on the basis of Ad. B37, several words have dropped out here.

[112] Foerster plausibly argues, on the basis of Ad. B37 and Leiden ch. 43, that *libidinem* ('lust') or *libidinosum* ('lustful') should be read here instead of MSS *idem*.

capillos praefert, calidum et animosum significat. cum humeri et metaphrena capillis circumdata sunt, avium mores id est leves et instabiles indicant. cum omne corpus contectum est capillis, animum quadrupedis potius quam hominis indicat. cum cervix a capite capillosa est, fortem et animosum indicat: refertur enim ad leonem. et cum ad mediam frontem capillus decurrit, ex utraque autem parte repressus vel reflexus est, ad equi speciem refertur.

74. Motus corporis alius est naturalis, alius affectatus. affectati tres sunt species. una cum homo honorem vel potestatem vel lucrum vel nuptias captans, prout acceptissimum esse potioribus arbitratur, ita se constituit. nam et luxuriae et bonitatis similitudinem induit et erectus et deiectus est et squalidus et ignavus et misericors et industrius, ubi pauperiem, rusticitatem, parsimoniam, parvitatem et misericordiam imitandam putat.[113] secunda species est affectationis eorum qui ad pulchritudinem student quique vultum et omne corpus ita informant, ut aut virginibus insidientur aut matrimonia perturbent; sed et qui in pueros dementes sunt aut mulierum loco se ipsos constituunt, quo viros in se provocare possint, affectatum atque elaboratum corporis motum habent. tertia species est eorum qui cinaedi quidem certa fide sunt, verum suspicionem a se removere conantes virilem sumere speciem sibimet laborant. nam et incessum pedum iuvenilem imitantur et semet ipsos rigore quodam confirmant et oculos et vocem intendunt atque omne corpus erigunt, sed facile deteguntur vincente se ac nudante natura. nam et collum et vocem plerumque submittunt et pedes manusque relaxant aliisque temporariis indiciis facile produntur. nam et timor subitus et gaudium improvisum ab imitatione eos procurata excutit atque ad suum ingenium revocat. plerumque etiam oscitantes detecti sunt. signa igitur omnia quae ex motibus corporis colliguntur, ad quattuor has species referenda sunt: ad unam quae vera et naturalis est, ad tres, quas fictas et simulatas esse constituimus.

75. Qui longis passibus incedunt, magnanimi sunt et efficaces; parvi autem et restricti passus inefficaces, parci, parvae[114] mentis sunt, dolorum artifices et obscurae mentis. celeritas motus cum est erecto corpore et honesto atque claro, calidum hominem indicat, qui aggrediatur res agendas magis quam perficiendas.

[113] Foerster argues that the text of this sentence is faulty, presumably because the lists do not correspond exactly.

When only the chest produces hair, it signifies an impetuous and spirited man. When the shoulders and upper back are surrounded with hair, they indicate the character of birds, that is light and unstable. When the whole body is covered in hair, it indicates the mind of a quadruped rather than of a man. When the neck below the head is hairy, it indicates a brave and spirited man: for he is (to be) referred to the lion. And when the hair runs down to the middle of the brow, but on either side is pressed or turned back, he is referred to the appearance of the horse.

74 (= B38). The movement of the body of one man is natural, of another affected. There are three types of affected movement. One is when a man is courting honour or a position of power or money or a marriage and conducts himself according to how he thinks he will be most acceptable to his betters; for he puts on the semblance of luxury and goodness and is upright or dejected or shabby or lazy or sympathetic or industrious when he thinks he should be imitating a poor man, a rustic, a miser, a little man, or a sympathetic man.[113] The second type of appearance consists of the affectation of those who are devoted to beauty and who compose their face and whole body so that they may ensnare virgins or disturb marriages. But also those who are mad about boys or play the role of women to excite men towards them have an affected and studied body movement. The third type of appearance consists of those who are certainly deviants, but who try to remove suspicion from themselves by striving to assume a manly appearance; for they imitate the gait of a young man and strengthen themselves with a certain stiffness and strain their eyes and voice and straighten their whole body, but they are easily detected when their true nature wins through and exposes them; for they often lower their neck and voice and relax their hands and feet and are easily betrayed by other passing signs; for sudden fear or unexpected joy shakes them from their careful pretence and recalls them to their own nature. Often they are detected when yawning too. Thus all the signs which are gathered from the movements of the body are to be referred to these four types of appearance: the one which is natural and true, and the three which we have established as false and simulated.

75 (= B39). Those who walk with long paces are magnanimous and efficient, but small and restricted paces are ineffectual, mean, belong to a small[114] mind, are masters of deceit and reveal a hidden intention. When the movement is swift and accompanied by an upright, noble and distinguished body, it indicates an impetuous man who sets about doing things rather than finishing them. If he

[114] Foerster plausibly argues that Anon. Lat. read μικροί ('small') instead of πικροί ('bitter') here. Cf. Ad. B39.

si autem celeriter quidem movetur, verum submittit oculos et se comprimit et vultum deducit atque omne corpus implicat et colligit, nimium timidum, parcum, versutum, minus liberalem indicat. cum autem celeritatem motuum pervideris atque incessus <et> oculorum perturbationem, capitis inconstantiam, anhelitum spissum, haec indicia hominem cladium magnarum auctorem et immanis audaciae declarant. qui breves passus habet eosdemque accelerat, malignus et plus quam timidus et imbecillis habendus est. tardus incessus si naturalis sit, etiam animum pigriorem indicat, si non potiora signa dissentiant. si autem procurata sit tarditas et interdum resistat, circumspiciat, cervicem erigat, superbiae dabit signum; recte autem eum etiam moechum et adulterum pronuntiabis.

76. Cum autem manuum ac pedum motus cum totius corporis consentiunt motibus et cum humeri moderate et tranquille inferuntur cum leni inclinatione cervicis, magnanimum hominem dicunt et fortem: huiusmodi leonis incessus est. qui autem humeros commovet, erigit tamen collum atque tendit, superbus atque insolens rectissime iudicabitur: est enim talis equorum incessus. haec satis esse arbitratur Palemon ad institutionem: minuta enim quaeque et similitudines subtilius atque accuratius comparatae ex his quae dicta sunt haud difficile constitui possunt. qui autem omni corpore moventur, manifeste atque evidenter effeminati sunt. ex his tolerabiliores sunt, qui cum moventur, corpus inclinant ad dextram partem, stultiores autem sunt, quorum corpus declinat ad sinistram partem. qui autem submittunt sese atque omne corpus infringunt, inhoneste blandi sunt, quos Graeci κόλακας vocant: refertur hoc ad canes.

77. Cum quietus est spiritus ita ut aut nullum aut pertenuem praebeat sensum[115] incurrens ac recurrens, in cogitatione constitutum hominem declarat, cuiusmodi autem cogitationes, fere {et} oculi indicabunt. cum spiritus interdum quiescit, longo autem post intervallo nimium trahitur vel editur tanquam in aestu revolutus, in magna tristitia indicat hominem constitutum. cum autem etiam caput quatit et ingemiscit, paenitentiam rei a se male gestae vel male dictae continet. si tamen oculis in officio constitutis ac vigentibus ita videatur cogitationem versare, rem potius malam agere credendus est quam rei gestae paenitentiam sustinere. spiritus cum mugit et graviter concipitur atque editur, feritatem et vinolentiam indicat. quorum anhelitus ita perturbatus ac spissus est, sicut post cursum hominis esse solet, inconsulti, iracundi sunt, quibus omne sit actu dictuque facile et satis promptum. qui desuper trahunt spiritum et sursum versus revocant quibusque levis et spissus est anhelitus, timidi, imbelles, interdum effeminati sunt, si cetera signa conveniant.

[115] Foerster suggests emending *sensum* to *sonum* ('sound'). Cf. Ad. B41.

moves quickly, but casts his eyes down and pulls himself in and turns his face down and cowers and crouches with his whole body, it indicates an excessively timid, mean, cunning, and less generous man. But when you see swift movement and gait and a disturbance of the eyes, instability of the head, and frequent panting, these signs reveal a man who is a cause of great disasters and huge daring. The man who has short steps and quickens them is to be regarded as malicious and more than timid and weak. If a slow gait is natural, it also indicates a rather sluggish mind, if the more significant signs do not contradict this. But if the slowness is contrived and he occasionally stops, looks around, and raises his neck, he will be giving a sign of pride. But you will rightly pronounce him a philanderer and adulterer as well.

76 (= B40). But when the movements of the hands and feet agree with the movements of the whole body and when the shoulders are carried moderately and peacefully with a gentle inclination of the neck, they tell of a magnanimous and brave man: the gait of the lion is of this sort. And who moves his shoulders, but raises and stretches his neck, will very rightly be judged proud and insolent; for this is the gait horses have. Polemon thinks that these things provide sufficient instruction; for individual details and comparisons made with real subtlety and accuracy can be easily established from what has been said. But those who move with their whole body are manifestly and evidently effeminate. Of these, those who incline their body to the right when they move are more tolerable, while those whose body inclines to the left are more stupid. But those who lean over and bend their whole body are disgraceful flatterers, whom the Greeks call κόλακες; this type is referred to dogs.

77 (= B41). When the breath is quiet so that while it races in and out it is not, or is barely, perceived,[115] it reveals a man set in thought, but usually his eyes will indicate of what sort his thoughts are. When the breath is sometimes quiet, but after a long interval is drawn or expelled excessively as if tossed in a swell, it indicates a man set in great sadness. When the head also shakes and he groans, he is regretting a thing which he has either done or said for bad. But if he seems to turn his thoughts with his eyes set on business and full of life, he should be believed to be doing something bad rather than to be suffering regret for something done. When the breath bellows and is heavily drawn in and expelled, it indicates wildness or drunkenness. Those whose breath is disturbed and rapid, as is usually the case with a man after running, are imprudent and irascible, by whom everything is done or said quickly and very readily. Those who breathe in and out shallowly and whose breath is light and rapid are timid, pusillanimous and occasionally effeminate, if the other signs agree.

78. Qui vocem gravem et quassam tanquam ex quassato vasculo promunt, stulti sunt et voraces. et quorum sonus ingratus est, sive sit solidus[116] sive sit ovium voci proximus, stultitiam indicat. qui incipiunt a gravi voce et in acutam desinunt, faciles ad fletum ac lugubri animo sunt. qui acutam vocem cum siccitate promunt, versipelles ac subdoli sunt. qui acutam et mollem habent vocem, effeminati sunt. qui vocem tanquam ex concavo depromunt gravem et inflexibilem, ingenio sunt virili et magnanimi. qui tardum et gravem vocis edunt sonum, tranquilli sunt, iocundi, affabiles. horum et iusti mores sunt.[117] qui in modum avium vocem intendunt, proni in venerem, inanes et instabiles[118] sunt. infracta vox et tenuis ac lugubris tristem, avarum ac suspicacem indicat. quorum vox incurrit in nares, ita ut resonent nares, mendaces, malivoli, invidi, gaudentes malis aliorum sunt. intenta vox vehemens cui tanquam sonus quassus permixtus est, violentum, iniustum, odia gerentem omnibus significat. tarda vox inertem, praeceps imprudentem declarat. referenda est etiam vox sicuti cetera ad similitudines animalium: nam et canibus et simiis et asinis voces similes sunt in hominibus, et alius equo, alius porco proximam vocem emittit.[119] ex similitudine igitur intellectum capies. quod autem supra de contrarietatibus constituimus et medium esse in plerisque optimum iudicavimus, hoc etiam de motu corporis et de voce pronuntietur, ut nimietatem ad malam partem accipias, medietatem ac temperamentum optimum iudices.

79. Colorum species in corporibus gentibus attributae sunt. prout sunt igitur gentium ingenia, ita colorum similitudo noscenda est. color niger {lenis}[120] imbellem, timidum, versutum indicat: refertur ad eos qui in meridiana plaga habitant, ut {sunt} Aethiopes, Aegyptii et qui his iuncti sunt. color albus subrubeus fortes et animosos indicat: refertur ad eos qui in septentrione commorantur. color vehementer albus virtuti est contrarius. cum color rubicundus est evidenter in omni corpore, dolis hominem studentem versutumque declarat. color qui pallore deformatus est, imbellem, timidum eundemque tergiversatorem significat, si non aegritudo sit causa palloris. cum fuscior color pallori permixtus est, quod Graeci μελάγχλωρον vocant, voracem, loquacem, intemperatum irae atque linguae denuntiat. color ignitus ad insaniam

[116] Foerster suggests *horridus* ('rough') for *solidus*.

[117] Foerster argues, on the basis of Ad. B42 and Leiden ch. 52, that this sentence should be transferred to after 'manly and magnanimous in character' in the previous line. This is a good example of ignoring Anon. Lat.'s autonomy.

[118] Foerster emends MSS *faciles* ('easy') to *instabiles* on the basis of Ad. B42 and Anon. Lat.'s practice elsewhere.

78 (= B42). Those who produce a deep voice which is cracked, as if from a cracked vessel, are stupid and greedy. And those whose voice is unpleasant, whether it is hard[116] or like the bleating of sheep, are indicated to be stupid. Those who begin with a deep voice and finish with a sharp one are prone to weeping and have a mournful mind. Those who produce a sharp voice with dryness are sly and deceitful. Those who have a sharp and soft voice are effeminate. Those who produce a deep and inflexible voice as if from a cavern are manly and magnanimous in character. Those who produce a slow and deep voice are calm, jovial, and affable. Their character is also just.[117] Those who strain their voice like the birds are quick to love, light-headed, and unstable.[118] A broken, thin, and mournful voice indicates a sad, greedy, and suspicious man. Those whose voice runs into their nose so that it echoes are liars, malevolent, envious, and rejoice in the misfortunes of others. A strong, strained voice which has a cracked sound mixed in, as it were, signifies a violent, unjust man who hates everybody. A slow voice reveals an idle man, a rapid voice an imprudent man. The voice too, like the other signs, should be referred to resemblances in animals: for among men there are voices which are similar to those of dogs and apes and donkeys, and one man produces a voice like that of a horse, and another like that of a pig.[119] Thus on the basis of resemblances you will gain understanding. The point we laid down above about opposites and our judgement that the mean is best in most cases should also be affirmed regarding the movement of the body and the voice, so that you will consider excess bad and will judge the mean and the proper mixture to be the best.

79 (= B 33–6). Different sorts of body colour have been attributed to the races. And just as the races have their characters, so we must know the correspondences of the colours. A black[120] colour indicates a pusillanimous, timid, and cunning man: it is referred to those who live in the southern regions, such as the Ethiopians, the Egyptians and those who neighbour them. A white, slightly red, colour indicates brave and spirited men: it is referred to those who live in the north. A strongly white colour is contrary to manliness. When a red colour is obvious on the whole body, it reveals a man who is cunning and devoted to deceit. A colour which is deformed by pallor signifies a pusillanimous, timid man who is at the same time an equivocator, if illness is not the cause of the pallor. When a darker colour is mixed with the pallor, which the Greeks call μελάγχλωρος ('sallow'), it denounces a greedy and garrulous man who is intemperate in anger and tongue. A fiery colour turns to

[119] Foerster wonders whether *alius urso, alius ovi proximam vocem emittit* ('one man produces a voice like that of a bear, another like that of a sheep') should be read instead of *alius equo, alius porco*, etc. Cf. Ad. B42 and Leiden ch. 52. However, it should be noted that this text is not a translation and that Anon. Lat. is perfectly capable of going his own way, as in fact are the other authors in the tradition.

[120] Omitting *lenis* ('mild') with A and Molinius and with Foerster's approval.

vergit. color tranquille et moderate rubeus docile ingenium veloxque declarat. cum pectus solummodo rubore obductum est, iracundia inflammatum animum demonstrat. cum venae cervicis et temporum extant sanguineique sunt coloris,[121] iracundum animum et vehementem ostendunt, nonnunquam et insanum. cum vultus rubet, aut verecundum aut vinolentum declarat. discernamus ergo hunc ruborem oculorum indiciis. nam si oculi rubeant cum aliquo liquore, vino indulgentem ostendunt; si sicci sint et rubeant, iracundum, si temperati, verecundum.

80. Nunc repetenda sunt, ut supra proposuimus, quae proprie Loxus seu Aristoteles posuerunt vel aliter interpretati sunt, quamvis etiam locis suis aliqua adiunxerimus. quae enim Palemon dixit et consentanea sunt reliquis auctoribus, propemodum prosecuti sumus.

81. Loxus tres oculorum colores optimos constituit. et primam speciem ponit oculorum χαροπούς, quos inter nigros et glaucos vult videri, secundam constituit αἰγωπούς,[122] quos magis glaucis proximos, albidiores tamen constituit, tertiam speciem ponit nigris proximos. idem pingues oculos dicit mansuetos quidem esse, verum ad libidinem et ad lacrimas faciles. idem siccos impudentes pronuntiat; glaucis nimium adimit fortitudinem, impudentiam relinquit. idem dicit, quod pupillae, quotiens foris sunt et ad aures conversae, iocundum animum et mansuetum mentemque timidam indicent, conversas autem pupillas ad nares[123] nimietatem in omnibus rebus ostendere. idem dicit, cum pupillae pars magna palpebra inferiore contegitur, mollioris animi esse, inanis, misericordis, angustae mentis, atque ita constituit medietatem oculi debere pupillam obtinere. idem dicit palpebram superiorem, si parva sit, tardum ingenium ostendere, si prolixior et deorsum summissa, infirmum atque imbecillem. idem dicit circumcisionem[124] palpebrarum, si rotunda fuerit, animosum magis quam sapientem indicare; si longa incisio fuerit et angusta, iniustum animum ostendere, si lata, immoderatum. idem dicit, cum anguli oculorum in acutum incisi sunt, non integram vel fidelem mentem ostendere, nisi sanguinolenta sit oculorum caro. idem dicit omnes qui cum pravis oculis nascuntur ad insaniam vergere. idem dicit palpebras crassas nec sanitati corporis convenire nec verae mentis indices esse. tenues palpebras et in sanitate optimas et mentem deo proximam indicare.

[121] Foerster emends MSS *oculi* ('eye') to *coloris* on the basis of Ad. B34. Cf. André (1981) 113 n. 1 '[c]onjecture inutile' on the basis of Leiden; but unfortunately Hoffmann's 'acie' (244. 23) is a typographical error for 'facie' (*wajh*).

[122] i.e. 'yellow-eyed'. This is Foerster's emendation of Molinius' ὀρπώπους, a non-existent word, on the basis of Arist. Hist. An. 1. 10. 492a3 and Gen. An. 5. 1. 779a35.

insanity. A softly and moderately red colour reveals a teachable and swift character. (B34) When the chest alone is covered with redness, it shows a mind inflamed with anger. When the veins of the neck and temples stick out and are a bloody colour,[121] they show an angry and impetuous mind, sometimes also an insane one. (B35) When the face is red it reveals either a shy man or a drunkard. (B36) And so let us discern this redness by the signs of the eyes; for if the eyes are red with some moisture, they show a man who indulges in wine; if they are dry and red, they show an irascible man, if tempered, a shy man.

80. Now we must return, as we proposed above, to what Loxus or Aristotle in particular laid down or interpreted differently, although we have cited some things in their own places; for we have effectively been following those views of Polemon that are consistent with the other writers.

81. Loxus establishes three excellent colours of the eye. He lays down that the first sort of eyes are χαροποί, by which he means those between black and light blue. He establishes that the second are αἰγωποί ('goat-eyed'),[122] which he defines as close to light blue, but whiter; and he lays down that the third sort are close to black. He says that glossy eyes are gentle, but are quick to lust and tears. He pronounces that dry eyes are impudent; he disallows bravery to very light blue eyes and leaves them impudence. He says that pupils, as often as they are outside and turned towards the ears, will indicate a jovial and gentle character and a timid mind, but that pupils turned to the nose[123] show excess in all things. He says that when a large part of the pupil touches the lower eyelid, it belongs to a rather soft, light-headed, and sympathetic character and to a narrow mind, and he established that the pupil should be in the centre of the eye. He says that if the upper eyelid is small, it shows a slow character; if it is longer and pressing down, it shows a feeble and weak one. He says that the periphery[124] of the eyelids, if it is round, indicates a spirited rather than a wise man; if the split is long and narrow, it shows an unjust mind, if broad, an immoderate one. He says that when the corners of the eyes form a point, they do not show a sound or faithful mind, unless the flesh of the eyes is bloodshot. He says that all those who are born with crooked eyes turn mad. He says that thick eyelids are not consistent with bodily health and are not indications of a sincere mind, and that thin eyelids are best for health and indicate a mind close to God.

[123] Reading Foerster's suggestion of *nares* instead of MSS *aures* ('ears'), given that a contrast is implied here.

[124] *circumcisionem*: as if the face were cut open to receive the eyes.

82. Idem dicit capillos qui intra aures sunt, si plures sunt et spissi longique multum, calidum animum, libidinis appetentem indicare. cum autem aures pilis non carent, vigorem sensuum et mentis indicant, veruntamen surdi tales plerumque efficiuntur. idem dicit capillos qui intra nares hominis nascuntur, si quidem densi multi crassique sint, immobilem animum durumque ostendere, si pauci mollesque sint, facilem ac docilem animum nuntiare. idem dicit balbos, quos Graeci τραυλοὺς <vocant>,[125] omnes esse elatos, superbos et corde rigidos existere.

83. Aristoteles[126] dicit, cum frons compressior fuerit ad caput, quod Graece ἀναστεῖλον[127] dicitur, et nares in origine sua prope simae sunt, liberales esse et referri ad leonem.[128] idem Aristoteles dicit eos qui supercilia obducunt deorsum, pupillas autem superius tendunt atque omni vultu summisso sunt, κόλακας esse id est inhoneste blandos et referri hoc ad canes. idem Aristoteles dicit eos qui vultu omni tranquillo sunt, pari modo blandos id est κόλακας esse et hoc ad canes referri. idem dicit, qui tenuem et acutam habet narem, querulum esse, qui Graece μεμψίμοιρος dicitur. idem dicit, quibus origo narium tenuis est, impudentes esse: referri ad speciem corvorum. idem Aristoteles dicit promptos[129] satis oculos inertes esse: referri hoc ad asinos.[130] idem dicit oculos caprinos libidini esse deditos: referri hoc ad caprum.[131] idem dicit, qui rotundiores oculos splendidosque gerunt, quos Graeci στίλβοντας dicunt, insatiabiles esse veneris, ut galli, quos ἀλεκτρυόνας Graeci vocant.[132]

84. Idem dicit animosos esse eos, quorum post primam iuventutem genae quodammodo duriores et nudae sunt, extimum autem mentum barba est obsitum. idem dicit eos qui vocem ita intendunt, ut proxime caprino balatu eam exasperent, furiosos esse in venerem: referri hoc ad capras.[133] idem dicit insidiosos esse qui brevem habent cervicem, tanquam si infulciatur cetero corpori.[134] μυκτηρισμὸς subsannatio vel aspiratio est narium et concussio plurima[135] vultus ac reductio oris, ut in risu solet fieri vel certe cum indignatione concepta εἰρωνικῶς sermone utimur, ut est ille sermo in bucolicis Vergilii: 'Mopse, novas incide faces, tibi ducitur uxor. sparge, marite, nuces, tibi deserit Hesperus Oetam.'[136]

[125] Foerster inserts *vocant*.

[126] Correspondences with our Ps.-Arist. are noted where they exist.

[127] Foerster's emendation of Molinius' ἀνασεισιώδιον [sic] (presumably 'shaking') on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 812b35, where, however, he argues that the otherwise unattested ἀναστεῖλον should be replaced by ἀνάσιλλος after 809^b24. We print ἀνάσιλλος in both places in the Appendix.

[128] Ps.-Arist. 812^b34–6.

[129] Foerster emends MSS *promptos* to *prominentes*, but this is unnecessary: cf. on n. 80.

[130] Ps.-Arist. 811^b23–4.

82. If the hair which is inside the ears is abundant and thick and very long, it indicates an impetuous mind which seeks lust. But when the ears do not lack hairs, they indicate strength of mind and senses; nevertheless such often become deaf. He says that if the hair which grows inside the nose of a man is thick and abundant and coarse, it shows a fixed and hard mind; if it is scanty and soft, it announces a quick and teachable mind. He says that lispers, whom the Greeks call[125] τραυλοί, are all arrogant, proud, and unyielding in heart.

83. Aristotle[126] says that when the brow is rather squeezed towards the head—what the Greeks call ἀνασπεῖλον[127] ('drawn back'), and the beginning of the nose is very snub, they are generous and are referred to the lion.[128] Aristotle also says that those who lower their eyebrows, but strain their pupils upwards and have their whole face cast down, are κόλακες, that is disgraceful flatterers, and are referred to dogs. Aristotle also says that those who have an entirely peaceful face are flatterers, that is κόλακες, in equal measure and are referred to dogs. He says that the man who has a thin and sharp nose is a complainer, who is called μεμψίμοιρος in Greek. He says that those with a nose that begins thin are impudent: they are referred to the appearance of ravens. Aristotle also says that eyes which protrude[129] a great deal are idle: this is referred to asses.[130] He says that goat-like eyes are devoted to lust: this is referred to the goat.[131] He says that those who have rounder and bright eyes, which the Greeks call στίλβοντες, are insatiable in love, like cocks, which the Greeks call ἀλεκτρυόνες.[132]

84. He says that those whose cheeks, after the first flush of youth, are rather hard and bare, but who have the end of the chin covered with beard, are spirited. He says that those who strain their voice, so it grates like the bleating of a goat, are mad in love: this is referred to nannygoats.[133] He says that those who have a short neck, as if it is crammed into the rest of the body, are insidious.[134] Μυκτηρισμός is a sneer or exhalation through the nose and a great[135] shaking of the face and drawing back of the mouth, as usually happens while laughing or certainly when we are indignant and use speech εἰρωνικῶς ('mockingly'), as in those words in the *Bucolics* of Vergil: 'Mopsus, cut new torches; you are getting married. Scatter the nuts, husband: Hesperus abandons Oeta for you.'[136]

[131] Ps.-Arist. 812^{b}6–7.
[132] Ps.-Arist. 812^{b}11–12.
[133] Ps.-Arist. 813^{b}4–6.
[134] Ps.-Arist. 811^{a}17.
[135] The text has *prima* ('first'), which seems to make little sense here. Foerster suggests *perpetua* ('continual'), but André's *plurima* ('un tremblement considérable') is better and close to MSS.
[136] Verg. *Ecl.* 8.29–30 (Damon mocks his rival on his marriage).

qui haec ita dicebat...[137] considerandum in quo statu oris vel motu σαρκασμὸς dicatur.[138] hoc vultu qui frequenter sunt absque indignatione, σαρκάζειν dicuntur. σαρκάζοντας igitur Aristoteles dicit contingere ea loca quae non oportet.[139]

85. Idem dicit, quotiens torus in fronte est superpositus superciliis, inquietos esse ac furiosos vel ut ipse nominavit ἄνους καὶ φρενετικοὺς[140] καὶ μωρούς. idem dicit eos qui colorem varium habent tanquam lente aspersum, quos φακώδεις[141] Graeci appellant, vitam turpem, facta turpia exercere tam mulieres quam mares. idem dicit imperitos ac rusticos esse qui cum incedunt brachia inferunt et immoderate commovent et qui calcaneis innituntur. idem dicit eos quibus parvum est veretrum atque siccum, mulieribus esse deditos et quibus etiam cum non intenditur rectum est et qui feminis proximos habent vultus et ceteram corporis speciem, masculis autem esse deditos, qui corpore et vultu sunt virili et qui alterum ex oculis habent glaucum. ita et de mulieribus dicit mulieres coire cum mulieribus, quarum species est muliebris, masculis autem magis deditas, quae magis ad virilem speciem respondent, quae ἀρρενικαὶ dicuntur. qui virilia habent magna laneaque, stolidi sunt. idem dicit eos qui cum ambulant calcaneis introrsum, pedibus autem forinsecus conversis incedunt, posteriora sectari. idem dicit attemptantibus se facilem esse qui in alios turpis est, qui vultum gerat femininum et qui nigrum quod est intra oculum aliquanto pinguius habeat et qui laevum oculum glaucum gerat.

86. Idem Aristoteles dicit sensibus esse eos tardiores, quorum crura incurva sunt, quae Graece ῥοικὰ[142] dicuntur: quos certum est detrectatione potius delectari. ἀδόλεσχοι vero[143] sunt otiosi homines convenientes ad locum certum ineptisque narrationibus studentes et stolidis. ἀδολέσχους Aristoteles dicit esse, quibus aures magnae et ad vultum conversae sunt pedesque in modum falcium recurvi et quorum voci insonant nares et quorum latera tumida sunt ac recurva et quorum ἰσχία introrsum retracta sunt. idem dicit colorem plumbo similem et qui distinctus est maculis rotundis, quem ipse μολύβδινον appellat,

[137] Lacuna indicated by André ('parum integra' Foerster).

[138] Following André rather than Foerster's *qui haec ita dicebat, †considerandum in quo statu oris vel motus σαρκασμός dicitur*. In fact further emendation seems necessary, e.g. *qui haec ita dicebat, considerandum in quo statu oris et vultus fuerit. hoc vultu qui frequenter sunt absque indignatione, Graece σαρκάζειν dicuntur.* 'It must be considered in what state were the mouth and face of whoever said this. Those who have this face frequently, without any cause to be indignant, are said in Greek to σαρκάζειν ("be sarcastic").' *et vultus* picks up the shaking of the face mentioned above and provides an antecedent for *vultu* in the next sentence; *fuerit* must be supplied (Foerster himself suggests *in quo statu oris vel motu fuerit*); *Graece* is added on the basis of Anon. Lat.'s practice elsewhere (e.g. 83); and σαρκασμός *dicitur* is deleted as a near-dittography of what is found in the following sentence.

The man who said this...[137] it must be considered with what position or movement of the mouth σαρκασμός ('sarcasm') is spoken.[138] Those who have this face frequently without any cause to be indignant are said to σαρκάζειν ('be sarcastic'). And so Aristotle said that σαρκάζοντες ('those being sarcastic') touch those places they should not touch.[139]

85. He says that as often as there is a protuberance on the brow above the eyebrows, men are disturbed and mad, or as he puts it himself: ἄνοι καὶ φρενιτικοί[140] καὶ μωροί ('mindless and delirious and stupid'). He says that those who have a variegated colour, as if sprinkled with lentils, which the Greeks call φακώδεις[141] ('lentilled'), lead a disgraceful life and perform disgraceful deeds, women as much as men. He says that those who, when they walk, carry their arms and move immoderately and lean on their heels, are unskilled and rustic. He says that those whose penis is small and dry are devoted to women, as also are those whose penis is straight without erection and whose face and the rest of whose bodily appearance is like a woman's. But those who have a manly body and face and one eye which is light blue are devoted to men. So he says about women too, that women whose appearance is feminine have intercourse with women, but that those whose appearance corresponds more with that of a man, who are called ἀρρενικαί ('masculine'), are more devoted to men. Men who have large and woolly privates are stupid. He said that those who, when they walk, walk with their heels turned in and their feet turned out, go for the rear. He says that a man who behaves disgracefully with others, who wears a female face, and whose pupils are rather glossy and whose left eye is light blue, is easy prey for those who make attempts on him.

86. Aristotle says that those whose shanks are curved, what the Greeks call ῥοικά[142] ('bow-legged'), are fairly slow in their senses, and that it is certain that they are rather attracted to doing people down. But[143] men who are at leisure and meet in a certain place to devote themselves to foolish and stupid stories are ἀδόλεσχοι ('idle-talkers'). Aristotle says that those whose ears are big and turned towards their faces, whose feet are curved like a sickle, whose voices are nasal, whose sides are swollen and curved, and whose ἰσχία ('hips') are drawn back inwards, are ἀδόλεσχοι. He says that a colour which is like lead and which is marked with round spots, which he himself called μολύβδινον ('leaden'), and

[139] André (1981) 147 n. 6 ad p. 113 discusses possible meanings incl. obscene ones.

[140] Foerster's emendation of Molinius' non-existent φρενήτους.

[141] Foerster's emendation of Molinius' non-existent φακώθεις.

[142] Foerster's emendation of Molinius' ῥοιή ('pomegranate').

[143] Foerster emends MSS *enim* ('for') to *vero*. But see n. 98.

omnemque sordidum colorem cutemque crassam ac rugosam, rotundum ventrem et prominentem quibusque caro durior est et quibus surae crassae atque nervosae sunt et quibus vultus naresque crassae sunt, stoliditatis omnia haec esse indicia. deinde Aristoteles dicit invidos esse, qui sinistras partes maiores habent et quibus supercilia ad oculos detracta sunt.

87. De maledicis idem dicit, ubi ea pars quae super gingivas et oram labii superioris est eminet, id est medietas eius spatii quod inter nares est oramque labii superioris, maledicum designari. idem dicit maledicos esse, quibus labium superius altum est, vultus pronior hispidus subrubeus vel ut ipse dixit ὑπέρυθρος. accipitur autem ἐρυθρὸν[144] in aliis rebus et ceteris animalibus magis de salacibus. idem dicit suras cum retractae sunt ad genua vel suffragines, indicare hominem qui ad coitum facilis sit et velox. idem dicit femur cum nimia carne circumdatum est, femininum potius videri, siccius solidisque ossibus virtuti assignari.[145] idem dicit cum hispida nimium sunt femina et crura, pronos in venerem ostendere. refertur hoc ad capros.[146] idem Aristoteles dicit nates sicciores viriles esse, nates amplis carnibus effeminatum ostendere. referri hoc ad ἐπιπρέπειαν. nates autem tanquam abscisas malignitatis esse signa. refertur hoc ad ursum et simiam.[147]

88. Idem dicit pantomimis et aleae deditos esse, qui brachium ab humero usque ad cubitum brevius habent quam est spatium ab humero usque ad caput summum.[148] isdem vitiis attineri dicit eum qui femina parva, crura autem habet longiora. idem dicit tristes id est δυσθύμους esse, quibus vultus omnis rugosus est. idem dicit parva corpora velocia. cum autem[149] sicca caro est in parvo corpore colorque calidus,[150] inefficacem hominem ostendit.[151] cum vero magno corpori caro mollis est, quae ὑγρὰ Graece dicitur, vel color est frigidus, inefficaces sunt.[152] color autem calidus niger est, subniger, ignitus, rubeus, color frigidus albus est, medius inter nigrum et <album>[153] pallidus, quem Graeci μελάγχλωρον vocant, habetur. et calidi coloris signum, ut supra dictum est, meridianae plagae, frigidi septentrionali attributum est. rursum cum corpus parvum molli id est ὑγρᾷ carne circumdatum est et colorem ex frigidioribus sortitum est, facile perficit coepta et est efficax.[154] corpus autem magnum cum sicca carne circumdatum est et colorem ex calidioribus sumpsit, efficax est vigetque sensibus.[155]

[144] Foerster's emendation of Molinius' ἐρίηρον ('faithful').
[145] Ps.-Arist. 810^{a}28–30.
[146] Ps.-Arist. 812^{b}13–14.
[147] Ps.-Arist. 810^{b}1–4.
[148] Ps.-Arist. 808^{a}31–32.
[149] Foerster emends MSS *igitur* ('therefore') to *autem*.

every dirty colour, a thick and wrinkly skin, a round and prominent stomach, rather hard flesh and thick and sinewy calves, and thick noses and faces, are all signs of stupidity. Finally Aristotle says that those whose left parts are larger and whose eyebrows are drawn down towards their eyes, are envious.

87. He says about abusive men that when that part which is above the gums and the edge of the upper lip, that is the middle of that space which is between the nose and the edge of the upper lip, sticks out, an abusive man is indicated. He says that abusive men are those whose upper lip is high and whose face is leaning forward, hairy and slightly red, or as he himself puts it, ὑπέρυθρος ('slightly red'). But ἐρυθρόν[144] is usually applied in other things and other animals more to those which are lustful. He says that when calves are turned back towards the knees or hams, they indicate a man who is well-disposed and quick to sexual intercourse. He says that when a thigh is surrounded with excessive flesh it seems more feminine, but when it is drier, with solid bones, it is assigned to manliness.[145] He says that when the thighs and shanks are hairy they show men who are inclined to sex; this is referred to goats.[146] He says that drier buttocks are manly; that buttocks with ample flesh show an effeminate man. This is referred to the ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall appearance'). But buttocks which seem to have been cut away are signs of malice. This refers to the bear and the ape.[147]

88. He says that those whose arm from the shoulder to the elbow is shorter than the distance from the shoulder to the top of the head are addicted to pantomimes and gambling.[148] He says that the man who has small thighs, but longer shanks, is afflicted by the same vices. He says that those whose whole face is wrinkly are sad, that is δύσθυμοι. He says that small bodies are fast. And[149] when the flesh in a small body is dry and the colour hot,[150] it shows an ineffectual man.[151] But when the flesh on a large body is soft, which is called ὑγρά in Greek, or the colour is cold, they are ineffectual.[152] A hot colour is black, blackish, fiery or red, and a cold colour is white or pale between black and white,[153] which the Greeks call μελάγχλωρον ('sallow'). And the sign of a warm colour, as has been said above, belongs to the southern zone; the sign of a cold colour belongs to the north. Again, when a small body is surrounded with soft, that is ὑγρά, flesh and has one of the colder colours, it easily completes what it has begun and is effectual.[154] But when a large body is surrounded by dry flesh and takes one of the hotter colours, it is effectual and is strong in the senses.[155]

[150] Foerster emends MSS *candidus* ('white') to *calidus*, presumably on the basis of what follows.
[151] Ps.-Arist. 813^b11–16.
[152] Ps.-Arist. 813^b16–20.
[153] On Foerster's suggestion, rather than MSS *medius inter nigrum et pallidum* ('in-between black and pale'—referring, nonsensically, to white). *Cf.* 91.
[154] Ps.-Arist. 813^b20–3.
[155] Ps.-Arist. 813^b23–7.

89. Haec sunt quae apud Loxum et Aristotelem notanda esse credidimus, quae etiam a Palemone vel non dicta vel aliter dicta esse perspeximus. in ceteris enim propemodum omnibus hi tres auctores sibimet consentiunt. quoniam igitur et signa membrorum et significationes ipsae signorum propemodum expositae atque enumeratae sunt tanquam prima elementa, ut supra diximus,[156] litterarum, nunc concipiamus atque constituamus species aliquas ex pluribus, sicut ex litteris syllabae constituuntur, ut informati a paucis exemplis tam Aristotelis quam Palemonis etiam per nosmet ipsos interpretari ac sociare signa valeamus et de moribus hominum instructi esse possimus, quamquam et superius nonnulla huiusmodi habeantur exempla.

90. Constituamus virum fortem. recto corpore debet esse, latera, articuli, ima pedum manuumque solida, ossa grandia, capillus durior, venter latus, aliquanto cavus, humeri fortes, scapulae seiunctae, pectus et metaphrena solida, ἰσχίον durum, surae solidae, crura non indigentia carnis, imi pedes discreti articulis, color acrior magis quam pressior, acies oculi velox humida, oculi non satis grandes non nimium patentes nec nimium conclusi, supercilia non extenta, frons nec levis nimium nec nimium aspera, vox durior ac vehementior, magnanimitate praecellens,[157] anhelitus quoque tranquillus: huiusmodi viro virtus et fortitudo assignanda est.

91. Timidus et imbecillis capillo est molliore omnique figura remissiore, collo longiore, colore nigro vel pallido vel albo, sed et cum pallore albo, oculis siccis perturbatis, palpebris citis atque mobilibus, anhelitu pavido, cruribus tenuibus, ima parte spinae, quae Graece ὀσφὺς dicitur, longa, pectore imbecilli, manibus longissimis, voce molli ac sonora. his timidus, ut diximus,[158] indiciis declaratur.

92. Ingeniosus esse debet non satis procerus nec brevis, coloris albi, cui sit permixtus etiam rubor, capillo flavo non adeo crispo sed nec extenso, corpore recto, membris magnis, articulis discretis, carne moderata, aliquanto molliore, crura feminaque habens modice pleniora, suras robustas, manuum pedumque articulos fortes, digitos simplices[159] moderate prolixos a se separatos, vultus non refertos carnibus nec nimium exiles, oculos humidos splendidos χαροπούς.

[156] Ch. 3.

[157] Cf. André ad loc. Foerster suggests that *magna, claritate praecellens* ('a rather harsh and strong and loud voice, pre-eminent in clarity') should be read instead of *magnanimitate praecellens* on the basis of Ad. B44 and Leiden ch. 53.

89. These are the things in Loxus and Aristotle which we believe should be noted, and which we have seen were either not mentioned or were differently expressed by Polemon; for in almost all other respects these three writers agree with each other. Since therefore the signs of the parts and the actual significations of the signs have more or less been set out and enumerated, like the basic letters of the alphabet, as we put it above,[156] let us now proceed to establish and define certain types of appearance on the basis of multiple signs, just as syllables are made up of letters, so that informed by a few examples in Aristotle and Polemon we ourselves shall be able to interpret and associate signs and be instructed about the characters of men—though several examples of this sort have been treated already.

90 (= B44). Let us define the brave man. He should have an upright body, with solid sides, joints, and extremities of feet and hands; he should have large bones, rather stiff hair, a broad, rather hollow stomach, strong shoulders, separated shoulder-blades, a hard chest and upper back, a hard ἰσχίον ('hip'), solid calves, legs not lacking flesh, the extremities of the feet well jointed, a brighter rather than a more subdued colour, a swift, moist look in the eyes, which should not be too big nor too open nor too shut, eyebrows which are not wide, a brow neither too smooth nor too rough, a rather harsh, strong voice, excelling in nobility,[157] and his breathing should be peaceful. Manliness and courage should be assigned to a man of this sort.

91 (= B45). The timid and weak man has softer hair and his whole figure is slacker, his neck longer, his colour black or pallid or white, but white with pallor too, his eyes dry and disturbed, his eyelids swift and mobile, his breath quaking, his legs thin, the bottom of his back, which is called the ὀσφύς ('loin') in Greek, long, his chest weak, his hands very long, his voice soft and sonorous. The timid man, as we have said,[158] is revealed by these signs.

92 (= B46). The talented man should be neither very tall nor too short, white-coloured with a mixture of red too, with blond hair which is neither too curly nor too straight, an upright body, large limbs, separate joints, a moderate amount of flesh which is rather soft, with shanks and thighs which are slightly thick, strong calves, strong joints in the hands and feet, distinct[159] digits which are moderately long and separated from each other, a face neither packed with flesh nor excessively thin, and eyes which are moist, bright, and χαροποί ('dark blue').

[158] Various passages: chs. 14, 23, 41, 53, 73, 67, 77, 79, 90.

[159] *simplices*, i.e. 'on their own'; as André points out (1981: 148 n. 6 ad p. 122), Anon. Lat. read the ἁπλοῖ ('simple') of Ps.-Pol. rather than Ad.'s ἁπαλοί ('delicate').

93. Qui sine sensu est, ita esse debet: albus nimis vel nimis niger, carne ambiri nimia, ventre ultra modum prominere, crassis cruribus, parvis articulis obligatis atque constrictis, iugulis nimium coniunctis atque conclusis, cervice vasta brevique, ima manuum pedumque habere debet imperfecta, malas et genas congestas carnibus, frontem rotundam, aciem oculorum non penetrabilem nec efficacem sed patulam.

94.[160] Impudens homo ita esse debet: oculis patentibus lucidis, palpebris plurimum reseratis,[161] crassis pedibus et manibus,[162] contra intuens, altius se erigens, rubicundus colore, vocis acutae. huiusmodi impudens, iniuriosus homo est.

95. Constituamus hominem temperatum atque moderatum. vox est in eo gravior, tardus incessus, motus palpebrarum temperatus nec spissus nec per longum intervallum, χαροπός, cuius non tam perluceant oculi quam humorem proferant, vultus rubori honesto permixtus.

96. Homo securus ita intelligitur: frontem habet non tenui cute sed pleniore carne contectam, eandem levem et humilem atque omnem vultum in plenitudine magis quam in macie constitutum eundemque vultum tanquam ex somno vel somno proximum, oculos humidos perlucidos sine vitio intuentes, qui etiam tranquille moveatur et mansueta voce sit.

97. Tristis homo ita intelligitur: vultus tenuis, frons rugosa, supercilia introrsus conversa, cilia intenta.

98. Qui inter virum est et feminam, quem Graeci ἀνδρόγυνον vocant, ita intelligitur: oculos habet humidos, qui impudenter intuentur, cuius quatiuntur et circumvolant pupillae, cuius frons contrahitur et malae, cuius non stant supercilia, cuius inclinata est cervix, cuius ὀσφὺς id est ima pars spinae non quiescit, cuius omnes artus incerti status sunt, qui insilit frequenter imis pedibus et calcaneis saepius insurgit, qui genua collidit, qui resupinatas plerumque manus praemovet, qui se circumspicit, qui voce est tenui et tanquam quae insonet gutturi, cuius vox prope garrula nec ingrata[163] interdum est nec interest an nimium tarda vox sit an praeceps.

[160] It is not clear why André (1981: 148 n. 5 ad p. 123, cf. 129 n. 1) denies the connection with Ad. B48.

[161] Foerster emends MSS *separatis* ('separated') to *reseratis*. Cf. chs. 39 and 41. He also conjectures that *crassis* ('thick') should be inserted from some MSS on the basis of Ad. B48.

93 (= B47). The man who is without sense should be as follows: too white or too black, surrounded with excessive flesh, his stomach should stick out beyond what is moderate, he should have thick legs, small joints which are bound up and compacted, excessively joined and closed collar-bones, a thick and short neck, the extremities of his hands and feet should be imperfect, his cheek-bones and cheeks congested with flesh, his brow round, and the gaze of his eyes neither penetrating nor effectual, but open.

94 (= B48).[160] The impudent man should be as follows: he should have open, bright eyes, eyelids very open,[161] thick feet and hands,[162] be looking straight at you, raising himself up, red in colour and with a sharp voice. An impudent and harmful man is of this type.

95 (= B49). Let us define the temperate and moderate man. His voice is rather deep, his gait slow, the movement of his eyelids temperate—neither frequent nor with long pauses, χαροπός ('dark blue-eyed'), a man whose eyes do not gleam as much as they show moisture, and whose face is coloured with a noble red.

96 (= B50). The carefree man should be understood as follows: his brow does not have thin skin, but is covered with rather thick flesh, it is also smooth and flat; his whole face is thicker rather than thin as if he had just woken up or were about to fall asleep, his eyes are moist and very bright and look without vice, and he also moves peacefully and has a gentle voice.

97 (= B51). The sad man should be understood as follows: his face is thin, his brow wrinkly, his eyebrows turned in and his eyelids taut.

98 (= B52). The man who is between a man and a woman, whom the Greeks call ἀνδρόγυνος ('androgynous'), should be recognized as follows: he has moist eyes which gaze impudently, his pupils dart and fly around, his brow and cheek-bones are drawn in, his eyebrows do not stand still, his neck is curved, his ὀσφύς ('loins'), that is the lower part of the back, is not still, all his limbs are in an agitated state, he frequently leaps up on his toes and often raises himself on his heels, his knees knock, he mostly moves his hands palm upwards, he looks about himself, his noise is thin as if the sound is in the throat, his voice is very prattling, sometimes not displeasing,[163] and it makes no difference whether his voice is excessively slow or very fast.

[162] Rose conjectured that *naribus* ('nose') should be read instead of *manibus* on the basis of Ad. B48. But Foerster draws attention to Leiden ch. 57.

[163] Foerster argues that *nec ingrata* here is corrupt, but cf. Ad. B52.

99. Qui amarus est et litigiosus his indiciis apparebit: subrideat necesse est, quod Graeci σεσηρέναι[164] dicunt, quod <in> talium vultibus {hunc}[165] iracundia facere consuevit, prope pallebit, ovatis palpebris et siccis oculis intuebitur, frontem habebit rugosam, vocem violentam,[166] anhelitum spissum, manus saepe collidet vel inter se complicabit, solum pedibus saepius tundet.

100. Mansuetum ingenium tale est: vultus omnis iocundus, carne molli, quam Graeci ὑγρὰν vocant, et aliquanto pleniore circumdatus, membra moderata, oculi tranquilli tardi, motus omnis corporis tardus, vox gravior remissa, ultima linea capillorum capitis superius erecta.

101. Εἴρωνας Graeci dicunt occultos aliquanto et obscurae mentis homines, quorum os tamdiu fictum atque simulatum est et qui sibimet derogant id quod in aliis praeferunt, quoadusque obtineant quod proposuerunt obtinere.[167] εἴρων ergo est qui circa oculos cutem habet relaxatam, oculos instructos ad speciem bonitatis, vocem summissam facilem ac volubilem, cuius incessus et sermo[168] ita moderatus est, ut ῥυθμῷ id est numero proximus esse possit.

102. Qui pecuniae cupidi sunt, ita sunt: parvis membris, parvis oculis, parvis vultibus, celeri incessu, incurvi,[169] celeri voce et acuta et quorum vultus[170] tanquam rubore superfusus esse videatur.

103.[171] Homo hirsutus capillis nigris directis, hirsuto ore ac mento et temporibus, oculis pinguibus relucentibus furiosis erit pronus in libidinem,[172] studiosus pantomimorum et maledicus.[173]

[164] Foerster's correction of Molinius' σηρέναι.

[165] Adding, on Foerster's suggestion, *in* before *talium* and deleting *hunc*.

[166] Following Foerster's conjecture, on the basis of Ad. B53 and Leiden ch. 66, that *vocem violentam* should be read instead of MSS *faciem vinolentam* ('drunken face'). A has *faciem violentam* ('violent face').

[167] L, although not A, has *certis signis atque indiciis detegantur* ('they may be detected by sure signs and indications') here, and Foerster wonders whether it should be inserted.

[168] Foerster conjectures that *sermo* should be amended to *motus* ('movement') on the basis of Ad. B55.

99 (= B53). The man who is bitter and contentious will be apparent by these signs: he is bound to grimace, what the Greeks call σεσηρέναι[164] ('to grin'), because this is what anger tends to do on the faces of such men;[165] he will be very pale; he will look with oval-shaped eyelids and dry eyes; he will have a wrinkly brow, a violent voice,[166] rapid breath, he will often beat or fold his hands together and he will often stamp the ground with his feet.

100 (= B54). The gentle character is as follows: the whole face is jovial, surrounded with flesh which is soft (which the Greeks call ὑγρά) and quite thick, the limbs are of moderate size, the eyes are peaceful and slow, the movement of the whole body is slow, the voice is rather deep and relaxed, and the fringe of hair on the head is raised up.

101 (= B55). The Greeks call men who are rather secretive and have a dissimulating mind εἴρωνες ('dissemblers'), and their mouth is fixed and counterfeit and they reject for themselves what they esteem in others for just as long as it takes them to get what they have determined to get.[167] And so an εἴρων is a man who has relaxed skin around his eyes, eyes ordered for the appearance of goodness, a subdued, ready and voluble voice, a gait and speech[168] so regular that they could be ῥυθμῷ, i.e. in time.

102 (= B56). Those who are desirous of money are as follows: they have small limbs, small eyes, small faces, a fast gait, they stoop,[169] they have a fast and sharp voice, and their face[170] seems to be as it were infused with red.

103 (= B57).[171] The man who is hairy with straight black hair, a hairy mouth and chin and temples, and who has glossy, reflecting, mad eyes, will be quick to lust,[172] is keen on pantomimes, and is abusive.[173]

[169] Foerster emends MSS *iniuriosi* ('harmful') to *incurvi* on the basis of Ad. B56.

[170] Foerster emends the various MSS readings on the basis of Ad. 56.

[171] The MSS place this chapter after 104. Foerster, followed by André, rightly transposes it on the basis of Ad. B57 and Leiden ch. 65.

[172] Foerster conjectures that *pronus in vini libidinem* ('quick in his desire for wine') should be read instead of *pronus in libidinem* on the basis of Ad. B57.

[173] Foerster emends MSS *maledicus* to *aleae deditus* ('addicted to gambling') on the basis of Ad. B57. But André (1981) 126 n. 5 notes the irrationality of the change given other inconsistencies with Ad. B57.

104. Sunt quidam homines cum stultitia nocentes, qui Graece μωροβλάπται dicuntur. hi signorum non una ratione noscuntur. nam interdum animalia signa gerunt, quae explorata atque perspecta dabunt etiam in uno homine utriusque rei intellectum. in quibusdam autem hominibus signa quidem sunt stultitiae, verum eadem exasperata atque efferata. quo igitur magis hoc clarum atque certum sit, respiciamus ad ea animalia,[174] quorum unum quidem genus est atque unum nomen, animus autem et corporis qualitas diversa atque discreta. nam quemadmodum ovis mansueta est, ita et alia animalia, ut asinus et capra et equus et sus et multa alia. sed quae mansueta magis sunt, et molliora sunt ac leviora et tranquilliora, quae vero ferociora, sicciora sunt et asperiora et vehementiora. ita in hominibus[175] ergo interdum stultitia ipsa ferocior asperior horridior est, interdum affabilior[176] ac lenior. nec solam stultitiam putemus vel stultitiae signa hanc habere discretionem: sunt et alia vitia quae in animi motibus denotantur interdum nocentiora, <interdum leniora>[177] {sunt} et signorum duritia vel mollitia atque vel inaffectata simplicitate vel exquisita et elaborata simplicitate discernuntur atque noscuntur. nam et hominibus duobus iniustis propositis alter mollius et affabilius, alter atrocius ac violentius iniustus existit, et intemperantia est quaedam mollior, est et vehementior. et qui molles sunt, pars mansueti, pars bruti atque efferati[178] sunt.

105.[179]... his igitur indiciis quibus stoliditas denotatur si accedant, ut supra diximus, quae ferociora sunt aut asperiora aut vehementiora aut sicciora aut intenta, etiam malitia non inferior quam stultitia adiudicanda est. redeamus nunc ad superiorem speciem. quo igitur indicio in eo corpore nocentem stultitiam deprehendamus, in quo partim malitiae, partim stultitiae signa sunt, exemplum quod Palemon auctor huius speciei ex homine temporis sui posuit quem sceleratissimum fuisse asseveravit prosequamur.[180] de homine vero dicit cuius erat nocens stultitia capillo fuisse tenso[181] eodemque horrido tanquam ex frigore, capite angusto obliquo, auribus ingentibus inclinatis ac propemodum infractis, cervice dura, temporibus rotundis non levibus sed ut ipse Palemon nominat γλαφυροῖς; frons in eo fuit angusta et aspera, oculi parvi tenebrosi sicci cavi subdiffluentes rigidi, genae angustae prolixae, labia[182] longissima, os longe rescissum patens semper ac si incisus vultus esset, omne intervallum oris

[174] Foerster emends the MSS *alia* ('other things') to *animalia*.

[175] Foerster argues, on the basis of Ad. B59, that several words have dropped out here. If so, the sense is not affected.

[176] Foerster emends the *fallacior* ('more deceitful') of L and A and the *facilior* ('easier') of Molinius to *affabilior*. See below in the same chapter.

[177] Foerster inserts *interdum leniora* on the basis of Ad. B59.

[178] Foerster emends the *effeminati* ('effeminate') of L and the *effrenati* ('unbridled') of A and Molinius to *efferati*. But note Ad. B59 'androgynous'.

104 (= B58–9). There are certain men who are harmful and stupid, who are called μωροβλάπται ('harmfully stupid') in Greek. These are not recognized by one system of signs; for sometimes they have signs which belong to animals, which when investigated and perceived will give, even in one man, a recognition of both faults. And in some men there are signs of stupidity, but they are aggravated and savage. And so that this might be clearer and more certain, let us look at those animals[174] which have one type and one name, but whose minds and bodily qualities are diverse and separate; for just as a sheep is tame, so other animals are too, such as the ass, the nannygoat, the horse, the pig, and many others. But those which are tamer are also softer and smoother and more peaceful, but those which are wilder are drier and rougher and more violent. (B59) And so sometimes in men[175] stupidity itself is wilder and rougher and fiercer; sometimes it is more affable[176] and gentler. And let us not think that only stupidity or the signs of stupidity have this distinction: there are other vices too, denoted in the movements of the mind, which are sometimes more harmful, sometimes gentler,[177] and they are discerned and recognized by the hardness or softness of the signs and by the fact that their simplicity is either unaffected or studied and artificial; for if there are two unjust men, one is more softly and affably unjust and the other is more fiercely and violently so, and one intemperance is softer, and another more ardent. And of those who are soft, some are gentle and some are brutal and savage.[178]

105.[179] And so, if, as we said above, those things which are wilder or rougher or more violent or drier or strained are added to these signs by which we denote stupidity, judge that the malice too is not inferior to the stupidity. Let us return now to the above type of appearance. To indicate how we might detect harmful stupidity in that body, in which there are the signs of both malice and stupidity, let us present an example of this type which our authority Polemon recorded in a man of his own time, who he asserted was the worst of criminals.[180] (B60) He says that the man who was harmfully stupid had straightened[181] hair which was also bristling as if from the cold, a narrow and oblique head, huge ears drooping and nearly bent back, a hard neck and round temples which were not smooth, but, as Polemon himself has it, γλαφυροί ('hollow'); his brow was narrow and rough, his eyes small, dark, dry, hollow, a bit watery, and staring; his cheeks were narrow and long, his lips[182] very long; his mouth was split wide apart, was always

[179] Foerster comments that the signs of stupidity (Ad. B60) have dropped out here. André notes the existence of ch. 93.

[180] The example has not been preserved in the drastically abbreviated Leiden ch. 65.

[181] Foerster emends s's *denso* ('thick') to *tenso* on the basis of Ad. B60 and Anon. Lat.'s practice elsewhere.

[182] Foerster emends s's *labia* to *barba* ('beard') on the basis of Ad. B60, where, however, γένειον almost certainly means 'chin'.

eius apertum, incurvus ipse, utero prominente, cruribus crassis, articulis manuum et pedum vastis atque duris, quod est proprium stultorum, colore subpallido, tumentibus ciliis ita ut semper eum <crapula>[183] vel somno pressum esse diceres, vox ovium similis impudens deformis detestabilis. praeterea humeros eidem et palpebras spasmus frequentissime contrahebat; qui ita taedio et intemperantia agebatur, ut dentibus barbam absumeret semper atque ederet, ex mento autem vel alios longe positos capillos manu intorquens ori devorandos applicabat. hic autem homo omnes feras secundum Palemonis sententiam et omnes homines sui temporis malitia malos, stultitia stultos supergressus est et utriusque speciei larga et clara indicia homo unus hic edidit.

106.[184] Nunc autem primo dicendum est de inverecundis. qui inverecundus est, ita esse debet: patulis oculis lucidis, palpebris crassis et sanguinolentis, aliquanto incurvus, scapulis in acutum eminentibus, non tamen erectus, <verum>[185] pronior, mobilis, aspersus rubore, sublucente intrinsecus sanguinolento colore, vultu rotundo, pectore superius retracto, inferiore palpebra magis crassa; et quibus caput in modum mallei prolixum est et prominet ante ac retro, et quibus cutis oris tensa est, inverecundi sunt.

107. Honestas morum et tranquillitas hominis qui Graece κόσμιος[186] dicitur his indiciis colligenda est: movetur tardius, loquitur gravius, vocem infirmi potius spiritus quam expressam et claram habet,[187] quam Graeci κοιλοστομίαν vocant, oculis erit non perlucidis, magis[188] nigris, non satis clausis nec <patulis>,[189] <palpebris>[190] tardis: palpebras enim celeres diximus alias imbellem, alias calidum indicare.

108. Homo animosus, qui Graece θυμοειδής dicitur, ita erit: corpore rectus, lateribus idoneus, artus omnibus membris atque concinnus, prope rubicundus. huius scapulae grandes separatae latae, extremitates pedum et manuum grandes tenaces, leve pectus, levia inguina, barba facile increscens, ultima linea capillorum capitis deorsum demissa, frons rotunda, capillus non planus, sed assurgens; supercilia trucia atque subrecta habebit et nares in origine sua id est super cilia aliquanto inferiores.

[183] Foerster inserts *crapula* on the basis of B60.
[184] See n. on ch. 94.
[185] Foerster inserts *verum* on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 807b32.
[186] Foerster's emendation of Molinius' non-existent λόις.

open, and, as if his face had been sundered, the whole aperture of the mouth was open; he himself stooped, with a prominent paunch, thick legs, solid and hard joints in his hands and feet (which is a property of stupid people), a rather pale colour, swollen eyelids so that you would say that he was always afflicted by a hangover[183] or by sleep; and his voice was like that of sheep and he was impudent, ugly and abominable. Moreover spasms very frequently contracted his shoulders and his eyelids. He was so driven by disgust and intemperance that he was always laying hold of and nibbling his beard with his teeth, and he would twist the hairs on his chin or other longer hairs with his hand and bring them to his mouth to consume them. This man, in Polemon's opinion, excelled in malice all those wild beasts and all his contemporaries who were bad, and in stupidity all those who were stupid, and this one man produced large and clear indications of both sorts of appearance.

106 (= B48).[184] But now we must first talk about those who are shameless. The man who is shameless should be as follows: he should have bright, open eyes, thick and blood-shot eyelids, he should stoop considerably, he should have shoulder-blades which stick out into a point, he should not be upright, but[185] rather inclined, mobile, flecked with red, with a shade which glows inside and is blood-coloured, a round face, a chest turned in above, the lower eyelid thicker. Those whose head is long like a mallet and is prominent both before and behind and whose skin on the mouth is stretched are shameless.

107. Nobility of character and peacefulness in a man, who is called κόσμιος[186] ('orderly') in Greek, is to be inferred from these signs: he moves rather slowly, he speaks rather deeply, he has[187] a voice more of weak breath than distinct and clear, which the Greeks call κοιλοστομία ('hollowness of voice'), he will not have very bright eyes, but rather[188] black ones, neither very closed nor open,[189] and slow eyelids:[190] for we said that some swift eyelids indicate a pusillanimous man, others a hot-tempered man.

108. The spirited man, who is called θυμοειδής in Greek, will be as follows: upright of body, with neat flanks, compact and shapely in all limbs, very red. His shoulder-blades are large, separate, and broad, the extremities of his hands and feet are large and gripping, his chest is smooth, his groin smooth, his beard grows easily, the fringe of hair on his head is pushed down, his brow is round, his hair not flat but sticking up; he will have savage and raised eyebrows and his nose at its top, that is above the upper eyelids, is rather low.

[187] Foerster replaces the MSS readings with *habet* on the basis of Anon. Lat.'s practice elsewhere.
[188] Foerster suggests that *magis* should be deleted on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 807^{b}36.
[189] Foerster inserts *patulis*, as the context demands.
[190] Foerster inserts *palpebris*.

109. Mansuetus homo ita intelligitur: erit solido ac forti vultu, carne ampliore ac molli id est ὑγρᾷ, corpore maiore magis quam minore, mensuris corporis inter se congruentibus, aliquanto resupinus, ultima linea capillorum capitis superius reducta, imae manus ac pedes γλαφυραί, γλαφυρὸν autem intelligendum est, quod non uniforme est nec congestum sed discretum tanquam interrasum vel insculptum.

110. Misericordem ex his intelliges: γλαφυροῖς membris esse debet, cuius nominis significationem supra insinuavimus, coloris albi, nitidis[191] oculis, naribus ex superiori parte tenuioribus. huiusmodi homines et ad lacrimas sunt faciles, mulieribus dediti et edunt facilius sobolem femininam, moribus autem propemodum uniformes.[192]

111.[193] Qui amoribus est deditus ita intelligitur: memor esse debet, ingeniosus, calidus, oculos habere prope lacrimantes et prope pallidos.

112.[194] Libidinosi et intemperantes libidinum ita sunt: color albus, corpus hispidum rectis capillis,[195] partes oris hispidae directis et solidis capillis et nigris, item tempora hispida similibus capillis. oculos habebunt pinguiores[196] humidos, crura tenuia nervis intenta atque hispida, ventrem pinguem, mentum reflexum <ad>[197] nares ita ut inter nares et mentum cava sit quaedam planities, et quibus vena in brachiis[198] est, et qui in palpebris capillos raros et defluentes habent.

113.[199] Loquaces sunt, qui superiores partes corporis multo maiores habent quam inferiores ab inguine, qui vultus habent γλαφυρούς (supra autem expositum est hoc nomen), qui ventrem hispidum habent.

114. Quibus memoria viget, superiores partes corporis minores habent, easdem etiam γλαφυρὰς et sicciores.[200]

115. Cinaedi autem, quos Graeci quidem κιναίδους dicunt,[201] ita sunt: inclinato ad <dextrum>[202] latus capite, coniunctis scapulis, qui extollunt calcanea, qui plerumque iunctos habent pedes, qui cum loquuntur glauciunt aliquatenus ut oves, qui narem suam respiciunt et qui narem digitis suis dirigunt atque fingunt, qui quod aut ipsi sputant aut alii sollicite calcant et obterunt, qui saepe inspiciunt partes eas sui corporis quas pulchriores sibi habere videntur, qui frequenter subrident loquentes, qui vocem tanquam perfractam habent, qui supercilia seiuncta, qui demissum superius cilium ita ut inferius occupetur, quibus salientibus etiam scapulae prosiliunt, qui movent corpus ut mulieres, qui brachia perversa habent et qui tunicam circa lumbos tendunt, qui cum rident clamant et qui frequenter manus aliorum apprehendunt.

[191] Foerster emends MSS *nigris* ('black') to *nitidis* on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 808^{a}34.

[192] Reading *uniformes* on Foerster's suggestion (Molinius has *uniformis*) instead of the majority reading *multiformes* ('multiform'); but cf. ch. 132.

[193] As André (1981) 149 n. 5 ad p. 131 notes, Anon. Lat. has created a new category from Ps.-Arist. 808^{a}37–8 by error (or, given his independent spirit, because it suited him).

[194] Corresponds to Ps.-Pol. B72 but not to anything in Ad. or Leiden.

[195] Foerster emends MSS *corpus hispidum, recti capilli* ('hairy body, straight hair') to *corpus hispidum rectis capillis* on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 808^{b}4–5.

[196] Foerster emends MSS *pigriores* ('rather sluggish') to *pinguiores* on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 808^{b}5.

[197] Foerster inserts *ad* on the basis of Ps.-Pol. B72.

[198] We must supply *clara* or similar. Cf. ch. 53.

[199] Corresponds to Ps.-Pol. B73.

[200] Foerster conjectures that *solidiores* ('harder') should be read instead of *sicciores* on the basis of Ps.-Arist. 808^{b}11.

109 (= B54). The gentle man is understood as follows: he will have a hard and strong face, with rather ample and soft, that is ὑγρά, flesh, a larger body rather than a smaller one, proportionate measurements of the body, he will lean backwards considerably, the fringe of hair on his head will be drawn back above, the extremities of his hands and the feet will be γλαφυραί ('hollow'), but γλαφυρόν is to be understood as that which is not uniform and not packed together, but is separated as if etched or sculpted.

110 (Ps.-Arist. $808^{a}34$–7). You will understand a sympathetic man from these signs: he should have γλαφυροί—as defined above—limbs, a white colour, bright[191] eyes, and a nose which is thinner towards the top. Men of this sort are quick to tears, devoted to women, and more readily produce female offspring, and are fairly uniform[192] in character.

111.[193] The man who is devoted to love affairs is understood as follows: he should have a good memory, be talented, impetuous, and have eyes which are very weeping and very pale.

112.[194] Lustful men and those who are intemperate in their desires are as follows: their colour is white, their body hairy with straight hair,[195] the parts of their mouths are hairy with straight, hard, black hair, and their temples are hairy with similar hair. They will have rather glossy[196] and moist eyes, thin, hairy legs which are taut with sinews, a fatty stomach, a chin turned up towards[197] the nose so that between the nose and the chin there is a hollow surface, and the vein in their arms is obvious,[198] and they have thin eyelashes which fall out.

113.[199] Garrulous men have the upper parts of their bodies much larger that the parts below the groin, they have γλαφυροί—this term has been explained above—faces, and have a hairy stomach.

114 (Ps.-Arist. $808^{b}10$–11). Those whose memory is good have smaller upper body parts, which are also γλαφυραί and drier.[200]

115. And deviants (*cinaedi*), whom Greeks indeed call κίναιδοι,[201] are as follows: their head is inclined to the right-hand[202] side, their collar-bones are joined, they lift their heels, they mostly have joined feet, they bleat in some degree like sheep when they talk, they look down their nose and adjust and shape their nose with their fingers, they carefully trample on and crush their spit or that of others, they often look at those parts of their own body which they find more beautiful, they frequently smile while talking, they have a voice that sounds as if it had been broken, they have separated eyebrows, they draw the upper eyelid down to cover the lower one, when they are jumping their shoulder-blades also leap forth, they move their body like women, they have crooked arms and stretch their tunic around their loins, they shout when they laugh and they frequently clasp the hands of others.

[201] Foerster reads *Molles autem, quos Graeci* κιναίδους *dicunt*, replacing MSS variations on *cinaedi* ('deviants') with *molles* ('soft men'), presumably because there would be no point in repeating the same word in Greek; but Molinius' text does this, and Anon. Lat. nowhere else uses *mollis* in this way. Foerster also replaces MSS *quidem* ('indeed') with *Graeci* ('Greeks'). While supplying *Graeci* seems right in order to provide a subject for *dicunt* ('call') and because Anon. Lat. has many examples of 'Greeks call/say, etc.', retaining *quidem*, of which Anon. Lat. is very fond, shows the author is signalling that Greek-speakers themselves use this word.

[202] Foerster inserts *dextrum* on the basis of ch. 55 and Ps.-Arist. $808^{a}13$.

116. Multis locis dictum est nimietates esse vitiosas et optimam esse medietatem,[203] sed nunc repetimus non certam[204] esse medietatem nec summo examine exploratum id quod medium est nec semper atque in omnibus praevalere, sed interdum temperamentum tunc optimum iudicari, cum non medium inter duas nimietates constituitur, sed cum magis ad partem alteram vergit. exemplis igitur duobus vel tribus propositis erit hoc manifestius, quae signa sint optima. diximus etenim <et altos et>[205] cavos oculos esse vitiosos. si igitur ad certam medietatem respiciamus, plani oculi erunt optimi; sed constituimus eos oculos esse optimos, qui aliquanto inferiores[206] sunt quam plani: refertur enim hoc ad leonem. diximus etiam enorme et nimium caput nec non et breve esse vitiosum:[207] secundum hanc igitur diffinitionem mediae magnitudinis caput optimum debuit iudicari, sed iudicatur optimum caput, quod aliquanto sit medio maius. item diximus os et cum breve est et cum enorme, esse vitiosum:[208] secundum haec igitur mediae magnitudinis os optimum esse debuit, sed non ita est: os enim tunc optimum est, cum aliquanto est maius quam medietas constituit: refertur enim etiam hoc ad leonem. secundum haec igitur exempla medietas non ex mensura nec modo neque pro ratione cum in diversos motus fuerit certa capienda est, sed prout eam ἐπιπρέπεια dictaverit, haec enim medietatis et temperaminis auctor esse debet.

117. Quae sit autem vis ἐπιπρεπείας, superius expositum est:[209] quae animum intuentis atque considerantis ad certae speciei similitudinem mox trahit, cum aut feminini aut masculini aut alicuius animalis ingenium imaginatur. ut autem etiam proprietates possis animalium colligere, pauca ex Loxo exempla proponemus. nam Palemon partem hanc operosius,[210] Aristoteles solito obscurius,[211] Loxus autem breviter quidem locum hunc sed planius est exsecutus, quod homines sint animalibus similes.

118. Equus animal erectum est atque exultans, in certando animosum, victoriae cupidum, non impatiens laboris. homines ergo qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur, capillo erunt tenso rubeo, genas habebunt maiores, collum longius, nares magis patulas, labium inferius demissum, erunt calidi[212] in venerem, iactantes sui, contentiosi nimium, sapientes minus.

119. Asinus animal est iners, frigidum, indocile, tardum, insolens, vocis ingratae. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, necesse est sint cruribus crassis, longo capite, auribus crassis longis, labiis demissis, voce deformi: qui sunt tardi, frigidi, penuriae atque iniuriae contemptores.

[203] Chs. 57, 73, 78.
[204] Amending *sinceram* ('pure') to *certam* on Foerster's suggestion. See below.
[205] Foerster inserts *et altos et*. Cf. 31 and 32.
[206] 'More recessed': *inferiores*; cf. Ad. B2; the establishment of this does not survive in Anon. Lat. as we have him.
[207] Ch. 16.
[208] Chs. 48, 122.

116. It has been said in many places that excesses are defective and that the mean is best,[203] but now we recall that the mean is not fixed,[204] that it is not found by exact calculation, and that it does not always, nor in all cases, prevail, but that sometimes the proportion should be judged best which lies not between two extremes, but verges more to one part. And so by two or three examples it will become clearer which signs are the best; for we said that high and[205] hollow eyes were defective. And so if we look to the fixed mean, flat eyes will be best; but we established that those eyes which were more recessed[206] than flat ones were the best, for this is referred to the lion. We also said that a huge and excessive head and a small head were defective.[207] And so following this distinction a head of medium size ought to be judged best; but that head which is somewhat larger than the mean is to be judged best. Again, we said that the mouth was defective when it was either small or huge.[208] And so following this a mouth of medium size should be best, but it is not so; for a mouth is best when it is considerably larger than the mean allows, for this too is referred to the lion. And so following these examples the mean should not be taken to be fixed by dimension or measure or in relation to different movements, but rather as the ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall appearance') dictates it, for this should be the reference point for mean and for proportion.

117. And the force of ἐπιπρέπεια ('overall appearance') has been explained above.[209] It is that which soon draws the mind of one studying or examining to the similarities with a particular type of appearance, when he pictures a female, male, or animal character. And so that you might be able to classify the qualities of the animals as well, we shall expound a few examples from Loxus; for Polemon went into this side, namely the correspondence between people and animals, too laboriously,[210] Aristotle more obscurely than his wont,[211] while Loxus treated it briefly but pretty clearly.

118. The horse is an upright and boastful animal, spirited when competing, desirous of victory, and not impatient of toil. And so men who are referred to this type of animal will have straight red hair, larger cheeks, a longer neck, wider-opening nostrils, a drooping lower lip, will be hot[212] in love, boasters, excessively contentious, and not very wise.

119. The ass is a lazy, cold, slow, insolent animal which is hard to teach and which has a grating voice. Men who are referred to this type of animal necessarily have thick legs, a long head, thick, long ears, drooping lips, and an ugly voice: they are slow, cold, and contemptuous of poverty and injury.

[209] Chs. 45, 116.
[210] Leiden ch. 2.
[211] Ps.-Arist. 809^{a}25–810^{a}13.
[212] Foerster emends Molinius' *callidi* ('clever') to *calidi*.

120. Bos animal est habens caput grande, frontem latam, oculos grandes, os latum, nares latas, latera grandia, ventrem pleniorem. ad huius animalis speciem homines qui referuntur, erunt indociles, consilii egentes, loquendi et agendi ignavi, tardiores, regi magis quam regere apti, non tamen sine honestate nec iniusti, sed fortes.

121. Cervus animal est timidum, velox, iracundum, incautum. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, erunt longi, angustioribus membris, habentes genas maiores, velociter ambulantes: qui etiam facile ad iracundiam provocantur, parvum animum gerentes, instabiles, calidi et acuti nimium et inefficaces erunt.

122. Leo animal est edendi avidum magis quam bibendi, saevum cum irritatur, quietum cum non impellitur, vehemens cum cibo indiget, tranquillum cum satiatum est, forte et invictum cum dimicat. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, erunt capite grandiore, oculis perlucidis, rescisso ore, naribus capacibus, cervice solida, humeris et pectore ingentibus, ilibus angustioribus, femoribus siccioribus, pedes imos et manus habebunt discretas atque seiunctas,[213] rubei aliquantum, refracto capillo. in his ingeniis affectus nullus, nulla fides amicitiae, nulla religio.

123. Canis animal est quod facile irascitur, facile blanditur, cibis suavibus deditum, quod Graeci λίχνον vocant, offenditur facile, quod Graece φιλεγκλῆμον dicitur, vigilat facile. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, erunt acuti vultus, proscissi oris, longi corporis, acutae naris, oculorum eminentium, maledici, calidi, leves, facile irascentes.

124. Simia est animal malignum, ridiculum, turpe. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, erunt parvi, cavis oculis, malae barbae, brevibus cervicibus, parvorum oculorum, rugosi vultus, imitatores ingeniorum alienorum, ipsi imperfectum ingenium habentes.

125. Anser animal est audax, pigrum, inane, clamosum. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, erunt latis pedibus, cruribus brevibus, grandibus calcaneis, naribus longis et directis, capite propemodum rotundo, oculis rotundis splendidis, dorso lato. huiusmodi hominibus nihil est commendandum: non enim reddent quod acceperint, fidem autem minus repraesentant ex eo magis quod edaces sint <quam> quod parum fideles. idem ipsi et quod dederunt reposcere negligunt.

[213] Foerster thinks that there should be a lacuna here.

120. The ox is an animal with a large head, a broad brow, large eyes, a broad mouth, a wide nose, large sides, and a fairly thick stomach. Men who are referred to this type of animal will be hard to teach, lacking counsel, lazy in saying and doing, rather slow, fit to be ruled rather than to rule, but they are not without nobility and they are not unjust, but brave.

121. The deer is a timid animal, swift, angry, and incautious. Men who are referred to this type of animal will be long, with narrower limbs, large cheeks, and will walk quickly: they are also easily provoked to anger, have a small mind, are fickle, impetuous, and excessively keen and ineffectual.

122. The lion is an animal keen on eating more than drinking, fierce when irritated, quiet when not pressed, violent when it lacks food, peaceful when it is full, brave and invincible when it fights. Men who are referred to this type of animal will have a rather large head, very bright eyes, a mouth split open, a capacious nose, a solid neck, huge shoulders and chest, rather narrow loins, rather dry thighs, separate and distinct extremities of hands and feet,[213] a somewhat red colour and flung back hair. In these characters there is no affectation, no faithful friendship, and no religion.

123. The dog is an animal which is easily angered, easily flattered, devoted to dainty food, what the Greeks call λίχνος ('gluttonous'), easily offended, which is called φιλεγκλήμων ('fond of fault-finding') in Greek, and readily stays awake. Men who are referred to this type of animal will have a sharp face, a gash of a mouth, a long body, a sharp nose, protruding eyes, and be abusive, impetuous, fickle and quick to anger.

124. The ape is a malicious, ridiculous and ugly animal. Men who are referred to this type of animal will be small, have hollow eyes, a bad beard, have a short neck, small eyes, a wrinkly face, and will feign the characters of others since they themselves have an imperfect one.

125. The goose is a daring, lazy, light-headed, and noisy animal. Men who are referred to this type of animal will have broad feet, short legs, large heels, a long straight nose, a nearly round head, round bright eyes, and a broad back. Nothing should be entrusted to men of this sort; for they will not give back what they receive, and they do not repay trust because they are greedy rather than because they are not trustworthy. And what they give they themselves forget to ask back.

126. Lupus animal est rapax, iracundum, insidiosum, audax, violentum. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, ita erunt: naribus obuncis, deorsum detractis superciliis coniunctis hispidis, oculis parvis clausis subcavis, capite parvo rotundo, hispido corpore, protensis capillis, reductis ac restrictis cruribus. huiusmodi homines callidi, impii, gaudentes sanguine, ad iracundiam faciles, moribus pravi usque adeo sunt, ut quod datur vel offertur non accipiant, quod non datur rapiant.

127. Testudo animal est iners, stultum, vorax, quod neque sibi aliquid neque cuiquam alteri prodest. mulier quaecunque ad huius animalis speciem refertur ita est: collo brevi, dorso lato, pedibus latis, rugoso vultu et maxime malis. huiusmodi mulier inepta, inefficax, ingrata.[214]

128. Coluber animal est saevum, nocens, insidiosum, cum constituerit animum terribile, cum timuerit fugax, gulae deditum. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, ita erunt: capite parvo tenui rotundo, oculis parvis rotundis lucidis, collo longo tenui, ore praeciso, prolixo corpore, pectore acuto, caput velociter et facile commovebunt. homicidae quoque huiusmodi homines erunt, audaces, timidi, studentes malitiae.

129. Noctua, quae Graece <γλαῦξ> dicitur, animal est loquax, ignavum, mutabile, nunquam in isdem permanens locis, sine affectu adeo ut pullos non ipsa educet, masculus enim educat filios, cum pullis convenit, variis locis habitat, mediis in muris commoratur: adeo pigra est. mulier quae ad huius <animalis>[215] similitudinem refertur, ita erit: obuncis naribus, genas magnas habebit, oculos magnos rotundos, humeros fortes, dorsum latum crassum. huiusmodi mulier nec filiis fidelis nec marito, parsimoniae ignara, manu iners, linguae indulgens.

130. Pavus animal est pulchritudini studens, stultum, posteriores partes corporis sui referens, clamosum, femininae vocis. quicunque ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, erunt graciles, non indecori corpore, capite prope rotundo, speciosis oculis, cervice procera, incessu pulchri. idem ipsi erunt faciles ad largiendum, moechi, cinaedi.

[214] The gendered interpretation of the tortoise appears to be Anon. Lat.'s own; similarly of the owl in ch. 129.

126. The wolf is a rapacious, angry, insidious, daring, and violent animal. Men who are referred to this type of animal will be as follows: they will have a hooked nose, eyebrows which are hairy, joined and turned downwards, small, shut, hollow eyes, a small, round head, a hairy body, long hair, and legs which are drawn back and restricted. Men of this sort are clever, impious, rejoice in blood, are quick to anger and bad in character to such an extent that they do not accept what is given or offered and they steal what is not given.

127. The tortoise is a lazy, stupid, greedy animal which is of no use either to itself or to anyone else. Any woman who is referred to this type of animal is as follows: she has a short neck, a broad back, broad feet, a wrinkly face and very wrinkly cheeks. A woman of this sort is useless, ineffectual, and unpleasing.[214]

128. The snake is a fierce, harmful, insidious animal which has a terrible spirit when it stands firm, but which seeks to flee when it is scared, and is devoted to gluttony. Men who are referred to this type of animal will be as follows: they will have a small, thin, round head, small, round, bright eyes, a long, thin neck, an abrupt mouth, a long body, a pointed chest, and they will move their head quickly and easily. Men of this sort will also be murderers, daring, timid, and devoted to malice.

129. The owl, which is called γλαῦξ in Greek, is a garrulous, lazy, changeable animal, which never stays in the same places, is without feeling to the extent that it does not raise its own chicks, for the male raises the young, it has intercourse with its chicks, lives in various places, and lives in the middle of walls, so lazy is it. A woman who is referred to this type of animal[215] will be as follows: she will have a hooked nose, large cheeks, large, round eyes, strong shoulders and a broad, thick back. A woman of this sort is faithful to neither her offspring nor her husband, is ignorant of frugality, lazy with her hands, and indulgent with her tongue.

130. The peacock is an animal which is devoted to beauty, stupid, shows off the hind parts of its own body, is noisy, and has a female voice. Whichever men are referred to this type of animal will be slender, have a handsome body, a very round head, beautiful eyes, a long neck and a beautiful gait. They will be quick to be lavish, and are adulterers and deviants.

[215] Foerster inserts *animalis*.

131. Gallus, qui Graece ἀλεκτρυὼν dicitur, animal est ineptum, in venerem calidum, speciei ac vocis suae gerens fiduciam magnam. qui ad huius animalis speciem referuntur homines, ita erunt: oculo rotundo nitenti, capite parvo mobili, subrecti collo, levibus humeris, in quibus vis et calor eorum omnis constitutus est. interdum coma capitis gloriabuntur, erecta habebunt crura, barbam honestam, <erunt>[216] vocales, honorem sibi plurimum deferentes, quos necesse est et certamina celebrando superbos esse, aliena libenter assumere, non esse contentos matrimoniis propriis, sine gravitate, sine consilio, sine reverentia esse.

132. Iuxta haec exempla etiam ceterorum animalium proprietates tam minimas quam maiores corporis partes considerans ad species humanorum morum, prout cuique animali quisque proximus fuerit, referes.[217] retinendum autem, quod interdum ex diversis animalibus de quibus iudicavimus signa conveniant in unum hominem, quae res difficilis quidem ad considerationem, sed tamen ad speciem suam singula referenda sunt nec dubitandum pluribus animalibus unum hominem similem pronuntiare. si enim ita evenerit, ut et equi et simiae signa conveniant, non dubitabis eidem et equi insolentiam et simiae malignitatem assignare, vel si tribus animalibus proximus quis fuerit, trium animalium mores illi confidenter ascribe. certum autem est inspectionem hominum ex eo difficilem esse, quod homo unusquisque vitium suum celare nitatur. sed et studia et conversationes satis humana ingenia obscurant, idque ipsum de quo nunc agitur frequenter evenit, ut multiforme sit unius hominis ingenium, animalia autem simplicia, nuda atque incauta sunt et naturam suam singula in promptu habent.

133. Usque adeo autem Palemon et Loxus doctrinam hanc proferunt,[218] ut etiam futurorum quaedam praedicere eam confirment. ex pluribus igitur quae Palemon se praedixisse retulit duo vel tria ponemus exempla, ne vel hoc omissum sit. Apud Samum[219] in convivio hominis vultum se considerasse dicit, qui mutaret interius cuiusque oculi differentiam...[220] †et splendorem vivacitatis suae pupillae, inquit, eius amiserant. haec igitur intuens Palemon divino etiam praesagio praedixit quid ei futurum esset, et tunc maxime coepit ex his indiciis cognoscere veritatem...[221]

[216] Foerster inserts *erunt*.
[217] Foerster emends MSS *instrueris* to *referes*.
[218] Foerster emends the MSS readings to *proferunt*.

131. The cock, which is called ἀλεκτρυών in Greek, is a useless animal which is hot in love, and has great faith in its own appearance and voice. Men who are referred to this type of animal will be as follows: they will have round, gleaming eyes, a small, mobile head, an upright neck, light shoulders, in which their whole strength and heat is situated. Sometimes they will pride themselves on their head of hair, they will have upright legs, a fine beard, they will be[216] noisy, confer very great respect on themselves, are necessarily proud in celebrating contests, freely take what is another's, are not content with their own marriages, are without gravity, without counsel and without respect.

132. Following these examples you will compare[217] the properties of the other animals as well with the types of human characters, considering the smallest as well as the larger parts of the body, according as each person is similar to each animal. But it should be remembered that sometimes the signs from different animals which we have judged coincide in one man, which is a difficult matter for consideration; but individual signs should be referred to their own type of appearance and you should not hesitate to pronounce that one man is similar to many animals; for if it happens that the signs of the horse and the ape coincide, you will not hesitate to assign to the same man both the insolence of the horse and the malice of the ape. Or if someone is similar to three animals, confidently ascribe the characters of the three animals to him. However it is certain that the inspection of men is difficult, because every single man strives to hide his own failing. But both culture and society obscure human characters, and that very thing which we are dealing with now happens frequently: that the character of the individual man is multiform; but the animals are simple, bare, and unguarded and each show their own nature openly.

133. Polemon and Loxus advance[218] this discipline to such an extent that they affirm it can even predict some things in the future. And so we shall set down two or three examples from the many predictions which Polemon reports he made, lest even this should be omitted. He says that at a feast on Samos[219] he examined the face of a man who was changeable within [?], whose eyes [showed] a difference...,[220] and his pupils had, he says, lost their bright, lively quality. And so looking at these things Polemon predicted by a presentiment that was truly divine what would happen to him, and then especially he began to know the truth from these indications...[221]

[219] This does not seem obviously related to the story of the wedding at Leiden ch. 69 as Hoffmann and Foerster supposed (emending Arabic دمسوس to سمسوس); cf. Mesk (1932) 64 and Ch. 3, n. 164. André (1980) 150 is doubly confused ('dans la ville de Smyrne'). On the loss of some of Polemon's 'many predictions', see Ch. 3 n. 209.

[220] The text is defective here.

[221] The text from this point on is lost.

Appendix
Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiognomy*

Simon Swain

The text presented below is based on the text in Foerster (1893) i. 2–90, slightly emended to follow the readings preferred by Loveday and Forster (see below). For discussion of the merits of the texts of Foerster and Immanuel Bekker, *Aristotelis opera*, ii (Berlin, 1831), cols. 805–14 see Vogt (1999) 229 ff. As Vogt remarks, Foerster several times intervened against the consensus of the MSS. For this reason she prefers to base her commentary on Bekker. In our view Foerster's interventions were largely necessary and his punctuation in particular is a great improvement on Bekker's.

The translation is a revised version of that by T. Loveday and E. S. Forster in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, i (Princeton, 1984) 1237–50, which is used by permission of the Jowett Copyright Trustees. Loveday and Forster's translations of body parts and character types have been changed to accord with our translation of Adamantius. Some other corrections and changes have also been made.

ΦΥΣΙΟΓΝΩΜΟΝΙΚΑ ΤΑ ΕΙΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗ ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΑ

A

1. [805a1] Ὅτι αἱ διάνοιαι ἕπονται τοῖς σώμασι καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς ἀπαθεῖς οὖσαι τῶν τοῦ σώματος κινήσεων, τοῦτο ὧδε δῆλον πάνυ γίνεται ἔν τε ταῖς μέθαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρρωστίαις· πολὺ γὰρ ἐξαλλάττουσαι φαίνονται αἱ διάνοιαι [805a5] ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων. καὶ τοὐναντίον δὴ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς παθήμασι τὸ σῶμα συμπάσχον φανερὸν γίνεται περί τε τοὺς ἔρωτας καὶ τοὺς φόβους τε καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις μᾶλλον ἄν τις συνίδοι, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα σῶμά τε καὶ [805a10] ψυχὴ συμφυῶς ὥστε τῶν πλείστων ἀλλήλοις αἴτια γίνεσθαι παθημάτων. οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε ζῷον γεγένηται τοιοῦτον ὃ τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἔσχεν ἑτέρου ζῴου, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἄλλου, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἕπεσθαι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι τοιάνδε διάνοιαν. ἔτι δὲ [805a15] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οἱ περὶ ἕκαστον ἐπιστήμονες ἐκ τῆς ἰδέας δύνανται θεωρεῖν, ἱππικοί τε ἵππους καὶ κυνηγέται κύνας. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἴη (ἀεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν), εἴη ἂν φυσιογνωμονεῖν.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένοι φυσιογνώμονες κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους ἐπεχείρησαν φυσιογνωμονεῖν, [805a20] ἕκαστος καθ' ἕνα.

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ζῴων φυσιογνωμονοῦσι τιθέμενοι καθ' ἕκαστον γένος εἶδός τι ζῴου καὶ διάνοιαν οἵα ἕπεται τῷ τοιούτῳ σώματι, εἶτα τὸν ὅμοιον τούτῳ τὸ σῶμα ἔχοντα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίαν ὑπελάμβανον.

Ἄλλοι δέ τινες τοῦτο μὲν ἐποίουν, οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων δὲ [805a25] τῶν ζῴων ἐδοκίμαζον, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους, διελόμενοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη, ὅσα διέφερε τὰς ὄψεις καὶ τὰ ἤθη, οἷον Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Θρᾷκες καὶ Σκύθαι, ὁμοίως τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν σημείων ἐποιοῦντο. οἱ δέ τινες ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐπιφαινομένων, οἵᾳ διαθέσει ἕπεται ἕκαστον ἦθος, τῷ [805a30] ὀργιζομένῳ, τῷ φοβουμένῳ, τῷ ἀφροδισιάζοντι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ παθημάτων ἑκάστῳ. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ πάντας τούτους τοὺς τρόπους φυσιογνωμονεῖν, καὶ ἔτι κατ' ἄλλους, καὶ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν σημείων ἀνομοίως ποιεῖσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ [805b1] τὰ ἤθη μόνον φυσιογνωμονοῦντες ἁμαρτάνουσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἔνιοι οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ὄντες τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν προσώπων ἤθη τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχουσιν, οἷον ὅ τε ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ ἀναιδὴς τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι, τὰς διανοίας πολὺ κεχωρισμένοι, δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι [805b5] κατὰ χρόνους τινὰς τὰ ἤθη οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλὰ ἑτέρων ἔχουσιν· δυσανίοις τε γὰρ οὖσιν ἐνίοτε συνέβη τὴν ἡμέραν ἡδέως διαγαγεῖν καὶ τὸ ἦθος λαβεῖν τὸ τοῦ εὐθύμου, καὶ τοὐναντίον εὔθυμον λυπηθῆναι, ὥστε τὸ ἦθος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου μεταβαλεῖν. ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις περὶ ὀλίγων ἄν ⟨τις⟩ τοῖς ἐπιφαι[805b10]νομένοις τεκμαίροιτο.

Οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν θηρίων φυσιογνωμονοῦντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν σημείων ποιοῦνται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων τὴν ἰδέαν διεξελθόντα ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν ὅμοιος τούτῳ τὸ σῶμα ᾖ, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιος ἔσται. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὕτως ὅμοιον θηρίῳ ἄν[805b15]θρωπον οὐδεὶς ἂν εὕροι, ἀλλὰ προσεοικότα μέν τι. ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις τὰ ζῷα ὀλίγα μὲν τὰ ἴδια ἔχει σημεῖα, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ κοινά· ὥστε ἐπειδὰν ὅμοιός τις ᾖ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κοινόν, τί μᾶλλον οὗτος λέοντι ἢ ἐλάφῳ ὁμοιότερος; εἰκὸς γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τῶν σημείων ἰδιόν τι [805b20] σημαίνειν, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ κοινόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ τῶν σημείων οὐδὲν ἂν διασαφήσειε τῷ φυσιογνωμονοῦντι. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἴδια ἑκάστου τῶν θηρίων ἐκλέξειεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι ἀποδοῦναι, οὗ ἐστὶ ταῦτα σημεῖα. εἰκὸς γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου, ἴδιον δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ζῴων τῶν φυσιογνωμονουμένων ἔν γε τῇ διανοίᾳ

THE *PHYSIOGNOMY* ATTRIBUTED TO ARISTOTLE

I

1. [805ᵃ1] That minds follow their bodies and are not isolated and unaffected by the changes of the body is something that becomes very clear in cases of drunkenness and illness: for states of mind appear to change a great deal through the affections of the body. And correlatively, the body is clearly affected along with the affections of the soul in cases of love and fear and grief and pleasure. Again, among things that come about by nature one might especially see that the body and soul are connate with each other to the extent that in the case of most affections they are causally active on each other. No animal has ever been born that has the appearance of one animal but the mind of another, but soul and body are always of the same animal—so that, necessarily, such-and-such a mind follows such-and-such a body. Moreover, experts on the animals are always able to judge of character by bodily form: it is thus that a horseman chooses his horse or a huntsman his hounds. If these things are true, and these things are always true, there can be physiognomy.

Three methods have been essayed in the past, each having had its special adherents.

The first method took as the basis for physiognomic inferences the various genera of animals, positing for each genus a peculiar animal form, and a peculiar mental character appropriate to such a body, and then assuming that if a man resembles such and such a genus in body he will resemble it also in soul.

Those who adopted the second method proceeded in the same way, except that they did not draw their inferences from all kinds of animals but confined themselves to human beings: they distinguished various races of men (for example Egyptians, Thracians, Scythians) by differences of appearance and of character, and drew their signs of character from these races.

The third method took as its basis the characteristic facial expressions which are observed to accompany different conditions of mind, such as anger, fear, erotic excitement, and all the other passions.

All these methods are possible, and others as well: the selection of signs may be made in diverse ways. The last-mentioned method [805ᵇ1] by itself, however, is defective in more than one respect. For one thing, the same facial expression may belong to different characters: the brave and the shameless, for example, look alike, though their characters are far apart. Besides, a man may at times wear an expression which is not normally his: for instance, a morose person will now and again spend an enjoyable day and assume a cheerful countenance, whilst a naturally cheerful man, if he be distressed, will change his expression accordingly. And, thirdly, the number of inferences that can be drawn from facial expression alone is small.

As to arguments from beasts, the selection of signs is made on wrong principles. Suppose you have passed in review one by one the forms of all the different kinds of animals: you still have no right to assert that a man who resembles a given kind in body will resemble it in soul also. In the first place, speaking broadly, you will never find this complete likeness, but only a resemblance. Moreover, very few signs are peculiar to individual genera; most of them are common to more than one kind, and of what use is resemblance in a common attribute? A man will resemble a lion, let us say, neither more nor less than a deer. (For we have a right to suppose that common signs indicate common mental characters and peculiar signs peculiar characters.) Thus the physiognomist will not get any clear evidence from common signs. But is he any better off if he takes every genus by itself and selects signs that are peculiar to each? Surely not, for he cannot tell what they are signs of. They ought to be signs of peculiar characteristics, but we have no right to assume that there are any mental characteristics peculiar to the different kinds of

[805b25] ἔχοι ἄν τις λαβεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μόνον ὁ λέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, οὔτε δειλὸν ὁ λαγωός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα μυρία. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὰ κοινὰ σημεῖα ἐκλέξαντι σαφές τι γίνεται μήτε τὰ ἴδια, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων σκέπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάντων τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιητέον [805b30] τῶν τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος πασχόντων, οἷον, ἂν μὲν ἀνδρείου ἐπισκοπῇ τις τὰ σημεῖα, τὰ ἀνδρεῖα τῶν ζῴων εἰς ἓν λαβόντα δεῖ ἐξετάσαι, ποῖα παθήματα τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδενὶ συμβέβηκεν. †εἰ γὰρ [806a1] οὕτω τις ἐκλέξειεν, ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ σημεῖα ἀνδρείας τοῖς προκριθεῖσι ζῴοις, μὴ μόνον ἀνδρείας κοινὸν ὑπάρχειν πάθημα τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ,[1] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, οὕτω δ' ἂν ἀπορήσειε πότερον ἀνδρείας ἢ θατέρου τὰ σημεῖά ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ [806a5] δεῖ ἐκ πλείστων τε ἐκλέγεσθαι ζῴων καὶ μηδὲν πάθος κοινὸν ἐχόντων (τῶν) ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἄλλο τι (ἢ) οὗ ἂν τὰ σημεῖα σκοπῇ.

Ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν σημείων μόνιμά ἐστι, μόνιμον ἄν τι καὶ σημαίνοι· ὅσα δὲ ἐπιγινόμενά τε καὶ ἀπολείποντα, πῶς ἂν τὸ σημεῖον ἀληθὲς εἴη τοῦ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ (μὴ) μένοντος; εἰ [806a10] μὲν γὰρ μόνιμον ἐπιγινόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολεῖπον σημεῖόν τις ὑπολάβοι, ἐνδέχοιτο μὲν ἂν αὐτὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οὐ μὴν ἐπιεικὲς ἂν εἴη, μὴ ἀεὶ τῷ παθήματι παρεπόμενον.

Ὅσα δὲ παθήματα ἐγγινόμενα τῇ ψυχῇ μηδέν τι ἐνδιαλλάττει τὰ σημεῖα τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷς χρῆται ὁ φυσιογνω[806a15]μων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ τοιαῦτα γνωρίσματα τῇ τέχνῃ, οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δόξας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· (εἰ γάρ τίς ἐστιν) ἰατρὸς ἢ κιθαριστής, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γνωρίζειν· ὁ γὰρ μαθὼν ὅ τι μάθημα οὐδὲν ἐξήλλαξε τῶν σημείων οἷς χρῆται ὁ φυσιογνώμων.

2. Δεῖ δὴ οὖν ὁρίσαι περὶ ποῖα ἄττα ἐστὶν ἡ φυσιογνω[806a20]μονία, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ πάντα, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἕκαστα σημεῖα λαμβάνεται, ἔπειτ' ἐφεξῆς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περὶ τῶν ἐπιφανεστέρων δηλῶσαι.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσιογνωμονία ἐστί, καθάπερ καὶ τοὔνομα αὐτῆς λέγει, περὶ τὰ φυσικὰ παθήματα τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων ὅσα παρα[806a25]γινόμενα μεθίστησι τῶν σημείων τῶν φυσιογνωμονουμένων. ὁποῖα δὲ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ὕστερον δηλωθήσεται. ἐξ ὧν δὲ γενῶν τὰ σημεῖα λαμβάνεται, νῦν ἐρῶ, καὶ ἔστιν ἅπαντα· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν κινήσεων φυσιογνωμονοῦσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν [806a30] ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου ἐμφαινομένων καὶ ἐκ τῶν τριχωμάτων, καὶ ἐκ τῆς λειότητος καὶ ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τύπου ὅλου τοῦ σώματος. καθόλου μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ φυσιογνώμονες περὶ ὅλων τῶν γενῶν ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τὰ σημεῖα. [806a35] εἰ μὲν οὖν εὐσαφὴς ἢ μὴ ἄσημος ἦν ἡ τοιαύτη διέξοδος, ἀπέχρησεν ἂν τὰ εἰρημένα. νυνὶ δ' ἴσως βέλτιόν ἐστι καθ' ἕκαστον περὶ πάντων, ὅσα ἐπιφανέστερα, τῶν φυσιογνω[806b1]μονουμένων, ἀκριβέστερον φράσαι τὰ (τε) σημεῖα λέγοντα, οἷά τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστα (καὶ εἰς τί) ἀναφέρεται, ὅσα μὴ ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις δεδήλωται.

Αἱ μὲν οὖν χροιαὶ σημαίνουσιν αἱ μὲν ὀξεῖαι θερμὸν καὶ ὕφαιμον, αἱ δὲ λευκέρυθροι εὐ[806b5]φυΐαν, ὅταν ἐπὶ λείου χρωτὸς συμβῇ τοῦτο τὸ χρῶμα.

Τὰ δὲ τριχώματα τὰ μὲν μαλακὰ δειλόν, τὰ δὲ σκληρὰ ἀνδρεῖον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σημεῖον εἴληπται ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων. δειλότατον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἔλαφος λαγωὸς

[1] Loveday and Forster circumvent the difficulties of the text by following Wachsmuth's εἰ δὲ οὕτω τις ἐκλέξειεν, ὥστε τοῖς προκριθεῖσι ζῴοις μὴ μόνον ἀνδρείας κοινὸν ὑπάρχειν, κτλ. (altering ὅτι, 'because' and omitting ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ σημεῖα ἀνδρείας, 'these are the signs of

animals that we examine in physiognomy. Courage is not confined to the lion, but is found in many other creatures; nor timidity to the hare, but it shares this quality with numberless other creatures. Thus it is equally fruitless to select the common and the peculiar features, and we must abandon the attempt to proceed by an examination of every kind of animal singly. Rather, we ought to select our signs from all animals that have some mental affection in common. For instance, when investigating the external marks of courage, we ought to collect all brave animals, and then to inquire what sort of affections are natural to all of them but absent in all other animals. For if we were [806ᵃ1] to select this and that as the signs of courage in the animals chosen in such a way as not to exclude the possibility of the presence in all these animals of some other mental affection,[1] we should not be able to tell whether our selected marks were really signs of courage or of this other character. The animals from which we choose our signs must be as numerous as possible, and they must not have any mental affection in common except that one of which we are investigating the signs.

Permanent bodily signs will indicate permanent mental qualities, but what about those that come and go? How can they be true signs if the mental character does not also come and go? No doubt if you took a transitory sign to be permanent, it might be true once in a while, but still it would be worthless because it would not be a constant concomitant of the affection.

Then again there are affections of soul whose occurrence produces no change in the bodily marks on which the physiognomist relies, and they will not provide his art with recognizable signs. Thus as regards opinions or scientific knowledge, you cannot recognize a doctor or a musician, for the fact of having acquired a piece of knowledge will not have produced any alteration in the bodily signs on which physiognomy relies.

2. We must now determine the special province of physiognomy (for the range of its application is limited), and the sources from which its various kinds of signs are drawn, and then we may proceed to a detailed exposition of the more convincing among its conclusions. Physiognomy has for its province, as the name implies, all natural affections of mental content, and also such acquired affections as on their occurrence modify the external signs which physiognomists interpret. I will explain later what kinds of acquired characters are meant, but now I will give a list—a complete list—of the sources from which physiognomic signs are drawn. They are these: movements, gestures of the body, colour, characteristic facial expression, the growth of the hair, the smoothness of the skin, the voice, condition of the flesh, the parts of the body, and the build of the body as a whole. Such is the list that physiognomists always give of the sources in which they find their signs. Were this list plain or not obscure, what I have said would suffice; but, as things are, it may be worth while to give a more detailed description of the more convincing of the inferences that they draw from their material, [806ᵇ1] and to state what their various signs are and on what they are supposed to be founded, so far as I have not already done so.

A brilliant complexion indicates a hot sanguine temper, whilst a pale pink complexion signifies a talented nature, when it occurs on a smooth skin.

Soft hair indicates cowardice, and coarse hair courage. This inference is based on observation of the whole animal kingdom. The most timid of animals are deer, hares, and

courage in the animals chosen'). Alternatively, something like ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται (Holford-Strevens), 'yet it is possible', might be read before μὴ μόνον.

πρόβατα καὶ τὴν τρίχα μαλακωτάτην ἔχει, ἀνδρειότατον δὲ λέων, ὡς ἄγριος καὶ τρίχα σκληροτάτην φέρει. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄρνισι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἰδεῖν· καθόλου τε γὰρ ὅσοι μὲν σκληρὸν τὸ πτερὸν ἔχουσιν, ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅσοι δὲ μαλακόν, δειλοί, καὶ κατὰ μέρη ἔστι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ἰδεῖν ἔν τε τοῖς ὄρτυξι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλεκτρυόσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταὐτὸ τοῦτο συμπίπτει· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ ταῖς ἄρκτοις οἰκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοί τέ εἰσι καὶ σκληρότριχες, οἱ δὲ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν δειλοί τε καὶ μαλακὸν τρίχωμα φέρουσιν. ἡ δὲ δασύτης ἡ περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν λαλιὰν σημαίνει. τοῦτο δὲ ἀναφέρεται εἰς τὸ γένος τῶν ὀρνίθων· ἴδιον γὰρ ὄρνιθος τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ δασύτης ἡ περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν, τῶν δὲ περὶ διάνοιαν ἡ λαλιά.

Ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἡ μὲν σκληρὰ καὶ εὐεκτικὴ φύσει ἀναίσθητον σημαίνει, ἡ δὲ λεία ⟨καὶ⟩ εὐφυέα καὶ ἀβέβαιον, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπ' ἰσχυροῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ἐγκρατῆ ἔχοντος τοῦτο συμβῇ.

Αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αἱ μὲν νωθραὶ μαλακὴν διάνοιαν, αἱ δὲ ὀξεῖαι ἔνθερμον.

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς ἡ μὲν βαρεῖα καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη ἀνδρεῖον, ἡ δὲ ὀξεῖα καὶ ἀνειμένη δειλόν.

Τὰ δὲ σχήματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη τὰ ἐπιφαινόμενα ἐπὶ τῶν προσώπων κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας λαμβάνεται τῶν παθῶν. ὅταν γὰρ πάσχῃ τι, εἰ τοιοῦτόν τι γίνεται οἷον ἔχει ὅταν τις ὀργίζηται, ὀργίλου τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους.

Τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος μεῖζον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἀκρωτήρια τοῦ σώματος ἰσχυρότερα καὶ λιπαρώτερα καὶ εὐεκτικώτερα καὶ βελτίω κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς. ἰσχυρότερα δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι σημείων ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ⟨προσώποις⟩ ἐπιφαινομένοις λαμβανόμενα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς κινήσεις καὶ τὰ σχήματα. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἑνὶ μὲν πιστεύειν τῶν σημείων εὔηθες· ὅταν δὲ πλείω συμφωνοῦντα καθ' ἑνὸς λάβῃ, μᾶλλον ἤδη κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἄν τις ὑπολαμβάνοι ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ σημεῖα.

Ἔστι δὲ ἄλλος τρόπος, καθ' ὃν ἄν τις φυσιογνωμονοίη, οὐδεὶς μέντοι ἐπικεχείρηκεν. οἷον εἰ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν δυσάνιον καὶ ⟨τὸν⟩ πικρὸν τὸ ἦθος φθονερὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μή ἐστι φθονεροῦ σημεῖα, ἐξ ἐκείνων δὲ τῶν προτέρων ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν τῷ φυσιογνώμονι καὶ τὸν φθονερὸν εὑρίσκειν, μάλιστα μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἴδιος τρόπος εἴη τοῦ πεφιλοσοφηκότος. τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι ἰδεῖν τινων ὄντων ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτ' εἶναι ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνομεν φιλοσοφίας. ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐναντιοῦται τῷ κατὰ τὰ πάθη φυσιογνωμονεῖν τὸ κατὰ τὰ ζῷα. περὶ φωνῆς κατὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἐπισκοπῶν ὀξεῖαν οἰηθείη ἄν τις δεῖν τιθέναι τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς. ὁ γὰρ ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ὀργιζόμενος ἐπιτείνειν εἴωθε τὸν φθόγγον καὶ ὀξὺ φθέγγεσθαι, ὁ δὲ ῥαθύμως διακείμενος τόν τε τόνον ἀνίησι καὶ βαρὺ φθέγγεται. τῶν δ' αὖ ζῴων τὰ μὲν ἀνδρεῖα βαρύφωνά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ δειλὰ ὀξύφωνα· λέων μὲν γὰρ καὶ ταῦρος καὶ κύων ὑλακτικός, καὶ τῶν ἀλεκτρυόνων οἱ εὔψυχοι βαρύφωνοι φθέγγονται, ἔλαφος δὲ καὶ λαγωὸς ὀξύφωνά ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ ἐν τούτοις κρεῖσσόν ἐστι μὴ ἐν τῷ βαρεῖαν ἢ ὀξεῖαν εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῶν ⟨τὸ⟩ ἀνδρεῖον ἢ δειλὸν τιθέναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ...[2] ⟨ὥστε φωνὴν⟩ τὴν μὲν ἐρρωμένην ἀνδρείου τὴν δὲ ἀνειμένην καὶ ἀσθενῆ δειλοῦ ὑποληπτέον εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ κράτιστον, ὅταν τὰ σημεῖα μὴ ὁμολογούμενα ἀλλ' ὑπεναντιούμενα,

[2] 'Intensity' added to fill a lacuna.

sheep, and they have the softest coats; whilst the lion and wild boar are bravest and have the coarsest coats. Precisely the same holds good of birds, for it is the rule that birds with coarse plumage are brave and those with soft plumage timid, particular instances being the cock and the quail. And again, among the different races of mankind the same combination of qualities may be observed, the inhabitants of the north being brave and coarse-haired, whilst southern peoples are cowardly and have soft hair. A thick growth of hair about the belly signifies loquacity, on the evidence of the whole tribe of birds, for the one is a bodily and the other a mental property peculiar to birds.

When the flesh is hard and constitutionally firm, it indicates insensibility; when smooth, it indicates natural talent combined with instability of character, except when smooth flesh goes with a strong frame and powerful extremities.

Lethargic movements are a sign of a soft character, rapid movements of a fervid temper.

As to the voice, when deep and full it is a sign of courage; when high-pitched and languid, of cowardice.

Gesture and the varieties of facial expression are interpreted by their affinity to different emotions: if, for instance, when disagreeably affected, a man takes on the look which normally characterizes an angry person, irascibility is signified.

Males are bigger and stronger than females of the same kind, and their extremities are stronger and sleeker and firmer and capable of more perfect performance of all functions. But inferences drawn from the parts of the body are less secure than those based on facial expression of character and movements and gesture. In general it is silly [807^a1] to rely on a single sign: you will have more reason for confidence in your conclusions when you find several signs all pointing one way.

Here I may mention a possible method of physiognomy which has never yet been tried. Suppose, for example, that irascibility and morose sulkiness necessarily involve an envious disposition, and that the physiognomist could, without any bodily signs of the last character, deduce its presence from the presence of the other characters: we should then have a method peculiarly appropriate to masters of philosophy, since it is, we suppose, the peculiar mark of philosophy to be able to tell that, when certain premisses are given, something necessarily follows. But this method, which considers the interrelations of mental affections, and that which proceeds by observation of animals, sometimes arrive at contrary conclusions. Take the voice, for example. By the former method you might feel bound to connect a shrill voice with a fierce temper, because in vexation and anger one's voice tends to become loud and shrill, whilst placid people speak in tones at once languid and deep. But as against this, if you observe beasts, you find that a deep voice goes with courage and a shrill voice with timidity, as witness on the one hand the roar of a lion and bull, the hound's bay, and the deep-noted crow of high-spirited cocks, and on the other the high-pitched tones of deer and hares. Yet perhaps even in these cases it is better not to connect courage and cowardice with the pitch of the voice, but rather with its intensity,[2] so that it is strength of voice that marks the brave and a languid and feeble voice the coward. It is safest, however, to refrain from all positive assertion when you find that your signs are inconsistent and contrary to one another in

μηδὲν τιθέναι, εἰ μή ἐστι τῶν διῃρημένων, ποῖα ποίων πιστότερα, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν εἰς εἴδη, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς ὅλα τὰ γένη ἀναφέρειν. ὁμοιότερα γάρ ἐστι τῷ ζητουμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων φυ[807a30]σιογνωμονοῦμεν, ἀλλά τινα τῶν ἐν τῷ γένει.

3. Ἀνδρείου[3] σημεῖα· τρίχωμα σκληρόν, τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ σώματος ὀρθόν, ὀστᾶ καὶ πλευραὶ καὶ τὰ ἀκρωτήρια τοῦ σώματος ἰσχυρὰ καὶ μεγάλα, {καὶ} κοιλία πλατεῖα καὶ προσεσταλμένη· ὠμοπλάται πλατεῖαι καὶ διεστηκυῖαι οὔτε [807a35] λίαν συνδεδεμέναι οὔτε παντάπασιν ἀπολελυμέναι, τράχηλος ἐρρωμένος, οὐ σφόδρα σαρκώδης, τὸ στῆθος σαρκῶδές τε καὶ πλατύ, ἰσχίον προσεσταλμένον, γαστροκνημίαι κάτω [807b1] κατεσπασμέναι, ὄμμα χαροπὸν οὔτε λίαν ἀνεπτυγμένον οὔτε παντάπασι συμμύον αὐχμηρότερον, τὸ χρῶμα τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ὀξύ, μέτωπον εὐθὺ οὐ μέγα ἰσχνὸν οὔτε λεῖον οὔτε παντάπασι ῥυτιδῶδες.

Δειλοῦ σημεῖα· τριχω[807b5]μάτιον μαλακόν, τῷ σώματι συγκεκαθικώς, οὐκ ἐπισπερχής, αἱ δὲ γαστροκνημίαι ἄνω ἀνεσπασμέναι, (τὰ) περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ὕπωχρος, ὄμματα ἀσθενῆ καὶ σκαρδαμύττει, καὶ τὰ ἀκρωτήρια τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενῆ, καὶ μικρὰ σκέλη καὶ χεῖρες λεπταὶ καὶ μακραί, ὀσφὺς δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἀσθενής, [807b10] τὸ σχῆμα σύντονον, ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν οὐκ ἰταμός, ἀλλ' ὕπτιος καὶ τεθαμβηκώς, τὸ ἦθος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου εὐμετάβολον κατηφής.

Εὐφυοῦς[4] σημεῖα· σὰρξ ὑγροτέρα καὶ ἁπαλωτέρα, οὐκ εὐεκτικὴ οὐδὲ πιμελώδης σφόδρα, τὰ περὶ τὰς ὠμοπλάτας καὶ τράχηλον ἰσχνότερα καὶ τὰ [807b15] περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον, {καὶ} σύνδετα τὰ περὶ τὰς ὠμοπλάτας, καὶ τὰ κάτω ἀνειμένα, εὔλυτα τὰ περὶ τὰς πλευράς, καὶ τὸν νῶτον ἀσαρκότερος, τὸ χρῶμα λευκέρυθρον καὶ καθαρόν, τὸ δερμάτιον λεπτόν, τριχωμάτιον μὴ λίαν σκληρὸν μηδὲ λίαν μέλαν, ὄμμα χαροπόν, ὑγρόν.

Ἀναισθήτου [807b20] σημεῖα· τὰ περὶ τὸν αὐχένα καὶ τὰ σκέλη σαρκώδη καὶ συμπεπλεγμένα καὶ συνδεδεμένα, κοτύλη στρογγύλη, ὠμοπλάται ἄνω ἀνεσπασμέναι, μέτωπον μέγα περιφερὲς σαρκῶδες, ὄμμα χλωρὸν κωφόν, κνῆμαι περὶ σφυρὸν παχεῖαι σαρκώδεις στρογγύλαι, σιαγόνες μεγάλαι σαρκώδεις, [807b25] ὀσφὺς σαρκώδης, σκέλη μακρά, τράχηλος παχύς, πρόσωπον σαρκῶδες ὑπόμακρον ἱκανῶς. τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου ἐπιφαινόμενον κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀναλαμβάνει.

Ἀναιδοῦς σημεῖα· ὀμμάτιον ἀνεπτυγμένον καὶ λαμπρόν, βλέφαρα ὕφαιμα [807b30] καὶ παχέα, μικρὸν ἔγκυρτα, ὠμοπλάται ἄνω ἐπηρμέναι, τῷ σχήματι μὴ ὀρθός, ἀλλὰ μικρῷ προπετέστερος, ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν ὀξύς, ἐπίπυρρος τὸ σῶμα· τὸ χρῶμα ὕφαιμον· στρογγυλοπρόσωπος· τὸ στῆθος ἀνεσπασμένον.

Κοσμίου σημεῖα· ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσι βραδύς, καὶ διάλεκτος βραδεῖα καὶ [807b35] φωνὴ πνευματώδης καὶ ἀσμενής, ὀμμάτιον ἀλαμπὲς μέλαν καὶ μήτε λίαν ἀνεπτυγμένον μήτε παντάπασι συμμεμυκός, σκαρδαμυκτικὸν βραδέως· τὰ {μὲν} γὰρ ταχέως [808a1] σκαρδαμύττοντα τῶν ὀμμάτων τὰ μὲν δειλόν, τὰ δὲ θερμὸν σημαίνει.

Εὐθύμου σημεῖα· μέτωπον εὐμέγεθες καὶ σαρκῶδες καὶ λεῖον, τὰ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα ταπεινότερα, καὶ ὑπνωδέστερον τὸ πρόσωπον φαίνεται, μήτε δεδορκὸς [808a5] μήτε

[3] 'Courageous' (ἀνδρεῖος): in Ad. we translate this term as 'manly' since it is mostly juxtaposed to ἄνανδρος ('unmanly') or γυναικεῖος ('womanly') *vel sim.* Loveday and Forster also translate as 'brave'.

detail, unless they belong to classes, some of which you have determined to be more trustworthy than others. Above all it is best to base your arguments upon assertions about species and not about entire genera, for the species more nearly resembles what we are concerned with, for in physiognomy we try to infer from bodily signs the character of this or that particular person, and not the characters of the whole human race.

3. Signs of a courageous[3] man: stiff hair, the carriage of the body upright, bones, flanks, and extremities of the body strong and big, the belly broad and flat, the shoulder blades broad and set apart neither too closely nor too loosely knit, a sturdy neck not very fleshy, a chest well covered with flesh and broad, flat hips, thickness of the calf [807^{b}1] low down the leg, dark blue eyes neither wide and staring nor yet mere slits and not glistening, the body of a brilliant hue, a forehead straight and lean, not large, and neither quite smooth nor yet a mass of wrinkles.

Signs of a cowardly man: a small growth of soft hair, the figure stooping and lacking in quickness, thickness of the calf high up the leg, a sallow complexion, weak blinking eyes, the extremities of the body weak and small, legs and hands thin and long, loins small and weak, a rigid gesture of the body with undecided, deprecating, scared movements, and a shifty downcast look.

Signs of a talented man:[4] rather moist and soft flesh, not exactly firm nor yet extremely fat; leanness of the shoulders, neck, face, and neighbouring regions; shoulder-blades closely knit and the parts below slack; supple flanks; a somewhat gaunt back; a clear pinkish hue over the body; a thin skin; a small growth of hair, neither very coarse nor very black; and moist, dark blue eyes.

Signs of an insensible man: the region of the neck and the legs are fleshy and stiffly fitted and knitted; the hip-joint round; the shoulder-blades high-set; the forehead big, round, and fleshy; the eyes pale and vacant; the legs thick and fleshy and round at the ankles; the jaws big and fleshy; loins fleshy; legs long; neck thickset; the face fleshy and rather long. The manner of movement, gesture, and facial expression, you may take it, are analogous to his character.

Signs of a shameless man: small, bright, wide-open eyes, with heavy blood-shot lids slightly bulging; high shoulder-blades; a carriage of the body not erect, but crouched slightly forwards; quickness of movement; a ruddy hue over the body; with a sanguine complexion, a round face, and high chest.

Signs of an orderly man: a slow gait; a slow way of speaking with a breath-like and weak voice; small eyes, black but not lustrous, not open and staring, nor yet mere slits; with a slow, blinking movement of the lids—for rapid [808^{a}1] blinking signifies either cowardice or a hot temperament.

Signs of a cheerful man: a good-sized forehead, fleshy and smooth; the region of the eyes rather low; a rather drowsy-looking countenance, neither keen nor reflective. The

[4] 'talented' (εὐφυής): most instances of this term refer to a moral, rather than a physical, quality, and we have in such cases translated it in Ps.-Aristotle and Ad. by 'talented'. Cf. Hunayn in Ghersetti (1999*a*) 21–2 (60).

σύννουν, ἐν {τε} ταῖς κινήσεσι βραδὺς ἔστω καὶ ἀνειμένος, τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ ἤθει τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου μὴ ἐπισπερχὴς ἀλλὰ ἀγαθὸς φαινέσθω.

Ἀθύμου σημεῖα· τὰ ῥυτιδώδη τῶν προσώπων καὶ ἰσχνά, ὄμματα κατακεκλασμένα (ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὰ κεκλασμένα τῶν ὀμμάτων δύο ση[808a10]μαίνει, τὸ μὲν μαλακὸν καὶ θῆλυ, τὸ δὲ κατηφὲς καὶ ἄθυμον), ἐν τῷ σχήματι ταπεινὸς καὶ ταῖς κινήσεσιν ἀπηγορευκώς.

Κιναίδου[5] σημεῖα· ὄμμα κατακεκλασμένον, γονύκροτος· ἐγκλίσεις τῆς κεφαλῆς εἰς τὰ δεξιά, αἱ φοραὶ τῶν χειρῶν ὕπτιαι καὶ ἔκλυτοι, καὶ βαδίσεις διτταί, ἡ [808a15] μὲν περινεύοντος, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀτρεμοῦντος τὴν ὀσφύν, καὶ τῶν ὀμμάτων περιβλέψεις, οἷος ἂν εἴη Διονύσιος ὁ σοφιστής.[6]

Πικροῦ σημεῖα· τὸ πρόσωπον σεσηρός, μελανόχρως, ἰσχνός, τὰ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον διεξυσμένα, τὸ πρόσωπον ῥυτιδῶδες ἄσαρκον, εὐθύθριξ καὶ μελάνθριξ.

Θυμώδους σημεῖα· ὀρ[808a20]θὸς {τὸ σῶμα,} τῷ σχήματι εὔπλευρος, εὔθυμος, ἐπίπυρρος (τὸ σῶμα), ὠμοπλάται διεστηκυῖαι καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ πλατεῖαι, ἀκρωτήρια μεγάλα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ, λεῖος καὶ περὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ περὶ βουβῶνας, εὐπώγων, εὐαυξὴς ὁ περίδρομος τῶν τριχῶν, κάτω κατεληλυθώς.

Πραέος σημεῖα· ἰσχυρὸς τὸ [808a25] εἶδος, εὔσαρκος, ὑγρὰ σὰρξ καὶ πολλή, εὐμεγέθης καὶ σύμμετρος, ὕπτιος τῷ σχήματι, ὁ περίδρομος τῶν τριχῶν ἀνεσπασμένος.

Εἴρωνος σημεῖα· πίονα τὰ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα ῥυτιδώδη, ὑπνῶδες τὸ πρόσωπον τῷ ἤθει φαίνεται.

Μικροψύχου σημεῖα· μικρομελής, [808a30] μικρογλάφυρος, ἰσχνός, μικρόμματος καὶ μικροπρόσωπος, οἷος ἂν εἴη Κορίνθιος ἢ Λευκάδιος.

Φιλόκυβοι γαλιάγκωνες καὶ ὀρχησταί.

Φιλολοίδοροι· οἷς τὸ ἄνω χεῖλος μετέωρον, καὶ τὰ εἴδη προπετεῖς, ἐπίπυρροι.

Ἐλεήμονες· ὅσοι γλαφυροὶ καὶ λευκόχροοι καὶ λιπαρόμματοι καὶ τὰ ῥινία [808a35] ἄνωθεν διεξυσμένοι, καὶ ἀεὶ δακρύουσιν. οἱ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι καὶ φιλογύναιοι καὶ θηλυγόναι καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ ἀειμνήμονες καὶ εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἔνθερμοι. τούτων δὲ σημεῖα [808b1] εἴρηται. ἐλεήμων ὁ σοφὸς καὶ δειλὸς καὶ κόσμιος, ἀνελέητος ⟨ὁ⟩ ἀμαθὴς καὶ ἀναιδής.

Ἀγαθοὶ φαγεῖν· οἷς τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ πρὸς ⟨τὸ⟩ στῆθος μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν πρὸς τὸν αὐχένα.

Λάγνου σημεῖα· λευκόχρως καὶ δασὺς εὐθείαις [808b5] θριξὶ καὶ παχείαις καὶ μελαίναις, καὶ οἱ κρόταφοι δασεῖς εὐθείαις θριξί, λιπαρὸν τὸ ὀμμάτιον καὶ μάργον.

Φίλυπνοι· οἱ τὰ ἄνω μείζω ἔχοντες καὶ γυπώδεις καὶ θερμοί, εὐεκτικὴν σάρκα ἔχοντες.

⟨Λάλοι· οἱ τὰ ἄνω μείζω ἔχοντες,⟩ καὶ γλαφυροὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ δασεῖς τὰ περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν.

Μνήμονες· οἱ τὰ ἄνω ἐλάττονα [808b10] ἔχοντες καὶ γλαφυρὰ καὶ σαρκωδέστερα.

[5] κίναιδος: for this translation see Ch. 11, text n. 68.

[6] See Vogt (1999) for the suggestion (originally by Foerster) that the unique example of 'Dionysius the Sophist' is a later addition to the text referring to the politician and sophist (T. Claudius Flavianus) Dionysius of Miletus, who was active in the late 1st/early 2nd c. AD (see on

gait will be slow and languid, the carriage and facial expression those of a good but not a quick man.

Signs of a sad man: lean and wrinkled brows; drooping eyes (but you should notice that drooping eyes may signify softness and effeminacy as well as dejection and sadness); a meek bearing and weary gait.

Signs of a deviant:[5] drooping-eyed and knock-kneed; his head hangs on his right shoulder; his hands are carried palms up and are flabby; and as he walks he either wags his loins or else holds them rigid by an effort; and he casts a furtive gaze around, for all the world like Dionysius the Sophist.[6]

Signs of a bitter man: a grin on his face; a black complexion and dry skin; a gaunt, wrinkled face and the neighbouring regions furrowed with lines; and straight black hair.

Signs of a fierce-tempered man: erect in carriage, broad about the ribs and moves with an easy gait; body with a reddish hue, shoulder-blades set well apart, large and broad; extremities large and powerful; smooth about the chest and groin; has a great beard, and the hair of the head starts low down with a vigorous growth.

Signs of a mild man: robust-looking, well covered with plenty of moist flesh; well sized and well proportioned; carrying himself with head thrown back; and the fringe of the hair starts rather high up on the head.

Signs of a dissembler: fat about the face, with wrinkles round his eyes, and he wears a drowsy expression.

Signs of a petty-minded man: small limbs and small, delicate, lean bodies, small eyes, and small faces, just like a Corinthian or Leucadian.

Men fond of gambling have short arms, like weasels, and are dancers.

Men fond of abuse have the upper lip updrawn; they tend to lean forwards, and their hue is reddish.

Merciful men are delicate, pale, and lustrous-eyed: the top of their noses is furrowed with lines, and they are always weeping. Such men are fond of women and beget female children, and in character they are erotic and mindful of the past, with natural talent and a fervid temper. The signs of these qualities have already [808^{b}1] been mentioned. The merciful type is wise, cowardly, and orderly, whereas the hardhearted man shows stupidity and effrontery.

Hearty eaters are indicated when the distance from navel to chest is greater than that from chest to neck.

Signs of a lascivious man: a pale complexion, a heavy growth of straight, thick, black hair over the body, a heavy growth of straight hair on the temples, and small, lustrous, lewd eyes.

Somnolent men are those whose upper parts are disproportionately large; such men are vulture-like and hot, and their flesh is firm.

Loquacious men are those whose upper parts are disproportionately large, and have a round delicate build, with a thick growth of hair about the belly.

Men with a good memory are those whose upper parts are disproportionately small, delicate, and tolerably well covered with flesh.

him e.g. Campanile 1999: 294–7 concerning his relations with Polemon). Although the specification 'sophist' makes the suggestion superficially attractive, in truth we do not know, and Philostratus' life (*VS* 1. 22, 521–6 = 35–8) at any rate presents a very different sort of man.

B

4. Δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα συμπαθεῖν ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξις ἀλλοιουμένη συναλλοιοῖ τὴν τοῦ σώματος μορφήν, πάλιν τε ἡ τοῦ σώματος μορφὴ ἀλλοιουμένη συναλλοιοῖ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξιν. ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐστι [808b15] ψυχῆς τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαί τε καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι, καταφανὲς ὅτι οἱ ἀνιώμενοι σκυθρωπότεροί εἰσι καὶ οἱ εὐφραινόμενοι ἱλαροί. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν τῆς ψυχῆς λελυμένης ἔτι τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος μορφὴν μένειν, ἦν μὲν ἂν καὶ οὕτως ἡ ψυχή τε καὶ τὸ σῶμα συμπαθῆ, οὐ μέντοι συνδιατελοῦντα ἀλλήλοις. [808b20] νῦν δὲ καταφανές, ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ἕπεται. μάλιστα μέντοι ἐκ τοῦδε δῆλον ⟨ἂν⟩ γένοιτο. μανία γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ φαρμάκοις καθαίροντες τὸ σῶμα καὶ διαίταις τισὶ πρὸς αὐταῖς χρησάμενοι ἀπαλλάττουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῆς μανίας. ταῖς δὴ τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαις [808b25] {καὶ} ἅμα ἥ τε τοῦ σώματος μορφὴ λέλυται καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μανίας ἀπήλλακται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἅμα ἀμφότερα λύονται, δῆλον ὅτι συνδιατελοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις.

Συμφανὲς δὲ καὶ ὅτι ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς ὅμοιαι αἱ μορφαὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπιγίνονται, ὥστ' ἐστὶν ἅπαντα ⟨τὰ⟩ ὅμοια ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις τοῦ αὐτοῦ τινος [808b30] δηλωτικά. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ὧν διαπράττεται τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἑκάστου γένους πάθη τῶν ζῴων ἐστί, τὰ δὲ κοινά. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἰδίοις ἔργοις τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδια τὰ πάθη κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς τὰ κοινά. κοινὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὕβρις τε καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἔκστασις. τῶν [808b35] μὲν οὖν λοφούρων κοινόν ἐστιν ὕβρις, τῶν δὲ ὄνων τε καὶ συῶν ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἕξις. ἴδιον δ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κυνῶν τὸ λοίδορον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὄνων τὸ ἄλυπον. ὡς μὲν [809a1] οὖν τὸ κοινόν τε καὶ τὸ ἴδιον χρὴ διελέσθαι, εἴρηται.

Δεῖ μέντοι πρὸς ἅπαντα πολλῆς συνηθείας, εἰ μέλλει τις αὐτὸς ἔσεσθαι ἱκανὸς περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα λέγειν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὰ ὁρώμενα ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται ἀναφέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰς [809a5] ὁμοιότητας τάς τε ἀπὸ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων γινομένας, καὶ ἰδέαι τινὲς ἄλλαι ἀπὸ θερμοτήτων καὶ ἀπὸ ψυχροτήτων γίνονται, ἔστι τε τούτων ἔνια τῶν ἐπιφαινομένων ἐπὶ {τε} τοῖς σώμασι μικραῖς διαφοραῖς κεχρημένα καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορευόμενα, οἷον αἵ τε ἀπὸ [809a10] φόβων ὠχρότητες καὶ ⟨αἱ⟩ ἀπὸ πόνων, αὗται γὰρ ὀνόματί τε τῷ αὐτῷ κέχρηνται, καὶ διαφορὰν μικρὰν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας, μικρᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐ ῥᾴδιον διαγινώσκειν ἀλλὰ ἢ ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τῆς μορφῆς τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν εἰληφότα. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχιστος καὶ ἄριστος ⟨τρόπος⟩ ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς [809a15] ἐπιπρεπείας,[7] καὶ ἔστι γε οὕτως τούτῳ χρώμενον πολλὰ διαγινώσκειν. καὶ οὐ μόνον καθόλου χρήσιμον ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν σημείων ἐκλογήν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ἐκλεγομένων καὶ πρέπειν δεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ἐκλεγόμενον θέλει.

[7] 'Congruity' (ἐπιπρέπεια). See Vogt (1999) 402–5. Ad. B1 and Anon. Lat. 45 take the term to mean 'overall appearance'. Vogt discusses various translations and herself uses 'Gesamteindruck'. In our view Loveday's and Forster's 'congruity' is about right. Here at 809a13–18 the text links ἐπιπρέπεια directly to the fit between a particular sign and a particular signified (note the gloss πρέπειν δεῖ, 'must be congruous'). Other uses support this. Ps.-Aristotle nowhere talks of ἐπιπρέπεια as something that 'supervenes' on the totality of physical traits (Ad. B1)—and in fact

II

4. Soul and body seem to me to affect each other sympathetically. A change in the state of the soul alters the appearance of the body, and conversely, when the appearance of the body changes, it changes the state of the soul as well. Grief and joy, to take an instance, are states of the soul, and everyone knows that grief involves a gloomy and joy a cheerful countenance. Now if it were the case that the external expression persisted after the soul had got rid of these emotions, we might still say that soul and body are in sympathy, but their sympathetic changes would not be entirely concomitant. As a matter of fact, however, it is obvious that every modification of the one involves a modification of the other. The best instance of this is to be found in insanity. Madness, it is generally allowed, is a condition of the soul, yet doctors cure it partly by administering purgative drugs to the body, partly by prescribing, besides these, certain courses of diet. Thus the result of proper treatment of the body is that they succeed, and that too simultaneously, not only in altering the physical condition, but also in curing the soul of madness; and the fact that the changes are simultaneous proves that the sympathetic modifications of body and soul are thoroughly concomitant.

It is quite clear that the appearances which come to supervene on bodies are similar to the powers of the soul, so that all the resemblances in animals are indicative of some identity. Again, in the case of animal behaviour, some traits are proper to a particular species, others common to several; and the proper activities of the soul are accompanied by proper physical traits, common activities by common traits. Examples of common characters are insolence, which is found in all animals with bushy tails, and violent sexual excitability, which is found alike in asses and in pigs: whilst on the other hand railing is a character peculiar to dogs, and insensibility to pain is peculiar to the ass. It has already been explained [809ᵃ1] how common and proper characters are to be distinguished.

At the same time it is only by long and wide experience that one can hope for oneself to attain detailed and expert understanding of these matters. For not only are visible characteristics of the body to be referred for explanation, as we are told, to analogies drawn partly from animals, partly from modes of action, but there are other external traits which depend on the varying proportions of bodily heat and cold; and to add to the difficulty, some of these traits are very much alike and have not got distinctive names, as is the case, for example, with the paleness that results from terror and the paleness due to fatigue—for these have the same name and differ only slightly from one another. Now when the difference is so slight, it can hardly be discerned except by those whom practice has taught to appreciate the congruity of different shades of expression with different conditions of mind, and so the argument from congruity[7] leads to the quickest and soundest conclusions, and enables us to distinguish minute differences. It is a method generally useful, and particularly in the selection of physiognomic signs, for the signs selected must be congruous with what they stand for.

uses supervening in a quite different context, of the relationship between appearance and psychological capacity at 808ᵇ27–9. Cf. Ch. 2 n. 113. Clearly, Ad. and Anon. Lat. believed that they were interpreting Aristotle correctly. It is not possible to say when the meaning of the word changed in philosophical or physiognomical circles; but the sense 'overall appearance' is already established at Polybius 3. 78. 3 (Hannibal's wigs).

Ἔτι τε κατὰ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν σημείων, καὶ τῷ συλλο[809a20]γισμῷ {ᾧ} δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅπου ἂν {τι} τύχῃ, προστιθέντα τοῖς προσοῦσι τὰ προσήκοντα, οἷον εἰ ἀναιδής τε εἴη καὶ μικρολόγος, καὶ κλέπτης ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, καὶ κλέπτης μὲν ἑπομένως τῇ ἀναιδείᾳ, τῇ δὲ μικρολογίᾳ ἀνελεύθερος. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστου δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προσ[809a25]αρμόζοντα τὴν μέθοδον ποιεῖσθαι.

5. Νυνὶ δὲ πρῶτον πειράσομαι τῶν ζῴων διελέσθαι, ὁποῖα αὐτῶν προσήκει διαλλάττειν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἀνδρεῖα καὶ δειλὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα. διαιρετέον δὲ τὸ τῶν ζῴων γένος εἰς δύο μορφάς, εἰς ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ, προσάπτοντα τὸ πρέπον [809a30] ἑκατέρᾳ μορφῇ. ἔστι δὲ ὁποῖα ἂν ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὖν τρέφειν τῶν θηρίων προσηνέστερα καὶ μαλακώτερα τὰς ψυχὰς τὰ θήλεα τῶν ἀρρένων, ἧττόν τε ῥωμαλεούμενα, τάς τε τροφὰς καὶ τὰς χειροηθείας μᾶλλον προσδεχόμενα. ὥστε τοιαῦτα ὄντα εἴη που ἂν ἀθυμότερα τῶν ἀρρένων. καταφανὲς δὲ τοῦτο ἐξ [809a35] ἡμῶν πού ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐπὰν ὑπὸ θυμοῦ κρατηθῶμεν, δυσπαραπειστότεροί τε, καὶ μάλιστα ἐρρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδὲν εἶξαι, ἐπὶ τὸ βιάζεσθαι δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαι φερόμεθα, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁ θυμὸς ὁρμήσῃ. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ κακουργότερα γίνεσθαι τὰ θήλεα τῶν ἀρρένων, καὶ προπετέστερά τε καὶ ἀναλκέστερα. [809b1] αἱ μὲν οὖν γυναῖκες καὶ τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς τρεφόμενα καὶ πάνυ που φανερὰ (τοιαῦτα) ὄντα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν οἱ νομεῖς τε καὶ θηρευταὶ ὅτι τοιαῦτά ἐστιν οἷα προείρηται. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὅτι ἕκαστον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει [809b5] θῆλυ ἄρρενος μικροκεφαλώτερόν ἐστι καὶ στενοπροσωπότερον καὶ λεπτοτραχηλότερον καὶ τὰ στήθη ἀσθενέστερα ἔχει, καὶ ἀπλευρότερά ἐστι, τά τε ἰσχία καὶ τοὺς μηροὺς περισαρκότερα τῶν ἀρρένων, γονύκροτα δὲ καὶ τὰς κνήμας λεπτὰς ἔχοντα τούς τε πόδας κομψοτέρους τήν τε τοῦ σώματος ὅλην μορφὴν [809b10] ἡδίω καὶ ἀμαλεστέραν ἢ γενναιοτέραν, ἀνευρότερα δὲ καὶ μαλακώτερα, ὑγροτέραις σαρξὶ κεχρημένα. τὰ δὲ ἄρρενα τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐναντία (ὥστε τοῦ μὲν ἄρρενος) τὴν φύσιν ἀνδρειοτέραν καὶ δικαιοτέραν εἶναι γένει, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θήλεος δειλοτέραν καὶ ἀδικωτέραν.

Τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων φαίνεται τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων (ὁ) λέων [809b15] τελεώτατα μετειληφέναι τῆς τοῦ ἄρρενος ἰδέας. ἔστι γὰρ ἔχων στόμα εὐμέγεθες, τὸ δὲ πρόσωπον τετραγωνότερον, οὐκ ἄγαν ὀστῶδες, τὴν ἄνω τε γένυν οὐ προεξεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλὰ ἰσορροποῦσαν τῇ κάτω, ῥῖνα δὲ παχυτέραν ἢ λεπτοτέραν, ὀφθαλμοὺς χαροποὺς ἐγκοίλους, οὐ σφόδρα περιφερεῖς οὔτε ἄγαν [809b20] προμήκεις, μέγεθος δὲ μετρίους, ὀφρὺν εὐμεγέθη, μέτωπον τετράγωνον, ἐκ μέσου ὑποκοιλότερον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὀφρῦς καὶ τὴν ῥῖνα ὑπὸ τοῦ μετώπου οἷον νέφος ἐπανεστηκός, ἄνωθεν δὲ τοῦ μετώπου κατὰ τὴν ῥῖνα ἔχει τρίχας ἐκκλινεῖς οἷον ἀνάσιλλον, κεφαλὴν μετρίαν, τράχηλον εὐμήκη πάχει σύμ[809b25]μετρον, θριξὶ ξανθαῖς κεχρημένον, οὐ φριξαῖς οὔτε ἄγαν ἀπεστραμμέναις, τὰ περὶ τὰς κλεῖδας εὐλυτώτερα μᾶλλον ἢ συμπεφραγμένα, ὤμους ῥωμαλέους καὶ στῆθος νεανικόν, καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον πλατὺ καὶ εὔπλευρον καὶ εὔνωτον ἐπιεικῶς ζῷον, ἀσαρκότερον τὰ ἰσχία καὶ τοὺς μηρούς, σκέλη (ἔχει) ἐρρωμένα [809b30] καὶ νευρώδη βάσιν τε νεανικήν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα ἀρθρῶδες καὶ νευρῶδες οὔτε λίαν σκληρὸν οὔτε λίαν ὑγρόν, βαδίζον δὲ βραδέως καὶ μεγάλα διαβαῖνον καὶ διασαλεῦον ἐν τοῖς ὤμοις, ὅταν πορεύηται. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοιοῦτον· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δοτικὸν καὶ ἐλευθέριον, με[809b35]γαλόψυχον καὶ φιλόνικον, καὶ πραῦ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ φιλόστοργον πρὸς ἃ ἂν ὁμιλήσῃ.

Ἡ δὲ πάρδαλις τῶν ἀνδρείων εἶναι δοκούντων θηλυμορφότερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὰ σκέλη· τούτοις δὲ συνεργεῖ καί τι ἔργον ῥώμης ἀπεργάζεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἔχον πρόσωπον μικρόν, στόμα μέγα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μικρούς, [810a1] ἐκλεύκους, ἐγκοίλους, αὐτοὺς δὲ περιπολαιοτέρους, μέτωπον προμηκέστερον, πρὸς τὰ ὦτα

Deduction also should be used in the selection of signs, whenever possible. In the deductive procedure we attach to our data known attributes of them. For instance, if we have it given that a man is shameless and niggling, we can add that he will be a thief and a miser, the one as a consequence of his shamelessness, the other as a consequence of his niggardliness. In all such cases we ought to include the deductive method in our procedure.

5. Now, first of all, I shall try to distinguish among animals which ones stand out as being brave or cowardly or just or unjust. The whole animal kingdom is to be divided into two types, male and female, and what is appropriate associated with each type. In all beasts that we try to breed the female is tamer and gentler in disposition than the male, less powerful, more easily reared, and more manageable. One may conclude from this that the female has a less spirited temper, and I think we find a parallel to this in ourselves, for when we are mastered by a fit of temper we become more obstinate and totally intractable; we grow headstrong and violent and do whatever our temper impels us to do. Further, the female is, in my opinion, more mischievous than the male, and (though feebler) more reckless. [809^{b}1] Everyone can see that this is so in women and in domesticated animals, and according to the unanimous evidence of herdsmen and hunters it is no less true of the beasts of the field. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that in every genus the head of the female is smaller than that of the male, her visage narrower, her neck thinner, her chest weaker, her flanks of smaller build, and that, whilst her hips and thighs are fuller, she inclines to be knock-kneed, the lower parts of her legs are less stout, and her feet more delicately made: in short, the build of her body is more pleasing to the eye and softer rather than imposing, and she is in comparison feeble and tender, and of moister tissue. The male is the opposite of all this: his is the braver and more upright nature, whilst the female is the more timid and less upright.

This being so, the lion manifestly exhibits the male type in its most perfect form. He has a good-sized mouth; his visage is square and not too bony, the upper jaw level with the lower and not protruding; his nose you would call, if anything, rather thick; his dark blue eyes are deep-set, and neither absolutely round nor unduly long, and of moderate size; his brow is of the right size, his forehead square and slightly hollowed from the centre, and over its lower part towards the eyebrows and nose there hangs a sort of cloud, and from the top of his forehead down to his nose there runs a ridge of hairs sloping outwards; his head is of moderate size; his neck of due length and broad in proportion with a tawny mane upon it, which is neither stiff and bristly nor yet too closely curled. About the collarbone he is supple and not too tightly articulated; his shoulders are stalwart, his chest powerful, his trunk broad, with sides and back to match; there is no superfluity of flesh on his haunches or thighs; his legs are powerful and sinewy, his gait vigorous, his whole frame well knit and sinewy and neither too stiff nor too soft; he moves slowly with a large stride, rolling his shoulders as he goes. Such is his bodily appearance, and in soul he is generous and liberal, proud and ambitious, yet mild and just and affectionate to his comrades.

Of all animals accounted brave, the leopard approximates more closely to the feminine type, save in its legs, which it uses to perform any feat of strength. For its face is small, its mouth large, its eyes small [810^{a}1] and whitish, set in a hollow, but rather flat in themselves; its forehead is too long and tends to be curved rather than flat near the ears;

περιφερέστερον ἢ ἐπιπεδώτερον, τράχηλον μακρὸν ἄγαν καὶ λεπτόν, στῆθος ἄπλευρον καὶ μακρὸν νῶτον, ἰσχία σαρκώδη καὶ μηρούς, τὰ δὲ περὶ [810a5] τὰς λαγόνας καὶ γαστέρα ὁμαλὰ μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ χρῶμα ποικίλον, καὶ ὅλον (τὸ σῶμα) ἄναρθρόν τε καὶ ἀσύμμετρον. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ σώματος ἰδέα τοιαύτη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μικρὸν καὶ ἐπίκλοπον καὶ ὅλως εἰπεῖν δολερόν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκπρεπέστερα μετειληφότα ζῷα τῶν δοκούντων ἀνδρείων εἶναι τῆς [810a10] τε τοῦ ἄρρενος ἰδέας καὶ τῆς τοῦ θήλεος εἴρηται· τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα οἷα τυγχάνει, ῥᾴδιον ἤδη μετιέναι. ὅσα δὲ πρὸς τὸ φυσιογνωμονῆσαι συνιδεῖν ἁρμόττει ἀπὸ τῶν ζῴων, ἐν τῇ τῶν σημείων ἐκλογῇ ῥηθήσεται.

6. Ἡ δὲ ἐκλογὴ τῶν σημείων ἡ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους [810a15] ὧδε λαμβάνεται.

Ὅσοις οἱ πόδες εὐφυεῖς τε καὶ μεγάλοι διηρθρωμένοι τε καὶ νευρώδεις, ἐρρωμένοι τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν γένος. ὅσοι δὲ τοὺς πόδας μικροὺς [810a18] στενοὺς ἀνάρθρους ἔχουσιν, ἡδίους τε ἰδεῖν ἢ ῥωμαλεωτέρους, μαλακοὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ [810a20] γένος. οἷς τῶν ποδῶν οἱ δάκτυλοι καμπύλοι, ἀναιδεῖς, καὶ ὅσοις ὄνυχες καμπύλαι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρνεις τοὺς γαμψώνυχας. οἷς τῶν ποδῶν τὰ δάκτυλα συμπεφραγμένα ἐστί, δειμαλέοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρνιθας τοὺς στεγανόποδας τῶν λιμναίων.

Ὅσοις τὰ περὶ τὰ σφυρὰ νευ[810a25]ρώδη τε καὶ διηρθρωμένα ἐστίν, εὔρωστοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν γένος. ὅσοι τὰ σφυρὰ σαρκώδεις καὶ ἄναρθροι, μαλακοὶ τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ γένος.

Ὅσοι τὰς κνήμας ἔχουσιν ἠρθρωμένας τε καὶ νευρώδεις καὶ ἐρρωμένας, εὔρωστοι τὴν ψυ[810a30]χήν· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. ὅσοι δὲ τὰς κνήμας λεπτὰς νευρώδεις ἔχουσι, λάγνοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρνιθας. ὅσοι τὰς κνήμας περιπλέους σφόδρα ἔχουσιν, οἷον ὀλίγου διαρρηγνυμένας, βδελυροὶ καὶ ἀναιδεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν.

Οἱ γονύκροτοι κίναιδοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ [810a35] τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν.

Οἱ τοὺς μηροὺς ὀστώδεις καὶ νευρώδεις ἔχοντες εὔρωστοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. οἱ δὲ τοὺς μηροὺς ὀστώδεις καὶ περιπλέους ἔχοντες μαλακοί· ἀναφέρεται [810b1] ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ.

Ὅσοι δὲ πῦγα ὀξεῖαν ὀστώδη ἔχουσιν, εὔρωστοι· ὅσοι δὲ σαρκώδη πίονα ἔχουσι, μαλακοί. ὅσοι δὲ ἔχουσιν ὀλίγην σάρκα, οἷον ἀπωμοργμένα, κακοήθεις· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς πιθήκους.

Οἱ εὔζωνοι φιλόθηροι· ἀνα[810b5]φέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας καὶ τοὺς κύνας. ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τοὺς φιλοθηροτάτους εὐζώνους ὄντας.

Οἷς τὰ περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν λαπαρά, εὔρωστοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. ὅσοι δὲ μὴ λαπαροί, μαλακοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν.

Ὅσοις τὸ νῶτον εὐμέγεθές τε καὶ ἐρρωμένον, [810b10] εὔρωστοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. ὅσοι δὲ τὸ νῶτον στενὸν καὶ ἀσθενὲς ἔχουσι, μαλακοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ.

Οἱ εὔπλευροι εὔρωστοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. οἱ δὲ ἄπλευροι μαλακοὶ τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ. ὅσοι δὲ ἐκ τῶν πλευρῶν [810b15] περίογκοί εἰσιν, οἷον πεφυσημένοι, λάλοι καὶ μωρολόγοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ {τοὺς βοῦς ἢ ἐπὶ} τοὺς βατράχους. ὅσοι δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀκροστήθιον μεῖζον ἔχουσιν ἢ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκροστηθίου πρὸς τὸν τράχηλον, βοροὶ καὶ ἀναίσθητοι, βοροὶ μὲν ὅτι τὸ τεῦχος μέγα ἔχουσιν, ᾧ δέχονται [810b20] τὴν τροφήν, ἀναίσθητοι δέ, ὅτι στενώτερον τὸν τόπον ἔχουσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις συνεωσμένον τε τῷ τὴν τροφὴν δεχομένῳ, ὥστε τὰς αἰσθήσεις βεβαρύνθαι διὰ τὰς τῶν σιτίων πληρώσεις (μᾶλλον) ἢ ἐνδείας.

Ὅσοι δὲ τὰ στήθη ἔχουσι μεγάλα καὶ διηρθρωμένα, εὔρωστοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. [810b25]

its neck too long and thin; its chest narrow and its back long; haunches and thighs fleshy; flanks and abdomen rather flat; its colour spotted; and its whole body ill articulated and ill proportioned. Such is its bodily aspect, and in soul it is mean and thievish, and in a word, a beast of low cunning.

I have now described the more notable examples of the male and the female types of body to be found among animals accounted brave, and the characterization of the remainder will present no difficulty. I will next proceed to explain in a chapter on selection of signs what marks derived from animals the student of physiognomy should take into consideration.

6. The selection of signs with regard to men is as follows.

A large and shapely foot, well articulated and sinewy, is held to signify a strong character. For evidence we are referred to the male sex in general. A small, narrow, ill-articulated foot, pretty but weak, signifies a soft character, as in the female sex. Curved toes are a sign of shamelessness, and so are curved nails, on the evidence of birds with curved claws, whilst toes that are not properly divided indicate timidity, as in web-footed water-birds.

Ankles sinewy and well articulated mark a strong character, on the evidence of the male sex; fleshy and ill-articulated ankles a soft character, on the evidence of the female sex.

When the lower leg is at once well articulated and sinewy and stalwart, it signifies a strong character, as in the male sex; when it is thin and sinewy it signifies salaciousness, as in birds. When it is full and almost bursting, it signifies by congruity blatant shamelessness.

Knock-knees are a sign of deviants, by congruity.

Thighs bony and sinewy indicate a strong character, as in the male sex; but when bony and full a soft character, [810^b1] as in females.

Buttocks pointed and bony are a mark of a strong character, fat fleshy buttocks of a soft character, whilst lean buttocks which look as if they had been rubbed bare are indicative of a mischievous disposition, as in apes.

A slim waist marks the hunter, as in the lion and the dog; and you will find that the best hunting dogs also are narrow in the waist.

A loose build round about the belly indicates strength of character, as in the male sex, whilst the opposite is by congruity indicative of a soft character.

A well-sized and sturdy back marks strength, and a narrow feeble back softness of character, as in males and females respectively.

Strong flanks indicate strength and weak flanks softness, as in males and females respectively, whilst swollen inflated flanks signify aimless loquacity, as in frogs. When the distance from the navel to the lower end of the breastbone exceeds that from the latter to the neck, it is a mark of gluttony and of insensibility, of gluttony because there is so large a receptacle of food, and of insensibility because the seat of the senses is correspondingly confined and compressed by the receptacle of food, so that the senses have become stupefied by repletion of the stomach rather than, as is usual, by inanition.

A large well-articulated chest signifies strength of character, as in males.

Ὅσοι δὲ τὸ μετάφρενον ἔχουσι μέγα καὶ εὔσαρκον καὶ ἀρθρῶδες, εὔρωστοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. ὅσοι δ' ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἄσαρκον καὶ ἄναρθρον, μαλακοὶ τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ. ὅσοις δὲ τὸ μετάφρενον κυρτόν ἐστι σφόδρα οἵ τε ὦμοι πρὸς τὸ στῆθος συνηγμένοι, [810b30] κακοήθεις· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν, ὅτι ἀφανίζεται τὰ ἔμπροσθεν προσήκοντα φαίνεσθαι. ὅσοι δὲ τὸ μετάφρενον ὕπτιον ἔχουσι, χαῦνοι καὶ ἀνόητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε κυρτὸν σφόδρα δεῖ εἶναι οὔτε κοῖλον, τὸ μέσον ζητητέον τοῦ εὖ πεφυκότος.

Ὅσοις αἱ [810b35] ἐπωμίδες ἐξηρθρωμέναι καὶ οἱ ὦμοι, εὔρωστοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. ὅσοις δὲ οἱ ὦμοι ἀσθενεῖς ἄναρθροι, μαλακοὶ τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ. [811a1] ταὐτὰ λέγω ἅπερ περὶ ποδῶν καὶ μηρῶν. ὅσοις (οἱ) ὦμοι εὔλυτοί εἰσιν, ἐλευθέριοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ φαινομένου, ὅτι πρέπει τῇ φαινομένῃ μορφῇ ἐλευθεριότης. ὅσοις δὲ οἱ ὦμοι δύσλυτοι συνεσπασμένοι, ἀνελεύθεροι· [811a5] ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν.

Οἷς τὰ περὶ τὰς κλεῖδας εὔλυτα, αἰσθητικοί· εὐλύτων γὰρ ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὰς κλεῖδας εὐκόλως τὴν κίνησιν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δέχονται. οἷς δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς κλεῖδας συμπεφραγμένα ἐστίν, ἀναίσθητοι· δυσλύτων γὰρ ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὰς κλεῖδας ἐξαδυνατοῦσι [811a10] τὴν κίνησιν παραδέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

Ὅσοι τὸν τράχηλον παχὺν ἔχουσιν, εὔρωστοι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. ὅσοι δὲ λεπτόν, ἀσθενεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ. οἷς τράχηλος παχὺς καὶ πλέως, θυμοειδεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς (θυμοειδεῖς) ταύρους. οἷς δὲ εὐμεγέθης μὴ [811a15] ἄγαν παχύς, μεγαλόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἷς λεπτὸς μακρός, δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐλάφους. οἷς δὲ βραχὺς ἄγαν, ἐπίβουλοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λύκους.

Οἷς τὰ χείλη λεπτὰ καὶ ἐπ' ἄκραις ταῖς συγχειλίαις χαλαρά, ὥστε τὶ τοῦ ἄνω χείλους πρὸς τὸ κάτω ἐπιβεβλῆ[811a20]σθαι τὸ πρὸς τὰς συγχειλίας, μεγαλόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεγάλων καὶ εὐρώστων κυνῶν. οἷς τὰ χείλη λεπτὰ σκληρά, κατὰ τοὺς κυνόδοντας ἐπανεστηκότα ... οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες ἀγεννεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὗς. οἱ δὲ τὰ χείλη ἔχοντες παχέα καὶ [811a25] τὸ ἄνω τοῦ κάτω προκρεμάμενον μωροί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄνους τε καὶ πιθήκους. ὅσοι δὲ τὸ ἄνω χεῖλος καὶ τὰ οὖλα προεστηκότα ἔχουσι, φιλολοίδοροι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς κύνας.

Οἱ δὲ τὴν ῥῖνα ἄκραν παχεῖαν ἔχοντες ῥάθυμοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς βοῦς. οἱ δὲ τὴν ῥῖνα ἄκροθεν παχεῖαν ἔχον[811a30]τες ἀναίσθητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὗς. οἱ τὴν ῥῖνα ἄκραν ὀξεῖαν ἔχοντες δυσόργητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς κύνας. οἱ δὲ τὴν ῥῖνα περιφερῆ ἔχοντες ἄκραν, ἀμβλεῖαν δέ, μεγαλόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἱ δὲ τὴν ῥῖνα ἄκραν λεπτὴν ἔχοντες ὀρνιθώδεις· οἱ ἐπίγρυπον ἀπὸ τοῦ με[811a35]τώπου εὐθὺς ἀγομένην ἀναιδεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς κόρακας. οἱ δὲ γρυπὴν ἔχοντες καὶ τοῦ μετώπου διηρθρωμένην μεγαλόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀετούς. οἱ δὲ τὴν ῥῖνα ἔγκοιλον ἔχοντες, τὰ πρὸς τὸν μέτωπον περιφερῆ, τὴν δὲ πε[811b1]ριφέρειαν ἄνω ἀνεστηκυῖαν, λάγνοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας. οἱ δὲ σιμὴν ἔχοντες λάγνοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐλάφους. οἷς δὲ οἱ μυκτῆρες ἀναπεπταμένοι, θυμώδεις· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἐν τῷ θυμῷ γινόμενον.

Οἱ τὸ [811b5] πρόσωπον σαρκῶδες ἔχοντες ῥάθυμοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς βοῦς. οἱ τὰ πρόσωπα ἰσχνὰ ἔχοντες ἐπιμελεῖς, οἱ δὲ ὀστώδη δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄνους καὶ τὰς ἐλάφους. οἱ (τὸ πρόσωπον) μικρὸν ἄγαν ἔχοντες μικρόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ αἴλουρον καὶ πίθηκον. οἷς τὰ πρόσωπα μεγάλα, νω[811b10]θροί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄνους καὶ βοῦς. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα δεῖ εἶναι, ἡ μέση ἕξις εἴη ἂν τούτων ἐπιεικής. οἷς δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον φαίνεται μικροπρεπές, ἀνελεύθεροι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν.

When the upper part of the back is large and well covered with flesh and well knit, the character is strong, as in males; when it is feeble and gaunt and ill-knit, the character is soft, as in females. When it is very much bent and the shoulders fall in upon the chest, it is argued by congruity to signify a mischievous disposition, since the front parts of the body, which ought to stand clear to view, become invisible. When it is curved backwards, it signifies vanity and lack of intelligence, as in the horse. So it must not be either convex or concave; and something intermediate between these extremes, therefore, should be looked for as marking a man of good natural parts.

When the shoulders and the back of the neck are well articulated, they signify a strong character, whilst weak and ill-articulated shoulders signify a soft character, the reference being to the sexes, [811^{a}1] as I explained when speaking of feet and thighs. Supple shoulders signify liberality of soul, the argument being based on the external appearance, with which liberality seems to be congruous. On the other hand, stiff, clumsy shoulders indicate an illiberal disposition, also by congruity.

Suppleness of the collarbone signifies quickness of perception, for when the collarbone is supple, stimulation of the senses is rendered easy. Contrariwise, a stiff collarbone indicates insensibility, because then it is difficult to apprehend sense-stimuli.

A thick neck indicates a strong character, as in males; a thin neck, weakness, as in females; a neck thick and full, fierce temper, as in bulls; a well-sized neck, not too thick, a proud soul, as in lions; a long, thin neck, cowardice, as in deer; an unduly short neck, a treacherous disposition, as in wolves.

Lips thin and pendulous at their points of junction, such that part of the upper lip overhangs the lower at the corners, signify pride of soul. The reference generally given is to the lion, but you may see the same thing as well in large and powerful breeds of dogs. Lips thin and hard with a prominence about the eye-teeth are a sign of base breeding, on the evidence of swine. Thick lips, with the upper overhanging the lower, mean folly, as in the ass and the ape. Projecting upper lip and gums mark those fond of abuse, on the evidence of dogs.

A nose thick at the tip means laziness, as witness cattle; but if thick from the tip, it means insensibility, as in swine; if the tip is pointed, irascibility, as in dogs; whilst a round, blunt tip indicates pride, as in lions. Men with a nose thin at the tip have the characteristics of birds. When such a nose curves slightly right away from the forehead, it indicates shamelessness, as in ravens; but when it is strongly aquiline and demarcated from the forehead by a well-defined articulation, it indicates a proud soul, as in the eagle; and when it is hollow, with the part next the forehead rounded and the [811^{b}1] curve rising upwards, it signifies lasciviousness, as in cocks. A snub nose means lasciviousness, as in deer. Open nostrils are a sign of fierce temper, for they enter into the facial expression of temper.

The face, when fleshy, indicates laziness, as in cattle; if gaunt, assiduity; and if bony, cowardice, on the analogy of asses and deer. A small face marks a petty mind, as in the cat and the ape; a large face means lethargy, as in asses and cattle. So the face must be neither large nor little: an intermediate size is therefore best. A mean-looking face signifies by congruity an illiberal spirit.

Οἷς τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οἷον κύστιδες προκρέμανται, οἰνόφλυγες. ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ [811b15] τὸ πάθος· ἔστι γὰρ τοῖς σφόδρα ἐμπεπωκόσι τὰ πρὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οἷον κύστιδες. (οἷς δὲ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς οἷον κύστιδες) ἐφεστήκασι, φίλυπνοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι τοῖς ἐξ ὕπνου ἀνεστηκόσιν ἐπικρέμαται τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς. οἱ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς μικροὺς ἔχοντες μικρόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν καὶ [811b20] ἐπὶ πίθηκον. οἱ δὲ μεγαλόφθαλμοι νωθροί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς βοῦς. τὸν ἄρα εὖ φύντα δεῖ μήτε μικροὺς μήτε μεγάλους ἔχειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. οἱ δὲ κοίλους ἔχοντες κακοῦργοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ πίθηκον. ὅσοι ἐξόφθαλμοι, ἀβέλτεροι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειάν τε καὶ τοὺς ὄνους. ἐπεὶ δὲ [811b25] οὔτε ἐξόφθαλμον οὔτε κοιλόφθαλμον δεῖ εἶναι, ἡ μέση ἕξις ἂν κρατοίη. ὅσοις ὀφθαλμοὶ μικρὸν ἐγκοιλότεροι, μεγαλόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἷς δ' ἐπὶ πλεῖον, πραεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς βοῦς.

Οἱ τὸ μέτωπον μικρὸν ἔχοντες ἀμαθεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὗς. οἱ δὲ μέγα ἄγαν [811b30] ἔχοντες νωθροί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς βοῦς. οἱ δὲ περιφερὲς ἔχοντες ἀναίσθητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄνους. οἱ μακρότερον ἐπίπεδον ἔχοντες ἀναίσθητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς κύνας. οἱ δὲ τετράγωνον σύμμετρον τὸν μέτωπον ἔχοντες μεγαλόψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἱ δὲ συννεφὲς [811b35] ἔχοντες αὐθάδεις· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ ταῦρον καὶ λέοντα. οἱ δὲ γαληνὲς ἔχοντες κόλακες· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον πάθος. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις (καὶ) ἐπὶ τῶν κυνῶν, ὅτι {οἱ} κύνες ἐπειδὰν θωπεύωσι, γαληνὲς τὸ μέτωπον ἔχουσιν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἥ τε [812a1] συννεφὴς ἕξις αὐθάδειαν ἐμφαίνει ἥ τε γαληνὴ κολακείαν, ἡ μέση ἂν τούτων ἕξις εὐαρμόστως ἔχοι. οἱ σκυθρωπὰ μέτωπα ἔχοντες δυσάνιοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι οἱ ἀνιώμενοι σκυθρωποί εἰσιν. οἱ δὲ κατηφεῖς ὀδύρται· ἀνα[812a5]φέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι οἱ ὀδυρόμενοι κατηφεῖς.

Οἱ τὴν κεφαλὴν μεγάλην ἔχοντες αἰσθητικοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς κύνας. οἱ δὲ μικρὰν ἀναίσθητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄνους. οἱ τὰς κεφαλὰς φοξοὶ ἀναιδεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς γαμψώνυχας.

Οἱ τὰ ὦτα μικρὰ ἔχοντες πιθηκώδεις, οἱ [812a10] δὲ μεγάλα ὀνώδεις· ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους μέτρια ὦτα ἔχοντας.

Οἱ ἄγαν μέλανες δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους (καὶ) Αἰθίοπας. οἱ δὲ λευκοὶ ἄγαν δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν συντελοῦν χρῶμα [812a15] μέσον δεῖ τούτων εἶναι. οἱ ξανθοὶ εὔψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἱ πυρροὶ ἄγαν πανοῦργοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς ἀλώπεκας. οἱ δὲ ἔνωχροι καὶ τεταραγμένοι τὸ χρῶμα δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἐκ τοῦ φόβου γιγνόμενον. οἱ δὲ μελίχλωροι ἀπεψυγμένοι εἰσίν· τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ δυσ[812a20]κίνητα· δυσκινήτων δὲ ὄντων τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶεν ἂν βραδεῖς. οἷς τὸ χρῶμα ἐρυθρόν, ὀξεῖς, ὅτι πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ κινήσεως ἐκθερμαινόμενα ἐρυθραίνεται. οἷς δὲ τὸ χρῶμα φλογοειδές, μανικοί, ὅτι τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα σφόδρα ἐκθερμανθέντα φλογοειδῆ χροιὰν ἴσχει· οἱ δὲ ἄκρως [812a25] θερμανθέντες μανικοὶ ἂν εἴησαν.

Οἷς δὲ περὶ τὰ στήθη ἐπιφλεγές ἐστι τὸ χρῶμα, δυσόργητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος· τοῖς γὰρ ὀργιζομένοις ἐπιφλέγεται τὰ περὶ τὰ στήθη. οἷς {τὰ} περὶ τὸν τράχηλον καὶ τοὺς κροτάφους αἱ φλέβες κατατεταμέναι εἰσί, δυσόργητοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ [812a30] τὸ πάθος, ὅτι τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ταῦτα συμβαίνει. οἷς τὸ πρόσωπον ἐπιφοινίσσον ἐστίν, αἰσχυντηλοί εἰσιν· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις ἐπιφοινίσσεται τὸ πρόσωπον. οἷς αἱ γνάθοι ἐπιφοινίσσουσιν, οἰνόφλυγες· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσιν ἐπιφοινίσσουσιν [812a35] αἱ γνάθοι. οἷς δὲ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐπιφοινίσσουσιν, ἐκστατικοὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι οἱ ὑπ' ὀργῆς ἐξεστηκότες ἐκφοινίσσονται τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς. οἷς δὲ οἱ ὀφθαλ[812b1]μοὶ ἄγαν μέλανες, δειλοί· ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν μελαίνη χρόα ἐφάνη δειλίαν σημαίνουσα. οἱ δὲ μὴ ἄγαν μέλανες ἀλλὰ κλίνοντες πρὸς τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα εὔψυχοι. οἷς δὲ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ γλαυκοὶ ἢ λευκοί, δειλοί· ἐφάνη γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν

As to the eyes, when the lower lids are pendulous and baggy, you may know a bibulous fellow, for heavy drinking produces bagginess below the eyes; but when the upper lids are baggy and hang over the eyes, that signifies somnolence, for on first waking from sleep our upper lids hang heavily. Small eyes mean a petty mind, by congruity and on the evidence of the ape; large eyes, lethargy, as in cattle. In a man of good natural parts, therefore, the eyes will be neither large nor small. Hollow eyes mean villainy, as in the ape; protruding eyes imbecility, by congruity and as in the ass. The eyes, therefore, must neither recede nor protrude: an intermediate position is best. When the eyes are slightly deep-set, they signify a proud soul, as in lions; and when a little deeper still, mildness, as in cattle.

A small forehead means stupidity, as in swine; too large a forehead, lethargy, as in cattle. A round forehead means insensibility, as in the ass; a somewhat long and flat forehead, quickness of sense, as in the dog. A square and well-proportioned forehead is a sign of a proud soul, as in the lion. A [812ᵃ1] cloudy brow signifies self-will, as in the lion and the bull; a smooth brow is taken from observation to mark the flatterer, and you may notice how a dog's brow smoothes out when he fawns upon you. So, a cloudy brow indicating self-will and a smooth brow obsequiousness, the proper condition must be intermediate between these extremes. A scowling brow means a morose disposition, for we observe that vexation is thus expressed; a downcast brow means querulousness, as may also be verified by observation.

A large head means quickness and a small head insensibility, on the evidence of the dog and the ass respectively. A peaked head means shamelessness, as in those birds which have curved claws.

Men with small ears have the disposition of monkeys, those with large ears the disposition of asses, and you may notice that the best breeds of dogs have ears of moderate size.

Too black a hue marks the coward, as witness Egyptians and Ethiopians, and so does also too white a complexion, as you may see from women. So the hue that makes for courage must be intermediate between these extremes. A tawny colour indicates a bold spirit, as in lions; but too ruddy a hue marks a rogue, as in the case of the fox. A pale mottled hue signifies cowardice, for that is the colour one turns in terror. The honey-pale are cold, and coldness means immobility, and an immobile body means slowness. A red hue indicates hastiness, for all parts of the body on being heated by movement turn red. A flaming skin, however, indicates madness, for it results from an overheated body, and extreme bodily heat is likely to mean madness.

A fiery colour on the chest signifies irascibility, for it is part of the expression of the onset of anger. Swollen veins on the neck and temples also signify irascibility, being part of the expression of anger. A face that reddens easily marks a bashful man, for blushing is an expression of bashfulness. But when the jowl goes red, you have a drunkard, for a red jowl is an expression of heavy drinking; whilst eyes that flush red indicate uncontrollable temper, for in a wild outburst of temper the eyes flush red. If the eyes [812ᵇ1] are too black, they signify cowardice, for we saw above that this is the signification of too black a hue; if they are not too black, but inclining to chestnut, they indicate a bold spirit. Light blue or white eyes indicate cowardice, for we saw above that this is the signification of

χρῶ[812^{b}5]μα δειλίαν σημαῖνον. οἱ δὲ μὴ γλαυκοὶ ἀλλὰ χαροποὶ εὔψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ λέοντα καὶ ἀετόν. οἷς δὲ αἰγωποί, μάργοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς αἶγας. οἷς δὲ πυρώδεις, ἀναιδεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς κύνας. οἱ ὠχρόμματοι ἐντεταραγμένους ἔχοντες τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται [812^{b}10] ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι οἱ φοβηθέντες ἔνωχροι γίνονται χρώματι οὐχ ὁμαλῷ. οἱ δὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς στιλπνοὺς ἔχοντες λάγνοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ κόρακας.

Οἱ δασείας ἔχοντες τὰς κνήμας λάγνοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς τράγους. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν ἄγαν [812^{b}15] δασέως ἔχοντες οὐδέποτε πρὸς τοῖς αὐτοῖς διατελοῦσιν· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρνιθας, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ στήθη καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν δασυτάτην ἔχουσιν. οἱ τὰ στήθη ψιλὰ ἄγαν ἔχοντες ἀναιδεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε ἄγαν δασέα δεῖ εἶναι οὔτε ψιλά, ἡ μέση ἕξις κρατίστη. οἱ [812^{b}20] τοὺς ὤμους δασεῖς ἔχοντες οὐδέποτε πρὸς τοῖς αὐτοῖς διατελοῦσιν· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρνιθας. οἱ τὸν νῶτον δασὺν ἔχοντες ἄγαν ἀναιδεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰ θηρία. οἱ δὲ τὸν αὐχένα ὄπισθεν δασὺν ἔχοντες ἐλευθέριοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἱ δὲ ἀκρογένειοι εὔψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ [812^{b}25] τοὺς κύνας. οἱ δὲ συνόφρυες δυσάνιοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πάθους ὁμοιότητα. οἱ δὲ τὰς ὀφρῦς κατεσπασμένοι πρὸς τὴν ῥῖνα, ἀνεσπασμένοι δὲ πρὸς τὸν κρόταφον εὐήθεις· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς σῦς. οἱ φριξὰς τὰς τρίχας ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι {καὶ} οἱ ἐκ[812^{b}30]φοβοι γιγνόμενοι φρίσσουσιν. οἱ τὰς τρίχας σφόδρα οὔλας ἔχοντες δειλοί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς Αἰθίοπας. ἐπειδὴ οὖν αἵ τε φριξαὶ καὶ αἱ σφόδρα οὖλαι δειλίαν ἐμφαίνουσιν, αἱ ἄκρουλοι ἂν εἶεν πρὸς εὐψυχίαν ἄγουσαι· ἀναφέρεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν λέοντα. οἱ τοῦ μετώπου τὸ πρὸς τῇ κε[812^{b}35]φαλῇ ἀνάσιλλον ἔχοντες ἐλευθέριοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἱ {ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς} προσπεφυκυίας ἔχοντες τὰς τρίχας ἐπὶ τοῦ μετώπου κατὰ τὴν ῥῖνα ἀνελεύθεροι· ἀνα[813^{a}1]φέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν, ὅτι δουλοπρεπὲς τὸ φαινόμενον.

Μακροβάμων {καὶ} βραδυβάμων εἴη ἂν νωθρεπιθέτης τελεστικός, ὅτι τὸ μακρὰ βαίνειν ἀνυστικόν, τὸ βραδέως δὲ [813^{a}5] μελλητικόν. βραχυβάμων βραδυβάμων νωθρεπιθέτης οὐ τελεστικός, ὅτι τὸ βραχέα βαίνειν καὶ βραδέως οὐκ ἀνυστικόν. μακροβάμων ταχυβάμων {οὐκ} ἐπιθετικός, τελεστικός, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τάχος τελεστικόν, ἡ δὲ μακρότης {οὐκ} ἀνυστικόν. βραχυβάμων ταχυβάμων ἐπιθετικός οὐ τελεστικός.

Ἀπὸ δὲ χει[813^{a}10]ρὸς καὶ πήχεως καὶ βραχίονος φορᾶς αἱ αὐταὶ ⟨ἀναφοραὶ⟩ ἀναφέρονται. οἱ δὲ τοῖς ὤμοις ἐπισαλεύοντες ὀρθοῖς ἐκτεταμένοις γαλιάγκωνες ⟨γαῦροι·⟩[8] ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους. οἱ τοῖς ὤμοις ἐπενσαλεύοντες ἐγκεκυφότες μεγαλόφρονες· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἱ δὲ τοῖς ποσὶν ἐξεστραμμένοις πορευόμενοι [813^{a}15] καὶ ταῖς κνήμαις θήλεις· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. οἱ δὲ τοῖς σώμασι περικλώμενοι καὶ ἐγκλινόμενοι κόλακες· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος. οἱ ἐγκλινόμενοι εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ ἐν τῷ πορεύεσθαι κίναιδοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν.

Οἱ εὐκινήτους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες ὀξεῖς ἁρπαστικοί· ἀνα[813^{a}20]φέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱέρακας. οἱ σκαρδαμύκται δειλοί, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι πρῶτα τρέπονται. οἱ κατιλλανταὶ ὡραϊσταί, καὶ οἷς τὸ ἕτερον βλέφαρον ἐπιβέβηκε τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς κατὰ μέσον τῆς ὄψεως ἑστηκυίας καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ βλέφαρα τὰ ἄνω τὰς ὀψίας ἀνάγοντες μαλακόν τε βλέποντες καὶ οἱ τὰ [813^{a}25] βλέφαρα ἐπιβεβληκότες ὅλως τε πάντες οἱ μαλακόν τε καὶ διακεχυμένον βλέποντες· ἀναφέρονται ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. οἱ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς διὰ συχνοῦ χρόνου κινοῦντες, ἔχοντές τε βάμμα λευκώματος ἐπὶ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, ὡς προσεστηκότας, ἐννοητικοί· ἂν γὰρ πρός τινι [813^{a}30] ἐννοίᾳ σφόδρα γένηται ἡ ψυχή, ἵσταται καὶ ἡ ὄψις.

a white hue; but if they are dark blue rather than light blue, they mean a bold spirit, as in lions and eagles. Goatish eyes mean lustfulness, as in goats; fiery eyes, shamelessness, as in dogs; eyes pale and mottled, cowardice, for in terror the eyes go pale with splotches of colour; glistening eyes lasciviousness, on the analogy of the cock and the raven.

Hairy legs mean lasciviousness, as in goats. Too much hair on breast and belly means lack of persistence, as argued from birds, in which this bodily characteristic is most developed; but breasts too devoid of hair indicate shamelessness, as in women. So both extremes are bad, and an intermediate condition must be best. Hairy shoulders mean lack of persistence, on the analogy of birds; too much hair on the back, shamelessness, as in wild beasts. Hair on the nape of the neck indicates liberality, as in lions; hair on the point of the chin, a bold spirit, on the evidence of dogs. Eyebrows that meet signify moroseness, by congruity; eyebrows that droop on the nasal and rise on the temporal side, silliness, as is seen in swine. When the hair of the head stands up stiff, it signifies cowardice, by congruity, for fright makes the hair stand on end; and very woolly hair also signifies cowardice, as may be seen in Ethiopians. Thus extremely bristly and extremely woolly hair alike signify cowardice, and so hair gently curling at the end will make for boldness of spirit, as is to be seen in lions. A ridge of hair on the upper part of the forehead indicates a liberal disposition, as in the lion; but a growth of hair on the forehead down by the nose indicates illiberality, the argument [813^a1] being from congruity, because such a growth presents a servile appearance.

A long and slow step indicates a mind slow to begin, but persistent when started, for the length of the stride shows determination, but its slowness procrastination. A short slow step means tardiness without persistence, for shortness and slowness indicate lack of determination. A long quick step means enterprise and persistence, for its speed indicates enterprise and its length determination. A short quick step signifies enterprise without persistence.

Identical references are made about gesture of hand, elbow, and arm. To hold one's shoulders straight and stiff and roll them as one walks and to have weasel-arms is haughty,[8] on the analogy of the horse; but to roll the shoulders if one stoops a little forwards means a proud soul, as in the lion. To walk with feet and legs bent out means femininity, as being a characteristic of women. To keep turning and bending the body is a sign of obsequiousness, for that is the gesture of the flatterer. To walk with a stoop to the right by congruity of appearance shows deviants.

Mobile eyes signify keenness and rapacity, as in hawks; blinking eyes cowardice, for flight begins with the eyes. Sidelong leering glances are held to be characteristic of a fop, and so are drooping movements of one lid half over a motionless eye, and an upward roll of the eyes under the upper lids with a tender gaze and drooping eyelids, and in general all tender melting glances; we argue partly from congruity, partly from the fact that these looks are common in women. A slow movement of the eyes which allows a tinge of white to show all the time, so that they look stationary, indicates a reflective character; for when the mind is absorbed in reflection, our eyes also are motionless.

[8] 'Haughty' added following Foerster's suggestion.

Οἱ μέγα φωνοῦντες βαρύτονον ὑβρισταί· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄνους. ὅσοι δὲ φωνοῦσιν ἀπὸ βαρέος ἀρξάμενοι, τε[813a33]λευτῶσι δὲ εἰς ὀξύ, δυσθυμικοί ὀδύρται· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς βοῦς καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πρέπον τῇ φωνῇ. ὅσοι δὲ ταῖς φωναῖς [813a35] ὀξείαις μαλακαῖς κεκλασμέναις διαλέγονται, κίναιδοι· ἀνα[813b1]φέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν. ὅσοι βαρὺ κοῖλον φωνοῦσι (μέγα) μὴ πεπλεγμένον, …[9] ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς εὐρώστους κύνας καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν. ὅσοι μαλακὸν ἄτονον φωνοῦσι, πραεῖς· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς ὄις. ὅσοι δὲ φω[813b5]νοῦσιν ὀξὺ καὶ ἐγκεκραγός, μάργοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς αἶγας.

Οἱ μικροὶ ἄγαν ὀξεῖς· τῆς γὰρ τοῦ αἵματος φορᾶς μικρὸν τόπον κατεχούσης καὶ αἱ κινήσεις ταχὺ ἄγαν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ τὸ φρονοῦν. οἱ δὲ ἄγαν μεγάλοι βραδεῖς· τῆς [813b10] γὰρ τοῦ αἵματος φορᾶς μέγαν τόπον κατεχούσης αἱ κινήσεις βραδέως ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ τὸ φρονοῦν. ὅσοι τῶν μικρῶν ξηραῖς σαρξὶ κεχρημένοι εἰσὶν ἢ καὶ χρώμασιν, ἃ διὰ θερμότητα τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπιγίνονται, οὐδὲν ἀποτελοῦσιν· οὔσης γὰρ τῆς φορᾶς ἐν μικρῷ καὶ ταχείας διὰ τὸ πυρῶδες, οὐδέ[813b15]ποτε κατὰ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ φρονοῦν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλων, πρὶν τὸ περιὸν περᾶναι. ὅσοι δὲ τῶν μεγάλων ὑγραῖς σαρξὶ κεχρημένοι (εἰσίν) ἢ καὶ χρώμασιν, ἃ διὰ ψυχρότητα ἐγγίνονται, οὐδὲν ἐπιτελοῦσιν· οὔσης γὰρ τῆς φορᾶς ἐν μεγάλῳ τόπῳ καὶ βραδείας διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα (ἡ κίνησις) οὐ συνανύει ἀφι[813b20]κνουμένη ἐπὶ τὸ φρονοῦν. ὅσοι δὲ τῶν μικρῶν ὑγραῖς σαρξὶ κεχρημένοι εἰσὶν (ἢ) καὶ χρώμασι, (ἃ) διὰ ψυχρότητα, γίνονται ἐπιτελεστικοί· οὔσης γὰρ τῆς κινήσεως ἐν μικρῷ τὸ δυσκίνητον τῆς κράσεως συμμετρίαν παρέσχε πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν. ὅσοι δὲ τῶν μεγάλων ξηραῖς σαρξὶ κεχρημένοι εἰσὶν (ἢ) καὶ χρώμασιν, (ἃ) [813b25] διὰ θερμότητα γίνονται, ἐπιτελεστικοὶ καὶ αἰσθητικοί· τὴν γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους ὑπερβολὴν σαρκῶν τε καὶ χρώματος ἡ θερμότης ἠκέσατο, ὥστε σύμμετρον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν μεγέθεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα τῶν σωμάτων ἢ μικρότησιν ἐλλείποντα, ὡς τυχόντα ἐπιτελεστικά ἐστι καὶ ὡς [813b30] ἀτελῆ, εἴρηται. ἡ δὲ τούτων μέση φύσις πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις κρατίστη καὶ τελεστικωτάτη, οἷς ἂν ἐπιθῆται· αἱ γὰρ κινήσεις οὐ διὰ πολλοῦ οὖσαι ῥᾳδίως ἀφικνοῦνται πρὸς τὸ νοοῦν οὖσαί τε οὐ κατὰ μικρὸν (οὐχ) ὑπεκχωροῦσιν. ὥστε τὸν τελεώτατον πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τε ἃ ἂν προθῆται καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι μέλ[813b35]λοντα μέτριον δεῖ εἶναι τὸ μέγεθος.

Οἱ ἀσύμμετροι πανοῦρ[814a1]γοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ θῆλυ. εἰ δὲ οἱ ἀσύμμετροι πανοῦργοι, οἱ σύμμετροι δίκαιοι ἂν εἴησαν καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι· τὴν δὲ τῆς συμμετρίας ἀναφορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων εὐαγωγίαν καὶ εὐφυίαν ἀνοιστέον, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς [814a5] τὴν τοῦ ἄρρενος ἰδέαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ διῃρέθη.

Καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ πάντα τὰ σημεῖα, ὅσα προείρηται, ἀναφέρειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιπρέπειαν καὶ εἰς ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ· ταῦτα γὰρ τελεωτάτην διαίρεσιν διῄρηται, καὶ ἐδείχθη ἄρρεν θήλεος δικαιότερον καὶ ἀνδρειότερον καὶ ὅλως εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον. ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ [814b1] τῇ τῶν σημείων ἐκλογῇ ἕτερα ἑτέρων σημεῖα μᾶλλον δηλοῦσιν ἐναργῶς τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἐναργέστερα δὲ τὰ ἐν ἐπικαιροτάτοις τόποις ἐγγινόμενα. ἐπικαιρότατος δὲ τόπος ὁ περὶ τὰ ὄμματά τε καὶ τὸ μέτωπον καὶ κεφαλὴν καὶ [814b5] πρόσωπον, δεύτερος δὲ ὁ περὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ ὤμους, ἔπειτα (τὰ) περὶ τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ πόδας, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν ἥκιστα. ὅλως δὲ εἰπεῖν οὗτοι οἱ τόποι ἐναργέστατα σημεῖα παρέχονται, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ φρονήσεως πλείστης ἐπιπρέπεια γίνεται.

A big, deep voice indicates insolence, as in the ass; a voice which, starting low, rises to a high pitch indicates despondency and querulousness, the argument being partly from cattle and partly from congruity. Shrill, soft, broken tones mark the speech of deviants; for [813^{b}1] such a voice is found in women and is congruous. A deep, hollow, simple voice is noble,[9] as in the stronger breeds of dogs, and also by the argument from congruity. A soft, languid voice means mildness, as in sheep; a shrill, shrieking voice, lewdness, as in goats.

Men of abnormally small stature are hasty, for the flow of their blood having but a small area to cover, its movements are too rapidly propagated to the organ of intelligence. Men of abnormally large stature, on the other hand, are slow, for the flow of the blood has to cover a large area, and its movements are therefore propagated to the organ of intelligence slowly. Small men with dry flesh, or of the hue that heat produces in the body, have not persistence enough to effect their purposes; for their blood flowing in a confined space, and at the same time, in consequence of the fiery condition of the body, flowing rapidly, their thought never keeps to a single topic, but is always passing to something new before being done with the old. Again, big men with moist flesh or of the hue that results from cold, also lack persistence; for their blood flowing over a large area, and slowly, on account of the cold condition of the body, its movement does not manage to reach the organ of intelligence entire. On the other hand, small men with moist flesh and of the hue that results from cold, do effect their purposes; for their blood moving in a confined area, the less mobile constituent in its composition produces a proportion which conduces to effectiveness. And again, big men with dry flesh, and of the hue that results from heat, are also persistent, and are keen of sense; for the warmth of flesh and complexion counteracts the excessive size, so that a proportion conducive to effectiveness is attained. So we have discussed how excess or deficiency in physical size make for effective or ineffective bodies. But someone whose nature falls in the mean between these points has the keenest senses and is most effective. For the blood does not have far to go in order to reach the mind; but nor does lack of space force it away from the mind again. This is why a moderate size makes for efficiency and the keenest senses.

An ill-proportioned body indicates a rogue [814^{a}1], the argument being partly from congruity and partly from the female sex. But if bad proportions mean villainy, a well-proportioned frame must be characteristic of upright men and brave; only, the standard of the right proportions must be sought in the good training and good breeding of the body, and not in the male type, as we said at the beginning.

It is advisable, in elucidating all the signs I have mentioned, to take into consideration both their congruity with various characters and the distinction of the sexes; for this is the most complete distinction, and, as was shown, the male is more upright and courageous and, in short, altogether better than the female. It will be found, moreover, in every [814^{b}1] selection of signs that some signs are better adapted than others to indicate the mental character behind them. The clearest indications are given by signs in certain particularly suitable parts of the body. The most suitable part of all is the region of the eyes and forehead, head and face; next to it comes the region of the chest and shoulders, and next again, that of the legs and feet; whilst the belly and neighbouring parts are of least service. In a word, the clearest signs are derived from those parts in which intelligence is most manifest.

[9] Foerster, drawing on Ad. B42, suggests filling the lacuna with γεννᾶιοι or μεγαλόνοι.

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

Ad. = Adamantius, *Physiognomy*
Anon. Lat. = Anonymus Latinus, *Physiognomy*
ANRW = *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*
Aristotle:
DA = *De anima*
GA = *De generatione animalium*
HA = *Historia animalium*
NE = *Nicomachean Ethics*
PA = *De partibus animalium*
CMG = Corpus Medicorum Graecorum
CPh = *Classical Philology*
CQ = *Classical Quarterly*
DL = Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*
EI = H. A. R. Gibb *et al.*, *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*^{2}, 12 vols. (Leiden, 1960–2004)
EK = L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd (eds.), *Posidonius*, i: *The Fragments*^{2} (Cambridge, 1989)
FHSG = W. W. Fortenbaugh, P. H. Huby, R. W. Sharples, and D. Gutas (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, 2 vols. (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1993)
Freytag = G. W. Freytag, *Lexicon Arabico-Latinum*, 4 vols. (Halle, 1830–7)
Galen:
QAM = *Powers of the Soul* (*Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur*)
PHP = *de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*
GALex = G. Endress and D. Gutas, *A Greek and Arabic Lexicon* (Leiden, 1992–)
GAS = F. Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums* (Leiden, 1967–)
Hippocrates: *AWP* = *Airs, Waters, Places*
IGR = R. Cagnat *et al.*, *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* (Paris, 1906–27)
IK = *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* (Bonn, 1972–)
JAOS = *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
Kazimirski = A. de Biberstein Kazimirski, *Dictionnaire arabe-français*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1860)
Lane = E. W. Lane, *An Arabic–English Lexicon* (London, 1863–93)
LGPN = P. M. Fraser *et al.*, *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* (Oxford, 1987–)
LIMC = *Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae*, 9 vols. (Zurich, 1981–97)
OLD = P. G. W. Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, 1968–82)
Payne Smith = R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus* (Oxford, 1879–1901)
PCPhS = *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*
Philostratus: *VS* = *Vitae sophistarum*

PIR[2] = *Prosopographia Imperii Romani* (2nd edn.)
QSA = *Quaderni di studi arabi*
RE = A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Berlin, 1893–1980)
RhM = *Rheinisches Museum*
SE = Sextus Empiricus
PH = *Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes*
SSR = G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, 4 vols. (Naples, 1990)
SVF = *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim, vols. i–iii (Stuttgart, 1903–24); vol. iv (indexes) by M. Adler
TAPhA = *Transactions of the American Philological Association*
TLG = *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* CD Rom # E (Irvine, Calif., 1999)
Wehr = H. Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*[4], ed. J. M. Cowan (Wiesbaden, 1979)

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Arisṭāṭālīs, *see* Ghersetti (1999*a*).
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[Avicenna], *De physiognomonia libellus*, see Pack (1974).
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